Indifferent acts

93. Declarations. 1. It is not asked whether human acts are morally indifferent: for it is clear that human acts which are done without advertence to the moral order are neither good nor evil (n. 55). But the question is instituted concerning moral acts: namely, whether acts which are done with advertence to the moral norm are all either good or evil, or whether moral actions must be admitted which are indifferent.

2. This question concerns moral acts considered concretely and in the individual, namely as they are exercised by an individual person operating here and now, and therefore together with the end of the one operating and with the remaining adjuncts accompanying the action in the concrete, for example to sing in church in order to praise God. For if moral acts are considered abstractly and according to species, that is, only according to their object, for example to sing, with abstraction made from the end of the one operating and from the remaining circumstances, it is certain that moral actions can be indifferent, because per se they have neither conformity nor difformity with the norm of morality.

It is clear that an act considered according to species does not exist except in the abstraction of the mind: for as often as an act is performed, it is performed in certain circumstances and unto some end which the agent proposes to himself.

3. Now concerning moral acts considered concretely and in the individual, there is not one opinion of philosophers and theologians. For the Scotists, affirming with St. Bonaventure,¹ and the Thomists with St. Thomas,² and the greater part of other theologians, denying, are opposed concerning whether any moral act considered in the individual can be indifferent. Nevertheless, they affirm this only of truly moral acts, which are done deliberately and with advertence to the moral order. For it cannot be denied that acts which are done without advertence either to the act itself or to the morality of the act are indifferent even considered in the individual.

These things, however, hold concerning the natural order and the natural goodness of actions. For indifferent actions are sometimes also called supernatural actions which are not meritorious and yet are not sins, that is, actions which are neither meritorious nor demeritorious. It is readily conceded that there are indifferent supernatural actions, of which kind are works both of sinners and of unbelievers which are done from grace, but especially works by which they dispose themselves for justification. Whether such actions must also be admitted in the just, who are in the state of sanctifying grace, depends upon the conditions which are required for a meritorious act.

¹ In II Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3.

² Summa I-II, q. 18, a. 9.

94. There are no indifferent moral acts. For the one operating either intends an honorable end or does not intend one. If the first, the action is morally good. If the other, the one operating either apprehends the action to be exact according to the norm of reason, or apprehends it as opposing the norm of reason. There is no middle in him who adverts to the morality of the action. If the first, the action is good; if the other, the action is evil (n. 87).

1. Many Thomists reason in this way: any action which is exercised deliberately is ordered by the one operating to some determinate end, because man acting deliberately always acts from some end. Now this end is either an honorable end or it is not. If the first, the action will be good; if the other, the action will be evil. For as often as man acts deliberately, he must act according to the dignity of rational nature. But he acts according to the dignity of rational nature only if he acts for an honorable end; therefore in the concrete there is no morally indifferent action.

This argument supposes that actions must be positively directed to an honorable end in order that they be good. Therefore, if it is taken strictly, as the words sound, those actions indifferent from the object which are done from an indifferent end or on account of sensible delight, but are nevertheless ordered according to the mode prescribed by reason, would have to be called morally evil.

2. The reason of the Scotists, by which they fortify the contrary affirmative opinion, is this: in order that man act fittingly to rational nature, it is not necessary that always and in all things he tend toward a positively honorable end. Therefore if an action is ordered to some advantage of nature or is exercised for relieving a need of nature, it will not be good, because it does not tend toward an honorable end; nor will it be evil, because on the one hand it is not unfitting to rational nature, and on the other it is not necessary that every action be referred to an honorable end. Therefore it will be indifferent.

This argument also supposes the same theory, namely that actions must be positively directed to an honorable end in order that they be good. Nevertheless it affirms that those actions which are done on account of an indifferent end, whether their object is good or indifferent, but nevertheless ordered according to the prescription of reason, are morally indifferent.

95. Things to be noted concerning this question. 1. From the premises it is clear that the whole controversy concerning indifferent acts depends upon two heads of doctrine: a. whether an obligation can be demonstrated of always and in all deliberate actions intending a positively good end; for if this obligation exists, actions placed on account of an indifferent end become evil because of this neglected obligation. b. But if this obligation is not established, it is further asked whether those actions which are exercised on account of an indifferent end, but nevertheless according to the prescription of reason, must be called good or indifferent.

2. Whatever is said, certainly those theologians are not to be tolerated who on the one hand deny acts indifferent in the individual, but on the other hand absolutely require for the moral goodness of an act that an honorable end be positively intended. For the rigor of this doctrine is too greatly opposed to the mind and practice of the faithful, who are not persuaded that in absolutely all actions a positively honorable end must be sought lest they be evil. Therefore no one, whether uneducated or learned, whether of lax or timorous conscience, recognizes a moral defect in the omission of this good intention, and therefore no one ever accuses himself of it. And indeed it cannot be understood why, for example, an action is evil by which someone tries to drive away the sensation of cold only to relieve this annoyance without a higher end. Therefore it will be either good or at least indifferent; the Scotists call it indifferent, but according to the theory expounded it must be called morally good, if the agent judges it licit in the concrete and explicitly intends it as such.

There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether, besides the division into good and bad actions, we must also admit a third class, neither good nor bad, but indifferent. In the abstract, indifferent actions certainly exist; to take a walk, for example, in itself and in the abstract, is neither a good nor a bad action. But in the concrete, a man’s intention, and the circumstances in which the action is performed, necessarily give it a moral quality. The intention must be honest or not, the circumstances must be such as to make the action conformableto right reason or not, and so in the concrete any particular action must be either right or wrong; it must be either good or bad, it cannot be indifferent. An action may of course be morally good, and yet not supernaturally meritorious, and so indifferent from a supernatural point of view; and this perhaps is the meaning of some of those divines who contradict the above teaching of St Thomas and the common opinion of the schools.¹

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 9.

The discussion is of human or deliberated acts alone. Now:

I. There are acts indifferent according to species. For an act considered in species or in the abstract is understood as an act viewed according to its object. "But it happens that the object of the act does not include anything pertaining to the order of reason, i.e., it does not include anything which agrees with reason nor anything which is repugnant to reason, as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, and things of this sort" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIII).

II. There are not, at least in themselves, acts indifferent in the individual, i.e., in the concrete, or with the circumstances also considered, especially the end of the one acting. This is established against the Scotists, who think that acts which by their nature are ordered to pleasure alone, such as smelling flowers, etc., are indifferent if they are exercised proximately for the end of the work alone, i.e., for pleasure alone. But rightly this is denied; for one who acts deliberately necessarily acts for some end, and indeed either for an honorable good or for a pleasurable good (n. 1). But an act ordered to an honorable good is morally good; one ordered to a pleasurable good alone is morally evil (n. 243; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 9; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

But it is more disputed whether by accident there is an indifferent act in the individual, namely: 1. if someone in no way attends to the morality of the act; 2. if, adhering to the opinion of the Scotists, he acts for pleasure alone. Now:

I respond to I that a deliberated act without any advertence to the morality of the act is admitted only with difficulty.

