Kinds of ignorance

WE have seen that we are responsible only for those actions which are performed with knowledge or advertence and freedom of choice. Whatever tends to prevent or lessen advertence, or to restrict liberty, will tend to diminish our responsibility. Ignorance affects advertence, fear and violence influence freedom of choice, and concupiscence influences both. Something must now be said on each of these causes which affect the voluntariness and imputability of our actions.

Ignorance is the absence of knowledge which the person who is ignorant should have. It is thus distinguished from nescience, which is merely the absence of knowledge, without the implication that the knowledge should be possessed.

Ignorance must also be carefully distinguished from error or mistake, which is a false judgement concerning something. Thus, if I simply do not know the person to whom I am speaking, I am in ignorance of his identity; if I mistake him for someone else, I am in error.

(a) With reference to the subject who is ignorant, ignorance is either invincible or vincible.

Invincible ignorance cannot be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. This may arise in my mind either because no thought of my want of knowledge occurs to me, and so the idea of making inquiries never enters into my head, or because I have failed to acquire knowledge on the point, though I made all reasonable efforts to do so. What efforts should be made in any given case depends on the character and circumstances of the person and the matter on which he is ignorant. If the matter is of great importance, if it affects the salvation of souls or the spiritual and temporal welfare of large numbers, great efforts must be made to dissipate ignorance; the efforts which would be sufficient in the case of one poorly instructed, or very much occupied with other weighty affairs, would not be It sufficient in other cases where these suppositions are not verified. In general, where knowledge is of obligation those efforts must be made to acquire it which ordinarily prudent and good men would exert in the circumstances.

Vincible ignorance is such as can be removed by the use of the requisite diligence. Various degrees are distinguished by divines according as some, or little, or no diligence is exercised to dispel it or means are used to foster it. If means are used to foster it, the ignorance is called affected; if little or no diligence is used to dispel it, it is called crass or supine; if some diligence is used, but not what is required in the case, it is called simply vincible ignorance.

(b) With reference to the object of ignorance, we must distinguish ignorance of law, fact, and penalty. 'There is ignorance of law, if the law’s existence is not known, as when a Catholic does not know that the Church forbids marriage within the third degree of kindred. There would be ignorance of fact, if it were not known that A. B. is related to C. D. within the third degree. Ignorance of the penalty is distinguished from ignorance of law when some special sanction is not known, though the law itself is known.

(c) With reference to the action of the subject, we distinguish antecedent, consequent, and concomitant ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is not voluntary, it is not willed by the subject; consequent ignorance is voluntary; concomitant is not expressly willed, but the action which is done with concomitant ignorance would ex hypothesi be done, even if the ignorance did not exist.

Vincible ignorance of the malice of the act, however, cannot excuse one who does wrong. He does not indeed will the evil in itself, but he wills its cause, and so it is voluntary in its cause and imputable. A person who sins in simply vincible ignorance, or even in crass ignorance, is indeed less blameworthy than one who sins with full knowledge of the malice of his act; the sin is only imperfectly voluntary, and less imputable than if perfectly voluntary. There is an apparent difference of opinion among theologians as to whether affected ignorance increases or lessens the malice of a wrong Prop. 2 damn. ab Alex. viii; 68 inter Baianas, can. 2202. action. With many modern authors it seems best to distinguish the motive with which in each case ignorance is fostered. If the state of ignorance is fostered through fear of being compelled by knowledge to abstain from the sinful act, such affected ignorance would seem to lessen the malice of the sin; the wrongdoer would not in this case venture to sin if he had full knowledge, and so he fosters his ignorance; his will is less malicious than if he sinned with full deliberation and consent. If, on the contrary, he merely fosters his ignorance to be able to plead it in excuse, and he is so bent on sinning that he would do the act in the same way even if he had full knowledge of its malice, then it does not seem to diminish the sin; it is rather a sign of an absolute determination to commit the sin.¹

We saw in a former chapter that the degree of malice which attaches to a sin committed in more or less culpable ignorance is measured rather by the sinfulness of the neglect to put away the ignorance, than by the sinfulness of the act in itself.

¹ Bucceroni, 1, n. 51, can. 2229.

We saw in Chapter VI that if the legislator chooses, and if he thinks it will be for the public good, he may intend a positive law made by him to bind, not under pain of committing sin by its mere violation, but only under pain of being obliged to pay the penalty imposed. Such a law is, as we saw, called by theologians a penal law. Besides the rules and constitutions of certain religious orders, ecclesiastical legislation does not afford many examples of penal laws. As a rule, ecclesiastical laws are either moral laws or mixed; they forbid or command an action under pain of sin, and frequently they impose a penalty on transgressors.

It may be asked whether ignorance excuses from the penalty imposed by a law. This question is now settled by Canon 2229.

Sec. i. Affected ignorance, whether of a law or of a penalty only, excuses from no penalties latae sententiae.

Sec. ii. If a law has the words, shall have presumed, dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, designedly done it, or other similar phrases which require full knowledge and deliberation, any diminution of imputability whether on the part of the intellect, or of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae.

Sec. iii. If a law has not those words, ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, if it were crass or supine, exempts from no penalty latae sententiae, if it were not crass or supine it excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindictive penalties latae sententiae.

Certain conditions are required in order that any particular sin may be reserved. First of all it must be a grave sin such as forms the necessary matter of confession, for a venial sin which the penitent need not confess cannot be effectually reserved. It is not the practice of the Church to reserve merely internal sins; there must be an external act and as such gravely sinful. So that a slightly: indecent word, even if uttered with a seriously bad intention, would not fall under reservation if all sins of indecency were reserved. The sin must be completed and perfect in its kind, not merely attempted, for reservation is to be strictly interpreted. For the same reason it must be certain that the sin is reserved, so that any prudent doubt of law or of fact whether a particular sin is reserved is sufficient to enable the confessor to give absolution without special faculties. ‘4. Those who are under the age of puberty do not incur papal cases unless they are expressly included in the law. The only papal cases in which they are so included is the violation of the enclosure of nuns. The same rule may be applied to bishops’ cases, unless a bishop has made known his intention to bind even those who have not reached the age of puberty. Ignorance of a censure, unless it be crass or supine, excuses from the censure, as is expressly laid down in the Decretals.¹ As in papal cases the reservation of the sin is on account of the censure annexed to it, and ignorance excuses from incurring this, therefore ignorance will excuse one from incurring papal reserved cases to which a censure is attached. The reservation of false accusation of solicitation is very probably penal, as theologians gather from the words by Benedict XIV in the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae, and as ignorance of a penalty excuses one from incurring it, therefore ignorance will excuse one from incurring this reserved case. This opinion, however, which many hold to be still probable, is hardly of practical importance, for the ecclesiastical judge who receives the false accusation will certainly warn the culprit of the penalty incurred by false accusation.

It is a disputed point whether ignorance excuses from incurring bishops’ cases or not. It excuses, indeed, from incurring any censure inflicted by any ecclesiastical superior, but it certainly does not excuse from incurring a reserved sin if the bishop has expressed his intention of reserving it even when committed in ignorance of the reservation. Otherwise it is probable that ignorance excuses in episcopal as well as in papal cases, for reservation is partly penal, and it cannot attain its end of deterring the faithful from committing reserved sins if they are ignorant of the reservation.

According to Canon 900, all reservation ceases: (1) When either the sick who cannot leave the house make their confession, or those about to be married with a view to marriage.

(2) Whenever either the lawful superior on being asked has refused to grant faculties for absolving a particular case, or in the prudent judgement of the confessor faculties for granting absolution cannot be asked for from the lawful superior without serious detriment to the penitent or without danger of violating the seal of confession.

(3) When the penitent is outside the territory of him who reserved the case, even though he left it only to obtain absolution. But, according to the Commission for the Interpretation of Canon Law a stranger (peregrinus) incurs the reserved cases of the place where he is staying (A.A.S. xii, 575)-

¹ C. 2, de const. in 6to; can. 2229, sec. 3, i.

As only males and those who are baptized can be validly ordained, the same two conditions are required in order to be subject to irregularity. There is nothing to prevent the same person from being subject to several different irregularities arising from different defects or crimes, nor from being subject to several irregularities of the same species arising from several crimes committed against different people, as from several homicides; but otherwise only one irregularity is contracted from one and the same cause though several times repeated, and so a priest who while under suspension celebrates Mass several times only incurs one irregularity (Can. 989).

Whenever there is a doubt either of law or of fact as to whether an irregularity has been incurred, almost all authorities agree that in practice it must be held not to have been incurred.

Irregularities are incurred even by those who are ignorant of them (Can. 988).

Besides irregularities which of themselves are perpetual impediments to the reception of Orders, the Code enumerates certain simple impediments which cease to exist on certain conditions. They are: (1) The sons of non-Catholics as long as their parents remain in error; (2) husbands who have wives; (3) those who hold an office forbidden to clerics; (4) slaves; (5) those bound to military service; (6) neophytes; (7) those who labour under infamy of fact (Can. 987).

I. Notion. Ignorance is the habitual lack of knowledge. It differs, therefore, from inadvertence, which is the actual lack of knowledge in one who habitually knows the matter.

II. Division. Ignorance is divided:

1. By reason of the subject, into negative, privative, and positive ignorance. Negative ignorance is ignorance in a subject not capable of knowledge, as in an infant or in a madman; it is usually called nescience. Privative ignorance is ignorance in a subject capable of knowledge. Positive ignorance is ignorance joined with error or the admission of the false; it is called simply error (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 3, n. 13; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 76, a. 2; De Malo, q. 3, a. 1).¹

2. By reason of the object, into ignorance of law and ignorance of fact. The former is that by which either the existence, or the meaning, or the extension, or the cessation of the law is unknown. The latter is that by which a fact or some circumstance is unknown, on which the application of the law depends. If someone does not know that the fast before Holy Communion is to be observed from the twelfth hour, there is ignorance of law. If someone does not know that he has eaten after the twelfth hour, there is ignorance of fact (St. Alphonsus, same place).

3. By reason of influence on the act, into antecedent and concomitant ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is that which is the cause of the act, so that the act would not have been placed if the ignorance had not existed, as if you kill a man thinking he is a wild beast. Concomitant ignorance is said to be that which accompanies the act but is not its cause, so that, even if it had been absent, the act would nevertheless have been placed, as if, prepared to kill an enemy, you kill him thinking he is a wild beast (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, same place).

4. By reason of perfection, into full and half-full ignorance, according as the truth, for example the malice of the act, is not at all adverted to or is adverted to in some measure, as if someone doubts whether some act is evil, or whether from some action an evil effect is going to follow.

5. By reason of the power to dispel it, into invincible and vincible ignorance, according as it cannot or can be overcome by moral diligence. Invincible ignorance is, for example, the ignorance of one who does not even think about some matter, say, about the malice of an act.

6. By reason of fault, into inculpable and culpable ignorance, according as it ought not to have been dispelled, or ought to have been dispelled and was not dispelled. Thus, for example, one who does not know the duties of his state and does not learn them labors under culpable ignorance.

Culpable ignorance is distinguished into affected and non-affected. Affected ignorance is had if the truth is not sought precisely so that one may sin more freely. Otherwise it is non-affected. This latter is divided into crass or supine, simply grave, and light ignorance, according as one was wholly, or almost wholly, gravely, or lightly negligent in seeking the truth which ought to have been sought.

¹ Others do not call the ignorance which we have called negative ignorance properly so called, but nescience; and they distinguish ignorance properly so called into negative and privative, according as it is ignorance of knowledge not owed, as jurisprudence in a farmer, or of knowledge owed, as the Decalogue in a Christian.

III. Influence on the voluntary-free.

1. Full ignorance removes the voluntary-free character of a work placed from it or with it, and excuses from fault. For ignorance of this kind excludes all cognition. Now what is entirely unknown cannot be willed, according to the saying: nothing is willed unless known. Add the second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Even if invincible ignorance of the natural law is granted, in the state of fallen nature this does not excuse the one acting from formal sin."¹

2. Half-full ignorance operates thus:

a) If the truth can be sought, and is not sought at all or not sufficiently sought, it does not remove the voluntary-free character of the work placed from it or with it, nor does it excuse from fault. For one who acts thus admits the work, whatever it may be, and rashly exposes himself to the danger of doing what is forbidden. Nevertheless, the aforesaid ignorance generally lessens the voluntary and the fault, since the cognition is less perfect. I said generally, because with respect to affected ignorance it is disputed whether it increases or lessens the voluntary. St. Thomas teaches: "Such ignorance seems to increase the voluntary and the sin" (I-II, q. 76, a. 4). Yet it does not seem to increase it by reason of itself or as such, since it involves a more imperfect knowledge; rather, it points to a greater inclination toward the evil act, and under this respect a greater sin.

b) If the truth cannot be sought, or has been sufficiently but fruitlessly sought, it removes the voluntary-free character and excuses from fault, according as the ignorance or doubt concerning the lawfulness of the work has been practically set aside, or has not been set aside, by the aid of a reflex principle; as will be explained more fully in the treatise on conscience. There we shall likewise say how great a diligence must be used in seeking the truth.

Note 1. Under the name of ignorance, forgetfulness is also understood; likewise inadvertence, which is actual ignorance in one who enjoys habitual knowledge.

Note 2. A sin committed with half-full ignorance and with the truth not sufficiently investigated is of the same species as a sin knowingly committed in the same matter.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1292.

V. Knowability of natural law. Concerning this, it must first be seen how far the objects, and consequently the precepts, of natural law are distinguished when their knowability is considered; then how far ignorance can in fact have place concerning them.

1. The objects, and consequently the precepts, of natural law, by reason of knowability, are distinguished into primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary precepts are those which become known at first glance, as: good is to be done; evil is to be avoided; order is to be preserved. Secondary precepts are those which are immediately and easily deduced from the primary ones. To these belong the precepts of the Decalogue, except the circumstance of the third precept by which the day to be sanctified is determined. Tertiary precepts are those which are deduced mediately and with more difficulty from the primary or secondary ones, such as, for example, precepts concerning certain contracts to be avoided (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 94, aa. 4 and 6; q. 100, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, I, 171; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 1, n. 5).

