Marriage as a sacrament: minister, matter and form

639. What They Are. 1. The first and chief effect is the conjugal bond (matrimony in facto esse, by its nature perpetual and exclusive),¹ which is ordered to the generation of offspring. For this reason there is founded in it the right and office toward conjugal acts. This right consists on one side in the power of demanding the conjugal debt, to which on the other side corresponds the obligation of rendering the debt.

2. The right to conjugal acts, which belongs to the spouses from the very beginning of matrimony, is equal on each side:² let the husband render the debt to the wife, and likewise the wife to the husband.³

a. The old law, by which newly married persons in the first two months were not held to render the conjugal debt if either of them wished to deliberate about entering a religion of solemn vows, has been taken away.

b. Nevertheless the right of demanding the debt from the other party can be lost, just as also the obligation of rendering the debt to the other party can cease.

3. The right and office of generating offspring through conjugal acts demands an indivisible fellowship of life, or communion of dwelling, bed, and table, to which spouses are held by justice: A man shall leave his father and his mother and shall cleave to his wife.⁴

4. Although in conjugal life the rights and offices of the spouses are equal, in the rest of the fellowship of life the wife is subordinated to the husband: let women be subject to their husbands, since the man is the head of the woman.⁵ For to him belongs marital power over the wife, by which the man can require, not from her as from a slave but as from an associate, that she help him in caring for and governing the family. By force of this power the man must provide for the wife with suitable sustenance.

5. It belongs to the wife to help the husband in governing the family and to care for the family property. She on her part a. ordinarily becomes participant in the name, state, dignity, and privileges of the husband; b. acquires the domicile of the husband. Nevertheless she can obtain a quasi-domicile for herself if she is legitimately separated from the husband.⁶

6. The right and office of caring for the education of offspring, both religious and moral, so that they may be instructed in the doctrine of religion, and physical and civil, so that they may learn those arts by which childhood is usually formed to humanity; likewise the right and office of providing for their temporal good, so that parents procure for them necessary and suitable things (clothing, food).⁷

¹ Cn. 1110.

² Cn. 1111.

³ 1 Cor. 7, 3.

⁴ Gen. 2, 24.

⁵ Eph. 5, 22.

⁶ Cn. 1112.

⁷ Cn. 1113.

We have seen that according to the teaching of the Church the contract of marriage was raised by our Lord to the dignity of a sacrament, so that the marriage contract constitutes the sacrament, and as such confers grace on baptized and worthy recipients to enable them to perform the duties of their state of life like true Christians. The efficient cause of the contract is the mutual consent of the parties, who thereby confect the sacrament, and who are, therefore, its ministers to each other. The remote matter would seem to be the marital rights which are the matter of the contract; the proximate matter is the mutual offer, and the form the mutual acceptance of those rights. It is uncertain whether a Christian who by dispensation marries a non-baptized person receives the sacrament or not, as the other party is certainly incapable of receiving a sacrament. It is also disputed whether the marriage of unbaptized persons who are converted to the Faith becomes a sacrament on the reception of Baptism.

The civil authority probably has power over the marriages of non-baptized subjects, so that it can make diriment and prohibitory impediments to such marriages for the common good, Christian marriage is a sacrament, and the administration of the sacraments belongs exclusively to the Church, so that the State has no power to make diriment or prohibitory impediments for Christian marriage. The regulations which the civil authority makes concerning marriages of soldiers and others should, of course, be observed if they are reasonable and just, but they are not impediments in the strict sense. There is nothing to prevent the State from making laws concerning the civil effects of marriage, such as the property rights of married people, rights of inheritance and succession, titles of nobility, and similar matters; these things are within the competence of the State. But questions which affect the bond of marriage and the capacity of parties to contract marriage belong exclusively to the Church, and so laws of divorce made by the civil authority are of no validity in the forum of conscience, except in so far as they sanction and apply the laws of the Church (Can. 1016).

Marriage is a sacrament of the living, and should be received in the state of grace. The priest should endeavour - to get the parties to go to confession and Communion when they are married, so that they may enter on their new state of life with the blessing of God. The rite in Catholic marriages should be performed in the Church, and if the wife has not received the nuptial blessing before, it is the wish of the Church that, whenever the rubrics permit, the Mass Pro Sponso et Sponsa should be said, and the nuptial blessing given as therein laid down. This Mass may be said on all days outside close time except on feasts of the first and second class, and on days of obligation. On these days, however, a commemoration may be made of the Mass Pro Sponso et Sponsa and the prayers after the Pater and Communion may be added.

The common law of the Church prescribes that the nuptial blessing shall not be given out of Mass, and in England, by a special indult of the Holy See, when the nuptial Mass is not said, a special blessing is given by the priest according to the Ritual.

In England the State does not acknowledge Catholic marriages unless they are celebrated in presence of a registrar and in a building registered for marriages. A priest who solemnized marriage otherwise would be liable to severe punishment as a felon. Due notice of a marriage must also be given to the superintendent registrar of the district or districts in which the parties reside. The marriage cannot take place without the registrar’s certificate, which cannot be granted before the expiration of twenty-one days after the notice has been entered if the marriage is to be without licence, or of one day if it is to be with licence. These and other laws which the civil authority has imposed on Catholic marriages should be observed in order that the marriages of Catholics may be recognized by the law of the land, and to avoid greater evil. The Nonconformist Marriage Act of 1899 enabled Nonconformists to dispense with the presence of the registrar, but its onerous conditions prevented the Catholic Bishops from accepting it except in some parishes,

We shall speak first of the sacrament of matrimony considered in itself, then of the ministration and form of celebration, finally of the reception of the sacrament of matrimony.

One must treat of the existence, essence, and effects of the sacrament of matrimony.

The Elements of Marriage as a Sacrament.—(a) The matter and form of marriage are found in the contract, for the Sacrament is the natural pact elevated to the dignity of a sacred sign productive of grace. The remote matter is, therefore, the bodies of the spouses, or the bodily rights which they give one another (I Cor., vii. 4). Since the indeterminate part of a contract is the offer or bestowal, and the determinate part the approval, the proximate matter of Matrimony is found in the grant of mutual conjugal rights externally manifested, and the form in the acceptance of that right externally manifested.

(b) The ministers and the recipients of Matrimony are the parties themselves, since it is they alone who make and receive the contract. In order to be a recipient of the Sacrament it is necessary that a person be baptized and be free from all natural, divine and human impediments that make one incapable of the contract of marriage.

(c) The effects of Matrimony are per se second grace, which increases sanctity and is of help especially for the due performance throughout life of the duties of the conjugal state and for domestic blessedness and happiness.

Duties in Connection with Marriage.—The duties in reference to marriage as a permanent state of life were treated already in 2613 sqq., and we shall consider here only the duties that have to do with marriage as a contract and a Sacrament. These duties can be arranged under three heads: (a) before marriage, there are obligations in reference to the preparation for marriage, which consists remotely in engagement or espousals, and proximately in compliance with duties owed to divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law (e.g., license from the State, establishment of freedom to marry, proclamation of banns, dispensations, confession); (b) during marriage, in addition to the common obligations of intention and a state of grace, there are special duties in reference to the external form or rite of marriage; (c) after marriage, there is a duty of making canonical records and of validating defective marriages.

What is marriage? - Marriage can be considered in two ways, namely as contract and as sacrament, since it is both. Marriage as contract is an agreement by which a man and a woman legitimately hand over to each other dominion over their bodies in order to acts of themselves apt for the generation of offspring, and oblige themselves to an undivided society of life. Marriage as sacrament is defined: a sacrament of the new law, conferring grace for sanctifying the legitimate union of man and woman, and for piously receiving and holily educating offspring. Trent, sess. 24, Doctrine on the sacrament of marriage, c. 1; Decree of the Holy Office, Lamentabili, July 3, 1907, prop. 51; L. 879, 880; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 42, q. 44.

Resolutions: Therefore marriage is licit; and its use is licit. It is not, however, necessary for individuals, since it is necessary from its intrinsic nature only for the perfection of the multitude, and not for the perfection of each one. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 41, a. 2, 3; E. M.

What is the division of marriage? Marriage can be considered both as regards the union of man and woman, and as regards the bond which arises from it. Hence it is called first in fieri or in facto esse. Marriage in fieri is called the actual contract itself, which is perfected by the mutual consent of man and woman. But the marriage persisting in the bond, which comes from the matrimonial contract, is called in facto esse.

Moreover, marriage is distinguished as legitimate, ratified, and consummated. Legitimate marriage is called that which is contracted according to the norm of natural and civil law, but nevertheless does not have the ratification of the Church or the notion of sacrament; such as was formerly entered in the law of nature and the Mosaic law, and is also now entered among Jews and Gentiles. - Ratified marriage is that which is contracted between Christians entangled by no impediment, between whom, however, after the contract, conjugal commerce has not yet intervened. Ratified, because not only nature and civil law, but also the Church approves it and holds it ratified. C. Quanto 7, de Divort. Consummated marriage is called that which has been completed by the intercourse of the spouses; this must be understood not only of ratified marriage, but also of merely legitimate marriage. That marriage may be called consummated, two things are required: 1. that the carnal union be perfect and sufficient for generation, so that, as is had in C. Verum 2, de Conv. coniug., the spouses have been made together one flesh. Therefore that would not suffice from which, although the bodily integrity of virginity had been taken from the woman, nevertheless, because suitable effusion of male seed was lacking, generation could not follow. 2. That legitimate consent or ratified marriage preceded a union of this sort. Therefore intercourse had before the matrimonial contract does not bring it about that the marriage afterward contracted is judged consummated, and therefore neither indissolubility nor the other effects of consummated marriage will be produced. Whence you conclude that he who, bound by a vow of religion, has violated a woman can marry her and then, unless another cause stands in the way, enter the vowed religion, if after he married her, he did not know her again. - Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 227, 228.

There is moreover another distinction of marriage into true, presumed, and putative. - True is called that which has really and validly been contracted, and is proved as such by some one of those arguments by which other affairs also are customarily proved, such as the testimony of the parish priest or of others, the book of marriages, the confession of the spouses, long cohabitation of an honorable woman. Lighter proofs suffice when the question concerns sustaining a marriage than when the matter is of dissolving it. Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 233.

Presumed is called that which is presumed by law; and this presumption of law has place especially in a threefold case. And 1. when, in places where the Tridentine decree concerning the form of marriage was not in force, after betrothals entered absolutely between two capable persons, carnal intercourse followed between them; for then consent concerning the future is presumed to have passed into consent concerning the present, and intercourse is presumed to have been admitted with conjugal affection. Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 115 ff.; Pirhing, e. t., n. 27; Barbosa on Cap. Is qui, e. t., n. 3 ff.; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 46, a. 2. - 2. When after betrothals entered under a condition, before the event of the same, carnal commerce intervened between the spouses; for the Church, with abstraction made from the aforesaid Tridentine Decree concerning form, then presumes that the spouses receded from the condition, and therefore wished to contract marriage purely and absolutely. This is clear from C. Per tuas 6, de Cond. apposit. - 3. When after betrothals concerning the present invalidly contracted by prepubescents, in whom malice does not supply age, signs of ratified consent intervene between the same after they have attained puberty, such as not only carnal intercourse, but also kisses, embraces, cohabitation, etc. This is clear from C. unic. section idem quoque, de Desp. impub., in 6. Nevertheless this case also can have place only where the aforesaid Tridentine Decree is not in force. Cf. Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 234.

But by the Decree of Leo XIII, February 15, 1892, this presumption of law, which at the same time was a presumption de iure, admitting no contrary proof, was abrogated. By this Decree, indeed, the presumption from carnal intercourse is explicitly abrogated. But consequently and implicitly the presumption from other signs, which are of lesser force, must be judged abrogated. The presumption, however, is abrogated. Wherefore, if intercourse, or other signs, really express consent concerning the present from the real intention of the contracting parties, the marriage will still be valid in places where the Tridentine Decree is not in force. - C. H. 83.

Moreover, in the present day from the above-cited Decree Ne temere, this presumed marriage can no longer have place, since for its validity it must altogether be contracted according to the form established in the same Decree, except in those places and among those persons whom the aforesaid Decree does not regard.

Finally putative marriage is called that which is believed to have been legitimately contracted, although nevertheless in the reality of the matter it is null because of some hidden impediment. Concerning this the doctors therefore inquire, so that it may be clear when it has the force of legitimating offspring received from it and other effects of law. Now two things are necessary for this: 1. that it be contracted in good faith by at least one of the spouses, who was ignorant of the impediment.

Thus in C. Ex tenore 14, Qui filii legit. This good faith indeed neither an error of law nor doubt concerning the value of the marriage excludes, as Covarruvias proves, de Spons., p. 2, c. 8, section 1, n. 9. But in doubt this good faith is presumed. 2. That the marriage was contracted publicly and in the face of the Church, that is, before the parish priest and witnesses, and with the denunciations premised, or at least dispensed. Cf. C. fin., de Clandest. desp., section 1.

Another distinction of marriage into canonical, political or civil, and of conscience must also be remembered. They call that marriage canonical in which all things concur which are prescribed by the sacred canons for marriage. - They call that marriage political or civil in which those things also concur which are required by civil law, namely certain solemnities, dotal agreements, etc.; without which marriage is indeed canonically valid, but nevertheless is reputed illegitimate civilly, and therefore in the civil forum it has no action and lacks civil effects, for example, as regards the paternal power of the husband and wife, as regards the succession of children, as regards the dowry of the woman, etc. Marriage of conscience, or morganatic marriage, is called the legitimate union of a man with a woman of inferior condition, entered by this agreement: that the wife and the children born from it are content with the nuptial gift or another certain portion, destined at the time of betrothals, and abstain from the remaining ancestral and paternal goods, together with titles, dignities, and insignia. Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 236 ff. - But marriage of conscience or occult marriage is called that which is contracted secretly before the parish priest, or another priest deputed by the Ordinary or parish priest, and two familiar witnesses, who are bound to preserve secrecy. Marriages of this sort, and baptism conferred on children born from them, are noted in a secret book of marriages and baptisms. Care must be taken in them lest the marriage, which is occult, be held with scandal as shameful concubinage, lest the children be judged illegitimate and be deprived of their legitimate portion, and lest their education be neglected. Wherefore it cannot be done without the faculty of the Bishop. Benedict XIV, Const. Satis vobis, November 17, 1741; E. M.

Clandestine marriage: It is marriage celebrated without previous banns; this, without due permission, is illicit. It is also marriage celebrated without the parish priest, or another priest legitimately delegated, and witnesses; and this now, as regards Catholics, is altogether null, unless there is a positive exception, according to the Decree Ne temere. From it no impediment of public honesty is had.

What are the essentials of marriage, insofar as it is a contract? As all contracts, so marriage consists of thing, cause, and consent.

The thing is what is mutually given and accepted: power or right over the body, for coming together, in order to generation. Therefore the commingling itself does not pertain to the essence, but only to its consummation. Hence spouses can licitly abstain from the use of marriage, and wish that no more children be born than they can nourish, provided they do not positively impede them, nor procure abortion.

The cause is the procreation and education of offspring, the primary end of marriage, and the mutual help of the whole of life, the secondary end of marriage, Gen. 1:28. After the sin of Adam, a remedy also for concupiscence is another secondary end of marriage, 1 Cor. 7:2, 5, 9. The generation of offspring is from the primary institution of marriage, the remedy from the secondary institution, which presupposes the former. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 42, a. 2; C. G., l. 4, c. 78. Hence marriage is licitly contracted as a remedy for concupiscence, provided offspring is not positively excluded, and therefore with the primary end of marriage presupposed, namely the generation of offspring, without which end marriage cannot exist. For that remedy is not to be sought in another thing, but in marriage. - And the same must be asserted of the use itself of marriage for calming concupiscence. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 49, a. 5, ad 2, opines the contrary. But St. Alphonsus 882 departs from him, and rightly, since this is drawn by a more proper interpretation from the text of St. Paul cited. Likewise it is licit to contract marriage for an honest extrinsic end, for example, to reconcile the peace of families, to preserve love among blood relatives, to preserve the honor of the family, to protect health, etc. The reason is that "this is not disorder, to choose one of the honest secondary ends before the primary end, provided that this is not excluded. But otherwise, if the end is not honest, namely if it is of pleasure, or of desire for riches, or of vain honor." L. 883. Indeed for every right operation it is not necessary that the principal end to which that operation is ordered always actually be intended. It suffices actually to intend other ends to which that operation also by its nature is referred, provided the primary end is not excluded, or something is not positively done contrary to it, or they are subordinated to the primary end, so that another secondary end is not intended as principal, nor the others subordinated to that secondary end.

Finally it is perfected by consent, namely the true will of each concerning the same thing, i.e. the right of coming together, by handing this over on both sides, marriage is contracted. The right of coming together, namely in order to generation. And because marriage is perpetual, if one of them has the purpose of contracting it only for a time, from defect of legitimate will, although not manifested externally, nothing will be done. Wherefore marriage can indeed be given without the good of offspring and without the good of faith, or fidelity, according to themselves; because these two goods of marriage, according to themselves, regard the use of marriage, and the being of a thing does not depend on its use; but marriage cannot be given without the good itself of sacrament or inseparability; for this "pertains to marriage itself according to itself, because from this very fact, that by the conjugal pact spouses mutually hand over to each other power over themselves in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be separated, and hence it is that marriage is never found without inseparability." St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 49, a. 3. - L. 879, 883; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 41, a. 1; q. 42, a. 2, 4; q. 44, a. 1; q. 45, a. 1; q. 48, a. 1; q. 49; q. 54, a. 3; q. 58, a. 1, ad 3; 4 D. 2, q. un., a. 4; D. 26, q. 2, a. 4; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, Lect. 1; C. G. 146; C. B. 1325; E. M.

What sort of consent must there be? - Consent must be: 1. Mutual; for marriage consists in a contract, which is essentially the consent of two, or mutual consent. Whence if it is lacking on one side, it will be null. - 2. Concerning the present: because by a promise concerning the future only betrothals are made, not marriage. This is also deduced from C. Si inter 31, de Spons. et matrim. - 3. Deliberate and voluntary: because it is a contract concerning a grave matter, and therefore inducing a grave obligation; but no one is judged to impose a grave obligation on himself unless he consents freely and fully. This is clear from Canon Law, which invalidates marriages contracted from grave fear. - 4. Manifested by external signs, because every agreement among men must be known by some external sign; for agreement necessarily supposes mutual acceptance among those contracting. - St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 45; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 42; E. M.

Must consent be expressed by words? R. In the negative as regards validity, because by natural law in a contract it suffices that consent be expressed by some certain sign. C. un. section fin., de Despons. impub., in 6; C. Is qui fidem 31, de Spons.; C. Tuae fraternitati 25, de Spons. Wherefore it suffices that consent be externally manifested, for example, by the handing over and acceptance of a ring, and as regards the woman even by silence. L. 882, 887; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 45, a. 2; q. 47, a. 3. - In the affirmative as regards liceity, because otherwise one would act against the Rubric and the custom of the Church. Yet it does not seem to exceed venial sin if words are not used; indeed shame or another reasonable cause would excuse from every fault. L. 888.

What is to be done if someone says that he consented fictitiously? - As regards the external forum, credence is not given to him, unless from the circumstances it is clear that he was either deceived by fraud or induced by grave fear to contract; for it cannot be supposed that he who freely entered marriage consented fictitiously. - As regards the internal forum, he who asserts that he consented fictitiously must be obliged to abstain from asking and rendering the debt until he has truly consented, and ordinarily also to place true consent, so that he thus repairs the injury inflicted on the other party. Ordinarily, because if the other party consents to separation, or if he himself was forced to contract, he is not bound to supply consent. But it suffices that the consent of the one party accede to the preceding and not revoked consent of the other. Wherefore, if someone before the parish priest and witnesses did not truly consent, he satisfies by consenting afterward.

Besides, the spouse who placed true assent is not obliged to believe the other asserting that he consented fictitiously, unless he confirmed it by oath; and therefore he would licitly ask the debt until the defect of consent was evidently proved. S. C. C., February 24, 1720; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 45, a. 4, ad 2. But the obligation of entering marriage by true consent easily shows itself to be most grave, not only because otherwise one sins gravely against the reverence owed to the sacrament, but also because by injury a most grave damage is inflicted on the other party. Indeed since in the external forum fiction can be proved with very great difficulty, other nuptials are not permitted to the deceived party, and therefore this one thing remains to that party: either to enter Religion, or to remain unmarried in the world. - L. 887, 1113, 1114; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 265 ff.

Does consent through a procurator suffice? - R. In the affirmative, as regards validity, provided the required conditions are present, because marriage has the whole nature of a natural contract. But any contract can be made through a procurator. - The conditions for contracting marriage in this way are: 1. that the procurator have a special mandate; that the mandate be concerning contracting with a determined person; that he execute the mandate by himself, C. fin., de Proc., in 6, unless he has had an express faculty for this; 2. that the one mandating has not revoked the mandate, neither only mentally, nor even tacitly, for example by celebrating betrothals with another; 3. that the procurator show the written mandate to the parish priest and witnesses: but it also suffices that the mandate be given orally; 4. that he contract marriage before the same, according to the Tridentine form formerly in force, and now also before the parish priest and witnesses according to the Decree Ne temere; it likewise matters nothing that the mandate is given to a man or a woman. For this neither removes nor changes the nature of mandate; 5. that he not exceed the limits of the mandate, if, for example, the condition required by the one mandating is that it be contracted with such a dowry, at such a time, etc. - In the negative as regards liceity, unless a very grave cause urges. The reason is that this mode of contracting is contrary to the ordinary practice of the Church, and marriages are scarcely made thus among any but Princes and Magnates. Hence the parish priest ought not by his own authority to bless marriages of this sort, as is clear from the practice of the Church and the Rituals. - L. 885, 886, 889; Sanchez, l. 5, d. 8, n. 24.

Marriage can likewise licitly be contracted by letter, which is read by the other party before the parish priest and witnesses, declaring at the same time his or her consent. And this also now after the Decree Ne temere. The invitation of the parish priest can well be made by an absent person through a letter, and through a letter read before the other party and witnesses the parish priest can seek the consent of the absent person, and likewise through a letter read before the same witnesses and the other party he can have the offered consent of the absent person and the accepted consent of the other.

Is marriage entered under condition valid? - It is certain that it is valid if the condition is concerning the past or the present, and is verified. The reason is that that conditioned consent immediately passes into absolute consent, and therefore nothing is lacking to the value of the sacrament. - If an honest and possible condition concerning the future is added, marriage is not perfected until the condition is fulfilled; because the contract must transfer the mutual right over bodies concerning the present.

But when the condition has been fulfilled, the marriage is valid without new consent, since a conditioned contract, once the condition has been fulfilled, passes into an absolute one, and by that very fact is valid by reason of sacrament, because among Christians the contract of marriage cannot be separated from the sacrament. Without new consent; although many deny this, and from St. Alphonsus 895 probably, it is safer to renew consent. Although the marriage is valid even if the contracting parties are ignorant that the condition has been fulfilled, because the existence of the condition does not depend on knowledge of it, nevertheless they cannot use marriage before receiving notice of its fulfillment; otherwise at least by will and intention they would commit fornication. - A condition impossible from the nature of the thing, or only in fact, is held as not added in the external forum, because in so grave a matter it is presumed not to have been added seriously. C. fin. 7, de Condit. apposit. But because presumption yields to truth, both for the external forum and for the internal forum those cases must be excepted in which the truth certainly opposes and prevails over the presumption. But if there is doubt, then the condition is held for both forums as not added, lest perhaps those who are legitimately joined be separated, and be joined illegitimately to others. - 5.

"But if the condition concerns a necessary future, as that the sun will rise tomorrow, then it is marriage; because such future things are already present in their causes." St. Thomas, 4 D. 29, q. un., a. 3, q. 3; L. Si pupillus 9, section 1, de Novationib. - L. 890, 892, 895; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 47, a. 5; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 5, n. 37, 60 ff.

Is it licit to contract with conditioned consent? R. In the negative. Such a mode of contracting is illicit, especially if the condition concerns the future, unless perhaps, as St. Liguori 892 has it, there is a most urgent cause. The reason is that many and grave inconveniences can easily follow from such a mode of contracting, namely ambiguities, difficulties, and from them quarrels and scandals.

Is marriage entered under a shameful condition valid? - If the shameful condition does not repugn to the substance of marriage, the marriage is judged valid in the external forum; for in it the condition is held as not added. C. fin., de Condit. apposit. But because this rests on presumption, hence if from elsewhere it is certain that it was added seriously, and that consent in reality was not given except under its event, then certainly the marriage will be judged valid in neither forum unless the condition happens. But when the condition has been verified, as regards the internal forum it is controverted, as in other contracts. Ordinarily, however, it is not judged a condition sine qua non, but a mere purpose or promise independent of the matrimonial contract, and therefore consent is not judged suspended by such a condition unless this is altogether clear. Besides, in doubt one must always judge in favor of marriage. L. 891. - But the marriage is judged invalid in the internal forum if this condition repugns to the substance or essence of marriage, namely to its threefold essential good, that is, 1. the good of sacrament; 2. the good of faith; 3. the good of offspring; which would happen if the spouses, in contracting marriage, excluded perpetuity in marriage by making divorce, fidelity in marriage by not rendering the debt and by commingling with another, or the generation of offspring by positively impeding it. The reason is that by such a condition, whether added only interiorly in the intention of one or both contracting parties, or only exteriorly, either there is not had, or at least exteriorly there is not expressed, consent to true marriage, since the very substance or essence of marriage is taken away by force of such a condition.

But in the external forum, unless the condition is drawn into an express pact, the presumption is for the value of the marriage, since the cause is favorable and of the common good. - Therefore marriage is invalid, if such a condition repugnant to the substance of marriage is expressly added and drawn into a pact, in both forums, even if interior consent were present, because sufficient exterior consent would be lacking.

C. Si conditiones 7, de Cond. appos. - If the shameful condition does not concern the future, but the present or the past, according to the more common opinion the marriage is valid if the condition is verified, and is not valid if it is not verified. The reason is that such a condition is not properly a condition. L. Institutio 10, section 1, ff. de Condition. institution. - L. 881, 882, 891; St. Thomas, 4 d. 29, q. un., a. 3, q. 3; d. 31, q. 1, a. 3; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 5, n. 90 ff.; Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 129; E. M.

Resolutions: If the shameful condition does not affect the contract itself, but affects only the execution of the contract, because they do indeed wish to be bound by marriage, but do not wish to fulfill the offices of marriage, then they sin gravely, but the marriage is valid. - In places where a law of divorce exists, if knowledge of the law has itself antecedently as regards consent, i.e. if they contract for this reason, because they know that this is licit for them, and otherwise they would not contract, the marriage is invalid; but if it has itself concomitantly, because they have the general will of contracting, so that they would contract equally without such knowledge, the marriage is valid.

In the external forum the general will of contracting is always presumed, unless the contrary is proved, as Benedict XIV teaches, de Syn., l. 13, c. 22, n. 7, and as Pius VI declared, Letter to the Archbishop of Prague, July 11, 1789. - If marriage was indeed entered under a condition excluding the good of offspring, but one which is honest, namely under the condition of preserving chastity, the marriage is valid: for consent and object, which are altogether essential to the contract, are still had; for the object is the mutual handing over and power over one's own body. Yet others deny this. And Benedict XIV, l. c., n. 10, reports that a marriage of this sort was declared null by the S. C. C. in a certain particular case. And it seems thus to have to be held if by the aforesaid condition one renounces not merely the use, but the power.

"For that agreement, expressly drawn into a pact, by which the woman abdicated from herself power over the body of the man, and the man likewise power over the body of the woman, is openly contrary to the substance of marriage." Benedict XIV, l. c. And this certainly was verified in the aforesaid case decided by the S. C. - L. 881, 882; Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 131, 132; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1291, 1292, 1299, 1301, 1302.

"It must be noted here that a condition differs from a demonstration, cause, mode, and day, because a demonstration, or added cause, for example if someone says, I marry you, who are a virgin, or because you are a virgin, does not vitiate nor suspend marriage, even if the cause is false or shameful, even against the substance of marriage, as Sanchez, l. 5, d. 19, n. 2. For although he would not contract if he knew that she was not a virgin, nevertheless he then gives absolute consent, which is not impeded except by error concerning the substance, or concerning the substantial conditions of marriage. Nor does a mode suspend, if it is said, for example, I marry you so that you may serve me..., even if the mode concerns a shameful or impossible thing, I marry you so that you may kill, etc. The reason is that consent does not depend on a mode, as it depends on a condition. And even if, says Viva with Palaus, the mode is against the substance of marriage, namely, I marry you so that you may commit adultery, etc. But more probably Salmanticenses with Sanchez contradict this, because he who has an intention opposed to the contract does not seem to have the mind of contracting.

But whether an attached day suspends the contract, for example if it is said: I marry you after three days? Sanchez denies. But more probably Viva with Coninck, etc., affirm, because the one contracting then does not intend to place perfect consent except after the third day." L. 896. - St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 48, a. 2; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 5, n. 136 ff.; Sanchez, l. 5, d. 19, n. 2, 3.

What are the essentials of marriage insofar as it is a sacrament? The sacrament of marriage is not something distinct from the contract of marriage itself, but is the very contract of marriage itself, elevated by Christ our Lord to the being of a sacrament. Pius IX, Allocution, September 27, 1853; propositions 67 and 73 of the Syllabus given by Pius IX. - Hence it is clear that the contracting parties themselves are the ministers and subjects of this sacrament.

Florence, Decree for the Armenians; Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, de R. M. But the matter and form are contained in the contract itself. The remote matter is the bodies themselves or the right over the bodies of the spouses, to be mutually handed over in the contract of marriage in order to generation. But the proximate matter is the mutual handing over of bodies, which is perfected through words or signs expressing consent in the contract; and the form is the mutual acceptance of the contracting parties, expressed by words or signs. - Wherefore among Christians, laboring under no impediment, whether natural, divine, or canonical, there cannot be had a contract of marriage without at the same time having the sacrament of marriage; and conversely, the sacrament cannot exist without the contract. Among Christians, for unbaptized men are not capable of sacraments.

Laboring under no impediment, etc.; for although of itself every baptized human being is a subject capable of the sacrament of marriage, nevertheless accidentally many are barred from validly contracting marriage because of various impediments. - From the aforesaid mutual acceptance and handing over, moreover, the bond of marriage arises, namely the mutual right and obligation over bodies in order to generation, and therefore the union of husband and wife for one generation and education of offspring, and again for one domestic life. - L. 879, 880, 897-899; St. Thomas, 4 d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; d. 28, q. 1, a. 3; Suppl. q. 44, a. 1; q. 45, a. 1, 2; q. 48, a. 1; E. M.

Resolutions: The marriage of unbelievers, although it is valid in the notion of contract, nevertheless is not a sacrament. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 2. Whether the marriage of a faithful person with an unbeliever, with the Pope's dispensation acceding, is a sacrament, some deny, others affirm. But a marriage contracted by unbelievers, when both spouses are converted to the faith, passes into a sacrament by the reception of baptism. - Heretics and schismatics who, in entering marriage, observe the laws of the Church as regards the substance of marriage, validly contract and are fortified with the sacrament. - All Christians who are altogether unwilling to receive the sacrament do not validly contract, even if they wish to contract marriage; and if they truly wish to contract marriage, they also receive the sacrament, even if they do not wish to make the sacrament. - Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 120-130; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 302-304; t. 19, n. 164-176; Ferraris, v. Matrimonium, a. 1, n. 19; Clericatus, de Matr., decis. 4, n. 25.

Is marriage governed by civil or ecclesiastical authority? - Since among Christians the contract itself of marriage is a sacrament, marriage cannot, insofar as it is contract, be governed by civil power, and insofar as it is sacrament, by ecclesiastical power; nor at the same time, insofar as it is contract and sacrament, be governed by both powers, civil and ecclesiastical; but it must be governed exclusively, both as contract and as sacrament, by the authority of the Church.

Wherefore to the Church alone it belongs to establish especially those things which regard the substance of this contract, both as regards the incapacity of persons and as regards the form and solemnity to be constituted, namely as regards diriment impediments to be established. And likewise to the Church alone belong matrimonial causes and causes of betrothals and of other impediments immediately and directly impeding marriage. Trent, sess. 24, c. 4, 12; Benedict XIV, Const. Singulari, sections 7, 9; Leo XIII, Encyclical Arcanum, and Letter to the Bishops of the Province of Venice, February 3, 1893; Syllabus, prop. 68 ff. - But since families are members of Civil Society, hence marriage in Civil Society produces civil rights and obligations, which are called the civil effects of marriage.

Therefore if civil Princes can do anything over marriages, those things only are regarded which are situated in the civil order. Leo XIII, Encyclical Arcanum, and Letter dated February 8, 1893. - But marriage is not a certain civil contract, but is most of all natural. The contract of marriage was instituted by God Himself at the beginning of the world, Gen. 2:18; and furthermore it always was and is a sacred thing, sacred indeed not only by natural law, but also by the supernatural ordination of God. Trent, sess. 24, Doctrine on the Sacrament of Matrimony; Leo XIII, cited Encyclical.

Hence marriage, as regards unbelievers, both as natural contract and as sacred thing, by no means depends on the civil power and jurisdiction of Princes as regards impediments diriment of it, according to the opinion of many grave doctors. But there are other doctors who think that the marriages of unbelievers, since they are not sacraments, and therefore cannot be governed by canon law, lest those contracting be without law in so grave a matter, are governed by the power and jurisdiction of Princes, whether faithful or unbelieving. St. Thomas seems to adhere to this second opinion, 4 d. 39, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, since "those things which pertain to the law of nature are determinable by positive law; and therefore if by some positive law among those unbelievers marriage with unbelievers of another rite is prohibited, disparity of worship impedes marriage among them." - St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 42, a. 2; 4 d. 34, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. 5, a. 15; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 360 ff.; t. 18, n. 2-8; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1089; E. M.

Resolutions: Impediments diriment of marriage are to be taken from Canon Law, by no means from Civil Law, except insofar as the approbation and confirmation of the Church has acceded to this, or insofar as Civil Law is conformable in this matter to Canon Law; from this it is to be corrected where it is discordant. Trent, sess. 24, Decree de R. M., etc.; C. I. 56 ff.; C. G. 161 ff.; C. H. 83 ff.; C. A. 47 ff.; C. B. 1303 ff.

Civil marriage contains nothing illicit in itself, if nothing else is signified by it except "an extrinsic ceremony for fulfilling the forms which are customarily required by civil authority." S. C. C., January 7, 1899. Wherefore in this sense it is permitted. Monit. Eccles., v. 11, p. 389.

Note: Since by present Italian, French, and German Civil Law marriage is not admitted unless civil, namely entered according to civil law, hence, if that is passed over, many grave damages can follow, both spiritual and temporal. Spiritual, because it will be open to one to depart from the other and to enter another civil marriage. Temporal, because the husband is not compelled by law to support the wife, and the children, in no way recognized by law as legitimate, do not succeed to the paternal inheritance by force of civil law in the external forum. Wherefore the civil ceremonies are not to be omitted. And if by civil law the bridegroom and bride are prohibited from marriage, it is not licit to join them in marriage without the command of the Bishop. S. Poenitentiaria, January 15, 1866. Cf. C. I. 70 ff., 93 ff., 721; C. G. 165 ff., 723; C. B. 1317, 1324. - But it is otherwise from C. A. 69 ff., 75 ff., and from C. H. 42 ff., 75 ff. - Cf. V. 1, n. 223, 680; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1390; E. M.

Civil marriage is not marriage, nor is it equivalent to betrothals, and therefore induces no impediment of public honesty.

Nevertheless, since it has the appearance of marriage, it can be sanated in the root. It is to be contracted before religious marriage by reason of civil effects, lest otherwise grave damages arise. And in this sense civil marriage, insofar as it signifies the civil rite to be observed in it for obtaining its civil effects, contains nothing, as has already been said, which cannot be approved. And when it cannot be contracted, recourse must be made to the Bishop. In particular cases, it can be permitted by the Bishop that first the religious marriage be contracted and then the civil. Therefore the Ordinary can permit religious marriage to be contracted without civil marriage having first been entered, but there is need: that if before this the spouses had been bound by civil marriage, they have obtained legal separation; or, if this cannot be had, that it be morally certain that the other party will never demand civil union before the law; that they promise in writing and before a person delegated by the Ordinary and two witnesses that they will celebrate civil marriage as soon as it can be done; that it be morally certain that those entering marriage are not afterward to be separated from one another. S. C. of Sacraments, March 1909. - Civil marriage, as also mixed marriage or a null marriage contracted ignorantly or knowingly, or the danger of marriage whether civil or mixed, is a canonical cause for obtaining dispensation from some diriment impediment. - Clerics constituted in sacred orders, or Regulars or Nuns after the solemn vow of chastity, presuming to contract marriage, and also all presuming to contract marriage with some one of the aforesaid persons, even merely civilly, incur excommunication reserved to the Ordinary. - Clerics constituted in sacred orders consummating this marriage incur irregularity besides.

Is the state of grace required for the sacrament of marriage? - Spouses contracting marriage must be in the state of grace, because marriage is a sacrament of the living. Those who contract in mortal sin become guilty of sacrilege, and do not receive sacramental graces. Probably, however, those graces are only suspended, and when the obstacle or mortal sin has been removed, they are applied to the soul. - If no fruit is hoped from admonition, it will be better not to admonish the unworthy person concerning the sacrilege, so that at least thus he may sin less; and rather he should be induced at least to approach confession as soon as possible. - L. 894.

Must the parish priest require that a certificate of Confession be exhibited by the spouses? He cannot of himself require this, unless law or a precept of the Bishop establishes it. The reason is that although the state of grace is required for receiving this sacrament, nevertheless Confession is not necessarily required, since contrition can suffice absolutely even for those who are in the state of mortal sin. From another source it is generally not known to the parish priest that the spouses are not in the state of grace. - Where a particular law exists, the parish priest must require testimony of Confession. Nevertheless cases can occur in which this law admits exception, as if marriage has already been contracted civilly, and one party exhibits the required testimony of Confession, etc. And if the bridegroom is not a public sinner, nor is his unworthiness clear, even less grave reasons suffice. Cf. 372 ff.

Must marriage be celebrated in Church, and be blessed by the parish priest at Mass? - It is fitting that marriage be celebrated in Church, and spouses are to be exhorted that they receive the nuptial blessing, which pertains to the solemnity of nuptials, and is altogether distinguished from the rite of celebrating the sacrament of marriage, by which the priest joins the spouses and blesses the ring, and which is contained in the Roman Ritual. The Missal exhibits the nuptial blessing in the Mass for the bridegroom and bride. If they omit it, either they are free from every fault, or certainly from grave fault.

Marriage can be celebrated at any time, even forbidden time, or time of interdict. The nuptial blessing is given only in Mass, and can be given even after marriage has been celebrated, even if the bride approaches pregnant. But it is given by the Bishop alone or by the proper parish priest, only in their own proper territory, and outside forbidden time and interdict. It consists in the Prayers which are had in the Missal: Propitiare, etc., and Deus, qui potestate, etc., to be said before Libera nos; and also Deus Abraham, to be said before the blessing. In Mass; namely, if it can be done, a votive Mass for the bridegroom and bride; this is therefore permitted on any day, except doubles of the first and second class, feast days of precept, and the vigil of Pentecost, and other excepted days. Cf. here 657; but on these days the prescribed commemoration for the bridegroom and bride is to be added to the Mass; and moreover after the Lord's Prayer and Ite Missa est the Prayers are added which are had for this purpose in the Mass for spouses. But once it has been given either to the man or the woman, it cannot be given again in second nuptials. But since that blessing chiefly regards the woman, if the woman has never received it, it can be given, whether she then marries for the first time, or then marries again, where this custom is in force. - C. 1, 3, de Secund. nupt.; Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, de R. M.; Roman Ritual, h. t.; Holy Office, September 1, 1841, Collect. S. C. de P. F., v. 1, n. 938; S. R. C., June 23, 1853; August 14, 1858, Mont. Alb.; May 9, 1893; June 30, 1896; Benedict XIV, Instr. 80, n. 8; L. 984, 988; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1536, 1537, 1559, 1560, 1561; E. M.

For imparting the nuptial blessing after forbidden time, the presence of both spouses is necessary, and that of the bride alone does not suffice. S. R. C., May 27, 1911, ad 7.

If one party is Catholic and the other has publicly cast off the faith or has enrolled himself in a condemned sect, although he has not also been enrolled in a heretical sect, the matter having been brought to the Bishop, the Bishop can permit the parish priest to assist at the marriage only as an authorized witness, if otherwise grave scandal or damage would arise, with every ecclesiastical rite excluded, and the celebration of Mass altogether excluded, unless the circumstances require otherwise. Holy Office, February 21, 1883; April 23, 1873; E. M.

All priests blessing nuptials, or joining spouses in marriage, without permission of the parish priest of the spouses are suspended until they are absolved by the Ordinary of the aforesaid parish priest. - The blessing after childbirth must be done by the parish priest, if he himself has been requested; it can be done by any Priest, if he likewise has been requested, in any church, after its superior has been informed. It is not to be denied to a woman after childbirth whose offspring died without baptism. A woman who has given birth to an illegitimate child does not have a right to the blessing after childbirth.

Proof of marriage. If legitimate proof of an entered marriage cannot be had, an oath is to be deferred to the parties by which they confirm their own assertion; when this has been furnished, the parties are to be held as joined in legitimate marriage, and their offspring as legitimate. Nevertheless those cases are to be excepted in which the law requires full proof, for example if the question concerns prejudice to another marriage, or receiving orders. But marriage confirmed by oath, as above, is to be inscribed not indeed in the common book of marriages, but in a distinct booklet destined for this purpose. S. C. of Sacraments, March 6, 1911.

What concerning the unity of marriage? The unity of marriage consists in this, that marriage is the union of one man with one woman. - It is certain that polyandry, or the simultaneous union of several men with one woman, conflicts with the natural law, because it is opposed to the chief ends of marriage, namely the generation of offspring and their good education. The seed of several mixed is sterile. Furthermore, the father becomes uncertain, upon whom the education of offspring especially falls. - It is certain that simultaneous polygamy, or the simultaneous union of several women with one man, is prohibited in every case, at least by positive divine law of the New Law, as is clear from Luke 16:18: Everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery.

It is likewise clear from Trent, sess. 24, Doctrine on the sacrament of matrimony, c. 2. Moreover, it repugns at least to the peaceful dwelling of spouses, a secondary end of marriage, and renders the education of offspring more difficult. - It is certain that second nuptials and further nuptials are licit both for a man and for a woman even under the Evangelical law. This is clear from the authority and practice of the Church, and also from Sacred Scripture, 1 Cor. 7:39: A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband lives; but if her husband has fallen asleep, she is freed: let her marry whom she wishes, only in the Lord. - St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 63, q. 65; E. M.