I respond to II that it seems improbable; since in the stated hypothesis the agent holds the act as licit. But what is held as licit or permitted by God, as such is held as honorable, and therefore the agent, although unconscious of it, acts honorably.¹

¹ Billuart, De act. hum., diss. 4, art. 7.

Indifferent Acts.—An act is entirely indifferent if all the elements in it—its object, circumstances and purpose—are neither harmonious nor discordant with the standards of morality. Such an act would be walking home rapidly in order to eat a meal, if besides these factors, which bear no relation to good morals, there was nothing else in the act that did bear such a relation.

As to the actual existence of a human or voluntary act that is morally indifferent, we conclude: (a) Considered in the abstract and universally, some human acts are morally indifferent; for if acts be considered with reference to their objects alone and apart from the circumstances that accompany them, and as they are classified in the mind, it is clear that many of them have no determinate relations to moral norms—e.g., reading, writing, walking, etc. (one can read either good or bad literature); (b) considered in the concrete, and as they happen in individual cases, no human acts are morally indifferent, since the purpose of the agent is either according to right reason or against it, so that, in spite of the indifferent object, the act becomes either good or bad by reason of the presence or absence of the good purpose.

Considered even in the concrete and in individual cases, all acts that are not human, but indeliberate or involuntary (see 23 sqq.), are morally indifferent—or, more correctly, unmoral, as being outside the genus of moral acts on account of the absence in them of will, which is the prerequisite of morality. Thus, absent-minded acts are neither good nor bad morally.

As to the kind of intention required to make an indifferent act morally good, or which should be had when the act is objectively good, we conclude: (a) The good intended must not be solely a sensible good (i.e., the pleasure that the act gives), but also and chiefly a rational good (i.e., its conformity to moral standards), since man, unlike the animals, was made, not for sensible, but for rational good. Hence, to eat deliberately with no other end than that of gratifying the palate, is to eat without a moral purpose worthy of a human being, and is a bad act.

(b) The moral good of virtue which is intended in acts must not be regarded as the supreme good, but should be referred to God, since He alone is the Last End (see 20). Hence, to eat and drink with moderation solely because that is reasonable and suitable to human nature, if one excludes the Last End, is to slight the necessary purpose and is morally bad. (c) The intention of moral good or virtue in human acts need not be actual or reflex. Thus, a person who has a previously formed intention of living reasonably, or who at the time of eating intends to eat moderately for the sake of health, sufficiently intends a moral end. Likewise, it is not necessary that the reference of an act to the Last End be made actually or explicitly. Hence, every person in the friendship of God, in all his deliberate acts that are not evil, has a sufficient reference of them to God contained in the fact that he has chosen God for his Last End, or in that here and now he intends some motive that becomes a rational being.

An actual and explicit intention of the moral goodness of an act, and an actual and explicit reference of the act to the Last End, though not necessary, increase the moral value of what is done.

2. Here the question is raised whether there are indifferent human acts, i.e. acts which are neither morally good nor morally evil, neither honorable nor base. — If human acts are considered in the abstract, or according to their species, which they intrinsically have from their proper object, with precision made from the end and from determining circumstances, then indeed there are indifferent acts, namely those which from their species are neither evil nor good, just as man according to himself, or according to his species, is neither virtuous nor vicious. And the reason is that every object has some goodness or malice, at least natural; nevertheless it does not always import moral goodness or malice, which is considered by comparison to reason, namely to the order of reason. For not every object of a human act includes something pertaining to this order of reason: indeed not all actions are of themselves necessarily connected with the ultimate end, nor are all commanded by law or prohibited by law, but many are merely permitted, such as to walk, to go into the field, to lift a straw from the ground, and things of this sort. Therefore such acts according to their species are indifferent. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8. — But if human acts are considered in the individual, or concretely, namely according as they are determined both by particular circumstances and by the end, the Scotists affirm that there are indifferent acts in the individual. The reason is that no certain law commands that they be directed to the ultimate end of human life, namely God, nor that one always act from a higher motive of honorableness and virtue; but, human frailty and infirmity being considered, God Himself permits man to act from this very infirmity and frailty on account of the necessity and advantage of nature itself, as, for example, sometimes to eat more abundantly, to hold banquets, to be refreshed by the sight of the sky, a field, etc. Therefore these and other similar actions can be exercised from a merely indifferent end. The Thomists, on the contrary, deny that indifferent acts are given in the individual, and more truly. And this indeed is the opinion of the Angelic Doctor. The reason is that either someone does a thing necessary, useful, fitting to rational nature, namely to soul, to body, to exterior things themselves, which are ordered to both; or he does something wholly useless and idle. If the first, this action tends to an end naturally good, and it is good. If the second, he does a thing unfitting to rational nature, as being at least superfluous; for reason dictates that beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, or utility, or some fittingness. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 9, paragraph Sed contra; 2 D. 40. q. 1. a. 5. Moreover, since this is proper to reason, to direct and order human acts which are done from deliberation to a due end, either a human act is in reality ordered to the due end, and has the character of good, or it is not ordered to the due end, and then by this very fact it is repugnant to right reason and has the character of evil. St. Thomas, q. 18. a. 9; Suarez, D. 9, S. 3. And from the reason adduced it is luminously clear that those indifferent acts of the Scotists are not truly such, but are morally honorable; for if they are done on account of necessity, utility, or fittingness, they are according to the order of reason and consequently morally honorable. Nor indeed is it necessary to intend another extrinsic honorable end, besides the end intrinsic to acts of this sort, in order that one act honorably. For indeed sometimes to eat more abundantly, to hold banquets, and to be refreshed in mind and body are acts according to reason, if these are contained within due limits. Therefore these acts are truly done from a motive of honorableness and virtue, although they are done from natural frailty, necessity, utility, or fittingness, since honorableness and virtue consist in this, that the rectitude of reason be observed. Moreover they are also ordered to God, at least implicitly, although not explicitly, as we shall soon explain more, since, by the very fact that they are according to reason and good, they are referred by their nature to God. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 9 ad 3; q. 39. a. 2; 2. 2. q. 23. a. 3; q. 141. a. 6 ad 2; q. 145. a. 1, 2, 3; q. 168. a. 3 ad 3; S. q. 49. a. 2 ad 6; q. 169. a. 1 ad 1; 2 D. 39. q. 3. a. 3 ad 6; D. 40. q. 1. a. 5; 4 D. 16. q. 2. a. 2 q. 1; C. G. l. 2, c. 29; de Caritate q. un. a. 7 ad 13 and ad 14; Suarez, D. 4, S. 1, n. 12.

24. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether acts properly indifferent, or lacking morality, are given, either in species or in the individual?

