Question IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in theft

Deservedly one may cite here the saying: As many heads, so many opinions, which Diana reports p. 1. Tract. 17. resolut. 57. and Tract. de paupertate religiosa, resol. 36.

The first opinion is that of Navarro in Manuali, cap. 17.: one and a half regales is a notable quantity of money that constitutes mortal theft; or two, or at most two and a half. Thus also Tolet. l. 5. cap. 16. assigns two Iulii; for among the Italians the Iulius is the same as the Regalis among the Spaniards, as Fagundez says l. 7. cap. 1. num. 15.

The second opinion is that of Corduba in summa, quaest. 109. and Salonii 2. 2. tom. 1. quaest. 66. art. 6. controu. 1. who say absolutely that one silver coin is grave matter, that is, four or five regales stolen from the rich; but one or two from the poor.

Third, Bartholomaeus Medina prima secundae, quaest. 88. art. 8. with many others says that it is not mortal theft unless it rises to the sum of two silver coins.

Fourth, Gregorius de Valentia Tom. 3. disp. 6. quaest. 19. punct. 16. Rebellius p. 1. l. 3. quaest. 15. sect. 2. num. 22. assert that it is absolutely lethal to steal three silver coins.

Fifth, Vega in summa tract. 1. cap. 129. casu 12. teaches that four or five regales constitute notable matter of theft.

Sixth, Molina de Iust. t. 3. disp. 685. says that as much value as the money given in one day to a digger of earth is seen to be mortal in regard to those who are not very rich.

Seventh, Bartholomaeus a S. Fausto in speculo disp. 2. quaest. 18. num. 26. and Sayrus l. 9. cap. 15. define the sum of three Iulii as grave even if taken from a most wealthy man; but two Iulii from one of moderate means; and finally, one silver coin or one Iulius taken from a poor man constitutes grave matter. Thus also Sanctes noster in cap. 6. Regulae, lays upon us poor wretches one single Iulius.

Eighth, Bonacina de contract. disp. 2. quaest. 8. p. 1. num. 7. distinguishes, saying that theft is grave according to the variety of persons from whom the thing is taken. For if the person is illustrious, opulent, splendid, a gold coin will be grave matter; but if he is an ordinary rich man, living on his revenues, four regales; if the person supports himself by a craft, two regales; fourth, ¶ if he is poor, one regale.

This opinion, which Nauarrus de restit. l. 3. cap. 1. num. 39. and Reginaldus in praxi, T. 2. l. 22. cap. 1. quaest. 4. num. 19. also hold, Diana says is more probable than the others, saying that a notable quantity, with respect to the rich, is about one gold coin, or sixty asses; but with respect to common persons, about 20 asses; and with respect to a poor man, about 7 asses.

The ninth opinion is that of Rodriquez in summa t. 5. cap. 118. num. 27. and 29.: that is a notable quantity which exceeds two gold coins; and Angel. v. Furtum, num. 34. and Syluester on the same word, quaest. 2. hold this opinion with regard to the wealthy. But whether Sotus l. 5. de iust. quaest. 3. art. 3. ad 3. teaches this opinion, Vasquez opusc. de restit. cap. 5. §. 1. dub. 5. num. 30. denies; but Turrianus, Bartholomaeus a S. Fausto supra, and Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. causa 10. Lessius, ubi infra, assert it, and the Doctors generally; and concerning this whole question see Megalam 2. 2. l. 2. cap. 1. quaest. 3. Rebellium de oblig. iust. p. 1. l. 3. quaest. 15. sect 1. Graffium p. 1. l. 2. decif. cap. 97. n. 27. Bannem 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. who posits a quite lax opinion. Malderum 2. 2. tract. 4. cap. 1. disp. 3. Lessium l. 2. cap. 12. dub. 6. num. 29. Azorium p. 3. l. 5. cap. 15. quaest. 2. Medinam C. de restit. quaest. 10. Tolet. summa, l. 5. cap. 16. Tutrianum l. 2. T. 2. disp. 33. dub. 2. Sanchez Tom. 2. l. 7. cap. 20. Cenedum de pauperie et relig. dub. 13. Conradum in resp. p. 1. cap. 166. Sayrum l. 9. cap. 15. qui num. 11. reports the opinion of Bannis 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. who says: if some steward of the King were to steal 200 gold coins, it would not be grave matter.

