Joy in evil and sadness at good

331. Notions. 1. Joy here is taken for deliberate complacency in an evil thing done either by oneself or by others; therefore it is referred to an evil work perpetrated, which pleases the will. Boasting concerning a committed sin is reduced to joy.

2. The object of joy can be: a. the evil work itself done; b. the mode in which the evil was done; c. the effect which followed from the evil work; d. the evil work on account of a good effect.

332. Principles. 1. Joy concerning the evil itself done is a sin of the same gravity and species as the evil itself done. The reason for the first is that the internal act of joy receives malice from the object, since it is an approval of an evil thing, which is always evil, whether it is evil in itself or only evil on account of prohibition, as to rejoice concerning blasphemy or concerning a meal taken on a fast day. Therefore joy is a grave or light sin according to the gravity of the matter. The reason for the second is that the will approves the evil thing as it was perpetrated; therefore it also induces all the malices which it knows to have been joined with the thing.

Note. Hence the penitent in confession ought to explain not only the object of desire and joy, but also the circumstances changing the species, provided they were known, e.g. in joy concerning the striking of a cleric, in the desire of fornicating with a relative by blood.

As joy concerning an evil done is a sin, so also sadness concerning a good done is a sin, and indeed:

a. sadness concerning a good done which was commanded under grave obligation is a grave sin;

b. sadness concerning a good done which was commanded under light obligation is a light sin;

c. sadness concerning a good done which was not commanded, e.g. concerning a vow made, concerning the priesthood received, does not exceed a light sin, provided the will of fulfilling the obligation undertaken is retained. Whether it is a light sin or no sin depends on the motive on account of which someone is saddened, namely whether it is reasonable or not; ordinarily, however, sadness of this kind lacks a reasonable motive.

d. sadness not concerning the good itself done, but concerning the adjuncts of the good action, e.g. concerning inconvenience and labor, is not a sin.

2. To rejoice not concerning the evil work, but concerning the mode in which the evil was perpetrated, is not a sin: for the act of the will in this case is borne toward an object good or indifferent.

It is licit to rejoice concerning obscene paintings or comedies on account of the art by which they were composed; concerning theft or fraud on account of singular and ingenious cleverness; concerning an impure narration on account of the witty manner of narrating; concerning a man's fall on account of the ridiculous things which occurred in the fall. Nevertheless joys of this kind are not without danger, because the passage from the mode to the work itself is easy.

3. Of itself it is licit to rejoice concerning the good effect of an evil work, whether this was materially or formally evil, because the act of the will is not borne toward the evil thing, but precisely toward the good effect, even if it supposes an evil work.

Therefore it is licit for a son to rejoice concerning an inheritance which he obtained on account of a homicide, whether voluntary or involuntary. It is licit to rejoice concerning nature relieved or concerning a temptation quieted, which followed from pollution, whether involuntary or even voluntary. But these things are dangerous, because joy can easily pass from the good effect to the evil work.

4. It is not licit to rejoice concerning the evil work itself which had a good effect, but it is licit to rejoice concerning an evil work on account of the good effect which followed from it, whether the work was materially or formally evil. The reason for the first is that it is not licit to approve evil on account of a good end, nor does an evil work therefore become good and worthy of approval because it can produce, or in fact has produced, a good effect.¹ The reason for the second is that the object of joy is not the evil itself, but precisely this circumstance of it, that it had a good effect. For an evil work can be considered according to itself and insofar as it is the cause of a good effect; if it is considered according to itself, it is not licit to rejoice concerning it; but if it is considered precisely as it is the cause of a good effect, it is licit to rejoice concerning it; but this is rather to rejoice concerning the good effect of an evil cause.

It is not licit to rejoice concerning perjury, even if only materially evil, which freed another from punishment, nor concerning the omission of a fast, even if it happened from inadvertence. It is not licit to rejoice concerning the killing of an enemy of the Church; but it is licit to rejoice that from it the peace of the Church followed. It is not licit to rejoice concerning the sin of Adam, even if a great good followed from it. But if the Church sings, O happy fault, this is not joy concerning the sin itself, but concerning the sin because and insofar as it had a good effect.

Note. What it is licit to desire, concerning that it is likewise licit to rejoice, and conversely; therefore it is licit to rejoice concerning the evil of one's neighbor, provided the order of charity is not injured; thus it is licit for a mother to rejoice concerning the death of a little son on account of his eternal happiness.

¹ There are those who demonstrate that this same thing is illicit from proposition 15 condemned by Innocent XI: It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness on account of the great riches obtained from the inheritance thence. But from this proposition that cannot rightly be inferred, because the proposition is false also from another reason, namely because the joy of the son is repugnant to the order of charity.

It is not sinful to take pleasure in a good result which followed from some evil, as, for example, in the good results of a war or of a revolution. We may lawfully rejoice in the death of someone who was causing great harm to public morality, or to the public good in general, not precisely because he is dead, but for the reason that the cause of public harm is removed. We prefer the public good to the good of the individual, especially if he is doing harm. In this connection mention may be made of certain propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which the following is a specimen: “It is lawful for a son to rejoice that he killed his father in a drunken fit on account of the great wealth to which he has thereby succeeded.”’ It is obvious that such joy is morally wrong, for the act of parricide was at any rate materially wrong even when committed while drunk, and joy on account of what was, and is, wrong is unlawful; nor does succession to the father’s wealth, a good of a lower order than human life, especially a father’s life, furnish a just cause for such unfilial rejoicing.

As it is unlawful to take pleasure in evil, so it is sinful to entertain voluntary sadness on account of good. To be sorry, therefore, for what is good and matter of precept is a mortal or a venial sin according as the precept binds under mortal or venial sin; and so a reprobate sins grievously who laments the years that he spent in leading a virtuous life. Even though the good be not matter of precept, as, for example, the vows of religion, it is irrational and at least venially sinful to be sorry for having taken them; it will be grievously sinful if it leads to the danger of transgressing them.

On the questioning of penitents concerning bad thoughts, see Genicot, I, n. 175.

Joy.—The precept of charity includes a precept of joy, and hence the Apostle says: “Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice” (Philip., iv. 4, 5). This joy of charity has the following properties: (a) it is about good, not about iniquity, and it is not unrestrained; it rejoices “in the Lord”; (b) it should not be discontinued or interrupted by sin, but should rejoice “always.” It may, however, be mixed with sorrow over sin or the delay of entrance into the presence of God ( Rom., xii. 15; Ps. cxix. 5), for only in heaven will joy be filled (John, xv. 11). St. Paul spoke of himself as “sorrowful, yet always rejoicing” (II Cor., vi. 10).

167. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited by the imagination as present, without desire.

2. Joy, or deliberate complacency concerning a past evil thing, or an evil work performed either by oneself or by another ¹.

¹ Complacency here does not mean pleasure or delight drawn from consideration of the evil object, but rather a certain approval by which the will has the evil perpetrated as pleasing and accepted: which approval indeed can be called joy in this sense, that someone concerning the evil deed not only is not sorry, as he ought to be, but rather rejoices.

Moreover joy is properly said also of a present good; indeed it is customarily defined as enjoyment of a good possessed and loved (Suarez, On 1.2, treat. 2, disp. 7, sect. 1, nos. 3-5). Concerning which matter St. Thomas says thus (1.2, q. 31, art. 3): Joy is a certain species of delectation... For we are delighted also in those things which we desire, when we obtain them.... But the name of joy does not have place except in delectation which follows reason; whence we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but only the name of delectation.

3. Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if an intention or absolute proposal of executing it is present; otherwise it is called inefficacious ². - St. Lig., no. 15.

² It is necessary that some efficacy be present even in inefficacious desires; otherwise they would not even deserve the name of desire. Namely there is present a conditionally efficacious will, which would pass into work unless something else obstructed. Hence St. Alphonsus well says (book 5, no. 15): A desire is called inefficacious if it does not propose absolutely to execute, but consents that it would execute, if it could, when, for example, it says: If I could steal the treasure of the Church, I would steal it.

But what the malice of these is, and what the species, hold in these few words:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1. it is truly a sin. For this is established from the precept, Thou shalt not covet, which must generally and indefinitely be understood of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is opposed to right reason: for it is base and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, that which it is not licit to execute.

2. It takes on the species of its object. For any desire, even inefficacious, tends to its object, and consequently is a volition of the special malice of that object, and therefore contracts its specific malice ³. This is also established from the words of Christ, Matth. 5.28: He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood as adultery. Therefore...

³ The internal act about which this treats here regards the external act as to be entrusted to execution, either absolutely or at least hypothetically; therefore it is necessarily carried to it according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or of their own accord follow from it.

3. It also takes on the species of the circumstances of the object. For desire, since it tends to an object, touches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. Hence in confession, for example of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the person desired must be declared. - St. Lig., no. 12.

168. • II. Joy likewise is a sin and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances joined to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of a past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also takes on the whole malice of these.

Hence he who in the recollection of past sins is complacent in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency, and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting about a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed ⁴, must be recalled to joy.

⁴ Understand this especially of a work which had to be performed by strict obligation; and thus sadness of this sort will be such a sin as a refusal to fulfill the obligation would have been. But if the discourse is about a good act to which one was not held, to repent without just cause of a good of this kind will certainly not lack some venial fault; since this is against reason, because the proper object of repentance is an evil thing; but there will be no fault if a cause is present which makes the repentance honorable. Confer what Sanchez has concerning one who repents of a vow emitted (On the Decalogue, book 4, ch. 12, no. 2).

