II. On the Impediments of the Human Act

What are the impediments of the human act? - As is clear from what has been said, to have a human act there is required: 1. the exercise of the adverting intellect; 2. the free exercise of the will; 3. the exercise of the other faculties proceeding from free will. Now then, if we look at the fact itself, often we act without knowing what we are really doing, for we think we are doing something else. Likewise, often we act impelled by some vehement passion of concupiscence, or oppressed by some vehement passion of fear, and with violence done to us. In the first case there seems to be lacking the condition required on the part of the intellect; but in the second case there seems to be lacking the condition required on the part of the will. Here without doubt an impediment of the human act is had; and the question is raised concerning ignorance, concerning concupiscence and passion, concerning fear and force, whether they cause the involuntary. For ignorance and error obstruct advertence; force and fear obstruct deliberation; concupiscence and passion obstruct both.

Does ignorance cause the involuntary? - Ignorance with which someone acts either has itself causally in relation to that which is done, or has itself merely concomitantly with respect to that which is done. It has itself concomitantly "when ignorance concerns that which is done; nevertheless, even if it were known, it would still be done. For then ignorance does not induce one to willing that this be done, but it happens at the same time that something is done and unknown; as... when someone would indeed wish to kill an enemy, but, ignorant, kills him, thinking he is killing a deer. And such ignorance does not make the involuntary" (namely contrariwise), "because it does not cause something that is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary" (or the involuntary merely privatively), "because what is unknown cannot be actually willed." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8.

But it makes the non-voluntary, whether that merely concomitant ignorance is involuntary, or whether it is not merely concomitant, but voluntary. Nevertheless there is a distinction between involuntary and voluntary ignorance in the case; because involuntary concomitant ignorance, since it simply takes away the voluntary, makes something simply non-voluntary. But voluntary concomitant ignorance, since it does not simply take away the voluntary, for it is voluntary, makes that which is done with that ignorance non-voluntary indeed in itself, but voluntary in some way in the cause. S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 8.

Voluntary in the cause, namely insofar as the ignorance concerns a thing which ought to have been known, and perhaps someone knowing would not do what he does ignorantly. And if certainly he would do it even knowing, the voluntary is still had indirectly in the cause, by reason of that evil disposition which the willed ignorance leaves intact, and by reason of that action, for example hunting, which was the cause of the consequent act, for example homicide. To the point Suarez, on 1. 2, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2, n. 19: "That ignorance does not excuse from fault; therefore neither does it take away the voluntary. He is bound to expel that ignorance in order to avoid the act, and voluntarily omits to do this; therefore he also acts voluntarily, at least indirectly. Therefore it matters nothing that this ignorance is not the cause of the act, and that if knowledge were present, the act would nevertheless take place; both because, although we grant that that act is not voluntary in ignorance as in a cause, nevertheless that ignorance will be a sufficient condition for that act to be voluntary indirectly, insofar as man is bound and can avoid it and does not do so; for what he would have done if knowledge existed does not excuse him, but rather in a certain way accuses him more, because that is an evil disposition and contrary to the obligation by which he is bound to avoid the act; and also because that effect is voluntary in another act directly willed, as, for example, the killing of a man in hunting. But voluntary ignorance, although it is concomitant, is the reason or condition that that prior act of hunting be done imprudently or incautiously, and consequently that in it the effect thence following is judged to have been willed."

Indeed, notwithstanding that evil disposition, he was still then bound, indeed much more, to know; and knowing, perhaps, notwithstanding that evil disposition, he would not have committed the monstrous crime with open eyes. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; Billuart, de Act. hum., diss. 1, art. 6, I say 3.

If ignorance is not merely concomitant, or does not have itself merely concomitantly in relation to that which is done, but is causing, or has itself causally, namely is the cause of doing that which is done, then that ignorance is either voluntary, or consequent upon a free act of the will, or it is not voluntary, or antecedent to a free act of the will. A free act of the will, namely concerning the ignorance itself, not concerning that which is afterward done from that ignorance. "But consequently," says S. Th. ibid., "ignorance has itself to the will insofar as it is voluntary."

Therefore when ignorance of this kind is the cause of doing that which is done, "since it is itself voluntary... it cannot cause the involuntary simply" (that is, contrariwise; since that which is done is voluntary in the cause from which it proceeds, i.e. in that willed ignorance). "Nevertheless it causes the involuntary according to a certain respect, insofar as it precedes the movement of the will to doing something, which would not be if knowledge were present," ibid.; that is, although that movement of the will is voluntary in the cause, nevertheless in itself it is altogether involuntary, for it would not be if knowledge were present. L. 1. 5. n. 4.

