Article II: On Complacency and Joy

350. DEFINITION. Complacency is an act or affection of the will delighting itself in some thing. Joy, in general, is the complacency of the appetite in a good already obtained, or apprehended as such. As it is taken here, it is the deliberate complacency of the will concerning an evil work carried out either by oneself or by others (V, 15).

To this also can be recalled: 1. boasting about a sin committed; 2. sorrow or displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, or impossible; 3. sadness concerning a good carried out.

351. PRINCIPLES. I. Joy concerning an evil perpetrated is sin. For such joy includes approval of evil. The same must be said concerning displeasure on account of an evil not perpetrated, for example, on account of a theft omitted.

But sadness concerning a good carried out is not always sin, if, namely, a cause is present which renders the regret honorable, for example, after some vow not sufficiently considered when emitted. But if no cause rendering the regret honorable is present, he would sin venially who was saddened concerning a good act to which he was not bound; for this sadness would be against reason, since the proper object of sadness is an evil thing. But he would sin mortally if he were saddened concerning a good work to which he was bound from a grave obligation (Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2).

352. II. Joy concerning an evil carried out comprehends the whole malice of the work, and all its species. The reason is because joy or complacency in a work already perpetrated necessarily, just as desire also, embraces the sinful act as it exists in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the morality of these, not otherwise than a depraved desire.

Hence: 1. He who takes complacency for himself in the remembrance of past sins, and approves them, ought to explain in confession both the object of this complacency and its species-changing circumstances, if any are present. 2. Likewise, "he who boasts about a grave sin truly perpetrated by himself ought to explain in confession also the species of the sin; because then complacency concerning the sin done is commonly added to the boasting, and this takes the same species of sin. But otherwise if the boasting is about a fictitious sin" (V, 26; H. Ap., III, 48).

353. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether it is lawful to rejoice concerning an EVIL WORK ON ACCOUNT OF A GOOD EFFECT which followed from it?

Resp. 1. If the work is formally evil, namely perpetrated with sin, it is certain among all that it is not lawful to be delighted concerning it.

2. But if it is only materially evil, because it happened without sin, for example, homicide committed in drunkenness, there are not lacking authors who admit that the will can be delighted concerning it, as concerning the cause of a good effect.

But St. Alphonsus (V, 20; H. Ap., III, 52), with many others, says that the following must be held as truer: that such delectation is always illicit; because although the action was not formally sinful, nevertheless it was objectively evil. If someone therefore is delighted not concerning the effect alone, but concerning the evil thing itself, as concerning the cause of a good effect, the direct object of his delectation is an objectively evil thing; and therefore he sins.

Therefore you have among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI the 15th, which sounds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the enormous riches thereafter obtained from inheritance."² Hence they sin at least lightly (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 358), who are delighted concerning the omission of the Hours, or the eating of meat, or the breaking of a fast, even if these occurred from inadvertence or from ignorance (H. Ap., III, 54; cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 2).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is lawful to rejoice concerning THE GOOD EFFECT of an evil work?

Resp. It is lawful, speaking per se; because then the will is not borne into an evil object. We say speaking per se, that is, setting aside the danger of rejoicing concerning the evil work itself; for we are bound to avoid such danger (cf. n. 374).

Hence: 1. It is lawful to be delighted concerning relief following from pollution, whether accidental or voluntary, provided there is absent the danger of delighting oneself concerning the pollution itself, which, always and objectively evil, ought to be displeasing, even if inculpably in sleep, through touches or a base dream, it was had. 2. A son does not sin who rejoices concerning the obtaining of an inheritance on account of homicide; nor a woman who is delighted concerning gain acquired for herself from dishonest trade; provided that in these or similar cases the cause itself is always held in hatred (V, 20).

QUAER. 3. Whether it is lawful to rejoice or be delighted CONCERNING THE NOT EVIL MODE by which an evil action was carried out?

Resp. It is lawful, per se, because, since the mode of action was not evil in itself, the delectation is not concerning an evil object. Thus, without sin, stories, comedies, wars, homicides, frauds, thefts, quarrels, etc., often delight us (V, 18).

It was said per se, because by reason of danger it can be illicit. Thus those easily come into danger of delighting themselves concerning the evil thing who, for example, frequently and willingly hear certain base deeds, in the narration of which only the ingenious manner by which they were carried out seems to please. For if the discourse were concerning honest actions, even carried out in an ingenious manner, persons of this kind, for the most part, would perceive much less delight (Praxis, n. 40).

Note. The things which above (n. 349) were said concerning a licit object of desire can also be said concerning joy and complacency. For concerning the things which it is lawful to desire, concerning these it is likewise lawful to rejoice.