169. • III. Morose delectation 1. is certainly a sin; 2. it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is that it is opposed to rational nature and divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it: but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear ⁵. Therefore... Hence Osee 9.10: They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Prov. 15.26: Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord. Therefore...

⁵ The guilt of morose delectation appears easily, since in reality it is nothing other than consent to delectation concerning an evil work. Thus St. Thomas, where he excellently distinguishes delectation about the thought of an evil work, which does not pertain here, and delectation about the evil work thought of (1.2, q. 74, art. 8): Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted about two things. In one way, about the thought itself; in another way, about the fornication itself thought of... But the thought itself, according to itself, is not mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for example when someone thinks about it uselessly; but sometimes it is without any sin at all, for example when someone thinks usefully about it, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it. And therefore consequently the affection and delectation which is thus about the thought of fornication is not of the genus of mortal sin, but sometimes is venial sin, sometimes none. Whence neither is consent to such delectation mortal sin... But that someone thinking about fornication is delighted ABOUT THE ACT ITSELF thought of, this happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act. Whence that someone consents to such delectation is nothing other than that he consents in this, that his affection be inclined toward fornication: for no one is delighted except concerning that which is conformable to his appetite. But that someone chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which according to themselves are mortal sins is mortal sin. Whence such consent to the delectation of mortal sin is mortal sin.

More briefly Laymann (book 1, treat. 3, ch. 6, no. 2): It is one thing to be delighted about the thing thought of, for example fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thing itself, but thought is only the condition proposing and applying the thing thought of; but another thing is to be delighted about the thought, for example of fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thought itself... We are speaking here about delectation WHICH IS TAKEN FROM THE THING ITSELF. For since the thought of an evil thing is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, as if you think about base things for the sake of teaching or admonishing, but sometimes venially evil, as if you think about the same things from curiosity; it follows that delectation also concerning such thought as object is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, sometimes venially evil.

The reason for the second is that whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in what degree and species the object is evil, in the same plainly will its delectation be evil. Therefore... - St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 74, art. 8. - St. Lig., no. 15.

170. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether morose delectation also takes on the specific malice of circumstances, as desire and joy do?

I answer: It is controverted. Probably no. The reason is that simple delectation does not tend to the object as to be placed, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object besides that which moves the delectation ⁶. Lugo, Laymann, Reuter, Bonacina, etc., against others who contend that simple delectation takes on all the species of the object, just as desire itself does. St. Lig. says that each opinion is probable, book 5, no. 15 ⁷.

⁶ This opinion does not deny that specific malice is taken also from circumstances, if these also are the object of delectation; but if the delectation, as Sanchez says (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 11), whom therefore the Salmanticenses wrongly allege for the opposite opinion, no differently than several others there reported by Sanchez (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 31), is not carried to the object according to its whole malice apprehended, but according to a part, as to a woman apprehended indeed as not his own, yet not as married to another or a nun; it will not have the whole malice of the external work, but only the malice apprehended, and that alone will have to be confessed, and it will be reduced to the species of simple fornication.

This hypothesis indeed is founded in the nature of the thing. For it happens that the will is carried to that which is indeed delectable, the circumstances of which, far from alluring, rather blunt the appetite, for example that the woman is already married to another, that she is a nun, or a blood relative, etc., which the Salmanticenses also suggest (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 30), where they well advert that the things said above hold indeed concerning the circumstances of the object, but not concerning the circumstances of the person sinning, for example if he is married or bound by a vow of chastity, although these circumstances contribute nothing to the delectation.

⁷ ** Although St. Alphonsus says that the opinion of the Author is very probable, nevertheless he adds (ibid.) that he greatly likes what Holzmann says (On the Precepts of the Decalogue, treat. 2, no. 698), that, for example, the circumstance of adultery must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of desiring at least inefficaciously, etc. And the VV. (page 913, no. 20) recall here those things which the Holy Doctor has elsewhere (Apostolic Man, treat. 3, no. 48), where after alleging some from the indicated false allegations of the Salmanticenses, he adds that in practice... without doubt all the circumstances of the object must be explained in delectation.

I answer: The opinion of Holzmann will be able to have place when he who is morosely delighted concerning an evil object at the same time has known that he is then violating the obligation of guarding against the grave and proximate danger of falling into depraved desire for that same object. But otherwise in the other hypothesis. The reason is clear from the first principles of ethics; for no sin is ever committed if some notion of obligation does not shine beforehand.

171. • QUESTION 2. Whether it is licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

I answer with a distinction: Yes, of itself, if the condition applied takes away the whole malice of the thing; the reason is that such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which by the condition malice is wholly excluded. But no in the other hypothesis; the reason is that such an affection tends to an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not take away malice from the object even as represented, and consequently the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition however applied cannot take away malice. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and consequently a condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish for such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed. - St. Lig., no. 27; Apostolic Man, no. 50.

Yet he is probably to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not wish that that which was intrinsically evil should become licit, but only would show his propensity toward that object. - St. Lig., Apostolic Man, ibid., with others. Moreover everyone sees how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition applied were to take away the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, but licit in some case or state, for example: I would kill an enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by a vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife. Such desires Cajetan (Sins of Thought) deservedly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because although a desire of this kind is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in a venereal matter will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive law are also to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection ⁸.

⁸ Sometimes desires of this kind can be neither idle nor disordered, namely if they are concerning a good object, for example if, with a suitable condition applied, a married man were to foster desires about undertaking sacred ministries and enjoying Communion of the chalice, or a Religious bound by vow of poverty about distributing alms, building hospitals, adorning churches, etc., or a cleric about destroying the enemies of the Church in a just battle, etc.

172. • QUESTION 3. Whether it is licit to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left undone from forgetfulness?

I answer: No, if the joy is referred to the omission insofar as it is objectively evil. But yes, if it is referred only to the pleasure or advantage honest in itself. - Suarez, On Sins, disp. 5, sect. 7, no. 15. - Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 389, etc., against others who deny it without distinction ⁹.

⁹ Suarez and Lugo, alleged here by the Author, and also others commonly, hand this down not only concerning the omission of a commanded work, but generally concerning any act whatsoever evil according to itself, which nevertheless someone performed without fault, namely from inadvertence or ignorance, or in madness, sleep, drunkenness: namely, that it is not licit to rejoice concerning the past act according to itself and on account of its pleasure; nevertheless it is licit to rejoice concerning the good effect thence following, and therefore concerning that act only insofar as it was the cause of such an effect, as Suarez says.

Here carefully observe those words: According to itself and on account of its pleasure; for by these is excluded the reason because of which St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 20) seems with Sanchez and certain others to depart from this doctrine. For Sanchez shrewdly observes (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 16) that the aforesaid causes, which are reduced to defect of free consent, indeed excuse the exterior work from fault, but do not likewise make licit the delectation inherent in an evil work which is later freely taken. And hence comes the solution of the question whether it is licit to rejoice concerning pollution in sleep, or even to desire it. For as St. Thomas teaches (on 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5), it will be a sin if pollution pleases on account of the delectation; but not if it pleases as an unloading or alleviation of nature. Concerning this matter see the same St. Thomas (2.2, q. 154, art. 5), where, contrary to what St. Alph. has, l. c., he recalls to the natural cause of pollution a base dream, to which also the touches or movements following that same dream can be reduced. For when, he says, seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of humor has occurred... the sleeper dreams those things which pertain to the emission of such abundant or resolved humors; as also happens when nature is burdened by some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination.

** The VV. (page 140) move a twofold complaint: 1. that you will seek in vain in the text of Sanchez the words brought above; 2. that the Author twists Sanchez into his own sense.

I answer to 1. There the opinion of Sanchez is reported, not the words. If the VV. desire that opinion expressed in the words of Sanchez, behold it (l. c.): As often as the cause excusing the exterior deed from mortal fault, namely defect of consent, does not concur in the delectation itself, although the deed is free from fault, nevertheless the delectation will not be free from sin.... The reason is that that deed was OF ITSELF mortal, and free from fault solely by ignorance or defect of reason. Since therefore that delectation lacks a similar excusing cause, and is wholly voluntary, and is concerned with an object OF ITSELF mortal, it will be mortal. Was not this opinion expressed in the preceding, even though in other words?

I answer to 2. There is no twisting there, nor could there have been any necessity of twisting. The Author was suggesting there that the hypothesis or question about which Suarez, Lugo, etc., who affirm that joy is licit, is one thing, but the hypothesis about which Sanchez, who denies it, is another. It was a deed worthy of its authors that the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 48) in some way set up the question according to the hypothesis of Suarez, Lessius, etc., and then in a manner often customary to them opposed (ibid., no. 49) to these Sanchez, Azor, etc., who discuss the question according to another hypothesis. The great confidence of St. Alphonsus toward the Salmanticenses caused that here, as also often elsewhere, he transcribed these things from them, and moreover added Collet, Roncaglia, and also Croix; although the last, since he sets up each hypothesis, therefore, as the matter demanded, in the one (book 5, no. 89) agrees with Sanchez, etc., but in the other (ibid., no. 91) with Suarez. But you would say that the Salmanticenses are less worthy of excuse in this, because since apud Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, etc., they could see each hypothesis most clearly proposed, and aptly solved according to the diverse merits of the cause, they opposed to them authors who did not even mention a word concerning the other hypothesis. But as to the fact that the VV., with no one preceding, undertook (l. c.) to refute the resolution of Suarez, etc., for the diverse hypothesis, it will have been enough to observe that the question is brought to this: whether the same fact, under a diverse aspect or consideration, can or cannot stir up a diverse and indeed right affection; and whoever understands this question will be able by himself to decide concerning the merit of the refutation.