2. Ignorance with respect to the precepts of natural law can have place in a human being of sound mind as follows:

a) Ignorance cannot be given with respect to primary precepts, because "these stand to practical reason as the first principles of demonstrations stand to speculative reason" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 94, a. 2). Moreover, first principles become known to each person (St. Alphonsus, I, 170).

b) Generally ignorance is not given with respect to secondary precepts considered in themselves. This is clear both from the notion of them handed down and from experience. I have said "generally" and "considered in themselves," because sometimes ignorance is present "in rude persons and for a brief time, or... with some apparently honorable circumstance added" (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 1, n. 5; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 94, a. 6), for example if there is question of a lie for saving the life of an innocent person.

c) Concerning tertiary precepts, ignorance is more easily had, as is deduced from their notion and from daily experience (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 100, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, I, 171).

V. Causes excusing from invalidation. "No ignorance of invalidating or incapacitating laws excuses from them, unless something else is expressly said" (can. 16, § 1). Likewise grave damage to be avoided does not prevent invalidation. The reason is that the common good requires that invalidating laws made in favor of the common good retain their force, even if the invalidation is unknown, or the act cannot be avoided without grave damage (St. Alphonsus, VI, 1079). Except the case in which the damage would be of such a sort that there would be place for epikeia (n. 143).

If, however, the invalidating law is purely penal, ignorance which excuses from fault brings it about that invalidation does not have place. In the case the condition is lacking, namely fault, which a purely penal invalidating law supposes. Hence one who inculpably did not recite the canonical hours makes the fruits his own (cf. can. 1475).

A cause excusing is one which brings it about that one who is subject to the law is not held to observe it. It differs from a cause exempting, which brings it about that someone ceases to be subject to the law (St. Alphonsus, I, 152).

The excusing causes are ignorance and inability. Ignorance brings it about that one who transgresses the law does not sin formally, but not that material sin is absent. Inability averts not only formal sin, but also material sin. Ignorance was discussed where there was speech about impediments of liberty (nn. 30-32), so that only inability must be treated.

I. Culpable ignorance; which can be a cause of sin to the extent that man, if he had expelled the ignorance, would have abstained from the depraved act. To this cause also belongs defect of consideration, which is a certain actual culpable ignorance, concerning which the prophet Jeremiah says: "With desolation the whole land is made desolate, because there is no one who reflects in the heart."¹

¹ Jer. 12:11.

I. Requisites on the part of the one vowing. There are required a will to bind oneself, sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow, and perfect liberty.

1. A will to bind oneself, at least implicit; for this belongs to the essence of a vow. When the aforesaid will is lacking, there is a mere proposal (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 201).

Corollary I. One who is ignorant of the obligation of a vow vows invalidly, because he lacks the will to bind himself; for the will is not borne toward what is unknown. Except one who wills to vow as others are accustomed to do, even if he merely is ignorant that an obligation arises; for he has an implicit will to bind himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Corollary II. One who wills to vow, but positively excludes the obligation, does not vow; for although the obligation itself is the effect of a vow, nevertheless he who positively excludes the obligation does not have the mind, not even implicitly, of binding himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. Sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow; namely, distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices; yet this, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se. I said:

a) Distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices. The reason is that vague knowledge suffices for the one vowing to consent to the object, that is, to those things by which the object is constituted. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity is valid when the one vowing knows that by this vow carnal pleasures are renounced, although he is ignorant of precisely what these pleasures consist in; likewise even if he is ignorant of the "mysteries of life," as they are called.

b) Vague knowledge, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se; for, when this too is lacking, the one vowing does not consent to the object, since it is in no way known. It is said per se, because even vague knowledge does not seem to be required if the one vowing expressly intends to vow what others vow; for then he implicitly consents to the object. Hence one who, for example, in vowing chastity, expressly intends to vow what is vowed by others seems to vow validly, even if he is ignorant, for example, that by a vow of chastity carnal pleasures are renounced. But a defect even of vague knowledge seems almost hypothetical.

Corollary I. Error obstructs validity if it concerns the substantial elements of the thing promised, that is, whether its substance,¹ or the final cause,² or a circumstance which notably changes the substance.³ The reason is that, while error concerning substantial elements remains, consent to the substance is lacking. That a circumstance which notably changes the thing also must be referred to the substantial elements follows from the fact that in this case, according to common estimation, there is a substance or thing morally diverse (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary II. Error does not obstruct validity if it concerns either circumstances of lesser moment,⁴ or the impulsive cause.⁵ The reason is that consent to the substance of the thing promised is not lacking. And this holds even if the error gave occasion to the vow;⁶ for the question is not what someone would have done, but what he did. But the fact that, once the error was removed, he would not have consented, does not prevent the fact that he consented (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary III. Religious vows, no less than other vows, are void because of error concerning substantial elements, because the reason given above, being drawn from the nature of the thing, must hold here too. Nevertheless, in practice, the said vows will scarcely be void except because of error concerning the very substance of the vows, because, when that error is lacking, error generally will not be such as to constitute a morally diverse object.

3. Perfect liberty, that is, such as is required for sinning gravely; for only an act fully human or fully deliberated suffices for undertaking an obligation (St. Alphonsus, III, 196). Hence vows are invalid when made before the age of discretion, or by one semi-insane, semi-drunk, semi-asleep, or arising from fear which so disturbs the use of reason that full deliberation is impeded. But vows emitted in fervor of devotion are valid, and generally also those which are emitted from sudden passion or levity of mind, because sufficient deliberation generally is present.

Fear which does not impede full deliberation influences a vow in this way:

a) The following do not obstruct validity: 1. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) struck from within, that is, by a cause that is not free; hence a vow emitted in danger of shipwreck is valid; 2. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) justly struck. The reason is that in each case, on the one hand, full deliberation is supposed, and on the other hand no injury has been done to the one vowing, so that no reason exists why the vow would be invalid; 3. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) unjustly struck, but not for extorting a vow, does not obstruct validity; hence a vow emitted so that God may rescue you from the hands of robbers is valid. The reason is that, in relation to the vow, no injury is inflicted on you (St. Alphonsus, III, 197).

b) At least by canon law, grave fear struck from without, unjustly, and for extorting a vow, obstructs validity (can. 1307, § 2). It is disputed whether such fear also by natural law impedes the validity of a vow. Some affirm, and they extend this also to light fear, because God does not accept a vow of this kind, lest He give force to unjust compulsion. Others deny, because, in their opinion, a sufficiently solid reason cannot be alleged why God would not accept a fully deliberated act (cf. St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ For example, someone vows a thing of his own which he judges to be glass, when it is a gem.

² Someone vows a Mass for the health of his father, when he is dead.

³ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues, when it is six leagues.

⁴ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues; but it is three and a half leagues.

⁵ Someone vows alms to be given to poor Peter, whom he judges to be religious, when he is irreligious.

⁶ Suppose that in the cases set forth under 4 and 5, had the error been absent, he would not have vowed the pilgrimage or the alms.

I. Division. Error is distinguished:

1. Into substantial and accidental. Substantial error is had: 1° when the nature of the contract intended by one party is different from the nature of the contract which the other party intends, as if you accept something as a gift, when the other party intends to lend it for use; 2° when the object of consent, at least morally speaking, is different from the object of the present contract, that is, the object upon which the expression of consent is borne, as if you intend to buy a gem, and the expression of consent is borne upon glass; 3° error concerning the person with whom one contracts can be substantial only then when, as in matrimony, the person constitutes the object of the contract.

Others, however, speak thus with respect to error concerning the person: error concerning the person can be substantial or accidental. In matrimony it is always substantial, because the person itself is the object about which the contract is made. In other contracts error is substantial if the person is intended per se and principally, as commonly happens in gratuitous contracts; for example, if you give alms to Peter, thinking him to be poor, when he is rich. Error is accidental if the person is something secondary, which most often has place in onerous contracts, for example if you buy something from Paul the heretic, thinking him to be Catholic; sometimes it also has place in gratuitous contracts, as if you give alms to Peter the poor man, thinking him to be Paul.

Outside the cases enumerated above, error is accidental.

2. Into error which gave cause to the contract, and such as did not give cause to it, according as the contract, with the error set aside, would not have been entered into, or nevertheless would have been entered into.

II. Influence upon the contract. Error concerning the nature of the contract, as is clear, makes the contract void. Hence now let us speak about error which concerns the object of the contract. Now then:

1. Substantial error makes the contract void. For it brings it about that consent is borne upon an object different from the object of the present contract, that is, from the object upon which the expression of consent is borne. Therefore consent is lacking with respect to the object of this contract (St. Alphonsus, III, 714; cf. can. 104).

2. Accidental error effects these things:

a) It makes the contract void if the contracting party attaches his consent to the accident in such a way that it falls back into a condition sine qua non (cf. can. 104). Otherwise it does not make the contract void, because it does not prevent consent from being borne upon the object of the present contract. But the case of nullification occurs especially in error concerning the person, and indeed, that we may apply what others according to the things said in n. 836 hold as substantial error, if the person is intended per se and principally, as commonly happens in gratuitous contracts; for example, if you give alms to Peter, thinking him to be poor, when he is rich. Otherwise it must be said if the person is something secondary, which most often has place in onerous contracts, for example if you buy something from Paul the heretic, thinking him to be Catholic; sometimes also in gratuitous contracts, as if you give alms to Peter the poor man, erroneously thinking him to be a religious (St. Alphonsus, III, 737).

b) It renders the contract rescindable if the error was induced by fraud, and indeed by the other contracting party, and gave cause to the contract. Otherwise it does not render the contract even rescindable.

The reason for the former is that a contract induced by the fraud of the other contracting party involves an injury inflicted by the other contracting party; and this injury must be repaired by him. It is repaired by the fact that the contract involving the injury is removed, in other words rescinded. Therefore it must be rescinded, or at least rescission of it must be offered, by him who inflicted the injury; corresponding to this obligation is the right of rescinding in him who has suffered the injury. If the contract has already been given to execution, the injury is repaired by the fact that the deceived person is restored to his former state with respect to his things (St. Alphonsus, III, 715).

The latter involves three things, namely:

a) Accidental error does not render the contract rescindable if it was not induced by fraud, but, for example, inculpably or fortuitously, or by a non-free cause; because an injury, at least a formal one, to be repaired is lacking.

b) Accidental error does not render the contract rescindable if it was induced by the fraud of a third party. The reason is that injury to be repaired by the other contracting party, for example by Peter, is absent. But an injury inflicted by a third party, Paul, upon one contracting party, James, is not a reason why the other contracting party, Peter, can be deprived, by rescission of the contract, of the right acquired through the contract with James.

c) Accidental error does not render the contract rescindable if it did not give cause to the contract. For from the fact that, with the error excluded, the contract nevertheless would have been entered into, it follows that the contract, equally as other contracts entered into without error, was acceptable to the will; hence, equally as those other contracts, it must be held as firm and non-rescindable.

Nevertheless, observe that if the due equality between wage and price has been injured because of error, it must be repaired; and if fraud has been added, the deceiver is bound to repair also other damages, if perhaps they have followed from the fraud (St. Alphonsus, III, 714 and 715).

Note 1. With respect to ecclesiastical matter, observe these words of can. 104: "In contracts error can give place to a rescissory action according to the norm of law"; likewise these words of can. 1684, § 1: "If someone ... circumvented by fraud ... has entered into a contract which is not null by the law itself, he can, ... once the fraud has been proved, obtain ... the rescission of the contract by the action which is called rescissory."

Note 2. What civil law establishes concerning error, see in the law of one's country.

I. The notion of betrothals. Betrothals¹ are the mutual promise of matrimony between one man and one woman who are capable. It is said:

1. A promise. Therefore a desire, a mere purpose, or a simple negotiation about entering matrimony does not suffice.

2. Mutual. Therefore it is not sufficient that only one party promise, even if the other accepts the promise; but a counter-promise also is required (canon 1017, § 1). As is clear from what has been said, betrothals constitute a contract, and indeed an onerous one; hence for them, as for every contract of this kind, consent is required:

a) Internal. If it is not internal, consent or volition is lacking in reality. Therefore a fictitious promise does not suffice, that is, one made externally but without the mind of promising. One who wishes to enter betrothals, but has the mind of not binding himself, seems not to enter betrothals, because he excludes that without which the contract cannot exist (cf. vol. I, n. 834). But one who wishes to enter betrothals acts validly, even if he has the mind of not fulfilling the obligation (cf. ibid.). In addition, one who has promised fictitiously is guilty of fraud, and therefore is bound to prevent or compensate the damage; even, if this cannot be done in another way, by now promising truly (St. Alphonsus VI, 832, 833).

b) Fully deliberate; for only an act of this kind can produce an obligation and the acquisition of a right. Hence betrothals entered, for example, in drunkenness, by one half-insane, are invalid; likewise betrothals made from a sudden movement of passion can be invalid (St. Alphonsus VI, 831).

c) Sufficiently free from error; wherefore it is enough to note:

α) Error concerning the person with whom betrothals are entered renders these betrothals invalid. The reason is that in betrothals the person constitutes the object of the contract. But error concerning the object of a contract invalidates the contract (vol. I, n. 836).

β) For the same reason, error concerning a quality or circumstances of the person with whom betrothals are entered renders these betrothals invalid if the error redounds into error concerning the person. Otherwise it does not invalidate them, because consent to the object of the contract is not lacking; nevertheless it renders them rescindable if, had the error not existed, the betrothals would not have been entered; practically, if the error concerns a notable defect. These things indeed do not of themselves hold for all onerous contracts, but with regard to betrothals they are admitted in law, as will be explained later (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 18, n. 2).

d) Sufficiently free from fear. Fear which so disturbs the use of reason that the act is not fully deliberate invalidates betrothals (vol. I, n. 840). These things set aside:

α) Fear, whether arising from within, or from a necessary cause, or inflicted justly or unjustly by a free cause, does not invalidate betrothals. The reason is that fear does not prevent the contracting party from furnishing perfect consent. But every contract is intrinsically constituted by perfect consent (St. Alphonsus VI, 844; cf. vol. I, n. 840).