I answer 1. It is certain that indifferent acts in species are given, or acts which in their species are without morality. For there are acts which, considered in themselves, abstracting from end and circumstances, have no agreement or repugnance with law or right reason, and therefore are to be reckoned neither good nor evil. Thus to walk, to write, and innumerable similar things are acts indifferent per se.

I answer 2. But there is controversy regarding acts in the individual, or considered in the agent.

The first opinion, more common and more probable, denies this with St. Thomas. The reason is that man, acting deliberately, necessarily proposes some end to himself; for he ought to act as man. Moreover, the end which he proposes to himself is necessarily good or evil, or conformable to reason, or not conformable: therefore in no case will there be given an act properly indifferent in the individual ⁴.

⁴ ** Compare St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, art. 9. St. Alphonsus (book 5, On Human Acts, no. XLIV) added also this argument to the arguments of St. Thomas: Besides these things, man is held to refer all his acts to God when he acts with deliberation and for some end. For the Apostle says, 1 Cor. 10: Whether you eat, or drink, or do anything else, do all things unto the glory of God. If therefore he refers it to God at least by a virtual intention, the act will be good; if he does not refer it, it will be evil; therefore no act is indifferent.

This argument indeed the holy Doctor took almost to the letter from Collet (On Human Acts, ch. 6, sect. 2, conclusion 1), to whom (he says) I send the one who studiously seeks this question treated more at length....

But indeed it must not be dissembled that this is pressed by very grave difficulties, nor are there lacking rocks which scarcely or not even scarcely can be avoided. And in reality Collet himself observes that both John Hus, and Luther, and Baius, and Jansenius, and Quesnel took arms from here for the defense of their errors; to whom must be added those pseudo-theologians of Louvain, Laurentius Neessen, Macarius Havermans, Ioannes Sinnichius, Gerardus Van Werm, Gregorius Van Goorlaechem, etc., as may be seen in Cardinal Aguirre (Theology of St. Anselm, disp. 130): and to decline these rocks Collet had to flee to the absurdities which you may see below (note to § 32, question 1).

Moreover, that the matter may be clear, not many words are needed. For, according to this doctrine, lest an act be evil, and therefore sin, a relation to God, at least virtual, is necessary. Moreover, that is called virtual which remains by virtue of a previously had actual relation, and has not been revoked (as Collet rightly says in the cited place) through a contrary act, namely sin; the same thing is repeated also by Cardinal Gotti, alleged by VV. (page 130). Therefore, as often as either no actual relation has preceded, or one previously had has already been retracted through a contrary act, all consequent acts will lack the necessary virtual relation, and thus will be evil. And since referring acts to God, or to the glory of God, pertains to the theological virtue of charity, as is evidently shown below, and the actual relation of works to God is nothing else, as St. Thomas has it (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 6), than that the habit of charity go forth into act, it manifestly follows that he who either has never elicited an act of charity, or has lost the habit of charity through sin, sins in every deliberate work. Therefore we have revived the condemned doctrine that both unbelievers and sinners always sin in every work of theirs.

Nor indeed can these consequences be ascribed to the doctrine of St. Thomas. For he certainly teaches that it falls under the precept of charity that all things be referred to God; but at the same time he teaches that this precept does not always urge, but only when man is held to elicit an act of charity; otherwise he nowhere says that a relation of this kind is so necessary for the moral goodness of acts that, if this is lacking, they are deprived of every moral goodness and thus, as the opinion of the Jansenists and of Collet has it, become evil. And these things indeed will appear better below, where the discussion of this relation of works to God will return.

Moreover, if any others, to prove that no act in the individual is indifferent, invoked the sentence of the Apostle, they argued from it only that any act ought to be referable to the ultimate end, and for this reason ought to be honest, and therefore ought to have an honest and reason-consonant proximate end. But, as is clear, what is said about an actual or virtual relation to the glory of God, in which the influence of a preceding actual relation perseveres, pertains nothing to this. Wherefore that argument of Collet cannot be drawn from here: either man refers the act to God at least virtually, and thus it will be good; or he does not refer it, and thus it will be evil. Indeed, rather, the relation of an act to God, as ultimate end, supposes the act already to be referable per se, and thus to exist as honest from the proximate end.

The second opinion affirms this with the Scotists. Their reason is that it is not clear that there is a law of intending a positively good end in all things, since such a law is unknown to many doctors. For does right reason dictate that a man acts badly when he posits an action permitted by God, and nevertheless does not refer it to a positively honest end ⁵? not however as to moral goodness. See 2, Dist. 28, art. 2, q. 3. Indeed Gabriel Vasquez also shows that Scotus must be understood thus. On I-II, disp. 217, ch. 1, no. 6.

⁵ Father Staidel attributes this opinion to St. Bonaventure in the Dissertation on Human Acts prefixed to volume I of Gabriel Antoine, no. 278. But in reality the holy Doctor at most affirms this concerning the indifference of acts as to the merit of eternal life,

Moreover, although each opinion, as far as appearance goes, is opposed, nevertheless it does not seem to differ so greatly. For according to all, a depraved end must always be excluded; otherwise an act, however indifferent in itself, would become evil. But an end is called good by Thomists which is held as indifferent by their adversaries. For the matter is of an end not supernatural, but naturally good or honest. Moreover he is led by a naturally honest end who acts on account of an end naturally intrinsic to the work, or on account of that to which the work by its own nature is ordered.

189. 1. State of the question. After the things said concerning the morality of an act directly or indirectly voluntary, it remains to be inquired whether there is given an act which is neither good nor evil, but indifferent with respect to morals. Concerning this there was keen dispute in the schools. - In order that we may separate certain things from uncertain ones, a few things must be noted beforehand:

(A) A human act can be considered in species, or in the abstract, or in the individual case, or in the concrete: it is considered in the former way when it is inspected in its object, the circumstances and the end of the one operating being set aside: thus to walk, to eat, to play, etc.; it is considered in the individual case when not only the object, but at the same time the circumstances and the end of the one operating are inspected: thus to eat moderately, in order to renew strength and to work better. Now all concede that there are given some acts indifferent in species, at least when the object is inspected in the abstract, without those marks which introduce objective morality, for example to walk, to play, without any other determination; hence St. Thomas says:¹ "But it happens that the object of the act does not include anything pertaining to the order of reason, such as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, and things of this kind; and such acts according to their species are indifferent."

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 8.

190. (B) Here there is question of mere natural honorableness; for, in the supernatural order, acts are given which are neither meritorious nor demeritorious or sinful: thus the works of unbelievers, or of those who are placed in mortal sin, are not truly meritorious, or do not merit an eternal reward, although they can be morally good (for example, alms given from a natural affection of mercy).

(C) Moreover there is question of deliberate acts, that is, acts done with knowledge and advertence; for all confess that there can be indeliberate acts indifferent even in the individual case: for these are not truly human, nor moral.