The VV. add (page 142) that the authority of St. Thomas is invoked by the Author. But from what has been related in the Note, that appears false. For by the Author only two things are suggested. 1. Under a diverse consideration it is licit or not licit to have delectation concerning nocturnal illusion. 2. That St. Thomas stands against the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 20), that pollution in sleep is objectively evil if it comes from touch and a base dream; St. Thomas recalls even that which proceeds from a base dream to a natural cause. And these things suffice for the seventeen columns with which the VV. detain the reader. For concerning condemned propositions it will be said in its own place.

Concerning the general question proposed in the text, it will be useful to have indicated that several Doctors distinguish between things prohibited by the law of nature and things prohibited only by human law; and they affirm delectation illicit concerning the first genus, but not likewise as to the other, provided it is not done under the aspect of prohibition. Thus Sanchez (book 1, ch. 2, no. 10), Azor (part 1, book 4, ch. 6, q. 1), and others, whom St. Alphonsus follows (book 5, no. 27), saying, thus it must be held... whatever Croix says (book 1, no. 81). Yet immediately the Holy Doctor (l. c.) adds: Nevertheless it is not licit to be delighted concerning Mass left aside because of forgetfulness, and similar things; because the omission is objectively evil, as Roncaglia (treat. 2, ch. 3, q. 5) with Azor and Sanchez.

And in reality Roncaglia wrote thus, distinguishing with the Salmanticenses (whom he transcribes with their name passed over in silence) whether an impediment of fulfilling a precept withdraws from the obligation of the precept, or only excuses. Hence he deduces that it is licit for a youth to be delighted concerning the omission of a fast to which he is not yet held, and for the sick to be delighted concerning the omission of Mass; but otherwise if this happens from forgetfulness, because the omission then remains objectively evil; then he alleges Azor and Sanchez. But Sanchez in the very place cited by Roncaglia (book 1, ch. 2, no. 16) teaches the opposite and adds this exception to the general rule: Understand, unless concerning things prohibited only by human law... there is delectation about the material act, and as to its substance, with the prohibition set aside; in which case we said, no. 10, that it is not mortal to be delighted, even when breaking the precept is mortal, much less when it is freed from sin by ignorance. - But Azor (q. 1, book 4, ch. 6, q. 1): If he who is delighted thinking about eating flesh meats absolutely and in itself, but not as it is forbidden at certain times, does not sin, therefore it is because he does not take delectation from an evil thing insofar as evil; for the eating of flesh meats is not evil of itself. Tamburini (Decalogue, 1.3, ch. 5, sect. 1, no. 2) applies this doctrine to the omission of the Breviary, since the object of delectation can be the lack of labor and watching; and say the same of the omission of Mass, when someone can be delighted merely concerning the avoided inconvenience of a journey, rain, etc. The defect of coherence in this question is owed to the Salmanticenses, whom Roncaglia also copied; since they (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 37) say that in things prohibited by positive law the substance of the work can be set aside from its prohibition; and then they forget this very thing.

173. Resolves. - 1. If a penitent accuses himself of some depraved thought, he must be asked whether he knew it was a sin; and if he answers that he detested it as soon as he knew it was base, he must be judged wholly immune from sin. - If he answers that for some time he had some confused cognition of the malice, and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a God-fearing conscience. - Saettler.

2. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, but another to be delighted concerning the, for example, clever mode by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed of itself can lack fault); nevertheless the Confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who willingly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except to make manifest the ingenious mode by which they were performed; and certainly if the discourse were about honest actions, however ingeniously performed, they would generally perceive much less delectation. Say the same about those who eagerly read books less honest ¹⁰.

¹⁰ In these things it must chiefly be attended whether at other times the penitent is accustomed to consent to depraved delectation. For otherwise, that someone is more inclined and eager to be engaged in reading or hearing a base subject is not an indication of deliberate delectation from base things, but of human infirmity; and although the delectation by which the lower appetite is solicited is rejected, this does not impede weak nature from inclining toward matters of this kind more than toward other matters to be handled; especially because sometimes there also accedes a certain curiosity, which is accustomed to be sharpened toward new and unusual things the more a man would not dare without just cause to undertake that work. Hence the anxiety by which some are sometimes troubled must be calmed, because in handling these matters rather than others, or in hearing confessions of women rather than of men, they seem to themselves to be willingly engaged.

3. It is not mortal to be saddened concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is burdensome only, or in the divided sense of the law, for example concerning the burden of fasting. - St. Lig.

4. It is not licit to be delighted concerning the evil thing itself considered in itself, because the object of delectation is always evil. Nevertheless it is licit to be delighted concerning the good effect which proceeds from it, provided the order of charity is not violated ¹¹. Hence the following proposition under no. 15 was condemned by Innoc. IX: It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of his father perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thence obtained from the inheritance.

¹¹ The Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 47), whom St. Alphonsus followed (book 5, no. 20), fabricate a disagreement here among doctors, and accuse Vasquez, Lessius, Palau, etc., as if they taught that, on account of a good effect, it is licit to be delighted concerning a formally such sin, and consequently that affection can licitly be terminated, on account of a good end, in a thing intrinsically evil. But these things are wrongly fabricated, since no disagreement is had in these authors except perhaps in words. Let Lessius, with whom the others also agree, be heard (On Justice and Right, book 4, ch. 3, no. 105): When someone is said to rejoice concerning an evil work, insofar as it is the cause of good, it can be understood in two ways. First, that on account of the good effect he rejoices that that work is or was, or was done by himself; and this is wholly illicit, if that work was intrinsically sin: because this is to approve sin, and to have complacency in it on account of a good end.... For just as that effect, or relation to that effect, cannot effect that that work, which is intrinsically sin, be licit or good, so neither that it be worthy of joy and complacency.... Secondly it can be understood that he rejoices that that depraved work had or has such a good effect; and thus it is licit to rejoice concerning an evil work. For we do not rejoice that that work is evil; but supposing that it has been done, we rejoice that it gave cause for a good effect. For it is truly worthy of joy that by divine goodness the greatest goods proceed even from the worst works. But this is rather to rejoice concerning the effect than concerning the work, although we also rejoice concerning the causation of the good which belongs to the work.

** The VV. (page 145), having set forth the opinions, as they understood them, of Vasquez, Bonacina, Lessius, and Palau, conclude (page 144): Rightly therefore St. Alphonsus attributed to Palau and Lessius the opinion that it is licit to be delighted concerning an evil work not as sin, but as cause of the effect following. They add that Vasquez and Bonacina, whom they falsely say was added by St. Alphonsus, had progressed further; and therefore that a disagreement of doctors concerning this question exists.

I answer: 1. The mark of false accusation was attributed to the Salmanticenses, not because the accused Authors do not have that thesis, but because this is explained by the Salmanticenses as if the affection, as is said in the Note, were terminated to a thing intrinsically evil. But this is false; because the aspect of causality in the case is not evil.

2. It was said that there is no disagreement among the Doctors except in words. This is clear from the words of Lessius brought forward, and also from the fact that none of the Doctors whom the Salmanticenses and St. Alphonsus oppose as contrary has anything against the thesis thus proposed.

3. Finally, what the VV. add, that Vasquez and Bonacina progressed further, is an indication that they did not grasp even the least bit the opinion of Vasquez, and therefore of Bonacina; whence we think it happened that they wrote: Vasquez, S.J., teaches that it is not mortal sin to desire a formally evil work with efficacious will; which words indeed, having regard not to the mind of the VV. but to the words, carry open calumny. Vasquez and Sayrus, says Sanchez (book 1, ch. 2, no. 9), say that although in general an efficacious will (which they call desire) of any mortal thing is mortal, yet not every delectation concerning any work whatsoever, even by natural right prohibited under mortal sin, is mortal, provided it is not concerning the work under the aspect under which it is sin, or contrary to a precept. He then indicates their singular doctrine, which he says is proved most widely and learnedly by Vasquez, and concludes: And thus, although Vasquez admits that morose delectation of a mortal thing is mortal, nevertheless he recedes from the foundations by which the most common opinion proves this. These things prove that Vasquez, as to substance, did not recede from the common doctrine. Lugo himself also testifies to the same thing (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 363), saying: This opinion of Vasquez is embraced by not a few others, Reginald, Sayrus, and others, whom Diana reports and follows..., and Azor, Salas, Filliuccius, Bonacina, and Lessius apud the same Diana call it probable, and Castrus Palao follows the same. And he indeed adds (no. 364): This opinion is difficult perhaps more in the mode of explaining than in the thing itself; which he pursues up to no. 370. Yet that Vasquez declined to these absurdities which the VV. saw, neither Lugo, nor anyone else, saw through or suspected.

5. The Confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice about an advantage coming to them from their own or another's sin, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor ¹². The same is to be feared about him who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but which proceeds from his misfortune, for example from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For joy concerning the neighbor's evil can sometimes creep in rather than concerning the good effect thence proceeding, especially if he previously had enmity with him. Therefore the Confessor, if the matter seems to require it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent. - St. Lig., no. 20. - See Cases, no. 150 and following.