Objection. Grave fear, inflicted unjustly and for extorting consent, invalidates betrothals at least by canon law, just as it invalidates matrimony (canon 1087, § 1), according to that rule: connected things ought to have the same reckoning.

Response. The assertion seems to have to be denied; for since the application of the assigned rule is in itself rather difficult, the Code certainly, if it had wished the rule to be applied, would have stated that betrothals are invalidated by the said fear in the same way as matrimony.

β) Fear renders betrothals rescindable if it has been inflicted both unjustly and by the other contracting party, and has given cause to the contract. If one of the assigned conditions is lacking, fear does not render betrothals rescindable (vol. I, n. 840).

e) External, namely insofar as it must be made known to the other party. Of itself, however, it is indifferent whether it is manifested by words, in writing, or by a sign, for example by a nod. But, with positive law considered, it is required that the legitimate form, to be explained later, be observed (St. Alphonsus VI, 838).

f) Made known to the other party, as was explained in vol. I, n. 834.

g) Made known by the promisor or in his name (vol. I, ibid.).

h) Simultaneous, the one with the other, because otherwise they do not truly agree into one. Of itself, however, it suffices that one consent while the consent previously given by the other persists (vol. I, n. 834).

3. Of matrimony; others say of future matrimony, so that betrothals may be more expressly distinguished from matrimony not yet consummated, which formerly came under the name of betrothals concerning the present, while betrothals properly so called were called betrothals concerning the future.

4. Between one man and one woman. Hence there would not be betrothals if someone promised matrimony to two at the same time.

5. Capable, that is, it is required that the promisors be both actually capable of promising matrimony and at least later capable of contracting it; these things, however, need explanation, which we shall add in the corollaries.

¹ Betrothals are so called from promising, namely from the practice of the Romans, by which one who wished to take a girl as wife addressed her father or guardian with the solemn formula: "Do you promise?" and he responded: "I promise." She who was promised was the bride, that is, the promised one; he to whom she was promised was the bridegroom; he who promised was the sponsor; the whole contract was betrothals; the day on which it was entered was called sponsal.

III. Sufficiently free from ignorance; concerning which observe that ignorance differs from error. Ignorance is the mere defect of knowledge, and does not import an opinion or judgment; error, however, imports an opinion or judgment, and a false one. Now ignorance of the matrimonial object invalidates consent, because the will is not borne toward the unknown. Hence:

Corollary I. Those who are ignorant that matrimony is a permanent society between man and woman for procreating children contract invalidly (canon 1082, § 1). This ignorance is not presumed after puberty (canon 1082, § 2). It is said permanent; by this word indissolubility properly so called, or the essential property of matrimony, is not understood; otherwise the Code would also make mention of other equally essential properties, for example unity. But there is understood some permanence which must last more or less, and is supposed in every society.

Corollary II. Those who are ignorant that the procreation of offspring is obtained by means of bodily union seem to contract invalidly, because there is ignorance of the object, that is, of the right over the body in order to procreating children.

Corollary III. Those who are ignorant only of the mode of union or intercourse have sufficient knowledge of the object, because the said ignorance does not prevent them, by explicitly handing over the right over the body in order to procreation, from at least implicitly handing over the right to acts of themselves apt for generation. Thus also the Sacred Congregation of the Council.¹ The aforesaid things hold even if someone, once the truth was known, would not have entered matrimony, since the question is not what someone would have done, but what he did.

¹ March 15, 1856; December 18, 1869.

I. The formal causes of imputability are: 1° the malice of the delinquent; 2° the fault of the delinquent, whether in ignorance of the law or in omission of the diligence required so that the law may be observed (canon 2199).

1. Malice here is the deliberate will of violating the law; to it is opposed, on the part of the intellect, defect of knowledge, and on the part of the will, defect of liberty. Once the external violation of law has been posited, malice is presumed in the external forum until the contrary is proved (canon 2200).

Corollary I. Those who actually lack the use of reason are incapable of delict (canon 2201, § 1). The reason is that deliberation is absent.

Corollary II. Those habitually insane, although at times they have lucid intervals or seem sane in certain reasonings or acts, are nevertheless presumed incapable of delict (canon 2201, § 2). The reason is that deliberation in them is presumed to be absent until it is proved to be present.

Corollary III. A delict committed in voluntary drunkenness does not lack some imputability (canon 2201, § 3). This is clear if drunkenness does not wholly take away the use of reason; but if it wholly takes it away, the delict is imputed if it was foreseen at least in some measure (vol. I, n. 60). Besides, the imputability of a delict committed in voluntary drunkenness is less than when the same delict is committed by one who is fully master of himself, unless, however, drunkenness was sought precisely for perpetrating or excusing the delict. But when law is violated in involuntary drunkenness, imputability is wholly absent if drunkenness wholly takes away the use of reason; it is diminished if it takes it away only in part. The same should be said of other similar disturbances of mind (canon 2201, § 3), for example from morphine.

Corollary IV. Weakness of mind diminishes the imputability of a delict, but does not wholly remove it (canon 2201, § 4).

2. Ignorance of the violated law influences the imputability of the transgression in this way:

a) Inculpable ignorance removes the imputability of the transgression and consequently the delict (canon 2201, § 1).

b) Culpable ignorance diminishes imputability more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself (cited canon). Nevertheless, concerning affected ignorance it is disputed whether it increases or diminishes imputability (vol. I, n. 32).

Note 1. Ignorance of the penalty alone does not remove the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat (canon 2202, § 2).

Note 2. Those things which are established concerning ignorance, whether of the law or of the penalty, also hold concerning inadvertence¹ and concerning error² (canon 2202, § 3); likewise concerning ignorance of fact, for instance if someone strikes a cleric whom he certainly or probably holds to be a layman.

Note 3. Ignorance, or inadvertence or error concerning law or penalty or fact, is generally not presumed (canon 16, § 2).

3. Omission of due diligence. If someone has violated the law from omission of due diligence, the imputability is diminished in the manner to be determined from the circumstances by a prudent judge; but if he foresaw the matter and nevertheless omitted the cautions for avoiding it which any diligent person would have used, the fault is proximate to malice (canon 2203, § 1). Moreover, a fortuitous case which cannot be foreseen, or which when foreseen cannot be met, exempts from any imputability (canon 2203, § 2).

¹ It is actual ignorance in one who enjoys habitual knowledge.

² It is positive ignorance, or ignorance joined with the admission of what is false.

II. Requisites for someone actually to contract a penalty latae sententiae.

1. Requisites on the part of the delict. A penalty established by law is not incurred unless the delict has been perfect in its own kind according to the property of the words of the law (canon 2228). This condition regards the external part of the delict (n. 846); when the attempt of a delict is punished in law, consummation in the genus of attempt is required. Finally it must be observed that the property of the words requires strict interpretation; for example, the delict of homicide, which is punished by law, is not present unless death has followed. In doubt, whether of the external fact or of imputability, the penalty is not incurred, because from a doubtful cause no one is deprived by a certain right (cf. canon 2232, § 1: "who is conscious to himself of the delict").

2. Requisites on the part of the delinquent regard the formal part of the delict, or imputability. Therefore first recall that grave imputability is required¹ (canon 2218, § 2), but does not always suffice, for someone to be liable to a penalty. With these things attended to, certain things are noted or even established by the Code, of which some are general and regard ignorance and similar things which influence imputability; others concern the impubescent and cooperators.

a) General matters. alpha) Affected ignorance either of the law or of the penalty alone excuses from no penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 1).

beta) If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, has acted deliberately, or other similar words which require full knowledge and deliberation, any diminution of imputability, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 2). It is said any diminution of imputability; hence even ignorance of the penalty, unless it is affected (cf. canon 2202, § 2); likewise even light fear.

gamma) If the law does not have those words:

1° Crass or supine ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, exempts from no penalty latae sententiae. Ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, which was not crass or supine excuses from medicinal penalties latae sententiae; but if the imputability of the delict is grave, it does not excuse from vindicative penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 3, 1°, compared with canon 2218, § 2).

2° Drunkenness, omission of due diligence, weakness of mind, or impulse of passion, if, notwithstanding the diminution of imputability, the action is still gravely culpable, do not excuse from penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 3, 2°).

3° Grave fear, if the delict tends toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward public harm of souls, in no way exempts from penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 3, 3°). With these things attended to, grave fear outside the enumerated cases excuses from penalties latae sententiae, at least on account of doubt; the doubt is introduced by canon 2218, § 2.

Note. Although the guilty person according to the norm of § 3, n. 1, is not bound by censures latae sententiae, nevertheless this does not prevent him, if the matter bears it, from being affected by another congruous penalty or penance (canon 2229, § 4).

b) Impubescent persons are excused from penalties latae sententiae, and are to be corrected rather by educational punishments than by censures or other graver vindicative penalties; but pubescent persons who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in the delict according to the norm of canon 2209, §§ 1-3 (n. 849), themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law (canon 2230). Note that an irregularity from delict can nevertheless be contracted by impubescent persons (canon 985).

c) Cooperators. If several have concurred in perpetrating a delict, although only one is named in the law, those also who are mentioned in canon 2209, §§ 1-3, are bound, unless the law has expressly provided otherwise, by the same penalty; the others, however, are not likewise bound, but are to be punished with another just penalty according to the prudent judgment of the Superior, unless the law establishes a particular penalty against them (canon 2231).

Question. To what extent, if there is question of a penalty latae sententiae, is a declaratory sentence required?

Response. A penalty latae sententiae, whether medicinal or vindicative, binds the delinquent who is conscious to himself of the delict by the fact itself in both forums; nevertheless, before a declaratory sentence, the delinquent is excused from observing the penalty whenever he cannot observe it without infamy, and in the external forum no one can exact from him the observance of that same penalty, unless the delict is notorious, the prescription of canon 2223, § 4, remaining firm (canon 2232, § 1; n. 856).

A declaratory sentence carries the penalty back to the moment of the committed delict (canon 2232, § 2); this is practical, for example, in the case of restitution to be made of fruits received, which therefore must be computed from the moment of the perpetrated delict (cf. canon 2280).²

¹ At least insofar as the defect of grave imputability excuses from any penalty in the internal forum, and also in the external forum if the defect is proved for the external forum (cited canon).

² On the contrary, if someone incurs excommunication latae sententiae and before the sentence acquires an office, after the sentence the acquisition is not rendered invalid, as Cerato thinks, p. 20; for only acquisition after the sentence is invalid (cf. canons 2265, § 1, 2°; 2266; 2296, § 2).

Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.—An act is human, or voluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be deliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge is not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the language he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand what he is saying.

With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three kinds of ignorance may be distinguished.

(a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the act that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had there been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a hunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally while shooting at an animal.

(b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is voluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is affected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about his duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may not be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to acquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a man, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before firing.

(c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act would not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a hunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a man whom he mistook for a deer.

With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant, there are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it cannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily prudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus, a person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in vain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant. (b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of ordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance: first, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised, but not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any diligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person deliberately aims to continue in ignorance.

Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of Acts.—(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality, makes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as will be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that is not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may say: “Ignorance excuses.”

(b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless the law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as will be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law is sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one’s own self, the presumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable. Hence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence: “Ignorance does not excuse” (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law).

Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.—(a) Concomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does not cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the act that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be actually desired.

(b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since such ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect make an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been done save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act entirely involuntary.

Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.—(a) Invincible ignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act involuntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence, no matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of formal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice involved.

(b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the ignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It does not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the ignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a state of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though he had knowledge.

Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, Nich. Ethics, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b 27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general). else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory (I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or presumption which he entertains.

Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins habitually without fear or remorse.

Those who have not the use of reason, either habitually (as children and the insane) or actually (as the intoxicated), may be invincibly ignorant of the Natural Law—for example, they may be unable to perceive even the difference between right and wrong. As to those who have the use of reason, they can be ignorant of the Natural Law only as follows:

(a) they cannot ever be invincibly ignorant of the most general precepts (such as “good is to be done,” “evil is to be avoided”), for since they know the difference between right and wrong, they must also perceive that which is contained in the concepts of right and wrong, viz., that the former is something desirable and which ought to be done, the latter something undesirable which must not be done;

(b) one cannot, as a rule, be invincibly ignorant of those precepts that are immediately inferred as necessary conclusions from the most general precepts (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned”), for the conclusion follows so easily from the manifest principle that only in exceptional cases could one be excused for not knowing its truth;

(c) one can, even as a rule, be ignorant of precepts that are inferred as necessary but very remote conclusions from the most general precepts, (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned at such a time or place, or in such a manner or condition”), for this conclusion is so far removed from its premise, and there are so many factors to be considered, that considerable knowledge and skill in reasoning are required for a correct judgment—things in which many people are lacking.

Ignorance of the Law of Christ.-(a) Outsiders may be in invincible ignorance of the Law of Christ. For many persons through no fault of their own, in times past or even today, have not heard the Gospel message: “How shall they believe Him of whom they have not heard?” (Rom, x. 14).

(b) Christians may be in invincible ignorance of the Law of Christ. For, just as want of a preacher causes a pagan to be invincibly ignorant of the necessity of Baptism, so a lack of instruction in Christian doctrine might leave a baptized person inculpably ignorant (e.g., of the duty of receiving the Eucharist).

Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness.—After the sins against faith itself come the sins against the Gifts of the Holy Ghost that serve faith (see 808): (a) against the Gift of Knowledge is the sin of ignorance; (b) against the Gift of Understanding are the sins of blindness of heart and dullness of understanding.

Culpable ignorance regarding truths of faith, as a distinct sin, is as follows:

(a) It is not distinct from its cause (i.e., negligence), for ignorance is not a sin at all, except in so far as it proceeds from negligence. Hence, one would not be obliged to accuse oneself of the sins of omission in regard to instruction in Christian doctrine and of ignorance in Christian doctrine, for these are but one sin.