But if the causing ignorance, or that which is the cause of doing what is done, is not voluntary, or is antecedent, then ignorance causes the involuntary simply, since that which is done, by the very fact that it is caused by ignorance, would not be if knowledge were present, and accordingly is against the will. Nor indeed is that willed in itself; nor in any way willed in the cause. Therefore it remains totally or simply involuntary. "But antecedently," says the Holy Doctor ibid., "ignorance has itself to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when some man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act which he was not bound to know, and from this does something which he would not do if he knew: for example, when someone, diligence having been used, not knowing that someone is passing along the road, shoots an arrow with which he kills the passerby. And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply."

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. As regards the insane, it is certainly not always established that they are not sufficiently in possession of themselves in an act of sin. Nor likewise is it established whether those who are hypnotized, and in hypnotic sleep execute the evil commands of the one hypnotizing, are not also sufficiently in possession of themselves. But in these cases the voluntary can easily be in the cause.

Whether ignorance renders the act objectively null? - R. Negatively. The reason is that our false estimation cannot change the objective truth of the thing. And thus an unbeliever who baptizes, thinking that a man is not really justified by baptism, nevertheless, if he has the intention of doing what the Church does, baptizes validly. A priest baptizing in a case of necessity with water which he falsely does not think to be natural, if the water is truly natural, baptizes validly. A pastor who assists at a marriage, falsely thinking that he still needs some special delegation of the bishop which he does not have, validly assists at it. Consequently it must be said that by ignorance an act objectively null is not validated. Therefore, if a confessor ignorant of reserved cases absolves from them, he by no means truly absolves from them. Bonacina, de Sacram., d. 1, q. 2, p. 1, n. 28; Sporer, de Matr., n. 48.

Is ignorance always sin? - One ignorance is invincible, another vincible. Invincible ignorance has place when someone suspects nothing at all concerning the thing itself and concerning the obligation of inquiring; or although he has fallen into suspicion of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, nevertheless after using moral diligence, he could not know the thing. After moral diligence; for it is not necessary that the diligence to be used be the greatest, but it suffices that it be common and ordinary, proportionate to the person and to the matter about which there is question.

Vincible ignorance is had when someone not only comes into doubt about the thing and about the obligation of inquiring, but also has occasion of coming into knowledge of the thing, and nevertheless voluntarily passes it by. L. 1. 1. n. 3. Antecedent ignorance is always invincible; but not every invincible ignorance is antecedent. Even merely concomitant ignorance is invincible. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8. Invincible ignorance is involuntary; but vincible ignorance is voluntary.

Vincible ignorance is one thing directly voluntary, another indirectly voluntary, another voluntary accidentally. Directly voluntary ignorance is called affected ignorance. This is had when someone deliberately wills to be ignorant, whether because of weariness of learning, or so that he may sin more freely, or so that he may have an excuse, or so that he simply may not be drawn back from sin. Indirectly voluntary ignorance is had when someone omits to apply study to knowing, or neglects to learn because of mere laziness or sloth, because of the labor of learning, or because of other occupations. Ignorance of this kind is distinguished in two ways, namely into crass or supine, and into purely vincible. Crass or supine ignorance is in him who, although he does not studiously seek ignorance, nevertheless uses no diligence or almost no diligence to acquire for himself that knowledge which according to his condition he can have. Purely vincible ignorance is when someone uses some diligence for knowing the truth, but slight and by no means sufficient, considering the quality of the person and the gravity of the matter.

Finally, accidentally voluntary ignorance is that which is not intended and is outside the intention, and which is had "when someone directly or indirectly wills something to which ignorance follows. Directly indeed, as appears in the drunk man, who wills to drink wine excessively, through which he is deprived of the use of reason; but indirectly, when someone neglects to repel the rising motions of passion, which, growing, bind the use of reason in the particular thing to be chosen." S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 8.

Oblivion, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Therefore the same moral judgment must be made concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 3; L. 1. 1. n. 169; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 9; q. 76. a. 3.

Finally, one ignorance is of law, by which a law or precept is unknown, as if someone does not know that marriage is contracted invalidly with one related by affinity; another is of fact, by which a fact is unknown, as if someone contracting marriage with one related by affinity does not know that she is related by affinity; another is of penalty, by which someone is ignorant of the penalty added to the law, as if someone striking a cleric does not know that excommunication is attached to that striking.

Invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin if it concerns those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it concerns those things which one is not bound to know. The reason for the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason for the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or to do sins by a sin of omission. Hence because of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. Therefore it will be a sin to be ignorant of those things without knowledge of which one cannot rightly exercise a due act. Hence all are bound commonly to know those things which are of faith and the universal precepts of law; but individuals are bound to know those things which pertain to their state or office. But there are certain things which, although someone is naturally able to know them, nevertheless he is not bound to know, such as the theorems of geometry and contingent particulars, unless perhaps in some particular case that occurs.

St. Augustine, l. 3 de lib. arb., c. 19; Suarez, on 3. p., t. 5, d. 4, s. 8, n. 18; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 6; q. 76. a. 2, 3; Quodl. 1. a. 19; Quodl. 8. a. 15; L. 1. 5. n. 4, 26 ff.; Wurzburg, c. 1, a. 3; E. M.

Whether ignorance diminishes sin? - Antecedent, invincible, efficacious ignorance, or ignorance that is the cause of sin, "which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but altogether removes it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. "Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it." S. Th. l. c., since it in no way influences the act of sin; nor consequently does it take away sin, insofar as it does not render it involuntary, but it takes it away only insofar as it renders it non-voluntary. S. Th. l. c. a. 3. But cf. 48.

Consequent ignorance that is purely vincible, or even crass or supine, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "diminishes the voluntary and consequently sin." S. Th. l. c. For the voluntary is had only indirectly or in the cause. Consequent affected ignorance, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "seems to increase the voluntary and sin; for from the intention of the will to sin it comes that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the liberty of sinning." Thus S. Th. l. c. a. 3 and others. But others deny this, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. tr. 19, n. 8, truly cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat. But one must distinguish; for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives.

If someone affects ignorance because of weariness of learning, or not precisely so that he may not be drawn back from sin, but so that he may not be drawn back from such an action to which he strongly adheres, or even so that he may not be drawn back from sin, the sin is not thereby increased. For ignorance of itself diminishes the notion of a human act and formal contempt of the law. Moreover, if for this reason he wills to be ignorant, so that he may not be drawn back from sin, therefore if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows a will not so confirmed in such a sin.

But if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, then the sin is increased, because that ignorance is a sign both of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt; since with such affection he pursues sin that he is willing also to suffer the loss of ignorance, and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not a sin. Therefore although that ignorance also excuses, because it always conceals the condition of the work, nevertheless it accuses and increases the sin by reason of its cause. Luke 23:34; Acts 3:17; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, s. 4, n. 183; Struggl, l. c. n. 36.

Since sins which proceed from ignorance are voluntary only in the cause, and consequently have no other malice than the malice which was present in the positing of the cause itself, the gravity or lightness of the sin which follows from it must be taken from that cause, not from the gravity or lightness of the thing which is derived from it. For this latter is voluntary and culpable only insofar as the ignorance itself is voluntary and culpable. And thus from lightly culpable ignorance of a physician or confessor, grave effects can follow, which consequently do not bring grave fault.

Is vincible ignorance of law a special sin of itself? - R. Negatively. For every law commanding its own observance implicitly commands knowledge of the same law. But it commands this only in order to the work which is commanded to be done or omitted. Therefore that vincible ignorance of law receives its species from the transgression of the law itself, for which it provides the cause or danger. And this has place also as regards ignorance of the articles of faith. For although knowledge of them, as the more common opinion has it, is commanded by a special precept and through itself, and therefore, standing in the obligation itself of knowing, such ignorance is culpable of itself, nevertheless this sin is opposed to the same virtue of faith. For the malice of sin against faith is in this, that someone offends the authority of the one speaking by not believing. But this irreverence is found not only when someone knowingly dissents from God speaking, but also when someone culpably neglects to examine whether it is the doctrine of God, and because of that negligence dissents from those things which are said by God. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 182 ff.; Laymann, l. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, n. 10; Viva, de Act. hum., q. 3, final article.

Are actions which someone does from a contracted habit to be held as human, and accordingly imputable? - A habit is a certain disposition of the soul by which something is done when there is need; and, if it is acquired by acts, it is called acquired. Hence habit contains a certain special propensity to an act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 49.

Now speculatively: They are human and imputable if he adverts to them, in themselves; otherwise only in the cause, as long nevertheless as he foresaw, at least confusedly, that they would follow from the habit when he was contracting the habit, and has not retracted the habit, nor tries to extirpate it. Practically: "Sinners of this kind badly habituated, although they have less ready knowledge than others, nevertheless always have some actual knowledge of their crimes sufficient to render the acts deliberate and mortal." L. 5. n. 4, par. Third; l. 3. n. 127; tr. de Act. hum. XIV. "It is manifest that he who sins from habit sins from certain malice." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 78. a. 2. "He is said to sin from certain malice or industry, as if knowingly choosing evil," S. Th. l. c. a. 1, with full affection of the will.