¹² The vigilance of the Confessor is opportune because of two things, namely 1. lest the desire or joy of a good effect (for those things which are said here about joy, from the common opinion of the Doctors, are almost valid concerning desire, or even concerning delectation) pass over into joy, or desire, or approval of sin considered in itself, from which that effect is caused; especially if someone has obtained profit of great moment from his sin; in which case joy and delectation concerning the great happiness acquired will indeed scarcely be abstracted from delectation in the evil cause. 2. Lest ever, namely even if any fault whatsoever of anyone is absent, or at least delectation concerning fault is absent, the order of charity be violated, which certainly demands that the good which we intend be reasonably preferable to the good of which we either wish another to be deprived or rejoice that he is deprived. Hence the condemnation of the proposition mentioned in the preceding number; for the order of charity does not permit that a son prefer the hope of inheritance to the death of his father. But concerning these things better where charity is treated.

— Morality of joy. 1. Complacency in an evil action done, or joy concerning a committed sin, necessarily participates in its theological and moral malice.

2. Joy concerning a work evil according to itself, but which, because of sleep, ignorance, drunkenness, was without fault, will sometimes but not always be excused. If the work was not a material sin, the object will be honorable: as if someone rejoices concerning a nocturnal pollution by which daytime temptations are hindered. But if it was a material sin, for example pollution procured by touches in sleep, in order that you may be able to rejoice about that act, the same cause is required on account of which you could permit it. That is, in order that you may licitly rejoice about that action because of the good effect, it is necessary that the good effect have proportion to the evil which is always a material transgression of the law.

Moreover, according to the variety of the precept, fault will vary in degree. Thus joy concerning a precept of abstinence violated without fault will be at most venial, even if you do not consider the proportion of the good effect. In this matter Innocent XI deservedly condemned this prop. 15: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent, perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, because of the great riches thence obtained by inheritance."

3. Joy concerning the good effect following from an evil work is not about an evil object, and therefore is not to be charged as a sin. Thus we conceive a most honorable joy concerning the glory of the martyrs, concerning our redemption consummated through the crime of the Jews, concerning public peace after the death of a tyrant.

This holds of itself even if the effect flowed from one's own sin, provided you detest the cause: thus concerning a fault which has been the occasion of penance. But such joy will sometimes be dangerous.

— What if you rejoice concerning a physical evil. Concerning the ruin, sickness, death of a neighbor, or concerning his evil that is not moral, it will be lawful to be delighted, and to the same extent it will be right to wish these things for someone, insofar as this is congruent with the order of charity; therefore, insofar as his temporal evil "is an impediment of the evils of another whom one is more bound to love, or of the community or Church," or "insofar as through the evil of punishment the evil of his fault is frequently impeded" (S. Th. 3 S. d. 30, q. 1 art. 1 ad 4). But one must beware lest, "when we pursue our own hatreds, we be deceived under the appearance of another's utility" (St. Greg. M., Moral. 22, c. 11, n. 23).

— You ask, how is boasting about sin, and sadness concerning good, to be estimated?

1. True boasting, not fictitious boasting, superadds to joy a glorying concerning an offense of God and scandal.

Fictitious boasting, for example from human respect, besides a lie, contains malice of itself grave, in grave matter, against the obligation of Christian profession.

2. Sadness concerning the trouble of a good work, or concerning a good work as troublesome, is commonly only venial torpor, unless it generates a true aversion from the thing itself, according to itself, or induces grave danger of omitting a work owed under grave obligation.

Yet sadness concerning divine friendship itself is condemned as mortal sloth, because it must be preserved with struggle; or concerning a vocation to divine beatitude, to be acquired through labors. Cf. Lehmk. I, 359.

— I. Interior acts which are directed to a complete external act are often one sin with the complete act. If they must be estimated separately, they are in the moral species of the complete act, yet they differ from it in species on account of this other notion: that they are incomplete, begun. Here we consider incomplete acts, omitting fruition, which is necessarily one with the consummated act.

II. Morose delight, or simple deliberate complacency in an evil object, participates in the species and gravity of this object, if it is absolute. If it is conditional and of the rational order, its morality will depend on the nature and force of the condition added. But if it is a delight of the sensitive appetite, since it follows the phantasm, which is concerning the concrete thing, it regards the object as it is in the concrete. Wherefore sensitive delight concerning copulation with an unmarried person will necessarily be evil venereal delight. Intellectual delight concerning copulation with an unmarried person under this condition: if she were one's own spouse, will be dangerous, but not objectively dishonorable. Thought of an evil thing can be good, evil, or indifferent; thence the delight will have to be estimated. Delight concerning the mode in which an evil thing has been done is not necessarily evil. Morose delight is specified by the object. But, in a venereal matter, by this name there is for the most part designated consent into a present carnal commotion, so that it is rather a consummated sin of solitary luxury, for which imagination was the instrument.

III. Absolute desire necessarily participates in the species, both moral and theological, of the exterior act. Conditional desire will be sinful or not, according as the affection which the inefficacious desire places in the will is honorable or not. Wherefore the true desire: I would eat meat unless it were forbidden, will be honorable; but this will be dishonorable: if it were not a sin, I would fornicate.

IV. Joy concerning a committed sin necessarily participates in its moral and theological malice. Joy concerning a work evil according to itself, but which, because of a subjective condition, was without fault, will be dishonorable if it was a material sin, unless there was a proportionate cause on account of which it could be permitted. According to the gravity of the precept, the fault will be venial or mortal. Thus joy concerning a violated precept of abstinence without fault will be only venial. Joy concerning a good effect is not of itself sinful, even if the effect follows sin. Joy concerning a non-moral evil of the neighbor will be excused insofar as it is not repugnant to the order of charity.

V. True boasting adds to joy glorying concerning an offense of God and scandal. Fictitious boasting, of itself, contains grave malice, in grave matter, against the profession of Christian life. Sadness concerning a good work as troublesome commonly is nothing except venial torpor, provided that it is not concerning divine friendship itself, because it must be preserved with struggle, or concerning beatitude to be acquired laboriously.

399. Notion. Joy, insofar as it constitutes a special internal sin, is the deliberate complacency which someone has concerning an evil thing carried out either by himself or by others.

It is therefore a certain approval of evil previously perpetrated. St. Alphonsus⁸⁶ and with him very many modern authors, such as Gury, Aertnys, Marc, Gopfert, etc., distinguish morose delectation from desire and joy in the following way: desire is concerning some future thing; joy is concerning a thing or act in the past; morose delectation is concerning the present imagination of some thing, abstracting from whether the thing itself is past or present or future. For morose delectation altogether abstracts from every external work. But the older authors took joy and morose delectation indiscriminately, or at least admitted no specific difference between the two, and consequently in their sense all those things which were said above concerning morose delectation are valid concerning evil joy.

To this joy are reduced a) boasting concerning a sin committed; b) sadness concerning an evil work not perpetrated or concerning a good work commanded by precept⁸⁷ having been performed.

In the sense of the moderns, the following things are to be noted concerning evil joy:

⁸⁶ L. c.

⁸⁷ If the good work was not commanded by precept, but was a mere counsel, as for example a private vow, then to be saddened concerning it is not a sin, if the sadness arose from a just cause; otherwise it is only a light sin, as lightly wounding the right order of reason.

400. Moral character. Joy can be concerned:

a) With the evil work itself perpetrated, vividly represented through memory and approved anew. In this case joy is entirely the same sin as that which was committed before. The reason is that the whole malice of sin is in the perverse act of the will. Moreover, this new act of the will is equally perverse as that which before was joined with the external work. Hence, for example, one who remembers adultery committed and rejoices concerning it again commits adultery in spirit and is bound to confess in clear words: I rejoiced concerning adultery committed; nor does it suffice to say: I rejoiced concerning obscene things. A fortiori these things are valid if someone boasts in an evil work perpetrated before others, since then the sin of scandal is added. In this case he is bound to confess: I boasted in such an evil work, for example in adultery, before several men.

b) With the ingenious manner in which an evil work has been done, but not with the work itself. Then those things are valid which were said above concerning morose delectation over the ingenious manner, namely such joy of itself is not a sin, but nevertheless is dangerous. In this sense "the Lord praised the steward of iniquity, because he had acted prudently."⁸⁸

c) With a good effect following from an evil work, for example someone rejoices over an inheritance which he acquired from the violent death of another man; or that famous example: the Church rejoices over the effect of Adam's sin, not over the sin itself, which was our redemption through Christ. Consequently on Holy Saturday it is sung: "O happy fault, which merited to have such and so great a Redeemer." Of itself it is clear that joy of this kind concerning a good effect is licit, whether the sin causing it was formal or material, provided nevertheless that only the good effect and not the sin is approved. For the good effect carries with it nothing disordered, if it is prescinded from the evil cause. Nevertheless such joy can be dangerous, because often it is not easy to separate the good effect from the evil cause. Attention must also be given to the proposition (15) condemned by Innocent XI: "It is licit for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches consequently obtained by inheritance."⁸⁹ This proposition indeed was deservedly condemned, since in it it is said: "it is licit to rejoice over parricide"; which is the same as saying, it is licit to rejoice over some evil thing. Moreover, the order of charity is gravely wounded, since such a son loves riches more than the life of his father. - Examples of such joy concerning a good effect following from an evil operation are very many. Thus we take delight in the glory of the Martyrs following from the detestable tyranny of the pagans, in the repentance of a youth, although we detest his crimes and quarrels, etc.

⁸⁸ Luc. 16, 8.

⁸⁹ Denz. n. 1165.

