Whether there can be invincible ignorance of the law of nature?

Note that the precepts of natural law are commonly distinguished, with the Author¹, into three classes: Some are first and most universal, which are rather principles of other precepts than precepts, such as : « Good must be done, evil avoided. What you do not wish done to yourself, do not to another. » Secondary are more determinate, which are deduced from the first immediately and by easy discourse, such as the precepts of the Decalogue. Tertiary are those contained obscurely in both, and deduced from these mediately and with difficult discourse, such as the precepts which prohibit certain contracts, as usurious or simoniacal, and many others. ¹ Hic infra, q. 100, a. 1, c.

It is agreed among theologians that there cannot be invincible ignorance of the first precepts, nor of the secondary considered in themselves, in adults having perfect use of reason; because the first are per se known and are understood from the mere apprehension of the terms; the secondary are deduced from the first immediately by an easy and obvious discourse, of which even ruder men are capable.

I said: « Of secondary precepts considered in themselves; » because, if they be considered as clothed with circumstances good and apparently excusing from sin, as to tell a slight lie to save the life of an innocent man, to steal to relieve one gravely needy, etc., it is more probable, with Sylvius, the Salmanticenses and several others, that they can be invincibly ignored, at least by ruder men and for some time; because on account of this circumstance they become obscure and are reduced to the third class. The question is therefore concerning the more remote and more obscure precepts of the third class. Wherefore

I say : There can be in adults having perfect use of reason invincible ignorance of natural law regarding the more remote and more obscure precepts, which are said to be of the third class. This is most common opinion against certain Louvanists and a few others.

It is proved by the authority and reasoning of St. Thomas, below, q. 100, a. 1, c, where he says: « Certain [precepts of the natural law] there are for whose judgment much consideration of diverse circumstances is required, which to consider diligently does not belong to everyone, but to wise men; just as to consider the particular conclusions of sciences belongs not to all, but to philosophers alone. » And further: « Certain things there are which by subtler consideration of reason are judged by wise men to be observed; and these are so of the law of nature, that however they need instruction whereby the lesser may be taught by the wise. » And a. 11, c, of the same question: « Certain things there are whose reason is not so manifest to everyone, but only to the wise; and these are the moral precepts superadded to the Decalogue. » — I subjoin. But not all are or can be wise; not all are capable of subtler consideration or more difficult discourse; nor is it granted to all to be instructed by the wise. Therefore, according to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, the more obscure precepts of natural law, which are remote conclusions from the first, can be invincibly ignored, no otherwise than the remote conclusions of the sciences.

The adversaries answer 1º that the remote precepts of natural law can be invincibly ignored speculatively, but not practically; and that St. Thomas must be understood of speculative ignorance.

Sed contra : 1° Therefore, according to St. Thomas, as it pleases the adversaries, the remote precepts of natural law can be invincibly ignored speculatively, because they are difficult, obscure and of subtler consideration. But they are not less difficult and obscure, indeed more so, in practice than in speculation, on account of the diverse circumstances which practice involves. Therefore. 2° St. Thomas wrote this part with respect to ignorance in practice, since thence they take their argument against us. If thus in this place, why not in another? Therefore the answer is gratuitously invented, nay false.

They insist : If men, as far as in them lies, purged away depraved affections and habits, and prayed as they ought, God would enlighten them, or remove from them the occasion of acting against natural law; which since they neglect, their ignorance is voluntary and culpable.

I answer. I deny the consequence, which the adversaries feign quite gratuitously. For where has God promised this? That it may be more evident, the 2° conclusion is proved by overturning this principal foundation of the adverse opinion. According to the adversaries, that ignorance of natural law must be held vincible which could be conquered 1° by study and human inquiry, 2° by purging depraved affections and habits, 3° by assiduity in prayer, 4° by right use of what is already known. For these are the four modes by which Steyaert and other Louvanists say ignorance of natural law is vincible, so that, if these being in place it is not conquered, it will be invincible. But ignorance of natural law is given which, all these means being employed, could not be conquered. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Jerome, Epist. XI, quoted by Augustine, taught that simulation was licit, and erred. Cassian, Collat. 17, and others taught that the officious lie, for instance for the liberation of one's country, is licit, and erred.