For he who neglects to amend a custom of sin is convicted of loving and fostering sin, freely conserving a habit freely acquired; from this the will is borne into the act with greater readiness and propensity. Hence the voluntary is increased, although the free is diminished. And this applies whether the habit is bad or good. But sin of this kind "from certain malice, according as it comes from the inclination of habit, is not a special sin, but a certain general condition of sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 14. a. 1 ad 3; 1. 2. q. 73. a. 4.

Does concupiscence cause the involuntary? - The sensitive appetite is distinguished into the concupiscible and the irascible. The concupiscible is that by which it reaches after or flees from those things which are represented through imagination as good or evil. The irascible is that by which it strives to remove those things which stand in its way as it reaches after the former things or flees from the latter. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23.

By the name concupiscence is understood here any movement whatever of the sensitive appetite which is borne toward the good or flees from the evil proper to itself. But those things which are said concerning the affection of the sensitive appetite can easily be applied to the affection of the will; for just as the movement of the will can be caused from sensitive concupiscence, so one affection of the will can be caused from another affection of the will itself. And thus from love of children, of God, of honor, someone voluntarily undertakes dangers, and that will will be the more fervent, the greater that affection was.

One concupiscence is antecedent, another consequent. The former precedes the free act of the will, and consequently is excited merely naturally. The latter follows upon the free act of the will. The former draws and inclines reason and the will. The latter redounds from the will. The former is not voluntary; the latter is voluntary, either in itself, if the will deliberately wills and excites it, or in the cause, if it naturally results from a free act of the will. "The sensitive appetite," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6, "can have itself to free choice both antecedently and consequently. Antecedently indeed, according as the passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines reason or the will. But consequently, according as the movement of the higher powers, if they are vehement, redounds into the lower powers. For the will cannot be moved intensely into something without some passion being excited in the sensitive appetite."

Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the voluntary both under the notion of voluntary and under the notion of free. Therefore an act proceeding from it is the less voluntary under both notions, the more intense it is. The reason for the first part is that an act is voluntary insofar as it is from an intrinsic principle. But concupiscence is extrinsic to the will. Therefore an act proceeding from its impulse is less voluntary under the notion of voluntary. Hence S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6 ad 3 says: "It must be said that, although the movement of the will is more intense when incited by passion, nevertheless it is not so proper to the will as if it were moved by reason alone to sin." And ibid. in the body: "An act is sin insofar as it is voluntary and existing in us. But something is said to be in us through reason and will. Hence the more reason and will do something from themselves, not from the impulse of passion, the more it is voluntary and existing in us."

The reason for the second part is that an act is the less voluntary under the notion of free, the less dependence it has on the part of free will and advertence on the part of reason. But when a preceding passion is more vehement, so much less is the dependence of this consequent act upon the will freely determining itself and upon reason considering. For the more the free will finds the soul already inclined by passion, the less it itself influences the determination of the consequent act. Then, although passion cannot directly influence judgment, nevertheless it can indirectly influence it in three ways: 1. Through a certain distraction, for the sense is less attentive to individual things when it is intent upon many. 2. Through a certain contrariety, insofar as it inclines to the contrary of what ought to be judged, and the soul becomes weak and feeble. 3. Through bodily alteration; for it perverts the phantasy, which does not present itself to the right operations of the intellect, as is seen in the insane and in those raging from the vehemence of passions.

But although from antecedent concupiscence the act of the will is less voluntary, nevertheless it becomes more intense and easier, because it inclines the will to willing. And according as the passion is greater, it renders the effort of the will easier. And thus soldiers from hope of glory, parents and friends from love of children and friends, gladly endure all kinds of burdensome things. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7 ad 3; q. 10. a. 3; q. 33. a. 3; q. 48. a. 3; q. 73. a. 6 ad 2; q. 77. a. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7; 2. 2. q. 154. a. 3 ad 1; q. 158. a. 3 ad 2; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 3, 4.