401. Scholion. On joy over the conjugal act, whether past or future. Here it is customarily asked whether it is licit for a widow to rejoice over an act of marriage legitimately had during matrimony, and whether it is licit for betrothed persons to rejoice over the future act of marriage. All authors teach that joy of this kind is to be avoided, since it is hardly possible that carnal movements and grave temptations should not arise from it. But theoretically speaking, a widow can rejoice over licit acts had in marriage, since such joy is nothing other than approval of a past licit act. As to betrothed persons the matter is more difficult, since in that case morose delectation concerning an object represented through phantasy is scarcely absent. Nevertheless, since all teach that it is licit for betrothed persons to desire future copulation, it does not so clearly appear why joy concerning the same future thing should be gravely prohibited to them. St. Alphonsus⁹⁰ proposes the stricter doctrine, saying: "Even with the danger of sensitive delectation set aside, it must more truly be said with Holzmann, Roncaglia, Sanchez, Vasquez, Azor, Laymann, Palao, Diana, etc., according to the Salmanticenses, that any delectation whatever of the will in betrothed persons and widows concerning future or past copulation is evil." But Ballerini⁹¹ rightly observes that the cited authors did not condemn delectation of this kind as such, but insofar as it induces sensitive or even venereal delectation. Hence also Cajetan⁹² says: "A widow who takes delight concerning past acts of marriage does not sin mortally, because she takes delight concerning works licit to her for the time in which they were licit. For to approve explicitly is more than to take delight, but it is clear that a widow licitly approves past pleasures." But Cajetan adds: "Nevertheless [the widow] sins venially in memory of this kind, because delectation of this kind lacks both necessity and piety, ... if nothing else is joined to it; but if you add that hence appetites arise in the concupiscible power in the widow, or movements in the flesh, it is necessary to recur to the rules concerning joined evils or dangers."⁹³

⁹⁰ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 24.

⁹¹ Opus. theol. I, tract. de pecc. n. 141 sqq.

⁹² Summa, s. v. "Delectatio morosa."

⁹³ Cf. also Billuart, De temperantia diss. 6, a. 15, § 4.

St. Alphonsus, V, 12; ed. G., II, p. 720; H. Ap., III, 47; Vind. Alph., P. 2, q. 2; Aertnys, I, n. 236; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 353; Ami du Cl., 1912, p. 1025.

345. Internal sins, as such, are all evil acts elicited by the will and deliberately willed, which are perfected in the mind. Concerning these the Tridentine Synod warns (Sess. XIV, c. 5) "that sometimes they wound the soul more gravely, and are more dangerous than those which are admitted openly." The reason is because they are more easily perpetrated, are less cared for, and especially in the article of death expose the soul to the danger of damnation (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 6, n. 4).

Internal sins are reduced to a threefold class: 1. to desire and purpose, which regard future time; 2. to joy or complacency, which look to past time; 3. to delectation, which refers itself to present time.

346. DEFINITION. Desire, not insofar as it is a passion, but insofar as it is an affection of the soul, is defined: An act of the rational appetite tending toward an absent good. As it is taken here, that is, as sin, it is an act of the will by which someone deliberately desires to complete an evil work by deed.

DIVISION. Desire, with respect to execution, is said to be: 1. inefficacious (or conditioned), which someone consents to execute if he could; which therefore stands without purpose and is called velleity, for example, if he says: if I could steal the treasure of the church, I would steal it; 2. efficacious (or absolute), if he consents to execute it with foresight, or at least hope, of completing the work, and thus a purpose is elicited, for example, if someone devises means for killing an enemy (V, 15; H. Ap., III, 47). Purpose is the act by which the will determinately wills and resolves to complete the work.

347. PRINCIPLES. I. Any desire, even inefficacious, or purpose, concerning an evil thing or action, is sin. This is clear both from the precept, "Thou shalt not covet," and from reason, because to seek evil is certainly repugnant to rational nature and to the divine ordination (recall the things said n. 316).

348. II. A depraved desire or purpose includes the same malice and species which are in the desired work. This is clear from Matt. (5:28): He who shall have looked upon a woman to covet her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. The reason is because the internal act of desire has its goodness and malice from the external act as from its object, indeed simply, that is, as it exists concretely (V, 12; H. Ap., III, 48). Cf. n. 312.

Hence: 1. It must be well examined whether he who admitted a depraved desire apprehended all the malices which are in the object, or only adverted to this or that one.

2. A penitent who elicited a desire, even inefficacious, of stealing ought to explain whether it concerned a grave thing. Likewise, he who basely desired a woman ought to say whether she is a blood-relative, or an affine, etc.; because such circumstances (unless they are invincibly unknown by the sinner) add new malice to the sin. Indeed, it is EXPEDIENT in hearing confession to understand whether the desire was efficacious or not, and a true purpose of perpetrating external sin, so that occasions to be fled and remedies to be applied may be better known.

349. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he sins gravely who wishes for some gravely evil object under the condition: IF IT WERE LAWFUL?

Resp. Regularly negatively, since the condition appended takes away in fact the malice of the work, because then the desire is borne toward an object stripped of malice.

I say regularly, because this is certain:

1. In those things which are forbidden by positive right alone; for example, if someone says: I would eat meat on Friday if the Church had not forbidden it; or: I would wish that today the eating of meat were not prohibited, so that I could feed on it. 2. In those things forbidden by natural right, which in some case and state are lawful: for example, I would kill an enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest.

This is also sufficiently probable if the matter concerns those things in which malice cannot be separated from the object, because then also malice is taken away, while the will, by wishing under a condition which it knows cannot be verified, does not truly wish, but rather shows a natural propensity. For the rest, desires of this sort commonly are dangerous, or at least idle.

But to desire that things intrinsically evil be lawful is a grave sin, for it is to wish for the inversion of the order of nature. Likewise, it is a grave sin if the condition appended does not regard the malice of the object, but the punishment or something else; for example, I would fornicate if there were no hell; I would kill an enemy if I were not a priest (V, 13; H. Ap., III, 50).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is lawful to wish temporal evil to a neighbor FOR A GOOD END?

Resp. 1. It is lawful, if the order of charity is preserved, namely so that temporal evil is wished for a greater good. Thus St. Alphonsus (V, 21) with St. Thomas and others commonly.

Hence it is lawful to desire temporal evil for a neighbor: a) on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; b) on account of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; c) on account of the good even of a third innocent person, provided that it is of greater moment. Thus, for example, it is lawful to wish for the death of a heresiarch, or of a disturber of public peace, on account of the common good and the good of many, according to that saying (Gal. 5:12): Would that they be cut off who trouble you. Likewise, it is lawful to be saddened by the fact that dignities are conferred upon the unworthy; or by the health of him who takes from it an occasion of sinning. Likewise, it is lawful to wish poverty, disease, or some other adversity to a wicked man, so that he may come to his senses. Nevertheless desires of this kind sometimes are not free from danger. Cf. II, 30; H. Ap., III, 63.

Resp. 2. It is not lawful in other cases, where, namely, the good intended does not surpass or at least equal the evil which is wished to the neighbor.

Wherefore it is illicit for a wife to desire the death of her husband because she is treated badly by him; and for a mother to desire the death of a daughter who, on account of deformity or poverty, lacks hope of marrying honorably. That these and similar things are not lawful is clear also from the condemnation of the 13th and 14th propositions made by Innocent XI, of which the former sounds thus: "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened about the life of someone, and rejoice about his natural death, ask and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal advantage"; but the latter: "It is lawful with an absolute desire to desire the death of one's father, not indeed as the evil of the father, but as the good of the one desiring, because, namely, a rich inheritance is going to come to him" (V, 22).¹

350. DEFINITION. Complacency is an act or affection of the will delighting itself in some thing. Joy, in general, is the complacency of the appetite in a good already obtained, or apprehended as such. As it is taken here, it is the deliberate complacency of the will concerning an evil work carried out either by oneself or by others (V, 15).

To this also can be recalled: 1. boasting about a sin committed; 2. sorrow or displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, or impossible; 3. sadness concerning a good carried out.

351. PRINCIPLES. I. Joy concerning an evil perpetrated is sin. For such joy includes approval of evil. The same must be said concerning displeasure on account of an evil not perpetrated, for example, on account of a theft omitted.

But sadness concerning a good carried out is not always sin, if, namely, a cause is present which renders the regret honorable, for example, after some vow not sufficiently considered when emitted. But if no cause rendering the regret honorable is present, he would sin venially who was saddened concerning a good act to which he was not bound; for this sadness would be against reason, since the proper object of sadness is an evil thing. But he would sin mortally if he were saddened concerning a good work to which he was bound from a grave obligation (Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2).

352. II. Joy concerning an evil carried out comprehends the whole malice of the work, and all its species. The reason is because joy or complacency in a work already perpetrated necessarily, just as desire also, embraces the sinful act as it exists in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the morality of these, not otherwise than a depraved desire.

Hence: 1. He who takes complacency for himself in the remembrance of past sins, and approves them, ought to explain in confession both the object of this complacency and its species-changing circumstances, if any are present. 2. Likewise, "he who boasts about a grave sin truly perpetrated by himself ought to explain in confession also the species of the sin; because then complacency concerning the sin done is commonly added to the boasting, and this takes the same species of sin. But otherwise if the boasting is about a fictitious sin" (V, 26; H. Ap., III, 48).

353. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether it is lawful to rejoice concerning an EVIL WORK ON ACCOUNT OF A GOOD EFFECT which followed from it?

Resp. 1. If the work is formally evil, namely perpetrated with sin, it is certain among all that it is not lawful to be delighted concerning it.