St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 67, a. 2, c, teaches that a judge is bound to condemn as guilty one juridically proved innocent; St. Bonaventure teaches the contrary: one or other erred concerning natural law. For many centuries Catholic and most pious doctors dispute about this case and several others pertaining to natural law, for instance about certain contracts, whether they are usurious, whether simoniacal, etc. But all these employed the above-named means. It would be impious to deny this of the holy Doctors of the Church St. Jerome, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, rash to deny it of others. Therefore.

The adversaries respond that these holy Doctors and others erred speculatively only, and not practically.

Sed contra. To be silent about others, St. Thomas composed his second and third parts of the Summa with a view to forming morals, avoiding sins, exercising virtues, administering and receiving sacraments, and singularly this article about which there is question, for duly exercising the office of judge; all which pertain to practical doctrine. Therefore, if he erred, he erred practically, and not speculatively only, as a Thomist doctor would now err if consulted by a judge he answered according to the opinion of St. Thomas: for it is not only practice to act, but also to teach and counsel in acting; nor is he alone culpable practically who does the evil work, but also he who cooperates with it by teaching and consenting. Nor say that St. Thomas gave no assurance; for he is held to give assurance who teaches something absolutely as true and obligatory, as St. Thomas does in the present case and in many others. And even if he gave no assurance to others, nevertheless he himself erred with a view to practice, since by thus teaching he did not know but that many would follow his doctrine.

Therefore when we read in Scripture : Ask, and you shall receive, John, XVI, 24. If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not, James, I, 5. Thou hast given a warning to them that fear thee, that they may flee from before the bow, Psal. LIX, 6 : these and similar texts are understood to mean that God, of his grace, will enlighten him who prays and does what in him lies regarding those things necessary with necessity of means, and for avoiding formal sins.

It is confirmed 2°. God does not always enlighten him who does what in him lies, of grace, according to the aforesaid modes, regarding those things which are of positive divine law, as the adversaries commonly admit. Therefore neither regarding those things which are of natural law.

Obj. 1° from St. Thomas : The Angelic Doctor, Quodlib. XIII, a. 13, says : « In two ways someone is bound to sin: one way, by acting against the law, as when someone fornicates; another way, by acting against conscience, even if it be not against the law... But that which is done against the law is always evil, nor is it excused by being according to conscience. » But he who acts against the more remote precepts of natural law acts against the law. Therefore his ignorance is not invincible; otherwise he would not sin.

I answer. This celebrated text of St. Thomas, which the adversaries at once urge, and which they boast never solved, never to be solved, does not fight even against us. For of our own accord we confess with the holy Doctor that everything done against the law formally is sin; because sin is defined : « A word, deed or desire against the law. » Whence to be formally against the law and to be sin are convertible. But that something be against the law formally, this law must be known, or morally able to be known, to exist; otherwise through defect of sufficient promulgation it will not be actually obliging, and what is done will not be formally against it, but materially only. Truly therefore says St. Thomas that everything done against the law formally, namely against the law virtually known, or invincibly unknown (for otherwise it is not done formally against the law), such as fornication, is always sin, and is not excused by its being according to conscience erring by vincible error dictating that to be licit. Moreover see more about this text, Dissert. on Probabilism, art. 3, obj. 3.

Obj. 2° : Concupiscence and ignorance are two wounds of human nature inflicted by original sin. But every concupiscence is vincible. Therefore every ignorance is vincible. This is almost the sole foundation of the Louvanists from reason.

I answer. I distinguish the minor. Every concupiscence is vincible as to its motions and stimuli, I deny. Experience shows it, and the Apostle thrice asked this of the Lord and obtained it not, II Cor., XIII, 8. As to consent, I concede. And to this same Apostle it was said, ibid., 9: My grace is sufficient for thee. So likewise every ignorance is vincible as to consent; for man can not consent to any ignorance whatever, doing morally what in him lies to conquer it, and thus make himself immune from all culpable ignorance. But, just as he cannot arrest all involuntary motions of concupiscence, so neither all involuntary errors of ignorance.

But if perhaps the question be not of concupiscence and ignorance themselves, but of those things to which concupiscence does not impel, v. g., fornication, adultery, etc., and of things done out of ignorance, I grant that the former we can conquer and avoid, not the latter. The reason of the disparity is evident, because, if those things to which concupiscence impels us, for instance fornication, adultery, etc., we could not conquer and avoid, since they are elsewhere supposed known, nothing would be wanting to formal sin, and thus we should be necessitated to sin formally; which cannot be admitted. But supposing invincible ignorance, the things we do through it are unknown to us, and therefore material sins only, and not formal.