Morose pleasure

333. Notions. 1. Delectation, as it is taken here, is the complacency of the will in an apprehended good. Delectation receives morality from the object in which the will takes complacency for itself.

By reason of the object, delectation is distinguished: a. concerning a thing thought and represented to the will, e.g. concerning the killing of an enemy, concerning fornication; b. concerning the knowledge of a thing, namely if not the thing itself, but the knowledge of it pleases, e.g. the knowledge of homicide, of fornication. It is indeed one thing to be delighted concerning homicide exhibited through imagination, and another thing to be delighted concerning the knowledge of homicide.

2. Morose delectation is free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through thought or imagination as present, without desire of doing it. Therefore he who is morosely delighted feigns to himself an act of sin, e.g. theft, a base touch, and takes complacency for himself concerning that act so represented, as if someone were executing it, yet without a will to execute it. This delectation is called morose not from the duration of the complacency, but because the will tarries in it after advertence, even for a single instant; therefore morose delectation is the same as voluntary delectation.

334. Principles. 1. Morose delectation concerning an evil thing is a sin of the same gravity and species as the evil thing itself represented through imagination or thought. The reason is that morose delectation receives both theological and specific morality from the object about which it is occupied. Wherefore morose delectation is grave or light according as the thing thought, in which the will is delighted, is gravely or lightly evil, and delectation concerning theft differs in species from delectation concerning homicide or concerning fornication.

And here again the distinction between delectation and thought concerning an evil thing appears: for delectation concerning prohibited carnal intercourse is always a grave sin, but not likewise thought and imagination concerning the same thing. For if this is done from an honorable end, e.g. for teaching, it is good, and if it is done from curiosity, it is a venial sin. But thoughts of this kind concerning obscene things are always dangerous, because they easily provoke the venereal sense; and if there is added delectation, that is, free complacency, concerning the venereal sense which is excited from the obscene thought or imagination, it is not spiritual morose delectation, concerning which the discussion here is, but venereal delectation, concerning which it is spoken elsewhere.

2. Morose delectation contains the malice which the thing thought, which pleases, has from circumstances, if the delectation is occupied about those circumstances themselves; wherefore delectation concerning the killing of a priest is mental sacrilegious homicide, and delectation concerning intercourse with a nun is mental sacrilegious fornication, if the will also is delighted concerning the circumstance of priesthood and consecration.

If therefore the will is not formally delighted concerning the circumstances which are found in the evil object thought, it does not contract the malice of the circumstances: for since there is no question of an evil thing already accomplished or to be accomplished by deed, but only of a thing thought, precision being made from its execution, the malice of the circumstances toward which the will is not explicitly borne is not contracted. Therefore he who, in the example posited above, is not delighted concerning the circumstance of the object does not contract it, and therefore in confession satisfies by saying: I was delighted concerning homicide; I was delighted concerning fornication.

Morose pleasure in the imagination of what is evil is what ordinary Catholics mean by a bad thought in the restricted sense, It is sinful when voluntary, for it is an approbation, a satisfaction in what is wrong; it is an act of the will which is specified by a bad object, and so it derives its special character and malice from the object. To take pleasure, then, in the thought of revenge, is a different sin from taking pleasure in the thought of adultery.

There is a difference, however, between the source of the malice of evil desires and of morose pleasures. We have seen that evil desires contract all the malice of the object and of its circumstances. Morose pleasure, too, contracts the malice of its object and of any circumstance which is a motive of the pleasure, but not of other circumstances which may belong to the object in the concrete. For the will in morose pleasure tends to the object not as it exists in the concrete with all its circumstances, but as it is represented in the imagination, and precisely in so far as the object thus represented allures the appetite. Morose pleasure, then, takes its malice from the object, but not from all the circumstances of the object.

Taking pleasure in an evil imagination must be distinguished from taking pleasure in the thought of sin. It is not sinful to take pleasure in thinking about pride, for example, and trying to penetrate its malice. Knowledge naturally gives pleasure and in itself is not sinful. But it is dangerous to think about some sins, about sins of lust or revenge, for example, and on account of the danger it is wrong to think about sins of the flesh without good reason. Thinking about such sins with good and sufficient reason is not sinful, for the danger of sin is not sin, and it may be neglected for sufficient cause; if there is not sufficient reason and the danger of consent is small, it will be a venial sin; if the danger of consent be proximate and the matter grave, the sin will be mortal.

Morose pleasure in certain definite sins of one’s past life has for its object the sins as they were actually committed with all their circumstances, and so it will be infected with all the malice of the circumstances. Morose pleasure in past sins is thus similar in its malice to evil desires, and on this account obtains the special name of “joy” in theology. A penitent who has been guilty of this sin should say what sins they were whose remembrance gave him pleasure.

Those who are not yet married and those who have been married may not take pleasure in the thought of what is allowed to married people, for in practice such pleasure cannot be confined to the intellect; it also excites the sensua appetite and this causes temptation and sin.

It is not sinful to take pleasure in a good result which followed from some evil, as, for example, in the good results of a war or of a revolution. We may lawfully rejoice in the death of someone who was causing great harm to public morality, or to the public good in general, not precisely because he is dead, but for the reason that the cause of public harm is removed. We prefer the public good to the good of the individual, especially if he is doing harm. In this connection mention may be made of certain propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which the following is a specimen: “It is lawful for a son to rejoice that he killed his father in a drunken fit on account of the great wealth to which he has thereby succeeded.”’ It is obvious that such joy is morally wrong, for the act of parricide was at any rate materially wrong even when committed while drunk, and joy on account of what was, and is, wrong is unlawful; nor does succession to the father’s wealth, a good of a lower order than human life, especially a father’s life, furnish a just cause for such unfilial rejoicing.

I. Notion. Morose delectation¹ is a free complacency of the will concerning an evil act taken objectively. It is said:

1. Complacency, i.e., rest in some object.

2. Of the will, i.e., of the rational appetite. Therefore, strictly speaking, the discussion is not of complacency of the sensitive appetite, but of the consent of the will in the complacency of the sensitive appetite. Namely, the will does not immediately delight in a sensible object, but mediately, i.e., through the mediation of the sensitive appetite (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, aa. 6 and 8).

3. Free, i.e., that to which the will assents after the advertence of the intellect to the malice of the act.

4. Concerning an evil act taken objectively, without addition. Hence the object of morose delectation, as we have already insinuated, is not an evil act whether future or to be perpetrated, whether past or perpetrated, whether present or being perpetrated here and now; nor is its object the thought about an evil act; nor even the evil act thought about, although thought is the condition without which the will cannot be borne toward the evil act, or the operation by which the evil act is presented to the will. The object of morose delectation is the evil act itself taken objectively. "Therefore," says St. Alphonsus, "one thing is delectation concerning an evil work, so that the evil work is the object of the delectation, which is always evil. Another is delectation concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the thought itself about the work is per se the object of the delectation" (V, 17; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8, ad 4).

¹ It is called morose not from a delay of time, but from a delay or lingering of the will, which can take place in an instant.

II. Morality. 1. Morose delectation concerning an evil act is evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil, according as it regards an act gravely or lightly illicit. The reason is that, as is clear from the notion handed down, it involves an affection of the will toward an evil act. But affection of the will toward an evil act is evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil, according as it regards an act gravely or lightly illicit (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8 and q. 88, a. 5, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, 17).

"But that," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "someone thinking about fornication should be delighted by the very act thought about happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act. Hence that someone consents to such delectation is nothing other than that he himself consents to this, that his affection be inclined toward fornication; for no one is delighted except in that which is conformed to his appetite. But that someone by deliberation chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which in themselves are mortal sins is mortal sin; hence such consent to the delectation of mortal sin is mortal sin."

2. Morose delectation takes its species:

a) From the object considered according to its generic species, so that, for example, delectation concerning an act of lust is opposed to chastity, and concerning vengeance to charity (St. Alphonsus, V, 28). It is disputed whether it also takes its species from the object considered according to its lowest species. A few deny this with regard to sins of lust, because a lustful affection seems to be more general, i.e., toward venery generally, than special toward such an object. But the contrary seems altogether to be admitted, because the lowest species of the object, as for example fornicatory or sodomitical intercourse, enters into the object of delectation, and therefore specifies the affection of the will which is borne toward the object (cf. St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 39, 1). Here, nevertheless, note that immodest acts, for example looking at or seeing an obscene thing, do not differ in species in themselves.

b) From circumstances of the subject. Hence, for example, one bound by a vow of chastity, if he is morosely delighted concerning an act of lust, also commits a sin against religion, and indeed personal sacrilege, at least if he is bound by a public vow; namely, the vow of chastity also excludes internal sins. Many affirm the same concerning the circumstance of marriage, because even marital fidelity seems to forbid an affection toward sin with another.

c) From circumstances of the object, if the delectation is also occupied around those circumstances, because then the circumstance pertains to the object of the delectation. Otherwise, against others, it seems this must be denied, because where delectation concerning the circumstance is absent, the circumstance does not seem to enter into the object of the delectation. Hence if someone is morosely delighted concerning intercourse with a blood-relative or a married woman as such, he contracts the malice of incest or adultery; but not if he is delighted, as commonly happens, concerning intercourse with a blood-relative or married woman as beautiful. Nevertheless, morose delectation must be said to take its species from a circumstance of the object if it induces proximate danger of desiring the act, for example, intercourse with a blood-relative (St. Alphonsus, cited place). But in order that this malice be contracted, attention must be paid to it; this commonly does not take place. Hence for the most part there is no obligation of declaring the aforesaid circumstances in confession, or of asking about them.