What concerning the firmness of marriage, insofar as it regards the bond? - Marriage is indissoluble, i.e. once marriage has been contracted, divorce as regards the bond cannot be made, at least by positive divine law. It is of faith. Proof 1. From the words of Christ, Matt. 19:6: And so they are no longer two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined, let not man separate. 2. From the words of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 7:10-11: But to those who are joined in marriage I command, not I, but the Lord, that the wife not depart from the husband; but if she departs, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. And let not the husband dismiss the wife. 3. From Trent, sess. 24, c. 5, 7. Therefore even if before consummated marriage a case occurs such that, were it standing, marriage could not have been entered, for example, if the man becomes impotent, if the woman becomes insane, the bond of marriage perseveres. C. 25, caus. 32. - L. 955; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 67; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1295; C. B. 1348; E. M.

Is an exception given as regards the aforesaid firmness of marriage? - A threefold case must be excepted. 1. Ratified and non-consummated marriage of Christians can be dissolved, for a grave cause, by dispensation of the Pope, from the power divinely conceded to him. This is clear from the fact that the Supreme Pontiffs have already used this power many times, as St. Gregory VII, Paul III, etc.; Benedict XIV, Const. Dei miseratione. Cf. Perrone, de Matr., t. 3, s. 2, c. 6, a. 4. Moreover, this faculty is to be extended to marriages consummated in unbelief, if the spouses after baptism, by which the union becomes ratified, have not again consummated it; and likewise to marriages consummated in unbelief, when the spouse converted and baptized is permitted, by Apostolic Authority, to remain with the wife who was converted and baptized with him, as with a legitimate wife, the others having been dismissed, although she is not his first wife; or, because the absent unbelieving spouse cannot be warned, when it is permitted by Apostolic Authority that the spouse converted to the faith and baptized contract marriage with any faithful person. Indeed this marriage is valid and firm, even if afterward it becomes known that the prior unbelieving spouse could not justly declare his or her will because of an impediment, and had also been converted to the faith at the time the second marriage was contracted. This is most clearly established from the Letters of St. Pius V, August 2, 1571; Gregory XIII, January 25, 1585; Urban VIII, October 20, 1624; September 17, 1627. - Non-consummated, namely by an act of itself suitable for the effect of generation; and consequently, St. Alphonsus 1036, St. Thomas, 4 D. 41, q. 1, a. 1, q. 4, ad 2, by an act perfect on both sides. - Consummated marriage of Christians can in no way be dissolved, Matt. 19:6; Trent, sess. 24, C. 7, de M., and the same must be said if marriage is contracted by a faithful person with an unbeliever from dispensation of the Roman Pontiff. Clement XIII, August 2, 1759; Holy Office, August 1, 1753. - L. 955, 956, 959; Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1308.

Dispensation from ratified non-consummated marriage is to be obtained exclusively from the Supreme Pontiff. The Bishop in this cause cannot, without a special faculty obtained from the S. C. of Sacraments, institute the process. But in other causes the Bishop is the competent judge in first instance.

2. Ratified and non-consummated marriage can be dissolved through the solemn religious profession of one spouse, and this from a special privilege conceded by Christ and declared by the Church. C. Verum, C. Ex parte, de Convers. coniugat.; Trent, sess. 24, c. 6. Solemn: i.e., not of simple vows, even in the Society of Jesus, but solemn vows. Profession; not mere entrance into Religion. - But so that the spouses may deliberate about the use of this privilege, by the law itself they have two months conceded to them after the nuptials, during which time they are not bound to render the debt. C. Verum, C. Ex publico, de Convers. coniug. And "either spouse can licitly deny the debt within the two-month period, although he does not have the intention of entering Religion, because he uses his own right." L. 956. Indeed after that two-month period also, if the marriage has not been consummated even through illicit denial of the debt, this privilege remains. Nor is it impeded by fornication had between the spouses before the celebration of marriage, unless the marriage is necessary for legitimating offspring, or for repairing scandal, or the honor of the bride. If within the two-month period violence is applied, and the marriage is thus consummated while the bride was in fact thinking about embracing religion, although the marriage is now indissoluble, nevertheless the bride can even in this case enter Religion. But he sins who contracts marriage with the intention of entering Religion without warning the other party. - L. 870, 958; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 61, a. 2, 3; Schmalzgrueber, l. 3, t. 32, n. 11 ff.

There are those who judge that a right of this sort is not conceded except to those who, after nuptials have been contracted and not yet consummated, deliberate about entrance into religion. But in this sense that right would be void, for then immediately after the contract of marriage each one would be bound to render the debt. For who is so mad that, while deliberating about entrance into religion, he would contract marriage?

3. Even consummated marriage of unbelievers can be dissolved from divine concession, when either spouse is converted to the Christian faith, although not Catholic but heretical, through reception of baptism, and the other refuses to cohabit peacefully with him, or does not cohabit except with injury to the Creator and contempt of the Christian Religion, or makes an attempt to draw the faithful party into mortal sin. This divine concession is drawn from the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7:12-15, where he says: If any brother has an unbelieving wife and she consents to dwell with him, let him not dismiss her...; but if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, for the brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such matters; but God has called us in peace. Innocent III explains the same more fully in C. Quanto 7, de Divortiis. - L. 955, 956; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 3-6; E. M.

Interpellation of the unbelieving spouse is to be made, if the other, while that one remains in unbelief, is converted and wishes to enter a new marriage. Provided it is clear that the spouse is unwilling to live peacefully from that one's response, or from a process at least summary that he or she was unwilling to give any response, or dispensation from making interpellation has been obtained from the Holy See, marriage can be contracted.

Note: Marriage is not dissolved immediately by reception of baptism; Crimes are dissolved in baptism, not marriages, C. Gaudemus 8, de Divortiis, C. Si quis 28, q. 2; but when the converted and baptized spouse enters a new union. Even after intercourse has been had after the conversion of either party, if the other party is unwilling to cohabit peacefully without insult to the Creator, the marriage can still be dissolved, whatever time has elapsed. But when the spouse converted passes to other nuptials, since the prior marriage is now dissolved, even the spouse who remains in unbelief can validly and licitly contract another marriage. - Regularly, from the prescription of the Law, C. Quanto 7, de Divortiis, interpreting the Pauline privilege, But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, the converted party cannot pass to other vows before the unbeliever, having been interpellated, has either absolutely refused to cohabit with the converted party, or at least has been unwilling to cohabit without insult to the Creator. - If the unbeliever cannot be interpellated, because he or she is far absent and has fled, or lies hidden, several judge, apud Sanchez, l. 7, d. 74, n. 13-15, that interpellation can be omitted, because there is no obligation of impossibilities; nor is there need of it, since it is now clear with moral certainty that the unbelieving spouse is unwilling to be converted, nor willing to live peacefully. Others, with whom Benedict XIV agrees, de Syn., l. 6, c. 4, n. 3, think pontifical dispensation necessary; and the S. C. C., January 17, 1722, adhered to this opinion apud the same Benedict XIV, l. c., and the Holy Office, September 16, 1824. Cf. Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 1328. The case would certainly be different if the unbelieving spouse is absent from the spouse by some compulsion and wishes to be joined with that spouse; for then the unbeliever neither departs nor can depart, in which case Apostolic dispensation would be needed for the converted unbeliever, and then indeed in this sense the dispensation from interpellation which is given can be well understood. - When, in some places, by law or custom, in order to remove a peculiar danger of perversion, it is prohibited that the converted party cohabit with the unbeliever unless this one also wishes to be converted to the faith, not only must the unbeliever be interpellated whether he consents to cohabit peacefully, but also whether he wishes to embrace the Christian faith. But if, when the time prefixed by law or custom has elapsed, he has declared that he is unwilling to be converted to the faith, although from another source he would wish to cohabit peacefully, the converted spouse recovers liberty and is permitted to fly to new nuptials. For by the judgment of the Church, according to the circumstances of places, the pertinacity alone of the unbeliever in unbelief is judged to present danger for the perversion of the faithful spouse, and for insult to the Creator. - By the Pauline privilege, it is not conceded to the converted party that he can enter a new marriage with another unbeliever, or even with a catechumen, but only with a baptized faithful person. S. C. de P. F., January 16, 1683; August 7, 1891, Collectanea cit. n. 2183; L. 956, 957; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 3, 6; Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 13, c. 21; Sanchez, l. 7, d. 73; Monit. Eccles., v. 11, p. 533.

When one of two unbelieving spouses is converted to the faith, the other remaining in unbelief, the converted one can receive sacred orders or profess religion. In the first case the marriage is not dissolved, and therefore if the other spouse is converted, he or she cannot contract a new marriage. Sanchez, l. 7, d. 76, n. 11. But in the other case, "it must altogether be held," says Sanchez, l. c., n. 9, "that the prior consummated marriage is dissolved through profession, just as it would be dissolved through subsequent marriage." - Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Privilegium Paulinum; E. M.

What and of how many kinds is divorce, and by what cause and authority is it licitly made? - Divorce is separation and disjunction. It is threefold: as regards the bond, as regards habitation, as regards the bed. Divorce as regards the bond is that by which the very bond of marriage is dissolved, so that the former spouses can licitly and validly enter another marriage; this is verified in the three cases explained in the preceding number. Divorce as regards habitation is separation merely as regards cohabitation, while the bond of marriage remains. - Divorce as regards the bed is separation regarding the use itself of marriage and the conjugal debt, while again the bond of marriage remains.

A spouse can separate from a spouse as regards habitation and bed: 1. From mutual consent, which is clear of itself, provided the danger of incontinence is absent; whether for a time, because of affairs, or perpetually because of a desire for a more perfect life. 2. Because of adultery of the spouse, on account of violated fidelity, Matt. 5:32; 19:9; 1 Cor. 7:11; C. 4, 5, 8, de Divort. Because of adultery, namely morally certain, not condoned either expressly or implicitly through a conjugal act, not mutual, because then compensation would exist, voluntary, but not committed from violence inflicted, perfect and consummated. Whether also because of sodomy and bestiality? The common opinion affirms, from which St. Alphonsus 362 says one must not withdraw, but he says that it is not really proved. St. Thomas, 4 D. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4. 3. Because of supervening heresy. C. de illa, de Divort. 4. Because of any grave danger of body and soul, can. 28, caus. 1; C. 8, 13, de Rest. spol.; Trent, sess. 24, c. 8; for example, if danger of life, mutilation, enormous or frequent cruelties is imminent; or danger of perversion. - C. I. 148-155.

The aforesaid divorce from bed because of adultery certainly can be made by one's own authority; likewise from bed and habitation, provided that, if the delict is hidden, scandal is absent, which can scarcely be absent; and more truly also because of heresy; and because of the aforesaid danger, if it is proximate and clear. - But no one of himself is bound to make divorce; since neither is anyone bound to this from justice, as is undoubted; nor from charity, which does not urge with grave inconvenience, which is ordinarily inherent in divorces: provision is made besides for one's own and the other's incontinence, and greater scandals are prevented.

Divorce is one thing perpetual, another temporary. Perpetual divorce is of itself divorce made because of adultery, or by the authority of a judge. Once perpetual divorce has been made, the innocent spouse, in whose favor it is, can still call the spouse back to himself or herself whenever he or she wishes; yet he or she is not compelled to admit that spouse, since this is not without grave inconvenience, although the other spouse has been converted to good fruit, or, more probably, has afterward fallen into the same delict, for example, of adultery, whether the divorce was made by one's own authority, or, more truly, by the authority of a judge. But if the divorce is temporary, the spouse is compelled to receive the spouse returned to the faith, C. 6, de Divort., or when the danger because of which he or she separated has now been removed. - L. 960-977; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 59, a. 3, 6; q. 62; Sanchez, l. 10; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 19; E. M.

What concerning children to be educated after divorce has been made? - The doctors unanimously establish that children are to be educated with the innocent party. But when the other spouse is an unbeliever or heretic, the offspring must always be educated with the faithful party, although this one is guilty, and this in favor of the faith, from C. fin., de Conv. infid. But the expenses for educating the offspring are to be borne by the father, if he is at fault, Auth. Si pater apud L. 976. But if the mother is at fault, the law establishes nothing; Sanchez, l. 10, d. 20, n. 8, nevertheless judges it equitable that what has been established for the father also be understood for the mother. But if, once divorce has been made, the man retains the dowry, the wife would now seem sufficiently to concur for the education of the offspring. These things according to Roman Law. But now the more recent laws of various places are to be consulted. C. I. 148 ff.; C. G. 229 ff.; C. H. 104 ff.; C. A. 103 ff.; C. B. 1585, 1635, 1636, 1685. - Schmalzgrueber, l. c., n. 181-183.

What concerning a sentence of divorce from the bond to be pronounced by a lay judge? - Where civil law of divorce is in force not only from bed and habitation, but also from the very bond of marriage, spouses cannot, for any reason, petition the sentence of the judge; nor consequently can advocates petition and defend it; nor can judges in any way pronounce it, namely a sentence which repugns to natural, divine, and ecclesiastical law concerning the indissoluble bond of marriage. For there is question of a thing intrinsically illicit. But if by supreme crime spouses have petitioned and obtained from a judge a sentence of this sort of divorce from the very bond of marriage, the civil registrar can in no way admit these spouses to another civil marriage and authorize it by his presence. For then by his authority he would admit them to nothing other than public and legal adultery, which would be protected by the very favor of the law. Hence he would inflict the greatest injury on the pre-existing marriage, and authoritatively declare those capable of the civil effects of marriage who, while the prior marriage still endures, are altogether incapable of these effects. C. B. 1564 ff.; E. M.

1. Augustinus, a jurist, holds that in the marriage of the faithful the contract and the sacrament can well be distinguished. Therefore matrimonial causes, he says, are mixed, and under the aspect of a contract pertain to the civil power, under the aspect of a sacrament to the Church.

It is asked: What must be thought of the doctrine of Augustinus?

R. Augustinus is remarkably deceived. For the sacrament of matrimony is not something added over and above the contract itself, or extrinsic to the contract, or separable from the contract, or really distinct from the contract itself; but the sacrament is the contract itself. And therefore, if matrimonial causes under the aspect of a sacrament pertain to the Church by her own right, they also pertain to her under the aspect of a contract. Therefore the Church, and she alone, and by her own right, has power to establish diriment impediments, and also directly to establish impediments which of themselves impede, and to dispense them; of herself also, and consequently, she has equal power of judging concerning the value, the consistency, and the duration of marriage.

Besides, from the opinion of Augustinus it would follow "that the marriage of the evangelical law, sanctified and perfected by the grace acquired by Jesus Christ through His Passion, and raised to the dignity of the great sacrament of the Church, would at the same time, by divine disposition, be exposed to contradictory enactments of laws, and would be perpetually battled over in war between two different powers, while the one protects what is rendered void by the other; the one holds in contempt and punishes what the other blesses and applies sanctification to; the one grants civil effects to him whom the other renders incapable of civil and spiritual effects." S. O., July 6, 1817; Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 1289; I. M. 971.

Those things which precede are confirmed from the things which Benedict XIV has in the Letter of Sept. 17, 1746, Redditae sunt Nobis. For he says, speaking of places where the Decree of the Council of Trent has been promulgated, "it is clear that a marriage entered into before a civil magistrate or a non-Catholic minister, and not likewise before the proper parish priest of either of the contracting parties and two witnesses, can be sustained neither under the aspect of a sacrament nor under the aspect of a contract, nor in any way be reputed valid." Therefore, under each aspect altogether, both of sacrament and of contract, the marriage of Christians is subject to no power except that of the Church. And soon after he adds: "Let the Catholics entrusted to your care know that, when they present themselves to a civil magistrate or a heretical minister for the sake of celebrating marriage, they perform a merely civil act, by which they show their obedience toward the laws and institutes of rulers; but that then no marriage is contracted by them. Let them know that, unless they celebrate nuptials before a Catholic minister and two witnesses, they will never be TRUE AND LEGITIMATE SPOUSES either before God or before the Church; nor, if meanwhile they have had conjugal intercourse with each other, will it be without grave fault. Finally let them know that, if any offspring arises from such a union, that offspring, as BORN FROM A NON-LEGITIMATE WIFE, WILL BE ILLEGITIMATE IN THE EYES OF GOD, and, unless the spouses renew consent according to the prescription of the Church, WILL BE PERPETUALLY ILLEGITIMATE ALSO IN THE FORUM OF THE CHURCH."

From these things it is clear what the nature of civil marriage is, and what and how great is the force of marriage as sacrament. It is, namely, so great that, true marriage being removed, the effects of true marriage are lacking before God, that is, in the objective truth of things and in the forum of conscience.

Hence Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Letter of February 10, 1880, expressly teaches these things: "It ought to be established for all that, if any union of a man and a woman among the Christian faithful is contracted apart from the sacrament, it lacks the force and character of a just marriage; and although it has been made agreeably to civil laws, nevertheless it cannot be more than a rite or custom introduced by civil law; but by civil custom only those things can be ordered and administered which marriages of themselves bring forth in the civil sphere, AND WHICH, IT IS MANIFEST, CANNOT BE BROUGHT FORTH UNLESS THEIR TRUE AND LEGITIMATE CAUSE, NAMELY THE NUPTIAL BOND, EXISTS." Cf. Cass. 55; I. M. 959, 969, 970, 973.

744. Definition. - Matrimony can be considered in two ways, namely, as a contract and as a Sacrament.

1. Matrimony as a contract is an agreement by which a man and a woman legitimately hand over to each other dominion over their bodies in relation to acts of themselves apt for the generation of offspring, and they obligate themselves to an undivided partnership of life.

2. Matrimony as a Sacrament is defined as a Sacrament of the New Law conferring grace for sanctifying the legitimate union of a man and a woman and for piously receiving and holily educating offspring.

745. Division. - Matrimony can be considered both as regards the union of man and woman and as regards the bond which arises from it; hence it is called:

1. In fieri or in facto esse. Matrimony in fieri is called the actual contract itself which is perfected by the mutual consent of the man and woman. Matrimony in facto esse is called the marriage persevering in the bond which proceeds from the matrimonial contract.

2. Legitimate, ratified, and consummated. A legitimate matrimony is said to be that which is contracted according to the norm of natural and civil law but does not have the ratification of the Church or the nature of a Sacrament, such as was formerly entered under the law of nature and the Mosaic law and is now also entered among Jews and gentiles. A ratified matrimony is one contracted between Christians bound by no impediment, between whom, however, conjugal intercourse has not yet occurred after the contract. It is called ratified because not only nature and civil law but also the Church approves and ratifies it. A consummated matrimony is said to be that which has been completed by the intercourse of the spouses; this must be understood not only of a ratified but also of a merely legitimate matrimony ¹.

¹ This distinction of matrimony into legitimate, ratified, and consummated must be carefully retained as being of the greatest importance, as will appear below.

Meanwhile, observe that two things are required in order that a matrimony can be called consummated: 1. that the carnal union be perfect and sufficient for generation, so that (as is contained in chapter Verum 2, On the Conversion of Married Persons) the spouses have together been made one flesh. Therefore, that union would not suffice by which, although the integrity of bodily virginity had been taken from the woman, nevertheless generation could not follow because a suitable emission of male seed was lacking; 2. that a legitimate consent or ratified matrimony preceded a union of this kind. Therefore, intercourse had before the matrimonial contract does not cause the matrimony afterward contracted to be considered consummated, and consequently will produce neither indissolubility nor the other effects of a consummated matrimony. Whence you conclude that one who, bound by a vow of religion, has violated a woman can marry her and afterward (unless another cause prevents it) enter the religion vowed, if after he married her he did not know her again. - See Schmalzgrueber, book 4, title 1, nos. 227-228.

Of no small importance for the use of Theologians is another distinction of matrimony into true, presumed, and putative.

That is called true which was in fact and validly contracted and is proved as such by any of those arguments by which other matters are customarily proved, such as the testimony of the Pastor or others, the register of marriages, the confession of the spouses, the prolonged cohabitation of an honorable woman, etc. Concerning these, see Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 1, no. 233), with whom observe that lighter proofs suffice when there is question of sustaining a matrimony than when the matter concerns dissolving it.

That is called presumed which is presumed by law; this legal presumption has place especially in three cases. First, when, in places where the Tridentine decree concerning the form of matrimony does not have force, after betrothals entered absolutely between two capable persons, carnal intercourse followed between them; for then consent concerning the future is presumed to have passed into consent concerning the present, and the intercourse is presumed to have been admitted with a conjugal affection. Concerning this most grave question, see Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 1, from no. 115), Pirhing (same title, no. 27), and especially Barbosa (on chapter Is qui, same title, no. 3 and following). Second, when, after betrothals entered under a condition and before the occurrence of the condition, carnal intercourse intervened between the betrothed persons; for the Church (we speak while abstracting from the aforesaid Tridentine Decree concerning form, etc.) then presumes that the betrothed persons withdrew from the condition and therefore wished to contract matrimony purely and absolutely. This is evident from chapter Per tuas 6, On Conditions Apposed. Third, when, after a betrothal concerning the present invalidly contracted by minors before puberty (in whom malice does not supply for age), signs of ratified consent intervene between the same persons when they have attained puberty; signs of this kind are not only carnal intercourse but also kisses, embraces, cohabitation, etc. This is evident from the sole chapter, section Idem quoque, On the Betrothal of Minors, in the Sixth Book. This case, however, also can have place only where the aforesaid Tridentine Decree does not have force. - See Schmalzgrueber, book 4, title 1, no. 234.

Finally, a matrimony is called putative which is considered legitimately contracted although, in reality, it is null because of some latent impediment. The Doctors therefore inquire concerning it in order that it may be established when it has the force of legitimating offspring conceived therefrom and the other effects of law. Two things are required for this: first, that it was contracted in good faith by at least one of the spouses, who was ignorant of the impediment. Thus in chapter Ex tenore 14, title Who Are Legitimate Children. Neither an error of law nor a doubt concerning the validity of the matrimony excludes this good faith, as Covarruvias proves (On Betrothals, part 2, chapter 8, section 1, no. 9); but in doubt this good faith is presumed. Second, that the matrimony was contracted publicly and in the face of the Church, that is, before the Pastor and witnesses, with the denunciations having been premised or at least dispensed from. See the final chapter, On Clandestine Betrothals, section 1.

Another distinction of matrimony into canonical, political or civil, and of conscience must also be remembered.

They call that canonical in which all things concur which are prescribed for matrimony by the sacred Canons.

They call that political or civil in which those things also concur which are required by civil law, namely, certain solemnities, dotal agreements, etc.; without these, a matrimony is indeed canonically valid but is regarded as illegitimate civilly and therefore lacks civil effects.

Finally, a matrimony of conscience, or morganatic matrimony, is called a legitimate union of a man with a woman of inferior condition entered with this agreement: that the wife and children born therefrom are content with the nuptial gift or another fixed portion appointed at the time of the betrothals and abstain from the other ancestral and paternal goods, together with titles, dignities, and insignia. Concerning this, Jurists must be consulted. - See Schmalzgrueber, book 4, title 1, from no. 236.

746. Principles. - I. Matrimony of Christians celebrated by the legitimate rite is a true and properly so-called Sacrament of the New Law. This is proved: first, from the Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians, chapter 5, verse 32, where he says: This is a great Sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church. Second, from the Council of Trent, session 24, canon 1: If anyone shall say that matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven Sacraments of the evangelical law instituted by Christ the Lord, but was invented by men in the Church, and that it does not confer grace, let him be anathema. From St. Augustine (On the Good of Marriage, chapter 18): In the nuptials of Christians, the sanctity of the Sacrament has more force than the fecundity of the womb.

II. True consent on the part of each contracting party is required for the validity of matrimony, because matrimony, as a contract, is an agreement between a man and a woman; but consent constitutes the essence of an agreement.

747. • III. Consent, however, must be:

1. Mutual, for it consists in a contract which is essentially the consent of two persons, or mutual consent. Hence, if it is lacking on one side, the matrimony will be null.

2. Concerning the present, because by a promise concerning the future only betrothals, not matrimony, are made. This is also deduced from chapter Si inter 31, On Betrothals and Matrimony.

3. Deliberate and voluntary, because it is a contract concerning a grave matter and therefore induces a grave obligation; but no one is considered to impose a grave obligation upon himself unless he consents freely and fully. This is established from Canon law, which invalidates marriages contracted from grave fear, as will be said below concerning impediments.

4. Manifested by external signs, because every agreement among men must be made known by some external sign; for an agreement necessarily supposes mutual acceptance among the contracting parties.

748. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Must consent be expressed in words?

Reply 1. No, as regards validity, because by natural law it suffices in a contract that consent be expressed by some certain sign. - St. Ligorius, no. 887.

Reply 2. Yes, as regards liceity, because otherwise the rubric and the custom of the Church would be acted against. Nevertheless, it does not appear to exceed a venial sin if words are not employed; indeed, modesty or another reasonable cause would excuse from all fault ². - St. Ligorius, no. 888.

² Certainly, if there is question of mute or deaf persons, it is manifest that signs other than words must be used.

749. • QUESTION 2. Does consent through a procurator suffice?

Reply 1. As regards validity, yes, provided the required conditions are present, because matrimony has the whole nature of a natural contract. But any contract can be made through a procurator.

The conditions for contracting matrimony in that manner are: first, that the procurator execute the mandate personally; second, that the mandator has not revoked the mandate; third, that the procurator appear with the other party before the Pastor and two witnesses ³.

³ Compare what we said above (note on no. 722) concerning betrothals contracted through a procurator.

Reply 2. As regards liceity, no, unless a very grave cause urges. The reason is that this manner of contracting is contrary to the ordinary practice of the Church, and marriages are scarcely made in this way among any others than Princes and Magnates. Hence the Pastor must not bless marriages of this kind by his own authority, as is established from the practice of the Church and the Rituals. - St. Ligorius, no. 888.

750. • QUESTION 3. Is a matrimony entered UNDER A CONDITION valid?

Reply 1. It is certain that it is valid if the condition concerns the past or the present and is verified. The reason is that this conditioned consent immediately passes into absolute consent, and therefore nothing is lacking to the validity of the Sacrament ⁴. - See St. Ligorius, no. 890.

⁴ This has force even if the contracting parties are ignorant that the condition is fulfilled. The reason is that they bound their consent not to knowledge of the condition but to its existence; nevertheless, they cannot use the matrimony before receiving notice that the condition exists, since otherwise they would place themselves in danger of fornication. Concerning this, see the history narrated by Fagnanus (on the final chapter, On Conditions Apposed, no. 13) and Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 5, no. 40).

Reply 2. If an honorable and possible condition concerning the future is added, I say, first: the matrimony is not perfected until the condition is fulfilled, because the contract must transfer a mutual right over the bodies concerning the present, as was said above. I say, second: when the condition has been fulfilled, the matrimony is valid; for a conditioned contract, when the condition has been fulfilled, passes into an absolute contract and by that very fact is valid by reason of the Sacrament, because among Christians the contract of matrimony cannot be separated from the Sacrament ⁵.

⁵ That a conditional matrimony immediately becomes perfect without new consent when the condition is fulfilled is the most received opinion of the Canonists. Thus Fagnanus (on chapter Super eo, On Conditions Apposed, no. 3), who adds that this opinion of the Canonists is observed in the Curia even after the Council of Trent and therefore must in no way be departed from in counseling and judging.

751. • QUESTION 4. Is it licit to contract with conditioned consent?

Reply. No. Such a manner of contracting is illicit, especially if the condition concerns the future, unless perhaps, as St. Ligorius has it, no. 892, a most urgent cause is present. The reason is that many and grave inconveniences can easily follow from such a manner of contracting, namely, scandal, quarrels, perplexities, difficulties, etc. - Thus the Theologians commonly.

752. • QUESTION 5. Is a matrimony entered under a base condition valid?

Reply 1. No, if this condition is repugnant to the substance or essence of matrimony, namely, to its threefold good, that is: first, the good of the Sacrament; second, the good of Fidelity; third, the good of offspring. This would happen if the betrothed persons, in contracting matrimony, excluded the generation of offspring ⁶, fidelity in the marriage, or perpetuity in matrimony. But for this it is required that a condition of this kind be expressly apposed and that the betrothed persons intend in mind to obligate themselves in no other way. The matrimony will be valid, however, if this condition is concomitant and therefore is not the motive why the matrimony is contracted, and there is otherwise some general will of contracting validly ⁷.

⁶ The question has been raised whether a condition which indeed excludes the good of offspring but is not base, rather honorable, is an obstacle to the validity of matrimony; for example, when someone adds to the contract the condition: if you live with me in chastity or perpetual continence.

And there were some who denied that matrimony is thus valid. See Gonzalez on chapter Si conditiones 7, On Conditions Apposed, no. 8 and following. They were led especially by this reason: that the contract of matrimony essentially denotes consent to the handing over of the body for conjugal use; but since this handing over imports the obligation of rendering the debt, that is, of furnishing the use of one's own body to the other, with whom by force of the contract the power over that same body remains, surely either there will be no contract, or certainly the one contracting must consent to conjugal use.

But a purpose of continence plainly excludes consent of this kind; and a fortiori this must be said of one who contracts with a firm will of keeping a vow of chastity which perhaps he made, since he does not have that consent otherwise essential to the matrimonial contract, nor can he have it without sin if he wishes to use the period of two months granted for deliberating. Finally, a fortiori, there will be no contract of matrimony if this very thing is reduced to an agreement or condition. And from this arises a difficulty also concerning the matrimony of the Virgin Mother of God with St. Joseph, and of others concerning whom ecclesiastical history speaks; for example, St. Pulcheria, who chose Marcian Augustus as her spouse with the virginity which she had vowed to God preserved.

But it is shown without difficulty that the apposition of that condition is no obstacle to matrimony being validly contracted, and therefore to a right over one's own body being truly handed over to the other and at the same time the obligation proper to matrimony concerning the rendering of the debt being undertaken.

And indeed it is certain that the purpose of not consummating matrimony is no obstacle to the validity of matrimony as regards one who has the intention either of passing over to Religion and professing in it or at least of suspending the execution of the conjugal obligation if he wishes to use the period of two months granted for deliberating concerning that matter. And now it does not pertain to the matter to dispute when this is licit or illicit; meanwhile, it must be held certain that a matrimony of this kind is valid and therefore that the handing over and power over one's own body which constitute the substance of matrimony are given to the other.

You will perhaps say that in this case the substance of matrimony is preserved, and the right granted is therefore by no means injured, because the nature of the contract itself bears this, which implicitly has this condition inserted; but no one is considered to obligate himself beyond what the nature of the contract bears, and consequently no further right is acquired by the other party.

But I say that this is not the sole reason for which, with the right of the other preserved, the obligation of rendering the debt can be suspended. I now omit that the bond of matrimony, with that obligation remaining suspended, endures not only through the two months granted for deliberating but throughout the whole period of religious novitiate. But to touch the matter more closely, can that which the laws of the Church grant not equally be furnished by the voluntary concession of him to whom the right over the body of the other belongs? What prevents the contracting parties themselves from agreeing by common consent upon not only two months but years in which they may deliberate? Why could they not suspend by agreement the execution of their own right also for another cause, for example, until the husband has obtained an office sufficient for supporting offspring? Why could they not agree upon a matrimony not to be consummated except after the fortieth or fiftieth year? And if this, why not also throughout the whole of life?

In a matrimony which is made with an agreement of continence, namely, a twofold contract manifestly intervenes: the one proper to matrimony, by which power over one's own body is mutually handed over to the other; the other, by which the spouses mutually yield the use or exercise of this right. Nor does it matter that they agree concerning the exercise or use of their own right before rather than after the matrimony has been entered. For there is no reason why that cannot first be promised which I can afterward licitly furnish. But, as we all acknowledge, after matrimony has been entered the spouses can licitly yield the use of matrimony; therefore they can also promise this beforehand.

I said promise, because in reality before the contract of matrimony they do not renounce the right over the body of the other; for renunciation or abdication of use has place only after the power of using has been acquired. Therefore, they promise only that they will renounce it, or, if you prefer, they promise that they will so contract matrimony that at the same time they abdicate its use. But these things do not conflict with each other, since, if an abdication of this kind can be made after the contract, it can also be made in the contract itself. Thus one who buys a house can indeed in the very act of contracting yield the use of that house to the seller.

Nor can it be said that a contract of this kind so lacks every effect that it is in some way deprived of the nature and force of a contract. For: first, one who contracts in this way remains incapable, by force of the matrimonial bond, of contracting with another person; second, if the spouses themselves afterward change their purpose and wish to be united, they will not be fornicators; third, likewise, if the husband who, for example, by agreement permitted his wife the condition of chastity, inflicts force upon her, he will indeed sin against justice because he violates the agreement, or at least will violate the virtue of fidelity because he broke his promise, but he cannot be called a fornicator; fourth, if each spouse not only grants continence to the other but both also vow it to God and afterward do not keep the vow, they will sin against the virtue of religion but not against the virtue of chastity; fifth, if either makes his or her body available to an outsider, that spouse is guilty of violated matrimonial fidelity and consequently is held to be an adulterer; sixth, finally (which it is strange is little observed by those who treat this question), when someone consents in contracting to a condition of chastity, does that person not use the matrimonial right especially? Just as one who buys a house exercises his right over it no less if he uses it by inhabiting it himself than if, unwilling to use it himself, he grants its use to another either for a time or in perpetuity; so surely, when someone voluntarily yields the use of his right over the body of the other, by this very fact he must be considered to have the right and power and to exercise it. For no one legitimately yields anything except that which he has in his power, and by yielding its use he evidently exercises that power. Therefore, it is false that through a condition of preserving chastity apposed to and accepted in matrimony, a contract is entered which has no force and no effect and therefore casts off the nature of a contract.

You have both older and more recent Doctors cited for this doctrine in Rebellus (part 2, book 2, question 10, section 3, no. 19), Clericatus (On Matrimony, decision 3, no. 21, and decision 20, no. 21), Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 5, no. 119), and Benedict XIV (On the Diocesan Synod, book 13, chapter 22, no. 11), who nevertheless adds that it is altogether necessary for the patrons of this doctrine to inquire diligently concerning the strength and subsistence of this opinion, as though a Herculean labor were required to defend it, or as though no one had yet brought forward anything solid for it! He himself merely opposes the citation of Schmalzgrueber, who otherwise concedes that the same opinion is probable. Moreover, the whole armory which Schmalzgrueber himself opposes (l.c., no. 121) consists in this: that through the apposition of such a condition, the contracting parties exclude the right of the other over their own bodies and the implicit consent to rendering conjugal acts, since by force of it they are obligated neither to demand nor render intercourse. The whole force of this argument, as is evident, is situated in the fallacy by which a right is confused with the exercise of the right, and therefore the renunciation of use with the nonexistence of the right. Are not spouses equally obligated neither to demand nor render the debt if both bind themselves to a religious Order by solemn vow? And if this obligation excluded the right over the body of the other, why is either of them who has intercourse with an outside person an adulterer and why does that person sin against justice? Again, if the obligation neither to demand nor render intercourse excludes the right over the body of the other, how will a matrimony be valid when two persons bound by a simple vow of chastity contract? Let us conclude: a contracting party indeed cannot agree concerning those things which by the order of nature cannot be absent from the contract and by force of the contract are inalienable, such as the right over the body of the other; but in those things whose use is indeed licit but neither commanded nor inalienable, it is false that the contracting parties cannot agree upon abdication.

⁷ That saying of Horace has surely happened to the Author in this place: While I labor to be brief, I become obscure. Therefore, a distinction must be made between an express condition apposed to the contract and a merely internal intention.

When an intention or condition contrary to the substance of matrimony is expressly apposed or reduced to an agreement, it is certain from the final chapter, On Conditions Apposed, that the matrimony is invalid in both forums; and the Apostolic See has declared this several times, as will appear below. Nor is that which the Author adds then required, namely, that the betrothed persons intend to obligate themselves in no other manner. For, as Lugo observes (On the Sacraments, disputation 8, no. 128), a matrimony cannot be valid unless someone sufficiently expresses internal consent externally by words or other signs. But in the aforesaid case (namely, an express condition contrary to the essential goods of matrimony), consent in no way appears to be expressed externally when rather the opposite is signified. Therefore, a valid matrimony cannot be had. Except, however, from the common opinion, the case in which that condition is added by only one of the betrothed persons while the other contradicts it, because if the former proceeds to the contract notwithstanding the contradiction of the latter, the former is presumed, in favor of matrimony, to have withdrawn from that condition. Indeed, there are some who think the same must be said when the other is silent at the apposition of a condition of this kind. For in this case also the silent party is presumed, in favor of matrimony, to contradict. - Schmalzgrueber, book 4, title 5, no. 116.

But if there is question of a merely internal bad intention, this can be understood in two ways: either the contracting party is so disposed in mind that he is altogether unwilling to undertake one of those obligations which pertain to the substance of matrimony; or he indeed has the intention of truly contracting matrimony and therefore of undertaking all the obligations proper to matrimony, although he is not prepared to fulfill them, for example, by breaking off an impure friendship with another woman.

If it is accepted in this latter sense, the matrimony is valid according to the opinion of all, and that for both forums. Although one will easily observe that the obligation which concerns the good of the Sacrament, that is, the indissolubility of matrimony, is scarcely, or scarcely at all, capable of the aforesaid distinction, so that it can be undertaken together with an intention of not observing it, unless perhaps we think that the case pertains here of one who intends to leave his wife after some time and secretly to marry another elsewhere while conscious and certain that the prior bond remains.

But if the matter is understood in the former sense, then even if the bad intention is not reduced to an agreement, nevertheless it per se invalidates the contract as regards the forum of conscience. The reason is evident, because the contract of matrimony from its essence requires consent to those obligations. Therefore, whoever has an intention excluding any one of those obligations by that very fact excludes the essence of matrimony, and consequently the matrimony is null. See Sanchez (On Matrimony, book 2, disputation 29, no. 12), who after St. Thomas clearly explains this doctrine, afterward received by all.

I said per se, for another distinction also has place here which the Author also indicates somewhat obscurely: whether this intention is concomitant with or antecedent to the contract. This distinction must be considered diligently because of consequences of the gravest importance as regards practice. And indeed, since, for example, the indissolubility of the bond pertains to the essence of matrimony, what must be said of those who contract with the intention of establishing a divorce not only as regards bed but also as regards the bond, or of giving the wife a bill of repudiation, as the Jews are accustomed to do according to the Mosaic law? A case of this kind is certainly so far from being imaginary that there is a most frequent occasion of this question, because the opinion of the dissolubility of matrimony also flourishes among the schismatic Greeks because of adultery, and the same custom has prevailed among several Protestant heretics; and finally, the same faculty is given to spouses in many places by civil law, to say nothing now of infidels, whether Jews, Mohammedans, or idolaters. Therefore, it ought not to be surprising if those who contract matrimony in these circumstances at the same time have the intention of dissolving the matrimony because of the aforesaid causes and circumstances.

Cardinal De Lugo proposes the resolution of the question according to the twofold case of the distinction from the common doctrine thus (On the Sacraments, disputation 8, nos. 131-132): If the spouses know that repudiation is permitted in their republic, but at the time of the contract have not added this limitation, that they obligate themselves only under this respect, then, if that knowledge which they had concerning the use of repudiation was antecedent, that is, if they therefore contracted because they knew repudiation to be permitted and otherwise would not have contracted, they now appear to have been unwilling to obligate themselves simply to perpetuity. And therefore judgment must incline to the nullity of the matrimony.... But if the contracting parties were altogether ignorant whether the bond would be perpetual, or if they believed it even to be dissoluble but did not limit their intention at the time of the contract to that estimation, but had a general will of contracting a valid matrimony so that that ignorance or estimation was concomitant, since they would equally contract even without it, then the matrimony appears valid and is to be observed. And the things which the same Author discusses at length (l.c., from no. 120 to no. 130) are plainly worthy of being read, so that he may explain how a twofold contrary will can concur and which, as the more efficacious, must be said to prevail. There he also explains what that will is which is more general than the other (which the Author also indicates) and which is therefore more efficacious. You have the counterparts of these things also in Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 1, nos. 302-304), where he asks whether the matrimony of a baptized person who wishes to celebrate it under the nature of a contract but not under the nature of a Sacrament, and therefore contracts with an intention excluding the Sacrament, must be called valid; and much more extensively (book 4, title 19, nos. 164-176), where he inquires into the case of Lugo itself.

These things, however, as was premised, have force for the forum of conscience; for in the external forum it is always presumed that that more general will of contracting legitimate matrimony was present, and therefore that any error adverse to the substance of matrimony was merely concomitant, until the contrary is proved. Benedict XIV reports from the consensus of the Doctors the general doctrine upon which this practice of the external forum rests thus (On the Diocesan Synod, book 13, chapter 22, no. 7): If that express condition concerning matrimony to be dissolved because of adultery was by no means apposed, however much the contracting parties were in this error, that the bond of matrimony could be dissolved through adultery, nevertheless there is place for the presumption that, when they wished to enter matrimony as it was instituted by Christ, they wished to contract it altogether perpetual and indissoluble even upon the intervention of adultery; namely, the general will which we have stated, concerning entering matrimony according to the institution of Christ, prevails and in some way absorbs that private error. Hence it happens that the matrimony so contracted remains valid and firm. But where the contracting parties in the matrimonial contract itself apposed an express condition concerning dissolving the matrimony as regards the bond in the case of adultery, it can no longer happen that the particular error remains absorbed by the general will of contracting matrimony as it was instituted by Christ the Lord; but rather a general will of this kind is extinguished and suffocated by the particular error which manifestly prevails and dominates. And hence arises the nullity of the matrimony in contracting which there was apposed

a condition contrary to its very substance. He soon confirms this doctrine in each sense by cited Declarations of the Sacred Congregations.

We find it proposed no less clearly in the Letters which Pius VI gave to the Archbishop of Prague on July 11, 1789: If a legal condition (he says) of dissolving the conjugal bond for the cited causes is apposed to matrimony through an express agreement, the matrimony must be called null and invalid from the beginning, nor could a conjugal bond have arisen therefrom; but an altogether illicit union was agreed upon, which each party, especially the Catholic party, is altogether bound to abandon by the law of Christ. But if no express condition of this kind repugnant to the substance of matrimony was apposed, although the contracting parties generally intend to contract according to the decrees of a sect or law granting the dissolution of the conjugal bond, nevertheless the matrimony must be considered validly contracted, and therefore a perpetual conjugal bond arose which can be dissolved by no civil law and no authority of non-Catholic consistories; and consequently the faculty of passing to other nuptials can be granted neither to the parties and much less to the Catholic party.

Pius VI gives the reason for the resolution, no differently from Benedict XIV, thus: Nor is there lacking an intrinsic reason why the intention of contracting according to the decrees of a sect asserting, or of a law permitting, the dissolution of matrimony does not impede its validity, provided it is not reduced to an agreement. For from this very fact that non-Catholics, deceived by a vain error, judge that the dissolution of matrimony for those causes is by no means repugnant to the law of Christ, it comes about that in their mind, because of that false estimation, the intention of contracting according to laws of this kind or the decrees of a sect by no means excludes the primary intention of contracting according to the divine law confirmed by Christ. Therefore this will remains in the act of contracting, and from it flows and is determined the nature of the consent which is actually furnished. Moreover, consent furnished according to the law of Christ is apt and sufficient for the validity of matrimony unless another canonical impediment stands in the way.