191. 2. The doctrine of St. Thomas. These things posited, St. Thomas (a) explicitly teaches that there are not given deliberate acts in the individual case which are naturally indifferent; for it is necessary that any individual act have some circumstance through which it is drawn to good or to evil, at least on the part of the intention. For an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason, to which it belongs to order rightly, and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not ordered to the due end.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9; cf. Quaest. disp., De malo, q. 2, a. 5.

(b) Yet he does not require, for the honorableness of the act, that this be explicitly referred to God, but only that the natural goodness which is conformable to right reason be intended. Now works indifferent of themselves are consonant with reason when they are done moderately, without any excess; for virtue stands in the mean;² wherefore he acts well who eats and drinks, the mode of temperance being observed, or who plays for recreation, the mode of eutrapelia being observed, which keeps the mean in games, or rests in order to repair the powers of the body.³ Wherefore idle words are reprehended only because they lack the reason of just necessity or pious utility: "For what is done on account of just necessity or on account of pious utility is done laudably and is a good act."⁴ Thus, for example, if there is question of play or conversation, the act will be morally good if these three things are observed: if delight is not sought in shameful or harmful operations or words; nor is the gravity of the soul totally relaxed, or, in other words, if one plays or converses moderately; if recreation agrees with the person, time, and place, and is duly ordered according to the other circumstances.¹

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 64, a. 1.

³ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 168, a. 2-4; in 2 Sentent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5^†.

⁴ St. Thomas, Quaest. disp., De malo, q. 2, a. 5.

¹ St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 168, a. 2.

(c) Works indifferent of themselves, when they are done deliberately by a just man (i.e. one who is in the state of grace), are not only morally good, but also meritorious of supernatural reward: "It sometimes happens that a man does not order some act to God, while nevertheless that act of itself does not contain any disordering by reason of which it is not referable to God, and because the mind of man is habitually related to God, that act is not only not a sin, but is also a meritorious act." For he who enjoys habitual grace, in a general mode orders his whole life to God, and therefore the act of a just man, which bears before itself nothing inordinate, by that very fact tends to God.²

² St. Thomas, Quaest. disp., De malo, q. 9, a. 2.

192. 3. Opinion of many Thomists. Yet many Thomists progress further, or perhaps declare the matter in a more explicit way, saying that an act is not good unless it is referred to God at least virtually and implicitly: virtually, that is, by force of an actual intention, at least general, previously had and still persevering; and implicitly, namely one which is contained in the general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason.³ This they prove from a double text of Scripture: (a) from the words of the Apostle:⁴ "Therefore whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God"; for there, they say, is included the precept of referring all acts to God, at least virtually and implicitly. (b) Besides, Christ Himself declared that an account must be rendered for every idle word;⁵ but a word is called idle, not because it has an evil end, but because it does not have a good and honorable end. (c) In reality, man acting deliberately cannot act except on account of delight or on account of an honorable end: if he acts on account of delight and rests in it, he acts inordinately, since the delightful ought to be subordinated as a means to some end; if on account of an honorable end, the action is good, as implicitly ordered to God.

³ Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 6.

⁴ I Cor., X, 31.

⁵ Matt., XII, 36.

193. 4. Opinion of the Scotists. But the Scotists, after St. Bonaventure,⁶ hold that indifferent acts in the individual case can be given, and therefore they try to blunt the force of the aforesaid arguments.

⁶ Scotus, in II lib. Sentent., dist. 40-41; St. Bonaventure, in l. II Sentent., dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 52; Arriaga, De act. hum., disp. 21; Henno, Theologia, Cologne Agrippina, 1718, De Act. hum., disp. III, q. 6.

(a) They understand the words of St. Paul brought above as concerning counsel, not however concerning precept; besides, they say, St. Paul here speaks of supernatural charity and of the supernatural relation of acts to God, not however of their natural honorableness.

(b) What Christ says concerning an idle word is to be understood not of a merely idle word, but of a lying and calumnious word, both from the context and according to the opinion of many Fathers;¹ therefore from this it is by no means inferred that there falls upon man the obligation of referring all acts and all words positively to God.

¹ Cornelius a Lapide reports these on this place.

(c) Nor is this obligation proved by reason. It is indeed true that man is rational, and therefore ought to do nothing against reason; but from this it by no means follows that the office falls upon him always of directing his actions to an honorable end; for since man is composed of soul and body, and his nature is spiritual and bodily, sometimes he can act on account of bodily good, or on account of delight, provided he does not seek an evil end.

194. 5. Conclusion. (A) With the Angelic Doctor we think that per se there are not given deliberate acts morally indifferent in the individual case; for the end which a man deliberately operating intends is either in some way subordinated to the ultimate end, or it is not; if it is subordinated in some way, mediately or immediately, implicitly or explicitly, the act is good; but if in no way, namely if someone rests ultimately in delight, the act is disordered, and consequently evil.²

² In this sense the doctrine of St. Thomas is embraced not only by Thomists, but by most other theologians, such as Suarez, De bonit. et malit., disp. IX, sect. 3; Costa Rossetti, op. cit., th. 26, p. 84-90; Meyer, op. cit., t. I, n. 193; Bouquillon, n. 377; Walsh, n. 674-688; Noldin, n. 74.

(B) Nevertheless we do not assent to those Thomists who hold that for a good act a positive relation of the act to God is required, even virtual and implicit; for we judge that acts indifferent of themselves, which do not lack the reason of just necessity or true utility, which otherwise do not recede from the mean through excess or defect, are morally good, according to the principles of the Angelic Doctor himself set forth above, even if they are not positively referred to a further honorable end; for acts of this kind, considered in the concrete, are conformable to reason, and consequently tend toward God as by their own weight.

But per accidens indifferent acts in the individual case can be given, namely if they are indeliberate, or are done without advertence to their morality.

31. 3. A good act, an evil act, an indifferent act, according as it is either conformed to right reason as the norm of morality, or deformed from it, or indifferent to right reason. For example, a good act is prayer to God, an evil act is a lie, an indifferent act is walking (considered objectively). Below (n. 129 sqq.) we shall prove that indifferent acts are not given except when taken in the abstract, but that in the concrete every act is either good or evil because of the end or the adjoining circumstances. A good or indifferent act is called a licit act insofar as it is prohibited by no law; but an evil act is the same as an illicit act.

127. Preliminary Note. 1. Here we speak of truly human acts, but not of first-first acts, which occur without deliberation. For it is certain that first-first acts of this kind have no morality at all, or are amoral.¹⁰⁶

2. Here we speak only of human acts in order to morality, but not in order to supernatural merit. For an act morally good is not by that very fact meritorious in the strict sense (or de condigno), since for merit properly so called habitual grace is required.¹⁰⁷

3. A human act can be considered in two ways: a) in abstracto according to species and on the part of the object only; just as also man can be considered according to species only, under which consideration he is a rational animal and nothing else. Thus, for example, in the abstract can be considered the acts of walking, painting, writing, etc., without relation to the circumstances of the act and the intention of the agent; - b) in concreto or in the individual, insofar as such a man in such circumstances with such an intention places the act; for example, Peter, wearied from labor, takes a walk in order to restore his strength.