Corollary I. It is licit for spouses to be morosely delighted concerning intercourse or immodest acts with the partner, even if on account of the latter's absence they cannot take place here and now. The reason is that the delectation regards acts licit for spouses (St. Alphonsus, V, 25). Nevertheless, if the delectation takes place with a rather grave venereal commotion, danger of pollution will easily be present. If it takes place with a light commotion and danger of pollution is absent, an act of this kind, as by its nature regarding the partner, perhaps to be equated with mutual incomplete acts, and therefore seems licit (St. Alphonsus, V, 25).

Corollary II. With St. Alphonsus and others, though several contradict it, it seems it must be said that it is illicit for widows to be morosely delighted concerning intercourse had, and for betrothed persons concerning future intercourse. The reason is that in the case the object of the delectation is not intercourse had or future as such - for as such it is the object of joy or desire - but intercourse had objectively, or taken in itself. But all intercourse for widows and betrothed persons is intrinsically evil. Therefore the object of the delectation of which we speak is evil, and consequently the voluntary delectation itself concerning it is also evil (St. Alphonsus, V, 24). Those who think that the aforesaid delectation is licit in itself nevertheless warn that by accident it easily becomes sinful, on account of the danger both of exciting venereal commotions and of consenting to them.

Nevertheless, it is licit for betrothed persons to rejoice over the fact that intercourse will be licit; likewise to desire it or to have the will of exercising it after marriage has been entered, because the intercourse then to be had is good, and therefore the object of such desire is good (St. Alphonsus, V, 24).

Corollary III. It is licit to be morosely delighted concerning an act licit in itself and prohibited only by positive law, for example, concerning the eating of meat on a day of abstinence, provided the delectation is not concerning the act as prohibited. The reason is that in the case the delectation is concerning the eating of meats taken objectively. But the eating of meats taken objectively is good, and therefore the object of delectation is good (St. Alphonsus, V, 27).

Corollary IV. It is licit to be morosely delighted concerning the manner, for example, the dexterity or industry by which an evil act was perpetrated, provided nevertheless that the manner is not evil in itself. Hence "without sin fables, comedies, wars, homicides, frauds, thefts, the fall of a man, for example from a horse, etc., often delight us, not according to themselves, but the manner of stealing, the unexpected manner of falling" (St. Alphonsus, V, 18).

Corollary V. Knowledge, or habitual cognition, of lustful acts is not evil in itself, because in itself it does not involve an affection of the will toward the acts themselves; indeed it can be joined with the greatest aversion from acts of this kind. Likewise and for the same reason, thought about a lustful act is not evil in itself; nor consequently is morose delectation concerning the knowledge or thought of a lustful act evil in itself, namely because the very object of such delectation is not evil (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, V, 17). Nevertheless, thoughts and delectations of this kind can become evil, and very often do become evil, by reason of the danger either of exciting venereal motions or pollution, or of being morosely delighted concerning the evil act which is thought about. Hence St. Alphonsus, cited place: "Thought can be good if there is a just cause for thinking, for example, for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes even be gravely evil if there is proximate danger of consent."

Besides, in this matter the descent is easy from delectation of the thought to delectation of the thing thought about, especially if it is a useless and vain thought; hence one who dwells long upon it exposes himself to danger.¹

When it is doubted whether the delectation was concerning the thought itself or concerning the thing thought about: if the thought with delectation frequently thrusts itself in without necessity or utility, it is a sign that the delectation is concerning the thing thought about, because frequency of thought of this kind without necessity or utility seems to arise from a depraved inclination of affection toward the things themselves. But if such a thought is not importunate, but follows the judgment and moderation of reason, it is a sign that the delectation is only concerning the thought itself.²

Corollary VI. Thought and morose delectation concerning an object which, if, for example, it were seen or touched, is apt to excite venereal motions, for example, concerning an obscene part of the body which someone represents to himself, are not evil in themselves, because the object itself is not evil. Nevertheless they will easily become evil by reason of the danger annexed to such thought and delectation, for example, of exciting venereal motions, etc.; therefore apply the things said in Corollary V concerning thought about a lustful act and concerning morose delectation with respect to such thought.

¹ Billuart, De temperantia, diss. 6, art. 15, § I.

² Billuart, cited place.

I. Notion. Morose pleasure¹ is the free complacency of the will concerning an evil act objectively considered. It is called:

1. Complacency, that is, rest in some object.

2. Of the will, that is, of the rational appetite. And so, strictly speaking, there is no question of the complacency of the sensitive appetite, but of the consent of the will in the complacency of the sensitive appetite. For the will is not immediately delighted by a sensible object, but mediately, that is, through the sensitive appetite (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, aa. 6 and 8).

3. Free, that is, to which the will, after advertence of the intellect to the malice of the act, assents.

4. Concerning an evil act objectively considered, without addition. Hence the object of morose pleasure, as we have already intimated, is not an evil act as future or to be committed, nor as past or committed, nor as present or being committed here and now; nor is its object the thought about an evil act; nor even the evil act thought about, although the thought is the condition without which the will cannot be borne toward the evil act, or the operation by which the evil act is presented to the will. The object of morose pleasure is the evil act itself objectively considered. "One thing, therefore," says St. Alphonsus, "is pleasure concerning an evil work, so that the evil work is the object of the pleasure, which is always evil. Another is pleasure concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the very thought about the work, is of itself the object of the pleasure" (V, 17).

¹ It is called morose not from a delay of time, but from the delay or lingering of the will, which can take place in an instant.

II. Morality.

1. Morose pleasure concerning an act which is opposed to chastity is evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil according as it regards an act gravely or lightly unlawful. The reason is that, as is clear from the notion handed down, it involves an affection of the will toward an evil act. But an affection of the will toward an evil act is evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil according as it regards an act gravely or lightly unlawful (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8; St. Alphonsus V, 17). "But that," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "someone thinking about fornication is delighted in the very act thought about happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act; hence that someone consents in such pleasure is nothing else than that he consents in this, that his affection is inclined toward fornication: for no one is delighted except in that which is conformed to his appetite. But that someone by deliberation chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which according to themselves are mortal sins, is a mortal sin; hence such consent in the pleasure of mortal sin is a mortal sin."

2. Morose pleasure takes species:

a. From the object, considered according to its lowest species. Some indeed deny this, because a lustful affection seems to be general rather than special, that is, directed to venereal pleasure generally rather than to such an object. But the contrary seems altogether to be admitted, because the lowest species of the object, such as fornicatory or sodomitic intercourse, enters into the object of pleasure, and therefore specifies the affection of the will which is borne toward the object (cf. St. Alphonsus, Praxis confessarii, n. 39, 1). Here, however, note that immodest acts, for example the sight and touch of an obscene thing, do not differ in species according to themselves (n. 71).

b. From the circumstances of the subject. Hence one bound by a vow of chastity, if he is morosely delighted concerning an act of lust, also commits a sin against religion, and indeed personal sacrilege, at least if he is bound by a public vow; for a vow of chastity also excludes internal sins. Many affirm the same concerning the circumstance of marriage, because matrimonial fidelity also seems to forbid an affection toward sin with another woman.

c. From the circumstances of the object, if the pleasure is also concerned with those circumstances, because then the circumstance pertains to the object of pleasure. Otherwise, against others, it seems that this must be denied, because where pleasure concerning the circumstance is absent, that circumstance does not seem to enter into the object of pleasure. Hence if someone is morosely delighted concerning intercourse with a blood-relative or a married woman as such, he contracts the malice of incest or adultery; but not if he is delighted, as commonly happens, concerning intercourse with a blood-relative or a married woman as beautiful. Yet morose pleasure must be said to take species from a circumstance of the object if it induces the proximate danger of desiring the act, for example intercourse with a blood-relative (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). But in order that this malice be contracted, attention must be given to it; this commonly does not happen. Hence for the most part there is no obligation of declaring the aforesaid circumstances in confession or of asking about them.

Corollary I. It is lawful for spouses to be morosely delighted concerning intercourse or immodest acts with the partner, even if on account of that partner's absence they cannot take place here and now. The reason is that the pleasure regards acts lawful for spouses (St. Alphonsus V, 25). Nevertheless, if the pleasure occurs with graver venereal commotion, danger of pollution will easily be present. If it occurs with light commotion and the danger of pollution is absent, an act of this sort, as regarding the partner, is with sufficient probability by its nature ordered to intercourse, or is to be equated with incomplete mutual acts, and therefore seems lawful (St. Alphonsus V, n. 103).

Corollary II. With St. Alphonsus and others, although many contradict, it seems that one must say that it is unlawful for widowed persons to be morosely delighted concerning intercourse had, or for betrothed persons concerning future intercourse. The reason is that in the case the object of pleasure is not intercourse had or future intercourse as such - for as such it is the object of joy or desire - but intercourse had as objectively or in itself considered. But every intercourse objectively considered is intrinsically evil for widowed persons and betrothed persons. Therefore the object of the pleasure of which we are speaking is evil, and consequently the voluntary pleasure itself concerning it is also evil (St. Alphonsus V, 24). Those who judge that the aforesaid pleasure is lawful in itself nevertheless warn that it easily becomes sinful accidentally, on account of the danger both of exciting venereal commotions and of consenting to them.

It is lawful, however, for betrothed persons to rejoice in the fact that intercourse will be lawful, and likewise to desire it, or to have the will of exercising it after marriage has been entered, because the intercourse then to be had is good and therefore the object of such desire is good (St. Alphonsus V, 24).

Corollary III. It is lawful to be morosely delighted concerning an act lawful in itself and prohibited only by positive law, for example concerning the imaginary eating of meat on a day of abstinence, provided the pleasure is not concerning the act as prohibited. The reason is that in the case the pleasure concerns the eating of meat objectively considered. But the eating of meat objectively considered is good, and therefore the object of the pleasure is good (St. Alphonsus V, 27).

