Chapter I. On Internal Sins

167. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited by the imagination as present, without desire.

2. Joy, or deliberate complacency concerning a past evil thing, or an evil work performed either by oneself or by another ¹.

¹ Complacency here does not mean pleasure or delight drawn from consideration of the evil object, but rather a certain approval by which the will has the evil perpetrated as pleasing and accepted: which approval indeed can be called joy in this sense, that someone concerning the evil deed not only is not sorry, as he ought to be, but rather rejoices.

Moreover joy is properly said also of a present good; indeed it is customarily defined as enjoyment of a good possessed and loved (Suarez, On 1.2, treat. 2, disp. 7, sect. 1, nos. 3-5). Concerning which matter St. Thomas says thus (1.2, q. 31, art. 3): Joy is a certain species of delectation... For we are delighted also in those things which we desire, when we obtain them.... But the name of joy does not have place except in delectation which follows reason; whence we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but only the name of delectation.

3. Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if an intention or absolute proposal of executing it is present; otherwise it is called inefficacious ². - St. Lig., no. 15.

² It is necessary that some efficacy be present even in inefficacious desires; otherwise they would not even deserve the name of desire. Namely there is present a conditionally efficacious will, which would pass into work unless something else obstructed. Hence St. Alphonsus well says (book 5, no. 15): A desire is called inefficacious if it does not propose absolutely to execute, but consents that it would execute, if it could, when, for example, it says: If I could steal the treasure of the Church, I would steal it.

But what the malice of these is, and what the species, hold in these few words:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1. it is truly a sin. For this is established from the precept, Thou shalt not covet, which must generally and indefinitely be understood of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is opposed to right reason: for it is base and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, that which it is not licit to execute.

2. It takes on the species of its object. For any desire, even inefficacious, tends to its object, and consequently is a volition of the special malice of that object, and therefore contracts its specific malice ³. This is also established from the words of Christ, Matth. 5.28: He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood as adultery. Therefore...

³ The internal act about which this treats here regards the external act as to be entrusted to execution, either absolutely or at least hypothetically; therefore it is necessarily carried to it according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or of their own accord follow from it.

3. It also takes on the species of the circumstances of the object. For desire, since it tends to an object, touches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. Hence in confession, for example of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the person desired must be declared. - St. Lig., no. 12.

168. • II. Joy likewise is a sin and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances joined to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of a past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also takes on the whole malice of these.

Hence he who in the recollection of past sins is complacent in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency, and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting about a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed ⁴, must be recalled to joy.

⁴ Understand this especially of a work which had to be performed by strict obligation; and thus sadness of this sort will be such a sin as a refusal to fulfill the obligation would have been. But if the discourse is about a good act to which one was not held, to repent without just cause of a good of this kind will certainly not lack some venial fault; since this is against reason, because the proper object of repentance is an evil thing; but there will be no fault if a cause is present which makes the repentance honorable. Confer what Sanchez has concerning one who repents of a vow emitted (On the Decalogue, book 4, ch. 12, no. 2).

169. • III. Morose delectation 1. is certainly a sin; 2. it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is that it is opposed to rational nature and divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it: but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear ⁵. Therefore... Hence Osee 9.10: They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Prov. 15.26: Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord. Therefore...

⁵ The guilt of morose delectation appears easily, since in reality it is nothing other than consent to delectation concerning an evil work. Thus St. Thomas, where he excellently distinguishes delectation about the thought of an evil work, which does not pertain here, and delectation about the evil work thought of (1.2, q. 74, art. 8): Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted about two things. In one way, about the thought itself; in another way, about the fornication itself thought of... But the thought itself, according to itself, is not mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for example when someone thinks about it uselessly; but sometimes it is without any sin at all, for example when someone thinks usefully about it, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it. And therefore consequently the affection and delectation which is thus about the thought of fornication is not of the genus of mortal sin, but sometimes is venial sin, sometimes none. Whence neither is consent to such delectation mortal sin... But that someone thinking about fornication is delighted ABOUT THE ACT ITSELF thought of, this happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act. Whence that someone consents to such delectation is nothing other than that he consents in this, that his affection be inclined toward fornication: for no one is delighted except concerning that which is conformable to his appetite. But that someone chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which according to themselves are mortal sins is mortal sin. Whence such consent to the delectation of mortal sin is mortal sin.