¹⁰⁶ Sometimes first-first acts are also called morally indifferent, but then moral indifference is taken in a wholly negative sense. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point: "It is necessary that every act of man proceeding from deliberative reason, considered in the individual, be good or evil. But if it does not proceed from deliberative reason, but from a certain imagination (as when someone strokes his beard or moves his hand or foot), such an act is not, properly speaking, moral or human, since the act has this from reason; and thus it will be indifferent, as if existing outside the genus of moral acts" (S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 9).

¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless I cannot admit the opinion of P. Lehmkuhl (Theol. mor.¹¹ I, 106), saying: "I am altogether in that opinion: that there can be acts which are neither evil, nor in any way supernaturally good or meritorious." For since man has been elevated to the supernatural order, every truly human act merits or demerits something at least by congruity broadly so called (cf. below n. 137). Vermeersch agrees with us, Theol. mor. I, n. 142.

128. Principle 1. There are human acts indifferent from their species, that is, which, considered abstractly, are neither morally good nor morally evil. Thus the very common opinion, against a few Scotists.¹⁰⁸

The reason is that human acts considered abstractly take their morality from the moral object alone. But there are certain objects wholly indifferent morally, as the objects of walking, painting, eating, etc. Wherefore St. Thomas teaches: "If therefore we speak of a moral act according to its species, then not every moral act is good or evil, but some act is indifferent."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Scotus himself seems to have taught the very common opinion (in the place cited below).

¹⁰⁹ De malo q. 2, a. 5.

129. Principle 2. There neither is nor can be any act indifferent in the individual. Thus St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus,¹¹⁰ all Thomists, and almost all more recent authors, such as Müller,¹¹¹ Simar,¹¹² Bouquillon,¹¹³ Pruner,¹¹⁴ Noldin,¹¹⁵ Lehmkuhl,¹¹⁶ Frins.¹¹⁷ On the contrary, that human acts even in the individual and concrete sometimes remain indifferent, either from an erroneous conscience, or because they turn upon the mere convenience of nature or upon the nolition of a greater perfection, is taught by Scotus,¹¹⁸ St. Bonaventure,¹¹⁹ Vasquez,¹²⁰ Reuter,¹²¹ Viva,¹²² very many Scotists, and among moderns Walsh.¹²³

It is proved. St. Thomas¹²⁴ says pointedly: "It is necessary that every individual act have some circumstance by which it is drawn to good or to evil, at least on the part of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to a due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil; but if it is ordered to a due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the character of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not ordered to a due end. Hence it is necessary that every act of man proceeding from deliberative reason, considered in the individual, be good or evil." The same argument can also be proposed under this form: Whenever man acts deliberately, he is bound to act as man, that is, according to the dignity and exigency of rational nature, and insofar as he is distinguished from brutes. Therefore in every act he must seek an honorable end and one fitting to reason, not mere delectation, as brutes do. But if man in any act whatever intends such an honorable end, he acts well; otherwise he sins. Therefore there is not given an indifferent act in concrete. - Billuart¹²⁵ further brings forward the following argument, which nevertheless does not differ from the proofs adduced except according to form: "The end of a human act, in which the agent rests, is either God (whether actually or explicitly or implicitly intended) or a creature; for under these two ends all ends are contained. If the first, it is good; if the second, it is evil, because this is to use things to be enjoyed and to enjoy things to be used, in which the whole perversity of life is situated, as St. Augustine says somewhere."

From these arguments it clearly appears that this opinion concerning the impossibility of an indifferent act in concrete follows logically from the third principle of the preceding paragraph. Moreover it follows that those authors who deny this third principle proceed illogically if nevertheless they teach that no human act is indifferent in concrete.

¹¹⁰ Theol. mor. l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 44.

¹¹¹ Theol. mor. I, § 97.

¹¹² Moraltheologie § 56.

¹¹³ Theol. mor. fund. n. 377.

¹¹⁴ Lehrbuch der kath. Moraltheologie n. 66.

¹¹⁵ Princ. Theol. mor. l. 7, n. 92 sqq.

¹¹⁶ Theol. mor. I¹¹, 106.

¹¹⁷ De act. hum. II, n. 498 sqq.

¹¹⁸ 2, dist. 41, quaest. unic., Corollaria.

¹¹⁹ 2, dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3. Note also in the Quaracchi edition the Scholion in this place.

¹²⁰ I-II, disp. 52, c. 3, 4.

¹²¹ Theol. mor. pars I, tract. 1, n. 55.

¹²² Curs. theol. II, disp. 7, q. 3.

¹²³ De act. hum. n. 558.

¹²⁴ S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 9; cf. also 2 dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

¹²⁵ De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 5.

130. Objections. There is no time to solve all the objections brought by the Scotists against the Thomistic opinion. See Billuart, l. c. It is useful to solve one and another rather specious objection. Someone can judge the opinion of Scotus more probable and be invincibly ignorant that he ought to set before each action an honorable end and at least an implicit relation to God. If such a man does a work indifferent from the object and because of an indifferent end, his act will not be good, because from the object and end it is indifferent; nor yet is it evil, because he is excused by reason of invincible ignorance. Therefore this act in concrete is indifferent. - I answer: Certain authors¹²⁶ think that in this case there can truly exist an indifferent act even in concrete, but that this is by accident and from invincible ignorance; and therefore that the opinion of St. Thomas is to be understood per se and from the nature of the thing. But it seems better to deny the possibility of invincible ignorance concerning the obligation of setting before one's actions an honorable end and at least an implicit relation to God. The reason is that no one possessing reason can be invincibly ignorant that he is bound to act as a man, that is, according to reason. For thus synderesis dictates, which flourishes in any man whatever who possesses reason.¹²⁷

Elbel-Bierbaum objects:¹²⁸ "The probability of this [Scotistic] opinion can be most clearly urged even from this: because if on a weekday, on which I am not obliged, I voluntarily do not wish to hear Mass, such a nolition is a human act; but it is not evil, as being contrary to no law, nor also positively good, because it is not conformed to a law, except one permitting; therefore it is not good, especially if I do not intend positive goodness, just as I can licitly not intend it; therefore it is and remains indifferent in the individual." - That objection is easily solved. This nolition indeed is a human act, but nevertheless it is not indifferent. For if such nolition is caused by weariness of labor, by an itching desire of exercising liberty, or by other similar causes, it is an evil act; but if it is caused by a sufficient reason, for example, on account of care for health, of avoiding too much labor, or on account of some other rational motive, such nolition is a morally good act.