Corollary IV. It is lawful to be morosely delighted concerning the manner, for example concerning an ingenious metaphor by which obscene things are expressed (St. Alphonsus V, 18).

Corollary V. The knowledge or habitual cognition of lustful acts is not evil of itself, because of itself it does not involve an affection of the will toward those acts; indeed it can be joined with the greatest aversion from acts of that sort. Likewise and for the same reason, thought about a lustful act is not evil of itself; nor consequently is morose pleasure concerning knowledge or thought of a lustful act evil of itself, namely because the very object of pleasure of this sort is not evil (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8; St. Alphonsus V, 17). Nevertheless thoughts and pleasures of this sort can become evil, and very often do become evil, by reason of the danger either of exciting venereal motions or pollution, or of being morosely delighted concerning the evil act which is thought about. Hence St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.: "Thought can be good if there is a just cause for thinking, for example for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes even be gravely evil if there is proximate danger of consent." Besides, in this matter the descent is easy from pleasure in the thought to pleasure in the thing thought about, especially if it is a useless and vain thought; hence one who lingers over it for a long time exposes himself to danger.¹

When it is doubted whether the pleasure was concerning the thought itself or concerning the thing thought about: if the thought with pleasure frequently intrudes itself without necessity or usefulness, this is a sign that the pleasure is concerning the thing thought about, because frequency of thought of this sort without necessity or usefulness seems to arise from a depraved inclination of affection toward the things themselves. But if such thought is not importunate, but follows the judgment and moderation of reason, it is a sign that the pleasure is only concerning the thought itself.²

Corollary VI. Thought and morose pleasure concerning an object which, if it were seen or touched, would be apt to excite venereal motions, for example concerning an obscene part of the body which someone represents to himself, are not evil of themselves, because the object itself is not evil. Nevertheless they easily become evil by reason of the danger annexed to such thought and pleasure, for example of exciting venereal motions, etc.; wherefore apply what was said in corollary V about thought of a lustful act and about morose pleasure with respect to such thought.³

¹ Billuart, De temperantia, diss. 6, art. 15, § 1.

² Billuart, loc. cit.

³ Cf. Duynstee, De leer der kuischheid, p. 136.

II.

We have hitherto explained the external sins of lust; it remains that we speak of internal sins.

224. In this matter, besides thought on the part of the intellect and imagination on the part of the phantasy, three internal acts are chiefly and generally distinguished: morose delight, desire, and joy.

Impure thoughts and imaginations excite venereal delight, and of themselves they have a great influence upon it.

Thoughts of dishonorable things of themselves contain no sin. Consequently, to have them from an honorable end, even not without the wrong effect of venereal delight, is of itself no sin.

But if an honorable and just end is lacking, if they are had from a wrong affection, or if they are of things very dishonorable, even from mere curiosity or levity, or if one dwells on them too long, they contain a grave influence upon venereal delight, and then they cannot be excused from grave sin. But impure thoughts of things not very dishonorable and only slightly moving are not of themselves, by reason of their light influence upon venereal delight, except a light sin. And, since impure thoughts of this kind tend only to exciting venereal delight, they are all of the same species; and consequently then there is no need to explain their various objects in Confession.

225. Delight, in its most general acceptance, is the resting of a cognitive or appetitive faculty in its own proper object, from the conformity of such an object with that faculty. It is threefold according to the threefold faculty: spiritual or intellectual, which has place in the intellect and the will; such, for example, is the delight of the intellect in the contemplation of truth; sensible, which arises in an organ of sense, the organs of generation being excluded, for example, the delight of sight from a beautiful thing, of hearing from music, of touch from smoothness, of taste from flavor, of smell from sweetness of odor; carnal or venereal, which is felt in the organs of generation, and so is the resting of the sensitive faculty in matters of generation.

Sensible delight and carnal or venereal delight look to exterior acts. Concerning both, with respect to the present matter, it has already been said above, n. 2, and in the preceding chapters.

But spiritual delight is contained under interior acts; and when it regards a prohibited thing, it is usually called in moral theology morose delight; and it is a simple and voluntary complacency concerning an illicit thing. Simple, that is, without desire and intention of accomplishing it by deed, so that one is content with delight alone, with an interior thought, for example, concerning the killing of an enemy, or carnal copulation. Voluntary: hence delight is not called morose on account of any delay of time whatever, but on account of its continuation after full advertence of the intellect to the malice of the thing; and so delight is morose, even if the will, after such advertence, persists and freely dwells in it for one instant, or moment of time.

Therefore morose delight concerning a venereal thing merely spiritual, namely one which remains in the will alone, even joined with no base commotion of the flesh, will always be grave sin outside legitimate marriage, because it concerns an object gravely prohibited. Cf. here n. 2. And consequently the same must be said of desire and of joy concerning a venereal thing, which likewise are always grave. - Morose delight regards an object present according to apprehension, as "when through the imagination of the phantasy someone renders the work of sin present to himself, namely the act of fornication, and delights in it by deliberate consent, as though he were actually fornicating, yet without a desire of executing it." L. l. 5. numero 15.

Desire is an act of the will by which someone deliberately intends the object itself as future, and therefore as to be placed in himself. It is twofold: one is simple desire, or desire of itself inefficacious, and it is the mere concupiscence of the external work and of the means without intention of executing such a work, the means not being applied; the other is desire of itself efficacious, or purpose, and it is the interior concupiscence of the external work and of the means with an absolute intention, or at least a hypothetical one, if it could be done, of executing the work, the due means being applied.

Joy, finally, is an act of the will by which someone deliberately approves, and is complacent within himself concerning, the past object itself, that is, the object carried out in execution, and therefore as that object was placed in himself. Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 2-6.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. 1. III.; Lugo, de Poenit. D. 16. n. 363 and following.

Note. "Not a few, especially from the ruder sort, are involved in this deception, that they think they consent only when they have the will of executing, and of perpetrating by the work itself, fornication, deflowering, or some other external lustful act. This error is enormous and must be extirpated by priests, according to their strength." Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 5.

226. Desire, whether it be efficacious or inefficacious, takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances of that object. Joy likewise takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances annexed to it. Morose delight varies in species according to the variety of the apprehended objects and of the circumstances exhibited to the mind. - This is established from the very intrinsic tendency of such acts, already explained. Billuart, l. c.; Lugo, l. c.

Corollary 1. The sentence is very probable "that if someone delights concerning copulation with a married woman, not because she is married, but because she is a beautiful woman, etc., he does not contract the malice of adultery; for the circumstance of adultery then does not enter into the delight. For this reason chastity only is harmed, not justice. And Tamburini probably says the same, if someone, with venereal affection, without desire, looks upon a married woman. Yet, this notwithstanding, what Holzmann has greatly pleases me, namely that although by reason of the delight there is no obligation of explaining the circumstance of adultery, nevertheless in practice it must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of coveting, at least inefficaciously, that married woman, into which danger one casts himself who delights concerning her. But there is no doubt that adultery is committed as often as joy, or complacency, is had concerning copulation had, or desire concerning copulation to be had, with a married woman, because then the will embraces the whole wrong object with all its circumstances, and cannot prescind from them, and therefore harms chastity and justice. Likewise, if someone delights concerning sodomitic copulation. Likewise, if the person who delights is bound by a vow of chastity, he also sins against the vow." L. l. c. Cf. Billuart, l. c. Sect. III.; Lugo, l. c.

2. Delight concerning the evil work itself, for example, of fornication, etc., is always evil, gravely or lightly, according as the work itself is gravely or lightly evil. But delight concerning the thought of an evil work, so that not the evil work itself, but only cognition of it, is the object of the delight, is of itself indifferent; and so it can be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, for example, for the sake of study, consultation, etc., always with abhorrence of the object itself; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, levity, etc.; or it can also be gravely evil, if it is done from an end mortally evil, or if proximate danger is present of deliberate delight in the object itself. What has been said concerning delight of thought must also be said concerning delight in the artful, skillful, etc., manner of an evil work carried out; for example, if you delight in the ingenious abduction of a bride carried out by another, from an honorable end the delight will be honorable, but if from an evil end, the delight is evil. St. Thomas, Quodl. 12. a. 33.

3. The doctrine of St. Thomas saying, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 4, that it is not a sin if nocturnal pollution pleases as an unloading or relief of nature, can in no way be understood of the delight inherent in pollution, which, as being base, is in itself and objectively evil; and in this way the holy Doctor explains himself in IV. Dist. 9. q. 1. a. 4. q. 1. ad 5. Indeed St. Alphonsus, lib. V. n. 20, wishes St. Thomas to be understood of a purely natural pollution, which naturally proceeds from nature unloading itself, and by no means of nocturnal pollution which has happened from touch or from a base dream, because under this respect it is again objectively evil. Moreover, in practice complacency of this kind, although in itself and speculatively honorable, is to be avoided because of the danger which it brings. G. Dumas, v. 1. n. 173. "Concerning pollution had in sleep," says Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 6, "someone can rejoice, not insofar as it is venereally delightful, but insofar as it is useful, either for quieting temptations, or for consulting health." Cf. Scavini, Tr. 4. d. 1. c. 2. a. 4. q. 13.; Ithur. Cas. 23. n. 31 and following.; Sanchez, in Dec. l. 1. c. 2. n. 19.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 14, I say 1, I say 2.; D'Annib., p. 1. n. 275. (18), ed. 4.