(b) Culpable ignorance is not distinct from its effect (i.e., from a sin committed on account of the ignorance), if the truth one is ignorant of has to be known only on account of some passing duty that must be performed here and now; for in such a case the knowledge is required, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the duty. Hence, ignorance of fact or of a particular law is not distinct as a sin from the sin that results from it. Examples: Titus knows that he should not take money that belongs to another; but through his own carelessness he is ignorant of the fact that the money before him belongs to another, and takes the money. Balbus knows that the precept of the Church on fasting is obligatory; but through his own negligence he is unaware that today is a fast day, and does not fast. Titus and Balbus committed one sin apiece.

(c) Culpable ignorance is distinct from its effect, if the truth one is ignorant of has to be known for its own sake; for in such a case one sins against the virtue of studiosity (see 905) by not knowing something which one should know habitually, and also against some other virtue by violating its precepts as a result of one’s sinful ignorance. Truths one is obliged to know for their own sake are the mysteries of faith, the Commandments of the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church, and the duties of one’s own state. Examples: Sempronius through his own carelessness does not know the mystery of the Incarnation, and as a result blasphemes Christ. Titus does not know that stealing is a sin, and therefore he steals. In both cases two sins are committed, the sin of ignorance and the sin that resulted from ignorance.

Confessors should examine in religion penitents who show signs of ignorance (e.g., in the manner of making their confession), and should grant or deny absolution according to the case.

(a) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary as a means of justification (see 790), the penitents should be dealt with as explained in 792.

(b) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary because commanded and there is urgent need of absolution (e.g., on account of mortal sin committed), the penitent may be absolved, if he is truly contrite and promises to repair his negligence by studying his religion, attending Sunday school, instructions, etc.

(c) If the ignorance is about the truths necessary because commanded, and there is no urgent necessity of absolution, the penitents may be sent away without absolution. Thus, children who have no serious sins to confess and who do not know how to say the act of contrition or other prayers, or who cannot answer simple questions of the Catechism, should be sent away with a blessing and told to study these things and return when they know them better.

Does ignorance cause the involuntary? - Ignorance with which someone acts either has itself causally in relation to that which is done, or has itself merely concomitantly with respect to that which is done. It has itself concomitantly "when ignorance concerns that which is done; nevertheless, even if it were known, it would still be done. For then ignorance does not induce one to willing that this be done, but it happens at the same time that something is done and unknown; as... when someone would indeed wish to kill an enemy, but, ignorant, kills him, thinking he is killing a deer. And such ignorance does not make the involuntary" (namely contrariwise), "because it does not cause something that is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary" (or the involuntary merely privatively), "because what is unknown cannot be actually willed." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8.

But it makes the non-voluntary, whether that merely concomitant ignorance is involuntary, or whether it is not merely concomitant, but voluntary. Nevertheless there is a distinction between involuntary and voluntary ignorance in the case; because involuntary concomitant ignorance, since it simply takes away the voluntary, makes something simply non-voluntary. But voluntary concomitant ignorance, since it does not simply take away the voluntary, for it is voluntary, makes that which is done with that ignorance non-voluntary indeed in itself, but voluntary in some way in the cause. S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 8.

Voluntary in the cause, namely insofar as the ignorance concerns a thing which ought to have been known, and perhaps someone knowing would not do what he does ignorantly. And if certainly he would do it even knowing, the voluntary is still had indirectly in the cause, by reason of that evil disposition which the willed ignorance leaves intact, and by reason of that action, for example hunting, which was the cause of the consequent act, for example homicide. To the point Suarez, on 1. 2, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2, n. 19: "That ignorance does not excuse from fault; therefore neither does it take away the voluntary. He is bound to expel that ignorance in order to avoid the act, and voluntarily omits to do this; therefore he also acts voluntarily, at least indirectly. Therefore it matters nothing that this ignorance is not the cause of the act, and that if knowledge were present, the act would nevertheless take place; both because, although we grant that that act is not voluntary in ignorance as in a cause, nevertheless that ignorance will be a sufficient condition for that act to be voluntary indirectly, insofar as man is bound and can avoid it and does not do so; for what he would have done if knowledge existed does not excuse him, but rather in a certain way accuses him more, because that is an evil disposition and contrary to the obligation by which he is bound to avoid the act; and also because that effect is voluntary in another act directly willed, as, for example, the killing of a man in hunting. But voluntary ignorance, although it is concomitant, is the reason or condition that that prior act of hunting be done imprudently or incautiously, and consequently that in it the effect thence following is judged to have been willed."

Indeed, notwithstanding that evil disposition, he was still then bound, indeed much more, to know; and knowing, perhaps, notwithstanding that evil disposition, he would not have committed the monstrous crime with open eyes. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; Billuart, de Act. hum., diss. 1, art. 6, I say 3.

If ignorance is not merely concomitant, or does not have itself merely concomitantly in relation to that which is done, but is causing, or has itself causally, namely is the cause of doing that which is done, then that ignorance is either voluntary, or consequent upon a free act of the will, or it is not voluntary, or antecedent to a free act of the will. A free act of the will, namely concerning the ignorance itself, not concerning that which is afterward done from that ignorance. "But consequently," says S. Th. ibid., "ignorance has itself to the will insofar as it is voluntary."

Therefore when ignorance of this kind is the cause of doing that which is done, "since it is itself voluntary... it cannot cause the involuntary simply" (that is, contrariwise; since that which is done is voluntary in the cause from which it proceeds, i.e. in that willed ignorance). "Nevertheless it causes the involuntary according to a certain respect, insofar as it precedes the movement of the will to doing something, which would not be if knowledge were present," ibid.; that is, although that movement of the will is voluntary in the cause, nevertheless in itself it is altogether involuntary, for it would not be if knowledge were present. L. 1. 5. n. 4.

But if the causing ignorance, or that which is the cause of doing what is done, is not voluntary, or is antecedent, then ignorance causes the involuntary simply, since that which is done, by the very fact that it is caused by ignorance, would not be if knowledge were present, and accordingly is against the will. Nor indeed is that willed in itself; nor in any way willed in the cause. Therefore it remains totally or simply involuntary. "But antecedently," says the Holy Doctor ibid., "ignorance has itself to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when some man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act which he was not bound to know, and from this does something which he would not do if he knew: for example, when someone, diligence having been used, not knowing that someone is passing along the road, shoots an arrow with which he kills the passerby. And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply."

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. As regards the insane, it is certainly not always established that they are not sufficiently in possession of themselves in an act of sin. Nor likewise is it established whether those who are hypnotized, and in hypnotic sleep execute the evil commands of the one hypnotizing, are not also sufficiently in possession of themselves. But in these cases the voluntary can easily be in the cause.

Whether ignorance renders the act objectively null? - R. Negatively. The reason is that our false estimation cannot change the objective truth of the thing. And thus an unbeliever who baptizes, thinking that a man is not really justified by baptism, nevertheless, if he has the intention of doing what the Church does, baptizes validly. A priest baptizing in a case of necessity with water which he falsely does not think to be natural, if the water is truly natural, baptizes validly. A pastor who assists at a marriage, falsely thinking that he still needs some special delegation of the bishop which he does not have, validly assists at it. Consequently it must be said that by ignorance an act objectively null is not validated. Therefore, if a confessor ignorant of reserved cases absolves from them, he by no means truly absolves from them. Bonacina, de Sacram., d. 1, q. 2, p. 1, n. 28; Sporer, de Matr., n. 48.

Is ignorance always sin? - One ignorance is invincible, another vincible. Invincible ignorance has place when someone suspects nothing at all concerning the thing itself and concerning the obligation of inquiring; or although he has fallen into suspicion of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, nevertheless after using moral diligence, he could not know the thing. After moral diligence; for it is not necessary that the diligence to be used be the greatest, but it suffices that it be common and ordinary, proportionate to the person and to the matter about which there is question.

Vincible ignorance is had when someone not only comes into doubt about the thing and about the obligation of inquiring, but also has occasion of coming into knowledge of the thing, and nevertheless voluntarily passes it by. L. 1. 1. n. 3. Antecedent ignorance is always invincible; but not every invincible ignorance is antecedent. Even merely concomitant ignorance is invincible. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8. Invincible ignorance is involuntary; but vincible ignorance is voluntary.

Vincible ignorance is one thing directly voluntary, another indirectly voluntary, another voluntary accidentally. Directly voluntary ignorance is called affected ignorance. This is had when someone deliberately wills to be ignorant, whether because of weariness of learning, or so that he may sin more freely, or so that he may have an excuse, or so that he simply may not be drawn back from sin. Indirectly voluntary ignorance is had when someone omits to apply study to knowing, or neglects to learn because of mere laziness or sloth, because of the labor of learning, or because of other occupations. Ignorance of this kind is distinguished in two ways, namely into crass or supine, and into purely vincible. Crass or supine ignorance is in him who, although he does not studiously seek ignorance, nevertheless uses no diligence or almost no diligence to acquire for himself that knowledge which according to his condition he can have. Purely vincible ignorance is when someone uses some diligence for knowing the truth, but slight and by no means sufficient, considering the quality of the person and the gravity of the matter.

Finally, accidentally voluntary ignorance is that which is not intended and is outside the intention, and which is had "when someone directly or indirectly wills something to which ignorance follows. Directly indeed, as appears in the drunk man, who wills to drink wine excessively, through which he is deprived of the use of reason; but indirectly, when someone neglects to repel the rising motions of passion, which, growing, bind the use of reason in the particular thing to be chosen." S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 8.

Oblivion, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Therefore the same moral judgment must be made concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 3; L. 1. 1. n. 169; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 9; q. 76. a. 3.

Finally, one ignorance is of law, by which a law or precept is unknown, as if someone does not know that marriage is contracted invalidly with one related by affinity; another is of fact, by which a fact is unknown, as if someone contracting marriage with one related by affinity does not know that she is related by affinity; another is of penalty, by which someone is ignorant of the penalty added to the law, as if someone striking a cleric does not know that excommunication is attached to that striking.

Invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin if it concerns those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it concerns those things which one is not bound to know. The reason for the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason for the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or to do sins by a sin of omission. Hence because of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. Therefore it will be a sin to be ignorant of those things without knowledge of which one cannot rightly exercise a due act. Hence all are bound commonly to know those things which are of faith and the universal precepts of law; but individuals are bound to know those things which pertain to their state or office. But there are certain things which, although someone is naturally able to know them, nevertheless he is not bound to know, such as the theorems of geometry and contingent particulars, unless perhaps in some particular case that occurs.

St. Augustine, l. 3 de lib. arb., c. 19; Suarez, on 3. p., t. 5, d. 4, s. 8, n. 18; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 6; q. 76. a. 2, 3; Quodl. 1. a. 19; Quodl. 8. a. 15; L. 1. 5. n. 4, 26 ff.; Wurzburg, c. 1, a. 3; E. M.

Whether ignorance diminishes sin? - Antecedent, invincible, efficacious ignorance, or ignorance that is the cause of sin, "which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but altogether removes it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. "Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it." S. Th. l. c., since it in no way influences the act of sin; nor consequently does it take away sin, insofar as it does not render it involuntary, but it takes it away only insofar as it renders it non-voluntary. S. Th. l. c. a. 3. But cf. 48.

Consequent ignorance that is purely vincible, or even crass or supine, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "diminishes the voluntary and consequently sin." S. Th. l. c. For the voluntary is had only indirectly or in the cause. Consequent affected ignorance, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "seems to increase the voluntary and sin; for from the intention of the will to sin it comes that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the liberty of sinning." Thus S. Th. l. c. a. 3 and others. But others deny this, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. tr. 19, n. 8, truly cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat. But one must distinguish; for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives.

If someone affects ignorance because of weariness of learning, or not precisely so that he may not be drawn back from sin, but so that he may not be drawn back from such an action to which he strongly adheres, or even so that he may not be drawn back from sin, the sin is not thereby increased. For ignorance of itself diminishes the notion of a human act and formal contempt of the law. Moreover, if for this reason he wills to be ignorant, so that he may not be drawn back from sin, therefore if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows a will not so confirmed in such a sin.

But if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, then the sin is increased, because that ignorance is a sign both of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt; since with such affection he pursues sin that he is willing also to suffer the loss of ignorance, and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not a sin. Therefore although that ignorance also excuses, because it always conceals the condition of the work, nevertheless it accuses and increases the sin by reason of its cause. Luke 23:34; Acts 3:17; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, s. 4, n. 183; Struggl, l. c. n. 36.

Since sins which proceed from ignorance are voluntary only in the cause, and consequently have no other malice than the malice which was present in the positing of the cause itself, the gravity or lightness of the sin which follows from it must be taken from that cause, not from the gravity or lightness of the thing which is derived from it. For this latter is voluntary and culpable only insofar as the ignorance itself is voluntary and culpable. And thus from lightly culpable ignorance of a physician or confessor, grave effects can follow, which consequently do not bring grave fault.

Is vincible ignorance of law a special sin of itself? - R. Negatively. For every law commanding its own observance implicitly commands knowledge of the same law. But it commands this only in order to the work which is commanded to be done or omitted. Therefore that vincible ignorance of law receives its species from the transgression of the law itself, for which it provides the cause or danger. And this has place also as regards ignorance of the articles of faith. For although knowledge of them, as the more common opinion has it, is commanded by a special precept and through itself, and therefore, standing in the obligation itself of knowing, such ignorance is culpable of itself, nevertheless this sin is opposed to the same virtue of faith. For the malice of sin against faith is in this, that someone offends the authority of the one speaking by not believing. But this irreverence is found not only when someone knowingly dissents from God speaking, but also when someone culpably neglects to examine whether it is the doctrine of God, and because of that negligence dissents from those things which are said by God. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 182 ff.; Laymann, l. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, n. 10; Viva, de Act. hum., q. 3, final article.

Can someone labor under an invincibly erroneous conscience as regards depraved desires and other merely internal acts, namely if no exterior action follows? - Speaking explicitly and generally about desire, Elbel has this, n. 127: "That many, at least among the more uneducated and less instructed, can inculpably persuade themselves that desires of this kind are not evil unless they are completed by deed, seems sufficiently certain; and Sanchez, Stoz, and La-Croix expressly teach this." This opinion, says S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 9, "I have never been able to judge probable.... With other learned recent authors I judge it little probable." The reason for this opinion is that if someone certainly knows the malice of the external action, and nevertheless wills to execute it, he already knows that he wills evil. How then will he be excused from sin? But as regards simple delectation, that invincible ignorance can more easily be present; for the tendency of the will toward evil is not so evident as in desire efficacious of itself. And the same also seems to have to be said of inefficacious desire.

