Article II: On Consent in Delight, or on Morose Delight

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 6, 7, 8; De Veritate q. 15, a. 4.

452. Morose delight, which is nothing other than consent in delight concerning an evil object, is defined: simple love or voluntary complacency concerning an illicit object or work, exhibited by cognition as present, without desire of execution.

It is not directly concerned with the external work but with the work exhibited to us through imagination. For he who delights feigns to himself an act of sin as present (for example, the killing of an enemy, theft, fornication) and is complacent in that act represented to him as if he were executing it (for example, actually killing, stealing, or fornicating), yet without the will of executing it.

It is called delight, because mere thought about an evil thing is not sin (unless per accidens insofar as it includes danger of sinning and inclines to sin), but delight concerning an evil thing thought of is sin (a. 8). It is called morose, not because it requires a delay of time, for it can be perfected in one moment, but because deliberating reason, rather than repelling the delight, lingers about it insofar as the evil thing is pleasing and pleasant to man (a. 6, ad 3).

453. Principles. I. Morose delight is sin: for no one delights except concerning that which seems good to him and conformed to his nature; therefore he who delights concerning an evil thing has it as good for himself, and consequently his affection tends into an evil thing.

II. Morose delight is grave or light sin according to the object: if it occurs concerning an object venially evil it is venial; if concerning an object gravely prohibited, it is always mortal: for that someone deliberately wills that his affection be conformed to a work which of itself is mortal is mortal sin (a. 8; Prov. XV, 26; Wis. I, 3; Matt. XXIII, 27).

III. Morose delight, although it is less evil than the evil work itself (from which it is distinguished as an incomplete species from a complete one) or than the proposal of it, nevertheless, because it tends into the same object thought of, has malice of the same species as the work (to be declared in confession), provided and insofar as the work is thought of as delectable, or moves to delight. Namely, merely internal delight is morally of the same reason as delight actually perceived which arises from the work.

Thus delight concerning homicide, concerning adultery as adultery, concerning sodomy as sodomy, or concerning false testimony differs in species from delight concerning wounding, fornication, pollution, or lying.

Nevertheless, probably morose delight does not contract the malice of circumstances which reason indeed adverts to but from which it abstracts in the delight and about which the delight is not concerned, or by whose delectability the appetite is not moved. For delight tends into the object not as really existing, but insofar as it exists in the intellect, and consequently it does not tend into circumstances which reason does not represent as delectable and which are not the motive of delight.

Hence if someone delights concerning the homicide of a priest, not because he is a priest, or concerning theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, he does not contract the specific malice of sacrilege but only of homicide or theft; and if he delights concerning intercourse with a married woman, but not as married but as a beautiful woman, he does not contract the specific malice of adultery but only of fornication.

454. Corollaries. - Morose delight is only concerning an evil object or work. Hence:

a) Delight, not indeed concerning the evil thing thought of, but concerning the thought itself or concerning the mode in which the evil thing is done, is good, venially evil, or mortally evil, according as the thought itself or the mode itself is good, lightly evil, or gravely evil. Examples are: to delight concerning knowledge of the crimes of a penitent, concerning knowledge idly acquired or from curiosity, concerning knowledge of a secret or occult crime from detraction; or concerning a mode that is ingenious, skillful, subtle, wondrous, new, or laughable (as concerning the flexibility of a drunk man), concerning marital intercourse had outside the natural mode or position, concerning a mode against nature in sins of lust.

Thus licitly it occurs concerning obscene paintings and plays on account of the artistry; concerning the subtle or artful mode by which a thing was taken away; concerning the Attic salt with which a fictitious narration has been sprinkled; concerning singular or ingenious craftiness in fraud; concerning the eloquence of one detracting; concerning the dexterity of one fighting; concerning the fall of a man from a horse on account of laughable circumstances; concerning the mode in which little women quarrel among themselves or in which obscene deeds are narrated; concerning obscene statues because they are very artful; concerning lubricious spectacles because represented with great art; concerning a most beautiful or witty mode of narrating lubricious things.

b) Delight concerning an evil work, abstracting from the fact that it is evil, or concerning a materially evil work, is licit if the work is prohibited only by positive right, unless someone delights in it insofar as it is prohibited by law, for example, concerning the eating of meats on a forbidden day, concerning forgetfulness of matins, concerning omission of Mass: for this work in itself is not objectively intrinsically evil. On the contrary, it is illicit if the work is prohibited by right of nature, because then the work in itself is intrinsically evil, for example, concerning material fornication, involuntary homicide, pollution involuntarily procured, material perjury on account of liberation (cf. proposition 15 condemned by Innocent XI).

But since merely natural pollution, proceeding from nature alone relieving itself, is not materially evil, it is not sin on account of a good end to delight concerning it or even by a simple affection to desire it, yet not on account of pleasure.

c) Delight concerning an evil work on account of a good effect is evil, for example, concerning the killing of a father on account of inheritance, concerning omission of Mass on account of utility, concerning procured pollution on account of concupiscence quieted. But it is licit concerning only the good effect, or concerning the fact that the evil work had good effects, for example, concerning inheritance from homicide, concerning offspring from fornication, concerning the glory of martyrs, concerning the cessation of scandal from the killing of a seducer; or even concerning the evil of neighbor, not indeed as it is evil for him but insofar as it is a greater good for him or for others, with the order of charity observed, namely, so that the evil which is avoided outweighs or equals the evil of neighbor which pleases.