These things, however (as Benedict XIV has it in the text cited above), must always be referred to the presumption by which the practice of the external forum is governed. For by these things the Pontiff did not intend to define that true consent cannot be lacking even when that condition is not reduced to an agreement, just as, namely, the case of feigned consent is not excluded when the indissolubility of a marriage contracted between Catholics is determined generally. Therefore, as regards the forum of conscience, it always remains to be examined whether that bad intention is antecedent to the contract or only concomitant. For if the contracting parties so enter matrimony that they bind their intention to the error concerning the dissolubility of marriage alone and are altogether unwilling to contract except under the condition of dissolubility, the matrimony is null even if the condition is not reduced to an agreement, because they are unwilling to contract otherwise than dissolubly. Schmalzgrueber (book 4, title 19, no. 70) shows that this doctrine is common to the Theologians and Canonists. Indeed, if it were established from the confession of both spouses that they did not have the intention of contracting in another manner, this would suffice for the matrimony to be declared null even in the external forum, unless there were a presumption of collusion. And if this intention was present in only one of the spouses, it will suffice for that spouse in the external forum; indeed, it will also suffice for the other party if reasons of such a kind concur which prudently persuade that the former is not lying. See Sanchez (book 2, disputation 45, nos. 4-12, and book 5, disputation 12, no. 5) and Lugo (On the Sacraments, disputation 8, no. 130).

But in doubt whether someone had that general and efficacious will of making the matrimony altogether valid, judgment must be made in favor of the contract, that it be valid.

The reason is that everyone is presumed to wish to execute a valid contract unless the contrary is proved, according to the common doctrine of the Jurists; and this will have place a fortiori in the case of matrimony, which is more favorable. Thus Lugo (On the Sacraments, disputation 8, no. 136).

Reply 2. But if the base condition is not repugnant to the substance of matrimony, distinguish: first, it is considered valid in the external forum because there the condition is held as not added; second, it is disputed as regards the forum of conscience, as in other contracts. Ordinarily, however, it is not considered a condition sine qua non, but a mere purpose or promise independent of the matrimonial contract, and therefore the consent is not judged suspended under a base condition unless this is altogether established, as was said in the first reply. - St. Ligorius, no. 891 ⁸.

⁸ The base condition of which the Author now speaks, like an impossible condition, is in reality held as not added only when it is doubtful whether the contracting parties added it seriously or in jest. For since in doubt judgment must be made, according to the norm of law, in favor of the validity of the matrimony, deservedly in this doubt also the Church presumes in favor of matrimony that the condition was not seriously added; deservedly, I say, lest perhaps those who are legitimately united be separated and be joined to others through illegitimate marriages. Nevertheless, since this presumption is only one of law, and not also de iure, it can therefore be overcome by reasons brought forward to the contrary. - Schmalzgrueber, book 4, title 5, no. 64.

It is not held as not added, however: first, if the contracting parties regard it as honorable; second, if it is otherwise established that the condition was seriously added by the contracting parties, and therefore that consent was not furnished except under its occurrence; for the presumption then yields to the truth, and therefore, if the condition does not occur, there will be no matrimony because of the defect of consent, which the Church certainly cannot supply; third, if both contracting parties, or at least one of them, were ignorant of the Constitution which holds conditions of this kind as not added; for it cannot then be said that, because they knew this condition to be rejected by the Church, they therefore contracted absolutely, since they wished to receive the Sacraments according to the intention of the Church. This has force only when the contracting parties know both that the condition is base and that it is not admitted by the Church.

But insofar as the Author adds that, as regards the forum of conscience, it is disputed whether the matrimony, once the base condition is fulfilled, must be held valid, just as in other contracts concerning base matter, see what we said at no. 760 of volume I, where we showed that the opinion denying the validity of these contracts is supported only by the coloring of false citations.

753. • QUESTION 6. What must be done if someone says that he consented fictitiously?

Reply 1. As regards the external forum, credence is not given to him unless it is evident from the circumstances that he was either deceived by fraud or induced to contract by grave fear; for it cannot be supposed that one who freely entered matrimony consented fictitiously.

Reply 2. As regards the internal forum, one who asserts that he consented fictitiously must be obliged: first, to abstain from demanding and rendering the debt until he has truly consented; second, ordinarily also to furnish true consent, so that he may thus repair the injury inflicted upon the other party. I say ordinarily, because if the other party consents to separation, or if he himself was compelled to contract, he is not bound to supply consent ⁹. - Decretals, book 4, title On Conditions, final chapter.

⁹ The deceiver is not bound to marry the deceived woman also in the following cases. First, if the deceiver has already entered matrimony with another; for although he cannot prove to the judge the fiction as regards the other matrimony, and therefore the judge compels him, even under threatened excommunication, to cohabit with the woman believed to be his spouse, he must rather endure this censure, which would not bind the soul, than mingle carnally with the first betrothed woman, as is evident from chapter Inquisitioni tuae 44, On the Sentence of Excommunication. Second, if fraud intervened also on the other side, for example, if she falsely boasted that she was a virgin; for the deception is then compensated by deception. Yet La Croix (book 6, part 3, no. 258), and after him St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 887), without reason refers the declaration of the Sacred Congregation of the Council to this case. See Thesaurus Resolutionum S. Congregationis Concilii, volume 3, pages 161-165. Third, if no harm came to the deceived party; or if the deceived party, once the deception is known, admits another compensation; or even if the harm inflicted can be compensated in another manner. Fourth, if the contracting party gave manifest indications of fictitious consent; for then the other party ought to attribute the deception rather to himself than to the other. The Doctors refer here the case in which the deceiver is of a much higher condition and state; for from this an indication of deception can become evident to the other party, although this is admitted with difficulty where the contract is celebrated before the Pastor. But an immense disparity can also excuse the deceiver for another reason, namely, because of the unhappy outcome, scandals, and other inconveniences which are rightly feared from such a marriage.

Moreover, the most grave obligation of entering matrimony with true consent easily manifests itself, not only because otherwise there is grave sin against the reverence due to the Sacrament, but because through the injury most grave harm is inflicted upon the other party. For since the fiction can be proved only with the greatest difficulty in the external forum, other nuptials are not permitted to the deceived party, and therefore this alone remains to her: either to enter Religion or to remain unmarried in the world.

Moreover, the spouse who furnished true assent is not bound to believe the other asserting that he consented fictitiously, unless he confirmed it by oath; and therefore the spouse could licitly demand the debt until the defect of consent were evidently proved. - Sacred Congregation of the Council, February 24, 1720.

754. • QUESTION 7. Is the consent of parents required for the validity or liceity of the matrimonial contract?

Reply 1. As regards validity, altogether no, because the consent of parents is required neither by natural nor by positive law. First, not by natural law, because the contracting parties have power over their own bodies, while parents do not have power over the bodies of their children in relation to matrimony; otherwise they could invalidate their marriages, whether justly or unjustly, which is altogether repugnant and opposed to the common sense of men. Second, neither by positive law; for the Council of Trent, session 24, chapter 1, struck with anathema those who falsely affirm that marriages contracted by children of a family without the consent of their parents are invalid and that parents can make them ratified or invalid. But if civil law requires the consent of parents for the validity of matrimony, its force extends only to merely civil effects. - Thus commonly all Catholic Theologians.

Reply 2. As regards liceity, yes, speaking generally. This is established: first, from natural law, because children owe honor, reverence, and obedience to their parents, especially in those things which concern the whole family, such as matrimony, upon which the honor and peace of families very often depend, etc.; second, from the Council of Trent (ibid.), where it is said: The holy Church of God has always detested and prohibited those marriages (entered without parental consent) ¹⁰.

¹⁰ These words of the Council of Trent refer rather to clandestine marriages, in which there is never lacking a reason why they should be prohibited.

755. • QUESTION 8. Can children ever contract matrimony against the will of their parents?

Reply. Yes, if the parents unjustly refuse consent. But since in this matter children of a family easily deceive themselves, before celebrating the nuptials they ought to consult prudent men and especially Confessors, lest in so grave a matter, full of such great dangers, they act imprudently while trusting their own judgment.

756. • QUESTION 9. What must a Confessor or Pastor do when children of a family wish to enter matrimony against the will of their parents?

Reply 1. As regards the Confessor, speaking generally, he ought to defend the part of the parents to the best of his ability; for generally the presumption is considered to favor them. Nevertheless, if the children, moved by a grave reason and with the legal conditions observed, persist in entering matrimony, they do not appear to be disturbed. - Thus commonly with Gousset.

667. 1° The various names of marriage. Matrimony (matris munium) is so called because the mother regularly expends greater labor than the father in receiving and educating offspring, since the infant is known to have been for the mother "burdensome before birth, painful in birth, laborious after birth."¹ It is also called conjugium (cum, jungere), because it is, as it were, a common yoke, to which those who contract marriage spontaneously submit themselves; connubium, or nuptiae (from nubendo, that is, veiling), because in antiquity brides, when they were handed over to men, covered the head with a veil for the sake of modesty;² consortium (cum, sors), by which is signified the very close society of bodies and souls by which man and woman are joined together.

¹ Gregory IX, Decretal., l. III, tit. 33, c. 2.

² Gen., XXIV, 65.

668. 2° Marriage as contract and sacrament. Matrimony can be considered as a natural contract and as a sacrament.

Matrimony as contract can be defined: a legitimate agreement between a man and a woman, conferring upon them a mutual, exclusive, and perpetual right both to acts of themselves apt for the generation of offspring, and to the fellowship of common life.

It is said: (a) a legitimate agreement... that is, entered into according to the laws, whether natural or positive, by which marriage is governed; and this is entered into between a man and a woman, who otherwise are by law capable of a contract of this kind.

(b) A mutual and perpetual right to acts... By these words the primary end of marriage is declared, namely the procreation of offspring and consequently education. But for the essence of marriage it is not required that children actually be begotten, since sterile persons lawfully marry; nor even the use of marriage, since the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph were joined in lawful marriage, although they never used matrimonial rights; but a right suffices to those acts which of themselves are apt for the generation of offspring, although by accident generation sometimes does not follow, or the spouses do not use their right. Moreover that right is mutual, as is clear, and perpetual, so that thus vague and fornicatory mingling of the sexes is excluded.

(c) To the fellowship of common life: here is signified the secondary end of marriage, mutual help which arises from the love and society of each, according to that word of Scripture:¹ "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like himself." - Wherefore spouses ought to be not only one flesh, so that they may generate offspring, but also one heart and one soul, so that they may bring help and solace to each other.

¹ Gen., II, 18.

Matrimony as sacrament is nothing other than the contract itself raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and is customarily defined: a sacrament of the New Law, by which, through the consent of the contracting parties legitimately furnished, grace is conferred upon spouses for rightly fulfilling the duties of marriage. The definition will be clearer from the things to be said below.

669. 3° On other divisions of marriage. Matrimony can be considered under a multiple respect:

1° By reason of validity, it is distinguished into valid and invalid: (a) the former, which is also called true, is that which in reality has been contracted, without any diriment impediment; (b) the latter, which is also called null, is that which, on account of some defect or impediment, was not truly contracted; it is called attempted, insofar as one or the other party with knowledge of the impediment has dared to enter it; putative, when by the spouses themselves, or at least by one or the other, it is considered valid, although on account of a hidden impediment it is invalid.

2° By reason of dignity, it is legitimate or ratified: (a) legitimate, when it has been entered into according to the laws of natural and positive law, so that it is valid as a contract, although it does not attain to the dignity of a sacrament;¹ such is marriage lawfully contracted between infidels or the non-baptized; (b) ratified, that is received, when it is validly entered into between the faithful, so that it has the nature of a sacrament.²

¹ Formerly even the marriages of the faithful were called legitimate, when all the solemnities of law had been observed; but today the sense set forth above has prevailed. Cf. Benedict XIV, De Synodo, lib. VIII, c. 12, n. 5.

² Sometimes, however, but in an improper sense, even clandestine and consequently invalid marriages of the faithful are called ratified. Cf. Gasparri, n. 235.

3° By reason of effect, it is called ratified or consummated: ratified, when it has been celebrated, but not yet completed by carnal copula; consummated, when it has been completed by carnal copula of itself apt for generation, whether conception really follows, or not.

4° By reason of duration, marriage is an act or a state: the former is the passing agreement itself by which a right over bodies is mutually handed over in order to generation (matrimonium in fieri); the latter is the permanent state resulting from this passing act (matrimonium in facto esse).

670. 4° Division. There will be four chapters: in the first, we shall treat of the contract itself of marriage; in the second, of the sacrament; in the third, of the impediments which sometimes stand in the way of the celebration of each; in the fourth, of dispensations which are customarily granted from these impediments. The two former chapters will be especially dogmatic, and in them we shall chiefly set forth natural and divine law concerning marriage. In the two others, we shall explain practical questions, namely moral and canonical ones, chiefly pertaining to positive law. Yet even in the former part, when occasion is given, we shall examine certain practical conclusions, lest we be compelled to treat twice of the same matter.

This division will be better understood from the following schema.

On marriage as contract

Its nature:

• It consists in a stable contract.
• The essence of the contract consists in consent.

Its properties:

• unity.
• indissolubility.

On marriage as sacrament

On the sacrament itself:

• Existence.
• Nature.
• Effects.
• The power of making laws concerning marriage.

On the celebration of marriage:

• On the preliminaries to the celebration.
• On the rite of celebration.

On the impediments of marriage

• Prohibiting.
• Diriment.

On dispensations

• On dispensations themselves.
• On the revalidation of marriage.

Appendix: On civil law with respect to marriage.

779. Among many peoples the contract of marriage bore before itself something sacred and religious, and was often celebrated with sacred rites.¹ But Christ raised the same to the dignity of a sacrament, so that, among Christians, it is a sign not only sacred, but also productive of grace. That we may embrace in this chapter questions both speculative and practical, we shall speak: 1° of the sacrament itself; 2° of the celebration of this sacrament.

¹ P. Sauzet, Reflexions sur le Mariage civil et le Mariage religieux, Lyon, 1853, p. 11 sq.; Glasson, Le Mariage civil et le Divorce dans l'antiquite, Paris, 1880, p. 139 sq.; R. Lemaire, Le Mariage civil, Paris, 1904, p. 4-15.

797. State of the question. Christ could have instituted the sacrament of marriage in a twofold way: either by adding to the natural contract some external sign productive of grace, for example a priestly blessing, or by raising the matrimonial contract itself to the dignity of a sacrament. Now, in the seventeenth century, Marcus Antonius de Dominis², Bishop of Spalato, afterwards a heretic, and J. Launoy³, and also in our times J. Nuytz, professor of Turin, taught that the sacrament so supervenes upon the contract of marriage already constituted that it can be separated from it, and therefore that diriment impediments can be established by princes, since the contract of marriage is by its nature civil. Politicians willingly embraced this doctrine, that they might thus more easily be able to make laws concerning marriage.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1; a. 3, ad 2; Bellarmine, de Matrim., c. 7-8; Billuart, diss. I, a. 5; Carriere, p. I, sect. 3, c. I, a. 1; Perrone, sect. I, c. 6; Palmieri, th. 10; Pesch, n. 718 sq.; Billot, th. 37.

² De Republ. christiana, l. III and V, c. 2.

³ De regia in matrim. potestate, t. I, p. 2, c. 4.

Certain Catholics, as M. Cano,⁴ thought indeed that the contract is the matter of the sacrament, but that the priestly blessing is the form, so that if the blessing is omitted, marriage exists as a contract, but not as a sacrament. A few others, after Vasquez,⁵ indeed acknowledged that the contract is the whole and integral sacrament, but held that contracting parties could by their own intention effect that a natural contract exist without the sacrament.

⁴ De Locis theolog., l. VIII, c. 5.

⁵ De Sacram., disp. 138, c. 5, n. 63-64.

But the Catholic doctrine is that the matrimonial contract itself has been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, so that among the baptized there cannot be given a contract of marriage unless at one and the same time it is a sacrament.

798. Thesis: "Among the baptized a valid matrimonial contract cannot subsist unless it is by that very fact a sacrament" (can. 1012, § 2). It is certain.

It is said among Christians; for Infidels can contract valid marriages, which have the notion of a contract, but not of a sacrament.

(A) By Scripture it is not indeed demonstrated but suggested; for from the words of St. Paul to the Ephesians praised above, with the interpretation of the Fathers added, that very marriage was raised to the dignity of a sacrament which God had instituted from the beginning; but what God had instituted from the beginning is nothing other than the matrimonial contract itself; therefore the contract itself, and not some other accessory rite, was truly raised to the dignity of a sacrament. - In reality, no rite, no prayer, no matter or form is determined in Scripture, besides the matrimonial contract itself; therefore every marriage legitimately celebrated among Christians is a sacrament; and conversely, if the sacrament is not present, neither will there be a true matrimonial contract.

799. (B) Tradition. (a) The Fathers indeed did not directly examine this question, but they so spoke of Christian marriage that from this it can be drawn out that the contract itself was raised to the dignity of a sacrament. All the Scholastics who flourished before the sixteenth century declared this more openly, teaching, after St. Thomas,¹ that the words by which consent or the matrimonial contract is expressed are the form of the sacrament, or, after St. Bonaventure,² that the sacrament of Marriage has legitimate persons for matter, and consent for form: and this indeed implies that consent, or the matrimonial contract, pertains to the essence of the sacrament, and cannot be torn away from it.

¹ Supplement, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1.

² In IV, dist. 28, a. 1, q. 5.

(b) The same is also inferred from various documents of the Church. First, the Decree for the Armenians has these words:³ "The efficient cause of marriage regularly is mutual consent expressed by words concerning the present." Hence thus: here certainly there is question of Matrimony as sacrament, since the Decree is an instruction concerning the sacraments; but the efficient cause, and therefore the essence, of this sacrament is declared to be mutual consent, or the matrimonial contract; therefore the contract cannot be separated from the sacrament. The same can be drawn from Trent: for it teaches⁴ that clandestine marriages were ratified and true marriages as long as the Church did not make the same null: and this indeed implies that they were a true sacrament, for, according to Innocent III,¹ marriage "exists true and ratified, because the sacrament of faith, which once has been admitted, is never lost, but renders ratified the sacrament of marriage." But in clandestine marriages nothing is found except the matrimonial contract; therefore such a contract truly constitutes the sacrament, and cannot be separated from it.

³ Denzing., n. 597.

⁴ Sess. XXIV, de Reformat., c. 1.

¹ Decretal., l. IV, tit. 19, c. 7, ap. Denzing., n. 351.

(c) Finally the matter has been placed beyond every doubt by the express declarations of Pius IX and Leo XIII.

The former, in an Allocution held to the Cardinals (September 27, 1852), reproving the law by which marriage was held only as a civil contract, gives this reason for the aforesaid condemnation: "Since no one from among Catholics is ignorant or can be ignorant that Matrimony is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law instituted by Christ the Lord, and therefore that among the faithful there cannot be a marriage which at one and the same time is not a sacrament; and for that reason any other conjunction whatever between a Christian man and woman, made even by the force of any civil law whatever, is nothing other than a base and deadly concubinage so greatly condemned by the Church; and therefore that the sacrament can never be separated from the conjugal covenant; and that it altogether pertains to the power of the Church to decree all those things which can in any way pertain to the same marriage." But the latter, in the Encyclical Arcanum (February 10, 1880), where he splendidly sets forth the Catholic doctrine concerning Christian marriage, has these words: "Nor should anyone be moved by that distinction so greatly proclaimed by the Regalists, by the force of which they disjoin the nuptial contract from the sacrament... For a distinction of this kind, or rather a tearing apart, cannot be proved; since it has been ascertained that in Christian marriage the contract is not dissociable from the sacrament; and therefore that a true and legitimate contract cannot subsist unless it is by that very fact a sacrament. For Christ the Lord increased marriage by the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the contract itself, provided only that it is made by law... And so it appears that every just marriage among Christians is in itself and through itself a sacrament: and that nothing is more abhorrent from truth than that the sacrament is some added ornament, or an extrinsically appended property, which can be separated and severed from the contract at the discretion of men."

The Code, can. 1012, thus condenses this doctrine: "Christ the Lord raised the matrimonial contract itself among the baptized to the dignity of a sacrament. Wherefore among the baptized a valid matrimonial contract cannot subsist unless it is by that very fact a sacrament."

800. Corollary. Hence, even if the baptized contracting parties are entirely ignorant that the matrimonial contract is a sacrament, they nevertheless effect the sacrament by the very fact that they intend to contract maritally. But if, well instructed, on account of their impiety they should be unwilling to make a sacrament, a distinction must be made: if their predominant intention is to enter marriage, they effect the contract and the sacrament together; but if their intention is so depraved that they prefer to choose concubinage rather than the sacrament of Marriage, their union is concubinary, not marital.

801. Melchior Cano seems to have been the first who taught that not the contracting parties themselves, but the Priest who joins them in marriage, are the ministers of the sacrament;² many theologians embraced his opinion, among whom are Sylvius, Drouin, Tournely, and others: but today the ancient opinion, which had flourished for so many centuries, is altogether certain from the practice and declarations of the Church.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 45, a. 5; q. 46, a. 2; Bellarmine, c. 6; Drouin, lib. X, q. II; Billuart, diss. I, a. 6; Carriere, pars I, sect. 2, c. 2; Perrone, sect. I, c. 2; de Augustinis, a. 3; Palmieri, th. XI.

² De Loc. theolog., l. VIII, c. 5. Melchior Cano attributes his opinion to William of Paris, Peter Paludanus, indeed to St. Thomas, but undeservedly, as Perrone shows at length, l. c., p. 48 sq.

802. Thesis: The ministers of the sacrament of Matrimony are the contracting parties themselves, and not the Priest blessing the nuptials. It is certain.

(A) From ancient Rituals. For as Martene,³ a man very well versed in ancient rites, rightly observes, in this way marriage was formerly celebrated: the spouses stood before the priest at the doors of the church; then, right hands having been mutually given, they furnished consent, "in which the ancients placed the whole essence of the sacrament of marriage. For among them those words of the pastor, I join you, were unheard of, in which some of the more recent Scholastics constitute the form of this sacrament." In reality these words are lacking in most ancient Rituals. Now if the essence of the sacrament of marriage consists in the sole consent of the spouses, not in the blessing of the priest, the contracting parties themselves, who furnish the consent, administer the sacrament to themselves.

³ De Antiquis Eccl. Rit., p. II, c. 9, a. 1.

(B) By the authority of theologians. The old Scholastics declared this openly; thus St. Thomas writes:¹ "Consent expressed by words concerning the present, between persons legitimate for contracting, makes marriage, because these two are of the essence of the sacrament; but all other things are of the solemnity of the sacrament, because they are employed for this, that marriage may be made more fittingly." In the same place (ad 2) he adds: "And therefore the blessing of the Priest is not required in marriage, as though of the essence of the sacrament." Now it certainly would be required, if the Priest were the minister of marriage. St. Bonaventure² and other theologians even to the sixteenth century taught the same. Now it is impossible that the teaching Church should have erred in so grave a matter through many centuries. Therefore.

¹ Supplement, q. 45, a. 5.

² In IV Sent., dist. 28, q. 5.

(C) By the practice and declarations of the Church. (a) Trent declared that clandestine marriages, contracted without the presence of a Priest, were ratified and true, as long as the Church did not make them null.³ But from ecclesiastical usage of speaking a ratified marriage is the same as the sacrament of marriage; for Innocent III says (l. c.): "Although a true marriage exists among infidels, nevertheless it is not ratified; but among the faithful it exists true and ratified: because the sacrament of faith, which once has been admitted, is never lost, but renders ratified the sacrament of marriage, so that it may endure in spouses while that endures." Therefore, according to Trent, marriages celebrated without the presence and blessing of a priest can be ratified, that is, a true sacrament. Therefore priests are not the ministers of this sacrament, but the contracting parties are.

³ "Although it is not to be doubted that clandestine marriages, made by the free consent of the contracting parties, are ratified and true marriages, as long as the Church did not make them null; and therefore those are deservedly to be condemned, as the holy Synod condemns them with anathema, who deny that they are true and ratified..." (Sess. XXIV, de Ref. Matrim., c. 1.)

(b) Moreover, when the doubt had been proposed whether marriages performed at the time of the Gallican disturbance, without the presence of a Priest, were to be revalidated by the blessing of a Priest, the Congregation deputed for the affairs of the Gallican Church answered (April 22, 1792) "that the faithful are to be exhorted that, when they can have the supply of a Priest, they ask a blessing from him, who nevertheless will declare to them that a blessing of this kind pertains least of all to validity."

(c) This thesis is altogether confirmed from can. 1098, according to which in some cases it is lawful to contract without the presence of a priest.

(D) Theological reason. From what was said in the preceding thesis, the matrimonial contract is inseparable from the sacrament itself, and therefore those truly effect the sacrament who at the same time perfect the contract; but the contracting parties themselves, not the Priest, perfect the matrimonial contract, as is clear; therefore the contracting parties themselves effect the sacrament, or in other words are the ministers of the sacrament.

803. (E) Principles for solving difficulties. Since it would be too tedious to refute one by one the various arguments brought forward by adversaries, let it suffice to set forth some principles, from which they can be solved.

(a) Arguments taken a pari from other sacraments have little or no force, since each sacrament has its own proper matter and also its own ministers. Therefore adversaries say in vain that regularly priests alone are the ministers of the sacraments, and therefore of marriage; for the parity is denied, since marriage is a contract and follows the laws of a contract; but besides, is not baptism, ministered by a layman, valid? Why therefore would marriage, ministered by laymen, be invalid?

(b) The minister of the sacrament is one thing and the minister of solemnity another; therefore, if in ecclesiastical documents there is question of the Priest as minister of marriage, it must be determined from the context whether the question is about the minister effecting, or only sanctioning, the sacrament by a special blessing.

(c) Marriages celebrated without the presence of a Priest were called illicit, or sometimes illegitimate, because they were contracted against the laws of the Church; but from this it least of all follows that the same were invalid. Again, some attribute sacramental power to the priestly blessing, but, when the context is inspected, the sense is that a blessing of this kind is a certain sacramental. Sometimes it is asserted that marriage, without that blessing, is not a sacrament of the true name, because the contracting parties, violating the law of the Church, were not receiving the grace of the sacrament. By the help of these principles, the principal difficulties can be solved: but if any authorities remain against our thesis, they cannot weaken the force of the decisions of the Church.

813. Since the contract of marriage has been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, by that very fact it is subject to the power of the Church.

¹ St. Thomas, Quodlibet., V, a. 15; Bellarmine, c. 32; Sanchez, l. VII, disp. III; Drouin, l. IX, q. VI, c. 1; Billuart, diss. VI, a. 23; Carriere, p. III, sect. II, c. 2, n. 520 sq., with the emendations inserted in the sixth edition of the Compendium, n. 130 sq.; Perrone, l. II; Palmieri, th. 28 sq.; de Angelis, Praelect. juris can., tom. III, p. I, p. 24 sq.; Cavagnis, Institut. juris publ., 3rd ed., l. V, n. 184 sq.; Billot, th. 47-48; Paoli, Etude sur les origines et la nature du mariage civil, Paris, 1890; R. Lemaire, Le Mariage civil, 2nd ed., Paris, 1904.

Nevertheless, not only the Innovators, who held that marriage is not a sacrament, denied this authority of the Church, but also M. A. de Dominis, Launoy, not a few Regalists, and also the Jansenists who were present at the Synod of Pistoia (1786): these indeed were not ashamed to teach that the power of making laws concerning Christian marriage, especially for annulling marriages, belongs to secular princes alone, and not to the Church, except perhaps from the indulgence of princes. Moreover, not a few Catholic authors, especially in France, thought that the power of establishing diriment impediments belonged not only to the Church, but also to princes, because marriage is a contract both civil and ecclesiastical. Yet today this opinion cannot be admitted, after repeated declarations of the Holy See. What the Church and what the civil power can decree concerning marriage, the following propositions will declare.

814. First thesis: The Church has the power of establishing by her own right impediments diriment of marriage, and of judging matrimonial causes which regard the bond of marriage. It is of faith from Trent:² "If anyone shall say that the Church could not constitute impediments diriment of marriage, or erred in constituting them, let him be anathema. - If anyone shall say that matrimonial causes do not pertain to ecclesiastical judges, let him be anathema" (sess. XXIV, can. 4, 12). Now canons of this kind are dogmatic, whatever a few may have said to the contrary; for here there is question of a matter not disciplinary, but pertaining to faith, namely of the very power of the Church and of her infallibility in the exercise of this right. Besides, that this power is in the Church by her own right, and not by concession of Princes, is gathered from the condemnation of the proposition of the Synod of Pistoia, in which the opposite error was defended: for such a proposition was reproved as contrary to Trent and proceeding from a heretical principle.¹

² Trent, sess. XXIV, can. 4, 12.

¹ Ap. Denzing., n. 1422-23.

815. (A) By the practice of the Church. Christ Himself had established the law of indissolubility, contrary to Roman law; Paul had promulgated the privilege of faith, above, n. 730. Adhering to their footsteps, the Church established various statutes concerning marriage; especially by her own right she established diriment impediments, and, when the occasion was given, judged concerning matrimonial causes as to the bond itself. (a) First, the law of the Church is most ancient by the force of which marriages of virgins who had solemnly vowed their virginity to God were held not only illicit but also invalid; thus, for example, Gelasius I writes:² "But we have known that certain men rashly join themselves to sacred virgins, and after the purpose dedicated to God mingle incestuous covenants and sacrilegious ones"; now incestuous covenants surely cannot be called a valid marriage. Moreover, a law of this kind was taken from no civil Code; therefore it was enacted by the Church herself by her own right. (b) Likewise the Council of Neocaesarea (314), can. 2, establishes:³ "If a woman has married two brothers, let her be cast out until death. But at death, on account of humanity, if she shall have said that, if she recovers, she will dissolve the marriage, she will have penance"; by which words it is supposed that the marriage of which there is question was held as null. Now this impediment was not borrowed from civil law, since this latter established the same thing only in the year 355.⁴ (c) The Synod of Macon (585), can. 16, declared that marriages contracted by widows of clerics were null: "let the wife of a subdeacon, exorcist, or acolyte, when he has died, not dare to join herself to a second marriage"; which is found in no civil law. (d) Finally, at Trent, the Orators of the King of the Gauls asked that clandestine marriages, and marriages contracted without the consent of parents, be declared null: the former was granted, but the latter denied; this indeed clearly proves that the authority of the Church in establishing impediments was fully acknowledged, and indeed independent from the right of princes.

² Ep. ad Episcopos Lucaniae, c. 20, P. L., t. LIX, p. 54.

³ Ap. Bruns, t. I, p. 71.

⁴ Cod. Theod., l. III, tit. 12, Etsi licitum.

Leo XIII (Arcanum) briefly gathers this argument thus: "The Church exercised power over the marriages of Christians in every time and place, and exercised it in such a way that it appeared that the power was her own, not sought by the consent of men, but divinely obtained by the will of her Author... No one is ignorant how many things concerning the impediments of bond, vow, disparity of worship, consanguinity, crime, public honesty, were constituted by the prelates of the Church in the Councils of Elvira, Arles, Chalcedon, the Second of Milevis, and others,¹ which often differed greatly from decrees sanctioned by imperial law. Nay, it was so far from the case that ruling men arrogated to themselves power over Christian marriages, that rather they acknowledged and declared that this power, as great as it is, is in the possession of the Church. In reality Honorius, Theodosius the younger, Justinian (Novel 137) did not hesitate to admit that, in those matters which touch nuptials, no more was lawful to them than to be guardians and defenders of the sacred canons."

¹ D'Aguirre, Conc. Hisp., tom. I, can. 13, 15-17; Harduin, Act. Concil., tom. I, can. 11, 16-17.

Deservedly therefore the Code, c. 1016: "The marriage of the baptized is ruled not only by divine law, but also by canonical law, saving the competence of the civil power concerning merely civil effects..."

816. (B) Theological reason. Marriage, celebrated among Christians, is a sacrament, and, from what has been said, the contract is so closely connected with the sacrament that one cannot exist without the other; but a sacrament is something altogether sacred, which transcends the power of civil authority and is subject to the power of the Church alone. Nor should adversaries say that marriage is a natural contract and as such subject to civil authority; for Christ, by elevating this contract to the dignity of a sacrament, rendered it sacred and withdrew it from civil authority, since this latter has no power concerning sacred things. "Therefore since marriage is sacred by its own force, by its own nature, of its own accord, it is fitting that it be ruled and moderated not by the command of princes, but by the divine authority of the Church, which alone has the magisterium of sacred things" (Leo XIII, l. c.).

817. Second thesis: The civil power cannot establish laws regarding the bond of marriage, but only concerning the temporal and separable effects of the contract. It is certain. To understand this, it is helpful to note that the temporal effects of marriage are of two kinds, some inseparable from the contract itself, for example the mutual rights and duties of spouses as to bed and habitation, and the legitimacy of offspring; but others separable from the very substance of the contract, for example dowry, donations on account of nuptials, hereditary succession, etc.

(A) The former part is proved: (a) by the practice of the Church; for the Church never acknowledged this power in princes, but on the contrary judged civil laws concerning the matrimonial bond to have no force; thus Gregory the Great reproved marriages of cousins permitted by princes; Benedict XIV¹, speaking of the law by which Theodosius had prohibited marriages of Jews with Christians, says: "This law, as having been established by a lay prince, ought to have no force in marriages"; likewise Urban VIII and Pius VII² declared that the civil law invalidating marriages entered without the consent of parents had no force in the forum of conscience.

¹ Litt. February 9, 1749, to the Cardinal of York.

² Litt. June 27, 1805, to Napoleon.

(b) By the authority of the Roman Pontiffs; let it suffice to report the words of Pius VI³: "It is a dogma of faith that marriage, which before the advent of Christ was nothing other than a certain indissoluble contract, after the advent of Christ became one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law... Hence it comes about that to the Church alone, to whom the whole care concerning the sacraments has been entrusted, there belongs every right and power of assigning her own form to this contract raised to the more sublime dignity of a sacrament, and therefore of passing sentence concerning the validity or invalidity of marriages." In the same place he refutes those who say that the canon of Trent (above, n. 814) does not say ecclesiastical judges alone, or all matrimonial causes: "For the words of the canon are so general that they comprehend and embrace all causes; but the spirit or reason of the law extends so widely that it leaves no place for any exception or limitation."

³ Brief to the Bishop of Motula, September 16, 1788.

(c) Theological reason. For marriage, as Pius VI rightly says, l. cit., is not a merely civil or natural contract, but one of the seven sacraments; but the Church alone, by the force of the power divinely entrusted to her, can make laws concerning the sacraments; therefore. Nor should it be said that in modern societies, which are of mixed religion, the civil power must make laws concerning the very essence of marriage, so that uniformity may be preserved for all citizens. For, to preserve this uniformity, it suffices that the State determine the civil conditions and effects arising from the matrimonial contract, nor is it required that it touch the matrimonial bond itself. Indeed liberty of conscience itself demands that, in mixed societies, no law be made concerning the matrimonial bond itself: for since the statutes of the various spiritual societies concerning this matter are not the same, from any civil law whatever concerning the bond it would happen that some citizens would be held to regard as invalid a marriage which according to their conscience is valid, or conversely. Therefore one thing remains, namely that the State regard only the civil effects of the matrimonial contract.

818. (B) The latter part is declared and proved, namely that the civil power can establish laws concerning the temporal and separable effects of marriage, for example dowries, inheritances, and generally possessions of temporal goods which follow from the marital contract. (a) It can prohibit, not indeed under penalty of nullity, but under other penalties, for example pecuniary fines, loss of civil rights, that marriages be made unless those conditions are observed which the public good requires, for example that minors not contract without the consent of parents, that soldiers not marry except by permission of military authority, etc. (b) It can also deny to marriages prohibited by it the recognition of certain civil effects, for example recognition of dowry, of the right of succeeding in the privileges of the father, where such privileges are acknowledged, etc. (c) It likewise has the right of registering marriages and of considering this registration as legal proof of the existence of the aforesaid marriage, although from equity it has been received that this proof can be supplied by an equivalent one, if the legal one is lacking. The reason why the State can establish all these things is that on the one hand these do not affect the substance of the contract, but are accessory to it, and on the other hand the civil power can determine concerning matters of this kind whatever the public good requires; for it least of all can be denied that all those things which we have enumerated can contribute to the good of society.

It is nevertheless disputed among theologians whether the State can deny to children born from marriages in themselves valid, but prohibited by civil law, civil legitimacy and the right of succession to the paternal inheritance by intestacy. The reason for doubting is that these two rights are partly from nature, partly from civil law. Yet all acknowledge that denial of these rights is foolish and cruel, since there are other more efficacious penalties for impeding those marriages, and it is not expedient to punish in children the offenses of parents.¹

¹ Cf. de Angelis, op. cit., p. 43 sq.; Palmieri, th. 31.

The Encyclical lays down to begin with this immutable fundamental doctrine: Matrimony was not instituted or restored by man, but by God ; not by man were the laws made to strengthen and confirm and elevate it but by God, the Author of nature, and by Christ our Lord by whom nature was redeemed.

The Encyclical tells us:¹ This is the doctrine of Holy Scripture, this is the constant tradition of the Universal Church, this is the solemn definition of the Sacred Council of Trent, which declares and establishes from the words of Holy Writ itself that God is the author of the perpetual stability of the marriage bond, its unity and its firmness. Genesis records that God gave the first woman as a companion to Adam, who, by Divine inspiration, as the Council of Trent tells us,² exclaimed: “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: wherefore a man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh.” This is what comes about by the use of marriage. God confirmed this inspiration by blessing them both and saying to them: “Increase and multiply.” Our Lord Himself quoted the words of Adam as containing the Divine law of unity, which limits true marriage to two persons.

¹ Pp. 22, 23.

² Sess. XXIV, De Sacramento Matrimony, at the beginning.

We mean that these laws are written in man’s very nature, even apart from all revelation.

The law of unity; the law of perpetuity; the law of indissolubility.

By human authority, yes. Man, being subject to the rational moral order can in no case derogate from it even for purposes which he thinks good. But God, the Author of nature and of order, can without offense to His own wisdom make some exceptions to laws other than the most principal or most essential ones. This He may do by positive authorization of the exceptions, for ends worthy of Himself, or by tolerating them through consideration of the weakness of human nature, with due regard to all the circumstances. Never has He permitted adultery or free love or fornication ; but He did tolerate among the Jews a certain

polygamy, and even in certain cases the repudiation of the wife.¹

¹ “Every action,” says St. Thomas, whose doctrine we abridge (Supplement 3 P. q. 67, art. 15), “which contradicts the end which nature has in view, is called contrary to the natural law. But such an action may be contrary to a primary or to a secondary end . . . according as it entirely prevents the attainment of the end or only makes its attainment more difficult or less perfect. Thus if an act is so contrary to the end intended by nature as to render a primary purpose directly unattainable, that act is forbidden by a primary precept of the natural law; if it prevents in any way the attainment of a secondary end, or makes a primary end more difficult or less perfect in its realization, it is forbidden, not in virtue of the primary precepts of the natural law, but in virtue of the secondary precepts which are derived from the primary; and in this sense it is contrary to the natural law. Now marriage has for its principal end the procreation and education of children, . . . and for its secondary end, community of life. . . . Plurality of wives does not entirely suppress nor even prevent the attainment of the primary end, since one husband can be a father by several wives and can educate the children they may bear him. But, as regards the secondary end, polygamy, if it does not entirely suppress it, at least places a great obstacle to its realization, for peace will not easily reign in a family where several wives claim the same husband. Thus it is clear that polygamy is in one way contrary to the natural law, while in another way it is not.” It is for this reason that God, but God alone, was able to dispense from the Divine law which made unity a necessary condition of conjugal union. (The same work, art. 2, c.) As for the power of putting away the wife, St. Thomas is of the opinion that it did not render the act licit, but merely exempted it from the legal penalty, and that this power was accorded only to prevent a greater evil, that is the murder of the wife. (The same work, q. 67, art. 3, c.) In the preceding article, however, he names indissolubility among the secondary precepts of the natural law, in which God can give a general dispensation. For that matter, there is no doubt of God’s power to permit divorce for higher reasons of His Providence. (Compare Meyer, Institutiones Juris Naturalis, Part 2, Thesis XVII, p. 99, 5.)

We prove it by the analysis of the sentiment which leads to the conjugal union; by the conjugal union considered in itself; and by the evil consequences of plurality. The sentiment of love, quite a different thing from that of quiet friendship, is jealous and exclusive. “Conjugal love,” says Abbé Dermine,¹ “must be exclusive under pain of dissolving itself. Conjugal love shared with another excites jealousy and divides the heart.” “I want to love you, you alone, you more than all the world. We want to belong to each other, live for each other, share joy and suffering together. That is the way this love expresses itself.”² Moreover the practically equal number of births of the two sexes shows that polygamy is possible only by the killing or mutilation of human beings—two abuses contrary to nature. Besides how could the mutual total self-surrender which the conjugal union implies be realized between more than two people?

Finally, plurality of wives reduces each one to a condition of too great inferiority; plurality of husbands lowers the male sex, and, by throwing doubt upon paternity, takes away from marriage one of the resources intended for the education of the child.

¹ Les lois du mariage chrétien, p. 103.

² Schilgen, Im Dienste des Schöpfers, p. 58.

We prove it by the natural aspiration of the sentiment of love which desires to last forever ; by the irrevocable character of mutual self-surrender, which takes away from the woman her integrity; by the duty of education, which by its nature requires years, and which goes on indefinitely, being renewed at every birth; finally, by the duties of mutual help and mutual upbuilding which are implied in marriage and which do not cease until death.

We prove it by the irreparable consequence which the consummation of marriage entails for the bride; by the obstacle which the mere possibility of divorce puts in the way of a perfect union between the spouses; and by the harm which the breaking of the bond necessarily inflicts upon the children. (See also Number 64 and the following sections.)

Because Christ, in virtue of His Divine power, suppressed polygamy which, even for the Jewish people, had been merely tolerated under the Old Law; and abolished the repudiation of the wife which the law of Moses had allowed in certain cases. In this way He restored to marriage its primitive unity and stability. Therefore [says the Sovereign Pontiff] although before Christ the sublimeness and the severity of the primeval law was so tempered that Moses permitted it to the chosen people of God on account of the hardness of their hearts that a bill of divorce might be given in certain circumstances; nevertheless Christ, by virtue of His supreme legislative power, recalled this concession of greater liberty and restored the primeval law in its integrity by those words which must

never be forgotten: “What God hath joined together let no man put asunder.”¹

¹ P. 31.

Polygamy and repudiation were tolerated in virtue of a Divine dispensation, as being reconcilable strictly speaking with the essential demands of nature. (See Number 11, above.) As regards the reason why, Our Lord Himself in the passage where He restores both the conjugal unity and indissolubility gives but this one reason for it: that the dispensations had been a concession to the moral weakness of the Jewish people.

Yes, the Sovereign Pontiff expressly teaches in this Encyclical that all forms of polygamy are abolished for the entire world. After recalling the fact that the primitive law of marriage was monogamy, the Holy Father adds:¹ And although afterwards this primeval law was relaxed to some extent by God, the Supreme Legislator, there is no doubt that the law of the Gospel fully restored that original and perfect unity and abrogated all dispensations, as the words of Christ and the constant teaching and action of the Church show plainly. With reason therefore does the Sacred Council of Trent solemnly declare: “Christ Our Lord very clearly taught that in this bond two persons only are to be united and joined together when He said: ‘Therefore they are no longer two but one flesh.’” Consequently when the Holy Father, immediately after these words, declares that Our Lord wished “to condemn any form of polygamy or polyandry,” he evidently means a condemnation which applied to the whole world. The restoration of a law which was primitively universal, is itself universal.