4. "It is not a sin, at least not mortal, if spouses delight by the rational appetite only concerning a past, future, or possible act of marriage, with respect to the partner present or absent. Likewise if a betrothed man desires future copulation, or delights concerning it; or a widow concerning past copulation. The reason is because these acts have a lawful object. I said: by the rational appetite; because if a betrothed man or a widow voluntarily consents to sensitive and carnal delight, which arises naturally from the remembrance of future or past copulation, he or she sins mortally, as Lessius, Bonacina, Tanner, Palaus, and Diana teach against Medina. But since sensitive and carnal delight, and indeed also the danger of consent to fornication, for the most part follows the aforesaid delight of the will, that delight of the will scarcely has a place in practice, at least in a widow and the betrothed; among spouses, however, provided danger of pollution is absent, Filliucci, Bonacina, Sanchez, Lessius, and Diana teach that even sensitive and venereal delight is not mortal; both because the state of marriage excuses these things, as also immodest touches undertaken for the sake of pleasure alone, and because these tend of themselves to the conjugal work, although by accident the work is not exercised." Busembaum apud S. Alph., l. V. n. 23. - Struggl, Tr. VII. q. 7. art. 2. nn. 18. 19.; Sporer, de matr. n. 505.; Ithur. Cas. 18.; L. l. c. n. 24, 25, lib. VI. n. 937.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. IV.

167. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited by the imagination as present, without desire.

2. Joy, or deliberate complacency concerning a past evil thing, or an evil work performed either by oneself or by another ¹.

¹ Complacency here does not mean pleasure or delight drawn from consideration of the evil object, but rather a certain approval by which the will has the evil perpetrated as pleasing and accepted: which approval indeed can be called joy in this sense, that someone concerning the evil deed not only is not sorry, as he ought to be, but rather rejoices.

Moreover joy is properly said also of a present good; indeed it is customarily defined as enjoyment of a good possessed and loved (Suarez, On 1.2, treat. 2, disp. 7, sect. 1, nos. 3-5). Concerning which matter St. Thomas says thus (1.2, q. 31, art. 3): Joy is a certain species of delectation... For we are delighted also in those things which we desire, when we obtain them.... But the name of joy does not have place except in delectation which follows reason; whence we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but only the name of delectation.

3. Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if an intention or absolute proposal of executing it is present; otherwise it is called inefficacious ². - St. Lig., no. 15.

² It is necessary that some efficacy be present even in inefficacious desires; otherwise they would not even deserve the name of desire. Namely there is present a conditionally efficacious will, which would pass into work unless something else obstructed. Hence St. Alphonsus well says (book 5, no. 15): A desire is called inefficacious if it does not propose absolutely to execute, but consents that it would execute, if it could, when, for example, it says: If I could steal the treasure of the Church, I would steal it.

But what the malice of these is, and what the species, hold in these few words:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1. it is truly a sin. For this is established from the precept, Thou shalt not covet, which must generally and indefinitely be understood of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is opposed to right reason: for it is base and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, that which it is not licit to execute.

2. It takes on the species of its object. For any desire, even inefficacious, tends to its object, and consequently is a volition of the special malice of that object, and therefore contracts its specific malice ³. This is also established from the words of Christ, Matth. 5.28: He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood as adultery. Therefore...

³ The internal act about which this treats here regards the external act as to be entrusted to execution, either absolutely or at least hypothetically; therefore it is necessarily carried to it according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or of their own accord follow from it.

3. It also takes on the species of the circumstances of the object. For desire, since it tends to an object, touches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. Hence in confession, for example of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the person desired must be declared. - St. Lig., no. 12.

169. • III. Morose delectation 1. is certainly a sin; 2. it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is that it is opposed to rational nature and divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it: but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear ⁵. Therefore... Hence Osee 9.10: They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Prov. 15.26: Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord. Therefore...

⁵ The guilt of morose delectation appears easily, since in reality it is nothing other than consent to delectation concerning an evil work. Thus St. Thomas, where he excellently distinguishes delectation about the thought of an evil work, which does not pertain here, and delectation about the evil work thought of (1.2, q. 74, art. 8): Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted about two things. In one way, about the thought itself; in another way, about the fornication itself thought of... But the thought itself, according to itself, is not mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for example when someone thinks about it uselessly; but sometimes it is without any sin at all, for example when someone thinks usefully about it, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it. And therefore consequently the affection and delectation which is thus about the thought of fornication is not of the genus of mortal sin, but sometimes is venial sin, sometimes none. Whence neither is consent to such delectation mortal sin... But that someone thinking about fornication is delighted ABOUT THE ACT ITSELF thought of, this happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act. Whence that someone consents to such delectation is nothing other than that he consents in this, that his affection be inclined toward fornication: for no one is delighted except concerning that which is conformable to his appetite. But that someone chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which according to themselves are mortal sins is mortal sin. Whence such consent to the delectation of mortal sin is mortal sin.

More briefly Laymann (book 1, treat. 3, ch. 6, no. 2): It is one thing to be delighted about the thing thought of, for example fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thing itself, but thought is only the condition proposing and applying the thing thought of; but another thing is to be delighted about the thought, for example of fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thought itself... We are speaking here about delectation WHICH IS TAKEN FROM THE THING ITSELF. For since the thought of an evil thing is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, as if you think about base things for the sake of teaching or admonishing, but sometimes venially evil, as if you think about the same things from curiosity; it follows that delectation also concerning such thought as object is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, sometimes venially evil.

The reason for the second is that whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in what degree and species the object is evil, in the same plainly will its delectation be evil. Therefore... - St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 74, art. 8. - St. Lig., no. 15.

170. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether morose delectation also takes on the specific malice of circumstances, as desire and joy do?

I answer: It is controverted. Probably no. The reason is that simple delectation does not tend to the object as to be placed, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object besides that which moves the delectation ⁶. Lugo, Laymann, Reuter, Bonacina, etc., against others who contend that simple delectation takes on all the species of the object, just as desire itself does. St. Lig. says that each opinion is probable, book 5, no. 15 ⁷.

⁶ This opinion does not deny that specific malice is taken also from circumstances, if these also are the object of delectation; but if the delectation, as Sanchez says (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 11), whom therefore the Salmanticenses wrongly allege for the opposite opinion, no differently than several others there reported by Sanchez (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 31), is not carried to the object according to its whole malice apprehended, but according to a part, as to a woman apprehended indeed as not his own, yet not as married to another or a nun; it will not have the whole malice of the external work, but only the malice apprehended, and that alone will have to be confessed, and it will be reduced to the species of simple fornication.

This hypothesis indeed is founded in the nature of the thing. For it happens that the will is carried to that which is indeed delectable, the circumstances of which, far from alluring, rather blunt the appetite, for example that the woman is already married to another, that she is a nun, or a blood relative, etc., which the Salmanticenses also suggest (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 30), where they well advert that the things said above hold indeed concerning the circumstances of the object, but not concerning the circumstances of the person sinning, for example if he is married or bound by a vow of chastity, although these circumstances contribute nothing to the delectation.

⁷ ** Although St. Alphonsus says that the opinion of the Author is very probable, nevertheless he adds (ibid.) that he greatly likes what Holzmann says (On the Precepts of the Decalogue, treat. 2, no. 698), that, for example, the circumstance of adultery must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of desiring at least inefficaciously, etc. And the VV. (page 913, no. 20) recall here those things which the Holy Doctor has elsewhere (Apostolic Man, treat. 3, no. 48), where after alleging some from the indicated false allegations of the Salmanticenses, he adds that in practice... without doubt all the circumstances of the object must be explained in delectation.

I answer: The opinion of Holzmann will be able to have place when he who is morosely delighted concerning an evil object at the same time has known that he is then violating the obligation of guarding against the grave and proximate danger of falling into depraved desire for that same object. But otherwise in the other hypothesis. The reason is clear from the first principles of ethics; for no sin is ever committed if some notion of obligation does not shine beforehand.

— Notions and varied morality. Delight is called morose not from a delay of time (for it can be completed in one moment), but from the deliberate assent of the will.

But it can be terminated either to the work itself, or to the thought of it: to the substance of the work, or to some mode of it.

1. Terminated to the thought-of evil work, for example to homicide, morose delight is according to itself mortal or venial, according as it approves a work gravely or venially evil (1, 2, q. 27 art. 3). But moral specification is drawn from the notes in which the complacency is had. For abstract consideration of the object can strip or clothe the object with certain notes.

2. Conditional delight, at least of the rational order, will not be illicit in itself, if the condition removes the disorder.

At least of the rational order, I say: for delight of the sensitive appetite, which follows the phantasm of the represented thing, affects the object as it is in itself. Wherefore, if the object cannot be good except by placing a certain condition which now is lacking, as is carnal intercourse of an unmarried person, the sensitive delight itself will be illicit. Therefore, although, because of the danger of evil commotion, this ought rather to be avoided, intellectual delight concerning carnal intercourse with some person, under that condition "if she were the spouse of the one delighting," objectively is not dishonorable; but delight of the sensitive appetite would be venereal commotion, which is prohibited under grave obligation to those not married. Cf. our De castitate, n. 367, 368.

That evil sensitive delight is had concerning a venereal act, concerning vengeance, concerning theft ¹. Yet this difference is present among the three delights: that the first and third consist rather in the sweet commotion of the subject enjoying, with delights or goods represented, while the other is rather drawn from the person over whom triumph is sought by vengeance. Whence the first and third, but not the other, can easily be without affection to the object.

3. Delight in the thought of an evil thing, but not in the evil work, is not evil according to itself: according to the end, usefulness, and mode, it can be evil or good. Thus a magistrate honorably thinks again about an offense so that he may punish it; a preacher, so that he may rebuke it.

4. Delight in the artful and industrious mode by which an evil thing is conceived to have been done is not about an evil object, and therefore of itself is not to be blamed.

