Appendix. On Acts Morally Indifferent

93. Declarations. 1. It is not asked whether human acts are morally indifferent: for it is clear that human acts which are done without advertence to the moral order are neither good nor evil (n. 55). But the question is instituted concerning moral acts: namely, whether acts which are done with advertence to the moral norm are all either good or evil, or whether moral actions must be admitted which are indifferent.

2. This question concerns moral acts considered concretely and in the individual, namely as they are exercised by an individual person operating here and now, and therefore together with the end of the one operating and with the remaining adjuncts accompanying the action in the concrete, for example to sing in church in order to praise God. For if moral acts are considered abstractly and according to species, that is, only according to their object, for example to sing, with abstraction made from the end of the one operating and from the remaining circumstances, it is certain that moral actions can be indifferent, because per se they have neither conformity nor difformity with the norm of morality.

It is clear that an act considered according to species does not exist except in the abstraction of the mind: for as often as an act is performed, it is performed in certain circumstances and unto some end which the agent proposes to himself.

3. Now concerning moral acts considered concretely and in the individual, there is not one opinion of philosophers and theologians. For the Scotists, affirming with St. Bonaventure,¹ and the Thomists with St. Thomas,² and the greater part of other theologians, denying, are opposed concerning whether any moral act considered in the individual can be indifferent. Nevertheless, they affirm this only of truly moral acts, which are done deliberately and with advertence to the moral order. For it cannot be denied that acts which are done without advertence either to the act itself or to the morality of the act are indifferent even considered in the individual.

These things, however, hold concerning the natural order and the natural goodness of actions. For indifferent actions are sometimes also called supernatural actions which are not meritorious and yet are not sins, that is, actions which are neither meritorious nor demeritorious. It is readily conceded that there are indifferent supernatural actions, of which kind are works both of sinners and of unbelievers which are done from grace, but especially works by which they dispose themselves for justification. Whether such actions must also be admitted in the just, who are in the state of sanctifying grace, depends upon the conditions which are required for a meritorious act.

¹ In II Sent., dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3.

² Summa I-II, q. 18, a. 9.

94. There are no indifferent moral acts. For the one operating either intends an honorable end or does not intend one. If the first, the action is morally good. If the other, the one operating either apprehends the action to be exact according to the norm of reason, or apprehends it as opposing the norm of reason. There is no middle in him who adverts to the morality of the action. If the first, the action is good; if the other, the action is evil (n. 87).

1. Many Thomists reason in this way: any action which is exercised deliberately is ordered by the one operating to some determinate end, because man acting deliberately always acts from some end. Now this end is either an honorable end or it is not. If the first, the action will be good; if the other, the action will be evil. For as often as man acts deliberately, he must act according to the dignity of rational nature. But he acts according to the dignity of rational nature only if he acts for an honorable end; therefore in the concrete there is no morally indifferent action.

This argument supposes that actions must be positively directed to an honorable end in order that they be good. Therefore, if it is taken strictly, as the words sound, those actions indifferent from the object which are done from an indifferent end or on account of sensible delight, but are nevertheless ordered according to the mode prescribed by reason, would have to be called morally evil.

2. The reason of the Scotists, by which they fortify the contrary affirmative opinion, is this: in order that man act fittingly to rational nature, it is not necessary that always and in all things he tend toward a positively honorable end. Therefore if an action is ordered to some advantage of nature or is exercised for relieving a need of nature, it will not be good, because it does not tend toward an honorable end; nor will it be evil, because on the one hand it is not unfitting to rational nature, and on the other it is not necessary that every action be referred to an honorable end. Therefore it will be indifferent.

This argument also supposes the same theory, namely that actions must be positively directed to an honorable end in order that they be good. Nevertheless it affirms that those actions which are done on account of an indifferent end, whether their object is good or indifferent, but nevertheless ordered according to the prescription of reason, are morally indifferent.

95. Things to be noted concerning this question. 1. From the premises it is clear that the whole controversy concerning indifferent acts depends upon two heads of doctrine: a. whether an obligation can be demonstrated of always and in all deliberate actions intending a positively good end; for if this obligation exists, actions placed on account of an indifferent end become evil because of this neglected obligation. b. But if this obligation is not established, it is further asked whether those actions which are exercised on account of an indifferent end, but nevertheless according to the prescription of reason, must be called good or indifferent.

2. Whatever is said, certainly those theologians are not to be tolerated who on the one hand deny acts indifferent in the individual, but on the other hand absolutely require for the moral goodness of an act that an honorable end be positively intended. For the rigor of this doctrine is too greatly opposed to the mind and practice of the faithful, who are not persuaded that in absolutely all actions a positively honorable end must be sought lest they be evil. Therefore no one, whether uneducated or learned, whether of lax or timorous conscience, recognizes a moral defect in the omission of this good intention, and therefore no one ever accuses himself of it. And indeed it cannot be understood why, for example, an action is evil by which someone tries to drive away the sensation of cold only to relieve this annoyance without a higher end. Therefore it will be either good or at least indifferent; the Scotists call it indifferent, but according to the theory expounded it must be called morally good, if the agent judges it licit in the concrete and explicitly intends it as such.