¹ Pp. 27, 28.

It means two things: indissolubility of the conjugal bond and the elevation of marriage to the dignity of a Sacrament of the New Law.

Because in classical Latin usage, sacramentum is used to designate an obligatory bond, a consecration, a binding promise.

Yes, every validly contracted marriage is indissoluble, as far as the parties are concerned, and even as far as any human power is concerned.

That is the teaching of the Church, based on these words of Our Lord: “What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder” (St. Matth. xix, 6).

Because God, the Author of order and of the law, can in His wisdom, for the sake of a higher good, make exceptions.

He has made none for marriage contracted between two Christians or baptized persons, which was afterward consummated by the use of the rights of wedlock. But He has given to the Sovereign Pontiff the power to dissolve, for grave reasons, marriage which has not been consummated. The tradition and practice of the Church make this power certain. Moreover, we know through St. Paul that a marriage which has been contracted between two unbaptized persons, may, after the baptism of one of them, be dissolved in favor of the Faith. If the spouse who has not been baptized refuses to cohabit with the party who has been converted to Christianity, under conditions which are acceptable to the latter, the Christian party can marry a Catholic, and from the time of this new marriage the former marriage is dissolved, and the unbaptized party is also free from the bond. Lastly, according to an opinion which is enjoying more and more credit, a marriage which has been consummated while it was not a Sacrament, can, like a Christian marriage which has never been consummated, be dissolved by the Sovereign Pontiff for grave reasons.

Yes, but as we saw in Number 15, Christ revoked this indulgence, which, as He said, had been accorded to the Jewish people because of the hardness of their hearts.

In Other Words, How Does Even Such a Marriage Come to be Beyond the Power of the Sovereign Pontiff? The ultimate reason for this inflexibility may be found in the mystical signification of Christian marriage. According

to St Paul (Ephes. v, 32), marriage between Christians reproduces the perfect union which exists forever between Christ and His Church. Now this reproduction is achieved in its perfection in marriage between baptized persons, which has been consummated. Common sense teaches us that by the use of the conjugal right marriage receives a sort of completion; something irreparable has taken place; the affective and verbal self-surrender has been supplemented by an actual physical one which justifies the expression, very significant in itself, of “consummated marriage.” It is consummated, we may say, in the physical order, and it is also consummated in the symbolical and mystical order, in which it represents the indefectible union between Christ and His Church. In a perfect representation of this union, the indefectibility of the union must have its own symbol; and it has it in the absolutely indissoluble marriage. Such is the reasonable explanation which we offer, as the Sovereign Pontiff says, with respect, as a help to grasp the meaning of that indissolubility which we know with certainty from the teaching of the Church.

On the contrary, this indissolubility is a great blessing for the institution of marriage. By removing the fear of a breach, it makes way for that full intimacy which is the joy of the home; it secures to each of the partners the peaceful possession of the other through good times and bad times; it prevents disagreements from growing into bitterness; it is a bulwark against temptations by making dreams of criminal indulgence impossible of realization; it is an assurance to the spouses that through charms that pass away and temporal goods that disappoint the heart, their union is designed to lead them to that higher end which is attained only in the next life. To the children, this indissolubility is a pledge of care and right education. It is often hard enough for children who have lost father or mother, to see a person who has been an utter stranger to them lawfully take the place of the parent whose loss they feel. Moral rectitude in the family, of which indissolubility is one of the safeguards, is as beneficial to society as it is to the individuals who practise it. No doubt some marriages

are unhappy, often through the fault or imprudence of those who suffer from them. But is that a reason for disturbing the right order of all marriages, for compromising and lessening the happiness of every conjugal union, and so multiplying those very misfortunes which it is thought to remedy?

Yes, this was defined by the Council of Trent in the XXIV Session in which the Council laid down the doctrine of marriage. In Canon 1, the Council pronounced an anathema against anyone who should say that matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven Sacraments of the New Law instituted by Our Lord Jesus Christ.

No, only the marriage of Christians, that is of persons who are validly baptized, is a Sacrament.

We mean a marriage contracted between two persons who are baptized. According to an opinion which has become morally certain, the marriage of a baptized person with an unbaptized person, even with the dispensation of the Church, is not a Sacrament. The reason is that in such a case the Sacrament, existing in only one of the parties, would be, as it were, lame; and because to represent the union between Christ and the Church, the matrimonial union itself must be representative, which it cannot be if it exists in only one of the parties.

It would, provided both were validly baptized.

It is a sensible sign, instituted by Our Lord Jesus Christ, to produce the grace which it signifies. Essentially, therefore, there are in every Sacrament an exterior sensible sign,

and a grace signified, which is also produced by the application of the sign.

Our Lord established as the sensible sign the exchange of consent by which the spouses give themselves to each other for the conjugal life.

It is the grace which is needed for a union worthy of Christians; hence one that is sufficient for the exercise of all the rights, for the accomplishment of all the duties, for the shouldering of all the burdens, for the innocent enjoyment of all the benefits which such a union implies. This grace, called sacramental grace, includes first sanctifying grace, or rather, since matrimony is a Sacrament of the living, normally an increase of sanctifying grace; and also all the actual helps which are absolutely needed or useful in conjugal life; in a word, all the graces which are proper to that state of life. This Sacrament not only increases sanctifying grace, the permanent principle of the supernatural life, in those who, as the expression is, place no obstacle (obex) in its way, but also adds particular gifts, dispositions, seeds of grace, by elevating and perfecting the natural powers in such a way that the parties are assisted not only in understanding but in knowing intimately, in adhering to firmly, in willing effectively, and in successfully putting into practice those things which pertain to the marriage state, its aims and duties. In fine, it gives them the right to the actual assistance of grace, whensoever they need it for fulfilling the duties of their state.¹ The Encyclical, therefore, distinguishes between a group of actual helps, which it calls particular gifts, good inclinations, seeds of grace (sanctifying grace is meant)— synonymous expressions, all these—whose immediate purpose is to reinforce supernaturally, that is to elevate, the natural powers; and a group of aids which are to go into operation only at the prayer of the parties to the marriage. The Encyclical thus attributes a peculiar efficacy to the prayer of the parties to obtain what is necessary or useful to them in every situation in which they may find themselves. In fact, according to the teaching of St. Augustine,² God does give ^Pp. 33, 34. **De bono perseverantiae , throughout, e. g. Ch. XI; Latin Patrology, 45, 1017.

certain graces directly, whereas for other graces He waits for our cooperation with the grace of prayer which He always gives.

¹ Pp. 33, 34.

² De dono perseverantiae, passim, e. g. Ch. XI; PL, 45, 101[-]. (The final digit is illegible in the scan. — ed.)

An opinion which has some authority, but which is not obligatory extends to all the Sacraments what we must hold as certain in the case of the three Sacraments that imprint a character on the soul: Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders. This character is a real supernatural quality which is immediately signified by the exterior sign, and which itself in turn immediately signifies the sacramental grace to which it confers a title. Thus through Baptism in the name of the Holy Trinity man receives the character of a Christian; by Confirmation he receives the mark of a soldier of Christ; by Orders, that of a minister of sacred offices. The Christian needs the sacramental grace of a Christian life; the soldier needs the grace of supernatural weapons required or useful in battles; the sacred minister needs the gifts which are necessary for the fulfilment of his sacred mission. Now whereas it is only in these three Sacraments that we have to acknowledge the physical reality of a character, yet the analogy of the Sacraments and the natural proximate meaning of the exterior sign lead us to recognize the immediate title as sign for receiving grace as inhering in a reality of the moral order,¹ which is directly or immediately signified by the exterior sign. Let us apply this to marriage. What does the consent of the parties signify? What does it immediately produce? A permanent bond. But this permanent bond involves the conjugal life, with all its rights and duties, its fecundity, its vicissitudes; it, moreover, requires the graces of that state of life. Consequently the meaning of the grace of matrimony clearly appears in this bond, which is thus found to be signified by the consent, and at the same time significative of the sacramental grace. The need of this supernatural grace, and the right to it, appear still more evident when we learn from the Apostle that Christians must represent or symbolize the union of Christ and His Church.

¹ A reality of the moral order is for example some quality which without affecting a person physically yet confers upon him rights and duties. Such is the jurisdiction of a judge, the authority of a ruler.

First, it follows that the spouses themselves are the ministers of the Sacrament. In the beautiful language of the Encyclical they open up for themselves a treasure of sacramental graces. The priest is there as a qualified witness, like a notary whose presence is required for certain contracts although he himself is not a party to them. The blessing of the priest is an accidental complementary rite. It calls down blessings on a marriage which is already contracted, on a Sacrament which is already received. Secondly, it follows that two baptized persons cannot contract a valid marriage without that marriage being a Sacrament. They may be ignorant of the doctrine of the Church regarding marriage; they may not even know that they are baptized; they will, nevertheless, confer upon themselves and receive the Sacrament, even though they do not know it. Alas, if they have become irreligious it may be that they do not want the Sacrament; it may be that they reject this honor and grace. If their refusal is absolute, if it is not virtually retracted by the preponderant intention of being united in marriage, then their consent will be inoperative; they will be husband and wife only in appearance, whereas in reality they will be companions in concubinage.

This consequence, that the partners, even though their dispositions were at first bad, can, if their hearts are changed by true conversion, count on the sacramental graces of matrimony. On the other hand, if they go on to the end in their evil way, this bond which was intended to make them holy, will, like every grace which is guiltily rejected, aggravate their guilt and condemnation. Let us hear on this point the consoling but admonitory teaching of the Encyclical : The Faithful, once joined by marriage ties, can never be deprived of the help and the binding force of the Sacrament. Indeed, as the holy doctor [St. Augustine]¹ adds, even M De nuptUs et concupiscentia, Book I, chapter 10; Latin Patrology, 44, 420.

those who commit adultery carry with them the sacred yoke, although in this case not as a title to the glory of grace but for the ignominy of their guilty action, “as the soul by apostasy, withdrawing as it were from marriage with Christ, even though it may have lost its faith, does not lose the Sacrament of Faith which it received with the laver of regeneration.”²

¹ De nuptiis et concupiscentia, L. I, c. 10; PL, 44, 420.

² P. 34.

According to the Encyclical the principal attack is against marriage as a Sacrament. The Holy Father says:¹ And now considering that the third blessing, which is that of the Sacrament, far surpasses the other two, we should not be surprised to find that this, because of its outstanding excellence, is much more sharply attacked by the same people.

¹ P. 45.

By tactics in which we can distinguish three steps: the denial of the sacred character of marriage; the assault upon its indissolubility; and the relegation of marriage to the rank of profane and civil affairs.

By regarding the marriage which is called civil as the real marriage, which can later be supplemented by a religious ceremony, a nuptial blessing, which is in no way essential.¹

¹ Pp. 45, 46.

It is impossible in this sense, that the declaration of a civil magistrate can never form the bond, whose only efficient cause is the exchange of consent by the two parties themselves. For non-baptized persons the civil contract may be the real contract in this sense that the competent authority — and according to a common opinion, that is, for those cases, the civil authority — can require on pain of nullity that the exchange of consent be given in the presence of a civil magistrate and two witnesses; just as the Church, since the Council of Trent, and now under the Code of Canon Law, requires on pain of nullity for marriages between two Catholics and between a Catholic and a non-Catholic, that the exchange of consent be given regularly in the presence of an authorized priest and two witnesses. We say this is required regularly, because the Code provides for certain cases in which the marriage may be validly contracted before any two witnesses, without the presence of a priest.

Although the nuptial blessing is a sacred ceremony, which, through the prayer of the Church, is a means of actual graces, yet it does not constitute the sacred element which is essential to marriage.

It is in the mutual consent of the parties to the marriage.

A marriage between Christians is the only marriage which is a Sacrament; but in a lower degree every marriage contains something sacred, “put there,” says Leo XIII, “by nature herself.”

We prove it from the unanimous consent of the peoples who have introduced a religious rite into the conjugal union; from the Divine origin of the institution of marriage; from

the end of marriage, which is to bring up for God the children that may be born, and to lead the spouses themselves to God by the mutual help which they give each other; finally from the mysterious alliance between God and the spouses in human generation, God creating and infusing the spiritual soul into the body prepared by the parents.¹ Leo XIII adds this more profound supernatural reason: “because marriage was from the beginning like an image of the Incarnation of the Word of God” (Encyclical "Arcanum”). The sacramental character gives besides to Christian marriage a new dignity or nobility in which the Apostle St. Paul recognizes a great mystery in Christ and in the Church (Ephes. v. 32). The conjugal community cannot derive entirely from the created natural order, either its end or its means. Its principal end, the generation of children, cannot be attained unless God, the Creator of the spirit, intervene in the paternal function and complete it by the creation of the soul. By that very fact, marriage, even in its natural reality, overflows the confines of this world and surpasses the forces of this world. From this point of view alone, every marriage is a mystery. Then, consider its interior structure. We find there a sensible, corporal side, and a moral, spiritual side. Inasmuch as it is placed in the sphere of the senses, marriage is in danger of losing itself by sinking into animality. It must cry for help from above to escape from the preponderance of the corporal element. On its moral and spiritual side, it is more than a simple alliance of mind and heart; it implies the mutual self-surrender of two persons destined to be welded together in one flesh, a thing, which is done in all security and purity only with the Divine good pleasure. Hence, even a purely natural marriage possesses a mystic character, and is a sacred and holy thing. According to the admirable expression of Leo XIII it is a foreshadowing of the Incarnation of the Son of God. Nowhere is man less autonomous than in marriage. Autonomy, by cutting the secret roots of its life, its special relation to God, makes marriage unrecognizable, reduces it to nothing.² What shall we say now of the supernatural elevation of Christian marriage by the sacramental character with which

Christ has endowed the consent which gives it birth? What shall we say of the mission which belongs as a consequence to Christian spouses to represent by their union and love the Union of Christ and His Church? Listen to this exhortation which the Ritual used in Germany addresses to the bride and groom in the ceremony of marriage: Just as Christ never abandons His Church, so you must never forsake each other, but ever remain faithfully united until death. And just as Christ sanctifies His Church, so too each of you should work for the sanctification of the other. As Christ loves His Church, and protects and cares for her, so the husband should love his wife, and protect her, and care for her with fidelity even unto the sacrifice of self; and as the Church is subject to Christ as to her head, so too the wife should obey her husband in all that is necessary, right, and fitting. And both should, in faithful unity, raise their children for Christ and for His holy Church. Consequently, as Dr. Riedel observes,³ the Sacrament of matrimony confers on the partners a grace which perfects their natural love, a grace which cements their indissoluble unity, which helps them to sanctify each other, and enables them to fulfil their duty in regard to their children.

¹ Pp. 46, 47.

² These thoughts are borrowed almost literally from the fine address which Mr. Karl Adam delivered at the general assembly of German Catholics held at Freiburg in Brisgau in 1929. It was published by Herder under the title, Die Sakramentale Weihe der Ehe.

³ Brautunterricht, p. 3 (Herder, 1929).

Because marriage between Christians whom heresy or schism has separated from the true and only Catholic Church, is a Sacrament just as much as that between Catholics, provided the parties have been validly baptized.

A high regard for Christian marriage which they are about to contract, and an ardent zeal to make their union resemble as closely as possible its arch-type, the union between Christ and the Church.

Unfortunately they are not, because Protestants deny the sacramental character of marriage.

Four centuries of Protestant teaching have established two convictions in the consciousness of the English-speaking world. The first is that the marriage of Christians is in no sense a sacramental union, and the second, that marriage is not a lasting, but a terminable, union. . . . It is a contract which can be terminated at will by the parties concerned, provided that they fulfil the conditions prescribed by the State.¹

¹ America, January 17, 1931, p. 350.

110. - A preliminary observation. In order that you may judge rightly concerning the perfection which Christ conferred upon the natural institution of matrimony, the present edifice is to be contemplated, rather than the first outlines of the Christian age, such as, after several centuries, already rises polished although not yet fully perfect, as a more mature fruit of evangelical revelation. For in the supernatural order itself, God demands human cooperation, which through successive approaches and endeavors, with which both defects and errors are easily mingled, is accustomed to attain progressively to a better understanding of immutable truth and to a more perfect execution of absolute duty. Wherefore, just as every living being is known better from its developed body than from the embryo, so it is perceived more clearly from the present perfection of Christian matrimony than from its first beginnings what Christ instituted. Provided that in present institutions we show directly or indirectly the legitimate continuation of apostolic doctrine, the present splendor of the doctrine renders us more certain concerning its principles; but from principles accurately weighed we draw an indication of a new progress to be attempted.

The benefits which the Catholic faith conferred upon conjugal society, and at the same time upon public morals and human society in general, regard some things immediately concerning matrimony itself, and other things concerning the preparation of persons for embracing this institution rightly.

111. - On the institution of matrimony. 1. The Catholic Church protects the perfect unity of matrimony and the absolute indissolubility of consummated matrimony; and, withdrawing it from profane authority, places it fully under the protection of religious power. Thus she perfectly fulfills and completes the desires of nature concerning the institution of matrimony.

2. Nor was she content with this. But, taught by Christ her author, she shows that the matrimonial covenant between the baptized has been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and thus demonstrates conjugal life to be suffused with the holy power of grace. She then inculcates the honor bestowed upon the permanent union of the spouses of representing the inviolable sanctity of the mysterious union by which Christ is joined to the Church.

It is useful here to explain briefly the celebrated passage of the Apostle to the Ephesians 5:22-33. On account of the humble condition in which women were placed at that time, St. Paul did not have to linger long in preaching the subjection of the wife. He rather recalls it in order that he may induce the man more gently to fulfill and profess his own duties. "How greatly," he reasons approximately thus, "is the Church rightly and deservedly subject to Christ! Yet how greatly He loves her! He handed Himself over for her." Christ Himself took upon Himself the care which of itself fell to the wife, that she should cleanse and adorn herself to please the man, so that He might "sanctify the Church, cleansing her by the washing of water in the word of life, that He might present to Himself a glorious Church." Thus also men ought to love their wives. If the man is the head of the woman, the wife is his body. Wherefore the wife completes the man as a part, so that by loving his wife the man loves himself. Do we not know from Scripture that unity of man and wife and the devotion of the man for the wife: "For this cause a man shall leave his father and his mother and shall cleave to his wife. And the two shall be in one flesh"? A great mystery lies hidden here, whose signification I find in the union of Christ and the Church. That is, unless we are mistaken: this marvelous disposition of divine Providence, by which the human race is so constituted that man and woman, divided by sex, should become one flesh and the man should leave all things for the sake of his wife, was destined by God to signify that more marvelous conjunction of Christ with the Church, from whom He was separated by His divinity, and for whom He nevertheless left heaven and the Father so that He might cleave to her and compose with her one body of which He Himself would be the head. Something great, therefore, the union of man and wife mysteriously portends in Christ and the Church. "But, even apart from this interpretation" (so says the Apostle himself), let each man love his wife "as himself" ¹.

¹ Compare also Prat, Saint Paul.

Certain theologians of an earlier age expanded the very rationale of the figure. And although perhaps destitute of certain arguments, nevertheless these comparisons are salutary and apt for establishing a great estimation of marriage. Wherefore the Church also profits not a little through them for the cause of matrimony. Thus it is read in Sanchez: A ratified marriage signifies the union of Christ with a soul existing in grace, or the union of Christ through charity with the whole Church, certain members of which can fail. But a consummated marriage signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church through assumed flesh. Christ was made one flesh with the Church "through the mystery of the Incarnation" (De matrimonio, book 2, disp. 13, no. 1).

If we now consider the ends of matrimony: as regards the end of offspring, Christian matrimony no longer aims only that the human race be propagated, but that children be begotten for the Church, "fellow citizens with the saints and domestics of God" ². As regards the remedy of concupiscence, the value of chastity is so exalted in the Catholic Church that the moderate use of marriage, sometimes tempered or interrupted by voluntary will in order to devote time to prayer, and exercised gently according to the desires of nature, fully suffices of itself for satiating lust; and so that souls also may be equal to bearing even a prolonged obligation of continence which circumstances sometimes render necessary. Finally, as regards love, the most noble exemplar of affection is proposed to spouses in the love by which Christ loves the Church.

² Ephesians 2:19.

But insofar as we attend to the sacramental signification, the speculative signification of Christian marriage, by which it represents the union of Christ with the Church, impels spouses to imitate the holy fecundity of the Church by a more chaste generation and a better education of offspring; the fidelity of Christ placed before their eyes strengthens their mutual fidelity by an ineffable example, with a new sanction also added by which infidelity becomes the violation of a sacred thing; finally, it perfects the indissolubility of a consummated marriage by an inviolate sacrament, so that Augustine could celebrate offspring, fidelity, and sacrament as the three goods of Christian marriage ³.

³ De Genesi ad litteram, book 9, chapter 7 (Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 34, col. 397).

112. - On the preparation of persons. 1. By the general rationale by which the Catholic faith cultivates chastity, humility, and noble affections, it already disposes souls not a little toward entering matrimony holily and bearing its burdens faithfully.

2. It indeed assigns to the wife an inferior place, but compensates for this humility by the affectionate devotion of the husband, so that it places the two bonds and means of the firmest and happiest union in humility and love.

3. Then, by admitting and rather commending the preparation of betrothal, through which only a union of souls is permitted, the Church provides for the nobility of mutual affection and at the same time offers no slight aid to youth that it may preserve itself perfectly chaste.

4. In the equal chastity which the Catholic religion imposes upon each betrothed person, there is held a new pledge of a happy union. St. Augustine already wrote what today we hear so often inculcated: "You who do not have a wife and wish to marry, preserve yourselves intact for them, just as you wish to find them intact" ⁴. Therefore, long ago the Catholic faith rejected that foul worldly distinction by which the sin of a youth or a man, but not of a maiden, is excused, and which is marked by the name of the double standard (la double morale).

⁴ Sermon 224 (Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 38, col. 1094).

5. Yet since misfortunes threaten us from every side in this life, religion in the patience of Christ hands on to spouses a most opportune teaching for alleviating hardships and for bearing adversities not without merit.

Therefore, that we may now comprehend in summary the whole matter concerning matrimony and the preparation of persons, these goods are of themselves available to Christian marriage: full mutual confidence and the communication of the whole of life; the hope of a spiritual union which, beyond the limits of the present life, will endure forever; protection against temptations and infidelities from the absolute firmness of the marriage; holy authority over children; formation for patience, always necessary in this life.

Utility. - From an accurate knowledge of this canonical part, the priest has these principal fruits to gather: that, with the impediments known, he may not lend his work except to valid marriages; that, with the prescriptions to be observed known, he may exercise his ministry according to the mind of the Church; that, with the faculties of dispensing or convalidating marriages known, he may cut away many scandals, and may rescue not a few men from the miserable state of sin.

— Appendix XVI belongs to this section. Historical. Cf. Appendix XVI.

This chapter is divided into four articles: 1. on the existence of the sacrament of matrimony; 2. on its matter and form; 3. on its minister; 4. on its subject.

642. Errors. 1. The Gnostics and Manichaeans erred concerning matrimony, although they condemned rather the use of matrimony as an incentive of concupiscence and as propagative of original sin. They held the whole of matrimony to be an invention of the evil principle.

2. Nearly all Protestants (with a few exceptions, for example, the Ritualists) indeed admit that matrimony is something religious; indeed, they say that it is better than virginity, but they utterly deny that it is a sacrament properly so called; indeed, Calvin did not fear to say that the character of a sacrament belongs no more to matrimony than to agriculture or the barber's or cobbler's art, and that it was not recognized as a sacrament before the time of Gregory I (the year 590).⁹⁵

3. Peter Lombard (the Master of the Sentences) indeed numbers matrimony among the sacraments, but appears to deny to it the power properly to cause grace.⁹⁶ John of Faenza taught the same.⁹⁷ Durandus of Saint-Pourcain (d. 1332) thinks that matrimony is a sacrament in a certain broad sense and does not produce grace ex opere operato.⁹⁸

Against all these, according to Catholic dogma, let there be the following:

⁹⁵ Institutes, l. 4, c. 19, § 34. Luther taught similar things, saying: "Marriage is an outward worldly thing, like clothing, food, house, and farm" (Von Ehesachen, the year 1530). Previously, however, he had admitted the sacramentality of matrimony.

⁹⁶ IV, dist. 1. Moreover, there is dispute concerning the true mind of Peter Lombard and Durandus.

⁹⁷ In Freisen, Geschichte des kanonischen Eherechtes, p. 37.

⁹⁸ Commentary on IV, dist. 26, q. 3. Cf. Drouven, De re sacr., l. 9, q. 1, § 2.

643. Thesis. Matrimony legitimately celebrated between Christians is a true sacrament, properly so called, of the New Law, instituted by Christ the Lord.

The proof of this dogma, which has been defined several times,⁹⁹ and especially by the Council of Trent,¹⁰⁰ thundering an anathema against anyone who should say that "matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ the Lord," pertains rather to Dogmatic or Apologetic Theology than to Moral Theology; hence only the following brief arguments are proposed. Although certain men (Cajetan, Estius, Vazquez) think that the dogma concerning the sacrament of matrimony cannot be proved from Sacred Scripture, but only from tradition confirmed through the definitions of Councils, the text of St. Paul soon to be cited appears to us to be strictly probative. The Catholic dogma is therefore proved:

1. From Sacred Scripture. St. Paul,¹⁰¹ treating of matrimony, says: "Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord, because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church.... Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church.... For this reason a man shall leave his father and his mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh; this is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church."¹⁰²

Certainly, from the word "sacrament" alone, which is found in this text, it is not yet lawful to deduce a direct argument for the dogma, both because "mystery" is had in the Greek text and because down to the twelfth century the word sacrament was employed in diverse senses by ecclesiastical writers.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, in the cited text there is a solid argument for the Catholic dogma. For a sacrament of the New Law is a sensible sign causing grace from the institution of Christ. But Christian matrimony is a sign of this kind. Therefore Christian matrimony is a true sacrament, properly so called, of the New Law. The major of this syllogism is the very definition of a sacrament. The minor, however, is easily proved: a) Christian matrimony is a sign; for it signifies the moral union of Christ with the Church, as manifestly appears from the words of the Apostle saying: "The husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church." "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church." "He who loves his own wife loves himself; for no man ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ also does the Church." Christian matrimony, therefore, is a sign of the union of Christ with the Church.

That matrimony is a sensible sign is evident of itself, since the matrimonial contract must necessarily be manifested externally. b) Christian matrimony is a sensible sign causing grace; for it is called by the Apostle "a great mystery, but I speak in Christ and in the Church." Certainly matrimony considered in itself, that is, the carnal union of the spouses and their mutual love and subjection, would undeservedly be called a great mystery, because nothing is more obvious and consonant with nature than such a union between a man and a woman. A union of this kind existed even before Christ; indeed, it is had in some manner among brute animals. Why, therefore, is such a union called by the Apostle a great mystery? But the Apostle himself immediately and expressly excludes this profane sense of matrimony; for he adds: "but I speak in Christ and in the Church" (in Greek it is said: "unto Christ and unto the Church"). Therefore St. Paul does not will every matrimony to be held as a great mystery, but only that which is entered into with respect to Christ and the Church. In other words: only Christian matrimony is a great mystery. But what distinguishes Christian matrimony from every other matrimony and renders it a great mystery? Nothing other than supernatural grace joined with it. Therefore from the words of the Apostle it is proved not obscurely that Christian matrimony causes supernatural grace. This indeed becomes all the more evident because the marital union is compared with the union between Christ and the Church. Now Christ, uniting Himself with the Church, causes supernatural grace in her. c) That matrimony as a sign causing grace was instituted by Christ is evident of itself, because no one except God alone is able to annex supernatural grace to natural causes. But in the present order of things all grace is conferred by Christ the Redeemer. From all these things it appears that the words of the Apostle furnish a solid argument that Christian matrimony is a true sacrament, properly so called. Therefore the Roman Catechism deservedly says:¹⁰⁴ "Now that matrimony is a sacrament, the Church, confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, always held as certain and established; for thus he writes to the Ephesians: Husbands ought to love.... For what he says, This is a great sacrament, no one ought to doubt must be referred to matrimony: namely, that the union of a man and a woman, of which God is the author, is a sacrament, that is, a sacred sign, of that most holy bond by which Christ the Lord is joined with the Church. And that this is the proper and true meaning of those words is shown by the ancient Holy Fathers who interpreted that passage, and the holy Synod of Trent explained the same."

2. From the Holy Fathers. St. Augustine¹⁰⁵ writes: "The good of nuptials, therefore, among all nations and men consists in the cause of generation and in the fidelity of chastity; but insofar as it pertains to the people of God, it consists also in the sanctity of the sacrament.... In the same manner, if there is an ordination of clergy for gathering a congregation, even if the gathering of a congregation does not follow, nevertheless the sacrament of ordination remains in those ordained." In these words St. Augustine attributes the sanctity of a sacrament to matrimony which pertains to the people of God, or to the matrimony of Christians, which he denies to other marriages; moreover, he compares the sacrament of matrimony with the sacrament of order, which certainly is a sacrament properly so called. In the same book, c. 18, the Holy Doctor calls matrimony "a seal and a sacrament," and concludes thus: "For in the nuptials of our [women], the sanctity of the sacrament has more force than the fecundity of the womb." But that the sacrament of matrimony is not merely a sign but also effects grace, St. Augustine asserts in this manner:¹⁰⁶ "The reality of this sacrament is without doubt that a male and a female joined by marriage persevere inseparably as long as they live, and that, except for the cause of fornication, it is not lawful for one spouse to be separated from the other." Now the res sacramenti signifies grace, and the Scholastics also understood this etymology in this manner. Therefore the sense of the cited text is: the sacramental grace of matrimony so assists the spouses that, notwithstanding human inconstancy, they can and ought always to remain united. St. Leo the Great¹⁰⁷ says: "Since the society of nuptials was so constituted from the beginning that, besides the union of the sexes, it had in itself the sacrament of Christ and the Church,¹⁰⁸ there is no doubt that that woman does not pertain to matrimony in whom it is shown that there was no nuptial mystery."¹⁰⁹

3. By the argument of prescription. From various documents and formulas of faith it is established that the Eastern Churches, separated from the Roman See for many centuries, hold matrimony as a true sacrament. But this fact cannot be explained unless it is admitted that already at the time of the separation (the fifth century), throughout the whole Church, matrimony was held to be a true sacrament. For the Eastern Churches after the schism certainly admitted nothing that had been newly introduced into the Roman Church. Therefore it must be conceded that already before the fifth century matrimony was recognized as a true sacrament,¹¹⁰ and that its institution is suitably referred to Christ Himself.

4. By the argument of congruity. Since the matter here concerns a supernatural reality, reason cannot demonstrate apodictically that matrimony is a sacrament; but it manifestly shows how exceedingly fitting is the elevation of matrimony to the dignity of a sacrament. For the welfare of the whole of human society depends upon marriages rightly entered into and holily preserved, because, if marriages are not holily preserved, quarrels and dissensions arise between the spouses, the education of offspring is ruined, and morals are corrupted more and more. Thus it is clearer than light from the history of all peoples. Moreover, the sanctity of matrimony can scarcely, indeed scarcely at all, be preserved unless the spouses are assisted by special supernatural grace. For suitably to generate and educate offspring, to dwell together peacefully and charitably throughout their whole life, patiently to bear each other's burdens, all these things, I say, demand such excellent virtues that they cannot be had without special supernatural grace. Therefore God most fittingly joined sacramental grace with matrimony. Briefly comprising these things, the Roman Catechism¹¹¹ says: "Therefore it must be taught that by the grace of this sacrament it is effected that the husband and wife, joined by the bond of mutual charity, rest each in the benevolence of the other, and do not seek strange and illicit loves and intercourse, but that in all things marriage be honorable and the bed undefiled."

⁹⁹ Already the Second Council of Lyons (the year 1274) defined: "The same Holy Roman Church also holds and teaches that there are seven ecclesiastical sacraments, one, namely, baptism, ... another is matrimony" (Profession of Faith of Michael Palaeologus; in Denz., n. 465). The Council of Florence defined: "The seventh is the sacrament of matrimony" (Instruction for the Armenians; in Denz., n. 702).

¹⁰⁰ Sess. 24, can. 1, De matrimonio (Denz., n. 971).

¹⁰¹ Eph. 5:22-32.

¹⁰² In the Greek text there is: Τὸ μυστήριον τοῦτο μέγα ἐστίν, ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν.

¹⁰³ Cf. Freisen, Geschichte des kanonischen Eherechtes, § 4, and above, III, n. 2.

¹⁰⁴ Part II, c. 8, q. 15.

¹⁰⁵ De bono coniugali, c. 24 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 394).

¹⁰⁶ De nuptiis et concupiscentia, l. 1, c. 7 (Migne, loc. cit. 44, 424).

¹⁰⁷ Ep. 92, Ad Rusticum, n. 4 (Migne, loc. cit. 54, 1204).

¹⁰⁸ Eph. 5:32.

¹⁰⁹ Several other Fathers teach the same, as can be seen in Billuart (De matrimonio, diss. 1, a. 3), or better in Drouven (De re sacr., l. 10, q. 1); whence Freisen (Geschichte des kanonischen Eherechtes, § 54) says altogether undeservedly that the Holy Fathers did not touch upon the question of the sacrament, and that if they sometimes employed the word sacrament concerning matrimony, they did not understand it in our sense. Certainly the Holy Fathers do not speak so explicitly about the sacrament of matrimony as modern authors treating this matter expressly; nevertheless, from this it is by no means lawful to infer that they in no way recognized matrimony to be a true sacrament. Do the Holy Fathers speak more clearly about the sacraments of confirmation and extreme unction, and about many other things pertaining to Catholic dogma? (Cf. Schanz, Die Lehre von den Sakramenten, § 55, and Drouven, loc. cit.)

¹¹⁰ Cf. Pourrat, La théologie sacramentaire, 2nd ed., pp. 252-267.

¹¹¹ Part II, c. 8, q. 15. See another argument of congruity in St. Thomas, S. theol. 3, q. 65, a. 1.

644. Objection. A sacrament does not diminish but increases grace and perfection. But matrimony diminishes grace and perfection, since it destroys the state of virginity, which excels matrimony, as was defined in the Council of Trent.¹¹² Therefore matrimony is not a sacrament.

Response: Without any doubt the sacraments of the New Law do not diminish grace, but either give or increase it actually and in a transient manner; but from this it by no means follows that he who has worthily received some sacrament is throughout his whole life in a more perfect state than another who has not received this same sacrament. Thus the sacrament of matrimony, rightly received, increases grace, but it by no means follows from this that it also constitutes a higher state. For state plainly differs from personal perfection. Thus, for example, religious and bishops are in the state of perfection, but from this it is not yet lawful to conclude that they always have greater grace than any layman. Therefore the state of matrimony is less perfect than the state of virginity, but the sacrament of matrimony causes grace ex opere operato, which the state of virginity does not do. On the contrary, he who preserves virginity from a motive of virtue performs a very good work and merits a great reward.

From the sacramental character of matrimony there follow several corollaries of great moment:

¹¹² Sess. 24, can. 10, De matrimonio (Denz., n. 981).

645. Corollary 1. The sacrament of matrimony was instituted by Christ the Lord.

Above, in the treatise on the sacraments in general, it was proved that all the sacraments were instituted by Christ Himself. But if it is asked when Christ instituted this sacrament of matrimony, three opinions are customarily adduced:

1. Christ elevated the matrimonial contract to the dignity of a sacrament when He honored the nuptials celebrated at Cana of Galilee both by His presence and by a notable miracle. This opinion is more common, and St. Cyril of Alexandria,¹¹³ St. Epiphanius,¹¹⁴ and St. Augustine¹¹⁵ appear also to favor it.

2. Christ instituted matrimony when He abrogated the law of repudiation and recalled matrimony to its pristine indissolubility, saying: "What therefore God has joined together, let no man separate."¹¹⁶

3. Christ instituted the sacrament of matrimony after the resurrection, when He spoke various things with the Apostles concerning the kingdom of God.

Nothing certain can be said about this question, which, moreover, is of lesser moment, since also concerning certain other sacraments the time when Christ instituted them is unknown, for example, concerning confirmation and extreme unction. This, however, appears to be certain: the sacrament of matrimony was not instituted in paradise, as certain theologians, for example, Catharinus and Maldonatus, taught, because in the Old Testament there did not exist a sacrament producing or increasing sanctifying grace ex opere operato. It can be conceded, however, that matrimony instituted by God in paradise was something sacred and bestowed the grace of state upon the spouses.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ In Ioan. 2:1-4 (Migne, Patr. graec. 73, 223).

¹¹⁴ Haer. 67 (Migne, loc. cit. 42, 179).

¹¹⁵ In Ioan., tract. 9, n. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 35, 1459).

¹¹⁶ Matt. 19:6.

¹¹⁷ The opinion of Catharinus and Maldonatus can scarcely be sustained while preserving the faith, since Pius IX (Ep. ad reg. Sardin., September 19, 1852) writes: "It is a dogma of faith that matrimony was elevated by Jesus Christ our Lord to the dignity of a sacrament."

646. Corollary 2. To the Church alone it pertains to judge and determine concerning all things which touch upon the essence of Christian matrimony.¹¹⁸

The Reformers of the sixteenth century falsely taught the contrary; to them are added Marcus Antonius de Dominis, Launoy, the Regalists, the Jansenists who participated in the Synod of Pistoia (the year 1787), and, among Catholics, Carrière,¹¹⁹ who taught as a probable opinion and safe in practice that the power of establishing diriment impediments of Christian matrimony belongs not to the Church alone, but also to lay princes.¹²⁰ Against all these, the thesis stated in this corollary is proved:

1. From the Council of Trent. "If anyone says that matrimonial causes do not pertain to ecclesiastical judges, let him be anathema."¹²¹ But that this canon is to be understood in such a way that it pertains to the Church alone to judge concerning things pertaining to the essence of matrimony is evident from several condemned propositions.¹²² Hence Pius VI, explaining the cited canon of the Council of Trent in a letter to the Bishop of Mottola (September 16, 1788), writes: "It is a dogma of faith that matrimony after the coming of Christ became one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical Law.... Hence it follows that to the Church alone, to which the entire care of the sacraments is entrusted, belong every right and power to assign its form, and consequently to pronounce judgment concerning the validity or invalidity of marriages." Leo XIII has similar things:¹²³ "Next, the dignity of the sacrament must be considered, by the accession of which the marriages of Christians became by far the most noble. But by the will of Christ, the Church alone can and ought so to establish and command concerning the sacraments that it is plainly absurd to will that even the smallest part of her power be transferred to the rulers of the civil state." The same Pontiff¹²⁴ proves that this power of the Church was always in force: "[The Church] exercised power over the marriages of Christians in every time and place, and so exercised it that it appeared to be her own, not acquired by the concession of men, but divinely obtained by the will of her Author.... No one is ignorant how many things concerning the impediments of bond, vow, disparity of cult, consanguinity, crime, and public propriety were established by the prelates of the Church in the Councils of Elvira, Arles, Chalcedon, the Second Council of Milevis, and others, which often differed greatly from decrees sanctioned by imperial law. Indeed, so far were princely men from arrogating to themselves power over Christian marriages that they rather recognized and declared that it belonged, in its entirety, to the Church. In truth, Honorius, Theodosius the Younger, and Justinian¹²⁵ did not hesitate to confess that, in those matters which touch upon nuptials, no more was permitted to them than to guardians and defenders of the sacred canons. And if they sanctioned anything concerning impediments of marriage by edicts, they taught the reason, not unwillingly, namely, that they had assumed this for themselves from permission and authority."

2. From reason. The contract and the sacrament are inseparable realities in Christian matrimony.¹²⁶ Now the Church alone, and by no means the civil power, ought to determine and judge concerning the sacraments. Therefore the Church alone judges concerning all things pertaining to the essence of the sacrament of matrimony. This argument is so evident that it struck Calvin himself, who consequently denied that matrimony is a sacrament. For he writes: "For once the Catholics obtained that matrimony is a sacrament, they drew to themselves the cognizance of matrimonial causes, since it was a spiritual matter not to be handled by profane judgments."¹²⁷

¹¹⁸ Code of Canon Law, c. 1960.

¹¹⁹ De matrimonio, I, 596.

¹²⁰ Carrière afterward (in the year 1857) retracted this opinion of his (cf. Feije, De imped. et dispens. matrim., n. 56).

¹²¹ Sess. 24, can. 12, De matrimonio (Denz., n. 982).

¹²² Propositions 59 and 60 of the Synod of Pistoia (Denz., n. 1559 ff.); propositions 68-71 and 74 of the Syllabus of Pius IX (Denz., nn. 1768 ff., 1774); cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1960.

¹²³ Constitution Arcanum.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Novell., 137.

¹²⁶ Cf. above, n. 628.

¹²⁷ Institutes, l. 4, c. 19, § 37. The most celebrated Protestant jurist of Berlin, Hinschius, recognized the same, writing: "The Catholic Church must oppose such [state legislation concerning marriage]; for from the sacramental nature assumed by her there follow as consequences exclusive legislation and jurisdiction in matrimonial causes, at least insofar as property law is not involved." Holtzendorff, Rechtslexikon, s.v. "Ehe."

647. Corollary 3. The civil power cannot establish diriment or prohibiting impediments for Christian marriages;¹²⁸ likewise, it cannot pronounce divorce with respect to the matrimonial bond, nor permit Christians who have obtained a divorce to hasten to new nuptials.

All these things are nothing but practical conclusions deduced from the preceding corollary. For all these things pertain to the essence of the sacrament of matrimony. Moreover, the civil power has no power concerning those things which touch upon the sacrament of matrimony. The matrimonial institution indeed pertains also to the preservation and good of civil society, whose government belongs to the civil government, and consequently the civil government has a true right rightly to govern the matrimony of its subjects. But since Christian matrimony is a sacrament, the civil government now has no power concerning all those things which touch upon its sacramental character; for it must yield to the Church, whose right is higher. For it is impossible that the same Christian matrimony be governed by two independent powers, namely, the civil and the ecclesiastical. Otherwise it could happen that the same matrimony would be valid according to ecclesiastical law and invalid according to civil law. From this reasoning, however, it is not lawful to infer that power over Christian matrimony belongs to the Church from a benign concession of the civil power, which was expressly condemned by Pius VI.¹²⁹ The power of the Church in this matter depends solely upon the will of Christ elevating the matrimonial contract between Christians to the dignity of a sacrament, and therefore upon divine law alone. Hence the Church has never recognized such power in civil governments, but rather has more than once expressly rejected laws enacted by emperors concerning matrimony. Thus, for example, the perverse sanctions of Roman law concerning adultery and divorce were rejected.¹³⁰ St. Gregory the Great reproved marriages of blood relatives permitted by princes.¹³¹ Not rarely the Supreme Pontiffs had to defend and protect the right of the Church concerning matrimony against emperors themselves and other very powerful persons. Thus, for example, Nicholas I in the most celebrated divorce case of Lothair II vindicated competence to the Church alone.¹³² With no less constancy Innocent II defended the divine and canonical rights concerning matrimony against Philip Augustus, King of France. And indeed it is marvelous with what constancy Pius VII resisted the most powerful Napoleon I in the divorce case.