Consequent concupiscence presupposes an act the more voluntary the more intense it is. The reason is that consequent concupiscence is excited in us consequently upon an act of the will freely determining itself. Therefore whether it is excited naturally, through a certain redundancy into the lower part from the higher; or whether it is excited voluntarily, either indirectly through voluntary negligence and omission of repressing rising motions, or directly, deliberately and studiously, by exciting motions in the lower part; concupiscence, as consequent and not preceding the free act of the will from which it proceeds, cannot exercise any causal influence upon that act, but presupposes the same act of the will, which rather exercises influence upon it. And, if the discussion again is of concupiscence which is excited from the very act of the will, whether voluntarily or naturally, since an effect must be proportioned to its cause and cannot surpass it, consequent concupiscence does not diminish the voluntary, but rather increases it, insofar as it signifies and demonstrates a greater propensity and inclination of the will to the act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 24. a. 3 ad 1; q. 73. a. 6 ad 2; q. 77. a. 6.

Consequent concupiscence which arises from a merely natural resulting and redundancy of the superior part into the inferior, renders that which proceeds from it voluntary and more voluntary in the cause, the more interior it is, by the very fact that it proceeds from the will. But it renders that less voluntary in itself, since it always somehow clouds reason and somehow impedes the free exercise of the will.

But consequent concupiscence directly excited for acting, for example if someone deliberately excites hatred in himself against an enemy by turning over received injuries in his mind, so that he may seek vengeance more obstinately and execute it with greater daring, renders that which proceeds from it more voluntary simply, because that passion directly and voluntarily excited is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger. S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 10, 11; 1. 2. q. 24. a. 3 ad 1, 3; E. M.

Does passion diminish sin? - Passion is here called a movement of the sensitive appetite, as if by a certain force and impetus carrying off the soul, so that the soul seems as if to suffer under its influence. "It must be said that sin essentially consists in an act of free choice, which is the faculty of will and reason. But passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Therefore if passion is taken according as it precedes the act of sin, then it is necessary that it diminish sin. For an act is sin insofar as it is voluntary.... And according to this passion lessens sin insofar as it lessens the voluntary. But consequent passion does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or rather is a sign of its magnitude, insofar namely as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act of sin. And thus it is true that the more someone sins with greater lust or concupiscence, the more he sins." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 79. a. 6; q. 24. a. 3. Cf. preceding n.; L. 1. 5. n. 23.

You will resolve: Hence it follows that sin is diminished the more vehement the antecedent passion is. "It must be said that it belongs to the notion of sin that it be voluntary, but that is called voluntary whose principle is in the agent himself. And therefore the more its principle is increased, the graver the sin also becomes; but the more an exterior principle is increased, the lighter the sin becomes. But passion is a principle extrinsic to the will, while the movement of the will is an intrinsic principle. And therefore the stronger the movement of the will has been toward sinning, the less" [the sin becomes]. S. Th. de Malo, q. 1. a. 11 ad 3.

But an act proceeding from consequent concupiscence is the more voluntary and the greater sin, the greater that concupiscence is. "If under concupiscence is included also the very movement of the will, then where there is greater concupiscence there is greater sin." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 73. a. 6 ad 2.

Does passion totally excuse from sin? - "It must be said that an act which of its genus is evil is totally excused from sin according to this alone, that it is rendered totally involuntary. Hence, if there is such a passion which renders the following act totally involuntary, it totally excuses from sin; otherwise not totally.... Passion sometimes indeed is so great that it totally takes away the use of reason, as is clear in those who become insane because of love or anger. And then, if such passion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed as sin, because it is voluntary in its cause.... But if the cause was not voluntary, but natural, for example when someone from sickness or some cause of this kind falls into such a passion that totally takes away the use of reason, the act is rendered altogether involuntary, and consequently totally excused from sin. But sometimes passion is not so great that it totally interrupts the use of reason; and then reason can exclude the passion by turning to other thoughts, or impede it from attaining its effect, because the members are not applied to the work except through the consent of reason. Hence such a passion does not totally excuse from sin." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 7; q. 6. a. 7 ad 3; q. 10. a. 3.

Are the first motions of evil concupiscence always sins, and of what kind? - There can be no doubt that the first motions of evil concupiscence are sins, and mortal sins, for there is question of a grave matter, if, when they arise, the will consents in the following time, and by consenting morosely delights in them, whether with a long, or short, and very brief delay. For the act is concerning a gravely base matter and is fully deliberate; and that first motion of concupiscence, although it was excited entirely independently of the will, once the consent of the will accedes, now begins to be a commanded act in its delay and permanence.

Likewise there is no doubt that the first motions of evil concupiscence naturally excited and independently of the will, which afterward dissents from and resists them according to its powers, are in no way sins. For the acts are altogether involuntary, and without the voluntary there is no sin. Indeed, merit is thence had for the will resisting. "The first motion," says S. Th. 2. d. 40. q. 1. a. 4 ad 3, "does not have the notion of fault except according as it is in some way in the power of the will. Hence, when the will does not resist, it has the notion of sin. But when the will already begins to resist, then man merits."

