Article III: On Morose Delectation

354. DEFINITION. Delectation, taken generally, is the rest of the appetite in a good possessed, that is, apprehended or had; and it can be in both the sensitive appetite and the intellective.

Morose delectation (or depraved thought properly so called) contains a double element: the thought by which an act of sin is rendered present, and the complacency of the will, by which it is delighted concerning that act as if it then executed it, yet without the intention of executing it (V, 15).

It is called morose not indeed from a delay of time, since even in one point of time every internal sin can be completed, but on account of the deliberate delay which the will makes in it.

The object of this delectation and of these thoughts is more often something illicit in itself, for example, homicide, fornication, and similar things; it can also be an object prohibited by positive law, for example, the eating of meat on a fast day, provided the will is borne toward it under the aspect of prohibition. For the law, with respect to these things, prohibits only the external action.

It is called depraved thought properly so called, that is, sinful, because the will, when it ought to have resisted it, rests in it. Therefore depraved thought is not to be confused with thought concerning a depraved thing, which thought can be lawful. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1912, p. 1025. See n. 357.

355. PRINCIPLES. I. Morose delectation is sin. For it is repugnant to right reason and to the divine law that someone have as pleasing what displeases God. Hence that saying (Hos. 9:10): They became abominable, like those things which they loved; and (Prov. 15:26): Evil thoughts are an abomination of the Lord.

356. II. Morose delectation takes its theological and moral species from the object which someone renders present to himself through the imagination of fantasy. The reason is because whoever is delighted concerning an act of sin takes that act as object, approves it, and adheres to it by his affection insofar as it is rendered present. Therefore, since morality is specified from the object, according to the grade and species of malice of the object, its delectation also will be evil with the same [malice]. Thus St. Thomas (1.2, q. 74, n. 8) and St. Alphonsus (V, n. 12). See the things said n. 347, 348.

357. Corollaries. 1. Speculatively speaking, it is very probable that morose delectation does not necessarily assume the specific malice of all the circumstances of the object. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as posited, or to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now, the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object, besides that which moves delectation. Thus, for example, if someone is delighted concerning copula with a married woman, not as married but only as beautiful, he does not commit adultery, since the circumstance of adultery does not move the delectation.

Note. But considering the matter practically, the opposite opinion greatly pleases St. Alphonsus, namely in the case where the delectation concerns some libidinous act with a determinate person. For then, on account of the corruption of human nature, there is a proximate danger of coveting or desiring, at least inefficaciously, the determinate object itself, especially if it is inordinately loved; and therefore these circumstances are to be explained in confession. But it would be otherwise if, from the nature of the thing, or from past experience, or from the disposition of the person, such a danger is judged not to be proximate (V, 15; H. Ap., III, 48). Cf. n. 1820.

2. It is lawful per se to be delighted concerning the thought or knowledge of an evil thing. We say: per se, that is, excluding depraved affection and danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself. For knowledge of evil is not per se evil, and therefore can be the object of the will, unless it is prohibited from elsewhere, or illicit.

Therefore the delectation which is had, not concerning the evil work, but concerning speculative or scientific thought of an evil object, can be: either 1. good, if a just cause of thinking is present, for example, on account of study, consultation, etc., with abomination of the object; or 2. venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc., with only remote danger; or 3. gravely evil, if, when the matter concerns a gravely evil work, there is present a proximate danger of consenting in the delectation (V, 17; H. Ap., III, 49).

Now, the danger of delighting oneself concerning the evil thing itself must practically be measured: a) from the mode of thinking; b) from the quality of the person thinking; c) from the matter thought about; d) from the cause on account of which it is thought about. Thus, for example, if someone reads a book less honorable, there must be considered: the mode by which he reads, for example, greedily; the quality of the reader, perhaps prone to venery; the book which is read, perhaps obscene by profession; the cause of reading, namely whether it is sufficient that the probable danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself be entered upon (Kon., n. 233).

3. It is not lawful for the betrothed and widowed, according to the truer opinion, to have delectation concerning the future or past work of marriage, even with the danger of sensitive delectation excluded. "The reason is because delectation renders the object present to itself; and therefore whenever the present object here and now is evil, since here and now there is absent the condition rendering marriage honorable, every actual delectation concerning it is also evil" (V, 24; H. Ap., III, 51).

"Another thing must be said concerning desire, by which the betrothed man wills future copula; for this is lawful, because, when the will is borne toward a future object, it can desire it under the condition by which the object will be lawful. But because in such desire there is also danger of delectation, therefore the betrothed are very much to be exhorted that they carefully turn away from themselves base thoughts of this kind." Concerning the Married, cf. n. 2111, 2.

358. Practical rules. The confessor, so that he may judge rightly concerning sinful thoughts, should duly attend to the following:

1. Lest he uselessly waste time through questions troublesome to himself and to the penitent, or even dangerous, let him not inquire concerning the species or number of thoughts unless it has first been clear to him concerning consent. Wherefore let him first ask the penitent whether he adverted that thoughts of this kind were sins. But if the penitent responds that he detested them as soon as he knew that they were base, he must be judged altogether immune from sin. If he responds that for some time he indeed had a confused knowledge concerning their malice, but did not attend to it perfectly, he is easily to be excused from grave sin, though not from venial.

2. But if the penitent is not able to free himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent, or perfect advertence, was lacking to him, especially if he is of timorous conscience. On the contrary, he who is accustomed to sins, and fears them little, in doubt must be presumed to have consented (Kon., n. 235). Recall the things said n. 337, q. 3.