§ I. On Morose Delectation

I. Notion. Morose delectation¹ is a free complacency of the will concerning an evil act taken objectively. It is said:

1. Complacency, i.e., rest in some object.

2. Of the will, i.e., of the rational appetite. Therefore, strictly speaking, the discussion is not of complacency of the sensitive appetite, but of the consent of the will in the complacency of the sensitive appetite. Namely, the will does not immediately delight in a sensible object, but mediately, i.e., through the mediation of the sensitive appetite (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, aa. 6 and 8).

3. Free, i.e., that to which the will assents after the advertence of the intellect to the malice of the act.

4. Concerning an evil act taken objectively, without addition. Hence the object of morose delectation, as we have already insinuated, is not an evil act whether future or to be perpetrated, whether past or perpetrated, whether present or being perpetrated here and now; nor is its object the thought about an evil act; nor even the evil act thought about, although thought is the condition without which the will cannot be borne toward the evil act, or the operation by which the evil act is presented to the will. The object of morose delectation is the evil act itself taken objectively. "Therefore," says St. Alphonsus, "one thing is delectation concerning an evil work, so that the evil work is the object of the delectation, which is always evil. Another is delectation concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the thought itself about the work is per se the object of the delectation" (V, 17; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8, ad 4).

¹ It is called morose not from a delay of time, but from a delay or lingering of the will, which can take place in an instant.

II. Morality. 1. Morose delectation concerning an evil act is evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil, according as it regards an act gravely or lightly illicit. The reason is that, as is clear from the notion handed down, it involves an affection of the will toward an evil act. But affection of the will toward an evil act is evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil, according as it regards an act gravely or lightly illicit (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8 and q. 88, a. 5, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, 17).

"But that," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "someone thinking about fornication should be delighted by the very act thought about happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act. Hence that someone consents to such delectation is nothing other than that he himself consents to this, that his affection be inclined toward fornication; for no one is delighted except in that which is conformed to his appetite. But that someone by deliberation chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which in themselves are mortal sins is mortal sin; hence such consent to the delectation of mortal sin is mortal sin."

2. Morose delectation takes its species:

a) From the object considered according to its generic species, so that, for example, delectation concerning an act of lust is opposed to chastity, and concerning vengeance to charity (St. Alphonsus, V, 28). It is disputed whether it also takes its species from the object considered according to its lowest species. A few deny this with regard to sins of lust, because a lustful affection seems to be more general, i.e., toward venery generally, than special toward such an object. But the contrary seems altogether to be admitted, because the lowest species of the object, as for example fornicatory or sodomitical intercourse, enters into the object of delectation, and therefore specifies the affection of the will which is borne toward the object (cf. St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 39, 1). Here, nevertheless, note that immodest acts, for example looking at or seeing an obscene thing, do not differ in species in themselves.

b) From circumstances of the subject. Hence, for example, one bound by a vow of chastity, if he is morosely delighted concerning an act of lust, also commits a sin against religion, and indeed personal sacrilege, at least if he is bound by a public vow; namely, the vow of chastity also excludes internal sins. Many affirm the same concerning the circumstance of marriage, because even marital fidelity seems to forbid an affection toward sin with another.

c) From circumstances of the object, if the delectation is also occupied around those circumstances, because then the circumstance pertains to the object of the delectation. Otherwise, against others, it seems this must be denied, because where delectation concerning the circumstance is absent, the circumstance does not seem to enter into the object of the delectation. Hence if someone is morosely delighted concerning intercourse with a blood-relative or a married woman as such, he contracts the malice of incest or adultery; but not if he is delighted, as commonly happens, concerning intercourse with a blood-relative or married woman as beautiful. Nevertheless, morose delectation must be said to take its species from a circumstance of the object if it induces proximate danger of desiring the act, for example, intercourse with a blood-relative (St. Alphonsus, cited place). But in order that this malice be contracted, attention must be paid to it; this commonly does not take place. Hence for the most part there is no obligation of declaring the aforesaid circumstances in confession, or of asking about them.