More briefly Laymann (book 1, treat. 3, ch. 6, no. 2): It is one thing to be delighted about the thing thought of, for example fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thing itself, but thought is only the condition proposing and applying the thing thought of; but another thing is to be delighted about the thought, for example of fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thought itself... We are speaking here about delectation WHICH IS TAKEN FROM THE THING ITSELF. For since the thought of an evil thing is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, as if you think about base things for the sake of teaching or admonishing, but sometimes venially evil, as if you think about the same things from curiosity; it follows that delectation also concerning such thought as object is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, sometimes venially evil.

The reason for the second is that whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in what degree and species the object is evil, in the same plainly will its delectation be evil. Therefore... - St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 74, art. 8. - St. Lig., no. 15.

170. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether morose delectation also takes on the specific malice of circumstances, as desire and joy do?

I answer: It is controverted. Probably no. The reason is that simple delectation does not tend to the object as to be placed, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object besides that which moves the delectation ⁶. Lugo, Laymann, Reuter, Bonacina, etc., against others who contend that simple delectation takes on all the species of the object, just as desire itself does. St. Lig. says that each opinion is probable, book 5, no. 15 ⁷.

⁶ This opinion does not deny that specific malice is taken also from circumstances, if these also are the object of delectation; but if the delectation, as Sanchez says (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 11), whom therefore the Salmanticenses wrongly allege for the opposite opinion, no differently than several others there reported by Sanchez (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 31), is not carried to the object according to its whole malice apprehended, but according to a part, as to a woman apprehended indeed as not his own, yet not as married to another or a nun; it will not have the whole malice of the external work, but only the malice apprehended, and that alone will have to be confessed, and it will be reduced to the species of simple fornication.

This hypothesis indeed is founded in the nature of the thing. For it happens that the will is carried to that which is indeed delectable, the circumstances of which, far from alluring, rather blunt the appetite, for example that the woman is already married to another, that she is a nun, or a blood relative, etc., which the Salmanticenses also suggest (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 30), where they well advert that the things said above hold indeed concerning the circumstances of the object, but not concerning the circumstances of the person sinning, for example if he is married or bound by a vow of chastity, although these circumstances contribute nothing to the delectation.

⁷ ** Although St. Alphonsus says that the opinion of the Author is very probable, nevertheless he adds (ibid.) that he greatly likes what Holzmann says (On the Precepts of the Decalogue, treat. 2, no. 698), that, for example, the circumstance of adultery must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of desiring at least inefficaciously, etc. And the VV. (page 913, no. 20) recall here those things which the Holy Doctor has elsewhere (Apostolic Man, treat. 3, no. 48), where after alleging some from the indicated false allegations of the Salmanticenses, he adds that in practice... without doubt all the circumstances of the object must be explained in delectation.

I answer: The opinion of Holzmann will be able to have place when he who is morosely delighted concerning an evil object at the same time has known that he is then violating the obligation of guarding against the grave and proximate danger of falling into depraved desire for that same object. But otherwise in the other hypothesis. The reason is clear from the first principles of ethics; for no sin is ever committed if some notion of obligation does not shine beforehand.

171. • QUESTION 2. Whether it is licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

I answer with a distinction: Yes, of itself, if the condition applied takes away the whole malice of the thing; the reason is that such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which by the condition malice is wholly excluded. But no in the other hypothesis; the reason is that such an affection tends to an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not take away malice from the object even as represented, and consequently the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition however applied cannot take away malice. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and consequently a condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish for such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed. - St. Lig., no. 27; Apostolic Man, no. 50.

Yet he is probably to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not wish that that which was intrinsically evil should become licit, but only would show his propensity toward that object. - St. Lig., Apostolic Man, ibid., with others. Moreover everyone sees how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition applied were to take away the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, but licit in some case or state, for example: I would kill an enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by a vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife. Such desires Cajetan (Sins of Thought) deservedly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because although a desire of this kind is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in a venereal matter will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive law are also to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection ⁸.

⁸ Sometimes desires of this kind can be neither idle nor disordered, namely if they are concerning a good object, for example if, with a suitable condition applied, a married man were to foster desires about undertaking sacred ministries and enjoying Communion of the chalice, or a Religious bound by vow of poverty about distributing alms, building hospitals, adorning churches, etc., or a cleric about destroying the enemies of the Church in a just battle, etc.

172. • QUESTION 3. Whether it is licit to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left undone from forgetfulness?

I answer: No, if the joy is referred to the omission insofar as it is objectively evil. But yes, if it is referred only to the pleasure or advantage honest in itself. - Suarez, On Sins, disp. 5, sect. 7, no. 15. - Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 389, etc., against others who deny it without distinction ⁹.