Thus, for example, concerning bodily evil on account of the good of the soul, concerning the infirmity of a neighbor so that he may be converted, concerning the evil of one on account of the common good, concerning the death of a persecutor of the Church or of an evildoer on account of the example of others. On the contrary, it is illicit to delight concerning the evil of neighbor on account of a lesser good, for example, concerning the death of a father on account of inheritance, as is clear from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI.

d) Delight concerning a work sometimes licit but illicit at the time of delight, if this is prohibited by positive right alone, ordinarily is not evil because positive law does not prohibit delight but only the work; for example, on a day of abstinence someone can delight concerning the eating of meats, yet not precisely as prohibited. But if the work is prohibited by right of nature, delight is evil if it occurs concerning the work absolutely and as present, for example, for the betrothed concerning intercourse now to be had; it will not be evil if it occurs under the condition of the time at which it will be licit, for example, concerning intercourse to be had in marriage.

But let it be noted that this last can occur if the delight is in the rational appetite, but not if it is in the sensitive appetite: for the rational appetite tends into the object proposed by reason, but reason can propose it under a condition concerning the future or the past, and thus abstracted from malice. On the contrary, the sensitive appetite tends into the object proposed by the internal senses, but sense proposes it without any condition or abstraction from malice, and therefore absolutely as present and as it is in itself; whence delight is borne into the object not as it is under a condition but as it is in itself, and consequently as it is absolutely evil in the present. Therefore sensible delight had here and now concerning hatred and revenge legitimate at another time would be evil; not so spiritual delight, or delight of the will, which can be under the condition of injury inflicted.

Hence for practice: 1) by the rational appetite, but not by the carnal, the betrothed can delight concerning future intercourse and desire it; likewise widowed persons can delight and rejoice concerning past intercourse; likewise a spouse who has made a vow of chastity while the other has not;

2. but for other unmarried persons, although the same is not illicit of itself, ordinarily it is illicit per accidens, because it will not occur without movements of concupiscence which they cannot excite and for permitting which they can have no reason;

3. on the contrary, spouses, even when the consort is absent, can delight carnally concerning intercourse had or to be had (provided it is not done principally on account of delight but on account of an honorable end and danger of pollution is not present), because here and now intercourse is licit for them, although per accidens it is impossible.

455. Observations. - A. Let it be noted that all the delights concerning which we have spoken in the preceding number are to be avoided in practice, both because they are often idle and therefore venial sins, and because they are very dangerous, especially when there is question of matters of lust or revenge, because a transition easily occurs to delight concerning the evil work itself.

B. The following conjectural criteria are listed for discerning whether delight was concerning the thought alone or mode, or concerning the evil thing itself:

a) The affection or good intention of the agent. For if someone from a good motive and sincere intention studies or speaks about evil things (for example, a confessor, physician, artist, etc.), delight can be presumed to be concerning the thought and not concerning the thing itself thought of; on the contrary, if delight arose from a vicious affection, from excessively curious and useless reading or consideration.

b) The occasion from which the delight arises. If it arises on account of study, confession, preaching, etc., it can be presumed that the delight is concerning the thought; on the contrary, if it proceeds from a base occasion, such as vengeance taken or sin perpetrated.

c) The habitual inclination of the agent. If someone habitually inclines and sins rather often, for example, in matters of lust, then his thoughts are presumed no longer merely theoretical, but concerning the depraved things themselves; on the contrary, in a God-fearing man.

d) The moderation or vehemence of the delight. If the thought (or mode) delights equally in licit and illicit things, it is a sign that the delight is not concerning the evil thing; on the contrary, if it is such as is perceived from the base thing itself when it is present, say with a similar commotion of appetite, it is an indication that the delight is not concerning cognition (or mode) alone, but also concerning the thing itself.

e) Sufficient cause. For if someone without any cause or from mere curiosity delights concerning the mode in which an evil thing was done or represented, it is sin (at least venial); but if he does this because he is bound to attend to such things, it is not sin.

1. Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologico-morale, vol. I, n. 538 sq.; Theologia Mechliniensis, Moralis generalis, n. 148, q. 2; and Prummer, Theologia Moralis I, n. 398, who adds: "Already the old authors, such as Castropalaus and the Salmanticenses, observed (and priests themselves should keep this before their eyes), that those are convicted of being latently carried by delight of the flesh who frequently and more willingly speak about hidden parts of the body, about illnesses, clothing, and other things pertaining to these, and easily break out into uncomposed laughter. Whence a priest who is a lover of chastity, when he either unwillingly hears these things or for a just cause utters them, ought to offer no sign of gladness, but preserve serenity and gravity of countenance in all things."

C. Just as delight concerning an evil thing is evil, so in the same mode sadness concerning a good thing: the latter truly hates good just as the former loves evil. Hence:

1. Sadness concerning a good which is prescribed under grave matter is grave sin.

2. Sadness concerning a good which is prescribed under light matter is light sin.

3. Sadness concerning a good which according to itself is not prescribed, e.g., concerning a vow emitted or to be emitted, concerning the priesthood received or to be received, does not exceed light matter, provided the will of fulfilling the obligation contracted is retained. Whether it is a light sin or no sin depends on the motive on account of which someone is saddened, namely, whether it is reasonable or not; ordinarily, however, once the work has been chosen, sadness of this kind lacks a reasonable motive.

4. Sadness not concerning the good work itself, but concerning only the circumstances of a good action, e.g., concerning inconvenience and labor, is not sin.

2. Noldin, Theologia Moralis I, n. 335.