¹ Sanchez, Decal. l. 1, c. 2, n. 35.

— Specification. Morose delight is specified by the object. By the object, I say, as it is apprehended and delights. Yet how, in a venereal matter, that which is accustomed to be accused as morose delight or complacency in shameful phantasms is rather consent into the excited venereal commotion, and therefore marks a sin of solitary action more than morose delight properly so called, cf. De castitate et vitiis oppositis, n. 266. There also we treat of the obligation of avoiding carnal delights or of repressing movements spontaneously arisen.

368. - That we may now speak of the former, or of the truer genus of interior acts, simple complacency of affection first occurs, without desire or a will of execution. Nothing is intended; something is loved in itself. A complacency of this kind is to be judged from the object, and it becomes moral from only those notes in which pleasure was truly taken. For it concerns an abstract object. Wherefore:

1. Deliberate intellectual complacency concerning a base action induces of itself the various guilt of that action. But if certain evil notes composing the object remain foreign to the affection, or do not positively please, they do not communicate their malice to the one taking pleasure. Thus complacency concerning inter- course with a definite person who is married or sacred will generally be only complacency in fornication, since the other notes rather displease of themselves.

2. Complacency concerning a thought entertained about a base thing is of itself about an honorable thing, since the thought of a base thing is not base in itself. But because of the danger of an obscene phantasm, it easily becomes suspect. Cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, question 15, article 4.

3. Complacency concerning the wondrous, rare manner in which an evil thing was performed, concerning the elegance of base speech, or concerning the art by which a statue was made, is also of itself about an indifferent thing; but again, because of the danger of evil complacency, it must be dissuaded.

369. - Desire superadds some tendency toward the object, or some will of execution, in an efficacious or inefficacious wish.

An efficacious will elicits an absolute resolution; an inefficacious will is subordinated to an unfulfilled condition. It is a mere wish.

Every desire is a movement of the will distinct from simple complacency. Yet as such, or in the subjective consideration of the act, if it was lustful, it induces the guilt of imperfect lust common with complacency, so that it does not of itself constitute an aggravating circumstance because of intensity. Cf. what was said, no. 356.

But objectively, an efficacious desire embraces the whole object as it exists; it loves or admits all its notes, at least absolutely, although not all for their own sakes, so that it contracts all the specific malices of the object.

But an inefficacious or conditioned desire must be judged from the nature of that condition.

If the condition excludes every malice, the desire will not of itself be objectively blameworthy, as if someone were to say: I would use her if she were mine. Yet it is evident that some danger is present in these desires.

And if the thing is evil only because it is prohibited, it is honorable to conceive the desire in this way: I would do it if it were lawful.

But if the thing is intrinsically dishonorable, we must bear an affection entirely detached from that thing, so that it may be conformable to right order. Wherefore it is not lawful, as though grieving over the prohibi- tion, deliberately to adhere to this will: I would fornicate if it were not prohibited.

Those malices which are repelled by the condition are taken away from the sin. Wherefore a desire conceived thus: I would sin if the woman were not married, were not my blood relative, and were not sacred, takes away the malice of adultery, of a sin against piety, or against religion.

But if the condition placed regards difficulty of execution, danger of punishment, or indifferent notes of this kind, the inefficacious desire communicates in every note of the evil object.

370. - Joy, as it is distinguished from desire, expresses approval of a past act, while desire is referred to a future act.

You will say that joy can also be conceived concerning a present action and is most frequent. But that joy is made one moral thing with the action itself. Wherefore it is passed over in silence in moral theology.

Moreover, concerning joy entirely the same must be said as concerning desire.

It is lawful to rejoice concerning the good effect of an evil thing, but not concerning the evil thing itself. Wherefore joy not only concerning a formal sin but also concerning a material sin, at least when it is conceived concerning a thing intrinsically evil ¹, is entirely unlawful. Therefore one who rejoices that, being ignorant, he performed depraved touches sins, just as does one who wishes that, being ignorant of the malice, he might be able to commit fornication.

¹ Cf. Sanchez, In Decalogum, book 1, chapter 2, nos. 15, 16.

Therefore, it is lawful to rejoice concerning natural nocturnal pollution but not concerning unnatural pollution: all admit this. Yet there are those who call natural only that pollution which is produced without a stirred phantasy and the sense of pleasure. But, as Sanchez ² observes, "that pleasure and commotion of the members naturally accompanies pollution; whence it does not prevent that pollution from being a natural evacuation and not of itself a sin."

² In Decalogum, book 1, chapter 2, no. 20. Cf. also Vasquez on I-II, question 74, article 8, disputation 115, chapter 3, nos. 7 and 9.

But it will have been unnatural if it was produced through involuntary masturbation during sleep. It is certainly not lawful, however, to foster with joy the carnal pleasure itself of pollution.

371. - Penitents, with the exception of an efficacious desire, are not accustomed to notice many species, so that they do not contract them either.

Wherefore, in practice, those who accuse depraved thoughts should be questioned concerning assent, so that they may learn to distinguish temptations and assent, and half assent from full assent.

If they doubt concerning assent, for the most part, according to the various presumption, they will be judged blameworthy or innocent. A habitually good will, an involuntary cause, indeed the omission itself of execution, ground a presumption of innocence.

Blameworthy imprudence, exterior acts which followed or preceded, and a habitual disposition toward lust generate rather the contrary presumption.

If they are found blameworthy, they should be questioned concerning desires.

Why anything else besides should be sought does not appear of itself, apart from the number and perhaps a general question whether or not they have anything to add. Cf. Reuter, Praxis confessarii, II, 204, or Noldin, De sexto, no. 62.

II. Lustful morose delectation (complaisance impure, onkuisch behagen) is nothing other than consent to pleasure concerning a lustful or immodest work; whence it is defined: simple love or voluntary complacency concerning a venereal work exhibited by cognition as present, without the will of carrying it out. For he who takes pleasure feigns to himself the action of sin as present, for example fornication, and concerning it, by deliberate consent, takes pleasure as if he were actually carrying it out and fornicating, yet without desire of carrying it out.

It is called delectation, because the mere thought of an evil thing is not sin, unless per accidens insofar as it includes danger of sinning, but the pleasure concerning a lustful thing thought of is sin. It is called morose, not because it requires a delay of time, for it can be perfected in a single moment, but because deliberating reason, rather than repelling the pleasure, dwells about it insofar as the venereal thing is grateful and pleasant to it.

Lustful morose delectation is sin, and indeed mortal sin. For no one takes pleasure except in that which seems good to him and conformable to his nature; therefore he who takes pleasure in a lustful thing has it as good for himself, and accordingly his affection tends into an evil thing. But since all external lust that is in itself and directly voluntary is mortally evil, voluntary pleasure concerning it is also mortal. For that someone deliberately choose that his affection be conformed to a work which of itself is mortal is already mortal sin. Thus Saint Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8.

This certainly is to be understood of fully voluntary complacency in venereal pleasure, and in acts of true lust, and indeed those gravely evil from their nature; not, however, of complacency in merely sensible pleasure, or in acts of lust from their nature lightly evil, as being voluntary only indirectly or in a cause influencing little, or in mere immodesty, as in the touch and look of the genitals had only from curiosity or levity. This is clear from the general principles explained above, and from the whole course of the argumentation.

III. Morose delectation, although it is less evil than the evil work itself or the proposal of it, nevertheless because it tends to the same thought object, has the specific malice of the work, provided and insofar as that work is thought of as pleasurable or moves to pleasure. Thus delectation concerning sodomy, concerning adultery as adultery, concerning fornication, differ in species. Nevertheless morose delectation does not contract the malice of circumstances which reason represents, but from which in the delectation it abstracts, and about which the delectation is not concerned, or by whose delectability the appetite is not moved. For delectation tends into the object, not as it exists really, but as it exists in the intellect, and accordingly does not tend into circumstances which reason does not represent as pleasurable and which are not the motive of the pleasure. Hence:

1. if the imagined object pleases only as a cause of carnal pleasure in general, only the malice of impudicity or imperfect lust is contracted and is to be accused, unless, however, pollution follows;

2. but if delectation is had concerning a special circumstance, for example concerning an act to be exercised precisely as solitary, or with a woman, with a married woman, with a sacred person, or with a male, and so forth, affection toward this special malice is contracted and one will have to be accused of solitary sin, or fornication, adultery, sacrilege, sodomy, and so forth;

3. if someone takes pleasure concerning a married or sacred person, not insofar as married or sacred, but insofar as beautiful, only the specific malice of fornication, not of adultery or sacrilege, is contracted.

V. Corollaries. Let morose delectation concerning a thought lustful work not be confused:

1. with delectation concerning the very thought itself, which can be good, for example to take pleasure in theological science concerning base things;

2. with delectation concerning the mode by which the lustful thing is done. For this is good, venially evil, or mortally evil, according as the mode itself is good or lightly or gravely evil. Examples are: to take pleasure in an ingenious or new mode of perpetrating lust, in matrimonial copulation had beside the natural mode, in a mode of exercising lust against nature;

3. with delectation concerning only the good effect following from lust, for example concerning offspring conceived from fornication or concerning concupiscence calmed from pollution. This is licit, provided it is not also had concerning the lustful work itself on account of the good effect;

4. with delectation concerning a work as licit at another time or in another state. For this is licit, not indeed if it is done concerning the work absolutely and as concerning the present, for example for the betrothed concerning copulation now to be had, but if it is done under the condition of the time or state in which it will be licit, because this condition removes the malice from the work, for example concerning copulation to be had in future marriage. This is to be understood of the delectation of the rational appetite, which can tend to the object as proposed by reason, and accordingly under a condition concerning the future or concerning the past and thus abstracted from malice; it is not valid of the delectation of the sensitive appetite, which tends into the object proposed by sense, and accordingly always absolutely and as concerning the present. Hence for practice:

a. by rational appetite, but not carnal appetite, the betrothed can take pleasure concerning future copulation and desire it; likewise widowers and widows can take pleasure concerning past copulation and rejoice in it;

b. but for other unmarried persons, although the same of itself is not illicit, ordinarily it is illicit per accidens, because it will not happen without motions of concupiscence, which they cannot excite, and for permitting which they can have no reason;

c. on the contrary, spouses, even when the partner is absent, can take pleasure carnally concerning copulation had or to be had, provided it is not done principally on account of pleasure but on account of an honorable end, and there is no danger of pollution, because here and now copulation is licit for them, although per accidens it is impossible.

