Section II. On the Indifferent Act

The discussion is of human or deliberated acts alone. Now:

I. There are acts indifferent according to species. For an act considered in species or in the abstract is understood as an act viewed according to its object. "But it happens that the object of the act does not include anything pertaining to the order of reason, i.e., it does not include anything which agrees with reason nor anything which is repugnant to reason, as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, and things of this sort" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIII).

II. There are not, at least in themselves, acts indifferent in the individual, i.e., in the concrete, or with the circumstances also considered, especially the end of the one acting. This is established against the Scotists, who think that acts which by their nature are ordered to pleasure alone, such as smelling flowers, etc., are indifferent if they are exercised proximately for the end of the work alone, i.e., for pleasure alone. But rightly this is denied; for one who acts deliberately necessarily acts for some end, and indeed either for an honorable good or for a pleasurable good (n. 1). But an act ordered to an honorable good is morally good; one ordered to a pleasurable good alone is morally evil (n. 243; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 9; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

But it is more disputed whether by accident there is an indifferent act in the individual, namely: 1. if someone in no way attends to the morality of the act; 2. if, adhering to the opinion of the Scotists, he acts for pleasure alone. Now:

I respond to I that a deliberated act without any advertence to the morality of the act is admitted only with difficulty.

I respond to II that it seems improbable; since in the stated hypothesis the agent holds the act as licit. But what is held as licit or permitted by God, as such is held as honorable, and therefore the agent, although unconscious of it, acts honorably.¹

¹ Billuart, De act. hum., diss. 4, art. 7.