⁹ Suarez and Lugo, alleged here by the Author, and also others commonly, hand this down not only concerning the omission of a commanded work, but generally concerning any act whatsoever evil according to itself, which nevertheless someone performed without fault, namely from inadvertence or ignorance, or in madness, sleep, drunkenness: namely, that it is not licit to rejoice concerning the past act according to itself and on account of its pleasure; nevertheless it is licit to rejoice concerning the good effect thence following, and therefore concerning that act only insofar as it was the cause of such an effect, as Suarez says.

Here carefully observe those words: According to itself and on account of its pleasure; for by these is excluded the reason because of which St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 20) seems with Sanchez and certain others to depart from this doctrine. For Sanchez shrewdly observes (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 16) that the aforesaid causes, which are reduced to defect of free consent, indeed excuse the exterior work from fault, but do not likewise make licit the delectation inherent in an evil work which is later freely taken. And hence comes the solution of the question whether it is licit to rejoice concerning pollution in sleep, or even to desire it. For as St. Thomas teaches (on 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5), it will be a sin if pollution pleases on account of the delectation; but not if it pleases as an unloading or alleviation of nature. Concerning this matter see the same St. Thomas (2.2, q. 154, art. 5), where, contrary to what St. Alph. has, l. c., he recalls to the natural cause of pollution a base dream, to which also the touches or movements following that same dream can be reduced. For when, he says, seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of humor has occurred... the sleeper dreams those things which pertain to the emission of such abundant or resolved humors; as also happens when nature is burdened by some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination.

** The VV. (page 140) move a twofold complaint: 1. that you will seek in vain in the text of Sanchez the words brought above; 2. that the Author twists Sanchez into his own sense.

I answer to 1. There the opinion of Sanchez is reported, not the words. If the VV. desire that opinion expressed in the words of Sanchez, behold it (l. c.): As often as the cause excusing the exterior deed from mortal fault, namely defect of consent, does not concur in the delectation itself, although the deed is free from fault, nevertheless the delectation will not be free from sin.... The reason is that that deed was OF ITSELF mortal, and free from fault solely by ignorance or defect of reason. Since therefore that delectation lacks a similar excusing cause, and is wholly voluntary, and is concerned with an object OF ITSELF mortal, it will be mortal. Was not this opinion expressed in the preceding, even though in other words?

I answer to 2. There is no twisting there, nor could there have been any necessity of twisting. The Author was suggesting there that the hypothesis or question about which Suarez, Lugo, etc., who affirm that joy is licit, is one thing, but the hypothesis about which Sanchez, who denies it, is another. It was a deed worthy of its authors that the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 48) in some way set up the question according to the hypothesis of Suarez, Lessius, etc., and then in a manner often customary to them opposed (ibid., no. 49) to these Sanchez, Azor, etc., who discuss the question according to another hypothesis. The great confidence of St. Alphonsus toward the Salmanticenses caused that here, as also often elsewhere, he transcribed these things from them, and moreover added Collet, Roncaglia, and also Croix; although the last, since he sets up each hypothesis, therefore, as the matter demanded, in the one (book 5, no. 89) agrees with Sanchez, etc., but in the other (ibid., no. 91) with Suarez. But you would say that the Salmanticenses are less worthy of excuse in this, because since apud Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, etc., they could see each hypothesis most clearly proposed, and aptly solved according to the diverse merits of the cause, they opposed to them authors who did not even mention a word concerning the other hypothesis. But as to the fact that the VV., with no one preceding, undertook (l. c.) to refute the resolution of Suarez, etc., for the diverse hypothesis, it will have been enough to observe that the question is brought to this: whether the same fact, under a diverse aspect or consideration, can or cannot stir up a diverse and indeed right affection; and whoever understands this question will be able by himself to decide concerning the merit of the refutation.

The VV. add (page 142) that the authority of St. Thomas is invoked by the Author. But from what has been related in the Note, that appears false. For by the Author only two things are suggested. 1. Under a diverse consideration it is licit or not licit to have delectation concerning nocturnal illusion. 2. That St. Thomas stands against the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 20), that pollution in sleep is objectively evil if it comes from touch and a base dream; St. Thomas recalls even that which proceeds from a base dream to a natural cause. And these things suffice for the seventeen columns with which the VV. detain the reader. For concerning condemned propositions it will be said in its own place.