If finally, when the first motion of concupiscence arises, the will neither consents nor dissents, but permits it, not prohibiting it, such a motion already has the notion of sin, because in some way it is in the power of the will. For that motion is now not against and outside the will, which certainly does not intend it, but at least permits it. But the sin is not mortal, but light. For mortal sin is in aversion from God, which cannot be had without reason turning itself away from God through deliberation, which aversion is not had here. Therefore that sin is not mortal, but venial. For it is sin, since it is a certain disorder against natural honesty. S. Th. 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2; Quodl. 4. a. 21; E. M.

Does fear cause the involuntary? - Fear is the trepidation of the mind because of present or future danger. L. 1. Quod metus, etc., Dig.

It is divided first into light and grave. The first is had either when the present or future evil is light, or when, although it is grave, nevertheless it is only little probable. The second is had when the evil is grave, very probable or certain. But an evil is grave either absolutely or relatively. Absolutely grave is that which strikes fear of itself even into a constant man, and it has place when the evil which is feared is grave in itself and is commonly reputed such, as death, mutilation, etc. Relatively grave is had when the evil which is feared is not grave according to itself, but is such with respect to this or that person.

Fear is furthermore divided into intrinsic and extrinsic by reason of the cause from which it proceeds. Intrinsic fear is that which arises from the intrinsic disposition of the subject himself, namely from each one's own weakness of body or soul. Fear of death excited by a grave illness is intrinsic fear, since it arises, as from a cause, from an infirmity which is in the very subject of the fear. Extrinsic fear is that which is excited by an extrinsic cause, whether this cause is natural or necessary, or whether it is a moral or free cause; as likewise fear of death from shipwreck, or from a robber encountered on the road. Extrinsic fear inflicted by a moral or free cause is subdivided into just and unjust, according as that cause has or does not have the right of inducing fear; as fear induced by a judge or by a highway robber. And whether fear has been inflicted justly or unjustly, such fear can be inflicted simply to obtain something, or to bring in some evil, as in robbers threatening death unless someone gives what he has, or in an enemy likewise threatening death in vengeance; and it can be inflicted in order to extort consent to some certain thing, for example, to betrothals, to marriage, to a contract, etc.

Fear by a special name is called reverential when there is fear lest a superior be offended, or by which someone fears to resist him to whom he is subject, namely father, mother, grandfather, father-in-law, husband, king, master, prelate, tutor, and curator; and likewise an uncle, or cousin, or older brother, if the one suffering the fear dwells with them and receives support from them. "Pontius deservedly says that reverential fear of itself is grave, because it is one thing to operate from reverence owed to a superior, another from reverential fear, which necessarily includes fear of some grave damage imminent from obedience not rendered, for example, long-lasting indignation, etc." L. 1. 3. n. 717. Certainly the indignation of a father, master, etc., is an evil; and if it is long-lasting, it is a grave evil. Therefore, even with other evils excluded, for example beatings, threats, etc., reverential fear of itself is grave. L. 1. 5. n. 20; l. 6. n. 1056; C. H. 1267; C. G. 111, 11112; C. I. 1111 ff.; C. L. 666. "It is one thing to do something with fear, another truly from fear; for the first states concomitance. Hence what is done in that way, although it is absolutely voluntary, nevertheless that voluntary does not arise from fear, but rather is opposed to and conquers the fear itself, which is a sign of a great will: as when Christ the Lord was advancing toward death, fearing it, He embraced it with the highest will, which did not arise from fear of the Father and of men, and therefore conquered natural fear. But to be done from fear signifies that the fear itself induces one to willing or doing something; and then fear is the cause of such voluntary, in the way in which among acts of the will intention is the cause of election, and love of good is the cause of hatred of the opposed evil. For in this way in the present case, when someone fears death, he determines and intends to flee it; and by force of this decree he chooses this means, for example, to throw goods into the sea, and use or execution follows upon this election. Therefore from first to last fear was the cause exciting and applying the will to that efficacious act by which it commanded that exterior action." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 1, n. 6.