¹²⁶ In Frins (De act. hum. II, 519) are cited Suarez, Valentia, Marinus, Salmanticenses, Mayr.

¹²⁷ Cf. Billuart, l. c. a. 6, obj. 4.

¹²⁸ Theol. mor. per modum conferentiarum I, conf. 5, n. 86.

131. Scholion. On the influence of the proposed doctrine in asceticism. The Thomistic doctrine concerning the good or evil morality of each of our deliberate actions is very consoling for men of good will. For a man who habitually follows the guidance of reason and not of pleasure acts well even in the least deliberate actions; indeed, if he is in the state of sanctifying grace, by those same least actions he merits from day to day an increase of grace and glory.

Yet this same doctrine also excludes the so-called "imperfections," which according to some authors are acts neither good nor evil (or sins). Under the name of such imperfection modern ascetical writers are accustomed to understand chiefly the voluntary omission, not approved by reason, of a good work which is of mere counsel; for example, without any sufficient reason at all, not to wish to assist at Mass on weekdays. If truly no indifferent act exists in the individual - as has been proved - it follows that such an omission made without any sufficient reason at all is an evil act or venial sin. Therefore per se such an omission would be sufficient matter of confession; but since in practice it can rather difficultly be perceived that it truly was made without any sufficient reason at all, modern authors commonly teach that so-called "imperfections" are not sufficient matter of sacramental absolution (cf. below III, n. 324). Such an omission made from a sufficient reason is a good act, although perhaps it is better to perform the work and, in the case, to hear Mass. For ordinarily it is better to perform a work of counsel than to omit it. Thus, for example, as St. Paul testifies, 1 Cor. 7:25: "He who joins his virgin in marriage does well, and he who does not join her does better."

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 1 and 8.

114. Morality is the attribution of human acts according to which they are called good or evil, that is, fitting or unfitting. Good and evil are attended to in a special way in human acts. For good and evil are said by comparison to the end; therefore where there is specially the notion of end, there there is specially the notion of good. But it belongs to man in a special way to act for the sake of an end, insofar as he freely determines the end for himself. Therefore in the human act, besides the metaphysical goodness of the act, common to all beings insofar as they are, there is given another goodness which consists in this, that man rightly determine an end for himself. And this is moral good, to which moral evil is opposed.

1. Cf. St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, ad 2.

115. Morality is a condition of every human act and is customarily defined: the conformity or difformity of a human act with its rule, right reason.

It is proved: good is that which is fitting to a being by comparison to the end, and evil is that which is unfitting; hence good in a human act is that which is fitting to a human act by comparison to the end. That which is fitting to a human act is fitting to the acting man insofar as he is man. That which is fitting to the acting man insofar as he is man is fitting to reason, which is the first principle of human acts and to which it belongs fittingly to order toward the end. Therefore good in a human act is that which is fitting to reason, or which is according to right reason, by comparison to the end; and evil is that which is not fitting to reason, or which is against right reason.

Right reason, however, is nothing other than a participation in the eternal law of God, whose foundation is the absolutely ultimate end. Hence a threefold rule can be distinguished, as it were: the ultimate end, the eternal law, and right reason.

Whence St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 2, a. 4: "Good and evil in acts must be taken according to that which is proper to man insofar as he is man. But this is reason. Hence good and evil in a human act are considered according as the act agrees with reason informed by divine law, either naturally, or through teaching, or through infusion."

116. The Essence of Morality.

Morality does not consist:

a) In the free act or in its freedom, which is attributed to Scotus: for this is a mere aptitude for morality, namely, the matter or foundation and condition of morality, which adds something to this; whence there can be manifold morality in the same act, but only one freedom. Moreover, freedom pertains to the physical being of the act, for even if morality did not exist, the free act would remain.

b) Nor in imputability, as Pufendorf holds: for this is a consequence of morality, since in order that an act be imputed to praise or fault, it is supposed to have been good or evil.

c) Nor is it a mere denomination extrinsic to the act, as Suarez holds, or a relation of reason, as Vasquez holds: for the act by reason of itself is good or evil; and goodness or malice in acts really and properly inheres and exists even if reason does not consider or denominate them. Whence St. Thomas, a. 4, ad 2: "the due proportion to the end and the relation to it inheres in the action."

1. Modern authors from the Society of Jesus unite the first and third opinions, and say that morality is freedom together with a twofold extrinsic denomination. Thus, for example, Frins and Cathrein say that it is the dependence of an act upon a free operating will and upon reason adverting to the honorableness or baseness of the object. Here there are three things: the intrinsic denomination of the voluntary, and a twofold extrinsic denomination: the relation of dependence upon the free will, and the relation of dependence upon reason adverting. Similarly Pesch says that it consists in this, that the will is freely borne toward an object apprehended under the aspect of good or base (Zeitschrift fur K. Th., 1887, p. 867).

d) Nor is it a real relation properly so called, or predicamental: for this is to a term as a pure term, whereas the act is related to the rule as to its perfective principle. Moreover, it does not pertain to the essence of the human act, but is an accident which comes to it, whereas morality is essential to it because it belongs to it by reason of its proper object, from which it has species.

e) But morality is an intrinsic respect or transcendental relation, that is, the intrinsic habitude of the act itself, by which it tends to the object precisely as conforming or difforming with the rules of conduct. This is the opinion of the Thomists.

It is proved: 1) Morality is an order or disposition which deliberate reason makes in voluntary acts. But reason precisely makes in these acts that their intrinsic habitude or physical tendency toward the object be a tendency toward the object as subject to rules. Therefore morality is the respect or intrinsic order which reason makes in human acts and by which they tend toward the object conformably or difformably to their rules.

2. The essence of any act is an intrinsic order to the object. Therefore the moral act essentially is an intrinsic tendency to the moral object. But the object is moral insofar as it is subjected to the rules of conduct. Therefore morality also essentially is the intrinsic tendency of the act to the object as subject to the rules of conduct.

117. Divisions of morality. - Since morality is the habitude of an action to a rule, hence according to a varying habitude to a varying rule, morality is varied:

1. The rule is remote and objective, namely law, whether the eternal law of God or the temporal law or prescribing right human reason; or proximate and subjective, namely the actual conscience of the law and of the conformity or difformity of the act to it. Hence there is distinguished material or objective morality, which is the conformity or difformity of the objective element, that is, of the act considered according to itself, with its objective rule, law, no account being taken of the relation of the agent to the rule, or independently of the practical judgment of the agent; and subjective or formal morality, which is the conformity or difformity of the subjective element, that is, of the act insofar as it proceeds from the agent, and of the one acting himself, with the subjective rule or practical judgment of conscience. One can be without the other, as when someone from invincible ignorance places an evil act which he thinks good, the act will be materially evil but formally good; and conversely. Thus blasphemy uttered by a madman is materially evil; uttered by one in possession of himself, it is also formally evil.