Concerning the general question proposed in the text, it will be useful to have indicated that several Doctors distinguish between things prohibited by the law of nature and things prohibited only by human law; and they affirm delectation illicit concerning the first genus, but not likewise as to the other, provided it is not done under the aspect of prohibition. Thus Sanchez (book 1, ch. 2, no. 10), Azor (part 1, book 4, ch. 6, q. 1), and others, whom St. Alphonsus follows (book 5, no. 27), saying, thus it must be held... whatever Croix says (book 1, no. 81). Yet immediately the Holy Doctor (l. c.) adds: Nevertheless it is not licit to be delighted concerning Mass left aside because of forgetfulness, and similar things; because the omission is objectively evil, as Roncaglia (treat. 2, ch. 3, q. 5) with Azor and Sanchez.

And in reality Roncaglia wrote thus, distinguishing with the Salmanticenses (whom he transcribes with their name passed over in silence) whether an impediment of fulfilling a precept withdraws from the obligation of the precept, or only excuses. Hence he deduces that it is licit for a youth to be delighted concerning the omission of a fast to which he is not yet held, and for the sick to be delighted concerning the omission of Mass; but otherwise if this happens from forgetfulness, because the omission then remains objectively evil; then he alleges Azor and Sanchez. But Sanchez in the very place cited by Roncaglia (book 1, ch. 2, no. 16) teaches the opposite and adds this exception to the general rule: Understand, unless concerning things prohibited only by human law... there is delectation about the material act, and as to its substance, with the prohibition set aside; in which case we said, no. 10, that it is not mortal to be delighted, even when breaking the precept is mortal, much less when it is freed from sin by ignorance. - But Azor (q. 1, book 4, ch. 6, q. 1): If he who is delighted thinking about eating flesh meats absolutely and in itself, but not as it is forbidden at certain times, does not sin, therefore it is because he does not take delectation from an evil thing insofar as evil; for the eating of flesh meats is not evil of itself. Tamburini (Decalogue, 1.3, ch. 5, sect. 1, no. 2) applies this doctrine to the omission of the Breviary, since the object of delectation can be the lack of labor and watching; and say the same of the omission of Mass, when someone can be delighted merely concerning the avoided inconvenience of a journey, rain, etc. The defect of coherence in this question is owed to the Salmanticenses, whom Roncaglia also copied; since they (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 37) say that in things prohibited by positive law the substance of the work can be set aside from its prohibition; and then they forget this very thing.

173. Resolves. - 1. If a penitent accuses himself of some depraved thought, he must be asked whether he knew it was a sin; and if he answers that he detested it as soon as he knew it was base, he must be judged wholly immune from sin. - If he answers that for some time he had some confused cognition of the malice, and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a God-fearing conscience. - Saettler.

2. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, but another to be delighted concerning the, for example, clever mode by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed of itself can lack fault); nevertheless the Confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who willingly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except to make manifest the ingenious mode by which they were performed; and certainly if the discourse were about honest actions, however ingeniously performed, they would generally perceive much less delectation. Say the same about those who eagerly read books less honest ¹⁰.

¹⁰ In these things it must chiefly be attended whether at other times the penitent is accustomed to consent to depraved delectation. For otherwise, that someone is more inclined and eager to be engaged in reading or hearing a base subject is not an indication of deliberate delectation from base things, but of human infirmity; and although the delectation by which the lower appetite is solicited is rejected, this does not impede weak nature from inclining toward matters of this kind more than toward other matters to be handled; especially because sometimes there also accedes a certain curiosity, which is accustomed to be sharpened toward new and unusual things the more a man would not dare without just cause to undertake that work. Hence the anxiety by which some are sometimes troubled must be calmed, because in handling these matters rather than others, or in hearing confessions of women rather than of men, they seem to themselves to be willingly engaged.

3. It is not mortal to be saddened concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is burdensome only, or in the divided sense of the law, for example concerning the burden of fasting. - St. Lig.

4. It is not licit to be delighted concerning the evil thing itself considered in itself, because the object of delectation is always evil. Nevertheless it is licit to be delighted concerning the good effect which proceeds from it, provided the order of charity is not violated ¹¹. Hence the following proposition under no. 15 was condemned by Innoc. IX: It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of his father perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thence obtained from the inheritance.