Just as the civil power cannot enact diriment impediments of matrimony, so also it has no power concerning prohibiting impediments of Christian matrimony. Binder-Scheicher, Schulte, Weber, and Silbernagl¹³³ indeed taught the contrary, but their opinion cannot be admitted, since prohibiting impediments also are matrimonial causes which in Christian matrimony do not pertain to the civil power, as was proved above.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, nothing prevents Catholics from observing civil statutes enacted concerning the contracting of matrimony, provided that they are not dishonorable in themselves nor expressly proscribed by the Church, for example, that soldiers cannot contract matrimony unless certain rules are observed. The reason is that otherwise the greatest inconveniences would arise.

It is evident of itself that the civil power is unable to pronounce divorce with respect to the bond, or to admit to new nuptials those who have illegitimately obtained a divorce. For not even the Church herself has power to do all these things if a valid Christian matrimony is in question. Moreover, all these are certainly matrimonial causes touching upon the very essence of the sacrament, which consequently in no way pertain to the civil power. But how Catholic men holding the office of judge or advocate ought to conduct themselves when the pronouncement of a civil divorce or the celebration of new nuptials by those who labor under a diriment impediment is in question will be stated below in the chapter on civil matrimony, n. 893 ff.

¹²⁸ Several ancient authors, such as Thomas Sanchez, Pirhing, Peter Soto, and others, also attributed to the civil power the faculty of establishing diriment impediments, but this opinion today is antiquated and abandoned among Catholics.

¹²⁹ Proposition 59 of the Synod of Pistoia: "The doctrine of the synod asserting that it pertains originally to the supreme civil power alone to attach to the contract of matrimony impediments of that kind which render it null and are called diriment; ... adding that, with the assent or connivance of princes supposed, the Church could justly establish diriment impediments of the matrimonial contract itself; as though the Church had not always been able and could not now by her own right establish in the marriages of Christians impediments which not only impede matrimony but also render it null with respect to the bond, by which Christians are held bound even in the lands of infidels, and dispense in the same: destructive of canons 3, 4, 9, and 12 of session 24 of the Council of Trent, heretical" (Denz., n. 1559).

¹³⁰ Cf. c. 4, C. 32, q. 4.

¹³¹ Cf. c. 21, C. 27, q. 2.

¹³² Cf. c. 4, C. 31, q. 2.

¹³³ Cf. Wernz-Vidal, Ius Can., V, n. 60.

¹³⁴ Cf. also condemned proposition 74 in the Syllabus of Pius IX (Denz., n. 1774).

648. Corollary 4. The civil power can and ought by its own authority to enact just statutes concerning the merely temporal effects of matrimony.¹³⁵

The reason is evident, because "the source and origin of the whole of human society consists in matrimony," as Leo XIII says in the Encyclical Arcanum. Therefore it also greatly concerns civil society that all things be rightly ordered in matrimony. Moreover, in the matrimonial contract there are found several material considerations, for example, the union and administration of goods, succession, the inheritance belonging to offspring, and so forth, which do not directly pertain to the ecclesiastical forum. Concerning all these things the civil power ought to enact just laws, which then, if they are truly just, bind subjects in conscience. It is also the office of the civil power to assist the Church in protecting the governance of Christian matrimony. It is highly expedient that in enacting laws concerning matrimony there be good concord between the Church and the civil power, in such a way that the Church strenuously admonishes the faithful to obey just civil laws, and in turn the civil power effectively prohibits subjects from transgressing the laws which the Church has enacted concerning matrimony.

¹³⁵ Code of Canon Law, cc. 1016 and 1961: "Causes concerning the merely civil effects of matrimony, if they are treated principally, pertain to the civil magistrate according to the norm of c. 1016; but if incidentally and accessorily, they can also be cognized and decided by an ecclesiastical judge by his own power."

649. Corollary 5. A matrimony contracted between non-baptized persons is not a sacrament of the New Law, nor is a matrimony between one baptized party and another non-baptized party.

The first part of this corollary is admitted by all today, since without baptism, as the gateway of all the sacraments, no other sacrament can be validly received. Nevertheless, in a broader sense certain ancient theologians, and even Innocent III and Honorius III, call the matrimony of infidels also a sacrament. Alluding to this, Leo XIII says in the Encyclical Arcanum: "For since matrimony has God as its author and was even from the beginning a certain foreshadowing of the Incarnation of the Word of God, there is therefore in it something sacred and religious, not adventitious but innate, not received from men but implanted by nature. Therefore Innocent III and Honorius III, Our predecessors, were able to affirm, neither unjustly nor rashly, that the sacrament of marriage exists among the faithful and infidels."

The second part of the corollary has now been disputed among authors for centuries. Ambrose Catharinus,¹³⁶ Dominic Soto,¹³⁷ Tournely,¹³⁸ Ferraris,¹³⁹ Perrone,¹⁴⁰ Palmieri,¹⁴¹ Christian Pesch,¹⁴² Scherer,¹⁴³ and others teach that a baptized person who legitimately enters matrimony with a non-baptized person receives a true sacrament. Peter de Ledesma,¹⁴⁴ Aegidius de Coninck,¹⁴⁵ Pirhing,¹⁴⁶ Schmier,¹⁴⁷ Schmalzgrueber,¹⁴⁸ Gotti,¹⁴⁹ Billuart,¹⁵⁰ Concina,¹⁵¹ and the Thomists commonly, De Smet,¹⁵² Billot,¹⁵³ Wernz-Vidal,¹⁵⁴ and many others teach the contrary. We adopt this latter opinion, which also conforms to the practice of the Roman Curia,¹⁵⁵ chiefly for two reasons: a) St. Thomas says simply and without any limitation, "Matrimony cannot limp,"¹⁵⁶ which is most commonly explained only in a negative sense, that is, if the matrimonial contract is invalid on the part of one of the contracting parties, it is also invalid on the part of the other. Consequently, if the sacrament of matrimony is not present on one side, neither is it present on the other side. Now it is certain that the infidel party is incapable of receiving the sacrament of matrimony. Therefore the Catholic party also does not receive the sacrament. b) If such a matrimony were a sacrament for the Catholic party, then, since the bond arising from a sacrament is stricter than that which arises from a contract alone, the obligation of the Catholic party would be stricter than the obligation of the infidel party, which is absurd, because the obligation of the bond is equal in the spouses. Billot observes excellently:¹⁵⁷ "The opinion of the adversaries, however, appears to have arisen from this, that in a sacrament they see nothing other than the external rite by which grace is immediately conferred; for certainly, with respect to receiving sacramental grace, each of the spouses is entirely independent of the consort, and the condition of one cannot impede the bestowal of grace upon the other. But if you keep before your eyes that grace is not conferred except through the mediation of the sacramental bond, and that the sacramental bond itself is the sole immediate effect of the external sacrament, then the matter will not even be doubtful to you. For the bond is a certain relation between two, and indeed a relation of equiparance of the same nature in each; if therefore one is absolutely incapable of the sacramental bond because of the defect of baptism, the other, although baptized, is known likewise to be incapable of a sacramental bond, not absolutely indeed, but with respect to the non-baptized person. Therefore there is no sacrament where no sacramental effect can either exist or be conceived."

¹³⁶ Commentary on 1 Cor. 7:14.

¹³⁷ Commentary on IV, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 3.

¹³⁸ Prael. theol., II, q. 2, a. 2.

¹³⁹ Prompta Bibliotheca, s.v. "Matrimonium," n. 19, where the author attempts to defend his opinion against the observation of the Roman theologian.

¹⁴⁰ De matrimonio, II, 306.

¹⁴¹ De matrimonio, 103.

¹⁴² Prael. dogm., VII, n. 728; Christian Pesch calls this opinion more probable.

¹⁴³ Kirchenrecht, II, § 123, note 9.

¹⁴⁴ De magno matrimonii sacramento (1592), in the additions to the Summa, p. 3, q. 59, a. 2.

¹⁴⁵ De sacramentis, II, disp. 24, n. 24.

¹⁴⁶ On IV, tit. 1, n. 71.

¹⁴⁷ On IV, a. 2, c. 1, n. 40 ff.

¹⁴⁸ On IV, tit. 1, n. 397.

¹⁴⁹ Theol. dogm., II, tr. 13, dub. 2, n. 10.

¹⁵⁰ De matrimonio, diss. 1, a. 5.

¹⁵¹ De matrimonio, diss. 1, c. 4, n. 29.

¹⁵² De sponsal. et matrim., n. 107.

¹⁵³ De eccl. sacr., de matrimonio, thesis 38.

¹⁵⁴ Ius Can., V, n. 42.

¹⁵⁵ The Holy Office on November 4, 1924, declared that such a matrimony can be dissolved by a dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff (American Ecclesiastical Review, 1935, p. 188).

¹⁵⁶ Suppl., q. 47, a. 1.

¹⁵⁷ Loc. cit.

650. Note. The things just said concerning the matrimony which a Catholic party contracts with a non-baptized party (by a pontifical dispensation) also hold if, of two non-baptized spouses, one is afterward baptized. Even such a matrimony does not become a sacrament for the party thus baptized. This opinion is so certain that it is denied by few. For such a matrimony, although it may have been consummated even after the baptism of the other party, can be dissolved with respect to the bond through the Pauline privilege and, more probably, also through a pontifical dispensation.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, it is unheard of that any consummated matrimony which is a sacrament should be dissolved with respect to the bond. On the contrary, when both spouses who contracted legitimate matrimony in infidelity have become Christians, by that very fact (provided that true marital consent perseveres) their matrimony becomes a sacrament. Thus holds the much truer opinion;¹⁵⁹ nevertheless, some contradict it, for example, Billuart,¹⁶⁰ Concina,¹⁶¹ the Salmanticenses,¹⁶² and others. The reason is that such a matrimony now becomes a legitimate matrimonial contract between Christian persons. Now every matrimonial contract between Christians is a true sacrament, as has already been said several times, and as Pius IX¹⁶³ and Leo XIII¹⁶⁴ expressly defined.

A theological reason is added: the efficient cause of matrimony is the legitimate consent of the contracting parties. But when the contracting parties, still persisting in infidelity, contracted legitimate matrimony, nothing else was lacking in order that the marital consent should produce the sacrament of matrimony except the baptismal character of both contracting parties. But after baptism has actually been received by both spouses, such an obstacle ceases and the matrimony contracted becomes a sacrament. St. Thomas¹⁶⁵ rather clearly favors this opinion, writing: "Although matrimony does not belong to infidels insofar as it is a sacrament, ... nevertheless it belongs to them insofar as it is an office of nature; and yet even such a matrimony is in some manner a sacrament habitually, although it is not so actually, because they do not actually contract in the faith of the Church." From the practice of the Church it is established that new marital consent is not required from new converts. For the consent previously given is supposed virtually to persevere, which suffices for the validity of the sacrament. But if the consent given in infidelity has been expressly revoked, for example, through civil divorce, it is difficult to understand how such a matrimony then becomes a sacrament through the baptism of both spouses. For these spouses would then receive a sacrament against their own will and intention. This indeed appears not to be possible. Furthermore, the efficient cause of the sacrament of matrimony is the consent of the contracting parties. Now in the case of revocation such an efficient cause is absent. Therefore the sacrament must also be absent. Nevertheless, some authors, for example, Billot,¹⁶⁶ think that even when marital consent has been revoked, the matrimony becomes a sacrament through the baptism of both spouses. When such a case occurs in practice, recourse must be had to the Holy See if either of such spouses wishes to enter a new matrimony.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. below, n. 676.

¹⁵⁹ This opinion, which was already called more common by Benedict XIV (De syn. dioec., l. 8, c. 13, n. 8), is held by almost all modern authors, for example, by Perrone, De matrimonio, II, 298; Rosset, De sacr. matrim., I, n. 340; Billot, De eccl. sacr., de matrimonio, thesis 38; Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor., de matrimonio, n. 807; Vlaming, Prael. de iure matrim., I, 36; van de Burgt-Schaepman, Tract. de matrimonio, I, 28; Christian Pesch, Prael. dogm., VII, n. 727; De Smet, De sponsal. et matrim., n. 106.

¹⁶⁰ De matrimonio, diss. 1, a. 5, Petes 6.

¹⁶¹ De matrimonio, diss. 1, c. 4, n. 30.

¹⁶² De matrimonio, tr. 9, n. 82.

¹⁶³ In the Consistorial Allocution Acerbissimum, September 27, 1852: "Among the faithful matrimony cannot exist without being at one and the same time a sacrament" (Denz., n. 1640).

¹⁶⁴ Encyclical Arcanum.

¹⁶⁵ Suppl., q. 59, a. 2, ad 1.

¹⁶⁶ Loc. cit., § 2.

651. Corollary 6. The legitimate matrimony of non-baptized persons is not subject to the laws of the Church, but is subject to just laws and impediments enacted by the civil power.

Authors disputed and dispute most sharply concerning this corollary. In these times, however, it received great strength from the Decree Ne temere and from the Code of Canon Law, c. 1099, § 2, by which it was authentically declared: "Non-Catholics, whether baptized or non-baptized, if they contract among themselves, are nowhere bound to observe the Catholic form of betrothals or matrimony."¹⁶⁷ Certainly, only the form of matrimony is treated here, and consequently it is not yet lawful to infer generally that non-baptized persons are in no manner bound, or cannot be bound, by laws enacted by the Church concerning matrimony; but from the cited places it is lawful to suspect that it is not the mind of the Church to intervene in the matrimonial causes of non-baptized persons, since she does not will even to subject heretics to the observance of the matrimonial form. Hence authors most commonly teach that the Church does not enact matrimonial impediments for infidels, nor are their marriages subject to the jurisdiction of the Church. There is added also the practice of the Roman Curia, which holds the marriages of infidels to be valid, although they were contracted with an impediment of ecclesiastical law, provided, however, that no impediment of natural or divine law is opposed. Thus, for example, the Holy Office on January 17, 1872, declared marriages contracted in infidelity to be valid, although an impediment of ecclesiastical law was opposed. The same Holy Office on August 26, 1891, declared that "affinity which is naturally contracted in infidelity from intercourse both licit and illicit is not an impediment for marriages which are entered into in infidelity," but adds: "nevertheless, it becomes an impediment for marriages which are entered into after baptism, by the reception of which infidels become subjects of the Church and consequently subject to her laws."¹⁶⁸

Infidels are sometimes indirectly subject to the jurisdiction of the Church with respect to matrimony, and especially with respect to diriment impediments of ecclesiastical law, namely, when they wish to contract matrimony with a faithful party.¹⁶⁹ For matrimony is an altogether indivisible contract, and consequently an incapacity which directly affects one party indirectly renders the other party incapable. Thus, for example, an infidel cannot take in matrimony a baptized person related to him by consanguinity in the second degree, or even by affinity. For matrimony cannot limp, as was said above in n. 635. Certainly the infidel party is not bound by the ecclesiastical impediment, but because the faithful party is bound and labors under incapacity, the infidel party is therefore affected by the same incapacity.

¹⁶⁷ Denz., n. 2070.

¹⁶⁸ Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 1766. The Holy Office already taught the same on September 16, 1824 (ibid., n. 784). Hence affinity, considered in itself and physically, which once has been contracted through consummated matrimony, becomes an ecclesiastical impediment after baptism has been received. Thus Wernz-Vidal correctly teaches (even after the new law), De matrimonio, n. 367. Against Cappello, De matrimonio, n. 67. The Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith taught the same concerning consanguinity on August 23, 1852: "Could an infidel converted to the faith, after the death of his legitimate infidel wife, contract matrimony with a blood relative (up to and including the fourth degree) of the same deceased wife, whether that blood relative received baptism before or after the death of the aforesaid infidel wife? Response: No." (Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 1079, ad 4.) Other impediments of ecclesiastical law in no way touch non-baptized persons. Thus, for example, the impediment of public propriety does not touch them, as the Holy Office taught on April 19, 1837: "Titius, a pagan, married Maevia, a pagan, but did not consummate; after the death of Maevia, Titius becomes a Christian: can he marry Bertha, the sister or cousin of Maevia, who from a pagan has become a Christian? And is the same true concerning the betrothals of pagans and concerning ratified matrimony?" The Sacred Congregation responded: "The impediment does not subsist." Likewise, neither does the impediment of crime (cf. Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, August 23, 1852, ad 5 [Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 1079]); nor the impediment because of defect of age (cf. Holy Office, December 10, 1885, and August 6, 1886 [Collect., nn. 1645 and 1662]).

¹⁶⁹ But when the Church dispenses from disparity of cult, she is considered simultaneously to dispense from impediments of ecclesiastical law to which the infidel party of itself is not subject. Cf. below concerning the impediment of disparity of cult, n. 809.

652. Concerning the other part of the corollary, Wernz-Vidal¹⁷⁰ deservedly writes: "The ancient theologians and canonists taught by common consent that civil princes could establish even diriment impediments for their infidel subjects, and they did not doubt that they should defend this opinion as certain." But not only the ancient theologians and canonists, but also almost all modern authors teach thus, for example, Cavagnis, Santi, De Angelis, Zitelli, Grandclaude, Gasparri, Rosset, Ballerini, D'Annibale, De Becker, De Smet, Cathrein, Hammerstein, Boeckenhoff, Vogt, and others.¹⁷¹ These authors do not agree, however, whether such a right belongs to the prince in a native and original manner, or only in a devolutive manner. Liberatore, Perrone, Zigliara, Martin, Heuser,¹⁷² and Billot¹⁷³ deny to the civil prince the right of establishing diriment impediments; their opinion acquired rather great weight from the Encyclical Arcanum, where Leo XIII says: "Since matrimony is sacred by its own force, its own nature, and of its own accord, it is fitting that it be ruled and regulated, not by the command of princes, but by the divine authority of the Church, which alone has the magisterium over sacred things. Next, the dignity of the sacrament must be considered, by the accession of which the marriages of Christians became by far the most noble." Leo XIII therefore appears to deny to the civil prince power over marriages, since these, even apart from the sacramental character, are something sacred. But notwithstanding these words of the Encyclical, the affirmative opinion appears to be truer. For:

1. If the civil prince has no power concerning diriment impediments of matrimony, then for infidels there exists no earthly authority governing matrimony, because the Church does not have jurisdiction over them, as was said above. But this appears to be absurd, or at least exceedingly unsuitable. For if the civil power did not enact just positive laws concerning the matrimony of infidels, and if infidels were not bound by these laws, their marriages would most certainly be disfigured by disorders of every kind, and the state itself would suffer the greatest harms. This certainly ought to be avoided, and consequently the power of enacting laws intimately touching upon the marriages of infidels must be conceded to the civil prince. This argument is admitted in some manner by the adversaries themselves. Hence Billot says:¹⁷⁴ "The prince can among them [the infidels] regulate the matrimonial contract and judge matrimonial causes, not because this authority is part of the civil principate, but because by accident and by reason of necessity it devolves in the aforesaid circumstances upon him who alone legitimately presides there, so that the social good may somehow be preserved there. For then the well-worn axiom is in some manner applied: The supreme law is the welfare of the people."

2. St. Thomas favors this opinion, writing:¹⁷⁵ "Matrimony, insofar as it is an office of nature, is established by the natural law; insofar as it is a sacrament, it is established by divine law; insofar as it is an office of the community, it is established by civil law. And therefore by any of the aforesaid laws some person can be rendered illegitimate for matrimony." St. Thomas therefore admits that the civil power can sometimes establish diriment impediments.

3. Certain documents of the Holy See are cited in favor of this opinion,¹⁷⁶ the principal of which is the Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, which is said to have been issued on June 26, 1820:¹⁷⁷ "Although among infidels there is true matrimony, nevertheless it can be referred only to the office of nature and of the community, and consequently it is plainly to be regulated by natural and civil law. It follows from this that secular princes, whether faithful or infidel, retain the fullest power over the marriages of their infidel subjects, so that, by attaching impediments which are not opposed to natural and divine law, they may entirely rescind the same not only with respect to civil effects, but also with respect to the conjugal bond, ... and what is said in this case concerning the law of a secular prince is to be understood also concerning a legitimate custom which has acquired the force of law over infidel subjects." The approval of this Instruction is found nowhere, and therefore Gasparri says:¹⁷⁸ "It is probable that this Instruction was approved by the Sacred Congregation, but not certain, because this approval is in fact absent."

¹⁷⁰ Ius Can., V, n. 68.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Adrian Resemans, De competentia civili in vinculum coniugale infidelium, Rome 1887.

¹⁷² De potestate statuendi impedimenta dirimentia, Louvain 1853.

¹⁷³ De eccl. sacr., II, thesis 47.

¹⁷⁴ De eccl. sacr., II, thesis 47, ad 5.

¹⁷⁵ Suppl., q. 50, a. un., ad 4. Cf. Summa c. gent., l. 4, c. 78; IV, dist. 39, a. 2, ad 3.

¹⁷⁶ Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, October 8, 1631; Instruction of the Holy Office, September 20, 1854, and October 29, 1739. Besides Resemans in the work cited, Feije (De imped. et dispens. matrim., n. 70) and Wernz (Ius Decretal., IV, n. 81, note 209) learnedly discuss all these declarations.

¹⁷⁷ Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 744, note.

¹⁷⁸ De matrimonio, I, n. 288.

653. Note for practice. 1. In this controversy concerning the power of the civil prince, which is not merely speculative but also of practical moment, because both among foreigners and among our own people marriages are entered into by non-baptized persons contrary to the statutes of civil law, to this day there exists no definitive and certain decision of the Holy See; indeed, there are not so many uniform and constant particular responses of the Roman Congregations that either opinion can be said to be received and approved from the "style of the Roman Curia." For this reason, in a practical case no judgment concerning the nullity of any matrimony entered into by infidels contrary to the statutes of civil law is to be rendered without previous recourse to the Holy See. And this all the more because it is often most difficult to judge whether civil laws which intend to establish truly diriment impediments actually exist in some region. For although in the civil code of almost every country there are statutes laying down norms without which matrimony cannot be celebrated, it does not yet follow certainly from this that the legislator willed to bind under pain of nullity. For often statutes of this kind are merely penal laws, and not truly invalidating laws.¹⁷⁹

2. The civil power, although it has power to establish diriment impediments for marriages of non-baptized persons, nevertheless cannot through perfect divorce dissolve their legitimately entered matrimony, since it is indissoluble by natural law.

3. Certain authors add the question whether a matrimony validly contracted between a baptized party and a non-baptized party falls under the governance of the Church alone, or, because of the non-baptized party, also under the civil power. Although certain authors, such as Van de Burgt-Schaepman,¹⁸⁰ De Becker,¹⁸¹ and D'Annibale,¹⁸² teach that a matrimony thus entered falls both under the governance of the Church and under the governance of the civil power, so that such a matrimony is not valid unless it is free from impediments of both ecclesiastical and civil law, nevertheless the contrary opinion, which is held by Wernz-Vidal,¹⁸³ Gasparri,¹⁸⁴ Resemans,¹⁸⁵ and De Smet,¹⁸⁶ appears to be preferred. For it is impossible that one and the same matrimony be governed independently by two distinct powers. For a case could then happen in which such a matrimony would be held valid by the Church and invalid by the civil power, and each statute would have force in conscience, which is certainly absurd. Hence it must be said that such marriages are subject to the superior power, namely, to the ecclesiastical power alone, although they are not sacraments, as was said above.

¹⁷⁹ In Germany (Civil Code, §§ 1323-1329) and Austria (Civil Code, §§ 48-69), the statutes appear to be true diriment impediments.

¹⁸⁰ Tract. de matrimonio, I, n. 48.

¹⁸¹ De matrimonio, 44.

¹⁸² Summula Theol. mor., III, 294.

¹⁸³ Ius Can., V, n. 52.

¹⁸⁴ In the third edition of De matrimonio, n. 306, the author changed the opinion he had previously proposed.

¹⁸⁵ Loc. cit., p. 2.

¹⁸⁶ De sponsal. et matrim., n. 438.

Since it is certain that in Christian matrimony the sacrament is inseparable from the contract, so that as often as a matrimonial contract is validly entered into between Christians, so often the sacrament of matrimony is present,¹⁸⁷ hence the matter and form of the sacrament of matrimony are the same as the matter and form of the matrimonial contract; or, as Benedict XIV says in the Constitution Paucis of May 19, 1758: "The legitimate contract is at once the matter and form of the sacrament of matrimony."

¹⁸⁷ Cf. above, n. 628.

654. The remote matter of the sacrament of matrimony is the persons of the contracting parties, or, as others will, the mutual right over bodies in order to generation. The reason is that the remote matter of every contract is the thing concerning which the stipulation is made. Now in the matrimonial contract the stipulation is made concerning mutual dominion over bodies in order to generation.¹⁸⁸

The proximate matter is the signs or words insofar as they express the handing over of bodies, or, what is the same: consent insofar as it expresses reciprocal handing over. Thus holds the far more common opinion, which is held, for example, by Billuart,¹⁸⁹ Dominic Soto,¹⁹⁰ Bellarmine,¹⁹¹ Suarez,¹⁹² Christian Pesch,¹⁹³ De Smet,¹⁹⁴ and others. The reason is that in every sacrament the proximate matter is called that which applies the remote matter and which is altogether determined by the form supervening. But this handing over of bodies is the application of the remote matter, namely, of the mutual right over bodies; but it is determined by the form, which is the acceptance of this handing over (as will be said immediately), so that then the whole matrimonial contract is completed.

The form is the mutual acceptance of this handing over externally manifested. Thus again holds the common opinion, which the same cited authors hold. Billuart writes excellently concerning this matter:¹⁹⁵ "The sacrament of matrimony is nothing other than a civil contract elevated to the being of a sacrament, with no change made concerning matter and form. Therefore the matter and form of the sacrament are those of the contract. I subsume: but in civil contracts, and consequently in the matrimonial contract, the handing over of the thing, or consent to the handing over externally expressed, is the matter; the acceptance, or consent to the acceptance externally expressed, is the form. Therefore.... I prove the subsumption: that has the character of matter which is determinable; but that has the character of form which is determinative.... But in every civil contract the handing over is determinable and is completed in the character of a perfect contract through acceptance, which has itself as determinative. Therefore...."

In other sacraments, indeed, matter is distinguished from form, and therefore the Council of Florence defined that the sacraments are perfected by three things, namely: matter, form, and the intention of the minister; but in the sacrament of matrimony these three are not distinguished except according to a formal concept. For the same marital consent, under a diverse aspect, is simultaneously matter, form, and efficient cause. This indeed proceeds from the fact that the sacrament of matrimony alone was instituted by Christ after the manner of a contract. Moreover, in a contract these three can be united in the same person, as if someone hires himself out for service. For in this contract the contracting party himself is simultaneously the matter, form, and efficient cause.

Scholion. On other opinions. Following Melchior Cano, certain men taught that the matter of the sacrament of matrimony is the words expressing consent, but that the form is the blessing of the priest, who is also the minister of this sacrament. This opinion is false, as we shall prove in the following article when there will be discussion of the minister of the sacrament of matrimony. There is no leisure here to speak of other opinions now altogether obsolete concerning this matter.¹⁹⁶

¹⁸⁸ Thus Billuart, De matrimonio, diss. 1, a. 7, and St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 880.

¹⁸⁹ Loc. cit.

¹⁹⁰ IV, dist. 25, q. 2, a. 3.

¹⁹¹ De matrimonio, c. 6.

¹⁹² De sacramentis in genere, disp. 2, sect. 1.

¹⁹³ Prael. dogm., VII, 758.

¹⁹⁴ Loc. cit., n. 109.

¹⁹⁵ Loc. cit.

¹⁹⁶ See Christian Pesch, Prael. dogm., VII, n. 754 ff.

655. Billuart rightly writes:¹⁹⁷ "The opinion of the ancient theologians was unanimous, if perhaps you except William of Paris, that the contracting parties are themselves the ministers of matrimony, not only under the aspect of the contract, but also under the aspect of the sacrament, until Melchior Cano, book 8, De locis theologicis, c. 5, in the solution to objection 3, entering upon a new way, taught that the priest is the minister of the sacrament of matrimony; that the words, I join you together, are the form; and the matter is the mutual consent of the contracting parties." Not a few, nor ignoble, theologians followed Melchior Cano: Estius, Sylvius, Juénin, Tournely, and others; Benedict XIV,¹⁹⁸ as a private author, calls their opinion very probable. But with the princes of the schools, the Master of the Sentences, the Angelic Doctor, Scotus, and with the more ancient and now most common and certain opinion, let the thesis be:

The ministers of the sacrament of matrimony are the contracting parties themselves.

Proof 1. From the authority of St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor¹⁹⁹ says: "The words by which matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament; but not the blessing of the priest, which is a certain sacramental." In another place²⁰⁰ he says: "Just as in other sacraments certain things belong to the essence of the sacrament, and when these are omitted there is no sacrament; but certain other things pertain to the solemnity of the sacrament, and when these are omitted the sacrament is nevertheless truly perfected, although he who omits them sins: so also consent expressed through words of the present between persons legitimate for contracting matrimony makes matrimony, because these two things belong to the essence of the sacrament. But all other things belong to the solemnity of the sacrament, because they are employed for this, that matrimony may be made more fittingly. Hence, if they are omitted, there is a true matrimony, although those contracting thus sin, unless they are excused by some legitimate cause." This argument indeed appears to be very clear if it is considered that in the time of St. Thomas the impediment of clandestinity did not yet exist.

Proof 2. From theological reasons. a) The instrumental efficient cause of a sacrament is the same as the minister of the sacrament. Now the instrumental efficient cause of the sacrament of matrimony is not the priest, but the contracting parties themselves, since the Council of Florence defined: "The efficient cause of matrimony regularly is mutual consent expressed through words of the present." Therefore the contracting parties themselves, expressing mutual consent, are the ministers of the sacrament of matrimony.

b) The marriages of Christians can sometimes be validly and licitly contracted without any intervention of a priest. Thus it was before the Council of Trent for clandestine marriages; thus it is after the new Code of Canon Law in a case of necessity. But every valid matrimony of Christians is a true sacrament, as Pius IX and Leo XIII declared.²⁰¹ Therefore it is clearer than light that the priest is not the minister of the sacrament of matrimony, and nothing remains except that the contracting parties themselves are the ministers of this sacrament.

Let these two reasons suffice; he who desires more should go to Billuart,²⁰² who proves our thesis with many arguments and excellently resolves the objections brought against it. There is no reason for us to note that, in the celebration of matrimony through a proxy, not the proxy but the mandator is the minister of the sacrament of matrimony. For the proxy is nothing but the instrument of the mandator.

¹⁹⁷ De matrimonio, diss. 1, a. 6.

¹⁹⁸ De syn. dioec., l. 8, c. 12, n. 4.

¹⁹⁹ Suppl., q. 42, a. 1, ad 1.

²⁰⁰ Suppl., q. 45, a. 5.

²⁰¹ Cf. above, n. 628.

²⁰² De matrimonio, diss. 1, a. 6.

656. The opinion of Maldonatus. Maldonatus and a few others²⁰³ taught that the priest is indeed the ordinary minister of the sacrament of matrimony, but that in extraordinary cases Christ conferred this office upon the contracting parties; just as in a case of necessity a layman is also the minister of baptism. This opinion indeed attempts to reconcile two other opposed opinions, but has no foundation either in tradition or in the infallible magisterium of the Church.

Scholion. It is not necessary that those about to marry know themselves to be the ministers of the sacrament of matrimony, because by the very fact that they intend to contract according to the institution of God, as is done in the true Church of Christ, they also have the intention of doing that which the Church does; and this suffices for the validity of the sacrament. Indeed, it is not customarily expedient that simple faithful be expressly admonished that those about to marry are themselves the ministers of the sacrament of matrimony, because they understand this with difficulty, and this knowledge can hinder rather than profit the reverence to be employed in receiving the sacrament of matrimony.

²⁰³ Cf. Hurter, Theol. dogm., III, n. 596.

657. 1. The subject capable of the valid sacrament of matrimony is every baptized person who does not labor under a diriment impediment.

Even heretics, provided that they are validly baptized and are not bound by any diriment impediment, validly receive the sacrament of matrimony. This holds even if the heretics do not know or do not believe that matrimony is a sacrament. For it suffices that they will to enter a true matrimonial contract, without placing any express condition against the essence of matrimony. A condition of this kind would be, for example, the lawfulness of divorce expressly stipulated. Then certainly the matrimony would be illicit and invalid. Above, in n. 649, it was proved that the sacrament of matrimony is not received by those about to marry of whom both or either one is not baptized. But all non-baptized infidels can enter a valid matrimonial contract (legitimate matrimony), provided that they are not bound by diriment impediments of natural law, positive divine law, or civil law.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ Cf. above, n. 650.

658. 2. For the worthy and fruitful reception of this great sacrament of matrimony, it is further required that a) those about to marry be free from every impeding impediment, and b) that they be in the state of sanctifying grace.

The reason is that a) even impeding impediments induce a grave obligation in conscience, and because b) the sacrament of matrimony is a sacrament of the living. If anyone receives the sacrament of matrimony in the state of mortal sin, he sins gravely and does not receive the sacramental graces proper to matrimony. More probably, however, these sacramental graces afterward revive when the obstacle of the state of mortal sin has been removed.²⁰⁵

By common law it is not strictly commanded that those about to marry receive the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist before matrimony.²⁰⁶ Nevertheless, the Council of Trent,²⁰⁷ the Roman Ritual,²⁰⁸ and the Code of Canon Law²⁰⁹ vehemently admonish the betrothed that, before they contract, they diligently confess their sins and devoutly approach the Most Holy Eucharist. By diocesan law or universal custom, the prior reception of penance and the Eucharist is not rarely altogether required of the betrothed. Hence the pastor in those places can require testimony that confession has been completed. Since, however, today throughout the whole world mixed marriages are invalid unless they are contracted before the pastor, hence, if perhaps some Catholic refuses confession, the pastor should first (if he can fittingly) consult the bishop concerning what must be done. But if this consultation is impossible, it is almost always better that the pastor assist at the matrimony of this perverse man in order to avoid the greater evil of concubinage. Worthy of note in this matter is the Instruction of the Holy Office given on July 3, 1878, to the Ordinaries of Brazil: "It can in no way be tolerated ... that marriages which are contracted by Freemasons be celebrated with all the solemnity of the Catholic rite. But when the pastor can in no way impede a matrimony of this kind, the matter is to be referred to the Ordinary, who ... will be able to permit the pastor to be passively present at the matrimony, that is, without a blessing or any other ecclesiastical rite, as an authorized witness, provided that the Catholic education of all the offspring is altogether safeguarded."²¹⁰

To the question whether it is lawful to enter matrimony with a public or occult sinner, it appears that the response must be that this is not lawful except for most grave reasons, since from a matrimony of this kind the greatest harms are accustomed to arise both for the Catholic party and the offspring to be born, and for Christian society. How the pastor can assist at such a matrimony will be stated below, n. 789.

²⁰⁵ Cf. above, n. 42.

²⁰⁶ Cf. De Smet, loc. cit., n. 192.

²⁰⁷ Sess. 24, c. 1, De reformatione matrimonii.

²⁰⁸ Tit. 7, c. 1, n. 14.

²⁰⁹ C. 1033.

²¹⁰ Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 1495; cf. also Holy Office, January 11, 1899. The bishop can indeed permit this passive assistance, but can also refuse it for just causes; cf. Holy Office, January 30, 1867; he must refuse it in illicit mixed marriages.

We shall treat: 1. of the notion of matrimony; 2. of the matter, form, and minister; 3. of the properties of matrimony.

1962. DEFINITION. Matrimony (instituted by God the Creator) is the marital conjunction of man and woman, between legitimate persons, retaining an undivided companionship of life.¹

It is said 1. marital conjunction: by which words the very essence of matrimony is expressed, namely the mutual bond binding man and woman, from the fact that, through consent expressed concerning the present, they hand over to one another dominion of their bodies, in order to generation. - 2. Between legitimate persons: by which words are indicated the conditions of the subject, which ought to be such that the contracting parties are impeded by no law from contracting matrimony; - 3. retaining an undivided companionship of life, which words intimate the properties of matrimony, namely unity and indissolubility.

MATRIMONY, considered formally as a Sacrament, can be defined: the legitimate and indissoluble contract of baptized persons between a man and a woman, by which mutual power over bodies is handed over and accepted, in order to acts of themselves apt for the generation of offspring, elevated by Christ to the dignity of a Sacrament, and conferring grace ex opere operato. This definition will be made clear from what is to be said.

DIVISION. Matrimony is distinguished in many ways, namely:

1. Into legitimate, ratified, and consummated. - 1) Legitimate is that which is contracted by the non-baptized according to the norm of the natural law, and which lacks the power of a Sacrament; such is the matrimony of Jews and Infidels. - 2) Ratified, however, is that which has been contracted between baptized persons entangled by no natural or canonical impediment, between whom, however, after the contract, conjugal intercourse has not yet intervened. It is called ratified, insofar as the Church holds it valid. - 3) Finally matrimony is called consummated when to legitimate or ratified matrimony there has been added carnal conjunction of itself sufficient for the generation of offspring.²

2. Into true, presumed, and putative. True is that whose conditions all objectively stand. - Presumed is called that which, in certain circumstances, is presumed by law, without proofs being brought. - Putative is that which is judged to have been validly contracted, when nevertheless on the side of reality, on account of some latent impediment, it is null.

3. Into canonical, political or civil, and of conscience. Canonical is called that in which all things concur which are required by the canons of the Church. Political or civil is that (which, unless canonical matrimony is added, is called matrimony by injury) in which those things also intervene which civil law requires, such as dotal pacts, consent of parents, and other solemnities, without which it is deprived of civil effect. Matrimony of conscience is that which is contracted in the usual form, the denunciations being omitted, under this law, that it should always be hidden (cf. n. 2080 Note).

Near to this is morganatic matrimony, when a noble man, after the death of a wife who left him children, marries another less noble woman under this law, that she herself and her children are excluded from the dignity of the husband and father and are content with some gift (Morgengabe) for their honorable support; and further that they abstain from the other goods, titles, and paternal insignia, and this especially in favor of the children begotten from the former wife.

1963. Principles. I. The essence of matrimony considered in fieri consists in mutual consent duly expressed; considered in facto esse, in the permanent bond which arises from the aforesaid consent and has annexed to itself dominion or mutual right over the body of the other, without, however, the use of this right belonging to the essence of matrimony. The first part is clear from the decree to the Armenians, saying: "The efficient cause of matrimony is mutual consent regularly expressed by words concerning the present." From this the second part also is clear, both because from compact and consent there arise a mutual obligation and bond between the contracting parties;³ and because every legitimate handing over confers a right in the thing handed over, which thing in the matrimonial contract is the use of bodies in order to generation. Hence the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:4): "The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. Likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman." But the third part is manifest from this, that the first parents before sin, at which time no intercourse of the flesh had intervened between them, as the Fathers testify, were plainly joined in true matrimony.⁴ It is confirmed also by the example of the Blessed Virgin Mary and St. Joseph, between whom it is altogether certain that true matrimony existed, yet no use intervened. Wherefore, in both laws the rule has been received: "Consent, not intercourse, makes nuptials."

1964. II. Matrimony of Christians, celebrated by legitimate rite, is a true Sacrament of the New Law. - It is of faith, from Trent (sess. 24, can. 1), defining: "If anyone shall have said that Matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven Sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ the Lord, but invented by men in the Church, and that it does not confer grace: let him be anathema." Nor does Paul the Apostle obscurely intimate the truth of the proposition, saying (Eph. 5:25): "Men, love your wives, as Christ loved the Church and handed himself over for her," and soon adding (v. 32): "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."⁵ And 1. indeed, it is a sign of a sacred thing, namely of that most holy bond by which Christ the Lord is joined with the Church, or the divine Word with human nature. - But 2. that grace also is signified and bestowed by this Sacrament, in which especially the nature of a Sacrament exists, these words of the Holy Synod declare: "But the grace which would perfect that natural love, and confirm the indissoluble unity, and sanctify the spouses, Christ himself, the institutor and perfecter of the venerable Sacraments, merited for us by his Passion." Nor 3. can it be doubted that, from the institution of Christ, matrimony, which before was only a natural and religious contract, was elevated to that dignity that it is a sign of a sacred thing, productive of grace, although it is not established concerning the time at which this was done. Therefore it is clear that nothing is lacking to matrimony from those things which belong to the nature of a Sacrament.⁶

It was said: matrimony of Christians; for matrimony of infidels, although perfect in the nature of a contract, cannot be a Sacrament, since Baptism is the gate of all the Sacraments.

But concerning the matrimony of INFIDELS who afterward were converted to the Christian faith, as also concerning the matrimony of a faithful person with an infidel, which has been contracted with previous pontifical dispensation: there are various opinions of Authors, since nothing has been defined by the Church, which may be seen discussed among the Dogmaticians. - Those things which are more approved by us are the following: 1. Matrimony contracted in infidelity, according to the opinion by far more probable, is raised to the nature of a Sacrament by the conversion of both spouses, but not by the conversion of only one spouse. When both turn themselves to the Faith, an express renewal of matrimonial consent is not required; sufficient for the nature of a Sacrament is that virtual consent by which the spouses, approaching Baptism, determine to persist in the matrimony previously entered upon, but in a Christian manner. 2. Matrimony which a faithful person contracts with an infidel, after previous dispensation of the Pontiff has been obtained, has, according to the truer opinion, the nature of a Sacrament on the part of the faithful person.⁷

1965. III. In Christian matrimony, the contract is NOT DISSOCIABLE from the Sacrament; and therefore a true and legitimate contract cannot stand without being by that very fact a Sacrament. - This is clear from the Encyclical Arcanum divinae sapientiae of Our Most Holy Lord Pope Leo XIII, in which the Pontiff speaks thus:⁸ "For Christ the Lord increased matrimony by the dignity of a Sacrament; but matrimony is the contract itself, if only it has been made by right. To this is added that matrimony is a Sacrament on this account, because it is a sacred sign and effective of grace, and bearing the image of the mystical nuptials with the Church. But the form and figure of these is expressed by that very bond of the highest conjunction by which man and woman are bound together among themselves, and which is nothing other than matrimony itself. And so it appears that every just union between Christians is in itself and through itself a Sacrament: and nothing is more abhorrent from truth than that the Sacrament is some adornment annexed, or a property having slipped on from without, which could be disjoined and separated from the contract by the will of men."⁹

From what has been said you will gather: 1. Matrimony is a contract sui generis, differing much from other contracts; and indeed: - 1) Matrimony has its origin and institution from natural and divine law; but other contracts from the law of nations, or from the special law of each nation. - 2) The object of matrimony has been determined by God in such a way that it cannot be modified by the stipulations of the contracting parties, while in other contracts many things are left to the judgment of the contracting parties. - 3) Matrimony, as regards validity, depends on divine, natural, and ecclesiastical law; but not, as civil contracts do, on civil law and the will of princes, who can do nothing in those things which pertain to the Sacraments (cf. n. 1994-1997).

2. Marriages entered into between HERETICS or SCHISMATICS, if no diriment impediment stands in the way, just as they are valid in the nature of a contract, so also truly have the nature of a Sacrament. But

IT IS ASKED. What is to be said of matrimony between BAPTIZED persons duly celebrated, with a positive will NOT TO RECEIVE the Sacrament?

