§ 2. On The Notion And Divisions Of Ignorance

39. Notions. To cognition concerning the morality of an act there is opposed ignorance. Ignorance is taken more broadly for any lack of cognition in a capable subject; but more strictly (and better in moral theology) it is accepted as: the lack of due cognition. Therefore in this sense ignorance is distinguished from simple nescience, which is the lack of any knowledge, whether due or not.⁵ Thus, for example, for a confessor living in Europe not to know the Japanese language is nescience; but not to know Moral Theology is ignorance. Moreover ignorance is distinguished from error, for "error," as St. Thomas teaches,⁶ "is to approve false things for true; whence it adds some act over ignorance. For there can be ignorance without someone passing judgment about things unknown; and then he is ignorant and not erring. But when he already passes a false judgment about those things which he does not know, then he is properly said to err." But in practice ignorance, accepted in the sense explained above, is the mother of error; for ignorance is a habit, but error is an act or judgment proceeding from the habit of ignorance. We treat at the same time of ignorance and error.

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 2.

⁶ De malo q. 3, a. 7.

40. Divisions. 1. By reason of the object ignorance of fact and ignorance of law are distinguished. The first is present when someone is ignorant of some substantial or accidental fact, for example, when someone does not know that this book, which he reads, is heretical. The other is ignorance of law, and is present when someone does not know some law,⁷ either commanding or prohibiting; for example, when someone reading a heretical book does not know the ecclesiastical law punishing the reading of heretical books.

⁷ To ignorance of law there seems also to be reduced ignorance of the penalty to be inflicted on transgressors of the law. For such a penalty is the sanction of the law and its integral part, and therefore ignorance of the penalty is partial ignorance of law or right.

41. 2. By reason of the subject, that is, of the ignorant man, ignorance is distinguished as invincible and vincible. The first is that which, with moral diligence having been employed, cannot be conquered or driven away. The other is that which could be driven away by moral diligence, but from negligence or evil will is not driven away. - Moral diligence is considered that which is customarily employed by prudent and God-fearing men in such circumstances. But I say: in such circumstances; for the same diligence is not always to be employed. For if there is question of a grave matter, for example, of the validity of a sacrament, greater diligence is required than if there is treatment of a light matter, for example, of the narration of some harmless little story, which perhaps is not true. Yet supreme or extreme diligence is never required. For neither divine nor human legislators are to be considered tyrants, willing to oblige subjects to learn with extreme diligence all the minutest obligations of the law. - Since vincible ignorance arises from culpable negligence or from evil will, it also is culpable;⁸ but invincible ignorance is inculpable.

⁸ Those authors who teach that vincible ignorance can be inculpable take ignorance for nescience, but not in the strict sense for lack of due knowledge.

42. Vincible ignorance is customarily subdivided according to the diverse degrees of negligence and culpability occurring:

a) Into simply vincible, when only slight negligence in driving it away was present.

b) Into crass or supine, when there was almost no diligence, but grave negligence opposed to driving away the ignorance. Crass or supine ignorance in a grave matter is gravely culpable; but it is a light sin in a light matter. Therefore crass or supine ignorance is not always the same as gravely culpable ignorance (as is taught by some authors), but only then, when there is question of a grave matter.

c) Into affected ignorance, which is ignorance deliberately willed by him who wishes to have either some excuse from sin, or not to be drawn back from sinning; for example, someone doubting whether a book is on the Index does not ask, although he can easily ask, lest perhaps he should have to desist from reading that book. Those who labor under ignorance of this kind as if say to God: "Depart from us, and we do not want the knowledge of your ways."⁹ As is plain, this ignorance arises from an affection toward sin. Such affection is various: "Some do not wish to attend to the law, so that they may act according to their pleasure; they would be drawn back from acting by reverence for a known law; others, so that they may act according to pleasure more freely and without remorse; they are prepared to violate the known law, yet have retained some reverence for it; others, because they contemn the law itself and the authority by which it is issued, by which reason many apostates of our age care nothing for what the Church teaches or what she commands."¹⁰ - This affected ignorance is the worst and not only does not excuse from sin committed in transgression of the law, but even increases it, since such an ignorant man employs an evil means for sinning more freely. Wherefore it was also very fittingly established by the Code of Canon Law, c. 2229, § 1: "Affected ignorance, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from no latae sententiae penalties."

⁹ Job 21:14. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8 and q. 6, a. 3.

¹⁰ Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 164.