¹¹ The Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 47), whom St. Alphonsus followed (book 5, no. 20), fabricate a disagreement here among doctors, and accuse Vasquez, Lessius, Palau, etc., as if they taught that, on account of a good effect, it is licit to be delighted concerning a formally such sin, and consequently that affection can licitly be terminated, on account of a good end, in a thing intrinsically evil. But these things are wrongly fabricated, since no disagreement is had in these authors except perhaps in words. Let Lessius, with whom the others also agree, be heard (On Justice and Right, book 4, ch. 3, no. 105): When someone is said to rejoice concerning an evil work, insofar as it is the cause of good, it can be understood in two ways. First, that on account of the good effect he rejoices that that work is or was, or was done by himself; and this is wholly illicit, if that work was intrinsically sin: because this is to approve sin, and to have complacency in it on account of a good end.... For just as that effect, or relation to that effect, cannot effect that that work, which is intrinsically sin, be licit or good, so neither that it be worthy of joy and complacency.... Secondly it can be understood that he rejoices that that depraved work had or has such a good effect; and thus it is licit to rejoice concerning an evil work. For we do not rejoice that that work is evil; but supposing that it has been done, we rejoice that it gave cause for a good effect. For it is truly worthy of joy that by divine goodness the greatest goods proceed even from the worst works. But this is rather to rejoice concerning the effect than concerning the work, although we also rejoice concerning the causation of the good which belongs to the work.

** The VV. (page 145), having set forth the opinions, as they understood them, of Vasquez, Bonacina, Lessius, and Palau, conclude (page 144): Rightly therefore St. Alphonsus attributed to Palau and Lessius the opinion that it is licit to be delighted concerning an evil work not as sin, but as cause of the effect following. They add that Vasquez and Bonacina, whom they falsely say was added by St. Alphonsus, had progressed further; and therefore that a disagreement of doctors concerning this question exists.

I answer: 1. The mark of false accusation was attributed to the Salmanticenses, not because the accused Authors do not have that thesis, but because this is explained by the Salmanticenses as if the affection, as is said in the Note, were terminated to a thing intrinsically evil. But this is false; because the aspect of causality in the case is not evil.

2. It was said that there is no disagreement among the Doctors except in words. This is clear from the words of Lessius brought forward, and also from the fact that none of the Doctors whom the Salmanticenses and St. Alphonsus oppose as contrary has anything against the thesis thus proposed.

3. Finally, what the VV. add, that Vasquez and Bonacina progressed further, is an indication that they did not grasp even the least bit the opinion of Vasquez, and therefore of Bonacina; whence we think it happened that they wrote: Vasquez, S.J., teaches that it is not mortal sin to desire a formally evil work with efficacious will; which words indeed, having regard not to the mind of the VV. but to the words, carry open calumny. Vasquez and Sayrus, says Sanchez (book 1, ch. 2, no. 9), say that although in general an efficacious will (which they call desire) of any mortal thing is mortal, yet not every delectation concerning any work whatsoever, even by natural right prohibited under mortal sin, is mortal, provided it is not concerning the work under the aspect under which it is sin, or contrary to a precept. He then indicates their singular doctrine, which he says is proved most widely and learnedly by Vasquez, and concludes: And thus, although Vasquez admits that morose delectation of a mortal thing is mortal, nevertheless he recedes from the foundations by which the most common opinion proves this. These things prove that Vasquez, as to substance, did not recede from the common doctrine. Lugo himself also testifies to the same thing (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 363), saying: This opinion of Vasquez is embraced by not a few others, Reginald, Sayrus, and others, whom Diana reports and follows..., and Azor, Salas, Filliuccius, Bonacina, and Lessius apud the same Diana call it probable, and Castrus Palao follows the same. And he indeed adds (no. 364): This opinion is difficult perhaps more in the mode of explaining than in the thing itself; which he pursues up to no. 370. Yet that Vasquez declined to these absurdities which the VV. saw, neither Lugo, nor anyone else, saw through or suspected.

5. The Confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice about an advantage coming to them from their own or another's sin, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor ¹². The same is to be feared about him who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but which proceeds from his misfortune, for example from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For joy concerning the neighbor's evil can sometimes creep in rather than concerning the good effect thence proceeding, especially if he previously had enmity with him. Therefore the Confessor, if the matter seems to require it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent. - St. Lig., no. 20. - See Cases, no. 150 and following.

¹² The vigilance of the Confessor is opportune because of two things, namely 1. lest the desire or joy of a good effect (for those things which are said here about joy, from the common opinion of the Doctors, are almost valid concerning desire, or even concerning delectation) pass over into joy, or desire, or approval of sin considered in itself, from which that effect is caused; especially if someone has obtained profit of great moment from his sin; in which case joy and delectation concerning the great happiness acquired will indeed scarcely be abstracted from delectation in the evil cause. 2. Lest ever, namely even if any fault whatsoever of anyone is absent, or at least delectation concerning fault is absent, the order of charity be violated, which certainly demands that the good which we intend be reasonably preferable to the good of which we either wish another to be deprived or rejoice that he is deprived. Hence the condemnation of the proposition mentioned in the preceding number; for the order of charity does not permit that a son prefer the hope of inheritance to the death of his father. But concerning these things better where charity is treated.