Now those things which are done from fear are more voluntary than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary according to a certain respect. For each thing is simply such according as it is in act. But here the act, insofar as it is exercised here and now, is simply willed, because, although such an action considered in itself is not lovable simply, nevertheless here and now it is proposed as absolutely to be chosen, as a suitable means for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore under that notion it is here and now simply voluntary. For judgment concerning the voluntary must be made with the thing considered in particular with all circumstances, and not by abstraction or precision of the intellect. "But that what is done through fear is taken as existing outside this case, insofar as it is repugnant to the will, this is only according to reason, and therefore it is involuntary according to a certain respect, i.e., insofar as it is considered as existing outside this case." "Therefore that which is done through fear is voluntary without qualification, i.e., according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a condition, i.e., if such fear were not imminent." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. "And because acts are in particulars, therefore it is voluntary simply, involuntary according to a certain respect." S. Th. Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; Quodl. 5. a. 10; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 1, 2.

Note: Light fear is not regularly judged a cause of acting, because it can easily be repelled and contemned. Nevertheless sometimes it can well be a cause of acting. And thus a subject, not daring out of reverence to contradict a superior, is determined by him, unwillingly, to acting.

Those things which are done from fear are involuntary according to a certain respect when the thing is evil in itself, but good only in the present circumstances, as is clear in the example given of throwing goods overboard for the merchant, which is evil for him in itself, and good for him in the present circumstance of shipwreck. But if the thing is good in itself, so that it is such even abstracting from the present circumstances, then he who operates from fear can be borne into that thing with a perfect inclination of the will, so that the voluntary simply is had, without at the same time having the involuntary according to a certain respect. And thus one who from supernatural fear of Gehenna wills to abstain from sin has the voluntary simply without an involuntary mixed in, because the observance of the divine law is simply good in itself, even abstracting from that circumstance of fear of divine judgments.

Moreover, "he who wills to keep the precept from fear of hell, if he understands the force of that motive, cannot have a simple contrary affection: I would transgress the precept if there were no punishment; for by this very affection he would sin and incur the guilt of punishment, and consequently would act against his own motive. If therefore he is truly and efficaciously moved by that motive, and understands its force and the quality of his acts, it cannot happen that such an affection be present with that motive." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 2, n. 6; L. 1. 6. n. 442, objection II.

Do importunate prayers constitute grave fear? - "Pontius, etc., affirms. But more truly it must be denied, unless the prayers are added to fear of reverence toward a superior; thus Sanchez, etc. And Sanchez well notes that not all assiduous prayers are called importunate, but only those which are most urgent and very often inculcated." L. 1. 2. n. 717.

Does grave fear excuse from fault? - Either the discussion is of those things which are not intrinsically and of themselves evil, or of those things which are from their nature intrinsically evil, as would be, for example, apostasy from faith, blasphemy against God. If the first, ordinarily speaking, grave fear excuses from all fault, because any positive law is not accustomed to oblige with a grave proportionate inconvenience, as is common. Ordinarily speaking, because if someone by grave fear were compelled to the violation of some positive law, which would yield to common harm, or to contempt of legitimate power, or of religion, with grave public scandal, then grave fear would not excuse from fault of transgression. For in the first, the common good must be preferred to private good; but in the second and third, there would already be question of a thing intrinsically evil from its own nature. Nevertheless in this second and third case, if the one suffering, when he violates the law, publicly protests that he does not act thus in contempt of the law or of religion, but only to decline the violence, in the presence of which he declares that law and religion no longer oblige, then, if public scandal ceases, and the aforesaid contempt ceases - which, practically speaking, seems altogether difficult - he would be excused from fault.

If the second, it is certain that fear, however grave, provided it is not such as to take away the use of reason, never excuses from all fault. For those things, since they include intrinsic and essential malice, if they are done voluntarily, can never lack fault. An example is in that Christian who, struck by fear of punishments or even of death, would deny the faith of Christ. Nevertheless it diminishes fault, since it diminishes the voluntary. But, ordinarily speaking, grave fear still leaves such cognition of the things which are done that it suffices for mortal sin. L. 1. 1. n. 175; l. 5. n. 21; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 125. a. 4; Elbel 43-52; Del Vecchio, vol. 1, n. 144.

You will resolve: Grave fear, for example of death, etc., often excuses not only from a positive precept, whether divine or human, even ecclesiastical, but sometimes also from an affirmative natural precept. And thus someone is not bound with danger to life to receive baptism, to confess integrally, to receive communion, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, or to aid a neighbor in extreme necessity of life. On the contrary, to avoid death a priest cannot violate the sacramental seal. Viva, Opusc. de Act. hum., q. 4, a. 4; Lessius, q. 6, a. 6; L. 1. 1. n. 175.