Resp. Dist. 1. If the predominant intention was to exclude absolutely the nature of the Sacrament, and rather to omit matrimony than to receive the Sacrament, the matrimony is invalid in the nature of a Sacrament, and consequently also in the nature of a contract. - 2. If the predominant intention was to celebrate matrimony in the nature of a contract, and therefore to posit all things which are required for its validity, the matrimony is valid, both by reason of the contract and by reason of the Sacrament, although this has been received unworthily. - In doubt as to which was the predominant intention, judgment must be made in favor of matrimony; for everyone is presumed to will to exercise a valid contract, unless the opposite is proved.¹⁰

1966. IV. The ENDS which can be considered in matrimony are of three kinds, namely: intrinsic essential ends, intrinsic accidental ends, and accidental extrinsic ends.

1. The INTRINSIC ESSENTIAL ends are two: 1) the mutual handing over of bodies with the obligation of rendering the debt; 2) the indissoluble bond. - Hence it is certain that, if someone should contract while positively excluding these ends, namely with the mind of not undertaking the obligation of rendering the debt, or of contracting for a time, he would not only sin, but would enter into no matrimony.

2. The INTRINSIC ACCIDENTAL ends likewise are two: 1. The procreation of offspring: for just as matrimony, as a natural conjunction, was instituted from the beginning for propagating the human race, so afterward, that a people might be procreated and educated for the worship and religion of the true God and of Christ our Savior, the dignity of a Sacrament was bestowed on it. 2. The remedy of concupiscence, namely that he who is conscious to himself of his weakness, and does not wish to endure the battle of the flesh, may use the remedy of matrimony for avoiding sins of lust. Concerning which the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:2) writes: "On account of fornication let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband." And again (v. 9): "But if they do not contain themselves, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to burn." Wherefore neither does he sin in any way who marries principally on account of the remedy of concupiscence, provided he does not exclude the end of procreating offspring. For there is no disorder if, from two licit ends, the secondary is chosen before the primary, when the latter is not smothered by the former. - But if someone should exclude these two intrinsic accidental ends, he could contract not only validly but also sometimes licitly: for example, if he were an old man and married without hope of procreating offspring, nor intended the remedy of concupiscence; for it suffices that the substantial ends be saved.¹¹

3. The ACCIDENTAL EXTRINSIC ends can be very many, such as peace to be reconciled, nobility to be acquired, etc. Ends of this sort, if in themselves honorable, are not to be condemned, since they are not repugnant to the holiness of matrimony; indeed they can even be intended primarily, because it is not a disorder, as we already said, to choose one of the secondary honorable ends before the primary end, provided this is not excluded.¹²

IT IS ASKED. Whether matrimony is commanded by SOME LAW?

Resp. Although matrimony is ordered to the conservation of society, and it is necessary that some embrace this state, nevertheless concerning this no precept has been given to individuals. "But what was said by the Lord: Increase and multiply, looks to this, that the cause for which matrimony had been instituted be declared: not that it impose necessity on individual men. For now, the human race having already been increased, not only does no law compel anyone to take a wife, but rather virginity is commended exceedingly, and it is advised to each one in Sacred Scripture, as being more excellent than the state of matrimony, and containing in itself greater perfection and holiness"¹³ (cf. n. 764).

1967. V. "There are three GOODS of matrimony: offspring, fidelity, and Sacrament; by compensation of which those inconveniences are lessened which the Apostle indicates by these words (1 Cor. 7:28): 'such persons will have tribulation of the flesh'; and it is effected that conjunctions of bodies, which outside matrimony would deservedly have to be condemned, are joined with honorableness.

"The first good therefore is OFFSPRING, that is, children, who are received from a just and legitimate wife. For the Apostle esteemed this so greatly that he said (1 Tim. 2:15): The woman will be saved through the generation of children. Nor indeed must this be understood only of procreation, but also of the education and discipline by which children are instructed unto piety."¹⁴

"FIDELITY follows, which is the second good of matrimony, namely a certain faithfulness by which mutually the man binds himself to the woman and the woman to the man in such a way that one hands over to the other power over his or her body, and promises that he or she will never violate that holy covenant of marriage... But this fidelity of matrimony demands that husband and wife be joined by a certain singular, holy, and pure love; nor that they love each other as adulterers, but as Christ loved the Church."¹⁵

The third good is called SACRAMENT, and is found in the nature of a Sacrament.

1968. Among all Catholic authors it is certain that the MATTER of this Sacrament is the matrimonial contract; as regards the FORM and MINISTER, various opinions have been handed down. - Certain Theologians, led by Melchior Cano, taught that the minister is the priest, but that the form is had in these words: "I join you in matrimony." But the opinion which has always been more common, and has now become common, teaches that the ministers are the contracting parties themselves, and that the form consists in their mutual acceptance. - With these things briefly set forth beforehand, let the following be held.

1969. Principles. I. The REMOTE matter of this Sacrament is the bodies of the contracting parties, to be handed over mutually, or the mutual right over the body of the other. The PROXIMATE matter is the handing over itself of the right in the bodies, made through words or signs expressing consent. Thus commonly.

For this Sacrament has the nature of a contract; therefore just as in other contracts the things are the remote matter, and the handing over of the thing the proximate matter, so consequently it is in matrimony, where the right in the bodies is handed over.¹

1970. II. The FORM consists in the mutual acceptance of the contracting parties, expressed by words or signs. Thus commonly, and it will be clear from what is soon to be said concerning the minister.²

1971. III. The MINISTERS of the Sacrament of Matrimony are THE FAITHFUL THEMSELVES contracting. - This is the common opinion, and altogether certain. The evident reason is that in places where the impediment of clandestinity does not exist, matrimony is contracted validly without the presence of a priest. Therefore if a true Sacrament is effected even when the priest is absent, it must certainly be concluded that the contracting parties themselves, and not the priest, are the ministers.³ Nevertheless the priest is the minister of the solemnity of matrimony, as will be explained below (n. 2073).

Hence, for the contracting parties there apply those things which were said in their places both concerning the administration and concerning the reception of the Sacraments (cf. n. 1416, 1433, 1434, 1436). But,

YOU WILL ASK: Whether it is licit to enter matrimony with a PUBLIC SINNER, and consequently to minister the Sacrament to him? - RESP. This is prohibited at least under venial sin, as many probably say; indeed according to St. Alphonsus, more probably under grave sin, on account of reverence due to the Sacrament. A just cause EXCUSES from every sin, e.g. if someone cannot withdraw from matrimony without grave inconvenience. Except, however, if the other is an excommunicate to be avoided, with whom to communicate in a sacred matter is altogether illicit.⁴

1972. IV. The CONSENT by which matrimony is perfected and the Sacrament is administered must be personal, internal, deliberate, mutual, concerning the present, and externally manifested.

1. It must be PERSONAL; for "in matrimony consent cannot be supplied by any human power."⁵

2. TRUE and INTERNAL; for it is an act of one's own will, which freely imposes on itself a new obligation. - Hence, if both, or either one of the contracting parties, should consent not from the soul but FICTITIOUSLY, there is no matrimony. In the first case the matter is clear of itself; in the other, because, since the matrimonial contract cannot limp, the consent of the other being lacking, the contract is null. The one contracting fictitiously commits both the sin of sacrilege, because he renders the Sacrament null; and the sin of injustice, if the counterpart contracts in good faith, because he deceives that person and inflicts on him or her a grave injury, which he is bound to repair by removing the fiction and truly contracting (cf. n. 2083). If this cannot be done, or if the deceived party does not will it, he is bound at least to repair the other damages. Except, if the other party also deceived, or if the deception was done in order that the deceiver might decline fear unjustly inflicted. Nevertheless Authors commonly say that it is not illicit to simulate the celebration of nuptials, on account of a just cause, e.g. on account of a diriment impediment, when namely the celebration cannot be omitted without grave damage, as was said n. 1430, at the end.⁶

3. DELIBERATE, i.e. furnished with sufficient knowledge and due liberty. Force and error stand in the way of deliberation; but concerning these there will be discussion where impediments are treated.

4. MUTUAL; because a contract burdensome on both sides and transferring a mutual right in the bodies, as the matrimonial contract is, is not effected except through the reciprocal consent of the contracting parties. Wherefore it must also be noted: union and at least moral simultaneity are required between the consent of one and of the other, such as namely is required in civil contracts (cf. n. 1044, 3).

5. CONCERNING THE PRESENT, namely by which the contracting parties mutually accept each other here and now as true spouses; for in this matrimony differs from betrothals (cf. n. 1950, It is said 5).

6. EXTERNALLY MANIFESTED; otherwise mutual acceptance would not be possible. - It is not indeed required for the VALIDITY of matrimony that consent be expressed by words; it suffices that it be expressed by signs, which Innocent III declared,⁷ saying: "The deaf and mute can contract matrimony through consent without words." A sufficiently adequate sign would be if the woman, after the man's consent has already been expressed, should extend her hand to him; but not if she should not withdraw her hand when it has been seized by him. Nor would the giving of a ring suffice, or the leading of the bride into the house of the man, unless by the custom of the place signs of this sort expressed consent. But as regards LICEITY, unless modesty or another reasonable cause excused, it would be a venial sin to express consent by signs alone; because it would be against the rubric of the Ritual and against the custom of the Church.⁸

But sometimes explicit consent is not required. For, in places where the impediment of clandestinity does not prevail, BETROTHALS THEMSELVES, to which free and consummated intercourse is added, pass into true matrimony; provided the intercourse was had with marital affection: and this affection indeed is always presumed in the external forum; but in the internal forum, presumption yields to truth.⁹

1973. Questions. Q. 1. Whether matrimony can be contracted VALIDLY and LICITLY THROUGH A PROCURATOR?

Resp. 1. It can be contracted VALIDLY, as is clear from law. The reason is that Christ, in elevating matrimony to the being of a Sacrament, did not change the nature of the contract, which is such that it can be entered into among absent persons through a procurator. - But for this many things are REQUIRED, namely: 1) A special mandate, which can be given orally; for writing is not demanded. - 2) That the mandate be concerning contracting with a determinate person. - 3) That the procurator contract by himself; for he himself cannot delegate another, unless he has express and special permission from the mandator. - 4) That the mandate has not been revoked by the mandator, even mentally, before the matrimony is celebrated. And this runs even if the revocation is made tacitly, namely if someone gave a mandate of contracting with one woman, and afterward celebrates betrothals with another. - 5) That, in places where the impediment of clandestinity prevails, the procurator show the mandate to the pastor and witnesses, and before them contract matrimony according to the form of Trent. - 6) That he not exceed the limits of the mandate. But in this it must be adverted that, if the condition is required by the mandator, namely that contraction be made with such a dowry, at such a time, etc., if the condition is not observed, the matrimony will be null. But if the condition is required by law, namely that contraction be made after denunciations have been premised, after permission of the Bishop has been obtained, etc., then the matrimony entered without them will be valid.¹⁰

Resp. 2. It can also be contracted LICITLY, but only when a grave cause suffices, as, e.g., among Princes; for one must not easily recede from the ordinary practice of the Church. And hence it is why the pastor ought not, without consulting the Bishop, to assist at such a matrimony.¹¹

Q. 2. Whether matrimony can be contracted through a LETTER?

Resp. Affirmatively, on account of the same reason as above. But it is contracted in the following manner: "The groom writes to the bride that he himself hands himself over to her as husband, and from that moment accepts her as wife. The bride writes the same in return to the man; this response is read before the pastor and witnesses. Moreover, it is also enough that the man write to the woman in the way related, and that the bride, without writing back to the groom, open the letters before the pastor and witnesses, and furnish her consent."¹² - But that this be done LICITLY, a grave cause is required. Hence it is plainly to be advised that the pastor do nothing in this matter without the permission of the Bishop. Except, unless perhaps it is a question of revalidating matrimony, in which case one party would refuse to present himself before the pastor.¹³

Q. 3. Whether matrimony can be contracted UNDER CONDITION?

Resp. Affirmatively, because neither the sacred canons nor the very nature of matrimony altogether impede certain conditions from being added to matrimonial consent. - But according to the variety of conditions, various things must be DISTINGUISHED:

1. If the condition, even a base one, is concerning the past or concerning the present, the matrimony is valid if the condition stands; on the contrary, if it is lacking, it is not valid, because consent is lacking.

2. If the condition is concerning a necessary future thing, e.g. if the sun rises tomorrow, the matrimony is valid at once, unless the contracting parties intend to suspend consent until the time of the fulfilled condition. Thus commonly.

3. If the condition is against the substance of matrimonial obligation, e.g. if one says to the other: "I contract with you, if you avoid the generation of offspring; or until I find another more worthy in honor or wealth; or if you hand yourself over to be adulterated for gain:" thus it must be DISTINGUISHED: 1) if the condition is added with the intention of not undertaking the obligations which are essential to matrimony, which can easily happen in regions where divorce is permitted by laws and is in use, the matrimony is invalid; 2) if it is added with the intention indeed of undertaking them, but of not fulfilling them, it is valid, and the depraved will must be corrected.¹⁴ - But here it is customary to ask whether the condition of not consummating matrimony is against the good of offspring? - The more common and more probable opinion denies it; wherefore matrimony entered into under this condition is valid, provided the contracting parties intend to hand over to each other the mutual right in the body and to bind only the use of it (cf. n. 1963).

4. If the condition is concerning an impossible or base thing, which nevertheless is not repugnant to the substance of matrimony, again it must be DISTINGUISHED: 1) if there is evidence of a serious will not to contract unless the added condition has been fulfilled, matrimony entered into under an impossible condition is null; but one entered into under a base condition is not null by that very fact, but before the condition has been fulfilled, it obliges to nothing; when it has been fulfilled, however, it becomes absolute matrimony. - 2) But if there is no evidence of that serious will, the base or impossible condition is held as not added, and the matrimony is immediately valid.

5. Finally, if the condition is concerning a future contingent and honorable thing, the matrimony remains suspended until the condition is fulfilled; but when this has been fulfilled, it becomes absolute. While the condition is pending, it is not licit for one, against the will of the other, to revoke consent.¹⁵

But note as regards LICEITY, that the pastor cannot, without a most urgent cause, admit conditional marriages of this sort; namely on account of the many inconveniences and difficulties which afterward can occur and be moved against their validity.¹⁶

Q. 4. Whether, when the condition has been fulfilled, NEW CONSENT is required for matrimony?

Resp. Some indeed affirm, because matrimony is not only a contract, but also a Sacrament, whose validity cannot be pending.

But others, more truly and commonly, deny it, because the condition having been fulfilled, the contract becomes absolute, and consequently by that very fact also is constituted in the nature of a Sacrament.¹

Q. 5. What if a demonstration, cause, or mode is added to consent?

Resp. DEMONSTRATION, e.g. I marry you, who are noble; CAUSE, e.g. I marry you, because you are a virgin; MODE, e.g. I marry you, that you may serve me, differ altogether from condition in this, that they do not suspend consent; wherefore matrimony becomes immediately absolute, unless perhaps the demonstration, cause, or mode have, in the mind of the contracting parties, the nature of a condition, or unless substantial error lies hidden in them.²

Q. 6. Whether the CONSENT OF PARENTS is required for the matrimony of children-of-the-family?

Resp. 1. Negatively, as regards validity: and this is of faith against the Lutherans and Calvinists. For Trent (sess. 24, cap. 1) "condemns with anathema those who falsely affirm that marriages contracted by children-of-the-family without the consent of parents are invalid, and that parents can make them ratified or invalid." Reason is added: for the contracting parties have power over their own body, nor do parents have power over the body of their children in order to matrimony. - But if CIVIL LAW requires the consent of parents for the validity of matrimony, its force extends only to merely civil effects.

Resp. 2. It is required, at least speaking regularly, for liceity; so that children-of-the-family sin gravely if parents justly contradict, or if they are judged to be reasonably unwilling. We said speaking regularly; for when a just cause intervenes, it is certain that children can, while parents are ignorant of it or even unwilling, enter matrimony³ (see n. 1951, query 1).

But when parents contradict justly, and when unjustly, cannot easily be defined: wherefore a prudent confessor will indeed persuade children that, in a matter of so great moment, they should not stand against the will of parents; but very rarely will he impose on them an obligation of withdrawing from entering matrimony, especially because greater evils, for the most part, are to be feared from this.

1974. Matrimony, "that it might respond more aptly to the most wise counsels of God, either from the beginning bore before itself chiefly two properties, and these especially noble, as though deeply impressed and engraved, namely unity and perpetuity."⁴ Concerning these two properties one must now treat.

The UNITY of matrimony, which is also called monogamy, is situated in the conjunction of one man with one woman. To unity is opposed polygamy, which is twofold: 1. simultaneous, when one man joins several wives to himself in matrimony at the same time, and this is called simply polygamy; or when one woman marries several men at the same time, and it is commonly called polyandry or polyviry; 2. successive, when after the death of the spouse, the surviving party hastens to new nuptials.

1975. Principles. I. SIMULTANEOUS POLYANDRY is prohibited, by the consent of all, by the NATURAL law itself. - For it is directly opposed to the generation and education of offspring: to generation indeed, since a woman knowing several men at the same time generally remains barren; but to education, since the father of such offspring, if perhaps it is born, is uncertain. And hence it is that prostitution, to which polyandry is reduced, has at every time been held as infamous and flagitious.⁵

1976. II. SIMULTANEOUS POLYGAMY is prohibited in the New Law by DIVINE right. - For Christ expressly taught: "Whoever shall have put away his wife and married another, commits adultery against her" (Mark 10:11). But now, if he is an adulterer who, having put away his wife, marries another, much more will he be an adulterer who does this while retaining the former. Hence Trent (sess. 24, can. 2): "If anyone shall have said that it is licit for Christians to have several wives at the same time, and that this is prohibited by no divine law: let him be anathema." - Wherefore, if some infidel, having several wives, is admitted to Baptism, he must retain only one, namely her whom he validly joined to himself in the first place, or any one of the others who is willing to embrace the Christian faith; unless the Pope has otherwise determined or permitted, according to what is to be said n. 1980.⁶

As regards the natural law, Theologians, led by St. Thomas,⁷ hold that polygamy is not contrary to the primary end of matrimony; and therefore that it is not intrinsically evil, nor absolutely prohibited by the precepts of nature; yet that it is opposed to the secondary ends of marriage, of which sort are peace, tranquility, mutual services, etc.; and therefore that it is contrary to the secondary law of nature, in which God alone can dispense. And indeed, after the flood, for just causes, moderate polygamy was granted to the Patriarchs and to the Israelite people. Indeed the more common opinion teaches that the same dispensation was extended to the Gentiles. But from the beginning it was not so (Matt. 19:8); and Christ the Lord restored the law of matrimony, whether for Christians or for Gentiles, to its primeval integrity.

1977. III. SUCCESSIVE polygamy has never been prohibited; and therefore second and later nuptials are LICIT, both for the man and for the woman, even under the evangelical law. - This is clear from the authority and practice of the Church, and also from the words of Paul the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:39): "The woman is bound by the law as long as her husband lives; but if her husband sleeps, she is freed; let her marry whom she will, only in the Lord." Recalling these words, Eugene IV in the decree for the Jacobites declared: "not only second, but third and fourth and further nuptials, if some impediment does not stand in the way, can be contracted licitly."

Nevertheless, the Church of God has always followed widowhood with special honor, nor has she ever held second nuptials as honorable as first nuptials, since the union of Christ with the one Church is represented less perfectly through them (cf. n. 1937).

Note. From the modern Codes, a WIDOW cannot enter matrimony unless ten months have elapsed from the death of the prior husband, or she has given birth: nevertheless this prohibition does not have the force of invalidating civil matrimony.⁸

1978. The INDISSOLUBILITY of matrimony is one thing as regards the bond, another as regards bed and cohabitation. The former belongs to the essence of matrimony, the latter to the offices of spouses. Here only the former must be treated.

Principles. I. Matrimony duly entered into is so indissoluble that it can NEVER be DISSOLVED through divorce as regards the bond. It is of faith from Trent (sess. 24, can. 5 and 7). For "the perpetual and indissoluble bond of matrimony the first parent of the human race, by the instinct of the divine Spirit, pronounced, when he said: This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh: wherefore a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall adhere to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh."⁹ But the "firmness" of this bond, "pronounced by Adam so long before, Christ the Lord confirmed by these words: What therefore God has joined, let not man separate."¹⁰

To the Hebrews indeed, by divine dispensation, the faculty of a bill of repudiation was made, by which the bond of matrimony, in certain circumstances, could be dissolved (Deut. c. 24); but "Jesus Christ restored it to its primeval state, namely to indissolubility, not by establishing a new law, but only by removing the old indulgence, or dispensation conceded over the aforesaid indissolubility."¹¹

But this indissolubility arises from NATURAL LAW itself, at least secondary, because it is necessary for the education of offspring that parents perpetually devote themselves to its good. Thus most commonly the Authors, led by St. Thomas.¹² It is also clear from condemned proposition 67 of the Syllabus: "By the law of nature the bond of matrimony is not indissoluble, and in various cases divorce properly so called can be sanctioned by civil authority." - Hence, "what a mass of evil DIVORCES contain in themselves, it scarcely needs to be said. For by reason of them marital covenants are made changeable, mutual benevolence is weakened, pernicious incentives are supplied to infidelity; harm is done to the protection and instruction of children; occasion is furnished for tearing apart domestic societies; seeds of discords among families are scattered; the dignity of women is diminished and depressed, who come into danger lest, after they have served the lust of men, they be held as abandoned."¹³

But, although matrimony of itself is indissoluble, nevertheless in certain cases it admits dissolution of the bond; wherefore diverse degrees of indissolubility can be distinguished, as will be clear from what is soon to be said.

1979. II. Matrimony of the faithful RATIFIED and CONSUMMATED can never by any reason be dissolved as regards the bond, except THROUGH THE DEATH of either spouse. - Concerning this especially that word of the Apostle avails: "The woman is bound by the law as long as her husband lives." And Our Most Holy Lord Pope LEO XIII defined: "To dissolve the bond of marriage between Christians ratified and consummated is in the power of no one."¹⁴ The practice of the Church is added, which has never dispensed in matrimony of this sort.

1980. III. Legitimate matrimony of INFIDELS, even if it has been consummated, CAN BE DISSOLVED as regards the bond, in the case which they call that of the Apostle: namely if, with one spouse converted to the faith, the other refuses to be converted, or at least does not wish to cohabit without contumely of the Creator. - It is a privilege conceded by Christ the Lord in favor of the faith, as is clear from the testimony of Paul saying: "But if the infidel departs, let him depart; for the brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such cases" (1 Cor. 7:15).

Various things on this point occur to be OBSERVED:

1. From a threefold cause the convert can pass to other nuptials: 1) if the infidel refuses to dwell with him; 2) if he wishes to dwell, but not except with injury of the Creator, e.g. by retaining concubines;¹⁵ 3) if he wishes to draw him into mortal sin.¹⁶ But the convert can enjoy this privilege, even if the infidel spouse consented to cohabit peacefully for some time, indeed for many years, and afterward, with will changed, no longer wishes to do this. Thus from the Decree of the Holy Office, 5 Aug. 1759.¹⁷

2. The convert to the faith cannot use the aforesaid privilege unless there precedes an interpellation of the infidel spouse, whether he wishes to be converted to the faith, or at least to cohabit without contumely of the Creator.¹⁸ - This twofold interpellation, which must be made after Baptism, is required not only that new nuptials can be entered into licitly, but also validly: thus from the declaration of the S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 5 March 1816.¹⁹ But if interpellation is impossible or of the greatest difficulty, the Supreme Pontiff customarily grants an Indult, so that, it having been omitted, the convert can contract a new matrimony.²⁰ But indults of this sort, conceded either for various infidel regions or to Apostolic Vicars for a certain number of cases, cannot be extended to other regions or to other cases, unless recourse has been made to the Holy See.²¹ The Church then dispenses from the rigor of the interpellation, so that the convert is bound only to interpellate the infidel spouse whether he wishes to be converted to the faith; the other being omitted, namely whether at least he wishes to cohabit peacefully.²² This dispensation is more easily conceded in those places where a law prevails forbidding the faithful to cohabit with infidels, since then there is given a presumption of law concerning the danger of perversion to be undergone (cf. n. 448).

3. The bond of marriage is dissolved only then when the convert contracts a new matrimony. This is clear from the Decree of the Holy Office, 5 Aug. 1759.²³ Hence 1) if the infidel, after hearing the interpellation and giving a negative response, afterward embraces the faith before the other converted spouse has contracted new nuptials, the matrimony can no longer be dissolved by force of the Pauline privilege, but becomes altogether ratified. 2) If the first convert meanwhile has received sacred Orders, he cannot return to the spouse now converted, because the use of matrimony is no longer licit to him; for, after the negative response was received, he used his right by choosing a new state. But neither can the second convert enter a new marriage, because the first matrimony endures: unless the spouse has emitted solemn vows, as will be said below (n. 1981).

IT IS ASKED. Whether the Supreme Pontiff CAN DISPENSE over matrimony entered in infidelity, when ONE PARTY or BOTH are converted to the faith?

Resp. Dist. 1. If the matrimony after the Baptism of both has been consummated, it has become altogether indissoluble, and therefore a dispensation cannot be given.

2. If the matrimony has never been consummated, the Pope can dispense, as in ratified matrimony of Christians, concerning which we shall speak soon. - 3. If the matrimony was consummated only in infidelity, it is disputed. Some, among whom is St. Alphonsus,¹ whom we follow, affirm it, and they seek the reason from the Constitution Romani Pontificis issued by St. Pius V,² and from the Constitution Quoniam saepe contingit of Gregory XIII;³ through which Constitutions the aforesaid Pontiffs are said to have dispensed over such a matrimony.⁴ Others, however, deny it, from the fact that they judge the said Constitutions must be understood of dispensation from interpellation to be made, but not from the bond of marriage.⁵

Note. Only the baptized can enjoy the Pauline privilege, but not catechumens.⁶ Nor can that faithful person enjoy it who, after obtaining pontifical dispensation over the impediment of disparity of cult, contracted matrimony with an infidel, even if this one does not wish to cohabit peacefully. S. C. Off., 4 July 1855.⁷ But whether the privilege is to be extended to those who, by receiving Baptism validly, pass to some Christian sect, but not to the Catholic Church, is freely disputed.

1981. IV. Matrimony RATIFIED, but NOT CONSUMMATED, is dissolved by the very fact THROUGH SOLEMN PROFESSION of Religion by either spouse. - It is of faith from Trent (sess. 24, can. 6), affirming that this privilege was conceded by Christ the Lord in favor of the Religious State. Nevertheless Profession would be illicit "if matrimony were necessary for legitimating offspring, or for repairing scandal or the honor of the bride; for then the man could not become a Religious by leaving the bride, who on account of infamy would no longer be able to enter nuptials."⁸

But that the spouses may be able to use the aforesaid privilege, there is conceded to them a two-month period from the celebration of matrimony, within which time they are not bound to render the conjugal debt. And indeed each spouse can enjoy this concession, although he does not have the mind of entering Religion: for he uses his own right. But if, after the two-month period has already passed and the matrimony has not been consummated, one, with the other contradicting, embraces the religious state and emits vows: his profession is indeed illicit, but not invalid; wherefore in this case also the bond of matrimony is dissolved. - Nevertheless he would sin who, the counterpart not having been forewarned, should enter matrimony wishing to enter Religion; for besides other inconveniences which can most easily arise from such a manner of acting, the abandoned spouse would be bound to wait for his solemn profession until she should again enjoy the liberty of marrying.⁹

For the rest, this case is very rare, especially because civil laws, in many places, impede spouses from having recourse to the use of the privilege.

1982. V. Matrimony RATIFIED, but NOT CONSUMMATED, can, on account of a most grave cause, be dissolved through Pontifical DISPENSATION. - Thus commonly today Theologians and Canonists. This is clear especially from the continued practice of several centuries, at least after Martin V;¹⁰ nor in our times are examples of a dispensation of this sort rare.¹¹

The Supreme Pontiff remits the cause for dispensing to the S. Congregation of the Council to be weighed; and for the most part a cause is judged to be present, if the matrimony is likely invalid, without however its nullity being able to be sufficiently proved, and if otherwise it is plainly established that it was not consummated.¹²

1545. - Definition. Matrimony can be considered in two ways, namely as contract, and as Sacrament.

1° Matrimony as contract is a convention by which a man and a woman legitimately hand over to one another dominion over their bodies in order to acts of themselves apt for the generation of offspring, and oblige themselves to an undivided society of life.

2° Matrimony as Sacrament is defined: A Sacrament of the new law conferring grace for sanctifying the legitimate conjunction of man and woman, and for piously receiving offspring and educating it holily.

But Matrimony is of precept as regards the community in general, but not as regards the individual members of the same, except accidentally on account of some other debt of justice or charity, for instance for legitimating offspring, for repairing the damage of defloration, or if someone were unwilling to employ other means for preserving continence. L. IV. 209.

1546. - Division. Matrimony can be considered both as regards the conjunction of man and woman, and as regards the bond which arises from it; hence it is called:

1° In fieri or in facto esse. Matrimony in fieri is called the actual contract itself, which is perfected by the mutual consent of man and woman. But the continuing wedlock in the bond which proceeds from the matrimonial contract is called in facto esse.

2° Legitimate, ratified, and consummated. Matrimony is called legitimate when it is contracted according to the norm of natural and civil law, yet does not have the ratification of the Church or the character of a Sacrament, such as was once entered in the law of nature and the Mosaic law, and even now is entered among Jews and Gentiles. - Matrimony is ratified when it is contracted between Christians entangled by no impediment, between whom, however, after the contract, conjugal intercourse has not yet intervened. It is called ratified because not only nature and civil law, but also the Church approves it and holds it ratified. - Matrimony is called consummated when it has been completed by the copula of the spouses had after Matrimony has been contracted, and that, for the internal forum, probably perfected on each side; such copula is always presumed in the external forum, and in doubt is to be presumed also for the internal forum.¹

3° True, presumed, and putative.

It is called true when it has really and validly been contracted, and as such is proved by some one of those arguments by which other affairs also are wont to be proved, of which kind is the testimony of the Pastor or others, the book of Marriages, the confession of the spouses, etc.

It is called presumed when it is presumed by law; and this presumption of law has place especially in a threefold case, but only in places where the decree of Trent concerning the form of Matrimony is not in force, namely: 1° when, after betrothals absolutely entered between two capable persons, copula has followed, even if imperfect;² for then the consent concerning the future is presumed to have passed into consent concerning the present, and the copula is presumed to have been admitted with conjugal affection.³ 2° When, after betrothals entered under a condition, before the event of that condition, carnal intercourse has intervened between the betrothed persons; for then the Church presumes that the betrothed persons have receded from the condition, and therefore have wished purely and absolutely to contract Matrimony.¹ 3° When, after betrothals concerning the present invalidly contracted by the impubes (in whom malice does not supply age), signs of ratified consent intervene between the same persons when they have attained puberty; of which kind are not only carnal copula, but also kisses, embraces, cohabitation, etc.²

Finally, Matrimony is called putative when it is thought to have been legitimately contracted, while nevertheless on the side of the thing, on account of some latent impediment, it is null. The Doctors therefore inquire concerning this, that it may be clear when it has the force of legitimating offspring thence received, and the other effects of law. Moreover two things are necessary for this: 1° that it was contracted in good faith at least by one of the spouses, who was unaware of the impediment.³ Indeed neither error of law, nor doubt concerning the value of the Matrimony, excludes this good faith, as Covarruvias⁴ proves; but in doubt this good faith is presumed. 2° That the Matrimony was contracted publicly and in the face of the Church, i.e. before the Pastor and witnesses, and with the denunciations premitted, or at least dispensed.⁵

4° Canonical, political or civil, of conscience, and morganatic.

They call that canonical in which all things concur which are prescribed by the Sacred Canons for Matrimony.

They call that political or civil in which those things also concur which are required by civil law, namely certain solemnities, dotal agreements, etc.; without these Matrimony indeed is canonically valid, yet civilly is reputed illegitimate, and accordingly lacks civil effects.

Matrimony of conscience is celebrated secretly before the Pastor or another priest deputed by the Bishop, with two faithful witnesses, the banns omitted. Besides a most urgent cause (e.g. Matrimony to be contracted by concubinaries who are held as legitimate spouses), there is also required the license of the Bishop, to whom there must be sent a written document of the Matrimony so celebrated; this is to be kept by him and inscribed in the book of secret Matrimonies, with those things observed which Benedict XIV prescribes on this matter in the constitution Satis vobis, November 17, 1741, §§ 10, 11.¹

Morganatic Matrimony is that which a noble man enters before the Pastor and witnesses, with dispensation from the banns obtained, with a woman of a lower order, with this condition added: that both the woman and the children to be born from that Matrimony can acquire nothing of the right which coheres with the nobility of the man, and that they be content with those things which are necessary for living, or with a nuptial gift, or with a certain portion of goods determined by antenuptial agreement.²

1547. Principles. - I. The Matrimony of Christians, celebrated by the legitimate rite, is a true and properly so called Sacrament of the new law. See the arguments among the Dogmaticians.

II. For the validity of Matrimony there is required true consent on the part of each contracting party; because Matrimony, as contract, is a convention between a man and a woman: but consent constitutes the essence of convention.

III. But the consent must be:

1° Mutual; for it consists in a contract, which is essentially the consent of two, or mutual consent. Hence, if it is lacking on one side, the Matrimony will be null.

2° Concerning the present; because by a promise concerning the future there are made only betrothals, not Matrimony.³

3° Deliberate and voluntary; because it is a contract concerning a grave matter, and therefore inducing a grave obligation; but no one is judged to impose a grave obligation on himself unless he freely and fully consents. This is clear from Canon Law, which invalidates Marriages contracted from grave fear, as will be said below concerning impediments.

4° Manifested by external signs; because every convention among men ought to be known by some external sign; for convention necessarily supposes mutual acceptance among the contracting parties.

1548. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What manner is to be observed with those faithful who, in those places of our Provinces where the Tridentine decree concerning the form of Matrimony is not in force, after absolute and valid betrothals and copula had with one party, either wish to enter, or have entered, nuptials with another either civilly or in the face of the Church?

Resp. The copula was had either with marital affection, or with fornicatorial affection. - If with marital affection, they are to be prohibited from any other Matrimony. The reason is clear from what was said n. 1546. 3°. Yet in the external forum they would be compelled to remain with her with whom they had contracted nuptials in the face of the Church, if they could not prove the copula had with the first; but they could exercise no carnal intercourse with the second. - If with fornicatorial affection, distinguish between the external forum and the internal. - If the copula has been brought into the external forum, they could be held by the ecclesiastical judge as in the likeness of legitimate spouses, and therefore be prohibited from any other Matrimony, and, if they had already contracted nuptials with another, be compelled to return to the first, with whom, nevertheless, they will be able to exercise no carnal intercourse. The reason is because in the external forum a delict is not presumed, and therefore the copula is presumed to have been had with marital affection. - But that carnal intercourse cannot be exercised with the first is from this, that the copula, although presumed to have been had with marital affection, in reality was had with fornicatorial affection. - If there is question of the internal forum, the Matrimony with the other will be valid, and also licit, if a legitimate occasion for dissolving the preceding betrothals has offered itself. - See the Instruction of the Congregation de Propaganda Fide, p. LXV sq., which was communicated also to the Bishop of Alton, for the information of one recurring. Likewise Heiss.¹

Note. - 1° In the question it is said: after VALID betrothals; for while, e.g., Titius, after having contracted betrothals with Anna, contracted betrothals with Maria against Anna's will, and then knew each woman, that copula had with Maria could not be a sign of Matrimony contracted with her, because the betrothals with her were null; but that copula had with Anna could be a sign of Matrimony contracted with her; for although he had the will of receding from her betrothals by contracting betrothals with Maria, yet in fact he did not recede, and having copula with her, he must be judged to have approved the aforesaid contract and to have amended the attempted recession.²

2° For the internal forum the persuasion of the penitent that he can enter a valid Matrimony with another, in doubt, will be an argument that the copula was had with fornicatorial affection.

Quaer. 2° Must consent be expressed in words?

Resp. 1° Negatively, as regards validity, because by natural law in a contract it suffices that consent be certainly expressed by some sign,¹ e.g. by marital cohabitation or by writing.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, as regards liceity, because otherwise one would act against the Rubric and the custom of the Church. Nevertheless it does not seem to exceed a venial sin if words are not employed; indeed shame or another reasonable cause would excuse from every fault.²

Quaer. 3° Does consent through a procurator suffice?

Resp. 1° As regards validity, affirmatively, provided the required conditions are present, because Matrimony has the whole character of a natural contract. But any contract can be made through a procurator.

But the conditions for contracting Matrimony in that mode are the same as those which are required for valid betrothals to be contracted in that mode (see n. 1528. q. 6°); to which, for places where the decree of Trent concerning the form of Matrimony is in force, there is to be added this sixth: that the procurator appear with the other party before the Pastor and two witnesses.

Resp. 2° As regards liceity, negatively, unless a very grave cause urges. The reason is because this mode of contracting is contrary to the ordinary practice of the Church, and scarcely are Marriages so made among others than Princes and Magnates. Hence the Pastor ought not by his own authority to bless Matrimonies of this kind, as is clear from the practice of the Church and the Ritual.³

Quaer. 4° Is Matrimony entered UNDER A CONDITION valid?

Resp. 1° It is certain that it is valid if the condition is concerning the past or concerning the present, and it is verified. The reason is because that conditioned consent immediately passes into absolute consent, and therefore nothing is lacking to the value of the Sacrament.⁴

Resp. 2° If an honest and possible condition concerning the future is added, I say: 1° The Matrimony is not perfected until the condition is fulfilled; because the contract ought to transfer a mutual right over the bodies concerning the present, as I said n. 1547, and hence, if one before the verification of the condition retracts consent, the Matrimony is null, since at the time in which the contract is perfected, mutual consent is lacking. I say: 2° But when the condition has been fulfilled, the Matrimony is valid; because a conditioned contract, when the condition has been accomplished, passes into an absolute contract, and by that very fact is valid by reason of the Sacrament, because among Christians the contract of Matrimony cannot be disjoined from the Sacrament. Hence more probably there is then no need of new consent; nevertheless more advisedly it is renewed.¹ (35) p. 423.

Quaer. 5° Is it licit to contract with conditioned consent?

Resp. Negatively. Such a mode of contracting is illicit, especially if the condition is concerning the future, unless perhaps, as St. Alphonsus² has it, there is present a most urgent cause which does not suffer delay, as if there is question of Matrimony with a dying person for legitimating offspring, in a case in which the death of the prior spouse is doubtful. The reason is because many and grave inconveniences can easily follow from such a mode of contracting, namely scandal, quarrels, complications, difficulties, etc. - Thus the more common opinion.

Quaer. 6° Is Matrimony entered under a base condition valid?

Things to be noted beforehand. - As regards the ends of Matrimony they distinguish: 1° intrinsic essential ends, namely a) the mutual handing over of bodies with the obligation of rendering the debt, if the other asks by right, and b) the indissoluble bond; - 2° intrinsic accidental ends, and indeed, as primary, the procreation of offspring; as secondary, the remedy of concupiscence; - 3° extrinsic accidental ends, as are, e.g., the peace of families, the obtaining of riches, etc.

Moreover the positive exclusion of essential ends in the celebration of nuptials renders Matrimony void; but not of itself the exclusion of accidental ends; indeed principally (with the relation of works to God saved) to seek nuptials either as a remedy of concupiscence (without, however, the end of procreating offspring being excluded), or on account of an extrinsic end, provided it is in itself honest, is no sin.³

With these things noted beforehand:

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the condition is repugnant to the substance or essence of Matrimony, namely to its threefold good, i.e. 1° to the good of Sacrament; 2° to the good of fidelity; 3° to the good of offspring; as it would be if the spouses, in contracting Matrimony, excluded the generation of offspring in the very use of Matrimony (but not if, out of love of continence, they excluded the use itself), or fidelity in marriage, or perpetuity in Matrimony. But for this it is required that a condition of this kind (namely for the external forum) be expressly posited, as is done in the formula of certain sects, by which perpetuity is excluded,¹ and that the spouses intend in mind to oblige themselves in no other way. But the Matrimony will be valid if this condition has itself concomitantly, and therefore is not the motive why the Matrimony is contracted, and otherwise there is present some general will of validly contracting. - Hence:

a) "The error of non-Catholics, by which very many think marriages can be dissolved by reason of adultery, or on some other account, by the authority of the State, does not obstruct the value of the contract; for the intention of contracting according to the law of nature and of Christ is stronger."

b) Matrimony is valid, although one of the spouses afterwards says that he had been ignorant of the Matrimonial debt, and, this having been known, affirms that he would not have entered Matrimony.²

c) The marriages of former "slaves, if the condition were added, 'so long as you shall have conducted yourself well,' are void."³

d) There was related to me the case of those contracting Matrimony before a magistrate or little heretical minister for this reason, that they believed the bond would thus be dissoluble, persuaded that it would be indissoluble if they contracted before a priest, whose ministry for that precise reason they did not use. I do not at all doubt that this Matrimony is null in the internal forum; for in this case error has itself antecedently to the contract, or they did not wish to enter any Matrimony other than a dissoluble one. But for the external forum, it would have to be clear concerning that matter from the confession or declaration of each spouse, against which the presumption of collusion does not militate. But if, as can easily happen among us, the confession of one party cannot be had, either because it is unknown where the party is, or because he refuses to appear, the sworn declaration of the other seems to suffice.⁴

Resp. 2° But if the base or impossible condition is not repugnant to the substance of Matrimony, distinguish. 1° It is judged valid in the external forum, unless the condition is proved to have been seriously posited; the reason is because in that case the condition is held as not added. 2° As regards the internal forum, distinguish. If it has been indubitably and seriously posited, it will be invalid: otherwise not. But in doubt a condition of this kind is presumed either not to have been posited, or not seriously, since in doubt judgment must always be made in favor of the value of Matrimony. Cf. n. 870. 2°. (36) p. 424.

Quaer. 7° What must be done if someone says that he consented fictitiously?

Resp. 1° As regards the external forum, faith is not given to him, unless either from the circumstances it is clear that he was deceived by fraud or induced by grave fear to contract, or by conjectures (which nevertheless is most difficult) fictitious consent is sufficiently proved. The reason is because it cannot be supposed that he who freely entered Matrimony consented fictitiously.

Resp. 2° As regards the internal forum, he who asserts that he consented fictitiously is to be obliged 1° to abstain from asking and rendering the debt until he truly consents; 2° ordinarily also to posit true consent, that thus he may repair the injury brought upon the other party. I say: ordinarily, because if the other party consents to separation, or fiction intervened also on the part of this party, or no damage is going to come to the party, or he who consented fictitiously was forced to contract, he is not held to supply consent.²

Besides, the spouse who posited true assent is not obliged to believe the other asserting that he consented fictitiously, even though he confirmed it by oath; and therefore would licitly ask the debt until the defect of consent was sufficiently proved.³

Quaer. 8° Is the consent of parents required for the validity or liceity of the matrimonial contract?

