Article I. On the Essence of Morality

I say, 1st. The essence of morality consists primarily in the habitude or relation of a human act to the eternal law, which is the divine reason, or the will of God commanding that the natural order be preserved and forbidding that it be disturbed. The reason is that only that can be the primary rule of morality which is the supreme norm of an infallible and indefectible order, and able to oblige in conscience; but such is the eternal law alone, from which alone the other laws receive the force of obliging. Therefore.

I say, 2nd. The essence of morality consists secondarily in the habitude of a human act to right reason. For human actions cannot be measured against the supreme norm of morality except by means of human reason, which is a certain participation in, and consequently manifestation of, the divine reason. Hence:

1st. That, and that alone, is a moral being which stands under the rule of morals, or under the law of God commanding or permitting. For through that alone are we ordered to our ultimate end, or disordered from it.

2nd. It is false that the essence of morality is to be placed in liberty alone. For this is prerequired as a condition that an act can be imputed, but it is not the reason why it is imputed unto praise or blame. For he who acts freely is not for that reason worthy of reward, but only he who, since he is free, acts conformably to the divine reason.

3rd. It is false also that morality consists in the voluntary alone. For the voluntary without liberty is in no way imputable, because without it man would not be master of his own actions.

4th. It is false that public opinion is the rule of morality, because it is neither infallible nor immutable, and consequently tomorrow that could be called unjust which today is reputed honest.

5th. Indeed the civil laws themselves cannot be the supreme rule of morals, because laws measure the goodness or malice of an act only insofar as they are honest and reasonable, and consequently insofar as they participate in some higher criterion. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 19, art. 4; q. 71, art. 6; and q. 93, art. 3. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 34 and 35.

Question 1. Are there acts properly indifferent, or lacking morality, either in species or in the individual?

Response. It is certain that there are acts indifferent in species, or acts which in their species are without morality. For there are acts which, considered in themselves while abstracting from end and circumstances, have no agreement or repugnance with law or right reason, and therefore are to be reputed neither good nor bad. Thus walking, writing, and innumerable similar things are acts indifferent through themselves.

But there is controversy concerning acts in the individual, or considered in the agent; but the more common and more probable opinion, which with St. Thomas denies it, is held. The reason is that it belongs to a man acting deliberately, and therefore master of his act, to order the act to a due end; but the due end is that which befits rational nature, as it is rational. Moreover an act otherwise good from the object, or at least indifferent, and thus ordered to a due end, is necessarily good; but an act lacking such ordering is bad; therefore in no case will there be given an act properly indifferent in the individual. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, arts. 8 and 9; and QQ. DD., De Malo, q. 2, arts. 4 and 5. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 42 and seq.

Question 2. Does an external act add morality to an internal act?

Response. Through itself an external act adds no morality to an internal act; and the reason is that all morality is taken from the intrinsic, or from the will; nor does an external act have any imputability unto merit or demerit proper to itself and distinct from the imputability of the internal act. Wherefore an external act is not formally, but only materially, honest or dishonest. Nor does the obligation of declaring the external act in confession stand in the way; for it must be declared both because reservation, scandal, or some damage of neighbor is often present, and because it constitutes one and the same act with the internal act, as will be said where there will be discussion concerning the integrity of confession. But by accident an external act usually increases morality, because very often it is the occasion why the goodness or malice of the internal act is increased, for example, that it is prolonged or multiplied, etc. For the internal act is increased on account of the arduousness of the good external work or the delight of the evil, or on account of the longer delay of time necessary in completing the external work. Cf. Suarez, in 1-2, tract. 3, disp. 10, sect. 1, nn. 3 and 9.