2. The rule is commanding, or approving and counseling, and therefore there is distinguished obligatory morality, when something is prescribed or prohibited, and free morality, when something is only approved and counseled. Evil is always prohibited; but good is not always commanded, but only that which is judged necessary.

3. The rule is necessary and natural, or positive, and therefore there is distinguished intrinsic and necessary morality, arising from the nature of things: this belongs to those things which are good or evil from their own nature, and necessarily commanded or prohibited; and extrinsic morality, arising from the positive free will of the one commanding: this belongs to those things which are good or evil only because commanded or prohibited.

118. Species of morality. - The supreme and fundamental species of morality is twofold: goodness and malice. It is said to be supreme, because there can be many lowest species of morality, which are taken from objects diverse in species, as will be explained below in q. 5.

It is proved: for a human act is either conformed to its rules or difform from them. In the first case it is good: for good and being are convertible, whence something has so much of goodness as it has of being; if therefore an act has the fullness of being due and fitting to it, it is good. But that which is conformed to its rules has everything that it ought to have. Therefore the act conformed to them is good. In the second case it is evil: for that which has something of the fullness of being is according to this a being and good; but insofar as it does not have the whole being which it ought to have, it falls short of goodness and is called evil. But an act which in some way is difform from its rules does not have the whole being which it ought to have. Therefore such an act is evil. Hence the axiom: Good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatever.

Accordingly, good is defined as that which agrees with the rule of reason and with rational nature, evil as that which disagrees.

119. Observation.

In the terminology of modern authors, moral act or morality is often taken in a rather different sense. A moral act is opposed to an immoral act, and then it is the same as an honorable act: thus Kant distinguishes moral, immoral, and amoral acts. In St. Thomas, moral act is never said in this sense, nor is the word immoral ever used, but to a moral act is opposed a non-moral act. Likewise morality among moderns is often taken for honesty and is opposed to immorality. But according to the meaning of the word, just as conduct can be good or depraved, so morality is twofold: goodness and malice.

1. Aptly Ballerini, Op. theol. mor. I, n. 135: "Yet these notions (of modern authors) have nothing in common with the first imposition of the name, according to which, just as conduct can be good and depraved, so also a moral act is good or evil, and therefore morality must be called both good and evil. And for this reason one would have to speak of moral acts in the same way as of human acts, namely, that any act is either human or not human, moral or not moral."

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 5 and 8; I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2; Contra Gentiles III, 9; De Malo q. 2, a. 4 and ad 10; II Sent., d. 40, a. 1.

That good and evil in the physical order do not constitute a specific difference is manifest: thus a good and bad garment, a healthy and sick man, are not species of garment or of man. Hence it is asked whether in human acts goodness and malice also are a mere accidental difference, or on the contrary differ per se and essentially, and consequently according to species. Concerning this one must hold what St. Thomas first of all taught.

144. Thesis. Human acts differ in moral species according to a good or evil object. - It is proved:

a) From the fact that a human act is rational. An act has species from the object. But an act is human and moral insofar as it proceeds from deliberating reason. Therefore it has species from the object considered as it is set before reason, or by comparison to reason. But good and evil in the object differ precisely and per se insofar as they are compared to reason, insofar as the object agrees with it or is repugnant to it. Therefore a good and evil object make human acts differ in species (a. 5).

1. Let it be noted that specific distinction does not arise from differences per accidens, but from a per se difference in the object according as it is compared per se to the principle of action. "Nothing," says St. Thomas, "which is per accidens constitutes species, but only what is per se." Thus to know color and sound are acts specifically diverse according to sense, because they differ per se by comparison to sense; not so according to intellect, which attains them under one notion of object, namely being and true. Likewise to sense white and black differ in species according to sight, because they differ under the notion of color, not according to taste. But human and moral acts are such according as they are from reason; and good and evil differ per se by comparison to reason. "Whence it is manifest that good and evil diversify species in moral acts" (a. 5). Cf. De Malo, q. 2, a. 4.

b) From the fact that a human act is voluntary. An act has species from the object. But an act is human and moral insofar as it is voluntary. Therefore it has species from the object by comparison to the will. But the object of the will is the good or the end. Therefore a human act has species from comparison to the end. But good and evil are said per se according to relation to the end: good insofar as it expresses order to the end, evil insofar as it deprives this order. Therefore in human acts good and evil differ in species (II Sent., d. 40, a. 1, ad 2; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; q. 2, a. 4, ad 10).

145. Is indifference a third species of morality? - Resp.: 1) It is certain that not all human acts are good or evil of themselves according to species, but some are indifferent. For an act has species from the object, and a human act from the object compared to reason, from which the act proceeds. Therefore if the object of itself agrees with the order of reason, the act will be good according to species, for example, to give alms; if it includes repugnance to reason, it will be evil according to species, for example, to steal. But there are objects which express nothing that pertains to the order of reason, for example, to walk, to lift a straw from the ground, to give money, etc., and then the act will be indifferent according to species.

2. Acts indifferent from their own nature do not seem to be moral. For indifference, which is midway between goodness and malice, because it is neither conformity nor difformity to the rule, is not a species of morality but the negation of it. For morality expresses a respect to the rule; but the indifferent does not express respect to the rule: for it is that about which the rule does not care, and it is the same as if the rule did not exist. In other words, morality is said in order to reason, to which it has conformity or repugnance; but the indifferent expresses nothing which pertains to the order of reason; therefore indifference exists outside morality (a. 8).

There are nevertheless some who say that it is an incomplete species of morality.

3. Among indifferent acts some are called well- or ill-sounding, whose object, although it is neither good nor evil, nevertheless inclines more toward goodness, and these acts very often have formal goodness, such as to go to church, to visit the poor, to give money, etc.; or on the contrary toward malice, and then it rather often has an attached injustice, such as to take another's thing, to place a cause from which someone's death can also follow, to use amphibological speech or restriction, etc.; and therefore the act cannot be placed unless a reason is present which renders it honorable, for example, in a case of necessity.

146. Observation.

In order that goodness, of the object or of a circumstance, be contracted, it is required that it be intended in itself and for its own sake; but in order that malice be contracted, it is enough that it be foreseen and indirectly voluntary. For right reason dictates that good is to be pursued and loved in itself because it is worthy to be desired for its own sake; consequently, one who does not intend good in itself does not will it well and rightly and laudably, and as it deserves to be intended. Therefore it is required that the good be the end intended by the agent, or the motive by which he is moved to placing the act; or, as St. Thomas says, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3: "in order that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the notion of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good." Therefore no one is praised because he visited the sick only for the sake of conversation, or fasted in order to spare money, because the honesty of mercy or of fasting is not formally intended.