Resp. 1° As regards validity, negatively altogether; because the consent of parents is required neither by natural nor positive law. And 1° not by natural law; because the contracting parties have power over their own body, nor do parents have power over the body of their children in order to Matrimony; otherwise they could void the Marriages of these, whether justly or unjustly, which is altogether repugnant and adverse to the common sense of men. 2° Nor by positive law; for Trent¹ struck with anathema those who "falsely affirm that Marriages contracted by children of a family without the consent of parents are void, and that parents can make them ratified or void." But if civil law required the consent of parents for the value of Matrimony, its force would extend only to merely civil effects.² - Thus commonly all Catholic Theologians. Cf. n. 425.

Resp. 2° As regards liceity, affirmatively, generally speaking. This is clear from natural law, because children owe parents honor, reverence, and obedience, especially in those things which look to the whole family, of which kind is Matrimony, upon which very often depend the honor and peace of families, etc.

Quaer. 9° Can children sometimes contract Matrimony against the will of parents?

Resp. Affirmatively, if the parents unjustly refuse consent. But, since in this matter children of a family easily deceive themselves, before they celebrate nuptials they ought to consult prudent men and especially confessors, lest in a matter so grave and full of such great dangers they act imprudently, trusting their own judgment.

Quaer. 10° What must be done by the confessor or Pastor when children of a family wish to enter Matrimony against the will of parents?

Resp. 1° As regards the confessor, if he judges the reclamation of the parents just, he will persuade the children to accommodate themselves to the will of the parents. But if they are unwilling, and the conditions required by law in some State do not obstruct, he ought not to disturb them; for it would be imprudent, in a matter so difficult, to constitute himself judge between the father or mother and their children. Thus Gousset³ practically resolves the matter. But if the children, while the parents are unjustly opposing Matrimony, "betake themselves outside the limits of the State ... for contracting nuptials, or seek by another compact to evade the penalties of the laws, with truth uninjured, they do not seem to be blamed; otherwise if they accomplish the matter by false oath or false witnesses." Thus Kenrick.⁴

Resp. 2° As regards the Pastor, he ought not to assist at Matrimony unless the conditions prescribed by civil law have been fulfilled, on account of the inconveniences otherwise going to arise. See n. 426. q. 4°. R. II. a).

15. • The existence of the sacrament of matrimony.

There is no reason for us to linger in establishing the existence of the sacrament of matrimony, since doing this pertains to the office of dogmatic theology. In this practical treatise let it suffice to remember that the Council of Trent strikes with anathema him who says: "That matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law instituted by Christ the Lord, but was invented by men in the Church, and does not confer grace,"¹ and hence that the existence of the sacrament of matrimony is a defined dogma of the Catholic faith.

¹ Sess. XXIV, De sacramento matrimonii. Denz.-Bannwart, n. 971.

In this article we shall treat: 1°) of the matter, form, and minister; 2°) of the subject of this sacrament.

16. • I. In this sacrament the matter and form do not differ from the matter and form of the matrimonial contract, since the contract itself has been raised by Christ to the supernatural dignity of a sacrament.

17. • II. The remote matter of the sacrament in matrimony is the persons contracting, or the mutual right over the body of the other in order to generation.

For in any contract, the remote matter is called the thing concerning which stipulation is made. But in the matrimonial contract a pact is made concerning the mutual right over bodies in order to generation.

18. • The proximate matter is the signs or words insofar as they express the reciprocal handing over of the right over bodies.

Thus the opinion far more common. For in every contract the proximate matter is the handing over of the thing.

19. • III. The form is the mutual acceptance of this handing over, outwardly manifested. It is the common and certain opinion. In the matrimonial contract, as in other contracts, the acceptance of the thing handed over is considered as form.

20. • IV. The minister of the sacrament of matrimony.

Melchior Cano, O.P., the famous theologian, taught that the priest is the minister of the sacrament of matrimony; that the words, I join you, are the form; but that the matter is the mutual consent of the contracting parties.¹

¹ De locis theologicis, book 8, ch. 5, in solution to 3.

And although many and great theologians have defended the opinion of Cano, nevertheless today it is commonly admitted that the contracting parties themselves are the ministers of the sacrament. And in fact it is certain that the marriages of baptized persons can sometimes be celebrated validly and even licitly without the intervention of a priest, and that such matrimony is a true sacrament.

Therefore not the priest, but the contracting parties themselves, are the ministers of this sacrament.

S. Th., Suppl. q. 42; III, q. 65, a. 1; C. Gent. IV, 78.

779. State of the question. - Besides the Gnostics and Manichaeans, who condemned nuptials as evil (n. 762-763) and thus indirectly denied their sacramental character, the Protestants directly denied this, although on the other hand they said that nuptials are good and often extolled them.

Peter de Bruis, Arnold of Brescia, and in general the Waldenses and Albigenses held the same as the Manichaeans. Luther said that matrimony is a worldly thing and denied that it is a sacrament, since it lacks a divine promise. Calvin says that the character of a sacrament belongs to nuptials no more than to agriculture or to the shoemaker's art, and that they were not held as a sacrament before the times of Gregory I. More recent Protestants, although they hold matrimony as a religious institution, nevertheless deny that it is a sacrament, except for the Ritualists, who place it among the lesser sacraments. And many Modernists hold, prop. 51: "Matrimony could not become a sacrament of the New Law except later in the Church; since, in order that matrimony be held as a sacrament, it was necessary that there precede a full theological explanation of the doctrine of grace and of the sacraments."

On the contrary, the doctrine of the Church is that matrimony, from the beginning, indeed foretold the future union of Christ with the Church, but in the New Law is the sign of this union now existing, and a properly so-called sacrament significative and productive of grace derived from Christ.

That this doctrine may be well understood, it must be noted:

a) There is a twofold union of Christ with human nature: one physical, the other spiritual. By force of the former the assumed humanity is drawn to the very personal being of the Word; by force of the latter charity and grace descends from Christ the head into the body of the Church: thus the second union integrates and completes the first.

b) Further, the conjugal union of man and woman has a proportional likeness with the union of the Word to humanity, and indeed in two ways:

1. By reason of the end and of the operation toward the end. For the principal end of matrimony is man to be procreated and educated for the worship of God; but the end of the union of the Word with flesh and of Christ with the Church is likewise man to be repaired by grace for the worship of God. Then, in the operation for obtaining the end of matrimony, the undivided work of man and woman is required; likewise, for obtaining the end of the incarnation there was required the theandric operation of one person in whom there was a twofold nature, divine and human; and after redemption was consummated, the undivided influence of Christ and of the Church is required for the spiritual life of the faithful.

2. By reason of the relations between the things conjoined, namely, between Christ and the Church, man and woman.

In the conjugal union there is had a fellowship of life and a communication of rights, yet in such a way that the man is the head of the woman, and retains the right of ruling, and as it were assumes the wife to himself, not conversely. So proportionally for the Church with respect to Christ, and for the assumed humanity with respect to the assuming divinity.

If these things are considered, matrimony already from its nature had a certain singular suitability, that it should be assumed as a sign and symbol of the conjunction of the Word with flesh and of Christ with the Church. But, as Scripture testifies, in fact it was assumed to signify this (Eph. V, 32). In the old law, indeed, it could be nothing except a shadowy type and a merely prognostic sign of the future incarnation; wherefore it was not a sacrament collative of grace. But in the New Testament the matrimonial union is a sacred sign expressing the likeness of the union now existing between Christ and the Church; indeed it is ordered to an end of the same order as the end of the incarnation, namely, to offspring to be formed, and not in any manner whatever, but according to the law of grace, for the propagation and perennial conservation of the Church. Wherefore in the law of Christ marriage, as to its substance, is perfected and elevated, so that it is a collative sign and a title of itself demanding, and a cause of, present grace, and therefore a sacrament properly so called.

780. Thesis. Matrimony legitimately celebrated between the baptized is a true and properly so-called sacrament of the New Law. - It is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 24, can. 1, and sess. 7, can. 1 and 6.

It is said: 1) matrimony, and not something added to it, so that matrimony itself in becoming and in fact, namely, the contract and the moral bond resulting therefrom, has been elevated to the dignity of a sacrament;

2. between the baptized: for the evangelical law, which constitutes matrimony as a sacrament, is not applied except to those who are subjected to it by Baptism, while unbelievers have matrimony such as is sanctioned in the natural law; Baptism, namely, is a condition without which there cannot be the sacrament of matrimony, just as neither can there be the other sacraments;

3. legitimately celebrated, or valid, so that there is no valid matrimony between the baptized which is not a sacrament;

4. is a true and properly so-called sacrament of the New Law, a sign of a sacred thing insofar as it is sanctifying men, which not only signifies but also confers grace.

It is proved: A. From the Scriptures, which intimate this, Eph. V, 22-32: Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church: he is the savior of his body. But as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let wives be to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church and delivered himself up for her, that he might sanctify her... that she might be holy and immaculate. So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no one ever hated his own flesh: but nourishes and cherishes it, as also Christ does the Church. Because we are members of his body, of his flesh and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church. By these words it is indicated that matrimony is a) a sacred sign, b) a sign of grace, and c) a practical sign collative of grace.

1° It is a sacred sign. For after recounting the words of Adam, by which the intimate and most close conjunction of man and woman is expressed, so that they are two in one flesh, Paul adds: This is a sacrament (mysterion, i.e., a mystical sign), and indeed a great one: but I speak in Christ and in the Church (thus: εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, i.e., unto Christ and unto the Church, or toward him and her), as if he were saying: the marital union, if considered in itself, seems an obvious and natural thing; nevertheless it must be called a great mystery, because as a sign it must be referred to the most high marriage of Christ with the Church, which in a wondrous and mysterious way it signifies.

2° It is a sign of grace. For it signifies the union of Christ with the Church; but this union is perfected through grace, for Christ loved the Church and delivered himself up for her that he might sanctify her, which cannot be done without grace; therefore matrimony is a sign of grace.

3° It is a practical sign, or a sign collative of grace, not a merely speculative sign as in the Old Testament.

The Apostle does not formally teach this, but he intimates it, as the Council of Trent, sess. 24, says, and supposes it. For:

a) The word sacrament, or mystical sign, is to be understood according to the diversity of times, so that in the broader sense it is taken for a bare sign of a sacred thing, which belongs to matrimony under the law of nature and the Mosaic law; now, however, in the stricter sense, for a sacred sign collative of grace, which belongs to matrimony under the new law, whose sacraments have this as proper to them, that they produce what they signify.

b) The Apostle, from the most lofty signification of matrimony, teaches that Christian spouses are obligated to that most excellent charity by which Christ loved the Church, and to that devoted subjection by which the Church is ordered to Christ; but this love and subjection ought to be something constant and permanent, just as the love of Christ and the subjection of the Church are permanent. But for such charity and subjection to be exhibited continually to one another, spouses need a permanent principle, namely, habitual grace with a right to actual helps. Therefore Paul intimates and supposes that this grace is truly conferred, by reason of the conjugal union insofar as it is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church.

c) The conjugal union, insofar as it is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church, orders the man and the woman to an end which is now of the same order as the end of the incarnation, namely, to offspring to be educated for the conservation and propagation of the Church. "For Christ," says St. Robert Bellarmine, De Matr. c. 4, "Christ and the Church always beget spiritual children through Baptism and nourish them through the Eucharist; and thus Christian spouses are obligated from marriage itself to divine offices. But offices which surpass nature are never committed by God unless at the same time grace is also given, through which those offices may be exercised as is fitting." Therefore the conjugal union, insofar as it is such a sacred sign, demands fitting graces and is an efficacious sign of grace, or a sacrament of the New Law.

B. From Tradition, which proposes the dogma, first implicitly, then explicitly, as is clear from the testimonies of the Fathers, the doctrine of Councils and Pontiffs, the voice of the liturgy and the monuments of antiquity, and the consensus of all the Eastern sects.

1° The Fathers teach: a) that Christ blessed matrimony and added sanctity to it: thus Epiphanius, haer. 67; Cyril of Alexandria, in Ioh. II, 2; the bishops in the Synod of Ephesus; Augustine, in Ioh. IX, 2.

b) That matrimony is a sacred thing, to be sealed by the solemn blessing of the Church, and joined with grace: thus Ignatius, ad Pol. V, 2; Tertullian, ad ux. II, 7-9; Origen, in Mt. XIV, 16; Ambrose, ep. ad Sir.; Pope Siricius, ep. 1, c. 4; Epiphanius, haer. 61 and 67.

c) That Christian matrimony surpasses the matrimony of unbelievers in dignity, and for this reason is a sacrament; which therefore must be understood of a sacrament properly so called, whence they compare it with Baptism and Order: thus Ambrose, De Abraham I, 7; Augustine, De bono coni. 18 and 24; De nupt. et conc. I, 10; Leo the Great, ep. 167, n. 4.

2° Pontiffs and Councils, just as theologians, from the twelfth century onward, more often explicitly enumerate matrimony among the seven sacraments of the Church: thus Lucius III in the Council of Verona, a. 1184; Innocent III in the profession of faith for the Waldenses; the profession of faith read in the Second Council of Lyons, a. 1274; the Council of Florence in the decree for the Armenians.

3° The liturgical books, namely, the Sacramentaries of the Latins and the Euchologia of the Greeks from the fifth century onward, speak in the same way: in them matrimony is shown to be a most holy thing, to be carried out amid the solemnities of Masses, and is called a sacrament, and God is prayed that he may bestow his grace on the spouses. And the monuments of antiquity show the celebration of marriage carried out with the blessing of Christ or under his patronage.

4° The dissenting Eastern Churches, whose schism was perfected from the fifth to the ninth century, all admit that matrimony is a true sacrament; therefore this doctrine was not introduced among them after the separation, but is shown to pertain to the common and ancient faith.

And although in the beginning the testimonies are ambiguous and obscure, nevertheless these are to be understood according to the express and clear doctrine of later times; because, since in the Church the explanation of doctrine is made under the assistance of the Spirit of Truth, if in later times matrimony is indubitably posited to be a sacrament properly so called, conferring grace ex opere operato, by that very fact it is demonstrated that this is the sense implicitly contained in the testimonies of primitive faith and revealed to the Apostles.

C. From the reason of fittingness, which confirms the thesis, and indeed in two ways: both from this, that the sacraments ought to provide for all the necessities of the spiritual life, and from this, that they were instituted as a remedy for concupiscence.

1° The sacraments were instituted for the necessities of the spiritual life, social as well as individual. But just as for spiritual society there is required the order of power by which it is ruled, so there is required matrimony by which it is conserved and propagated; moreover those who are destined to rule it or propagate it cannot duly fulfill their offices without grace. Therefore just as it was fitting to institute a sacrament for conferring grace on those who rule spiritual society, so also to institute matrimony as a sacrament which confers grace on those who are to propagate society.

2° The sacraments were instituted as a remedy for original sin and the evil concupiscence derived from it. But carnal concupiscence inclining to the propagation of the species is especially to be restrained; and matrimony affords an opportune remedy for it. Therefore it was fitting to institute matrimony as a sacrament collative of grace, by which carnal concupiscence is more efficaciously subjected to the bridle of reason.

781. When did Christ institute the sacrament of Matrimony? - He seems to have perfected this in a threefold stage:

1° he consecrated and sanctified nuptials by his presence at Cana of Galilee, John II, 1-11;

2° he sanctioned the essential properties of matrimony, namely, unity and indissolubility, and restored it in its primitive perfection, Mt. XIX, 3-9;

3° after his resurrection he definitively instituted it as a sacrament collative of grace, when the other sacraments had been instituted.

782. Corollaries. - 1. Christ elevated matrimony itself to sacramental dignity, namely, in becoming and in fact, and therefore not only the contract, nor only the bond, but both; as is clear from documents of the Church, which at one time assert that the matrimonial contract was elevated to the dignity of a sacrament, and at another time say the same of the bond itself, as will easily appear to the reader. So also St. Thomas, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1 and 2; a. 3, ad 2; q. 45, a. 1, ad 2.

In the word of God handed down there is contained the Catholic doctrine that Christian Marriage is truly and properly a Sacrament.

I. If by the perpetual and universal tradition of the Christian Church (which surely the decrees of Councils, solemn professions of faith, liturgies or sacramentals, the works of Theologians and Fathers represent) this doctrine is proved to be contained, namely that Christian Marriage is a true and proper Sacrament of the new law, that ought to be enough and more than enough for the Theologian, so that this truth may be said to be demonstrated; if indeed those things are true which concerning the force of Tradition we both teach in the Schools and defend against heretics. Moreover this is easily demonstrated. A true and proper Sacrament is that to which there univocally belongs the definition of those things which in the Church are held as sacraments, namely which are efficacious signs of sanctifying grace; that is, it is that which is a sacrament as Baptism, the Eucharist, etc., are. But by divine Tradition it is certain that Christian Marriage, which namely is contracted by Christian persons, is to be held in the number of these sacraments.

II. Indeed, that we may bring forward an argument which shows the agreement of both the Greek and Latin Church at once, it is certain that the heretical sects which in the fifth century, when namely each Church, Latin and Greek, was still united, departed from the Catholic Church, always had among themselves seven sacraments in number, and among these marriage; and although they disagree among themselves in other dogmas, nevertheless in this all agree. Therefore we gather that those sects received this sevenfold number from the Church and carried it with them.

Therefore in the fifth century the whole Catholic Church had marriage in the number of those things which are properly called sacraments. But this is sufficient that apostolic tradition be demonstrated. You have the proof of the antecedent from the following testimonies, provided you observe that sects of this sort were always tenacious of those things which from the beginning they received from their parents and abhorred changes. Now the faith of the Nestorian Syrians is testified to by Sulaka the Patriarch, in the profession of faith which, while still a monk, he issued at Rome in 1553: "We also believe in holy baptism, and in the sacrifice which is the body and blood of Christ, and in the holy priesthood, and in marriage." Simon Assemani reports the faith of the Jacobites and Copts (Bibliotheca Orientalis, tome II, dissertation On the Monophysites, n. 5): "As regards the sacraments, it is clear from their ritual and pontifical books, etc., that the sevenfold number of them, such as is acknowledged by the Catholic Church, is held most sacred among the Jacobites." Vartan, Bishop of the Armenians, who published his works about two centuries before the Council of Florence, is also a witness that the Armenians thought the same before the Council of Florence; for he says (cf. Galanus, tome 2, p. 440), in the admonitions to the Armenians, c. 6: "Paul the Apostle instructed his disciple Dionysius concerning the seven sacraments of the Church. Christianity rests upon the seven sacraments of the Church... The first sacrament is baptism, the second the sacrifice of the Mass; the third the blessing of the ointment, which the Latins call chrism; the fourth is order; the fifth is marriage, etc." Likewise in the seventeenth century the Greek Church, against Cyril Lucaris favoring the Protestants, issued the profession of its faith, saying among other things: "Anathema to Cyril, fabricating new dogmas and believing that the seven Sacraments of the Church, namely baptism, chrism, penance, eucharist, priesthood, extreme unction, and marriage, are not from the institution of Jesus Christ, nor from the tradition of the Apostles and perpetual practice." Therefore the consequent which we gathered is certain. Cf. Schelstrate, Acts of the Oriental Church against the Heresy of Luther.

III. But that we may enlarge this argument, let us consider singly the testimonies of the Church. Therefore, if in the Church, especially the Latin Church, we make our way from the latest times to the older, there stands forth first the Tridentine decree, session XXIV, canon 1, and the Florentine decree in the decree of Eugene IV to the Armenians; in these Marriage is numbered among the seven sacraments of the Church, which are called sacraments only properly, and it is said truly and properly to be one of the seven sacraments of the Evangelical law. Then there is at hand the profession of faith issued by Michael Palaeologus in the ecumenical Council of Lyons II (year 1274), in which you have these things: "The same holy Roman Church also holds and teaches that there are seven ecclesiastical sacraments: one, namely, baptism; another is the sacrament of confirmation... another is penance, another eucharist; another the sacrament of order; another is marriage; another extreme unction." Lucius III had preceded these (year 1181) in the Council celebrated at Verona (Ad abolendam, On Heretics), saying: "All who do not fear to think or teach otherwise than the Most Holy Roman Church preaches and observes concerning the sacrament of the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, or concerning baptism, or concerning the confession of sins, marriage, or the remaining ecclesiastical sacraments... we bind with the bond of perpetual anathema." Already before this, in the same century, the leading Theologians of the School had taught the same opinion: Hugh of St. Victor (about the year 1140), On Sacraments in General and On the Sacraments of Faith; and the Master of the Sentences (about 1150, in the fourth book), to whom all the rest of the theologians gave assent, teaching that a sacrament of the Church is the visible form of invisible grace, so that it bears its image and exists as cause (dist. 1); and that there are seven sacraments of this sort, among which they numbered marriage among the faithful (dist. 2) ¹. At the beginning and thus the one contracting marriage is more acceptable to God than he had been in the preceding instant, because to enter marriage is a good work, and the power of the sacrament, through the merits of Christ, works an increase of grace. But he would have pleased God more if he had wished to persevere celibate or a virgin. Moreover, to obtain grace with God can have a certain special signification, namely to be made, on account of some work, more acceptable to God than if the opposite, although licit, had been done. Therefore, if the grace of God is taken thus, it can be said that the other sacraments confer grace, but marriage only a remedy, which nevertheless is an effect of sanctifying grace. of the same twelfth century Otto, Bishop of Bamberg, in a Sermon (in Migne, P.L., vol. CLXXIII, p. 1555), after enumerating the Sacraments of the Church, baptism namely, etc., says: "the sixth is marriage, that is, matrimonial union." Again, at the beginning of the same twelfth century, the same doctrine was handed down plainly enough by Rudolph Ardens, who has these things in the Homilies on the Sunday Epistles and Gospels, homily 2: "What is marriage? The legitimate conjunction of male and female, retaining an individual custom of life. What are the goods of marriage? Three: fidelity, offspring, sacrament. It is a sacrament because it is the sign of a sacred thing... Therefore the bridegroom and bride who are about to approach the sacrament of nuptials ought to repent of past excesses and confess their sins." Certain ancient orders or rituals command the same thing. Cf. Martene, order 14. The same thing, on account of reverence for the sacrament, William, Bishop of Paris, prescribed in his Constitutions in the year 1208. Moreover, the duty of repenting and confessing for rightly receiving the sacrament of nuptials shows this to be a sacrament properly so called. Therefore this opinion was commonly known and certain in that age. Likewise at the beginning of the twelfth century Hildebert, Bishop of Tours, in Sermon 2 (Galland, tome 14, p. 334 ff.), n. 3, says: "Therefore there are three sacraments in the city of our God which both preceded the others in time and are known to obtain the primacy in the restoration of the sons of God. The first of these is marriage, the second baptism, the third the sacred libation of the Lord's table. Upon these, in the youth of the world, a form was impressed by God, etc."

¹ The Master indeed immediately adds: "of which some furnish a remedy against sin and confer helping grace, as baptism; others are only for a remedy, as marriage; others sustain us by grace and virtue, as the eucharist and order." By these words the Master seems to deny that marriage confers grace. But since, as St. Thomas observes in the same place, the definition of a genus ought to agree with all the species, and in the definition of sacrament by the Master himself it is placed that it exists as cause of grace, his opinion cannot be one which simply denies that grace is conferred through the sacrament of marriage. But that which is called a remedy will be a certain grace, which nevertheless, on account of a certain special reason, can be honored by this singular name and distinguished from grace taken generally. Thus St. Thomas interprets the saying of the Master in the same place, q. I, a. 1, ql. 2, ad 3: "It must be said that each thing is denominated from that to which it is ordered. But the grace which is conferred in marriage, insofar as it is a sacrament of the Church celebrated in the faith of Christ, is ordered directly (although not exclusively) to repressing concupiscence, which pertains to the act of marriage; and therefore the Master says that marriage is only for a remedy; but this is through the grace which is conferred in it." Perhaps the Master considered that which is special in marriage with respect to the grace of God before the other sacraments. Namely, he who receives any other sacrament becomes either simply acceptable to God or more acceptable to him, and always pleases him more than if he had not received the sacrament; nor does the opposite please God more than the reception itself of the sacrament, at least of itself. But he who contracts marriage does not please God more than if he had chosen the opposite, that is, life in continence. An increase of sanctifying grace is indeed conferred through marriage, with helps suitable to that state,

St. Thomas indeed, in IV, dist. II, q. I, a. 1, ql. 2, reports the opinion of certain persons saying that "in marriage some grace is not conferred, but that it is only for a remedy against concupiscence." Either this opinion must be accepted in the way in which we accepted the doctrine of the Master in the Note, whom they seem to have followed as to the manner of speaking, or it must be held to be a certain imprudent aberration from the common doctrine. Certainly, as St. Thomas argues in the same place, the very doctrine admitted by those same Theologians, namely that marriage is a sacrament of the New Law, and that the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace, is evidently repugnant to this other doctrine, that no grace is conferred through marriage. Wherefore aberrations of this sort, which touch the manner of speaking rather than the thing itself, are not witnesses of dissent from the doctrine of others, but are witnesses of a doctrine not yet clarified and illustrated by the scholastic method through proper and distinct concepts; and this also happens in other questions. Durandus also later joined those Theologians of whom Thomas makes mention, but, the School protesting, he afterwards corrected his opinion.

Therefore from the twelfth century it is certain that ecclesiastical preaching in the Latin Church had been sufficiently explicit: the marriage of Christians is truly and properly a sacrament.

IV. Moreover, in the preceding age there also exists a continuous series of tradition all the way to Apostolic times, handing down at least this, most openly and without doubt: namely that the marriage of Christians is of divine institution and is entered into with God as author; that it is a sacred thing; that it is joined with sanctification and grace; that it was sanctified by Christ; and now and then also teaching that marriage is truly and properly a sacrament.

Indeed, a) there exist either Orders or Rituals (cf. Martene, On the Ancient Rites of the Church, book I, part 2, chapter IX, article 6 ff., and Goar in the Euchologion of the Greeks), or Sacramentaries, which extend in a long series all the way to the Gelasian Sacramentary, which is said to have been derived from the Sacramentary of St. Leo. Now in the Sacramentary of Gelasius (cf. Thomasius, Codices of the Sacraments, book III, Sacramentary of the Roman Church) there is represented the nuptial action which takes place within the solemnities of Masses, consisting of the prayers and blessings of the Priest; and in it you have these things: "God is he who connects spouses in legitimate society; the wife is joined by the gift of God to marital fellowship." And God is entreated that "he pour upon the spouses the help of his blessing; that in conjugal fellowship, with equal affection, with similar mind, they be joined by mutual holiness; that he deign to confirm their nuptials as those of the first man; that he sanctify the beginnings of the woman; that she, associated in good and prosperous fellowship, may keep the commands of the eternal law and may marry faithful and chaste in Christ." Once the blessing has been completed, the spouses receive communion from the altar. But from these Ritual books, whose authority in the Church is very great, since they represent the public testimony of the Churches, it is manifest that marriage is exhibited as a thing flowing from divine institution, a thing which is made with God as author, a thing joined with sanctification and grace; namely, that man and woman are joined to each other by mutual holiness and marry in Christ.

b) The Fathers, even the most ancient, teach α) that "the Church conciliates marriage, the oblation confirms it, the blessing seals it, the Angels announce it when sealed, and the Father holds it ratified" (Tertullian, To His Wife, book II, chapter 9); β) that "it is fitting that bridegrooms and brides make marriage according to the judgment of the Bishop, that the nuptials may be according to the Lord and not according to cupidity" (Ignatius Martyr, Epistle to St. Polycarp, chapter 5); γ) that "marriage itself ought to be sanctified by the priestly veil and blessing" (Ambrose, epistle 19 to Vigilius); that "it is after the manner of sacrilege if by any transgression that blessing is violated which the priest imposes upon the woman about to marry" (Siricius, Roman Pontiff, to Himerius of Tarragona, n. 4). Therefore, in the address of Peter to the ecclesiastical assembly, which he is said to have had after he handed over his Roman chair to Clement, as is narrated in the Clementines (cf. either the epistle of Clement to James prefixed to these in the edition of Cotelerius, or, in Dressel, the other epitome of Clement of the preachings of Peter, n. 151), these words occur, spoken to the presbyters: "Those things which belong to presbyters are these: Before all things, let them quickly join the young in nuptials, by forestalling the snares of the cupidity burning in youth. But neither let them cast away care concerning the marriage of those now old; for in some, even when they have grown old, strong cupidity is present." Namely, the marriage of Christians is subject to the care and government of priests. Wherefore Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus, book 3, indicates that presbyters in the Church were accustomed to be present at Christian nuptials; for, reproving women adorned with false hairpieces and approaching the nuptial blessing, he says: "Upon whom will the presbyter impose hands? Whom, moreover, will he bless? Not the woman who is adorned, but another head by means of another's hair." But from these things it is certain that the rite which is exhibited in the orders is most ancient and reaches Apostolic times, or has been derived from the Apostles; then it is certain also from the opinion of the Fathers that marriage is a thing belonging to the Church, a sacred thing, joined with sanctification.

c) The Fathers again teach that divine grace coheres with marriage, as Tertullian, loc. cit., chapter 7: "If therefore a marriage of this sort is ratified before God, why should it not also turn out prosperously, so that it is not so harassed by pressures and straits and impediments and defilements, having already from a part the patronage of divine grace?" Therefore this is for marriage to be ratified before God: namely, to have the patronage of divine grace. Maximus of Turin, homily 23:

"Christ goes to nuptials, in order that those which long ago he constituted by power he may sanctify by the blessing of his presence." Innocent I, epistle 9, concerning a simultaneous bigamist, hands down these things: "We establish, with the Catholic faith giving support, that that was marriage which had first been founded by divine grace, and that the coming together of a second woman, while the former survives and has not been cast out by divorce, can by no compact be legitimate." Moreover marriage founded by divine grace is that which was contracted first. Therefore divine grace coheres with Christian marriage.

d) Monuments confirm the doctrine of the Fathers handed down thus far. In the work of the distinguished man Garrucci (Glasses, etc., table 26) there exists a twofold representation of nuptials; in each, the man and woman join right hands; in one, between them there stands the Monogram of Christ; in the other, between the same persons, a column adorned with gems, which is the symbol of the Church, whose gems are the Apostles, with the inscription: May you live in God. "Happy are the nuptials at which Christ is present," says Chrysologus, sermon 157. There exists a Greek coin to be referred to the fifth or sixth century, in which bridegroom and bride join right hands, Christ existing in the middle, who, embracing both, joins them, with the inscription Θεοῦ χάρις, "the grace of God." Nazianzen had already expressed this (epistle 193) a little otherwise: "I join youthful right hands to each other, and both to the hand of God."

V. But does the notion of sacrament properly so called, explicitly asserted of Christian marriage, occur in the monuments of the ancients which remain to us? That they may persuade this, some appeal to the words of Tertullian, On Prescription, chapter 40, by which they judge that he numbers marriage among the sacraments properly so called. "The devil," he says, "whose parts it is to overturn truth, emulates also the very things of the divine sacraments in the mysteries of idols. He himself also washes certain persons, namely his believers and faithful ones; he promises expiation from the laver (after the laver), and thus even initiates Mithras; there he signs his soldiers on the foreheads; he also celebrates the oblation of bread... What of the fact that he also establishes the supreme Pontiff in one marriage?... He therefore so emulously affected to express in the affairs of idolatry the very things from which the sacraments of Christ are administered, etc." Behold, they say, the Christian sacraments: baptism, penance, confirmation, eucharist, nuptials, which the devil emulates as an ape. But to establish the supreme Pontiff in one marriage is nothing other than to establish that the Pontiff be the husband of one wife, which Paul had prescribed, and which, with the devil persuading, unbelievers were imitating. Cf. the same author, To His Wife, book I, chapter 7.

But Augustine speaks more clearly. For in On Nuptials and Concupiscence, chapter 10, he teaches that not only fecundity and fidelity, but a certain sacrament of nuptials is commended to the married faithful. But he says that the effect of this sacrament is indissolubility, just as character is the effect of baptism. "Of this Sacrament, without any doubt, the thing is that male and female, joined in marriage, persevere inseparably as long as they live. Thus there remains among the living a certain conjugal thing which neither separation nor union with another can take away; but it remains for the guilt of crime, not for the bond of covenant; just as an apostate soul, departing as it were from the marriage of Christ, even when faith has been lost, does not lose the sacrament of faith which it received by the laver of regeneration." And in On the Good of Marriage, chapter 24, he compares the sacrament of marriage to the sacrament of ordination: "The good of nuptials, which belongs to the people of God, is also in the holiness of the sacrament, through which it is unlawful even for one departing by repudiation to marry another... nor is the conjugal bond dissolved except by the death of the spouse. Just as, if an ordination of clergy is made for gathering a people, even if the gathering of the people does not follow, nevertheless the sacrament of ordination remains in those ordained; and if by some fault anyone is removed from office, he will not lack the sacrament of the Lord." Wherefore in the same place, chapter 18, he says: "In the nuptials of Christians the holiness of the sacrament has more force than the fecundity of the womb." But a sacrament which belongs only to the faithful, which is the cause of a permanent effect after the manner of a character, which is compared to baptism and order, you will not interpret more suitably than if you understand a sacrament properly so called. Especially since this manner of speaking, the thing of the sacrament, is customarily employed by Augustine when he has speech concerning sacraments properly so called. Nor is St. Hildebert of Tours opposed to this interpretation; indeed he supports it, when in the Sermon cited above, n. 4, concerning this manner of speaking of Augustine he observes "that, all the other things which are required in legitimate marriage being omitted, Augustine ascribes sacrament to its stability; someone not imprudent, as I think, might say that this was said by prerogative rather than singularly (that is, not only in this, but chiefly in it): for an authority not to be contemned hands down that a sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing." Then he goes on to enumerate those things in which marriage is a sign of a sacred thing.

But especially Cyril of Alexandria must be appealed to, who thus discourses in On John, book II, chapter 2: "Christ himself, having been invited with his disciples, came to the nuptials, not so much in order to feast as in order to work a miracle, and besides to sanctify the principle of human generation, so far, namely, as pertains to the flesh. For it was fitting that he who was about to renew the very nature of man should not only impart a blessing to those who had already been called into birth, but should also pre-establish grace for those who were afterward to be born, and make their entrance into being (τὴν εἰς εἶναι πάροδον) holy." Therefore Christ not only imparted a blessing to those already born, namely through baptism, but besides sanctified the very principle of human generation, that is, marriage, and by this sanctification pre-established grace for those to be born, so that their birth would be holy. These things of themselves signify the supernatural sanctity of marriage, by which its act, or the generation of children, also is holy: which sanctity of a permanent thing is itself permanent of itself; and when this is posited, marriage becomes a true sacrament. Moreover Epiphanius teaches the same thing, although less clearly, heresy LXVII: "Who would not recognize that nuptials are venerable and, with the grace of God breathing upon them, obtain the heavenly kingdom, even from this, that the Savior himself was invited to nuptials, that he might bless them?" The Fathers of Ephesus likewise teach, Act 1, saying: "Christ then, by dispensation, blessed the nuptials themselves, when in Cana of Galilee he deigned to be present, being called with the holy Apostles." From these things you see that, just as Christ is said to have sanctified the waters by his baptism, so he is said by his presence to have sanctified nuptials. If you weigh this comparison rightly, you will easily understand that, just as the sanctification of the waters, according to the Fathers themselves, was a sanctification conferring sacramental power, in the same way the sanctification of nuptials must be accepted.

Now, if the opinion expressed in all these monuments of the earlier age that have been brought forward (IV, V) is compared with the opinion expressed in the monuments of the later age (III), which we enumerated above, it is clear, first, that speech in each series is about the same thing; secondly, that the opinion expressed in the more ancient monuments is related to the opinion of the later ones as a generic and more or less determined notion is related to a specific and more determined notion. But this specific and more determined account, which appears in the later monuments, was apprehended and implicitly asserted by all those formulas which exist in the older monuments. Therefore the same doctrine which is explicitly asserted in the later monuments was also held in the earlier age. The minor is proved. For it is necessary that the ancients, speaking of marriage as it is in the concrete, apprehended its notion not only generically, but also specifically, or the determinate mode by which it is a sacred thing and joined with sanctification; for any thing is determinate in itself and exists in a determinate mode. Therefore a sacred thing is sacred in a determinate mode. But it could not happen that for so long an age, when there was question of a matter frequent in daily use, the account of sacredness which is in marriage would be apprehended only in a confused mode still determinable, without the wise perceiving that the confused concept was to be determined more, lest marriage be confused with other sacred things of another species; without therefore a question arising concerning its proper and determinate notion, and doubts and diverse opinions existing. Nor could it happen that thereafter, from the eleventh century, a certain determinate mode by which marriage is sacred, if it had recently been devised, would be proposed to the faithful without any controversy as a known thing. But there exists no trace in the preceding centuries of questions or diverse opinions on this matter, and from the eleventh century a certain determinate mode by which marriage is a sacrament is proposed without any controversy. Therefore in the earlier ages the determinate account of sacredness which belongs to marriage was apprehended, and the faithful, or at least the teachers of the faithful, were conscious of this thing. But this determinate account of sacredness which was attributed to marriage in the earlier centuries could not be other than that which afterwards is explicitly expressed in the later monuments; otherwise there would have arisen in the Church a doctrine not only new, but also contrary to the ancient doctrine. Therefore the earlier formulas represent that same thing, although a little more obscurely, at least as regards us, which the later formulas represent; therefore the doctrine exhibited by the definitions of Councils is represented by an uninterrupted series of testimonies which is connected with the Apostolic age.

But if you add that in the series also of the ancient monuments the notion of Sacrament properly so called repeatedly shines forth (cf. n. V, Augustine and Cyril), you will have a confirmation, although not a necessary one, of the identity of the thing known both by the later and by the more ancient. Therefore from apostolic tradition proceeds the doctrine that Christian marriage is a sacrament properly so called. And so by a twofold kind of arguments Catholic tradition is demonstrated in this matter: that is, both by the consensus of all Christians in the fifth century (II), and by the analysis of the doctrine of every age all the way to Apostolic times or times near to them.

VI. Yet a difficulty not to be despised occurs. For it is asked, first, why the Fathers before Augustine, disputing with the Gnostics and Manichaeans, who rejected marriage as introduced by Satan, and bringing forward also testimonies of the Scriptures, why the Fathers, I say, when they attack this error with arguments drawn from divine authority, nevertheless never bring that into the middle, namely that marriage is a sacrament? Moreover, there disputed on this matter Irenaeus, book I, Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book III, Tertullian, book I, To His Wife, Titus of Bostra, book II, against the Manichaeans, Epiphanius, heresy 23 of Saturnilus, 32 of Epiphanes, 45 of the Severians, 67 of the Hieracites, and Didymus of Alexandria, Against the Manichaeans, etc. It is asked, secondly, why the Fathers disapproving the nuptials of the faithful with unbelievers, such as Tertullian, book II, To His Wife, Cyprian in Augustine, On Faith and Works, chapter 19, and the Fathers of the Council of Laodicea, canon 10, and of the ecumenical Council of Chalcedon, canon 14, did not appeal to the dignity of the sacrament, which seems to be the most powerful reason. It is also asked, thirdly, why Jovinian, who gathered together all arguments (cf. Jerome, book I, Against the Same) in order to extol marriage and make it equal to virginity, did not bring forward the account of sacrament. Namely, from all these things it seems that the doctrine was unknown to the earlier centuries: that marriage is a sacrament.

To the first it must be confessed that the ancient Fathers, when they attack that error of certain Gnostics and Manichaeans, do not use explicitly, and under this formula of words which we now would use, an argument taken from the dignity of a true and proper sacrament, but appeal both to the divine institution of marriage (Gen. II; Matt. XIX), and to the words of the Apostle (Hebr. XIII, 4; 1 Cor. VII, 2, 28 ff.; 1 Tim. V, 11), and also to the blessing which Christ imparted by his presence to the nuptials in Cana of Galilee. But, first, that argument sought from silence, since it is negative, loses all force if against it, as has been done, positive arguments can be brought forward. Secondly, we said deliberately: explicitly and under that formula of words which we now use. For since the Fathers must be judged to have attributed the dignity of sacrament to marriage when they say that it was sanctified by Christ by the blessing of his presence, and since they object this sanctification against the heretics, it cannot simply be asserted that the Fathers did not use that argument. Indeed, on the contrary, it must be held that when the Fathers objected that blessing against the heretics, which the Greeks frequently do, they objected to them the account of a true sacrament. For just as they signified that the true account of sacrament is present in baptism when they spoke of the sanctification imparted to the waters in the Jordan by Christ, so they must be thought to speak of true sacramental sanctification when they say that Christ, by his presence, blessed and sanctified nuptials. For the rest, thirdly, the argument taken from the proper dignity of a true sacrament was in no way necessary for the Fathers; rather, it was enough to urge the divine institution. Indeed, the matter was being dealt with against heretics who, permitting to themselves any wandering concubitus whatever for the sake of pleasure, nevertheless condemned the procreation of children and nuptials, as Epiphanius and Clement of Alexandria testify concerning the Gnostics in the places cited, and Augustine concerning the Manichaeans in On Heresies, heresy 46: "They admonish their hearers that, if they use spouses, they should nevertheless avoid conception and generation, lest the divine substance which enters into them through foods be bound by the chains of flesh in offspring." And against Secundinus the Manichaean, chapter 22: "For you do not so much detest concubitus as nuptials." Cf. also Titus of Bostra, cited work, book II. Now this base opinion erred simply in that which belongs to natural right, and therefore to overthrow it, it was enough to teach that the procreation of offspring and marriage are according to nature and honorable, which all the Fathers furnish; and also from the Scriptures, which those heretics received in some manner, it was enough to show that the procreation of offspring and marriage, which nature demands, were confirmed by divine institution. And this was directly opposed to their opinion, who taught that to take a wife and procreate children was from Satan.

To the second, we respond first that the dignity of the sacrament of itself does not prevent these nuptials from being permitted, as was done from the beginning of the Church; wherefore neither in the nearest centuries was this argument too much to be urged, especially lest the preceding Fathers seem to be condemned as injurious toward the sacrament. For the rest, where the necessity of permitting it was lacking, and it was lawful for Bishops, without scandal and disturbance of the faithful, to guard the honor of the sacrament most fully, it is false that an argument was not also drawn thence for prohibiting these nuptials, although they had not yet invalidated them. For in the Council of Elvira it is indeed said, canon 15: "On account of the abundance of girls, Christian virgins are by no means to be given in marriage to the Gentiles, lest an age swelling in its flower be dissolved in adultery of the soul." But in canon 16 it is added: "But it has pleased us that they be given neither to Jews nor to heretics, because there can be no society of a faithful person with an unbeliever," certainly in a sacred thing; which reason is not one that may be denied to be sought from the dignity itself of the sacrament. The same reason is also contained implicitly in the opinion of Cyprian, which Augustine reports in the cited place: "St. Cyprian in the epistle On the Lapsed (compare it), among the evil morals of Christians, counts joining the bond of marriage with unbelievers, which he asserted to be nothing other than prostituting the members of Christ to the Gentiles; these in our times are now not thought to be sins, because in truth in the New Testament nothing has been commanded concerning this, and therefore it has been believed either to be lawful or has been left as doubtful." But since the Laodicean and Chalcedonian canons bring forward no special reason, they also exclude no suitable one.