It should be noted, however, that all the aforesaid delectations in practice are to be avoided, both because they are often idle and therefore venial sins, and because they are very dangerous, since a transition easily occurs to delectation concerning the lustful work itself. Nevertheless, in this matter, there will be greater liberty for married persons.

395. Notion. Morose delectation is a sinful complacency concerning some evil representation exhibited to us by the imagination, without desire.

It is called a) morose, not from a delay of time, as though a rather long time were required, but from a delay of reason, because, namely, reason, deliberating, freely stops or lingers in that evil complacency, even if perhaps only for a few moments.⁷⁷

It is called b) concerning some evil representation exhibited by the imagination, to signify its object. For morose delectation is not directly concerned with the external work itself, but with the work exhibited to us by an image. - In order that the matter may become clearer, it must be observed that delectation in general is nothing other than the repose of the rational appetite, the will, or of the sensitive appetite, in some pleasing good. Moreover, this delectation can be concerned with four objects, namely 1. with the external work itself, for example delectation in causing damage; 2. with the external work represented through the imagination, for example delectation concerning damage to an enemy depicted to me through phantasy; 3. with the subtle and ingenious manner in which an evil work has been done, filouterie, Gaunerstreich, roguish trick; 4. with the thought or cognition of an evil work, for example a moralist takes pleasure in the knowledge acquired concerning damage, concerning lust, because he needs such knowledge in the confessional.

Note. Morose delectation is by no means to be confused with venereal delectation, concerning which there will be discussion below, II 681.

⁷⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 74, a. 6 ad 3.

396. Moral character. With these notions and distinctions having been set forth, I say: The first delectation is the very sin of the external work⁷⁸ which is pleasing.

The second delectation is properly called morose delectation, and is of the same species and gravity as the evil work to which it refers. The reason is that no one would take delight in those internal representations unless he were inwardly inclined to the evil work itself, although he would not wish to complete it outwardly. Hence deliberate consent in such delectation is nothing other than approval of the sinful thing, or even an affection freely inclined into the evil work itself, for example into fornication.⁷⁹ In one word: he who voluntarily takes delight in an evil thing, represented, and does this fully deliberately and advertently, loves the thing itself and is voluntarily affected toward it. Hence it is said in Sacred Scripture: "Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord."⁸⁰

The third delectation, concerning the ingenious manner in which a shameful act was perpetrated, is not evil of itself, since that ingenious manner is not of itself something evil but good. Thus, for example, someone could take delight and laugh while seeing the manner in which poor little women quarrel among themselves, or in which obscene deeds are narrated; or someone could take delight while seeing statues or images very artistic, although they represent illicit objects, or while seeing lewd spectacles represented with great art, or while reading books of classical authors in which lewd things are narrated in a most beautiful style.⁸¹ Nevertheless, that pleasures of this kind often are dangerous and give occasion for sinning will be said below, n. 398.

The fourth delectation, concerning the cognition of an evil thing, likewise is not evil of itself. For such delectation is concerned with a good object; for every cognition is a certain perfection and something good. "Hence such delectation, in whatever way it may follow a thought of evils, is entirely not a sin, but a laudable delectation, as when someone takes delight in the thought of truth; or if there is some immoderation there, it will be contained under the sin of curiosity."⁸² Wherefore it can be said briefly: an evil thought is evil, but a thought about an evil thing is not always evil. Sometimes it is evil accidentally, as will be said below, n. 398.

⁷⁸ Cf. nevertheless what was said above in nn. 87 and 88 concerning consequent passion.

⁷⁹ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 8.

⁸⁰ Prov. 15, 26.

⁸¹ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 18.

⁸² S. Thom., Quaest. disp. de verit. 15, a. 4; cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 74, a. 8. In the French and German languages one must distinguish pensees mauvaises, schlechte Gedanken (morose delectation), and pensees sur des mauvaises choses, Gedanken uber schlechte Dinge (speculative thought about evil things).

397. Specific malice. Morose delectation concerning an object gravely evil represented through the imagination is a mortal sin, and is specified from the object itself. Indeed of itself it would probably be specified from the object and from circumstances changing the species, since it is a sinful complacency not only in the evil represented object, but also in its represented circumstances. Hence one who had morose delectation concerning represented adultery ought to say in the confessional that he was delighted concerning adultery, and one who had morose delectation concerning incest ought to say that he was delighted concerning incest. Nevertheless, in practice very often it suffices if the penitent accuses only generically that about which the delectation was, without the circumstances. For example, it suffices if the penitent confesses that he had evil thoughts against chastity or against charity, etc.

The reason is, a) because it is almost always morally impossible for a penitent, especially if he has not confessed for a rather long time, to declare each and every evil thought according to objects and circumstances. Often it is already very difficult to find the number of those thoughts. Therefore a fortiori it is most difficult to indicate not only the number, but also the individual objects about which the evil thoughts were concerned. Moreover, moral impossibility excuses from material integrity of confession, as will be clear below in the treatise on penance. There is added, b) that evil thoughts, especially in the matter of lust, to which desire is not joined, are wont quickly to pass over from one object to another, nor do they exhibit the object with all its circumstances very clearly, but only in a vague and indeterminate way. But if the representation is so unstable, the delectation following therefrom also cannot put on all the circumstances of the represented object. - On account of these two reasons, let the confessor not torture a penitent accusing himself of evil thoughts against chastity, without desire, by asking him about what object in particular the thoughts were concerned.⁸³ Aertnys-Damen⁸⁴ calls this opinion very probable; nor is St. Alphonsus⁸⁵ contrary, teaching that the circumstances of it are to be accused, not indeed necessarily by reason of morose delectation alone, but on account of the proximate danger of falling into evil desires. For although objectively such a danger is often present, nevertheless subjectively it is often not perceived, and consequently it is not a formal sin nor is it necessarily to be accused.

⁸³ Billuart treats this matter very well and broadly, De temperantia diss. 6, a. 15, § 3. Cf. also Bucceroni, Instit. theol.^8 I 291; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor.^11 I 364.

⁸⁴ Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 246.

⁸⁵ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 15.

398. Distinctive criteria. We said above that delectation both concerning the ingenious manner of doing an evil thing and concerning the theoretical thought alone of an evil thing is not of itself something evil, but nevertheless is dangerous and consequently sinful if it takes place without sufficient reason. The reason for this danger is that so easily a transition is made from these delectations to evil delectation concerning the evil thing itself. Hence it is customarily asked how, in practice, one delectation can be discerned from the other. There are chiefly three criteria indicating the distinction:

1. The motive or good intention of the agent. For if someone from a pure and good motive studies or speaks about these things, for example a confessor, physician, artist, etc., it is permissible to presume delectation concerning the thought and not concerning the thing itself thought.

2. The habitual inclination of the agent. If someone is habitually inclined and sins rather frequently, for example in matters of lust, then his thoughts are presumed to be no longer merely theoretical but concerning the evil things themselves.

3. Sufficient cause. For if someone without any cause or from mere curiosity takes delight concerning the manner in which an evil thing has been done or represented, it is a venial sin; but if he does this because he is bound to attend to such things, it is no sin. - The older authors already, Castropalaus and the Salmanticenses, observed, and priests themselves should have this before their eyes, that those who frequently and more willingly speak about hidden parts of the body, about illnesses, garments, and other things pertaining to them, and easily break forth into unbecoming laughter, are not rarely being carried along latently by delectation of the flesh. Hence a priest who is a lover of chastity, when he either hears these things unwillingly or brings them forward for a just cause, ought to furnish no sign of gladness, but to preserve serenity and gravity of countenance in all things.

685. 1. Morose delectation in general can concern diverse sins, but it occurs principally in the matter of lust, and then it is complacency concerning a lustful thing represented through the imagination. We treated morose delectation in general more fully above, I, n. 395 ff., when there was discussion of internal sins in general; and therefore here we note only a few things. Morose delectation in lust is not concerned with the speculative knowledge of a lustful thing, nor with the ingenious manner in which an evil work was done; for such delectations are licit, at least if danger of consent to the venereal thing itself is absent. Morose delectation in the matter of lust is customarily called by the faithful in confession: impure thoughts (unkeusche Gedanken, pensées impures).

Malice. Venereal morose delectation is a grave sin, because such complacency is nothing other than a voluntary affection toward the lustful thing itself, even if it is not to be completed in deed. For no one would take delight in the thing represented unless he loved the thing itself. Moreover, this morose delectation is wont to cause carnal movements and to introduce serious danger of an evil desire or of the external sinful act itself. In practice it is often most difficult to judge whether someone gave full consent to morose delectation or not, and therefore whether he sinned gravely or lightly. This can be held as a rule: If morose delectation quickly passed, or if a man has not sinned externally against chastity for a notable time, there is at least a presumption that consent was not perfect.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 6, 7, 8; De Veritate q. 15, a. 4.

