Article II. On sinful joy

399. Notion. Joy, insofar as it constitutes a special internal sin, is the deliberate complacency which someone has concerning an evil thing carried out either by himself or by others.

It is therefore a certain approval of evil previously perpetrated. St. Alphonsus⁸⁶ and with him very many modern authors, such as Gury, Aertnys, Marc, Gopfert, etc., distinguish morose delectation from desire and joy in the following way: desire is concerning some future thing; joy is concerning a thing or act in the past; morose delectation is concerning the present imagination of some thing, abstracting from whether the thing itself is past or present or future. For morose delectation altogether abstracts from every external work. But the older authors took joy and morose delectation indiscriminately, or at least admitted no specific difference between the two, and consequently in their sense all those things which were said above concerning morose delectation are valid concerning evil joy.

To this joy are reduced a) boasting concerning a sin committed; b) sadness concerning an evil work not perpetrated or concerning a good work commanded by precept⁸⁷ having been performed.

In the sense of the moderns, the following things are to be noted concerning evil joy:

⁸⁶ L. c.

⁸⁷ If the good work was not commanded by precept, but was a mere counsel, as for example a private vow, then to be saddened concerning it is not a sin, if the sadness arose from a just cause; otherwise it is only a light sin, as lightly wounding the right order of reason.

400. Moral character. Joy can be concerned:

a) With the evil work itself perpetrated, vividly represented through memory and approved anew. In this case joy is entirely the same sin as that which was committed before. The reason is that the whole malice of sin is in the perverse act of the will. Moreover, this new act of the will is equally perverse as that which before was joined with the external work. Hence, for example, one who remembers adultery committed and rejoices concerning it again commits adultery in spirit and is bound to confess in clear words: I rejoiced concerning adultery committed; nor does it suffice to say: I rejoiced concerning obscene things. A fortiori these things are valid if someone boasts in an evil work perpetrated before others, since then the sin of scandal is added. In this case he is bound to confess: I boasted in such an evil work, for example in adultery, before several men.

b) With the ingenious manner in which an evil work has been done, but not with the work itself. Then those things are valid which were said above concerning morose delectation over the ingenious manner, namely such joy of itself is not a sin, but nevertheless is dangerous. In this sense "the Lord praised the steward of iniquity, because he had acted prudently."⁸⁸

c) With a good effect following from an evil work, for example someone rejoices over an inheritance which he acquired from the violent death of another man; or that famous example: the Church rejoices over the effect of Adam's sin, not over the sin itself, which was our redemption through Christ. Consequently on Holy Saturday it is sung: "O happy fault, which merited to have such and so great a Redeemer." Of itself it is clear that joy of this kind concerning a good effect is licit, whether the sin causing it was formal or material, provided nevertheless that only the good effect and not the sin is approved. For the good effect carries with it nothing disordered, if it is prescinded from the evil cause. Nevertheless such joy can be dangerous, because often it is not easy to separate the good effect from the evil cause. Attention must also be given to the proposition (15) condemned by Innocent XI: "It is licit for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches consequently obtained by inheritance."⁸⁹ This proposition indeed was deservedly condemned, since in it it is said: "it is licit to rejoice over parricide"; which is the same as saying, it is licit to rejoice over some evil thing. Moreover, the order of charity is gravely wounded, since such a son loves riches more than the life of his father. - Examples of such joy concerning a good effect following from an evil operation are very many. Thus we take delight in the glory of the Martyrs following from the detestable tyranny of the pagans, in the repentance of a youth, although we detest his crimes and quarrels, etc.

⁸⁸ Luc. 16, 8.

⁸⁹ Denz. n. 1165.

401. Scholion. On joy over the conjugal act, whether past or future. Here it is customarily asked whether it is licit for a widow to rejoice over an act of marriage legitimately had during matrimony, and whether it is licit for betrothed persons to rejoice over the future act of marriage. All authors teach that joy of this kind is to be avoided, since it is hardly possible that carnal movements and grave temptations should not arise from it. But theoretically speaking, a widow can rejoice over licit acts had in marriage, since such joy is nothing other than approval of a past licit act. As to betrothed persons the matter is more difficult, since in that case morose delectation concerning an object represented through phantasy is scarcely absent. Nevertheless, since all teach that it is licit for betrothed persons to desire future copulation, it does not so clearly appear why joy concerning the same future thing should be gravely prohibited to them. St. Alphonsus⁹⁰ proposes the stricter doctrine, saying: "Even with the danger of sensitive delectation set aside, it must more truly be said with Holzmann, Roncaglia, Sanchez, Vasquez, Azor, Laymann, Palao, Diana, etc., according to the Salmanticenses, that any delectation whatever of the will in betrothed persons and widows concerning future or past copulation is evil." But Ballerini⁹¹ rightly observes that the cited authors did not condemn delectation of this kind as such, but insofar as it induces sensitive or even venereal delectation. Hence also Cajetan⁹² says: "A widow who takes delight concerning past acts of marriage does not sin mortally, because she takes delight concerning works licit to her for the time in which they were licit. For to approve explicitly is more than to take delight, but it is clear that a widow licitly approves past pleasures." But Cajetan adds: "Nevertheless [the widow] sins venially in memory of this kind, because delectation of this kind lacks both necessity and piety, ... if nothing else is joined to it; but if you add that hence appetites arise in the concupiscible power in the widow, or movements in the flesh, it is necessary to recur to the rules concerning joined evils or dangers."⁹³

⁹⁰ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 24.

⁹¹ Opus. theol. I, tract. de pecc. n. 141 sqq.

⁹² Summa, s. v. "Delectatio morosa."

⁹³ Cf. also Billuart, De temperantia diss. 6, a. 15, § 4.