I. On Morose Pleasure

I. Notion. Morose pleasure¹ is the free complacency of the will concerning an evil act objectively considered. It is called:

1. Complacency, that is, rest in some object.

2. Of the will, that is, of the rational appetite. And so, strictly speaking, there is no question of the complacency of the sensitive appetite, but of the consent of the will in the complacency of the sensitive appetite. For the will is not immediately delighted by a sensible object, but mediately, that is, through the sensitive appetite (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, aa. 6 and 8).

3. Free, that is, to which the will, after advertence of the intellect to the malice of the act, assents.

4. Concerning an evil act objectively considered, without addition. Hence the object of morose pleasure, as we have already intimated, is not an evil act as future or to be committed, nor as past or committed, nor as present or being committed here and now; nor is its object the thought about an evil act; nor even the evil act thought about, although the thought is the condition without which the will cannot be borne toward the evil act, or the operation by which the evil act is presented to the will. The object of morose pleasure is the evil act itself objectively considered. "One thing, therefore," says St. Alphonsus, "is pleasure concerning an evil work, so that the evil work is the object of the pleasure, which is always evil. Another is pleasure concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the very thought about the work, is of itself the object of the pleasure" (V, 17).

¹ It is called morose not from a delay of time, but from the delay or lingering of the will, which can take place in an instant.

II. Morality.

1. Morose pleasure concerning an act which is opposed to chastity is evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil according as it regards an act gravely or lightly unlawful. The reason is that, as is clear from the notion handed down, it involves an affection of the will toward an evil act. But an affection of the will toward an evil act is evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil according as it regards an act gravely or lightly unlawful (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8; St. Alphonsus V, 17). "But that," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "someone thinking about fornication is delighted in the very act thought about happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act; hence that someone consents in such pleasure is nothing else than that he consents in this, that his affection is inclined toward fornication: for no one is delighted except in that which is conformed to his appetite. But that someone by deliberation chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which according to themselves are mortal sins, is a mortal sin; hence such consent in the pleasure of mortal sin is a mortal sin."

2. Morose pleasure takes species:

a. From the object, considered according to its lowest species. Some indeed deny this, because a lustful affection seems to be general rather than special, that is, directed to venereal pleasure generally rather than to such an object. But the contrary seems altogether to be admitted, because the lowest species of the object, such as fornicatory or sodomitic intercourse, enters into the object of pleasure, and therefore specifies the affection of the will which is borne toward the object (cf. St. Alphonsus, Praxis confessarii, n. 39, 1). Here, however, note that immodest acts, for example the sight and touch of an obscene thing, do not differ in species according to themselves (n. 71).

b. From the circumstances of the subject. Hence one bound by a vow of chastity, if he is morosely delighted concerning an act of lust, also commits a sin against religion, and indeed personal sacrilege, at least if he is bound by a public vow; for a vow of chastity also excludes internal sins. Many affirm the same concerning the circumstance of marriage, because matrimonial fidelity also seems to forbid an affection toward sin with another woman.

c. From the circumstances of the object, if the pleasure is also concerned with those circumstances, because then the circumstance pertains to the object of pleasure. Otherwise, against others, it seems that this must be denied, because where pleasure concerning the circumstance is absent, that circumstance does not seem to enter into the object of pleasure. Hence if someone is morosely delighted concerning intercourse with a blood-relative or a married woman as such, he contracts the malice of incest or adultery; but not if he is delighted, as commonly happens, concerning intercourse with a blood-relative or a married woman as beautiful. Yet morose pleasure must be said to take species from a circumstance of the object if it induces the proximate danger of desiring the act, for example intercourse with a blood-relative (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). But in order that this malice be contracted, attention must be given to it; this commonly does not happen. Hence for the most part there is no obligation of declaring the aforesaid circumstances in confession or of asking about them.