2. But if it is only materially evil, because it happened without sin, for example, homicide committed in drunkenness, there are not lacking authors who admit that the will can be delighted concerning it, as concerning the cause of a good effect.

But St. Alphonsus (V, 20; H. Ap., III, 52), with many others, says that the following must be held as truer: that such delectation is always illicit; because although the action was not formally sinful, nevertheless it was objectively evil. If someone therefore is delighted not concerning the effect alone, but concerning the evil thing itself, as concerning the cause of a good effect, the direct object of his delectation is an objectively evil thing; and therefore he sins.

Therefore you have among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI the 15th, which sounds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the enormous riches thereafter obtained from inheritance."² Hence they sin at least lightly (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 358), who are delighted concerning the omission of the Hours, or the eating of meat, or the breaking of a fast, even if these occurred from inadvertence or from ignorance (H. Ap., III, 54; cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 2).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is lawful to rejoice concerning THE GOOD EFFECT of an evil work?

Resp. It is lawful, speaking per se; because then the will is not borne into an evil object. We say speaking per se, that is, setting aside the danger of rejoicing concerning the evil work itself; for we are bound to avoid such danger (cf. n. 374).

Hence: 1. It is lawful to be delighted concerning relief following from pollution, whether accidental or voluntary, provided there is absent the danger of delighting oneself concerning the pollution itself, which, always and objectively evil, ought to be displeasing, even if inculpably in sleep, through touches or a base dream, it was had. 2. A son does not sin who rejoices concerning the obtaining of an inheritance on account of homicide; nor a woman who is delighted concerning gain acquired for herself from dishonest trade; provided that in these or similar cases the cause itself is always held in hatred (V, 20).

QUAER. 3. Whether it is lawful to rejoice or be delighted CONCERNING THE NOT EVIL MODE by which an evil action was carried out?

Resp. It is lawful, per se, because, since the mode of action was not evil in itself, the delectation is not concerning an evil object. Thus, without sin, stories, comedies, wars, homicides, frauds, thefts, quarrels, etc., often delight us (V, 18).

It was said per se, because by reason of danger it can be illicit. Thus those easily come into danger of delighting themselves concerning the evil thing who, for example, frequently and willingly hear certain base deeds, in the narration of which only the ingenious manner by which they were carried out seems to please. For if the discourse were concerning honest actions, even carried out in an ingenious manner, persons of this kind, for the most part, would perceive much less delight (Praxis, n. 40).

Note. The things which above (n. 349) were said concerning a licit object of desire can also be said concerning joy and complacency. For concerning the things which it is lawful to desire, concerning these it is likewise lawful to rejoice.

354. DEFINITION. Delectation, taken generally, is the rest of the appetite in a good possessed, that is, apprehended or had; and it can be in both the sensitive appetite and the intellective.

Morose delectation (or depraved thought properly so called) contains a double element: the thought by which an act of sin is rendered present, and the complacency of the will, by which it is delighted concerning that act as if it then executed it, yet without the intention of executing it (V, 15).

It is called morose not indeed from a delay of time, since even in one point of time every internal sin can be completed, but on account of the deliberate delay which the will makes in it.

The object of this delectation and of these thoughts is more often something illicit in itself, for example, homicide, fornication, and similar things; it can also be an object prohibited by positive law, for example, the eating of meat on a fast day, provided the will is borne toward it under the aspect of prohibition. For the law, with respect to these things, prohibits only the external action.

It is called depraved thought properly so called, that is, sinful, because the will, when it ought to have resisted it, rests in it. Therefore depraved thought is not to be confused with thought concerning a depraved thing, which thought can be lawful. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1912, p. 1025. See n. 357.

355. PRINCIPLES. I. Morose delectation is sin. For it is repugnant to right reason and to the divine law that someone have as pleasing what displeases God. Hence that saying (Hos. 9:10): They became abominable, like those things which they loved; and (Prov. 15:26): Evil thoughts are an abomination of the Lord.

356. II. Morose delectation takes its theological and moral species from the object which someone renders present to himself through the imagination of fantasy. The reason is because whoever is delighted concerning an act of sin takes that act as object, approves it, and adheres to it by his affection insofar as it is rendered present. Therefore, since morality is specified from the object, according to the grade and species of malice of the object, its delectation also will be evil with the same [malice]. Thus St. Thomas (1.2, q. 74, n. 8) and St. Alphonsus (V, n. 12). See the things said n. 347, 348.

357. Corollaries. 1. Speculatively speaking, it is very probable that morose delectation does not necessarily assume the specific malice of all the circumstances of the object. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as posited, or to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now, the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object, besides that which moves delectation. Thus, for example, if someone is delighted concerning copula with a married woman, not as married but only as beautiful, he does not commit adultery, since the circumstance of adultery does not move the delectation.

Note. But considering the matter practically, the opposite opinion greatly pleases St. Alphonsus, namely in the case where the delectation concerns some libidinous act with a determinate person. For then, on account of the corruption of human nature, there is a proximate danger of coveting or desiring, at least inefficaciously, the determinate object itself, especially if it is inordinately loved; and therefore these circumstances are to be explained in confession. But it would be otherwise if, from the nature of the thing, or from past experience, or from the disposition of the person, such a danger is judged not to be proximate (V, 15; H. Ap., III, 48). Cf. n. 1820.

2. It is lawful per se to be delighted concerning the thought or knowledge of an evil thing. We say: per se, that is, excluding depraved affection and danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself. For knowledge of evil is not per se evil, and therefore can be the object of the will, unless it is prohibited from elsewhere, or illicit.

Therefore the delectation which is had, not concerning the evil work, but concerning speculative or scientific thought of an evil object, can be: either 1. good, if a just cause of thinking is present, for example, on account of study, consultation, etc., with abomination of the object; or 2. venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc., with only remote danger; or 3. gravely evil, if, when the matter concerns a gravely evil work, there is present a proximate danger of consenting in the delectation (V, 17; H. Ap., III, 49).

Now, the danger of delighting oneself concerning the evil thing itself must practically be measured: a) from the mode of thinking; b) from the quality of the person thinking; c) from the matter thought about; d) from the cause on account of which it is thought about. Thus, for example, if someone reads a book less honorable, there must be considered: the mode by which he reads, for example, greedily; the quality of the reader, perhaps prone to venery; the book which is read, perhaps obscene by profession; the cause of reading, namely whether it is sufficient that the probable danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself be entered upon (Kon., n. 233).

3. It is not lawful for the betrothed and widowed, according to the truer opinion, to have delectation concerning the future or past work of marriage, even with the danger of sensitive delectation excluded. "The reason is because delectation renders the object present to itself; and therefore whenever the present object here and now is evil, since here and now there is absent the condition rendering marriage honorable, every actual delectation concerning it is also evil" (V, 24; H. Ap., III, 51).

"Another thing must be said concerning desire, by which the betrothed man wills future copula; for this is lawful, because, when the will is borne toward a future object, it can desire it under the condition by which the object will be lawful. But because in such desire there is also danger of delectation, therefore the betrothed are very much to be exhorted that they carefully turn away from themselves base thoughts of this kind." Concerning the Married, cf. n. 2111, 2.

358. Practical rules. The confessor, so that he may judge rightly concerning sinful thoughts, should duly attend to the following:

1. Lest he uselessly waste time through questions troublesome to himself and to the penitent, or even dangerous, let him not inquire concerning the species or number of thoughts unless it has first been clear to him concerning consent. Wherefore let him first ask the penitent whether he adverted that thoughts of this kind were sins. But if the penitent responds that he detested them as soon as he knew that they were base, he must be judged altogether immune from sin. If he responds that for some time he indeed had a confused knowledge concerning their malice, but did not attend to it perfectly, he is easily to be excused from grave sin, though not from venial.

2. But if the penitent is not able to free himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent, or perfect advertence, was lacking to him, especially if he is of timorous conscience. On the contrary, he who is accustomed to sins, and fears them little, in doubt must be presumed to have consented (Kon., n. 235). Recall the things said n. 337, q. 3.

228. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1° Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through the imagination as present, without desire.

2° Joy, or deliberate complacency in a past evil thing, or in an evil work performed either by oneself or by another.

3° Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if there is an intention or absolute purpose of executing it; otherwise it is called inefficacious.

But what the malice of these is, and what species, hold in these few things:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and assumes the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1° it is truly a sin. This is established from the precept: Thou shalt not covet, which must be understood generally and indefinitely of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is repugnant to right reason: for it is shameful and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, what it is not licit to execute.

2° It assumes the species of its object. For any desire whatever regards the external act as to be mandated to execution, either absolutely, if the desire is efficacious, or at least hypothetically, if it is inefficacious; necessarily therefore it is borne into that act according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or follow from it of their own accord. This is established also from the words of Christ:² He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood of adultery. Therefore ...

3° It also assumes the species of the circumstances of the object. This is clear from the reason just brought under 2°. Hence in confession, for example, of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, the bond of matrimony, or a vow of chastity, which affect the desired person, must be declared.

229. • II. Joy likewise is a sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is conversant, and similarly assumes the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself.

The reason is because joy, as we said above, is the approval of past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the whole malice of these. - Hence he who takes complacency in the recollection of past sins and approves them must in confession explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting concerning a sin committed, sorrow over evil not performed, and also sadness over good accomplished are to be referred back to joy.

230. • III. Morose delectation 1° is certainly a sin; 2° it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is because it is repugnant to rational nature and to divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant from right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object indicates affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is evil affection, as is clear. Therefore ... Hence Osee:² They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Proverbs:³ Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord.

