Chapter I. On Internal Sins

A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1st. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through imagination as present, without desire.

2nd. Joy, or deliberate approval of an evil work performed either by oneself or by another, by which the will holds the perpetrated evil as pleasing and acceptable.

3rd. Desire, or an act of the will seeking an evil thing as to be obtained, and therefore to be carried out by work. It is called efficacious if there is present an absolute purpose of carrying it out; inefficacious if there is present only conditioned consent, for example, if someone says: I would steal if I could; or I would fornicate with this woman unless I feared infamy, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Therefore morose delectation is concerned with the object, not as it is in itself, but as here and now it is presented to the imagination; joy, on the contrary, and desire are concerned with the object as it once was or will be in itself.

I Say 1st. Desire of an evil thing, even inefficacious, is truly sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances. The reason for the first is that it is base and dishonorable to desire absolutely or conditionally what it is not lawful to carry out. The reason for the second is that every desire, even inefficacious, tends toward its object, and therefore is a willing of the special malice of that object, and so contracts it. The reason for the third is the same; for desire, since it tends toward the object as to be carried out by work, reaches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. - Hence in confession, for example, of a desire of fornicating, there must be declared the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the desired person. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 12.

I say 2nd. Joy likewise is sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action with which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of past evil, which necessarily embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, clothed namely with its circumstances. Hence one who, in the recollection of past sins, takes complacency in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned again in act.

To joy are to be reduced boasting concerning a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed.

I say 3rd. Morose delectation is certainly sin, and certainly also takes on the gravity and species of the objects exhibited to the mind. The reason for the first is that it is repugnant to rational nature and divine law for the will to hold as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Besides, deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear of itself. Therefore ... Hence in Osee ix, 10, it is said: "They became abominable like those things which they loved." But the reason for the second is that whoever takes delight in an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection; and therefore the malice of that delectation will plainly be evil with the same gravity and species by which the object is evil. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 74, art. 8. - St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Question 1. Does morose delectation take on also the specific malice of the circumstances of the object, as desire and joy do?

Response. Negatively, probably, according to many theologians; and the reason is that simple delectation does not tend toward the object as it really exists, but rests in it as it is represented by phantasy. Moreover this, neither from the nature of the thing nor in fact, is accustomed to represent all circumstances, but only that one which moves the delectation more. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15. - Baller., note (a), p. 148.

Question 2. Is it lawful to desire an evil under the condition, if it were licit?

Response. Affirmatively, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the thing, because such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object from which by the condition malice is altogether excluded. But the response would be negative in another hypothesis, because such an affection tends toward an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object even as represented, as would be blasphemy, perjury, etc. Nevertheless he would probably be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly did not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but only showed his propensity toward that object. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 27; and Hom. Ap., n. 50.

For the rest, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition added would remove the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural right, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Bertha if I did not have a wife. Cajetan deservedly calls these desires foolish and diabolical temptations. Indeed also other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive right are to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection. - Cf. Cajet., under the title Sins of Thought.

Question 3. Is it lawful to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left aside from forgetfulness?

Response. Although it is never lawful to rejoice or take delight either concerning an evil omission or concerning an evil work, even when inculpably admitted, according as they were evil in themselves; yet it is lawful, of itself, that is, with the danger of consent to delectation concerning the evil cause excluded, to rejoice or take delight concerning the good and honorable effect which arose from them.

But whether it is also lawful to rejoice or take delight concerning the evil cause itself, not according as it is evil, but according as it was the cause of a good effect, many affirm with Lessius, Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, and others; but St. Alphonsus, with several others, denies it, alleging proposition 15, condemned by Innocent XI, which holds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thereafter obtained from the inheritance." - But it must be said that it is not clear whether by this proposition absolutely every joy concerning an inculpable evil work was condemned; or rather only the joy was reprobated by which the son, against the right order of charity, places the good of a much inferior order, namely the riches obtained from it, before the death of his parent. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Lessius, de just. et jure, lib. 4, cap. 3, n. 105. - Suarez, disp. 5, sect. 7, n. 15. - Lugo, de poenit., disp. 16, n. 389. - Viva, in the cited proposition, n. 12. - Baller., note (a), p. 152; and note (c), p. 186.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is not lawful to be delighted concerning nocturnal pollution according to itself and on account of its pleasure, but it is certainly lawful to be delighted concerning it according as it is an exoneration or alleviation of nature. For the defect of free consent through sleep, although it cannot make licit a delectation inherent in an evil work which thereafter is freely taken, nevertheless can very well excuse the exterior work from fault. And this is the true doctrine of St. Thomas, who also refers a base dream to the natural cause of pollution, to which can be reduced also the touches or motions following that same dream. "For when," he says, "seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of the humor has been made, ... the one sleeping dreams those things which pertain to the expulsion of such abundant or resolved humor; just as also happens when nature is burdened from some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination." - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 154, art. 5; and in 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Baller., note (b), p. 149.

2nd. The confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice concerning an advantage coming to them from their own sin or another's, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor. The same is to be feared concerning one who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but one which arises from his misfortune, for example, from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For sometimes joy concerning the evil of the neighbor can creep in rather than concerning the good effect arising from it, especially if he previously bore enmity against him; therefore the confessor, if the matter seems to demand it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent.

• Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

3rd. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, and another to be delighted concerning the manner, for example, an ingenious one, by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed can of itself be free from fault), nevertheless the confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who gladly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except for manifesting the ingenious manner by which they were done, especially when a habit of consenting to evil delectation confirms this suspicion.

4th. It is not mortal to be sad concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is only troublesome, or in the divided sense of the law, for example, concerning the trouble of fasting.

5th. If the penitent accuses himself of some evil thought, he is to be asked whether he knew it to be sin; and if he responds that he detested it as soon as he knew it to be base, he is to be judged altogether immune from sin. - If he responds that for some time he had some confused cognition of malice and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial sin. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it is to be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a timorous conscience.