Stephanus Fagundez num. cit. says that this matter is better left to the judgment of the prudent, considering persons less or more wealthy, and places, etc. Thus also Couar. l. 1. variar. cap. 3. num. 11. Syluest. verb. Furtum, quaest. 2. Ioan. Medina de contract. quaest. 10. Caspensis tract. 18. disp. 5. sect. 4. Indeed Sanchez 1. 2. decal. l. 7. cap. 20. num. 5. asserts that generally in Spain, because the region is richer, four silver coins are the mortal quantity. The same is the judgment of Suarez Tom. 3. de Relig. l. 8. cap. 6. num. 10. To such a judgment Bassaeus v. Furtum 1. num. 4. subscribes.

Fagundez therefore asserts, first, with respect to Kings, Princes, and most wealthy Prelates, and most rich men, that the sum of two or three ducats is mortal from its object. He alleges, Rodriquez in summa, cap. 149. Sotum, Rebellium, Lessium, Couarruviam, Syluestrum supra, Petrum Nauarrum l. 3. de restit. cap. 1. num. 35. Suarium vero loc. cit. et Maiorem 4. dist. 15. quaest. 25. who, he says, probably assign with respect to these persons the quantity of one gold coin.

He asserts, second, that with respect to men of moderate wealth four silver coins constitute the mortal quantity, or at most, with a half added. Thus also Sanchez 1. 2. Decal. l. 7. cap. 20. num. 5. Suarez loco citato.

He asserts, third, that with respect to the poor the quantity of one hundred dipondii, or at most with 20 added, is deadly. He adduces Rodriquez, and Aragonium, ac Nauarrum.

Finally he says: If we attend to places and cities more or less wealthy in money, and where things are sold more cheaply or more dearly, it is probable that in Lisbon, Seville, Paris, Venice, London, Lyons, Rome, and other places very rich in money and opulent, the quantity of four or five regales, or denarii, is mortal in theft, even with respect to men of moderate wealth. But in Brazil, or in the West Indies, where money abounds and things are sold at a high price, the quantity of 15 Iulii will be mortal, against Lopes p. 1. cap. 92. who says that the sum of two regales in India is deadly.

But if four or five quadrantes are deducted from the prescribed quantity, he concludes that it is still mortal, because things that differ but little seem not to differ at all. Moreover these quantities are not to be taken Mathematically, but morally, as Lessius l. 2. cap. 11. disp. 6. num. 32. well teaches.

In D. Bonav. I do not find any quantity prefixed; only in speculo animae, cap. 2. he says: Yet it must be noted that a thing might be so small, or of so little value, that it would not have the character of mortal, unless perhaps there were a will to take more, if the opportunity were present, or in that small thing there were notable damage to another; for a poor man is at any time damaged more in a small thing than a rich man in a great one. Thus also other ancient Theologians remit the whole business to the judgment of the prudent, as Sayrus l. 9. cap. 15. num. 9. notes, establishing nothing special.

They think, therefore, that grave matter must be judged according to the gravity of the damage. Hence it agrees with the last opinion, that according to the variety of persons, places, etc. the gravity of the thing taken must be computed. He warns, however, that a thing light in its genus can become grave from the damage. They bring the example: if you take from someone an instrument of his craft by which he earns notably, even if it be a needle, and he has no other like it. They agree with Suarez loc. cit. num. 16. Tolet. l. 5. cap. 6. Petrus Nauar. l. 3. de restit. cap. 1. num. 33. Lessius l. 2. cap. 12. dub. 12. num. 33. Nauar. Summa, cap. 17. num. 3. Sanchez T. 2. l. 7. cap. 20. Fagundez l. 7. cap. 2. num. 2. The reason is, because grave damage is against justice gravely, and obliges to restitution, C. si culpa tua, de iniuriis, et damno datis. Thus also Tannet. disp. 4. quaest 8. dub. 6. reporting Aragonium, Bannem quaest. 66. art. 2. Bartholomeum Medinam quaest. 86. art. 2. Valentiam quaest. 10. p. 5. Rebellium l. 3. de iust. quaest. 15. sect. 2. and 3. Azor. t. 3. l. 5. cap. 13. quaestio 1. Lessium lib. 2. cap. 12. dub. 6.