The reason for the second is because whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in the very degree and species in which the object is evil, in the same entirely will the delectation concerning it be evil. Therefore ... St. Thomas¹ and St. Alphonsus.²

Does it also assume the malice of the circumstances of the object? Negatively, very probably, theoretically speaking. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object besides that which moves delectation. In practice, however, the opposite opinion is very pleasing to St. Alphonsus,³ namely because of the proximate danger of depraved desire. Yet if you foresee that the penitent will be induced with difficulty to open the circumstances of the object thought upon, because of the speculative probability of the former opinion you will prudently abstain from troublesome questions. Thus with Billuart, Scavini, T. I, n. 923.

231. Questions. - Quaer. 1° ON DESIRE. Is it licit to desire evil under a condition, if it would be licit?

Resp. Distinguish. Affirmatively of itself if the appended condition removes the whole malice of the thing; the reason is because such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which through the condition the malice is wholly excluded. But negatively in the other hypothesis; the reason is because such an affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove the malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however appended, cannot remove the malice. For things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and therefore a condition would be appended uselessly, since to choose such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed.⁴

Nevertheless he would probably have to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but would only disclose what he would will in another condition of things. - St. Alphonsus⁵ with others. Besides, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this sort are, even if the appended condition removed the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife; which desires Cajetan rightly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because, although such a desire is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in venereal matters will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditional desires concerning things prohibited by positive law alone must also be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes they can labor under some inordinate affection.

Hence the confessor must prohibit betrothed persons from lingering in the desire of intercourse to be had in future matrimony; for "great" is "the danger of present delectation, which is evil when the condition which gives honorable character to that object is absent." Yet often betrothed persons and widowers are in good faith, not thinking it to be mortal to be delighted concerning a licit object, as intercourse in matrimony is; and therefore the confessor will prudently be silent about mortal sin, unless he should see pollution to follow from that complacency.

232. • Quaer. 2° ON JOY. Is it licit to rejoice 1) concerning the evil act itself because of the good effect following from it; 2) concerning the good effect of an evil act?

Resp. to the 1st: Negatively, and this (provided the reason for the prohibition of the act is not to be sought precisely from advertence alone, as for example in a lie) even though it was materially evil only. The reason is because then the act was evil from the object. This is also clear from proposition 15 among those condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV), in which the discussion is evidently of an act materially evil only, of parricide committed in drunkenness.

Hence they sin who are delighted concerning the eating of meat, or the breaking of fast, from ignorance or oblivion, even involuntary, or concerning nocturnal pollution not purely natural, that is, proceeding also from some cause other than from nature discharging itself; for example, from base phantasms presented to the imagination of the sleeper, or from touches wholly involuntary.²

Resp. to the 2nd: Affirmatively, provided there is absent a probable danger of formal sin; for in this case you do not rejoice concerning evil. Yet I said: provided it is absent, etc. The reason is because, as was said at n. 87, I, without a sufficient cause it is licit for no one to expose himself to such danger. Therefore it will be licit, speaking of itself, or setting aside that danger, to rejoice concerning the discharge caused by pollution, even voluntary, or concerning the obtaining of an inheritance from homicide.¹ - Each response is valid also concerning desire and delectation.

233. • Quaer. 3° ON DELECTATION. Is it licit to be delighted concerning 1) the thought of an evil thing; 2) the mode?

Resp. to the 1st: Affirmatively, provided there is absent a proximate danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself, as St. Thomas² explains in the following words: "Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted in two ways: in one way concerning the thought itself, in another way concerning the fornication itself thought of; ... but the thought itself according to itself is not a mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for instance when someone thinks uselessly about it; but sometimes it is wholly without sin, for instance when someone usefully thinks about it, as when he wills to preach or dispute about it," etc. - But the danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself in practice must be measured from the mode of thinking, - from the quality of the person thinking, - from the matter thought upon, - from the cause on account of which it is thought upon. Thus, if someone reads a less honorable book, these things must be considered: the mode in which he reads, for example eagerly; - the quality of the reader, perhaps prone to venery; - the book which is read, for example obscene by design; - the cause of reading, namely whether it is sufficient that he expose himself to the probable danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself.

Resp. to the 2nd: Affirmatively, provided 1) the mode is not evil of itself, and 2) the danger of which we have just spoken is absent. The matter is clear of itself. Thus he does not sin who laughs at the mode in which a drunk man proceeds with his foot wavering because of wine; because the mode of itself is not evil. On the contrary, he sins who is delighted concerning the frauds and lies which he used to seduce a girl, because those frauds and lies are evil. - But because of the danger of delectation concerning the evil thing, those can easily sin who, for example, frequently and willingly hear certain base things which do not seem to be narrated except to show the ingenious mode in which they were done; for if the conversation concerned honest actions, even if done more ingeniously, they would for the most part perceive much less delectation.

234. • Quaer. 4° Whether and when does he sin who does not resist the motions of concupiscence?

Resp. By concupiscence in this place we do not understand a passion of the sensitive appetite, indifferent to good or evil, insofar as it is considered as diminishing or even altogether removing the voluntary (n. 12-14), but the tinder of depraved desires, or propensity to evil, residing not only in the inferior appetite but also in the superior. Concerning the motions of this concupiscence hold these things:

Principles. - I. However much the soul may be struck by the stimuli of the depraved tinder, there will never be any stain of sin, unless the will in some way either consents to them, or does not impede them when it can and ought to impede them. Common and certain. - See St. Thomas.¹

II. Motions of the will which are first-first, namely those which precede any deliberation of reason whatever and are elicited before attention is given to the object's agreement with the rule of morals, are wholly without fault. The reason is because insofar as they precede deliberation of reason and advertence to moral malice, they are neither voluntary nor free, and consequently are free from formal sin. Thus all Theologians.

III. Motions of the will which are second-first, namely those which follow upon some use of reason, yet are elicited with only slight, obscure, and imperfect advertence to the rule of morals, in any matter, even grave, are only venial sin. The reason is because acts of this sort are imperfectly free and only semi-deliberate; and so on account of the imperfection of the act they are excused from grave fault. Thus likewise the common opinion of Theologians.

Resolves. - 1° Motions, however depraved, so long as they displease the will, even after advertence to the rule of morals, are free from all fault.²

2° One who bears himself negatively, that is, neither consenting nor resisting, when the danger of consent is absent, sins lightly; otherwise, in grave matter and when a just cause of bearing himself negatively is lacking, gravely. Hence:

a. In vehement motions, which greatly allure the consent of the will to grave sin, because, for example, venereal delectation is added, it is illicit to bear oneself negatively or indifferently, but there is required a positive act of resistance or at least of displeasure, and this under grave obligation; since with the same obligation by which one is held to avoid sin itself, one is also held to avoid the danger of it. Direct resistance is nevertheless not necessary; but indirect resistance suffices, and indeed is more advisable, namely by turning the mind to other things; nor is material resistance necessary, for example by pressing excited parts over the clothing, although that can be useful. But prayer will be best. - Resistance that is positive indeed, but tepid, excuses from mortal sin, but not from venial.

b. In carnal motions with which there is not joined a proximate danger of consent, to bear oneself negatively is not free from venial sin, since we are held to take care lest the appetite disturb reason even lightly, or entice to sin, even only remotely. - But light motions are better resisted by contempt.

c. There is no sin in bearing oneself negatively, if a just cause is present, as if you have experienced that the motions are increased by positive resistance or anxious solicitude or reflex thought; or the motions arise from an action necessary or useful, for example from hearing confessions, from reading base matters useful to be known, from a touch necessary for healing, and similar things.¹

235. • Quaer. 5° What is to be done with a penitent accusing himself of some depraved thought?

Resp. Lest you waste time uselessly and through questions annoying to you and the penitent, or even dangerous, do not inquire about the species or number unless first it is sufficiently certain to you concerning consent. But that you may recognize this, he must be asked whether he noticed that it was a sin; and if he answers that he detested it as soon as he knew it was base, he must be judged entirely immune from sin. - If he answers that for some time he had some confused knowledge of the malice and adhered to it, but without fully attending to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking, especially if he is of timorous conscience. On the contrary, he who is accustomed to sins or abhors them little is, in doubt, presumed to have consented; for in doubt a prudent presumption is sought from things commonly occurring. - But commonly it happens that a pious man does not consent without knowing that he is really consenting to sin; while a depraved man does not resist sin without a struggle, which indeed removes doubt concerning consent or dissent.

He who doubts whether he did something while awake or sleeping, in possession of himself or not, is judged not to have sufficiently adverted nor consented; for he who is awake sufficiently perceives himself to be awake.

If there is a defect of age, that is, before the completed seventh year, at least perfect advertence and full consent are not presumed, unless malice certainly supplies for age (yet see n. 548, q. 1° and n. 1344, 7°). Finally, the mere continuation of a depraved thought is not an indication of consent; since both temptation and resistance can be long-lasting.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 7, 9.

456. Morose delight, desire, and joy differ: the first regards present time because it is concerned with an object insofar as it is here and now present to us by cognition; desire regards the future because it is an act of the will wishing for an evil thing; finally joy regards the past and is complacency or approval of an evil work perpetrated by the one rejoicing or by others. In other words, morose delight is consent in the thought present delight alone and not in the act itself; desire is also consent in the future act and in the act to be placed; joy in the past act and in the act placed.

1. If the act were present so that the sin were committed here and now, delight concerning it as present would not be morally distinct from the sin.

