Whether there are indifferent acts?

I say 1° : There are given acts indifferent from their species¹. It is common opinion. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 8, c.

It is proved. Human acts draw their species from the object morally considered : so that those which have a good object be good; those evil, evil; those indifferent, indifferent. But there are human acts which have an indifferent object, that is, neither commanded nor forbidden by law, as to lift up a straw, to go into the field, and the like. Therefore.

Greater is the difficulty about acts indifferent in the individual. The question is not about indeliberate acts which proceed from imagination or impulse of nature, as it usually is to scratch the beard, to move hand or foot; for these, since they are not human and moral acts through defect of liberty, it sufficiently stands established that they are neither morally good nor bad.

Likewise the question is not about indifference toward moral goodness and badness in the supernatural order, but in the natural order only. For it stands established that there are given acts indifferent, neither good nor bad, neither meritorious nor demeritorious, in the supernatural order : thus alms done by an infidel or sinner from motive of mercy, although good morally in the natural order, since however it proceeds not from grace, which is the principle of goodness and merit in the supernatural order, is neither good nor bad in that order, nor meritorious of reward or of punishment in that order, because in no manner does it pertain to that order.

The question therefore is only about deliberate acts and their indifference toward goodness and badness in the natural order.

In which sense

I say : No act is nor can be indifferent in the individual¹. It is the more common opinion with the Author against Scotus, the Scotists and Vasquez. ¹ Ibid., a. 9, c.

It is proved by the fundamental reason. Man, as often as he acts deliberately, even concerning an object indifferent in itself, is held to act on account of honest end : if he do this, he acts well; if he do it not, he acts badly. Therefore no act indifferent exists in the individual. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Man, as often as he acts deliberately, is held to act as man, or according to the dignity and exigency of rational nature, and as distinguished from brutes. But this is to act on account of honest good, which is the end of rational creature. Therefore. 2° As natural beings are directed by natural inclination from the author of nature to their proper ends, so free and moral agent, such as man is, is directed by precepts to his proper end, which is honest good conformable to reason. Therefore. 3° The Apostle, I Cor., X, 31, commands all things to be done on account of the glory of God, that is, on account of honest end in which the glory of God is virtually and implicitly included. Therefore. 4° Work not directed to honest end is otiose work, therefore evil; because work is called otiose not because it is on account of evil end, but because it lacks good and honest end, or, as the holy Fathers say, because it lacks utility or necessity. Therefore. 5° Man acting deliberately cannot act on account of sensible delightful good as on account of end. Therefore he is held to act on account of honest good. — The antecedent is plain. Because sensible delightful good is end of brutes and of the sensitive part, not of rational creature.

But what the adversaries say, that it is licit to act on account of commodity and recreation of nature, we concede, provided this be done according to the dictation of reason. But to act on account of commodity and recreation of nature according to dictation of right reason is not to seek delight as end, but to refer it to honest ends, and consequently to act well.

Objection : that worn saying of St. Jerome, Epist. 89, ad Aug. :

« Good is continence, bad is luxury : between both indifferent is walking about, to dispose the excrements of the belly, to throw forth rheums with spittle. This is neither good nor bad. » Therefore.

Answer St. Jerome speaks of acts indifferent viewed on the part of object, and according to species.

[You will say : No species is there under which it contains not, or can contain, some individual. But some human act is indifferent according to its species, as proved above. Therefore some individual human act can be indifferent.

Answer. I distinguish the major. No species is there which under itself contains not, or can contain, some individual, yet without the abstraction which species has, I concede; with the same abstraction which species has, I deny. I distinguish also the minor. Some human act is indifferent according to its species in this sense, that it has not from its species that it be good or bad morally, I concede; in this sense, that indifference be owed it from its species so that it cannot be ordered to moral good or moral evil, I deny. And therefore I deny consequence —

For, as St. Thomas says¹, « that some act be indifferent according to its species can be understood in several ways : In one way thus, that from its species indifference be owed it; and thus the argument proceeds [that is, the objection in the minor]. But in this manner no act is indifferent from its species; for there is no object of human act which cannot be ordered either to evil or to good through end or circumstance. In another way it can be called indifferent from its species, because it has not from its species that it be good or bad : whence through something else it can become good or bad. As man has not from his species that he be white or black, nor yet does he have from his species that he be not white or black; for whiteness or blackness can supervene upon man from elsewhere than from the principles of the species. » ¹ Ibid., a. 9, ad 1.

Require other objections and answers in the same place.]