Can the will suffer violence besides fear? - Force or violence is the impulse of a greater thing which cannot be repelled. Here it is commonly defined as that which is from an extrinsic principle, while the one who suffers force resists. While resisting, and accordingly it is against the inclination of the will, so that the one who suffers force cannot do the contrary, and entirely resists. Therefore two things are required for violence. The first, that it be from an extrinsic principle, because no one can properly be said to inflict violence on himself. Hence the distinction between violence and fear is clear, which can come both from an intrinsic principle, such as, for example, fear of death coming from illness, and from an extrinsic principle, such as, for example, fear of shipwreck, of hell, and of punishments. The second thing required is that the one suffering entirely resist, that is, according to his powers and positively; for if someone were only passive, then indeed he would not contribute to violence by acting, but he would contribute by willing to suffer. Nevertheless resistance altogether absolute and continual against the coercion inflicted is not always required for avoiding fault, namely when on the one hand it would be useless, and on the other on the other hand the matter concerns something less dangerous. Thus the martyrs, when led to pagan temples, did not sin, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting the danger of scandal or injury to religion. L. 1. 5. n. 15 seq. "As regards the proper act itself of the will (namely, the elicited act), violence cannot be inflicted upon it. And the reason for this is that the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior principle which knows.... But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. Therefore no one can will unwillingly, because he cannot will while not willing to will. By the hypothesis he would will, and at the same time he would not will, because he would be opposing himself as willing. S. Anselm, De libero arbitrio, l. 1, c. 6; L. 1. 5. n. 19. "As regards acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence, insofar as the exterior members can be hindered by violence from carrying out the command of the will." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. The will can likewise suffer violence in the exterior members, even though the command of the will is not properly present, as, for example, if someone is seized against his will, bound hands and feet, cast into prison, etc. And this holds not only as regards the exterior members, but also as regards the interior faculties. For it is clear that the will can command not only the hand, for example, not to sign one's name on the promissory note of a fictitious creditor, and yet that hand, seized by force by him, must sign; but it can also command the intellect to think about and consider some matter, and yet the intellect, distracted, is carried off to thinking about other things; it can command the sensitive appetite to obey reason, and yet that appetite is moved contrary to reason. Likewise an extrinsic cause, for example the devil, can excite phantasms in the imagination against the will, etc. Suarez tr. 2. d. 2; Lessius on q. 6. a. 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 80, S. q. 47. a. 2; L. 1. 3. n. 430. 433; E. M.

64 bis. Note: The command of the will is not exercised in the same way over the senses as over the exterior members. When these are found in their normal state, the will exercises perfect command over them, according to their natural power. But as regards the senses and the sensitive appetite, it is not the same. "It must be said," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3 ad 3, "that, as the Philosopher says, reason, in which the will is, moves by its command the irascible and concupiscible powers; not indeed by despotic rule, as a servant is moved by his master; but by royal or political rule, as free men are governed by one ruling, who nevertheless can move in a contrary direction. Hence both the irascible and the concupiscible can move the will in a contrary direction. And thus nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them."

Does violence cause the involuntary? - Violence causes the involuntary as such contrarily. For "violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that both are from an intrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something be against nature, so in things that know it makes something be against the will. But what is against nature is said to be unnatural; and similarly what is against the will is said to be involuntary. Hence violence causes the involuntary," S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6; violence simply causes the involuntary simply, violence in a qualified sense causes the involuntary in a qualified sense; not indeed as regards elicited acts, but as regards commanded acts. For only as regards commanded acts, and not also as regards elicited acts, can the will suffer violence. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5 ad 1, S. q. 47. a. 1. - E. M.

You will resolve: Therefore when some passion is simply violent, namely because someone resists and opposes it by the will in every way he can, it is simply and contrarily involuntary, and therefore not human, nor imputable. But when it is only violent in a qualified sense, namely because it is not sufficiently resisted when it can be repelled or weakened, or because it is not wholly opposed when in no way can it be repelled or diminished, then the notion of the voluntary is not taken away, and therefore neither is the notion of a human and imputable act; but it is only diminished, according to the greater or lesser force inflicted, and according to the greater or lesser resistance and opposition. Rom. 7:20; S. Aug. De Civitate Dei c. 16; L. 1. 3. n. 430. 433, 1. 5. n. 16.

66 bis. Note: "The involuntary is said in two ways, namely through ignorance and through violence. And therefore robbery has one notion of sin, and theft another. Therefore on this account they differ in species.... In other genera of sins the notion of sin is not taken from something involuntary, as it is taken in sins opposed to justice; and therefore where a diverse notion of the involuntary occurs, there is a diverse species of sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 4. 9.