452. Morose delight, which is nothing other than consent in delight concerning an evil object, is defined: simple love or voluntary complacency concerning an illicit object or work, exhibited by cognition as present, without desire of execution.

It is not directly concerned with the external work but with the work exhibited to us through imagination. For he who delights feigns to himself an act of sin as present (for example, the killing of an enemy, theft, fornication) and is complacent in that act represented to him as if he were executing it (for example, actually killing, stealing, or fornicating), yet without the will of executing it.

It is called delight, because mere thought about an evil thing is not sin (unless per accidens insofar as it includes danger of sinning and inclines to sin), but delight concerning an evil thing thought of is sin (a. 8). It is called morose, not because it requires a delay of time, for it can be perfected in one moment, but because deliberating reason, rather than repelling the delight, lingers about it insofar as the evil thing is pleasing and pleasant to man (a. 6, ad 3).

453. Principles. I. Morose delight is sin: for no one delights except concerning that which seems good to him and conformed to his nature; therefore he who delights concerning an evil thing has it as good for himself, and consequently his affection tends into an evil thing.

II. Morose delight is grave or light sin according to the object: if it occurs concerning an object venially evil it is venial; if concerning an object gravely prohibited, it is always mortal: for that someone deliberately wills that his affection be conformed to a work which of itself is mortal is mortal sin (a. 8; Prov. XV, 26; Wis. I, 3; Matt. XXIII, 27).

III. Morose delight, although it is less evil than the evil work itself (from which it is distinguished as an incomplete species from a complete one) or than the proposal of it, nevertheless, because it tends into the same object thought of, has malice of the same species as the work (to be declared in confession), provided and insofar as the work is thought of as delectable, or moves to delight. Namely, merely internal delight is morally of the same reason as delight actually perceived which arises from the work.

Thus delight concerning homicide, concerning adultery as adultery, concerning sodomy as sodomy, or concerning false testimony differs in species from delight concerning wounding, fornication, pollution, or lying.

Nevertheless, probably morose delight does not contract the malice of circumstances which reason indeed adverts to but from which it abstracts in the delight and about which the delight is not concerned, or by whose delectability the appetite is not moved. For delight tends into the object not as really existing, but insofar as it exists in the intellect, and consequently it does not tend into circumstances which reason does not represent as delectable and which are not the motive of delight.

Hence if someone delights concerning the homicide of a priest, not because he is a priest, or concerning theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, he does not contract the specific malice of sacrilege but only of homicide or theft; and if he delights concerning intercourse with a married woman, but not as married but as a beautiful woman, he does not contract the specific malice of adultery but only of fornication.

454. Corollaries. - Morose delight is only concerning an evil object or work. Hence:

a) Delight, not indeed concerning the evil thing thought of, but concerning the thought itself or concerning the mode in which the evil thing is done, is good, venially evil, or mortally evil, according as the thought itself or the mode itself is good, lightly evil, or gravely evil. Examples are: to delight concerning knowledge of the crimes of a penitent, concerning knowledge idly acquired or from curiosity, concerning knowledge of a secret or occult crime from detraction; or concerning a mode that is ingenious, skillful, subtle, wondrous, new, or laughable (as concerning the flexibility of a drunk man), concerning marital intercourse had outside the natural mode or position, concerning a mode against nature in sins of lust.

Thus licitly it occurs concerning obscene paintings and plays on account of the artistry; concerning the subtle or artful mode by which a thing was taken away; concerning the Attic salt with which a fictitious narration has been sprinkled; concerning singular or ingenious craftiness in fraud; concerning the eloquence of one detracting; concerning the dexterity of one fighting; concerning the fall of a man from a horse on account of laughable circumstances; concerning the mode in which little women quarrel among themselves or in which obscene deeds are narrated; concerning obscene statues because they are very artful; concerning lubricious spectacles because represented with great art; concerning a most beautiful or witty mode of narrating lubricious things.

b) Delight concerning an evil work, abstracting from the fact that it is evil, or concerning a materially evil work, is licit if the work is prohibited only by positive right, unless someone delights in it insofar as it is prohibited by law, for example, concerning the eating of meats on a forbidden day, concerning forgetfulness of matins, concerning omission of Mass: for this work in itself is not objectively intrinsically evil. On the contrary, it is illicit if the work is prohibited by right of nature, because then the work in itself is intrinsically evil, for example, concerning material fornication, involuntary homicide, pollution involuntarily procured, material perjury on account of liberation (cf. proposition 15 condemned by Innocent XI).

But since merely natural pollution, proceeding from nature alone relieving itself, is not materially evil, it is not sin on account of a good end to delight concerning it or even by a simple affection to desire it, yet not on account of pleasure.

c) Delight concerning an evil work on account of a good effect is evil, for example, concerning the killing of a father on account of inheritance, concerning omission of Mass on account of utility, concerning procured pollution on account of concupiscence quieted. But it is licit concerning only the good effect, or concerning the fact that the evil work had good effects, for example, concerning inheritance from homicide, concerning offspring from fornication, concerning the glory of martyrs, concerning the cessation of scandal from the killing of a seducer; or even concerning the evil of neighbor, not indeed as it is evil for him but insofar as it is a greater good for him or for others, with the order of charity observed, namely, so that the evil which is avoided outweighs or equals the evil of neighbor which pleases.

Thus, for example, concerning bodily evil on account of the good of the soul, concerning the infirmity of a neighbor so that he may be converted, concerning the evil of one on account of the common good, concerning the death of a persecutor of the Church or of an evildoer on account of the example of others. On the contrary, it is illicit to delight concerning the evil of neighbor on account of a lesser good, for example, concerning the death of a father on account of inheritance, as is clear from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI.

d) Delight concerning a work sometimes licit but illicit at the time of delight, if this is prohibited by positive right alone, ordinarily is not evil because positive law does not prohibit delight but only the work; for example, on a day of abstinence someone can delight concerning the eating of meats, yet not precisely as prohibited. But if the work is prohibited by right of nature, delight is evil if it occurs concerning the work absolutely and as present, for example, for the betrothed concerning intercourse now to be had; it will not be evil if it occurs under the condition of the time at which it will be licit, for example, concerning intercourse to be had in marriage.

But let it be noted that this last can occur if the delight is in the rational appetite, but not if it is in the sensitive appetite: for the rational appetite tends into the object proposed by reason, but reason can propose it under a condition concerning the future or the past, and thus abstracted from malice. On the contrary, the sensitive appetite tends into the object proposed by the internal senses, but sense proposes it without any condition or abstraction from malice, and therefore absolutely as present and as it is in itself; whence delight is borne into the object not as it is under a condition but as it is in itself, and consequently as it is absolutely evil in the present. Therefore sensible delight had here and now concerning hatred and revenge legitimate at another time would be evil; not so spiritual delight, or delight of the will, which can be under the condition of injury inflicted.

Hence for practice: 1) by the rational appetite, but not by the carnal, the betrothed can delight concerning future intercourse and desire it; likewise widowed persons can delight and rejoice concerning past intercourse; likewise a spouse who has made a vow of chastity while the other has not;

2. but for other unmarried persons, although the same is not illicit of itself, ordinarily it is illicit per accidens, because it will not occur without movements of concupiscence which they cannot excite and for permitting which they can have no reason;

3. on the contrary, spouses, even when the consort is absent, can delight carnally concerning intercourse had or to be had (provided it is not done principally on account of delight but on account of an honorable end and danger of pollution is not present), because here and now intercourse is licit for them, although per accidens it is impossible.

455. Observations. - A. Let it be noted that all the delights concerning which we have spoken in the preceding number are to be avoided in practice, both because they are often idle and therefore venial sins, and because they are very dangerous, especially when there is question of matters of lust or revenge, because a transition easily occurs to delight concerning the evil work itself.

B. The following conjectural criteria are listed for discerning whether delight was concerning the thought alone or mode, or concerning the evil thing itself:

a) The affection or good intention of the agent. For if someone from a good motive and sincere intention studies or speaks about evil things (for example, a confessor, physician, artist, etc.), delight can be presumed to be concerning the thought and not concerning the thing itself thought of; on the contrary, if delight arose from a vicious affection, from excessively curious and useless reading or consideration.

b) The occasion from which the delight arises. If it arises on account of study, confession, preaching, etc., it can be presumed that the delight is concerning the thought; on the contrary, if it proceeds from a base occasion, such as vengeance taken or sin perpetrated.

c) The habitual inclination of the agent. If someone habitually inclines and sins rather often, for example, in matters of lust, then his thoughts are presumed no longer merely theoretical, but concerning the depraved things themselves; on the contrary, in a God-fearing man.

d) The moderation or vehemence of the delight. If the thought (or mode) delights equally in licit and illicit things, it is a sign that the delight is not concerning the evil thing; on the contrary, if it is such as is perceived from the base thing itself when it is present, say with a similar commotion of appetite, it is an indication that the delight is not concerning cognition (or mode) alone, but also concerning the thing itself.

e) Sufficient cause. For if someone without any cause or from mere curiosity delights concerning the mode in which an evil thing was done or represented, it is sin (at least venial); but if he does this because he is bound to attend to such things, it is not sin.

1. Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologico-morale, vol. I, n. 538 sq.; Theologia Mechliniensis, Moralis generalis, n. 148, q. 2; and Prummer, Theologia Moralis I, n. 398, who adds: "Already the old authors, such as Castropalaus and the Salmanticenses, observed (and priests themselves should keep this before their eyes), that those are convicted of being latently carried by delight of the flesh who frequently and more willingly speak about hidden parts of the body, about illnesses, clothing, and other things pertaining to these, and easily break out into uncomposed laughter. Whence a priest who is a lover of chastity, when he either unwillingly hears these things or for a just cause utters them, ought to offer no sign of gladness, but preserve serenity and gravity of countenance in all things."

