CHAPTER I: ON INTERNAL SINS

228. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1° Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through the imagination as present, without desire.

2° Joy, or deliberate complacency in a past evil thing, or in an evil work performed either by oneself or by another.

3° Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if there is an intention or absolute purpose of executing it; otherwise it is called inefficacious.

But what the malice of these is, and what species, hold in these few things:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and assumes the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1° it is truly a sin. This is established from the precept: Thou shalt not covet, which must be understood generally and indefinitely of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is repugnant to right reason: for it is shameful and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, what it is not licit to execute.

2° It assumes the species of its object. For any desire whatever regards the external act as to be mandated to execution, either absolutely, if the desire is efficacious, or at least hypothetically, if it is inefficacious; necessarily therefore it is borne into that act according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or follow from it of their own accord. This is established also from the words of Christ:² He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood of adultery. Therefore ...

3° It also assumes the species of the circumstances of the object. This is clear from the reason just brought under 2°. Hence in confession, for example, of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, the bond of matrimony, or a vow of chastity, which affect the desired person, must be declared.

229. • II. Joy likewise is a sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is conversant, and similarly assumes the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself.

The reason is because joy, as we said above, is the approval of past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the whole malice of these. - Hence he who takes complacency in the recollection of past sins and approves them must in confession explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting concerning a sin committed, sorrow over evil not performed, and also sadness over good accomplished are to be referred back to joy.

230. • III. Morose delectation 1° is certainly a sin; 2° it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is because it is repugnant to rational nature and to divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant from right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object indicates affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is evil affection, as is clear. Therefore ... Hence Osee:² They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Proverbs:³ Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord.

The reason for the second is because whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in the very degree and species in which the object is evil, in the same entirely will the delectation concerning it be evil. Therefore ... St. Thomas¹ and St. Alphonsus.²

Does it also assume the malice of the circumstances of the object? Negatively, very probably, theoretically speaking. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object besides that which moves delectation. In practice, however, the opposite opinion is very pleasing to St. Alphonsus,³ namely because of the proximate danger of depraved desire. Yet if you foresee that the penitent will be induced with difficulty to open the circumstances of the object thought upon, because of the speculative probability of the former opinion you will prudently abstain from troublesome questions. Thus with Billuart, Scavini, T. I, n. 923.

231. Questions. - Quaer. 1° ON DESIRE. Is it licit to desire evil under a condition, if it would be licit?

Resp. Distinguish. Affirmatively of itself if the appended condition removes the whole malice of the thing; the reason is because such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which through the condition the malice is wholly excluded. But negatively in the other hypothesis; the reason is because such an affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove the malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however appended, cannot remove the malice. For things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and therefore a condition would be appended uselessly, since to choose such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed.⁴

Nevertheless he would probably have to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but would only disclose what he would will in another condition of things. - St. Alphonsus⁵ with others. Besides, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this sort are, even if the appended condition removed the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife; which desires Cajetan rightly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because, although such a desire is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in venereal matters will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditional desires concerning things prohibited by positive law alone must also be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes they can labor under some inordinate affection.

Hence the confessor must prohibit betrothed persons from lingering in the desire of intercourse to be had in future matrimony; for "great" is "the danger of present delectation, which is evil when the condition which gives honorable character to that object is absent." Yet often betrothed persons and widowers are in good faith, not thinking it to be mortal to be delighted concerning a licit object, as intercourse in matrimony is; and therefore the confessor will prudently be silent about mortal sin, unless he should see pollution to follow from that complacency.

232. • Quaer. 2° ON JOY. Is it licit to rejoice 1) concerning the evil act itself because of the good effect following from it; 2) concerning the good effect of an evil act?

Resp. to the 1st: Negatively, and this (provided the reason for the prohibition of the act is not to be sought precisely from advertence alone, as for example in a lie) even though it was materially evil only. The reason is because then the act was evil from the object. This is also clear from proposition 15 among those condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV), in which the discussion is evidently of an act materially evil only, of parricide committed in drunkenness.

Hence they sin who are delighted concerning the eating of meat, or the breaking of fast, from ignorance or oblivion, even involuntary, or concerning nocturnal pollution not purely natural, that is, proceeding also from some cause other than from nature discharging itself; for example, from base phantasms presented to the imagination of the sleeper, or from touches wholly involuntary.²

Resp. to the 2nd: Affirmatively, provided there is absent a probable danger of formal sin; for in this case you do not rejoice concerning evil. Yet I said: provided it is absent, etc. The reason is because, as was said at n. 87, I, without a sufficient cause it is licit for no one to expose himself to such danger. Therefore it will be licit, speaking of itself, or setting aside that danger, to rejoice concerning the discharge caused by pollution, even voluntary, or concerning the obtaining of an inheritance from homicide.¹ - Each response is valid also concerning desire and delectation.

233. • Quaer. 3° ON DELECTATION. Is it licit to be delighted concerning 1) the thought of an evil thing; 2) the mode?