MANY say that the same follows if someone steals a small thing on account of which you know the Lord in his anger will break out in grave blows against another. Fagundez reports them, num. 5.

HERE arises the doubt, whether to steal in a Church a thing that is not sacred is sacrilege, by reason of the circumstance of the Sacred place and the injury inflicted upon it.

The SENTENCE formerly common was that, absolutely, theft by reason of the circumstance of the Sacred place becomes sacrilege, and most of the Recentiores also hold it, as Fagundez reports l. 7. cap. 2. and Diana p. 1. tract. de circumstantiis aggravantibus, resol. 27. Paulus Layman defends it l. 4. tract. 10. cap. 7. num. 18, Suarez de Relig. Tom. 1. l. 3. cap. 4. num. 7. where he says it is the common sentence.

It is PROVED from the words of Pope John in cap. Quisquis, dist. 17. quaest. 4.: Sacrilege is committed by taking a sacred thing from a sacred place; or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place; or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place. Therefore, since the Law does not distinguish whether that non-sacred thing is in custody, or deposit, or the possession of the Church, it does not seem it should be distinguished, as many distinguish; for thus the rule of the Law is had, de pretio, ff. de publican. unless another law or reason compels. There follow Raphaël de la Torre t. 2. t. 2. quaest. 99. art. 1. disp. 7. Rebellius p. 1. l. 3. quaest. 15. num. 25. with Reginaldus T. 2. l. 23. cap. 1. num. 12. Menoch. de arbitrar. l. 2. cent. 4. casu 389. num. 14. and Petrus Ledesma Summ. Tract. de poenit. cap. 10. This is the sentence of D. Bonau. in 3. dist. 37. dub. 7. litterali.

COMMONLY, however, they distinguish, as was intimated above, and say: if that thing is in deposit, or in the church, or the like, it is sacrilege; but not otherwise, if it is the purse of the one who is in the Church. Thus Sotus in 4. dist. 18. quaest. 2. art. 4. Ioan. de Cruz p. 2. direct. de Sacramento Poenit. quaest. 3. disp. 6. Fagundez lib. 7. in septimum praeceptum decal. cap. 2. num. 10. Henriquez l. 2. cap. 6. num. 5. and Diana judges it probable, and Raphaël de la Torre, and Lessius lib. 2. cap. 45. dub. 3. num. 14. Zerola praxi de poenit. cap. 12. quaest. 17. The same is defended by Cano 5. p. relectionis, §. Multa hic, Caietanus tomo 1. opusc. 31. resp. 12. dub. 2. Lopez Instruct. p. 1. cap. 31. §. At vero.

I indeed follow the sentence of D. Bonaventura, who posits three species of sacrilege. The first is to steal a sacred thing, e.g. a consecrated Chalice from a sacred place. The second, a sacred thing from a non-sacred place, as a consecrated chalice from the house of a craftsman. The third, a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, e.g. a purse in the Church; thus, besides those alleged, Sà distinguishes, v. Sacrilegium, Sylvest. there, §. 2. Rosella in the same place, Nauar. Manual. Lat. cap. 6. num. 4. and cap. 17. num. 95.

FOR we have from Canon Law the declaration of Pope John, nor ought we to stand on the civil law, which, that an action of sacrilege be given against the thief, requires that the thing be made and taken away from the sacred place, as Iulius Clarus reports l. 5. sent. §. Sacrilegium.

Nor does Fagundez, who cites that Canon, answer anything, except that the Canon intimates our sentence: but he plainly asserts it, as we saw, and Diana confesses it, who does not answer him a word in his own defense.

They OBJECT that it is per accidens that the thing exists in the Church.

D. Bonaventure ANSWERS that that place, even if physically it adds only an accident, morally nevertheless adds a species. For it is great irreverence of the place, and that thing is entrusted in faith to the Church; while those who are intent on religion ought therefore to have in safety what they have in it; and to steal is to wound the consecrated place; just as to commit other shameful things in the temple is to profane it itself.