Nevertheless one need not explicitly intend that honesty or conformity with the rule as such, but implicitly suffices, by willing the act under some honorable reason, for example, alms because it relieves the poor. On the contrary, evil must not only not be loved, but must be guarded against and avoided, even when it is not intended; and this is not done by him who foresees and does not prevent it.

Question 1. Are there acts properly indifferent, or lacking morality, either in species or in the individual?

Response. It is certain that there are acts indifferent in species, or acts which in their species are without morality. For there are acts which, considered in themselves while abstracting from end and circumstances, have no agreement or repugnance with law or right reason, and therefore are to be reputed neither good nor bad. Thus walking, writing, and innumerable similar things are acts indifferent through themselves.

But there is controversy concerning acts in the individual, or considered in the agent; but the more common and more probable opinion, which with St. Thomas denies it, is held. The reason is that it belongs to a man acting deliberately, and therefore master of his act, to order the act to a due end; but the due end is that which befits rational nature, as it is rational. Moreover an act otherwise good from the object, or at least indifferent, and thus ordered to a due end, is necessarily good; but an act lacking such ordering is bad; therefore in no case will there be given an act properly indifferent in the individual. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, arts. 8 and 9; and QQ. DD., De Malo, q. 2, arts. 4 and 5. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 42 and seq.

Question 2. Does an external act add morality to an internal act?

Response. Through itself an external act adds no morality to an internal act; and the reason is that all morality is taken from the intrinsic, or from the will; nor does an external act have any imputability unto merit or demerit proper to itself and distinct from the imputability of the internal act. Wherefore an external act is not formally, but only materially, honest or dishonest. Nor does the obligation of declaring the external act in confession stand in the way; for it must be declared both because reservation, scandal, or some damage of neighbor is often present, and because it constitutes one and the same act with the internal act, as will be said where there will be discussion concerning the integrity of confession. But by accident an external act usually increases morality, because very often it is the occasion why the goodness or malice of the internal act is increased, for example, that it is prolonged or multiplied, etc. For the internal act is increased on account of the arduousness of the good external work or the delight of the evil, or on account of the longer delay of time necessary in completing the external work. Cf. Suarez, in 1-2, tract. 3, disp. 10, sect. 1, nn. 3 and 9.

The sources of morality are named those principles which bestow upon human acts their species, or a modification of the species, in the genus of morals.

Three sources of morality are numbered, namely: 1st, the object of the act; 2nd, its circumstances; 3rd, the end of the agent. These three are altogether required for a good act; if even one is bad, the act will become bad. Hence the well-known axiom: Good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever.

I say 1° : There are given acts indifferent from their species¹. It is common opinion. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 8, c.

It is proved. Human acts draw their species from the object morally considered : so that those which have a good object be good; those evil, evil; those indifferent, indifferent. But there are human acts which have an indifferent object, that is, neither commanded nor forbidden by law, as to lift up a straw, to go into the field, and the like. Therefore.

Greater is the difficulty about acts indifferent in the individual. The question is not about indeliberate acts which proceed from imagination or impulse of nature, as it usually is to scratch the beard, to move hand or foot; for these, since they are not human and moral acts through defect of liberty, it sufficiently stands established that they are neither morally good nor bad.

Likewise the question is not about indifference toward moral goodness and badness in the supernatural order, but in the natural order only. For it stands established that there are given acts indifferent, neither good nor bad, neither meritorious nor demeritorious, in the supernatural order : thus alms done by an infidel or sinner from motive of mercy, although good morally in the natural order, since however it proceeds not from grace, which is the principle of goodness and merit in the supernatural order, is neither good nor bad in that order, nor meritorious of reward or of punishment in that order, because in no manner does it pertain to that order.

The question therefore is only about deliberate acts and their indifference toward goodness and badness in the natural order.

In which sense

I say : No act is nor can be indifferent in the individual¹. It is the more common opinion with the Author against Scotus, the Scotists and Vasquez. ¹ Ibid., a. 9, c.

It is proved by the fundamental reason. Man, as often as he acts deliberately, even concerning an object indifferent in itself, is held to act on account of honest end : if he do this, he acts well; if he do it not, he acts badly. Therefore no act indifferent exists in the individual. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Man, as often as he acts deliberately, is held to act as man, or according to the dignity and exigency of rational nature, and as distinguished from brutes. But this is to act on account of honest good, which is the end of rational creature. Therefore. 2° As natural beings are directed by natural inclination from the author of nature to their proper ends, so free and moral agent, such as man is, is directed by precepts to his proper end, which is honest good conformable to reason. Therefore. 3° The Apostle, I Cor., X, 31, commands all things to be done on account of the glory of God, that is, on account of honest end in which the glory of God is virtually and implicitly included. Therefore. 4° Work not directed to honest end is otiose work, therefore evil; because work is called otiose not because it is on account of evil end, but because it lacks good and honest end, or, as the holy Fathers say, because it lacks utility or necessity. Therefore. 5° Man acting deliberately cannot act on account of sensible delightful good as on account of end. Therefore he is held to act on account of honest good. — The antecedent is plain. Because sensible delightful good is end of brutes and of the sensitive part, not of rational creature.

But what the adversaries say, that it is licit to act on account of commodity and recreation of nature, we concede, provided this be done according to the dictation of reason. But to act on account of commodity and recreation of nature according to dictation of right reason is not to seek delight as end, but to refer it to honest ends, and consequently to act well.

Objection : that worn saying of St. Jerome, Epist. 89, ad Aug. :

« Good is continence, bad is luxury : between both indifferent is walking about, to dispose the excrements of the belly, to throw forth rheums with spittle. This is neither good nor bad. » Therefore.

Answer St. Jerome speaks of acts indifferent viewed on the part of object, and according to species.

[You will say : No species is there under which it contains not, or can contain, some individual. But some human act is indifferent according to its species, as proved above. Therefore some individual human act can be indifferent.

Answer. I distinguish the major. No species is there which under itself contains not, or can contain, some individual, yet without the abstraction which species has, I concede; with the same abstraction which species has, I deny. I distinguish also the minor. Some human act is indifferent according to its species in this sense, that it has not from its species that it be good or bad morally, I concede; in this sense, that indifference be owed it from its species so that it cannot be ordered to moral good or moral evil, I deny. And therefore I deny consequence —

For, as St. Thomas says¹, « that some act be indifferent according to its species can be understood in several ways : In one way thus, that from its species indifference be owed it; and thus the argument proceeds [that is, the objection in the minor]. But in this manner no act is indifferent from its species; for there is no object of human act which cannot be ordered either to evil or to good through end or circumstance. In another way it can be called indifferent from its species, because it has not from its species that it be good or bad : whence through something else it can become good or bad. As man has not from his species that he be white or black, nor yet does he have from his species that he be not white or black; for whiteness or blackness can supervene upon man from elsewhere than from the principles of the species. » ¹ Ibid., a. 9, ad 1.

Require other objections and answers in the same place.]