3. As regards Jovinian, we respond that he too denied the distinction between the innocent and penitents, or equated penitents with the innocent (Jerome, cited work, book II, in proposition 1), and nevertheless, in order to show this parity, did not gather an argument from the fact that penance is a sacrament. Namely, he was instituting a comparison between the merits of each, the innocent and the penitent, which each could acquire for himself in his own state, and between the reward which he contended had been promised as the same to all because of their works, not between the rites by which some state was consecrated. Wherefore neither did he appeal to the account of sacrament in marriage, because he was comparing the state of marriage with the state of virginity, or the merits which in each state man and woman could attain, and he gathered the equal merit of the virgin and the spouse from the value of the works of each before God.

By the written word of God also it is shown that Christian marriage, by reason of its state, has sanctifying grace conjoined to it; and that, when it itself comes to be, it is also the cause of this grace, is at least strongly urged from the words alone of the Scriptures, the analogy of faith being applied.

I. Let us come to the Scriptures. In Eph. V. 22 seq., as the Council of Trent bears witness, it is intimated that marriage is a sacrament. This must be explained, and it must be inquired whether a true demonstration of Catholic doctrine can be drawn out of this passage. Three partial questions must be distinguished: 1. whether marriage is a sacrament in some general respect; 2. whether it is of itself conjoined with sanctifying grace proper to its state; 3. whether the rite itself, by which marriage comes to be, is, under God, the cause of that grace.

As to what regards the first, after the Apostle has explained the mutual relation of man and woman by the mutual relation of Christ and the Church, he concludes thus, with the words of Adam from Gen. II. 24: For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh: This is a great sacrament (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦτο μέγα ἐστί); but I speak in Christ and in the Church (εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν). Now the pronoun this (in the words this sacrament) indicates that the appellation of sacrament is made of the preceding thing, which has already been shown and made present; but what precedes generally is the sentence of Adam, and what immediately comes before is this: that the two would be in one flesh. Therefore these words of Adam contain a mystery, or the thing expressed by these words is a mystery or sacrament. Moreover it must be observed that Adam, by those words for this cause, with which he begins the last part of the speech, joins the following things by a causal bond with the things preceding in Gen. II. 22, 23. But these preceding things are not only those words spoken of Eve: bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; for from these alone it is certainly not clear how there follows that which is then added: a man shall leave father and mother, etc. Rather, the preceding things are the whole deed which preceded, namely that God gave Eve as wife to Adam and joined her with him in such unity, as Adam himself also expressed. But when Paul had interpreted mystically of the Church those same words of Adam (bone of my bones, etc.; to be of the bones and flesh of someone designates in the Scriptures whatever degrees of necessity; cf. Fr. de Hummelauer on Genesis, at this place), v. 30, because we are members of his body, of his flesh and of his bones, that is, of Christ, and had thus transferred them to signify the marriage of Christ with the Church, he immediately continues by using the words of Adam, yet with the conjunction changed: ἀντὶ τούτου, a man shall leave father, etc. For in Hebrew it is על כן, which the LXX render ἕνεκα τούτου. But ἀντὶ τούτου can conveniently be translated: after the likeness of this. Namely, just as the Church is the spouse of Christ, so (after the likeness of this union) a man shall leave, etc., by which the relation of type and ectype is signified. Thus the Apostle returns to that which he had taught from the beginning of the discourse, that the union of Christ with the Church is the type of marriage.

Now no one doubts that all the words of Adam are to be taken in the literal sense of the marital union of man and woman, since this is the proper and immediate sense of the words, and the occasion on which they were uttered demands this sense; moreover Christ himself taught this interpretation, Matth. XIX. 5. But that these words, a man shall leave, etc., they shall be two in one flesh, also have a mystical signification, that is, that the thing immediately signified by these words also signifies something else, the Apostle teaches us, calling these words, or the thing expressed by the words, a sacrament, and declaring that it is great in Christ and in the Church, that is, in the union of Christ with the Church, which he had explained above as the conjunction of Bridegroom with Bride. Therefore the union of Christ and the Church is the term or object to which that mystery is referred, εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν; wherefore the union of man and woman is certainly a sign of this union. For it is called a mystery because in it lies hidden the signification of a hidden thing, of which sort is the espousal of the Word with the Church. Thus Jerome explains the mind of Paul on this passage: "The same thing he interprets by allegory in Christ and in the Church...

Not, as very many think, can the whole history which is written in Genesis concerning Adam and Eve easily be referred to Christ and the Church, but only that which is set down in the present passage: for this cause, etc. For the first man and first prophet, Adam, prophesied this concerning Christ and the Church: that our Lord and Savior left his Father, God, and his mother, the heavenly Jerusalem (I came forth from the Father, and have come into the world, John XVI. 28), and came to the earth on account of his body, the Church, and fashioned her from his own side, and on account of her the Word was made flesh. And because not all sacraments are equal, but one sacrament is greater and another lesser, for that reason he now says: This is a great sacrament; and at the same time this is an indication of him who infers: but I speak in Christ and in the Church"; as if he were saying, according to the interpretation of Nazianzen: "I know that this passage is full of ineffable sacraments and seeks the divine heart of an interpreter; but I, according to the smallness of my understanding, think meanwhile that it is to be understood in Christ and in the Church." Cf. also St. Thomas, discoursing on this passage in the same way.

Therefore the words of Adam, which in the literal sense signify the marital union of man and woman, mystically, with Paul as author, signify the marriage of Christ with the Church. Marriage, therefore, is a sign of this thing. And so marriage is a theoretical sign of a sacred thing, of which sort is the union of Christ with the Church. It is, moreover, a great sign. Why? Certainly because it signifies a great thing. Is it also because it signifies in a certain wonderful mode? This will be clear from what is to be said. Therefore, since the generic notion of a sacrament is that it is a sign of a sacred thing, in this sense certainly marriage is called a sacrament, because it is the sign of that most sacred thing.

II. But we must proceed further and ask whether marriage is only a theoretical sign of the union of Christ with the Church, or whether it is also conjoined with grace and signifies it. The question is, namely, whether by divine institution there is conjoined with marriage, by reason of itself, a grace fitting the state of marriage, which is conferred when marriage comes to be. But we are taught sufficiently clearly by Paul that marriage among Christians is of this sort. We suppose that the marriage of which he himself speaks is certainly the marriage of Christians; for those whom he addresses are Christians, and they are the same persons to whom the example of Christ and the Church is proposed as a thing known. But whether the doctrine of Paul pertains only to Christian marriage, we shall say later.

And so, A) if a brief analysis is made of the words of the Apostle from v. 22 onward, one may observe, 1. that that marriage is considered by the Apostle which is of divine institution; for it is considered as one of one man with one woman and indissoluble, vv. 23, 29; such, namely, as was declared by Adam in the prophetic words: for this cause, etc.

2. That the nature of a sacrament or sign is exhibited by the Apostle as inhering in marriage by divine institution, inasmuch, namely, as God himself assumed marriage into a sign. For he repeats it from the prophetic words of Adam, which words the Apostle knew were to be attributed to God, since they are attributed to God himself by Christ, Matth. XIX. 5. Hence although other mutual relations besides that which is proper to spouses, for example, that of father to son and conversely, can represent some relation of the Church to God and conversely, nevertheless it is not therefore lawful to conclude that there belongs to this relation what is asserted by Paul of marriage by reason of the sacrament, that is, of such mystical signification, unless you first demonstrate that that union also of father and son has been assumed by God as a sacrament or sign of some relation or union of his to the Church or to others.

3. That the relation which intervenes between man and woman is so explained by the Apostle that the man is the head of the woman (v. 23), the woman is the body of the man and subject to him (vv. 24, 28). But this relation is permanent, just as the relation of head to body is permanent. Therefore some state is signified.

Moreover, 4. with Paul as author, a certain proportion exists between this relation of man and woman and the relation of Christ and the Church; for the man is the head of the woman, as Christ is the head of the Church (v. 23), and the woman is subject to the man in all things, as the Church is subject to Christ (v. 24), or the woman is the body of the man, as the Church is the body of Christ (vv. 23, 28). Namely, the union of man with woman is similar to the union of Christ with the Church; it is, namely, a union representing the union of Christ with the Church, and therefore it is a state representing something wholly holy and supernatural, and for that reason this state itself also, by reason of representation, is holy and supernatural. According to Paul these things pertain to the essence of marriage; for from them he gathers the proper offices of spouses, namely, because they are such - the man the head of the woman, as Christ of the Church, the woman subject to the man, as the Church to Christ - the man must conduct himself in a certain way toward the woman, and the woman toward the man.

Now, 5. the offices which Paul gathers from this sort of state are the love of the man toward the woman (v. 25), and the fear of the woman toward the man (v. 33), which fear is itself also a certain love, but joined with a certain reverence and subjection. But that love is supernatural; for its norm, which is proposed, is wholly supernatural, namely the love of Christ and the Church (vv. 25-28), and the formal reason on account of which it is demanded is supernatural; for it is demanded from this, that the man is the head of the woman as Christ is the head of the Church, namely from this, that the union of man and woman is a union representing the union of Christ and the Church. And the final reason of the same is also supernatural, namely, that through acts in the exercise itself the love of Christ toward the Church and the subjection of the Church toward Christ may be represented. For to this also pertain the words of Paul: Men, love your wives, as Christ loved the Church; for they ought to act according to its norm, so that they may represent it, just as by reason of the state they represent the union of Christ with the Church. Besides, no other love than supernatural love could have been commended to the faithful in this economy from the example of Christ.

Moreover, 6. the love which is commended to spouses is a special love, that is, one proper to the state of marriage; for it is not commanded to them because they are Christians, but because the man is the head of the woman and the woman subject to the man. But the man existing as head of the woman and the woman subject to the man represent Christ and the Church. Therefore the love is permanent, just as the state remains. But, 7. in this is situated the proper office of marriage; therefore to the same also belongs the power or principle of this supernatural love proper to the same state, and this Paul manifestly supposes when he commands and commends the act.

Therefore the state of marriage, because it is such a state representing the marriage of Christ with the Church, has by reason of itself joined to it a permanent principle of supernatural love proper to it, that is, sanctifying grace proper to it, permanent, by which man and woman are able to conduct themselves toward one another as Christ toward the Church and the Church toward Christ, and so to represent the love of Christ and the subjection of the Church. I have said sanctifying grace, for the principle of permanent love is sanctifying grace, which besides gives a right to those actual helps which are suitable and necessary for that work on account of which habitual grace is given.

Therefore the sacrament of marriage, signifying the union of Christ with the Church, represents it also as to the mode in which the union comes to be, namely according to grace and holiness, because it is joined with sanctifying grace so that it may refer to the union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore marriage, when it comes to be, also signifies the grace annexed to it. For that contract or rite by which marriage comes to be signifies the very union of the spouses, and the contract or rite by which marriage comes to be among Christians signifies such a union as comes to be among Christians. But this is a union representing the union of Christ with the Church, a holy union or one conjoined with grace; therefore a twofold signification must be distinguished in marriage: one which is the signification of the union of Christ with the Church; the other which is the signification of the holiness or grace annexed to it, by which that union is perfectly represented.

Marriage, therefore, is a marital union supernaturally holy, with which sanctifying grace proper to that state is connected, and which marriage itself, when it comes to be, signifies.

III. But the question finally remains, whether God alone immediately effects in the spouses (disposed, of course) that grace which marriage signifies, or whether the rite itself of the nuptials is, under God, the cause of it, as the other sacraments are. We do not contend that this is openly taught by the Apostle in this place; nevertheless it is intimated, inasmuch as the Apostle teaches those things which, although of themselves they do not suffice, nevertheless, the account of the Christian economy being had, which he himself rightly must be said to suppose, certainly urge the matter. We say, therefore, that, when those things which the Apostle teaches are considered, and account is had of the character of the Christian economy, it is urged that the rite by which marriage comes to be is the cause of grace.

Certainly, 1. it is clear from what has been said that sanctifying grace is annexed to marriage by divine institution; for it is clear that it is annexed for a special reason, because marriage is the sign of the union of Christ with the Church, which signification is from divine institution. Therefore, 2. it is clear that marriage, when it comes to be, signifies by divine institution the grace annexed to it. For marriage itself, when it comes to be, signifies that union of spouses which comes to be by the force of mutual consent; but a holy union comes to be by divine institution, that is, grace is annexed to the union. Therefore just as it is from divine institution that this union is supernaturally holy, so from the same institution it arises that the rite essential to it, by which marriage is entered upon, signifies such a union.

I say 1°. Marriage of Christians celebrated by a legitimate rite is a true sacrament, properly so called, of the New Law. It is established from Trent, sess. 24, can. 1, where it is said: "If anyone shall say that Marriage is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the Evangelical Law instituted by Christ the Lord, but invented by men in the Church, and that it does not confer grace, let him be anathema."

And from Canon 1012:

§ 1. Christ the Lord raised the matrimonial contract itself between the baptized to the dignity of a sacrament.

§ 2. Wherefore, among the baptized there cannot exist a valid matrimonial contract without its being by that very fact a sacrament (Can. 1012).

I say 2°. § 1. The consent of the parties, legitimately manifested between persons capable by law, makes marriage; and this consent cannot be supplied by any human power.

§ 2. Matrimonial consent is an act of the will by which each party hands over and accepts the right over the body, perpetual and exclusive, in order to acts apt of themselves for the generation of offspring (Can. 1081).

C. 1, C. xxvii, q. 2: Intercourse does not make Marriage, but the will; C. 2, ibid.: Let the consent alone of those whose conjunctions are at issue suffice according to the laws. If this consent alone should perhaps be lacking in nuptials, all other things, even when celebrated with intercourse itself, are frustrated.

Every bilateral contract is constituted by the consent of parties capable of entering this contract. But marriage is a bilateral contract. Therefore marriage too is constituted by the consent of parties capable of entering it. Hence Eugene IV in the const. Exultate Deo: "The seventh is the Sacrament of Marriage, which is the sign of the conjunction of Christ and the Church according to the Apostle saying: this sacrament is great in Christ and in the Church. The efficient cause of marriage regularly is mutual consent, expressed by words concerning the present." And the error of the Armenians is condemned: "Also that among the Armenians there is no certain form of words expressing matrimonial consent between husband and wife; indeed many are compelled by parents and friends to come to the Church so that marriage may be made between them, and although one or both say that they do not wish to be matrimonially joined to each other, nevertheless marriage is made between them in the face of the Church." Thus Benedict XII to the Armenians, in the year 1341.

Besides, just as no contract can exist without consent, so neither can Marriage. Moreover, consent in every bilateral contract is an act of the will by which each party hands over and accepts that right which is proper to the contract. But the right proper to the matrimonial contract is the perpetual and exclusive right over the body in order to acts apt for generation. Therefore consent in marriage is an act of the will by which each party hands over and accepts a perpetual and exclusive right over the body in order to acts apt for generation. Consent must be mutual, perfectly deliberate, and manifested by external signs. The reason is that Marriage is a contract or covenant between a man and a woman, inducing a most grave obligation.

I say 3°. § 1. The internal consent of the mind is always presumed to be conformable to the words or signs employed in celebrating marriage.

§ 2. But if either party or each party by a positive act of the will excludes marriage itself, or every right to the conjugal act, or some essential property of marriage, he contracts invalidly (Can. 1086).

No one is to be judged to have said what he did not think in mind. The judge must take words according to their common signification; and even if the betrothed man proves that he had previously protested that he would not do the things which he says, nor wished to be understood according to the words, because he was going to speak fictitiously, he could recede from that will and express true consent into marriage; indeed he also seems to have acted thus according to that which he publicly did. Hence he is not believed, because interpretation must be made against him who employs deceit. Certainly in the forum of conscience one can believe him who accuses himself of fictitious consent; but in the external forum it is a question of administering justice according to assertions. Truly difficult is the proof of fictitious consent.

He enters a contract invalidly who excludes it by a positive act. Therefore he who by a positive act excludes every right to the conjugal act does not have matrimonial consent; but he who does not have matrimonial consent does not enter a valid marriage. He who by a positive act excludes the unity of marriage does not hand over and accept an exclusive right over the body; but such a one does not have matrimonial consent. He who by a positive act of the will also excludes indissolubility does not hand over and accept a perpetual right; but he who does not hand over a perpetual right does not have matrimonial consent.

I say 4°. Marriage enjoys the favor of law; wherefore in doubt one must stand for the validity of marriage, until the contrary is proved, with the prescription of Can. 1127 preserved (Can. 1014).¹

The marriage of the baptized is ruled not only by divine law, but also by canon law, with the competence of civil power preserved concerning the merely civil effects of the same marriage (Can. 1016).

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1129, n. 89.

Concerning the matter and form of Marriage, these things are to be held:

I. The remote matter of the sacrament of Marriage is the bodies of the betrothed, to be handed over to each other in the contract of Marriage.

II. The proximate matter is the handing over itself of the bodies, which is perfected through words or signs expressing consent.

III. The form consists in the mutual acceptance of the contracting parties, expressed by words or signs.

Concerning all these things it is established both from the common doctrine of theologians and because today it ought to be beyond controversy that the sacrament of Marriage is nothing other than the matrimonial contract itself. Cf. de Augustinis, Thes. 4, p. 222, and especially the Apostolic Letter of Leo XIII, Arcanum, 10 Feb. 1880.

I say. It is certain and Catholic doctrine that the Ministers of the sacrament of Marriage are the contracting parties themselves, and not the priest. The reason is that Eugene IV, in the Decree to the Armenians, wishing to hand down sound doctrine concerning the sacraments, established thus: "The efficient cause of Marriage regularly is mutual consent expressed by words concerning the present." Nor is it to be doubted that those words, efficient cause of Marriage, regard Marriage as a sacrament, since the seven sacraments are explained expressly in that Decree. - Nevertheless the Pastor is the Minister of the solemnity of Marriage, and the presence of him, or of the Ordinary, or of one delegated by either, is required for validity according to Can. 1094, with the exceptions contained in Can. 1098, 1099 preserved. Besides, the blessing is also to be bestowed upon those about to marry according to the rite described in the Roman Ritual.

Concerning the rite in the celebration of Marriage:

Outside the case of necessity, in the celebration of marriage the rites prescribed in ritual books approved by the Church, or received by laudable customs, are to be observed (Can. 1100). - Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 24, de Reform. Matrim.; Roman Ritual, de Matrim.; De Augustinis, Thes. 3, p. 197.

Question 1. What ought the pastor to do concerning marriages of those who have notoriously cast off the Catholic faith, although they have not passed over to a sect; or who are enrolled in condemned societies, and that notoriously; or who are public sinners or censured persons?

Resp. § 1. The faithful are also to be deterred from contracting marriage with those who have notoriously cast off the Catholic faith, even if they have not passed over to a non-Catholic sect, or are enrolled in societies condemned by the Church.

§ 2. The pastor is not to assist at the aforesaid nuptials unless the Ordinary has been consulted; after all the circumstances of the matter have been inspected, the Ordinary will be able to permit him to be present at the marriage, provided a grave cause urges and, according to his prudent judgment, the Ordinary judges that sufficient provision has been made for the Catholic education of all the offspring and for removing the danger of perversion of the other spouse (Can. 1065).

If a public sinner or one notoriously bound by censure has first refused to approach sacramental confession or to be reconciled with the Church, the pastor is not to assist at his marriage unless a grave cause urges, concerning which, if it can be done, he is to consult the Ordinary (Can. 1066).

Question 2. Can the nuptial blessing properly so called be separated from the celebration of Mass?

Resp. The rite of celebrating the sacrament of Marriage, by which the priest joins the betrothed and blesses the ring, and which is had expressed in the Roman Ritual, must be carefully distinguished from the nuptial blessing which is read in the Missal (Mass for bridegroom and bride) and pertains to the solemnity of those same nuptials. Concerning the former, one must altogether affirm that it can, indeed must, in forbidden time, or when the solemnities of nuptials are prohibited, be separated from the celebration of Mass; for Marriage can be contracted at every time. But one must deny it as regards the nuptial blessing properly so called, as is established from Canon 1101, soon to be cited. This blessing consists in the Prayers which are had in the Missal, "Propitiare," etc., "Deus, qui," etc., to be said before "Libera nos," etc., and also the other, "Deus Abraham," etc., to be said before the blessing. Decr. Auth. n. 3789, ad 3.

Question 3. Is there any obligation of receiving the nuptial blessing?

Resp. Negatively, at least by common law.

§ 1. The pastor is to take care that the betrothed receive the solemn blessing, which can be given to them even after they have lived long in marriage, but only in Mass, with the special rubric observed and except in the closed time.

§ 2. Only that priest who can validly and licitly assist at the marriage can give the solemn blessing, either himself in person or through another (Can. 1101).

Concerning this matter, behold the words of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 125: "Let [the Pastors of souls] inculcate frequently and with grave words that pious and laudable rite of the Church by which the faithful contract not at night but at the time of Mass, with the nuptial blessing. In this way they tacitly profess their Catholic faith and show before all how highly, as is fitting, and splendidly they think concerning the dignity and sanctity of marriage. And this indeed seems not only worthy of praise but almost necessary in these our times, when the enemies of religion leave nothing unattempted, so that from marriage, if it can be done, every appearance of sanctity, every appearance of sacrament, may be taken away and it may be esteemed as a merely civil contract."

Question 4. What must be said specially concerning the time and mode of giving this blessing, and concerning the Mass within which it must be given?

Resp. Concerning this matter, the following things are to be noticed:

1°. According to the decree of the S. R. U. Inq. given on 31 August 1881, the nuptial blessing is to be given, according to the rubrics however, namely within the celebration of Mass and outside the closed time, "to all those spouses who, in contracting Marriage, from whatever cause, did not obtain it; even if they ask after they have already lived long in Marriage, provided the woman, if she is a widow, has not received that blessing in other nuptials. - Besides, those same Catholic spouses who have not obtained the blessing of their Marriage are to be exhorted to seek it at the first available time. But it is to be signified to them, especially if they are neophytes or before conversion validly contracted from heresy, that the blessing itself pertains to the rite and solemnity, but not to the substance and validity of wedlock." - Cf. Acta S. Sedis, vol. 14, p. 513; Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 333, and Appendix XIII, p. 310; Amer. Eccl. Rev., vol. 2, pp. 120 and following.

2°. The nuptial blessing is to be omitted (1°) during the whole closed time, S. R. C., 31 Aug. 1839; (2°) if the woman is a widow and has already received this blessing in other nuptials; (3°) when the betrothed do not wish to receive the blessing within the celebration of Mass; (4°) in mixed marriages, even if they are contracted with dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff. Otherwise the woman is to be blessed; it is of no importance for the blessing whether the woman is a virgin or not.

3°. Whenever the nuptial blessing must be omitted, the votive Mass for bridegroom and bride is also prohibited, and likewise the commemoration for bridegroom and bride in the Mass of the day is inhibited. But whenever the woman is to be blessed, the votive Mass for the betrothed is also to be celebrated, except on Sundays, feasts of precept, doubles of the first or second class, days within the octaves of Epiphany, Easter, Pentecost, and Corpus Christi, and privileged ferias and vigils. With Christmas of the Lord and Easter excepted, in the Mass of the day there is to be made the commemoration of the votive Mass for the betrothed, which is always added under a distinct conclusion and in the first place after the prayers prescribed by the rubrics. - S. R. C., 20 April 1822; 15 June 1883.

4°. On licit days, when the Mass for bridegroom and bride is said, the second prayer will always be of the Office, and commemorations will be made of the proper day; in doubles a third prayer is not added (S. C. R., 24 May 1912). On days of inferior rite, the number at least triple is to be completed.

5°. The priest is not bound to apply the Mass for the betrothed unless he receives an alms from the same (S. C. Inq., 1 Sept. 1841).

6°. It is not required that the betrothed communicate within the Mass (n. 3922).

7°. The prohibition of the nuptial blessing in prohibited times must be understood of the Mass for bridegroom and bride and of the prayers in the Missal.

8°. When the blessing is to be given, the Mass for bridegroom and bride is to be said according to the things set forth, although it is not applied for them; nor can that Mass be said unless the blessing is given in the same.

9°. When nuptials have been celebrated in prohibited time and the spouses afterward have sought the nuptial blessing, it is not required that a day be chosen on which the votive Mass for the spouses can be said, but the nuptial blessing can be bestowed within Mass, for example of a double feast of the second class with the commemoration for the Spouses, according to the rubric placed at the head of the Mass for spouses. But the presence of both is necessary for bestowing the blessing. S. C. R., 27 May 1911.

10°. In the typical edition of the Roman Ritual published in the year 1925, Tit. VII, c. 1, n. 18, these things are found: "But let the Pastor beware that, when spouses have received the blessing in first nuptials, he not bless them in second nuptials, whether the woman or even the man passes to second nuptials. But where that custom prevails that, if the man alone has obtained this blessing at another time, the nuptials are blessed, it is to be observed; but a widowed woman, to whom the solemn blessing has once been given, cannot receive it again in subsequent nuptials, even if her husband has never taken a wife. Cf. below, Q. 10°." - S. R. C., 14 June 1918. Several marriages can be blessed at the same time in one Mass. S. Off., 1 Sept. 1841.

Question 5. In marriages between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party, must questions concerning consent be made?

Resp. § 1. In marriages between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party, questions concerning consent must be made according to the prescription of Can. 1095, § 1, n. 3.

§ 2. But all sacred rites are prohibited; but if graver evils are foreseen from this prohibition, the Ordinary can permit some one of the customary ecclesiastical ceremonies, always excluding the celebration of Mass (Can. 1102).

Hence, for the validity of marriage, the consent of the contracting parties is to be required and received by the pastor or the Ordinary of the place, or by one delegated by either. Therefore it is clear that not only in marriages between Catholics, but also in marriages between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party, Canon 1095, § 1, n. 3 exercises its whole force, which regards the very consent to be required and received. Then all sacred rites are prohibited in these marriages; but if graver evils are foreseen from this, the Ordinary can permit some one of the customary ceremonies, always excepting the celebration of Mass.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1090, n. 17; p. 1152, n. 128.

Question 6. Is it ever licit to celebrate a marriage of conscience?

Resp. Only from a most grave and most urgent cause, and by the Ordinary of the place himself, with the Vicar General excluded without a special mandate, can it be permitted that a marriage of conscience be entered, that is, that marriage be celebrated with the denunciations omitted and secretly, according to the norm of the canons which follow (Can. 1104).

Marriage pertains to the public order, and the whole security of the family is involved in the security itself of this Sacrament. And therefore it is to be entered publicly, nor is it easily to be permitted that it be contracted secretly. Hence a most grave cause is required in order that marriage without banns be celebrated secretly before the pastor and two confidential witnesses; and this is called a marriage of conscience, not because it is not a true marriage, but because it is occult and fortified by a true obligation of conscience, as any other wedlock. This Great Sacrament is, and it is unbecoming for it to be received occultly, unless ruling reasons excuse secrecy. An example can be that of a man and woman living publicly as spouses, concerning whom there is no suspicion of crime; in reality they are concubinarii. Indeed, it is a matter of great moment to permit such nuptials; wherefore the qualities of the betrothed and the freedom of their state are to be weighed, and a prudent minister is to be chosen.

Question 7. What obligation does the permission of such a Marriage carry with itself?

Resp. Thus Canon 1105:

The permission of the celebration of a marriage of conscience carries with itself the promise and grave obligation of preserving secrecy on the part of the assisting priest, the witnesses, the Ordinary and his successors, and also the other spouse, when the other does not consent to divulgation (Can. 1105).

Question 8. Does the obligation of secrecy extend itself to all cases?

Resp. The obligation of this promise on the part of the Ordinary is not extended to the case in which either some scandal or grave injury toward the sanctity of marriage threatens from the observance of secrecy, or the parents do not take care that children received from such a marriage be baptized, or they take care that those to be baptized are baptized with false names expressed, while meanwhile they do not furnish to the Ordinary within thirty days notice of the offspring received and baptized with a sincere indication of the parents, or they neglect the Christian education of the children (Can. 1106).

For the Church must defend the sanctity of wedlock and the rights of the woman and offspring equally with those of the man. Hence before such a marriage is celebrated, the betrothed are to be admonished concerning the various obligations toward each other, toward offspring, concerning announcing to the Ordinary himself the offspring born, and concerning procuring the Christian education of the same. If these conditions or obligations are not observed, the obligation of the Ordinary to be silent ceases. - Cf. Benedict XIV, Const. Satis Vobis.

Question 9. Is this Marriage to be noted in the book of marriages?

Resp. It is not to be noted in the customary book of marriages, but in a special book to be kept in the archive of the Curia, concerning which in Can. 379.

Question 10. At what time can Marriage be celebrated?

Resp. § 1. Marriage can be contracted at any time of the year.

§ 2. Only the solemn blessing of nuptials is forbidden from the first Sunday of Advent up to and including the day of the Nativity of the Lord, and from Ash Wednesday up to and including Easter Sunday.

§ 3. Nevertheless, Ordinaries of places can, with liturgical laws preserved, permit it even at the aforesaid times from a just cause, with the betrothed admonished to abstain from excessive pomp (Can. 1108).

Therefore it is established 1°. that nuptials can be celebrated at any part of the year, but not solemnly in forbidden time unless by permission of the Ordinary given from a just cause. - Cf. S. R. C., 14 June 1918.

Forbidden time is to be computed from the first Sunday of Advent up to and including the day of the Nativity of the Lord, and from Ash Wednesday up to and including Easter Sunday.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1135, n. 94.

Question 11. What is the proper place of the celebration of Marriage?

Resp. § 1. Marriage between Catholics is to be celebrated in the parochial church; but in another church or oratory, whether public or semi-public, it can be celebrated only by permission of the Ordinary of the place or of the pastor.

§ 2. The Ordinaries of places can permit marriage to be celebrated in private homes only in some extraordinary case and with a just and reasonable cause always acceding; but in churches or oratories, whether of a Seminary or of religious women, the Ordinaries are not to permit this unless necessity urges and suitable cautions have been employed.

§ 3. But marriages between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party are to be celebrated outside a church; but if the Ordinary prudently judges that this cannot be observed without graver evils arising, it is committed to his prudent judgment to dispense concerning this matter, with the prescription of Can. 1102, § 2 remaining firm (Can. 1109).

I. St. Augustine, Book 1 On Adulterous Marriages, to Pollentius, says: I know not whether the question concerning marriages be not the most obscure and most implicated. Nor do I dare to profess that I have as yet unfolded all its recesses either in this work or in another, or that I am now able, though it press to be explained. In the time of Augustine heretics, in our age not a few Moralists, have by diverse ways obscured this tract.

II. The conjunction of male with female the ancients called matrimonium rather than patrimonium, because it belongs to the woman to bear, to nourish, and to educate offspring. Nuptiae also is called matrimonium from nubendo; and conubium, and conjugium from the common yoke to which both man and woman are subjected.

III. Matrimony is regarded in three ways: 1. As a natural contract; 2. As a civil contract; 3. As a sacrament of the new law. Absolutely it is described as the marital conjunction of a man and a woman between lawful persons, retaining an undivided companionship of life. But it is added, as it is a sacrament divinely instituted, a sign of the conjunction of Christ with the Church, having the promise of grace for uniting the souls of the spouses, and for educating offspring piously and holily in the Christian faith. Lastly matrimony is threefold: legitimate, ratified, and consummated. Legitimate is that which is by the law of nations, contracted according to the norm of the civil laws, such as is that even of unbelievers. Ratified is that which is perfected according to the laws of the Church, and which is approved by the Church. Consummated is when the spouses are mingled together by carnal copulation.

IV. It coalesces out of several things: 1. Mutual consent; 2. An external promise; 3. A reciprocal delivery of bodies; 4. Thence results a perpetual bond; 5. The mutual obligation of rendering the debt; 6. The right which each has in the other; 7. Carnal copulation.

V. All Catholics deny that the essence of matrimony is set in carnal copulation. Between Adam and Eve there was true matrimony before their commixture. True was the matrimony of the Patriarch Joseph with the Blessed Virgin, all carnal copulation being utterly excluded.

VI. The mutual consent of the contracting parties is the efficient cause of matrimony. The Encratites, Marcionites, Manichees, and Priscillianists denied matrimony to be honourable and good. But the holy Scriptures and all Catholics execrate the error of those ravers. Since indeed matrimony was instituted by natural and divine right. The precept of contracting matrimony regards not individuals but the multitude.

VII. QUESTION I. Whether in the old law matrimony was a sacrament? ANSWER. The character of a sacrament can be regarded in two ways: 1. In the broader signification, according as in whatsoever manner it is called a sign of a sacred thing; 2. Inasmuch as it is a practical and efficacious sign of sanctifying grace. The common opinion of theologians denies that matrimony before the coming of Christ was a true sacrament. But that in the broader signification it was a sacrament, all concede, since, instituted in the state of innocence itself, it was a sign of the conjunction of Christ with the Church. This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. … Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh. Genesis 2.

VIII. QUESTION II. Is matrimony in the evangelical law a true sacrament? ANSWER. Hus, Luther, Calvin, and the Protestants deny it; but it is of faith that it is a true sacrament, St. Paul saying, Ephesians 5: For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. There is added the perpetual tradition of the Church, whose documents I have given in Vol. X, Book 2, dissertation 1, chapter 4.

IX. QUESTION III. Whether matrimony celebrated between absent faithful through a proctor be a true sacrament? ANSWER. Soto, Isambert, Gotti, Tournely, and very many others affirm it. Victoria, Cano, Cajetan, Catharinus, Vanroy, and others deny it. This second opinion is to me the more probable. For no sacrament is celebrated between the absent. Nor do these words I join you together, and so forth, require the contracting parties present any less than those other words I absolve thee require a present penitent. The use of absolution given to one absent Clement VIII condemned. Tournely answers that absolution given to one absent is not against the nature of the sacrament, and could be given, did not the prohibition of Clement VIII stand in the way. This answer seems futile. Did Clement VIII condemn the aforesaid opinion at his own arbitrary pleasure? He condemned it because these words I absolve thee require a present penitent. Valid therefore will be a matrimony entered upon between absent parties through a proctor in the character of a natural and civil contract; but that it is not a true sacrament is to me the more probable.

X. The matrimony of unbelievers after the promulgation of the evangelical law is not a sacrament. Similarly the matrimony of a believer with an unbeliever is not a sacrament, as seems to me the more probable. If unbelieving spouses be converted to the faith, their matrimony does not become a sacrament according to the more probable opinion: because a later intention cannot bring it about that a contract entered upon, which was not a sacrament, should afterwards become one.

XI. Marriages of Catholics with heretics are altogether unlawful, as all theologians confess. But no law declares them invalid.

I. QUESTION I. What is the matter of the sacrament of matrimony? ANSWER. I could recount more than seven opinions of theologians in designating the matter and form of this sacrament. But these being dismissed, with St. Thomas, to whom theologians commonly subscribe, I say it is the acts of the contracting parties. These are his words, Supplement, question 42, article 1, reply 2: The sacrament of matrimony is perfected by the act of him who uses that sacrament, as is penance. And therefore, just as penance has no other matter save the acts themselves subject to sense, which are in place of the material element, so is it of matrimony.

II. QUESTION II. Whether the priest assisting the contracting parties be the minister of the sacrament, and whether his words have the character of the form? ANSWER. There are two opinions, each of which has its most grave patrons, even in the Thomist school. Gonet, Gotti, and very many others teach that the contracting parties themselves are the ministers of this sacrament, and that their words are the form of the sacrament.

III. On the contrary, that the priest himself assisting is the minister of the sacrament, these most grave men maintain: William of Paris, Melchior Cano, Cardinal Toletus, Peter Ledesma, Peter de Marca, Maldonatus, Francis Sylvius, Assius, Natalis Alexander, Tournely, Le Drou, Gibert, Herminier, Du Hamel, Juvenin, Florentinus de Coq, Vanroy, Piette, Bannez. And by these arguments they evince their opinion.

IV. Trent, session 24, chapter 1 On Reformation, established: Let it be proceeded to the celebration of matrimony in the face of the Church, where the parish priest, the man and the woman being questioned and their mutual consent understood, shall either say: I join you together in matrimony, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; or shall use other words according to the received rite of each province. It seems to be gathered hence clearly enough that the priest is the minister of this sacrament, and that the words which he brings forth are the form. For the Council prescribes the words to be employed, or others according to the rite of each Church. In the same place it subjoins that this blessing is to be made by the proper parish priest. Several Councils — of Cologne, Cambrai, Rheims, Tours — which Sylvius reports, I pass over.

V. To these are added very many Rituals. The old Roman one of 1494 collected by Fr. Castellanus O.P. Another Roman one published by the command of Paul V prescribes these words I join you together, and so forth, to be brought forth by the parish priest as the minister of this sacrament. Fr. Martène On the Ancient Rites of the Church, Vol. II, Book 1, chapter 9, adduces several others upon this matter. Let it suffice to praise one, the Milanese, in which St. Charles Borromeo, part 4, took care to insert this: namely that there are only five sacraments which a parish priest can by office administer — Baptism, the Eucharist, Penance, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction.

VI. More clearly is this opinion confirmed by an argument which admits no solid answer. The Lutherans and Calvinists deny matrimony to be a sacrament, and study to elude with acute cavillings the testimonies of the Scriptures by which we evince that it is a sacrament. I yield. By what reasonings do we explode their comments? By none other than by the apostolic and universal tradition of the Church, of all the Fathers and Councils. Now all the Fathers with one voice call the nuptials sacred, because they are consecrated by the sacred blessing of the priest. The testimonies of the Fathers I have given in Vol. X, Book 2, dissertation 1, chapter 4, where they can be read.

VII. Adversaries reply that the priest's blessing, which all the Fathers require, is indeed necessary by the Church's mandate as an accidental ceremony for the greater solemnity of the nuptials, but not for the necessity of the sacrament imposed by divine precept. This answer to me is false. Let adversaries answer: Whence shall we draw arguments from tradition, that we may evince against the Protestants that matrimony is a sacrament, if the recounted answer stand? Assuredly, if the blessing of the priest, by which all the Fathers affirm that the nuptials are consecrated, so that they may show matrimony raised to the dignity of a sacrament, be a merely accidental ceremony, then all the safeguards fetched from tradition are taken from us, by which we may fight against the innovators denying matrimony to be a sacrament. For the tradition of the universal Church being taken away, which is the lawful interpreter of the sacred Scriptures, we are altogether unarmed in the contest, and fall from our cause against those same innovators.

VIII. Besides, the sacraments are ceremonies and sacred things of Religion: therefore a sacrament is a work of Religion. Further, not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament, but only that which is sacred. Since therefore matrimony is contracted civilly and profanely by the words alone of the man and the woman, although it be a seal of a sacred thing, it is nevertheless not a work of sacred Religion, and so not properly a sacrament. Otherwise the brazen serpent and the manna in the desert would have to be called sacraments. Therefore marriages without a sacred minister and without a sacred ceremony of Religion are not sacraments.

IX. What more? The Council of Florence, the seven sacraments of the new law being enumerated, thus defines: All these sacraments are perfected by three things: namely by things as the matter, by words as the form, and by the person of the minister conferring the sacrament; and if one of these be lacking, the sacrament is not perfected. Who is the ordinary minister of the sacrament, without whom the sacrament is not perfected? The spouses themselves? Are lay men the ordinary ministers of the sacraments? A woman baptizes when necessity urges, but she is not the ordinary minister; the priest is. Priests alone, consecrated by the sacrament of Order, are the lawful dispensers of the mysteries of Christ, as the Apostle Paul says, 1 Corinthians 4: Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God. By what right therefore can this power of administering the sacrament of matrimony — which is called by the same Paul a great mystery — be taken away from them and ascribed to a woman, to whom it is not even permitted to speak in the Church? Whence do the patrons of the adverse opinion gather that lay contracting parties are the ordinary ministers of the sacrament? From what testimony of the Scriptures, from what Council, from what tradition of the Fathers do they draw that the character of the sacrament of matrimony is diverse from that of all the rest? Assuredly they can adduce no monument of sacred antiquity. The ordinary minister of all the other sacraments is a priest. Christ in the new law raised matrimony to the dignity of a sacrament. And did he not institute a priest as minister of this sacrament alone? Solid and perspicuous reasoning evinces that, just as he raised matrimony to the dignity of the other sacraments, so, just as he instituted priests as ministers of the other sacraments, he instituted priests as ministers of matrimony also. This reason evidently demonstrates; this tradition confirms. That they may except the sacrament of matrimony from this universal rule and just principle, it does not suffice to bring one or another conjecture or an ambiguous testimony; but there are required most clear testimonies and a manifest exception.

X. The spouses receive the sacrament of matrimony. Of the sacraments which consist in the action alone, the minister is distinguished from the receiver. For no one can baptize, confirm, or absolve himself. How therefore can it come about that the spouses receiving the sacrament of matrimony are at the same time the ministers? For either each contracting party administers the sacrament to himself, or one to the other. Not the first: because, as I have said, no one can administer to himself a sacrament set in an action. If the second, two effect the sacrament: for neither is the sacrament so divisible that one minister should perfect one part and another minister the other part. For although two ministers can confer a sacrament upon a third at the same instant, yet it can in no way be perceived by what reason two spouses can effect one minister who should administer the sacrament to themselves. On the other hand neither can perfect the sacrament without the other. And then it is asked whether the man confers the sacrament upon the woman first, or the woman upon the man. The words therefore of the contracting parties are the matter of the sacrament; they are not the form. For the form of every sacrament is sacred, from which it is called a sacrament. These words I take thee as mine are in no way sacred. For these or like words were employed before Christ instituted matrimony a sacrament, and are employed by those destitute of all reason and Christian faith. If I wished to recount all the trifles which some — says Melchior Cano, who first of all brought this opinion into the light — have devised, that they might distinguish the matter from the form of this sacrament, I should fill leaves. This one says that the contracting parties themselves are the matter of the sacrament; that one, not they themselves but the consent; another, the gestures and nods which are employed by the man and the woman apart from the words. Another affirms that the words of the first speaker are the matter, those of the latter the form. Which things — would that they were said gravely and probably, lest we be by right derided by the heretics! To what end, in a matter most grave and necessary to faith and religion, to philosophize thinly, not to say ridiculously?

XI. Lastly this opinion is safer, and at the same time exceedingly probable, as being maintained by most grave theologians. Wherefore Benedict XIV, Book 8 On the Synod, chapter 13, no. 5, says: But although the opinion of Melchior Cano hitherto explained be fortified by so many suffrages of Doctors, and exceedingly probable, and it be free to anyone without the note of error to embrace it, and so forth. Not merely probable, but exceedingly probable is this opinion. But on the other hand it is at the same time safer. For all theologians to a man confess that matrimony blessed by a priest with the ecclesiastical rite is a true sacrament. On the contrary very many and most grave theologians deny that, the aforesaid rite being taken away, it is a sacrament. But that opinion is the safer concerning which no one of the theologians is in doubt. Therefore this of ours is the safer, and the contrary the less safe. All these things are certain and beyond controversy. And yet by the decree of Innocent XI, when there is question of the validity of the sacraments, out of two probable opinions disputed on either side by theologians, the safer is to be chosen. Therefore this ours is to be embraced, and the other rejected.

XII. The things which are objected against it by adversaries are, as I at least judge, of no moment. I have weighed them all in Vol. X, Book 2, chapter 2, and rejected them, and you can read them there, that I may avoid prolixity.