Can children invincibly be ignorant of the malice of pollution? - R. Affirmatively, absolutely speaking, at least in some rare case, and at the beginning of a depraved habit. The reason is that the fact that an immodest look or touch, or the capturing of pleasure from procured pollution, or even from that which has naturally arisen, etc., are morally evil and illicit, is not so evidently made known from the very comprehension of the first principles, but discourse is needed to detect their malice. Therefore their malice can at least for some time be inculpably unknown. From this a prudent confessor will easily conclude that in such a contingency of fact one must proceed cautiously and prudently; and this caution and prudence, if it must always and with all be observed, especially in the matter of chastity, must be observed most of all with boys and girls. Elbel 128; Struggl l. c. n. 13.

When does the obligation of law cease? Obligation can cease in three ways: either on the part of the subject, or on the part of the superior, or on the part of the law itself. On the part of the subject it can cease: 1. Simply, through exempting causes, which totally withdraw him from the dominion of the law, for example if someone betakes himself outside the place which the law affects. 2. In a qualified way, through impeding causes, which impede or excuse from its fulfillment a subject remaining under the law. These causes are reduced to invincible ignorance, to fear, and to impotence. Ignorance, if it is invincible, excuses; because no one sins except by a voluntary act, and this presupposes knowledge. But if it is vincible and culpable it does not excuse; such it is when you were able and bound to know or to learn, and it came to mind to doubt, and you did not take pains to understand. L. 168, 170 ff. Cf. here 50, 51. Fear, namely grave fear, often excuses, since from it the observance of the law passes into a grave inconvenience. And so fear of death, e.g., often excuses not only from a positive precept, both human and divine, but sometimes even from an affirmative natural precept. Hence one is not bound, with danger of life, to confess integrally, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, etc. L. 175. Cf. here 62, 63. Impotence, even moral impotence, excuses. For if the object of the law, considered in itself, is not so difficult and grave, but from particular circumstances becomes such, then there is no longer that obligation which the legislator intends to impose, since that object has been notably changed. And thus David ate the loaves of proposition, prohibited to laymen, when he was in danger of undergoing a grave evil. 1 Reg. 21; Matt. 12, 3, 4. But grave inconvenience and harm must be proportioned to the gravity of the law, so that it may legitimately excuse from it. Since no one is held to the impossible, after someone has become unable to fulfill the law, he is excused, although he sinned in positing the cause; e.g., if someone squandered his goods, and then cannot pay his debts. L. 176. Cf. here 64, 65, 66, 171.

On the part of the superior it can cease: 1. Through dispensation, which is the legitimate relaxation of the law in a particular case. 2. Through privilege, which is a constant and permanent favor granted by a superior against or beyond the common law.

On the part of the law itself the law can also cease. For "it happens many times that something, in the majority of cases, is useful to be observed for the common welfare, yet in some cases is very harmful. Therefore, because the legislator cannot look upon all singular cases, he proposes the law according to those things which happen in the majority of cases, directing his intention to common utility. Hence, if a case arises in which the observance of such a law is harmful to the common welfare, it is not to be observed... But nevertheless this must be observed: that if the observance of the law according to the words does not have a sudden danger which must be met at once, it does not belong to just anyone to interpret what is useful and what is useless to the city; but this belongs only to the Princes, who on account of cases of this sort have authority in the laws to dispense. But if there is a sudden danger, not permitting so much delay that recourse can be had to the superior, necessity itself has a dispensation annexed, because necessity is not subject to law." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96, a. 6. Cf. here 179.

Do ignorance, fear, and grave inconvenience excuse from invalidation? - R. To the first: Negatively, because subjective ignorance, whether of fact or of law, does not supply the objective defect of the act; and thus there is no marriage, when there stands, e.g., the diriment impediment of consanguinity, whether it is contracted in good faith or in bad faith. - But if the invalidating law is penal, then, if ignorance excuses from guilt, it also excuses from the penalty of invalidation. But if guilt is admitted, yet the penalty of invalidation is unknown, then more probably this is not incurred, because invalidation is an extraordinary and exorbitant penalty, from which ignorance excuses. Schmalz., l. 5, t. 37, n. 105; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 32, n. 17. More commonly, however, they affirm that it is incurred, because since such ignorance does not excuse from sin against the law, neither consequently does it excuse from the penalty, although this is unknown. Suarez, l. 5, c. 22; Ithur., Cas. 53, n. 24. Nor indeed does ignorance excuse in any way if the invalidation was established principally to preclude evils which otherwise would flow into the commonwealth, but the penalty only accessorily, for coercing the person. And indeed the proper reason of an invalidating law is common utility.

R. To the second and third: There are not lacking those who affirm it, because positive law ought to yield to the natural law of charity, and because in the case there is a certain legitimate epikeia. But it seems one must answer with the common opinion: Negatively; because grave fear, and even gravest inconvenience, neither render the person capable, nor restore to acts the force taken away by law. But since laws of this sort primarily and directly tend to preserving the public good, no place is given to epikeia on account of merely private harm. And thus a marriage between blood relatives and relatives by affinity will be void, even to avoid death, even in the article of death. Private harm, I say; for if a common harm is present, since then the law would become harmful to society, invalidation ceases. L. 191; l. 3, n. 112; l. 6, n. 1029; de Privil., n. 57; Diana, t. 2, tr. 6, r. 62, 73; Sanch., de Matr., l. 3, d. 17, n. 3; Ithur., Cas. 53, n. 18; M. E., vol. 20, p. 177, 474.

Do ignorance, fear, and age excuse from penalty? R. To the first: Affirmatively for the internal forum, if ignorance excuses from guilt against the law, whether it is ignorance of law or ignorance of fact; for penalty is a certain natural consequence of guilt. - R. Negatively for the same forum, if ignorance does not excuse from guilt against the law, and is concerned with the penalty alone, understand an ordinary penalty; but not an extraordinary and exorbitant one. The reason of the distinction is that an ordinary penalty is always foreseen in some way from the nature of the crime itself, since natural light itself dictates that evil is to be punished according to its nature. But an extraordinary penalty cannot be foreseen even confusedly. R. Likewise negatively for the external forum. For knowledge of the law is presumed, unless, however, ignorance of the law seems probable, i.e., likely. For presumption yields to truth. L. 169; l. 6, n. 705, 1074; l. 7, n. 351.

R. To the second: Unjust and grave fear, which excuses from human law, whose obligation regularly is none with grave inconvenience, consequently excuses from the penalty annexed to human law. Hence, although perhaps it does not excuse from grave sin, because that which was prohibited was forbidden also by natural law, nevertheless it still excuses from the penalty, unless the positive law itself does not cease, as for instance if something is extorted to public harm. C. 5, De his quae vi.

To the third: From the indulgence of canon law, age excuses those not yet pubescent, C. 1, 2 de Del. puer.; C. 1, 60 de Sent. exc. By civil law minors are punished more mildly. C. I. Poen. 44, 53 ff.; C. B. 828. - Cf. here 195; Suarez, de Cens., d. 5, s. 1, n. 19; Castropalao, tr. 3, d. 1, p. 24, § 2, n. 8; Scavini, l. 1, n. 822, ed. 12, Milan 1874; Bouquillon, de lege, n. 159.

What if someone were promoted to sacred orders either invincibly ignorant of the obligation of chastity attached to them, or expressly unwilling to vow that obligation itself, or if he were compelled to this by grave fear, or if he were ordained in the very age of infancy? - Reply to the first: Some probably say that he is held to chastity, namely by force of the universal law itself of the Church. Others "probably judge that if the ignorance had been altogether invincible, the ordained man would not be held to chastity, neither from a vow nor from a precept of the Church, because the Church would not intend to oblige such a one; but otherwise if the ignorance had been culpable, or if someone intended to receive the order with the same obligation with which others receive it." Ignorance of this kind is not presumed in the external forum, since it concerns a law so clear and most commonly handed down.

Reply to the second: "In such a case he would be held to chastity not from a vow, but from the precept of the Church, which from a motive of religion would bind him to chastity, the vow being absent."

Reply to the third: One must distinguish: If he did not have the intention of receiving sacred ordination, he is not held, as having been invalidly ordained. If he had the mind of receiving sacred orders, and the fear was just, more probably he is held, because since he is unwilling unreasonably, such fear neither exempts from law nor invalidates the vow. If again he had the mind of receiving sacred orders, but the fear was unjust, more probably he is not held, because of the opposite reason. Wherefore he can validly contract marriage, "but he cannot minister in the order while the marriage stands, nor enjoy clerical privileges." But the nullity of the ordination must be established in the external forum by canonical process. Cf. 106.

Reply to the fourth: "It is certain that he who is ordained before the use of reason, although the ordination is valid, nevertheless is not held to chastity; whence he can validly and licitly enter marriage." Benedict XIV, Bull Eo quamvis tempore, May 4, 1745, commands that in the sixteenth year of age an option be given to them; and, if they wish to preserve chastity, they are admitted to the exercise of the order; otherwise, if they do not wish. And he adds that after ratification they invalidly contract marriage and are held to the divine office. If after the use of reason, but before puberty, some probably say that he is held, others not improbably deny it. The reason is that such a vow, from which this obligation more probably comes, "constitutes a man in an irrevocable state, in which the Pontiff never or rarely dispenses; whence such a vow requires a mature and perfect use of reason." L. l. 6, n. 80, 781, 809-811; S. Th. Suppl. q. 39, a. 2; Sanchez in Dec. l. 5, c. 6, n. 5-8.

Does ignorance excuse from the impediment of asking the debt? R. More probably affirmatively, if there is ignorance of law, namely of the human law prohibiting this. The reason is that just as ignorance excuses from the transgression of a human law, so also from the penalty. If there is ignorance of fact, namely that this woman is a blood relative of the wife, it is common that the impediment is not incurred. The reason is that where the fault of incest is lacking, the penalty is also lacking. This is clear also from C. Si quis 1, de Eo qui cognovit, etc., where this impediment is imposed on one sinning knowingly. Ignorance of the penalty also excuses with sufficient probability, since it is an extraordinary penalty. L. 1072, 1074.

Does ignorance excuse from incurring censure? Invincible ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, i.e., of the censure attached, excuses from incurring it. For contumacy is lacking. Here forgetfulness and inadvertence operate the same as ignorance. Ignorance that is vincible and lightly culpable, or even gravely culpable if it is not crass or supine, also excuses from incurring censure; otherwise if it is crass and supine, from C. final, de Const., in VI, where it is said, "we do not wish the ignorant to be bound, when nevertheless their ignorance has not been crass or supine." But whether there is truly given gravely culpable ignorance which nevertheless is not crass or supine is disputed. Commonly they deny it; yet many affirm it, because for crass ignorance a certain highest negligence is required, and negligence can be gravely culpable although it is not the highest.

A fortiori affected ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, does not excuse from incurring censure. Vincible ignorance that is gravely culpable, whether it is crass or supine, or, probably, even affected, excuses from incurring censure if in the Decree there is a clause: whoever does this knowingly, deliberately, rashly; whoever has presumed to do this, etc. For one who acts with ignorance of whatever kind surely does not act knowingly. And indeed, from the Holy Office, January 12, 1870, by these words, by rash daring, or from presumption, etc., it is signified that someone committed a delict not while compelled or ignorant, but prudently and knowingly; and moreover it ought not to be wondered that one devoid of every excuse is subject to censure. L. 43-45, 48.

What is required for incurring irregularity from delict? In order that irregularity from delict be incurred, i.e., from one's own delict, the human act must be: 1. external, for this irregularity is a penalty in the external forum; 2. mortally evil, because it is a grave penalty, to which light fault does not correspond; 3. fully consummated, for odious things are to be restricted. L. 348. But it is by no means required that the crime be public. Rather irregularity is incurred because of a crime even occult. Trent, sess. 24, chap. Liceat 6; L. 349. But is knowledge of the law of the Church prohibiting required? The most common and more probable opinion affirms; because this irregularity is a true penalty. Chap. Proposuisti, Dist. 82; L. 350. Is knowledge of the penalty, or of the irregularity, also required? It is controverted; and it must be affirmed with sufficient probability, because irregularity is as it were an extraordinary penalty. L. 351; book 6, n. 705. But as ignorance excuses from irregularity as from a penalty, so fear also excuses. Irregularity, however, is not had from any delict whatsoever, although enormous, but only from delicts constituted in Law, namely from the following:

2. Ignorance is distinguished into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. Ignorance can be compared either to the will of the one ignorant, or to the action done ignorantly. With respect to the will, every ignorance is either antecedent, because it precedes the consent of the will, or consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. The former is involuntary, the latter voluntary. With respect to the action, it is either antecedent, because it is the cause of the act, or concomitant, because it is not the cause of the act. Hence the same ignorance can be antecedent and consequent in a diverse respect: antecedent, because it is the cause of the act; consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. Becanus, Tr. 1, C. 2, q. 10, n. 36.

89. (A) Notion. Ignorance in general is the lack of some knowledge in a subject otherwise capable; it is called negative, or simple nescience, when it is the lack of knowledge which we are not bound to acquire, for example, ignorance of medicine in a rustic; it is called privative if it is the lack of due knowledge, as is ignorance of theology in a priest; concerning the latter we treat here.

Ignorance differs from error, which, beyond the lack of knowledge, involves a judgment contrary to truth, as if someone thinks hatred of enemies to be something honorable. It differs also from inadvertence, which consists in this, that the mind does not actually attend to a matter, although it habitually knows it, as occurs in distractions: consequently inadvertence is the lack of actual attention, while ignorance denotes a habitual state. - But, in moral matters, the principles which we shall hand down concerning ignorance can be applied to error, forgetfulness, and inadvertence, with this distinction however, that inadvertence is more easily excused because of the weakness of the human mind.