Resp. to the 1st: Affirmatively, provided there is absent a proximate danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself, as St. Thomas² explains in the following words: "Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted in two ways: in one way concerning the thought itself, in another way concerning the fornication itself thought of; ... but the thought itself according to itself is not a mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for instance when someone thinks uselessly about it; but sometimes it is wholly without sin, for instance when someone usefully thinks about it, as when he wills to preach or dispute about it," etc. - But the danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself in practice must be measured from the mode of thinking, - from the quality of the person thinking, - from the matter thought upon, - from the cause on account of which it is thought upon. Thus, if someone reads a less honorable book, these things must be considered: the mode in which he reads, for example eagerly; - the quality of the reader, perhaps prone to venery; - the book which is read, for example obscene by design; - the cause of reading, namely whether it is sufficient that he expose himself to the probable danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself.

Resp. to the 2nd: Affirmatively, provided 1) the mode is not evil of itself, and 2) the danger of which we have just spoken is absent. The matter is clear of itself. Thus he does not sin who laughs at the mode in which a drunk man proceeds with his foot wavering because of wine; because the mode of itself is not evil. On the contrary, he sins who is delighted concerning the frauds and lies which he used to seduce a girl, because those frauds and lies are evil. - But because of the danger of delectation concerning the evil thing, those can easily sin who, for example, frequently and willingly hear certain base things which do not seem to be narrated except to show the ingenious mode in which they were done; for if the conversation concerned honest actions, even if done more ingeniously, they would for the most part perceive much less delectation.

234. • Quaer. 4° Whether and when does he sin who does not resist the motions of concupiscence?

Resp. By concupiscence in this place we do not understand a passion of the sensitive appetite, indifferent to good or evil, insofar as it is considered as diminishing or even altogether removing the voluntary (n. 12-14), but the tinder of depraved desires, or propensity to evil, residing not only in the inferior appetite but also in the superior. Concerning the motions of this concupiscence hold these things:

Principles. - I. However much the soul may be struck by the stimuli of the depraved tinder, there will never be any stain of sin, unless the will in some way either consents to them, or does not impede them when it can and ought to impede them. Common and certain. - See St. Thomas.¹

II. Motions of the will which are first-first, namely those which precede any deliberation of reason whatever and are elicited before attention is given to the object's agreement with the rule of morals, are wholly without fault. The reason is because insofar as they precede deliberation of reason and advertence to moral malice, they are neither voluntary nor free, and consequently are free from formal sin. Thus all Theologians.

III. Motions of the will which are second-first, namely those which follow upon some use of reason, yet are elicited with only slight, obscure, and imperfect advertence to the rule of morals, in any matter, even grave, are only venial sin. The reason is because acts of this sort are imperfectly free and only semi-deliberate; and so on account of the imperfection of the act they are excused from grave fault. Thus likewise the common opinion of Theologians.

Resolves. - 1° Motions, however depraved, so long as they displease the will, even after advertence to the rule of morals, are free from all fault.²

2° One who bears himself negatively, that is, neither consenting nor resisting, when the danger of consent is absent, sins lightly; otherwise, in grave matter and when a just cause of bearing himself negatively is lacking, gravely. Hence:

a. In vehement motions, which greatly allure the consent of the will to grave sin, because, for example, venereal delectation is added, it is illicit to bear oneself negatively or indifferently, but there is required a positive act of resistance or at least of displeasure, and this under grave obligation; since with the same obligation by which one is held to avoid sin itself, one is also held to avoid the danger of it. Direct resistance is nevertheless not necessary; but indirect resistance suffices, and indeed is more advisable, namely by turning the mind to other things; nor is material resistance necessary, for example by pressing excited parts over the clothing, although that can be useful. But prayer will be best. - Resistance that is positive indeed, but tepid, excuses from mortal sin, but not from venial.

b. In carnal motions with which there is not joined a proximate danger of consent, to bear oneself negatively is not free from venial sin, since we are held to take care lest the appetite disturb reason even lightly, or entice to sin, even only remotely. - But light motions are better resisted by contempt.

c. There is no sin in bearing oneself negatively, if a just cause is present, as if you have experienced that the motions are increased by positive resistance or anxious solicitude or reflex thought; or the motions arise from an action necessary or useful, for example from hearing confessions, from reading base matters useful to be known, from a touch necessary for healing, and similar things.¹

235. • Quaer. 5° What is to be done with a penitent accusing himself of some depraved thought?

Resp. Lest you waste time uselessly and through questions annoying to you and the penitent, or even dangerous, do not inquire about the species or number unless first it is sufficiently certain to you concerning consent. But that you may recognize this, he must be asked whether he noticed that it was a sin; and if he answers that he detested it as soon as he knew it was base, he must be judged entirely immune from sin. - If he answers that for some time he had some confused knowledge of the malice and adhered to it, but without fully attending to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking, especially if he is of timorous conscience. On the contrary, he who is accustomed to sins or abhors them little is, in doubt, presumed to have consented; for in doubt a prudent presumption is sought from things commonly occurring. - But commonly it happens that a pious man does not consent without knowing that he is really consenting to sin; while a depraved man does not resist sin without a struggle, which indeed removes doubt concerning consent or dissent.

He who doubts whether he did something while awake or sleeping, in possession of himself or not, is judged not to have sufficiently adverted nor consented; for he who is awake sufficiently perceives himself to be awake.

If there is a defect of age, that is, before the completed seventh year, at least perfect advertence and full consent are not presumed, unless malice certainly supplies for age (yet see n. 548, q. 1° and n. 1344, 7°). Finally, the mere continuation of a depraved thought is not an indication of consent; since both temptation and resistance can be long-lasting.