2. "It is wrong to confuse consent in a past act with consent in the delight of a past act thought of as present, which is morose delight." Waffelaert, De Virtutibus Cardinalibus, p. 323.

By reason of the object, desire is twofold: efficacious or absolute, which is called proposal, when someone proposes to perform the work; inefficacious or conditioned, when he wills that the work be performed by himself or by another under a certain given condition, for example, if nothing stood in the way, if he could, if it were licit, etc. This is not conditioned on the part of the will but on the part of the object: for it is not a merely interpretative will which someone does not have but would have if he knew something (this does not exist), but an actual will which he has here and now and by which he now establishes and intends that he would will the work to be performed if the condition were given.

457. Principle I. Absolute desire and joy have the same species and gravity of malice, mortal or venial, which the work has about which they are concerned, to be perpetrated or perpetrated, with all known circumstances (Matt. V, 28): for the interior act of the will has malice from the exterior act as from the object; for desire tends into the work really to be placed and consequently not as represented in the intellect as delectable but as it is on the part of the thing, and joy is concerning a past work as it was, and each tends into all the circumstances which are in the work and are not separable from it in the concrete. Whence, by difference from morose delight, desire contracts the malice of all circumstances, even those which are not held as delectable nor are the motive of the will.

Thus, for example, he who desires to sin with a married woman, not because she is married but because she is beautiful, is guilty of adultery; and he who wills to steal a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, is guilty of sacrilege. "In practice, however, it not rarely happens that desires are not referred to an object altogether determined, but rather to something generic. For example, someone desires to take revenge on his enemy, without determining the mode by which he wills that revenge; or someone desires to sin carnally with a person of the other sex, without being conscious to himself of the special act to be committed. In these cases it suffices to confess: I willed to take revenge on my enemy, or I willed to sin with a person of the other sex" (Prummer, Theologia Moralis I, n. 403).

458. Principle II. Conditioned desire, under a condition which takes away all malice from the object, per se is not sin, yet often it is idle and sometimes dangerous. Hence:

a) in all things prohibited only by positive right, desire under the condition "if it were not prohibited" is licit;

b) in things prohibited by natural right, naturally or ordinarily illicit or illicit outside a state, but licit in some case or state, desire is licit (although dangerous) under the condition of this state or case, for example: I would kill Peter if God commanded it; I would take a wife if I were not a religious; I would hang a thief if I were a judge; I would have intercourse with her if she were my wife;

c) things prohibited by the right of nature as essentially evil, which are never licit, are never licitly desired, because malice cannot be separated from them, for example: if it were not sin, I would will to blaspheme, to commit sodomy, to perjure myself, to avenge myself, etc.; for an impossible condition cannot take away malice.

Locutions of this kind, however, rather often only signify a natural propensity into such an object, without affection toward it, so that the sense is: I am inclined to blaspheme but I do not will it on account of the law of God; and then they are not sin. On the contrary, if it were a true desire or consent in the work, or if the sense were: I would will blasphemy not to be sin, which would still be worse than the simple desire of blasphemy.

459. Principle III. Conditioned desire, if the condition partially takes away the malice of the object, is sin, but less than absolute desire: namely, it puts on the malice which remains in the object, but does not contract that which was taken away. Thus if someone were to say: if I were not a priest I would fornicate, he would contract the malice of fornication, not of sacrilege, because the condition takes away the malice of this.

460. Principle IV. Conditioned desire, if the condition, as not pertaining to morality, in no way takes away the malice of the object, puts on its malice with all the circumstances. - The reason is that even conditioned desire consents and tends into the external work according to itself and as it is on the part of the thing. Thus if someone were to say: I would fornicate if there were no hell; if I could secretly, I would take revenge.

A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1st. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through imagination as present, without desire.

2nd. Joy, or deliberate approval of an evil work performed either by oneself or by another, by which the will holds the perpetrated evil as pleasing and acceptable.

3rd. Desire, or an act of the will seeking an evil thing as to be obtained, and therefore to be carried out by work. It is called efficacious if there is present an absolute purpose of carrying it out; inefficacious if there is present only conditioned consent, for example, if someone says: I would steal if I could; or I would fornicate with this woman unless I feared infamy, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Therefore morose delectation is concerned with the object, not as it is in itself, but as here and now it is presented to the imagination; joy, on the contrary, and desire are concerned with the object as it once was or will be in itself.

I Say 1st. Desire of an evil thing, even inefficacious, is truly sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances. The reason for the first is that it is base and dishonorable to desire absolutely or conditionally what it is not lawful to carry out. The reason for the second is that every desire, even inefficacious, tends toward its object, and therefore is a willing of the special malice of that object, and so contracts it. The reason for the third is the same; for desire, since it tends toward the object as to be carried out by work, reaches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. - Hence in confession, for example, of a desire of fornicating, there must be declared the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the desired person. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 12.

I say 2nd. Joy likewise is sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action with which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of past evil, which necessarily embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, clothed namely with its circumstances. Hence one who, in the recollection of past sins, takes complacency in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned again in act.

To joy are to be reduced boasting concerning a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed.

I say 3rd. Morose delectation is certainly sin, and certainly also takes on the gravity and species of the objects exhibited to the mind. The reason for the first is that it is repugnant to rational nature and divine law for the will to hold as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Besides, deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear of itself. Therefore ... Hence in Osee ix, 10, it is said: "They became abominable like those things which they loved." But the reason for the second is that whoever takes delight in an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection; and therefore the malice of that delectation will plainly be evil with the same gravity and species by which the object is evil. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 74, art. 8. - St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Question 1. Does morose delectation take on also the specific malice of the circumstances of the object, as desire and joy do?

Response. Negatively, probably, according to many theologians; and the reason is that simple delectation does not tend toward the object as it really exists, but rests in it as it is represented by phantasy. Moreover this, neither from the nature of the thing nor in fact, is accustomed to represent all circumstances, but only that one which moves the delectation more. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15. - Baller., note (a), p. 148.

Question 2. Is it lawful to desire an evil under the condition, if it were licit?

Response. Affirmatively, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the thing, because such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object from which by the condition malice is altogether excluded. But the response would be negative in another hypothesis, because such an affection tends toward an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object even as represented, as would be blasphemy, perjury, etc. Nevertheless he would probably be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly did not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but only showed his propensity toward that object. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 27; and Hom. Ap., n. 50.

For the rest, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition added would remove the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural right, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Bertha if I did not have a wife. Cajetan deservedly calls these desires foolish and diabolical temptations. Indeed also other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive right are to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection. - Cf. Cajet., under the title Sins of Thought.

Question 3. Is it lawful to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left aside from forgetfulness?

Response. Although it is never lawful to rejoice or take delight either concerning an evil omission or concerning an evil work, even when inculpably admitted, according as they were evil in themselves; yet it is lawful, of itself, that is, with the danger of consent to delectation concerning the evil cause excluded, to rejoice or take delight concerning the good and honorable effect which arose from them.

But whether it is also lawful to rejoice or take delight concerning the evil cause itself, not according as it is evil, but according as it was the cause of a good effect, many affirm with Lessius, Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, and others; but St. Alphonsus, with several others, denies it, alleging proposition 15, condemned by Innocent XI, which holds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thereafter obtained from the inheritance." - But it must be said that it is not clear whether by this proposition absolutely every joy concerning an inculpable evil work was condemned; or rather only the joy was reprobated by which the son, against the right order of charity, places the good of a much inferior order, namely the riches obtained from it, before the death of his parent. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Lessius, de just. et jure, lib. 4, cap. 3, n. 105. - Suarez, disp. 5, sect. 7, n. 15. - Lugo, de poenit., disp. 16, n. 389. - Viva, in the cited proposition, n. 12. - Baller., note (a), p. 152; and note (c), p. 186.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is not lawful to be delighted concerning nocturnal pollution according to itself and on account of its pleasure, but it is certainly lawful to be delighted concerning it according as it is an exoneration or alleviation of nature. For the defect of free consent through sleep, although it cannot make licit a delectation inherent in an evil work which thereafter is freely taken, nevertheless can very well excuse the exterior work from fault. And this is the true doctrine of St. Thomas, who also refers a base dream to the natural cause of pollution, to which can be reduced also the touches or motions following that same dream. "For when," he says, "seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of the humor has been made, ... the one sleeping dreams those things which pertain to the expulsion of such abundant or resolved humor; just as also happens when nature is burdened from some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination." - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 154, art. 5; and in 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Baller., note (b), p. 149.

2nd. The confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice concerning an advantage coming to them from their own sin or another's, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor. The same is to be feared concerning one who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but one which arises from his misfortune, for example, from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For sometimes joy concerning the evil of the neighbor can creep in rather than concerning the good effect arising from it, especially if he previously bore enmity against him; therefore the confessor, if the matter seems to demand it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent.

• Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

3rd. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, and another to be delighted concerning the manner, for example, an ingenious one, by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed can of itself be free from fault), nevertheless the confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who gladly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except for manifesting the ingenious manner by which they were done, especially when a habit of consenting to evil delectation confirms this suspicion.

4th. It is not mortal to be sad concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is only troublesome, or in the divided sense of the law, for example, concerning the trouble of fasting.

5th. If the penitent accuses himself of some evil thought, he is to be asked whether he knew it to be sin; and if he responds that he detested it as soon as he knew it to be base, he is to be judged altogether immune from sin. - If he responds that for some time he had some confused cognition of malice and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial sin. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it is to be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a timorous conscience.