90. (B) Division. (a) By reason of the object, ignorance is twofold: ignorance of law, when the law itself is unknown, for example if someone does not know that on the vigil of the Assumption fasting must be observed; and ignorance of fact, when someone does not know that the law, otherwise known, must be applied in the case, because, for example, he does not advert that this day is the vigil of the Assumption.¹

¹ Certain ones besides admit ignorance of the penalty attached to the delict, for example, if someone does not know that the reading of a book defending heresy is punished by excommunication: but this can be referred to ignorance of law.

91. (b) By reason of the subject, ignorance is: 1) vincible, and therefore culpable, when with moral diligence applied it can and ought to be driven away. The moral diligence of which there is question is not the highest diligence, but that which prudent persons are accustomed to apply in matters of this kind: for this ought to be diverse according to the various circumstances of person, thing, place, etc., nor can it be defined mathematically, but morally from the manner of acting of prudent persons in the same adjuncts. - Moreover, ignorance is not morally called vincible unless when the agent notices or at least suspects the obligation of putting it away, and voluntarily lets go the occasion of inquiring: for of what is unknown there is no desire.

Therefore there can be degrees in vincible ignorance; if someone deliberately wills ignorance, so that he may more freely violate the law, if perhaps it exists, this is called affected ignorance; for example, if someone doubting whether today one must fast does not wish to ask, although he easily can, lest perhaps he become conscious of the obligation of fasting. - But when someone omits due inquiry, not because he wishes to be ignorant of the matter, but from negligence, shame, lightness of soul, or another similar cause, the ignorance is called simply vincible; if no diligence or almost none has been applied, it is called crass or supine.

92. 2. Ignorance is called invincible, and therefore inculpable, when, with moral diligence applied, it cannot be expelled, and a fortiori that which is so rooted that not even a suspicion of inquiring arises. If knowledge could in no way have been acquired, the ignorance is absolutely invincible (concerning which, however, there is scarcely question in moral matters); if it could be put away only with difficulty and with extraordinary diligence, it is morally invincible. - Now that today there are many who labor under this ignorance in religious and moral matters, not only among rustics, but also among men otherwise learned in profane matters, those who have given labor to the sacred ministry for some time know very well. And this ignorance indeed is occupied not only with merely positive laws, ecclesiastical or divine, but also with the secondary principles of natural right.

93. (C) Another division, although of lesser moment, is found among theologians, namely into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent ignorance; this, however, is not opposed in its members, but is taken in a diverse way.

1. By reason of the work concerning which it is occupied, ignorance is antecedent when it is truly the cause of the work, so that the agent would not posit the action if he knew the truth; thus the hunter who kills a friend whom he thinks to be a wild animal, and certainly would not have killed him if he had known him to be a friend; - concomitant, when it is not the cause of the work, because the one operating is so disposed that he would posit the action even if he knew the matter: such is the hunter who kills an enemy whom he thinks to be a wild animal, but otherwise would have killed him if he had known.

2. By reason of the will, ignorance is antecedent when it precedes every act of the will, and therefore is altogether invincible, as is ignorance of fasting in him who by no means thinks of fasting; consequent, which is in some way willed, and consequently vincible, as it exists in him who, thinking about fasting, neglects to inquire concerning it, when he easily can.

39. Notions. To cognition concerning the morality of an act there is opposed ignorance. Ignorance is taken more broadly for any lack of cognition in a capable subject; but more strictly (and better in moral theology) it is accepted as: the lack of due cognition. Therefore in this sense ignorance is distinguished from simple nescience, which is the lack of any knowledge, whether due or not.⁵ Thus, for example, for a confessor living in Europe not to know the Japanese language is nescience; but not to know Moral Theology is ignorance. Moreover ignorance is distinguished from error, for "error," as St. Thomas teaches,⁶ "is to approve false things for true; whence it adds some act over ignorance. For there can be ignorance without someone passing judgment about things unknown; and then he is ignorant and not erring. But when he already passes a false judgment about those things which he does not know, then he is properly said to err." But in practice ignorance, accepted in the sense explained above, is the mother of error; for ignorance is a habit, but error is an act or judgment proceeding from the habit of ignorance. We treat at the same time of ignorance and error.

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 2.

⁶ De malo q. 3, a. 7.

40. Divisions. 1. By reason of the object ignorance of fact and ignorance of law are distinguished. The first is present when someone is ignorant of some substantial or accidental fact, for example, when someone does not know that this book, which he reads, is heretical. The other is ignorance of law, and is present when someone does not know some law,⁷ either commanding or prohibiting; for example, when someone reading a heretical book does not know the ecclesiastical law punishing the reading of heretical books.

⁷ To ignorance of law there seems also to be reduced ignorance of the penalty to be inflicted on transgressors of the law. For such a penalty is the sanction of the law and its integral part, and therefore ignorance of the penalty is partial ignorance of law or right.

41. 2. By reason of the subject, that is, of the ignorant man, ignorance is distinguished as invincible and vincible. The first is that which, with moral diligence having been employed, cannot be conquered or driven away. The other is that which could be driven away by moral diligence, but from negligence or evil will is not driven away. - Moral diligence is considered that which is customarily employed by prudent and God-fearing men in such circumstances. But I say: in such circumstances; for the same diligence is not always to be employed. For if there is question of a grave matter, for example, of the validity of a sacrament, greater diligence is required than if there is treatment of a light matter, for example, of the narration of some harmless little story, which perhaps is not true. Yet supreme or extreme diligence is never required. For neither divine nor human legislators are to be considered tyrants, willing to oblige subjects to learn with extreme diligence all the minutest obligations of the law. - Since vincible ignorance arises from culpable negligence or from evil will, it also is culpable;⁸ but invincible ignorance is inculpable.

⁸ Those authors who teach that vincible ignorance can be inculpable take ignorance for nescience, but not in the strict sense for lack of due knowledge.

42. Vincible ignorance is customarily subdivided according to the diverse degrees of negligence and culpability occurring:

a) Into simply vincible, when only slight negligence in driving it away was present.

b) Into crass or supine, when there was almost no diligence, but grave negligence opposed to driving away the ignorance. Crass or supine ignorance in a grave matter is gravely culpable; but it is a light sin in a light matter. Therefore crass or supine ignorance is not always the same as gravely culpable ignorance (as is taught by some authors), but only then, when there is question of a grave matter.

c) Into affected ignorance, which is ignorance deliberately willed by him who wishes to have either some excuse from sin, or not to be drawn back from sinning; for example, someone doubting whether a book is on the Index does not ask, although he can easily ask, lest perhaps he should have to desist from reading that book. Those who labor under ignorance of this kind as if say to God: "Depart from us, and we do not want the knowledge of your ways."⁹ As is plain, this ignorance arises from an affection toward sin. Such affection is various: "Some do not wish to attend to the law, so that they may act according to their pleasure; they would be drawn back from acting by reverence for a known law; others, so that they may act according to pleasure more freely and without remorse; they are prepared to violate the known law, yet have retained some reverence for it; others, because they contemn the law itself and the authority by which it is issued, by which reason many apostates of our age care nothing for what the Church teaches or what she commands."¹⁰ - This affected ignorance is the worst and not only does not excuse from sin committed in transgression of the law, but even increases it, since such an ignorant man employs an evil means for sinning more freely. Wherefore it was also very fittingly established by the Code of Canon Law, c. 2229, § 1: "Affected ignorance, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from no latae sententiae penalties."

⁹ Job 21:14. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8 and q. 6, a. 3.

¹⁰ Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 164.

43. 3. By reason of the act of the will ignorance is distinguished as antecedent, concomitant, consequent.¹¹ Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes every act of the will, so that in no way is it willed or voluntary; but it is the (negative) cause of willing or doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present. For example, someone in hunting kills a friend, invincibly thinking that he is killing a stag. He would never have killed the friend if he had known the matter. Antecedent ignorance is always invincible and therefore inculpable, but not vice versa is every invincible ignorance antecedent. For antecedent ignorance adds above invincible ignorance that it is the cause of an action which would not occur if ignorance were absent, as is plain in the example brought forward.¹²

Concomitant ignorance is that which likewise precedes every act of the will intending the ignorance itself, and is not willed, and therefore is invincible just as antecedent ignorance is, from which however it differs in this, that it is not the cause of the work. It has place in him who is so disposed that he would posit the work or action even if he knew that which he truly here and now does not know; for example, someone who is disposed to kill his enemy wishes in hunting to kill a stag. Yet by an unforeseen chance he kills his enemy in place of the stag. In this case the killer always remains guilty of internal homicide because of the evil will of killing the enemy, and this especially if, once the truth of the matter has been inspected, he rejoices over the killing committed. Nevertheless, as Billuart rightly observes,¹³ he is excused from external homicide and from penalties and censures which are inflicted only for an external act. In practice concomitant ignorance not rarely becomes crass ignorance, indeed even affected ignorance.

Consequent ignorance¹⁴ is that which follows from some act of the will willing it either directly or indirectly. If the will directly wills it, it is affected ignorance, of which there has already been discussion above. But if it wills it indirectly, it is simply vincible or even crass ignorance. Therefore consequent ignorance and vincible ignorance are the same in reality, although they differ according to concept. For it is called consequent because it follows an act of the will; but it is called vincible because the will can conquer it. Each ignorance also coincides with culpable ignorance, at least if ignorance is taken in the strict sense for the lack of due knowledge.

For relieving the memory we set down the following two schemata:

Ignorance

I.     antecedent                 consequent
       ||                         ||
       invincible                 vincible
       ||                         ||
       inculpable                 culpable

       invincible > antecedent = antecedent
                                  = concomitant

that is, really, although not formally, a) antecedent ignorance is the same as invincible and inculpable ignorance; b) consequent ignorance is the same as vincible and culpable ignorance. Yet invincible ignorance extends more broadly than antecedent ignorance (which in the schema is expressed by the sign >), since it also includes concomitant ignorance.

II.    Antecedent ignorance
              v
       act of the will              concomitant ignorance
              v
       Consequent ignorance

¹¹ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8.

¹² Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 9.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ This ignorance is also called by St. Thomas and Aristotle ignorance of evil choice (S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8).

44. Note. Although we have enumerated together this threefold division of ignorance, nevertheless ignorance is not called antecedent, concomitant, and consequent with respect to the same thing, as someone could easily suspect. For it is called antecedent and consequent with respect to the interior act of the will, which either never willed the ignorance (antecedent ignorance), or at some time willed it or at least from negligence permitted it (consequent ignorance). But ignorance is called concomitant not so much with respect to the interior act of the will, as rather with respect to the exterior action, which antecedent ignorance precedes and causes, but concomitant ignorance accompanies in a kind of parallel way, having no influence of itself upon its morality.¹⁵ Whence Cajetan says very well:¹⁶ "Whatever would be imputed to the agent without that (concomitant) ignorance, is imputed to the agent with it: and by this fact, it neither excuses nor accuses." All these things become clear in the example brought forward: If a hunter laboring under antecedent ignorance kills a friend, this ignorance precedes not only the exterior action of killing, but also and especially any act whatever of the will willing or permitting it. For the will never willed this ignorance nor the killing. But if the hunter, prepared to kill his enemy, truly kills him here and now, but ignorantly, this ignorance was in no way willed and therefore is invincible and precedes the act of the will desiring it here and now; but it accompanies the preceding and non-retracted intention of the will to kill, and besides this the external action of killing, upon the morality of which, however, it has no influence of itself. Whence such a one does not kill because of ignorance, but kills while ignorant or with ignorance. But if a hunter kills some man with consequent ignorance, this ignorance indeed accompanies the external action, but follows some prior act of the will, which either directly or indirectly willed it.¹⁷ - The same doctrine can also be stated briefly in this way: All three species of ignorance accompany the external action; indeed antecedent and consequent ignorance cause this action, since otherwise it would not occur. Antecedent and concomitant ignorance are invincible; but consequent ignorance is vincible.

¹⁵ Thus also the text of St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8, seems to be understood. Yet in some sense concomitant ignorance also accompanies the act of the will, insofar as, namely, it accompanies the preceding and non-retracted intention of the will.

¹⁶ Commentary on I-II, q. 76, a. 3.

¹⁷ Cf. Billuart, l. c. diss. 1, a. 9, and S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 1.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 19, a. 6; q. 76.

80. Ignorance properly is the lack of knowledge in a subject capable of it, for example of astronomy in a priest. It differs:

1. From nescience, which is the simple negation of knowledge in an incapable subject, for example in a child or a madman;

2. From error, which is not a mere lack but a positive act of the intellect judging a thing to be otherwise than it is; it arises from ignorance or rashness;

3. From inadvertence, which is the lack not indeed of habitual knowledge but of actual consideration;

4. From forgetfulness, which is the privation of knowledge previously had.

But since moralists treat only of due duties and undue sins, they often take ignorance more strictly, not indeed for a negation, but for the privation of knowledge which ought to be in someone, such as theology for a confessor. Hence some distinguish negative ignorance, privative ignorance, and even positive ignorance or ignorance of false disposition, if it includes error.

81. Ignorance is divided:

1. By reason of the object which is unknown, it is ignorance of law, whether natural or positive, whether divine or human, whether of the law itself or of the penalty joined to it, by which, namely, the existence or extension or sense of the law itself is unknown; and ignorance of fact, by which a fact or a concrete circumstance of fact determining the present application of the law is unknown.

Thus he who does not know that on the vigil of Pentecost one must fast, or that heretical books are prohibited, is in ignorance of law; he who does not advert that this day is the vigil of Pentecost, or that this book is heretical, is in ignorance of fact.

2. By reason of the subject or person who is ignorant, ignorance is invincible or vincible. Invincible or involuntary ignorance is that which could not be removed by moral diligence; but vincible or voluntary ignorance is that which could have been so removed.

Moral diligence is that which prudent persons are accustomed to employ, and which varies according to the various circumstances or quality of the business, person, place, etc.; for example, it will be greater in a priest for rightly executing his office than in a rustic, greater where there is question of the goods of life than of fortune, where there is question of notable harm to a third party than of a small one.