C. Just as delight concerning an evil thing is evil, so in the same mode sadness concerning a good thing: the latter truly hates good just as the former loves evil. Hence:

1. Sadness concerning a good which is prescribed under grave matter is grave sin.

2. Sadness concerning a good which is prescribed under light matter is light sin.

3. Sadness concerning a good which according to itself is not prescribed, e.g., concerning a vow emitted or to be emitted, concerning the priesthood received or to be received, does not exceed light matter, provided the will of fulfilling the obligation contracted is retained. Whether it is a light sin or no sin depends on the motive on account of which someone is saddened, namely, whether it is reasonable or not; ordinarily, however, once the work has been chosen, sadness of this kind lacks a reasonable motive.

4. Sadness not concerning the good work itself, but concerning only the circumstances of a good action, e.g., concerning inconvenience and labor, is not sin.

2. Noldin, Theologia Moralis I, n. 335.

S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 6-8.

1020. Internal luxury is that which consists in mere affection toward venereal pleasure or use. It is, namely, the consent of reason and will to inordinate venereal pleasure alone, represented in the mind; and therefore it is called morose delectation. But if besides this there is consent to a shameful work, it will be either desire of a future work to be executed, or joy concerning a past work perpetrated.

Morose delectation is the same as voluntary delectation. For it is not called morose from delay of time, since in one instant the sin of delectation can be completed by the consent of the will; but it is called morose from delay of reason, insofar as reason, noticing it, either consents to it, or voluntarily accepts it, or does not repel it as it can and ought, and thus lingers about it in that sense in which one who is not fulfilling his office is said to be in delay. But there can be delectation either concerning the very apprehension or cognition of a shameful object, or concerning the shameful thing itself apprehended or known. Now the question is whether simple voluntary delectation, both concerning the apprehension or cognition of a venereal thing, and concerning the venereal thing apprehended or thought, without the will of executing the work, is sin, and indeed mortal sin; for no one can doubt that the will of the luxurious work itself is mortally evil.

1021. Principle I. Voluntary delectation concerning the thought or cognition of a venereal thing is not mortally evil; indeed of itself it is no sin. - The reason is that delectation concerning the thought or cognition of a venereal thing, for example, fornication, follows the inclination of affection into the thought itself. But the thought or cognition itself, for example, of fornication, is not of itself mortally evil, indeed not even a sin, since it is in God. In fact, however, it will sometimes be venial, for example, when someone thinks altogether uselessly about fornication; but sometimes without sin, for example, when he thinks about it usefully, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it.

A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1st. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through imagination as present, without desire.

2nd. Joy, or deliberate approval of an evil work performed either by oneself or by another, by which the will holds the perpetrated evil as pleasing and acceptable.

3rd. Desire, or an act of the will seeking an evil thing as to be obtained, and therefore to be carried out by work. It is called efficacious if there is present an absolute purpose of carrying it out; inefficacious if there is present only conditioned consent, for example, if someone says: I would steal if I could; or I would fornicate with this woman unless I feared infamy, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Therefore morose delectation is concerned with the object, not as it is in itself, but as here and now it is presented to the imagination; joy, on the contrary, and desire are concerned with the object as it once was or will be in itself.

Question 1. Does morose delectation take on also the specific malice of the circumstances of the object, as desire and joy do?

Response. Negatively, probably, according to many theologians; and the reason is that simple delectation does not tend toward the object as it really exists, but rests in it as it is represented by phantasy. Moreover this, neither from the nature of the thing nor in fact, is accustomed to represent all circumstances, but only that one which moves the delectation more. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15. - Baller., note (a), p. 148.

Question 2. Is it lawful to desire an evil under the condition, if it were licit?

Response. Affirmatively, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the thing, because such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object from which by the condition malice is altogether excluded. But the response would be negative in another hypothesis, because such an affection tends toward an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object even as represented, as would be blasphemy, perjury, etc. Nevertheless he would probably be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly did not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but only showed his propensity toward that object. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 27; and Hom. Ap., n. 50.

For the rest, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition added would remove the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural right, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Bertha if I did not have a wife. Cajetan deservedly calls these desires foolish and diabolical temptations. Indeed also other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive right are to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection. - Cf. Cajet., under the title Sins of Thought.

Question 3. Is it lawful to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left aside from forgetfulness?

Response. Although it is never lawful to rejoice or take delight either concerning an evil omission or concerning an evil work, even when inculpably admitted, according as they were evil in themselves; yet it is lawful, of itself, that is, with the danger of consent to delectation concerning the evil cause excluded, to rejoice or take delight concerning the good and honorable effect which arose from them.

But whether it is also lawful to rejoice or take delight concerning the evil cause itself, not according as it is evil, but according as it was the cause of a good effect, many affirm with Lessius, Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, and others; but St. Alphonsus, with several others, denies it, alleging proposition 15, condemned by Innocent XI, which holds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thereafter obtained from the inheritance." - But it must be said that it is not clear whether by this proposition absolutely every joy concerning an inculpable evil work was condemned; or rather only the joy was reprobated by which the son, against the right order of charity, places the good of a much inferior order, namely the riches obtained from it, before the death of his parent. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Lessius, de just. et jure, lib. 4, cap. 3, n. 105. - Suarez, disp. 5, sect. 7, n. 15. - Lugo, de poenit., disp. 16, n. 389. - Viva, in the cited proposition, n. 12. - Baller., note (a), p. 152; and note (c), p. 186.

Thomas, recently placed in charge of a certain mission by the bishop, is of such a disposition of mind that he fears everything, perceiving difficulties and even sin everywhere. As often as he sits in the sacred tribunal to hear confessions, he is assailed by indecent thoughts and motions; when he applies himself to the study of moral theology, the same thing always happens to him. Several times during the day he repeats the resolution to die rather than consent; nevertheless, the temptations return and cling more tenaciously. He fears, moreover, that at least sometimes, although he had a firm will to expel temptations of this kind, he resisted negligently at the beginning. Finally, for recreation he read through a certain book treating profane love, although he foresaw most grave temptations and actually suffered them; nevertheless, he remained doubtful whether he consented or not. Hence it is asked:

1. What is deliberately entertained pleasure, what is joy, and what is desire?

2. By what stages does one arrive at sinful pleasure, and how is sin committed?

3. How is the species of sins of this kind discerned?

4. Just as the object of joy and desire must be disclosed in confession, must the object of deliberately entertained pleasure also be disclosed?

5. What judgment is to be made concerning Thomas’s case?

1. For the answer to this question see “Manual of Moral Theology,” p. 149 and following.

2. By what degrees is sinful pleasure arrived at, and how is the sin committed?

The first stage on the road to sin is the apprehension of a sinful object by the intellect. We here suppose that this simple apprehension is not voluntary. The sinful object thus present in the mind naturally attracts the appetite and an indeliberate motion of the will toward the object is the consequence. Then the intellect notices what is going on and reflects that it would be wrong to consent to the inordinate motion. If consent be given after advertence to the wrongfulness of the object, sin is committed. So that there is no sin in the apprehension of a sinful object by the intellect, nor in the natural and indeliberate movement of the will toward that object which follows. Sin is committed by freely choosing something which is sinful, and this can not be done without previous advertence by the intellect to the sinfulness of the object.

3. How are the species of this sort of sin known and distinguished?

Sins are human acts, and acts are specifically distinguished by their object, so that the species of a sin is known by its object. The object in sinful desire is something wrong in the concrete, invested with certain circumstances without which the object can not exist in the concrete. Sinful desire, then, will contract the malice of the object, and that of any evil circumstances with which the object may be invested. The same is true of joy about a sin committed in the past. Morose delectation in a sinful act as represented in the mind can prescind from certain circumstances which would invest the object in the concrete, and if it does so prescind from them, they do not form part of the object of the sinful delectation, and so they do not affect its malice.

4. Has the object of morose delectation to be made known in confession as the object of evil joy and desire has?

Yes, in itself; for otherwise the sin will not be confessed in its kind. Thus morose delectation in a thought of fornication is quite a different sin from morose delectation in a thought of revenge. Some theologians, however, admit an exception to this rule in the case of morose delectations of impurity. They point out that ordinarily in such sins it is not so much the object which attracts as the immodest pleasure which such thoughts ordinarily cause. This immodest pleasure gives unity to the sins of thought, even though their objects are different. This opinion relieves confessors of the irksome duty of asking for details about such sins in the confessional beyond the number and the kind in general. Detailed questions about the objects of such sins frequently could not be put without danger both to the penitent and to the confessor.¹

1 Génicot, vol. i, no. 175.

5. The case. Thomas, a priest who has lately been put in charge of a mission, is of a timid disposition, and fears difficulties and sin everywhere. He is tempted by bad thoughts and feelings whenever he hears confessions, as he was when he studied moral theology. These temptations are not sins, for he does not consent to them. They probably come from his being afraid of them, and they will cease if he does not bother about them, and commits himself to God. Sometimes he is afraid that at least he was negligent in repelling them at once. We understand by repelling thoughts of this kind the turning away of the mind from them as far as possible. Thomas may have committed fault in this way, as it is difficult always to be prompt in rejecting such thoughts, but the negligence would not be more than a venial sin. In reading a novel for recreation, though he foresaw that serious temptations would be the result, he did not commit a sin unless he foresaw proximate danger of consenting to evil. This we must not presume in a man like Thomas. Afterward he doubts whether he gave consent to evil; as the presumption is in his favor he need not confess this. However, it will be better if Thomas will for the future seek his recreation where he is not likely to be troubled by thoughts and feelings which are always objectionable and dangerous.