Corollary I. It is licit for spouses to be morosely delighted concerning intercourse or immodest acts with the partner, even if on account of the latter's absence they cannot take place here and now. The reason is that the delectation regards acts licit for spouses (St. Alphonsus, V, 25). Nevertheless, if the delectation takes place with a rather grave venereal commotion, danger of pollution will easily be present. If it takes place with a light commotion and danger of pollution is absent, an act of this kind, as by its nature regarding the partner, perhaps to be equated with mutual incomplete acts, and therefore seems licit (St. Alphonsus, V, 25).

Corollary II. With St. Alphonsus and others, though several contradict it, it seems it must be said that it is illicit for widows to be morosely delighted concerning intercourse had, and for betrothed persons concerning future intercourse. The reason is that in the case the object of the delectation is not intercourse had or future as such - for as such it is the object of joy or desire - but intercourse had objectively, or taken in itself. But all intercourse for widows and betrothed persons is intrinsically evil. Therefore the object of the delectation of which we speak is evil, and consequently the voluntary delectation itself concerning it is also evil (St. Alphonsus, V, 24). Those who think that the aforesaid delectation is licit in itself nevertheless warn that by accident it easily becomes sinful, on account of the danger both of exciting venereal commotions and of consenting to them.

Nevertheless, it is licit for betrothed persons to rejoice over the fact that intercourse will be licit; likewise to desire it or to have the will of exercising it after marriage has been entered, because the intercourse then to be had is good, and therefore the object of such desire is good (St. Alphonsus, V, 24).

Corollary III. It is licit to be morosely delighted concerning an act licit in itself and prohibited only by positive law, for example, concerning the eating of meat on a day of abstinence, provided the delectation is not concerning the act as prohibited. The reason is that in the case the delectation is concerning the eating of meats taken objectively. But the eating of meats taken objectively is good, and therefore the object of delectation is good (St. Alphonsus, V, 27).

Corollary IV. It is licit to be morosely delighted concerning the manner, for example, the dexterity or industry by which an evil act was perpetrated, provided nevertheless that the manner is not evil in itself. Hence "without sin fables, comedies, wars, homicides, frauds, thefts, the fall of a man, for example from a horse, etc., often delight us, not according to themselves, but the manner of stealing, the unexpected manner of falling" (St. Alphonsus, V, 18).

Corollary V. Knowledge, or habitual cognition, of lustful acts is not evil in itself, because in itself it does not involve an affection of the will toward the acts themselves; indeed it can be joined with the greatest aversion from acts of this kind. Likewise and for the same reason, thought about a lustful act is not evil in itself; nor consequently is morose delectation concerning the knowledge or thought of a lustful act evil in itself, namely because the very object of such delectation is not evil (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, V, 17). Nevertheless, thoughts and delectations of this kind can become evil, and very often do become evil, by reason of the danger either of exciting venereal motions or pollution, or of being morosely delighted concerning the evil act which is thought about. Hence St. Alphonsus, cited place: "Thought can be good if there is a just cause for thinking, for example, for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes even be gravely evil if there is proximate danger of consent."

Besides, in this matter the descent is easy from delectation of the thought to delectation of the thing thought about, especially if it is a useless and vain thought; hence one who dwells long upon it exposes himself to danger.¹

When it is doubted whether the delectation was concerning the thought itself or concerning the thing thought about: if the thought with delectation frequently thrusts itself in without necessity or utility, it is a sign that the delectation is concerning the thing thought about, because frequency of thought of this kind without necessity or utility seems to arise from a depraved inclination of affection toward the things themselves. But if such a thought is not importunate, but follows the judgment and moderation of reason, it is a sign that the delectation is only concerning the thought itself.²

Corollary VI. Thought and morose delectation concerning an object which, if, for example, it were seen or touched, is apt to excite venereal motions, for example, concerning an obscene part of the body which someone represents to himself, are not evil in themselves, because the object itself is not evil. Nevertheless they will easily become evil by reason of the danger annexed to such thought and delectation, for example, of exciting venereal motions, etc.; therefore apply the things said in Corollary V concerning thought about a lustful act and concerning morose delectation with respect to such thought.

¹ Billuart, De temperantia, diss. 6, art. 15, § I.

² Billuart, cited place.