Vincible ignorance is inculpable if it ought not to have been removed; but culpable if it ought to have been. But moralists, attending only to due and undue things, use the words culpable and vincible indiscriminately, and often call culpable ignorance vincible, and call inculpable ignorance invincible.

1. Speculatively one can still distinguish absolutely invincible ignorance, if it can in no way be removed; morally invincible and absolutely vincible ignorance, if absolutely it can be removed but only with toil and difficulty (because there is not given a proximate moral power for overcoming it); and morally vincible ignorance, if it can be removed morally and by ordinary diligence. But moralists do not treat of these.

Invincible ignorance can arise from a twofold head: either because someone has not thought at all about the truth to be sought or about the danger of error (for the first idea is not in man's power), or because, if he has thought and employed diligence, nevertheless he has not arrived at the truth. Whence it is not voluntary.

On the contrary, vincible ignorance is voluntary, whether directly and in itself, as if someone wills to be ignorant; or only indirectly from negligence, as if he omits to inquire when he ought to inquire; or only in the cause, if he wills something upon which ignorance follows (for example, drunkenness). But there are many degrees in it, which are usually reduced to three: a) ignorance strictly or simply vincible, when diligence is employed to overcome it, but not sufficient diligence, or not the whole diligence which is morally possible, or not all that which the quality of the business and person demands: it is indirectly voluntary; b) crass ignorance, when no or scarcely any diligence has been employed for acquiring knowledge, and supine ignorance, if this was so for driving away ignorance: it is voluntary, either indirectly, or in the cause; c) affected, malicious, or directly willed ignorance, when someone expressly and deliberately wills to be ignorant for any end whatever: whether so that he may act at pleasure and not be drawn back from his purpose, or so that he may have an excuse in sins committed or to be committed, or because of disgust, etc., especially if he studiously wills not to know so that he may not be drawn back from sinning but may sin more freely.

2. Several modern authors regard that three-membered distinction as not correct, because it is made with respect to a twofold diverse terminus: for ignorance is antecedent or consequent relative to the will itself of being ignorant; but it is antecedent or concomitant relative to the will of the work to be known. Nevertheless it seems that it can be rightly understood and defended by saying that the three aforesaid ignorances are distinguished by reason of both termini at once, namely, by considering at once the act of the will concerning ignorance and the act of the will concerning the work.

3. By reason of the act of the will together with the work, ignorance is:

a) Antecedent, which does not follow from the will but precedes its act, and yet is the cause to it of willing and doing what it would not will nor do if knowledge were present (according to the present disposition). Hence ignorance is the cause of the work because it removes knowledge which would impede the work, for example if someone, thinking he is killing a beast, kills a friend whom he would not have killed if he had known: such a person acts from involuntary ignorance. For all antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely, because invincible ignorance is not always the reason for doing that which otherwise would not be done.

b) Concomitant, which precedes the act of the will and is joined to it, yet not as the cause of willing and doing that which is done, because even if it were not present, nevertheless the thing would be done (according to the present disposition), for example if someone, thinking he is killing a beast, kills an enemy whom he would also have killed if he had known: such a person acts with involuntary ignorance. It is also invincible.

c) Consequent, which in some way follows from an act of the will directly not willing or indirectly neglecting to inquire, and is directly or indirectly voluntary and at the same time precedes the work so that it can be the cause of willing and doing it, for example if someone voluntarily neglects to inquire about the danger of killing a man, whom, if he knew, he would not kill, or about a day of abstinence, although, if he knew that abstinence was required, he would abstain; such a person acts from voluntary ignorance. Consequent ignorance is vincible, as voluntary, whether it is vincible at the moment when the work is placed, or was formerly vincible, provided that the work was foreseen and because of it ignorance ought to have been guarded against. Otherwise it would be invincible with respect to the work, although vincible in itself, and therefore antecedent or concomitant with respect to the work which is placed.

82. Principles. I. Antecedent ignorance removes the voluntary according to that which is unknown, because it is invincible; indeed it renders the work positively involuntary simply, because it makes something against the habitual inclination of the will: for the work would not be done if ignorance were absent.

Hence: that which is done from involuntary antecedent ignorance is positively and simply involuntary; therefore such ignorance excuses.

We said: according to that which is unknown, for under another respect it can be voluntary: thus he who kills a man or a friend, thinking him to be a beast or an enemy, voluntarily shoots the arrow, but does not shoot it into a man or into a friend; and he who sins with a woman, not knowing that she is joined in marriage, although he is not guilty of adultery, nevertheless is guilty of fornication.

II. Concomitant ignorance removes the voluntary because it is invincible, but does not render the work positively involuntary, because this is not against the inclination of the will but would also be done if ignorance were not present; therefore it makes the non-voluntary. Hence: that which is done with involuntary concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary; and of this ignorance it is said: it does not accuse, nor does it altogether excuse, namely, from the habitual disposition of the will.

III. Consequent ignorance does not make the simply involuntary, but renders the work simply voluntary, because it itself is vincible and voluntary. Yet it generally (even if it is affected) makes the involuntary in a certain respect, because it is against some inclination of the will, insofar as it is the cause of doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present; hence it diminishes the voluntary and the sin according to the degree of vincibility, so that sometimes it even makes a mortal sin venial.

But it must be well noted: ignorance exceptionally in no way diminishes the voluntary, namely, if it is so affected that someone precisely chooses it in order to sin more freely or so as not to be drawn back from sin. Namely, this in no way makes the involuntary, nor therefore diminishes the voluntary and sin, but rather increases it, not by reason of itself but by reason of the cause, because there is a greater affection toward evil. For then it comes from a greater intensity or more intense inclination of the will toward sinning that someone wills to undergo ignorance.

Hence: that which is done from voluntary or consequent ignorance is simply voluntary, but ordinarily involuntary in a certain respect, and then less voluntary. This ignorance does not excuse, but accuses.

83. Observations. - 1. The general doctrine concerning ignorance is briefly expressed in canon 2202, § 1: "The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed, if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself."

2. The things which we have said about ignorance can be applied to inadvertence and forgetfulness, and to error. Error includes ignorance; full inadvertence and perfect forgetfulness are equated with invincible ignorance; but if they are not perfect, but arise from negligence, they are equated with vincible ignorance. Whence canon 2202, § 3: "The things which are established concerning ignorance also hold for inadvertence and error."

Ignorance, taken generally, is the lack of knowledge; but it is divided in many ways, and is:

1st. Positive or negative, according as it is the lack of knowledge due, for example, of moral theology in a confessor; or not due, for example, ignorance of canon law in a rustic.

2nd. Of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or of a particular fact.

3rd. Vincible or invincible, according as, diligence being employed, it can be overcome, or not. But invincible ignorance is physically such if it can in no way be overcome; but morally such, if, moral diligence being employed, namely that which prudent men are wont to employ according to the gravity of the matter, it cannot be removed.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished as threefold, namely: 1st, simply such, when some diligence, yet not sufficient, is employed to drive it away; 2nd, crass or supine, when no, or scarcely any, zeal is applied in investigating the truth; 3rd, affected, which is directly willed, as when someone directly and positively wills to be ignorant of something, either that he may sin more freely, or that he may have an excuse from sins, or for some other reason.

To invincible ignorance are to be referred perfect forgetfulness and full inadvertence. But these, if they are not perfect, and proceed from negligence, pertain to vincible ignorance.

4th. Antecedent or consequent, according as it precedes an act of the will or follows it; whence the former is also called involuntary, invincible, and therefore inculpable; but the latter voluntary, either directly or indirectly, vincible, and more or less culpable. But each is a cause of willing or doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present. This last thing only, namely that it is the cause why the will wills what otherwise it would not will, antecedent or consequent ignorance adds beyond simply invincible ignorance, to which this does not necessarily belong. Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 13.

Here also mention is to be made of concomitant ignorance, which is had when someone is ignorant of what he is doing, but would still do it even if he were not ignorant; for example, if someone killed an enemy thinking him to be a wild beast, yet would still have killed him if he had not been ignorant. It in no way flows into the act, but only accompanies it by accident. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 26 and seq.

Invincible ignorance wholly removes the voluntary, because no voluntary can be present where no knowledge is had; but vincible ignorance does not remove it. For such ignorance is truly voluntary, either directly or indirectly, and in morals what is caused from the voluntary is reputed voluntary. Yet if this ignorance is indirectly voluntary, namely either simply vincible, or crass or supine, then it diminishes the voluntary, and consequently sin, because it diminishes, although in a diverse degree, the knowledge of the malice of the act. But if it is directly voluntary, that is, affected, then, according to St. Thomas, "such ignorance does not excuse sin either wholly or in part, but rather increases it." Yet this greater malice seems to have to be understood of the depravity of the will, while it positively neglects to learn the law in order to sin more freely, but not of the very infraction of the law, which indeed is sinful because known in some way, but nevertheless less so than if it were perfectly known. Cf. St. Thomas, QQ. DD., q. 3, De Malo, art. 8.

The voluntary properly so called, although diminished, can suffice for grave sin. And this must be adverted to. But the gravity of the sin is taken first from the gravity of the arising obligation, for instance, from a positive precept or from the matter considered in itself; as in children the necessity of learning the catechism, and in a confessor the necessity of knowing those things which are required for rightly fulfilling his office. Secondly, to this must be added the gravity of negligence, which is measured according to the mode of diligence which the matter demands. Cf. Ballerini, Op. Mor., v. 1, tr. I, n. 904.

You Will Resolve. 1st. A spouse sinning with a woman whom he invincibly does not know to be the sister of his wife is guilty of adultery, but not of incest.

2nd. Children who have done things illicit in themselves without any anxiety of conscience or suspicion of malice have in reality not sinned formally, even if they had already attained the use of reason; and therefore afterward they are not bound to confess those things, when they understand them to be illicit, since material sins are not matter for confession.

3rd. If a confessor adverts that sufficient knowledge is lacking to him for discharging, as is fitting, his office, and neglects to acquire knowledge, or before he acquires it goes on exercising his office, he is guilty of the errors which he foresaw at least in some way, because they themselves, at least in cause, are voluntary.

4th. If negligence in laying aside ignorance is culpable only venially, the deed following from it will be imputable unto only venial fault; because acts of this kind are voluntary, and therefore culpable, only in cause; since therefore the cause, namely ignorance, does not reach grave fault, the effect also cannot exceed slight fault.

5th. Ignorance can be concerned either with those things which ought to be known at any time whatever, or with those things which here and now only ought to be known; for example, upon any faithful person there lies the burden of knowing the truths of faith and the obligations of his state, and a similar burden is imposed upon a physician of investigating the disease of this sick person. In the first case the ignorance is habitual; in the other, actual. The one culpably ignorant of things necessary to be known is in some manner in the state of habitual sin; namely, he sins as often as there is present a recognized occasion of acquiring knowledge, which nevertheless he voluntarily neglects. In the second case the physician sins when the necessity of investigating shines forth to his mind, but he does not investigate.

6th. Error renders an act null if it is concerned with that which constitutes the substance of the act or falls back upon a condition sine qua non; otherwise the act is valid, unless something else is provided by law; but in contracts error can give place to a rescissory action according to the norm of law (Can. 104).

Ignorance on the part of the will is divided into ignorance antecedent, concomitant and consequent¹ : and of ignorance taken in this sense the question is here. Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes every act of the will, so that it is not at all willed or voluntary; it is nevertheless the cause of willing or doing what would not be done if knowledge were present: as in one who, with sufficient diligence used, kills a friend, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, whom he would not have killed had he known him to be a friend. It is also called invincible. Yet antecedent and invincible ignorance do not coincide, for antecedent, as here taken, adds over and above simply invincible ignorance that it be the cause why something is done which would not be done were it absent; which does not belong to every invincible ignorance, as is clear in concomitant ignorance, which, as I shall say presently, is invincible, and yet not antecedent. Whence every antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely. ¹ Here q. 8, a. 4, c.

Concomitant ignorance is that which also precedes every act of the will, nor is it at all willed, and therefore invincible, like the antecedent, but it is not the cause of willing or doing what would not be done if knowledge were present. It is clear in one who killed an enemy, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, whom he would just the same have killed had he known him to be an enemy.

Consequent ignorance is that which follows an act of the will, so that it is willed either directly or indirectly, and it is the cause why something is done which would not be done were it absent. That which is directly willed is called affected, as when someone directly and positively wills to be ignorant of something, whether that he may sin more freely, or that he may have an excuse in sins, or on account of something else; of this is understood that Job, XXI, 14 : The wicked said to God: Depart from us, and we will not the knowledge of thy ways. And that Psal., XXXV, 4 : He would not understand that he might do well. Indirectly willed it is, when someone, although he does not will directly and positively to be ignorant, yet neglects to learn; whence this ignorance is called voluntary or willed indirectly and in its cause, namely negligence of learning. Which negligence, if it be grave, such that either none or only very slight diligence was used according to the quality of the matter, the ignorance is called crass and supine; but if the negligence be slight, such that notable diligence was used in learning, yet not wholly sufficient, the ignorance is called light or lightest, according to the quantity of diligence used in learning, respectively to the quality of the thing to be learned. These things noted,

I say 1° : Antecedent ignorance causes the involuntary simply¹; because the work proceeding from it is done without cognition, and is, as to the circumstance ignored, against the inclination, whether actual, or habitual and interpretative, of the agent; for he would not will to do it if the ignorance were absent. It is clear in him who, sufficient diligence being used, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, killed a friend. For although this killing, as to the substance of the act, and as it is a killing as such, be voluntary, yet not inasmuch as it is the killing of a friend; under that reason indeed it repugns the inclination of the slayer, and is done without cognition. ¹ Ibid.

I say 2° : Concomitant ignorance does not make the voluntary simply; because the work proceeding from it is done without cognition, or with an ignorance which is neither voluntary in itself nor in its cause, since it is invincible. Nor does it make the involuntary positively and contrarily; because this work is not against the inclination of the agent, for it would be done just the same if cognition were present. But it makes the involuntary negatively, or not voluntary; because it is done without the cognition required for the voluntary. It is clear in him who, thinking invincibly that he was killing a beast, killed an enemy, whom he would just the same have killed had he known him.

