Article Second. On Depraved Joys.

331. Notions. 1. Joy here is taken for deliberate complacency in an evil thing done either by oneself or by others; therefore it is referred to an evil work perpetrated, which pleases the will. Boasting concerning a committed sin is reduced to joy.

2. The object of joy can be: a. the evil work itself done; b. the mode in which the evil was done; c. the effect which followed from the evil work; d. the evil work on account of a good effect.

332. Principles. 1. Joy concerning the evil itself done is a sin of the same gravity and species as the evil itself done. The reason for the first is that the internal act of joy receives malice from the object, since it is an approval of an evil thing, which is always evil, whether it is evil in itself or only evil on account of prohibition, as to rejoice concerning blasphemy or concerning a meal taken on a fast day. Therefore joy is a grave or light sin according to the gravity of the matter. The reason for the second is that the will approves the evil thing as it was perpetrated; therefore it also induces all the malices which it knows to have been joined with the thing.

Note. Hence the penitent in confession ought to explain not only the object of desire and joy, but also the circumstances changing the species, provided they were known, e.g. in joy concerning the striking of a cleric, in the desire of fornicating with a relative by blood.

As joy concerning an evil done is a sin, so also sadness concerning a good done is a sin, and indeed:

a. sadness concerning a good done which was commanded under grave obligation is a grave sin;

b. sadness concerning a good done which was commanded under light obligation is a light sin;

c. sadness concerning a good done which was not commanded, e.g. concerning a vow made, concerning the priesthood received, does not exceed a light sin, provided the will of fulfilling the obligation undertaken is retained. Whether it is a light sin or no sin depends on the motive on account of which someone is saddened, namely whether it is reasonable or not; ordinarily, however, sadness of this kind lacks a reasonable motive.

d. sadness not concerning the good itself done, but concerning the adjuncts of the good action, e.g. concerning inconvenience and labor, is not a sin.

2. To rejoice not concerning the evil work, but concerning the mode in which the evil was perpetrated, is not a sin: for the act of the will in this case is borne toward an object good or indifferent.

It is licit to rejoice concerning obscene paintings or comedies on account of the art by which they were composed; concerning theft or fraud on account of singular and ingenious cleverness; concerning an impure narration on account of the witty manner of narrating; concerning a man's fall on account of the ridiculous things which occurred in the fall. Nevertheless joys of this kind are not without danger, because the passage from the mode to the work itself is easy.

3. Of itself it is licit to rejoice concerning the good effect of an evil work, whether this was materially or formally evil, because the act of the will is not borne toward the evil thing, but precisely toward the good effect, even if it supposes an evil work.

Therefore it is licit for a son to rejoice concerning an inheritance which he obtained on account of a homicide, whether voluntary or involuntary. It is licit to rejoice concerning nature relieved or concerning a temptation quieted, which followed from pollution, whether involuntary or even voluntary. But these things are dangerous, because joy can easily pass from the good effect to the evil work.

4. It is not licit to rejoice concerning the evil work itself which had a good effect, but it is licit to rejoice concerning an evil work on account of the good effect which followed from it, whether the work was materially or formally evil. The reason for the first is that it is not licit to approve evil on account of a good end, nor does an evil work therefore become good and worthy of approval because it can produce, or in fact has produced, a good effect.¹ The reason for the second is that the object of joy is not the evil itself, but precisely this circumstance of it, that it had a good effect. For an evil work can be considered according to itself and insofar as it is the cause of a good effect; if it is considered according to itself, it is not licit to rejoice concerning it; but if it is considered precisely as it is the cause of a good effect, it is licit to rejoice concerning it; but this is rather to rejoice concerning the good effect of an evil cause.

It is not licit to rejoice concerning perjury, even if only materially evil, which freed another from punishment, nor concerning the omission of a fast, even if it happened from inadvertence. It is not licit to rejoice concerning the killing of an enemy of the Church; but it is licit to rejoice that from it the peace of the Church followed. It is not licit to rejoice concerning the sin of Adam, even if a great good followed from it. But if the Church sings, O happy fault, this is not joy concerning the sin itself, but concerning the sin because and insofar as it had a good effect.

Note. What it is licit to desire, concerning that it is likewise licit to rejoice, and conversely; therefore it is licit to rejoice concerning the evil of one's neighbor, provided the order of charity is not injured; thus it is licit for a mother to rejoice concerning the death of a little son on account of his eternal happiness.

¹ There are those who demonstrate that this same thing is illicit from proposition 15 condemned by Innocent XI: It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness on account of the great riches obtained from the inheritance thence. But from this proposition that cannot rightly be inferred, because the proposition is false also from another reason, namely because the joy of the son is repugnant to the order of charity.