43. 3. By reason of the act of the will ignorance is distinguished as antecedent, concomitant, consequent.¹¹ Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes every act of the will, so that in no way is it willed or voluntary; but it is the (negative) cause of willing or doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present. For example, someone in hunting kills a friend, invincibly thinking that he is killing a stag. He would never have killed the friend if he had known the matter. Antecedent ignorance is always invincible and therefore inculpable, but not vice versa is every invincible ignorance antecedent. For antecedent ignorance adds above invincible ignorance that it is the cause of an action which would not occur if ignorance were absent, as is plain in the example brought forward.¹²

Concomitant ignorance is that which likewise precedes every act of the will intending the ignorance itself, and is not willed, and therefore is invincible just as antecedent ignorance is, from which however it differs in this, that it is not the cause of the work. It has place in him who is so disposed that he would posit the work or action even if he knew that which he truly here and now does not know; for example, someone who is disposed to kill his enemy wishes in hunting to kill a stag. Yet by an unforeseen chance he kills his enemy in place of the stag. In this case the killer always remains guilty of internal homicide because of the evil will of killing the enemy, and this especially if, once the truth of the matter has been inspected, he rejoices over the killing committed. Nevertheless, as Billuart rightly observes,¹³ he is excused from external homicide and from penalties and censures which are inflicted only for an external act. In practice concomitant ignorance not rarely becomes crass ignorance, indeed even affected ignorance.

Consequent ignorance¹⁴ is that which follows from some act of the will willing it either directly or indirectly. If the will directly wills it, it is affected ignorance, of which there has already been discussion above. But if it wills it indirectly, it is simply vincible or even crass ignorance. Therefore consequent ignorance and vincible ignorance are the same in reality, although they differ according to concept. For it is called consequent because it follows an act of the will; but it is called vincible because the will can conquer it. Each ignorance also coincides with culpable ignorance, at least if ignorance is taken in the strict sense for the lack of due knowledge.

For relieving the memory we set down the following two schemata:

Ignorance

I.     antecedent                 consequent
       ||                         ||
       invincible                 vincible
       ||                         ||
       inculpable                 culpable

       invincible > antecedent = antecedent
                                  = concomitant

that is, really, although not formally, a) antecedent ignorance is the same as invincible and inculpable ignorance; b) consequent ignorance is the same as vincible and culpable ignorance. Yet invincible ignorance extends more broadly than antecedent ignorance (which in the schema is expressed by the sign >), since it also includes concomitant ignorance.

II.    Antecedent ignorance
              v
       act of the will              concomitant ignorance
              v
       Consequent ignorance

¹¹ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8.

¹² Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 9.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ This ignorance is also called by St. Thomas and Aristotle ignorance of evil choice (S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8).

44. Note. Although we have enumerated together this threefold division of ignorance, nevertheless ignorance is not called antecedent, concomitant, and consequent with respect to the same thing, as someone could easily suspect. For it is called antecedent and consequent with respect to the interior act of the will, which either never willed the ignorance (antecedent ignorance), or at some time willed it or at least from negligence permitted it (consequent ignorance). But ignorance is called concomitant not so much with respect to the interior act of the will, as rather with respect to the exterior action, which antecedent ignorance precedes and causes, but concomitant ignorance accompanies in a kind of parallel way, having no influence of itself upon its morality.¹⁵ Whence Cajetan says very well:¹⁶ "Whatever would be imputed to the agent without that (concomitant) ignorance, is imputed to the agent with it: and by this fact, it neither excuses nor accuses." All these things become clear in the example brought forward: If a hunter laboring under antecedent ignorance kills a friend, this ignorance precedes not only the exterior action of killing, but also and especially any act whatever of the will willing or permitting it. For the will never willed this ignorance nor the killing. But if the hunter, prepared to kill his enemy, truly kills him here and now, but ignorantly, this ignorance was in no way willed and therefore is invincible and precedes the act of the will desiring it here and now; but it accompanies the preceding and non-retracted intention of the will to kill, and besides this the external action of killing, upon the morality of which, however, it has no influence of itself. Whence such a one does not kill because of ignorance, but kills while ignorant or with ignorance. But if a hunter kills some man with consequent ignorance, this ignorance indeed accompanies the external action, but follows some prior act of the will, which either directly or indirectly willed it.¹⁷ - The same doctrine can also be stated briefly in this way: All three species of ignorance accompany the external action; indeed antecedent and consequent ignorance cause this action, since otherwise it would not occur. Antecedent and concomitant ignorance are invincible; but consequent ignorance is vincible.

¹⁵ Thus also the text of St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8, seems to be understood. Yet in some sense concomitant ignorance also accompanies the act of the will, insofar as, namely, it accompanies the preceding and non-retracted intention of the will.

¹⁶ Commentary on I-II, q. 76, a. 3.

¹⁷ Cf. Billuart, l. c. diss. 1, a. 9, and S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 1.