I say 3° : Consequent ignorance causes the voluntary simply, because it itself is simply voluntary, whether directly in itself, or indirectly in its cause, namely negligence of learning. Therefore the work proceeding from it is voluntary simply; for he who wills the cause wills also the effect. If you say that it is done without cognition, I answer that it is done indeed without formal cognition and in itself, yet not without virtual cognition and in its cause, namely in the ignorance which could and ought to have been driven away. He however is said to know virtually who could and ought to have known and would not. Yet it causes the involuntary secundum quid; because the work following from it is against some sort of inclination of the agent, for if knowledge were present, it would not be done, as is supposed. But if you suppose the ignorance to be so affected that, were it absent, the work would nonetheless be done; as if, e.g., someone rejects knowledge, not that with it present he may abstain from sin, but that he may sin without remorse: I confess that then it will not be involuntary secundum quid, but also neither will it be consequent ignorance in the sense of the conclusion, which is precisely that it be the cause why that is done which would not be done were it absent.

From what has been said you will gather that antecedent ignorance altogether excuses from sin, because it causes the involuntary simply: but concomitant does not altogether excuse, because it does not take away all willingness, whether habitual or actual conditioned to sinning; nor yet accuse, because it is involuntary and invincible. Whence, in the case posited, he who kills an enemy, thinking invincibly that he kills a beast, remains always guilty of internal homicide, on account of the evil will of killing the enemy, if he knew him; he is nevertheless excused from external homicide and from the punishments and censures, which are inflicted only on account of the external work, because the external work is not voluntary. Consequent however causes sin, because it causes the voluntary simply; it diminishes nevertheless, because it causes the involuntary secundum quid, and the lighter it is the more it diminishes, so that sometimes it makes venial out of mortal.

What I have said here of ignorance can be said of inadvertence, which is a kind of actual ignorance, or at least is equated to ignorance in ordine to the voluntary. Let these things suffice now on the present matter, for there will be further mention of it when treating of the causes of sins.

I say : Invincible ignorance of divine positive law can be given, not only among infidels, to whom the Gospel has not been announced, but also among the faithful, to whom it has been announced¹. ¹ 2a 2ae, q. 10, a. 1.

The first part is certain and is admitted by all the orthodox, especially after the condemnation of this proposition : « Negative infidelity, in those among whom Christ has not been preached, is sin. » It is number 68 among the Baians condemned by St. Pius V.

It is proved 2°. According to ordinary law of God, the unique medium of knowing the mysteries of faith is the preaching of the Gospel, according to that word Rom., X, 14 : How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? Whence Christ, Joann., XV, 22, says of the Jews : If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin — namely of infidelity, as Aug. interprets it, Tract. 89 in Joann.

And thence flows the second part, which one or another denies, being herein singular against the unanimous sense of the others. For if, because the Gospel is announced in no manner to infidels, invincible and blameless ignorance of all the mysteries and precepts of faith can exist in them, therefore those also among the faithful to whom it is not sufficiently announced, or as regards certain precepts, can invincibly and blamelessly ignore them : because what the defect of promulgation of the whole law effects with respect to infidels, that does the defect of promulgation of this precept effect with respect to a particular person; especially since from one precept known, another cannot be deduced with which it holds no connection.

It is confirmed. Divine positive law thrusts knowledge of itself upon us no more than human law. But invincible ignorance of human law can be given. Therefore.

You will say against the first part : Every ignorance of divine positive law at least necessary to salvation is culpable. Therefore vincible. — Proof of the antecedent. It arises from fault; for if man were to convert himself to God as he ought and can by the help of grace, which God denies to no one, as we said in the first part, God would instruct him concerning those things necessary to salvation, either through internal inspiration, or through a preacher, as St. Thomas teaches, Lect. 3 on chapter X Rom., and elsewhere. But ignorance which follows from fault is culpable. Therefore.

Answer. I deny the antecedent. In proof whereof I distinguish the minor. Ignorance which follows from fault is culpable, if it was foreseen in the fault, or could humanly have been foreseen, I concede; if it was neither foreseen nor could have been foreseen, I deny. For, that an effect following per accidens upon some voluntary cause be voluntary and imputable, it must, as I said so often already, be foreseen, or morally able to be foreseen, as about to follow from that cause. But they of whom the question treats neither apprehend, nor can morally apprehend, their conversion to God to be an ordered and suitable medium for driving away the ignorance of faith, concerning which they do not even think, or ever thought. Confer what I said in my great Work, tract on God, dissert. VII, art. 8, obj. 5.

You will insist Every adult can attain salvation, as is plain from what was said art. 8 cited. Therefore he can drive away the ignorance of those things at least necessary unto salvation.

Answer. I distinguish the consequence. Therefore he can physically drive away ignorance etc., insofar as he can be instructed by God, and would in fact be instructed, were he to convert himself to him, I concede the consequence; morally, so that it be imputed to him as fault, if he drive it not away, I deny, since he knows not that he can, nor that necessary knowledge would follow from his conversion. But there is no implication [contradiction] that someone can morally attain the end which he knows, and be able to attain the means only physically, when he knows them not.

Note that the precepts of natural law are commonly distinguished, with the Author¹, into three classes: Some are first and most universal, which are rather principles of other precepts than precepts, such as : « Good must be done, evil avoided. What you do not wish done to yourself, do not to another. » Secondary are more determinate, which are deduced from the first immediately and by easy discourse, such as the precepts of the Decalogue. Tertiary are those contained obscurely in both, and deduced from these mediately and with difficult discourse, such as the precepts which prohibit certain contracts, as usurious or simoniacal, and many others. ¹ Hic infra, q. 100, a. 1, c.

It is agreed among theologians that there cannot be invincible ignorance of the first precepts, nor of the secondary considered in themselves, in adults having perfect use of reason; because the first are per se known and are understood from the mere apprehension of the terms; the secondary are deduced from the first immediately by an easy and obvious discourse, of which even ruder men are capable.

I said: « Of secondary precepts considered in themselves; » because, if they be considered as clothed with circumstances good and apparently excusing from sin, as to tell a slight lie to save the life of an innocent man, to steal to relieve one gravely needy, etc., it is more probable, with Sylvius, the Salmanticenses and several others, that they can be invincibly ignored, at least by ruder men and for some time; because on account of this circumstance they become obscure and are reduced to the third class. The question is therefore concerning the more remote and more obscure precepts of the third class. Wherefore

I say : There can be in adults having perfect use of reason invincible ignorance of natural law regarding the more remote and more obscure precepts, which are said to be of the third class. This is most common opinion against certain Louvanists and a few others.

It is proved by the authority and reasoning of St. Thomas, below, q. 100, a. 1, c, where he says: « Certain [precepts of the natural law] there are for whose judgment much consideration of diverse circumstances is required, which to consider diligently does not belong to everyone, but to wise men; just as to consider the particular conclusions of sciences belongs not to all, but to philosophers alone. » And further: « Certain things there are which by subtler consideration of reason are judged by wise men to be observed; and these are so of the law of nature, that however they need instruction whereby the lesser may be taught by the wise. » And a. 11, c, of the same question: « Certain things there are whose reason is not so manifest to everyone, but only to the wise; and these are the moral precepts superadded to the Decalogue. » — I subjoin. But not all are or can be wise; not all are capable of subtler consideration or more difficult discourse; nor is it granted to all to be instructed by the wise. Therefore, according to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, the more obscure precepts of natural law, which are remote conclusions from the first, can be invincibly ignored, no otherwise than the remote conclusions of the sciences.

The adversaries answer 1º that the remote precepts of natural law can be invincibly ignored speculatively, but not practically; and that St. Thomas must be understood of speculative ignorance.

Sed contra : 1° Therefore, according to St. Thomas, as it pleases the adversaries, the remote precepts of natural law can be invincibly ignored speculatively, because they are difficult, obscure and of subtler consideration. But they are not less difficult and obscure, indeed more so, in practice than in speculation, on account of the diverse circumstances which practice involves. Therefore. 2° St. Thomas wrote this part with respect to ignorance in practice, since thence they take their argument against us. If thus in this place, why not in another? Therefore the answer is gratuitously invented, nay false.

They insist : If men, as far as in them lies, purged away depraved affections and habits, and prayed as they ought, God would enlighten them, or remove from them the occasion of acting against natural law; which since they neglect, their ignorance is voluntary and culpable.

I answer. I deny the consequence, which the adversaries feign quite gratuitously. For where has God promised this? That it may be more evident, the 2° conclusion is proved by overturning this principal foundation of the adverse opinion. According to the adversaries, that ignorance of natural law must be held vincible which could be conquered 1° by study and human inquiry, 2° by purging depraved affections and habits, 3° by assiduity in prayer, 4° by right use of what is already known. For these are the four modes by which Steyaert and other Louvanists say ignorance of natural law is vincible, so that, if these being in place it is not conquered, it will be invincible. But ignorance of natural law is given which, all these means being employed, could not be conquered. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Jerome, Epist. XI, quoted by Augustine, taught that simulation was licit, and erred. Cassian, Collat. 17, and others taught that the officious lie, for instance for the liberation of one's country, is licit, and erred.

St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 67, a. 2, c, teaches that a judge is bound to condemn as guilty one juridically proved innocent; St. Bonaventure teaches the contrary: one or other erred concerning natural law. For many centuries Catholic and most pious doctors dispute about this case and several others pertaining to natural law, for instance about certain contracts, whether they are usurious, whether simoniacal, etc. But all these employed the above-named means. It would be impious to deny this of the holy Doctors of the Church St. Jerome, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, rash to deny it of others. Therefore.

The adversaries respond that these holy Doctors and others erred speculatively only, and not practically.

Sed contra. To be silent about others, St. Thomas composed his second and third parts of the Summa with a view to forming morals, avoiding sins, exercising virtues, administering and receiving sacraments, and singularly this article about which there is question, for duly exercising the office of judge; all which pertain to practical doctrine. Therefore, if he erred, he erred practically, and not speculatively only, as a Thomist doctor would now err if consulted by a judge he answered according to the opinion of St. Thomas: for it is not only practice to act, but also to teach and counsel in acting; nor is he alone culpable practically who does the evil work, but also he who cooperates with it by teaching and consenting. Nor say that St. Thomas gave no assurance; for he is held to give assurance who teaches something absolutely as true and obligatory, as St. Thomas does in the present case and in many others. And even if he gave no assurance to others, nevertheless he himself erred with a view to practice, since by thus teaching he did not know but that many would follow his doctrine.

Therefore when we read in Scripture : Ask, and you shall receive, John, XVI, 24. If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not, James, I, 5. Thou hast given a warning to them that fear thee, that they may flee from before the bow, Psal. LIX, 6 : these and similar texts are understood to mean that God, of his grace, will enlighten him who prays and does what in him lies regarding those things necessary with necessity of means, and for avoiding formal sins.

It is confirmed 2°. God does not always enlighten him who does what in him lies, of grace, according to the aforesaid modes, regarding those things which are of positive divine law, as the adversaries commonly admit. Therefore neither regarding those things which are of natural law.

Obj. 1° from St. Thomas : The Angelic Doctor, Quodlib. XIII, a. 13, says : « In two ways someone is bound to sin: one way, by acting against the law, as when someone fornicates; another way, by acting against conscience, even if it be not against the law... But that which is done against the law is always evil, nor is it excused by being according to conscience. » But he who acts against the more remote precepts of natural law acts against the law. Therefore his ignorance is not invincible; otherwise he would not sin.

I answer. This celebrated text of St. Thomas, which the adversaries at once urge, and which they boast never solved, never to be solved, does not fight even against us. For of our own accord we confess with the holy Doctor that everything done against the law formally is sin; because sin is defined : « A word, deed or desire against the law. » Whence to be formally against the law and to be sin are convertible. But that something be against the law formally, this law must be known, or morally able to be known, to exist; otherwise through defect of sufficient promulgation it will not be actually obliging, and what is done will not be formally against it, but materially only. Truly therefore says St. Thomas that everything done against the law formally, namely against the law virtually known, or invincibly unknown (for otherwise it is not done formally against the law), such as fornication, is always sin, and is not excused by its being according to conscience erring by vincible error dictating that to be licit. Moreover see more about this text, Dissert. on Probabilism, art. 3, obj. 3.

Obj. 2° : Concupiscence and ignorance are two wounds of human nature inflicted by original sin. But every concupiscence is vincible. Therefore every ignorance is vincible. This is almost the sole foundation of the Louvanists from reason.

I answer. I distinguish the minor. Every concupiscence is vincible as to its motions and stimuli, I deny. Experience shows it, and the Apostle thrice asked this of the Lord and obtained it not, II Cor., XIII, 8. As to consent, I concede. And to this same Apostle it was said, ibid., 9: My grace is sufficient for thee. So likewise every ignorance is vincible as to consent; for man can not consent to any ignorance whatever, doing morally what in him lies to conquer it, and thus make himself immune from all culpable ignorance. But, just as he cannot arrest all involuntary motions of concupiscence, so neither all involuntary errors of ignorance.

But if perhaps the question be not of concupiscence and ignorance themselves, but of those things to which concupiscence does not impel, v. g., fornication, adultery, etc., and of things done out of ignorance, I grant that the former we can conquer and avoid, not the latter. The reason of the disparity is evident, because, if those things to which concupiscence impels us, for instance fornication, adultery, etc., we could not conquer and avoid, since they are elsewhere supposed known, nothing would be wanting to formal sin, and thus we should be necessitated to sin formally; which cannot be admitted. But supposing invincible ignorance, the things we do through it are unknown to us, and therefore material sins only, and not formal.

1. When is ignorance culpable?

Ignorance is culpable if it concerns what we are bound to know and if it is voluntary. There is no guilt attaching to ignorance about what we are under no obligation to know. Neither can we be blamed for ignorance which we can not help. The degree of culpability for voluntary ignorance about what we are bound to know will depend upon the seriousness of the matter and the degree of voluntariness in the ignorance. If the matter is serious and if there was great negligence in not procuring the requisite knowledge, grave sin will be committed. On the other hand, if either the matter be trivial or the negligence slight, no more than a venial sin will be committed.