Corollary I. It is lawful for spouses to be morosely delighted concerning intercourse or immodest acts with the partner, even if on account of that partner's absence they cannot take place here and now. The reason is that the pleasure regards acts lawful for spouses (St. Alphonsus V, 25). Nevertheless, if the pleasure occurs with graver venereal commotion, danger of pollution will easily be present. If it occurs with light commotion and the danger of pollution is absent, an act of this sort, as regarding the partner, is with sufficient probability by its nature ordered to intercourse, or is to be equated with incomplete mutual acts, and therefore seems lawful (St. Alphonsus V, n. 103).

Corollary II. With St. Alphonsus and others, although many contradict, it seems that one must say that it is unlawful for widowed persons to be morosely delighted concerning intercourse had, or for betrothed persons concerning future intercourse. The reason is that in the case the object of pleasure is not intercourse had or future intercourse as such - for as such it is the object of joy or desire - but intercourse had as objectively or in itself considered. But every intercourse objectively considered is intrinsically evil for widowed persons and betrothed persons. Therefore the object of the pleasure of which we are speaking is evil, and consequently the voluntary pleasure itself concerning it is also evil (St. Alphonsus V, 24). Those who judge that the aforesaid pleasure is lawful in itself nevertheless warn that it easily becomes sinful accidentally, on account of the danger both of exciting venereal commotions and of consenting to them.

It is lawful, however, for betrothed persons to rejoice in the fact that intercourse will be lawful, and likewise to desire it, or to have the will of exercising it after marriage has been entered, because the intercourse then to be had is good and therefore the object of such desire is good (St. Alphonsus V, 24).

Corollary III. It is lawful to be morosely delighted concerning an act lawful in itself and prohibited only by positive law, for example concerning the imaginary eating of meat on a day of abstinence, provided the pleasure is not concerning the act as prohibited. The reason is that in the case the pleasure concerns the eating of meat objectively considered. But the eating of meat objectively considered is good, and therefore the object of the pleasure is good (St. Alphonsus V, 27).

Corollary IV. It is lawful to be morosely delighted concerning the manner, for example concerning an ingenious metaphor by which obscene things are expressed (St. Alphonsus V, 18).

Corollary V. The knowledge or habitual cognition of lustful acts is not evil of itself, because of itself it does not involve an affection of the will toward those acts; indeed it can be joined with the greatest aversion from acts of that sort. Likewise and for the same reason, thought about a lustful act is not evil of itself; nor consequently is morose pleasure concerning knowledge or thought of a lustful act evil of itself, namely because the very object of pleasure of this sort is not evil (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8; St. Alphonsus V, 17). Nevertheless thoughts and pleasures of this sort can become evil, and very often do become evil, by reason of the danger either of exciting venereal motions or pollution, or of being morosely delighted concerning the evil act which is thought about. Hence St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.: "Thought can be good if there is a just cause for thinking, for example for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes even be gravely evil if there is proximate danger of consent." Besides, in this matter the descent is easy from pleasure in the thought to pleasure in the thing thought about, especially if it is a useless and vain thought; hence one who lingers over it for a long time exposes himself to danger.¹

When it is doubted whether the pleasure was concerning the thought itself or concerning the thing thought about: if the thought with pleasure frequently intrudes itself without necessity or usefulness, this is a sign that the pleasure is concerning the thing thought about, because frequency of thought of this sort without necessity or usefulness seems to arise from a depraved inclination of affection toward the things themselves. But if such thought is not importunate, but follows the judgment and moderation of reason, it is a sign that the pleasure is only concerning the thought itself.²

Corollary VI. Thought and morose pleasure concerning an object which, if it were seen or touched, would be apt to excite venereal motions, for example concerning an obscene part of the body which someone represents to himself, are not evil of themselves, because the object itself is not evil. Nevertheless they easily become evil by reason of the danger annexed to such thought and pleasure, for example of exciting venereal motions, etc.; wherefore apply what was said in corollary V about thought of a lustful act and about morose pleasure with respect to such thought.³

¹ Billuart, De temperantia, diss. 6, art. 15, § 1.

² Billuart, loc. cit.

³ Cf. Duynstee, De leer der kuischheid, p. 136.

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