Religious Poverty

Poverty in general is the want of temporal goods that have a money value. It is not a virtue of itself, but rather a physical defect, for a suitable provision of temporal goods is very useful and necessary for men to lead a decent life. Poor human nature, however, is inclined to attach itself too much to wealth, and for the sake of wealth to forget why man was created by God and placed in this world. Jesus Christ taught that detachment from worldly possessions was a necessary condition for being his disciple: “‘ Every one of you that doth not renounce all that he possesseth, cannot be my disciple.”¹ And for such as were not content to follow him in the ordinary way of the observance of the Commandments, but aimed at perfection, he proposed not only detachment from wealth or spiritual poverty, but actual poverty, the actual renunciation of wealth for his sake in order to imitate him more closely: “ If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me.² Hence voluntary poverty in imitation of Jesus Christ is the foundation of the religious state. Voluntary poverty, however, does not constitute the essence of religious perfection; all Christian perfection consists in charity, to which poverty is but a means. Hence there is not an absolute and uniform standard of religious poverty, but it varies with the different ends which religious orders propose to themselves. Indeed, religious poverty is personal; it is the voluntary renunciation of personal and individual wealth, so that the love of wealth may not be an obstacle to the perfect following of Christ. Its essence consists in the renunciation of personal and independent ownership and use of property, for this it is which constitutes a snare for men’s affections and a hindrance to perfection, So that religious poverty does not of itself prevent property being owned in common by religious, and if the end for which an order was founded requires it, there is nothing to prevent it having large possessions in common, provided that the individual religious practises poverty and is imbued with its spirit.

The effects of the vow of poverty depend to a great extent on the rules and constitutions of the various religious orders and on the positive law of the Church. The chief distinction is that between solemn and simple vows of poverty, due to positive ecclesiastical law. The legal effects of a solemn vow of poverty are to render the religious incapable of individual and personal ownership of any property that has money value. So that after taking a solemn vow of poverty the religious cannot own any property in his own personal right. As a member of a religious community he may be a joint owner of vast possessiens, but individually he is incapable of having anything as his own.

Ownership may be absolute or qualified. Absolute ownership is the moral right to dispose of property and of all its uses for one’s own advantage. Qualified ownership is the right to dispose of the property or of its uses for one’s own advantage. Divines call the qualified ownership of the thing itself direct ownership, and the qualified ownership of its uses they call indirect ownership. A religious, even though solemnly professed, retains his personal rights to life, good name, and honour; he can still dispose of his personal actions, such as the celebration of Mass, and such personal rights as that of presenting to a benefice; he may own a relic and dispose of it by gift, for it has no money value. As a solemnly professed religious is incapable of owning property in his own right, so he cannot acquire it for himself; whatever he gains by his labour, or whatever comes to him by gift or inheritance, becomes the property of the community to which he belongs; “ whatever a monk acquires he acquires not for himself, but for his monastery,” as the old adage had it. By the special constitutions of their respective orders, Capuchins, Observantines, and professed Jesuits cannot take property, even in the name and for the benefit of the community to which they belong, if it come to them by any hereditary title or by operation of law. They may, however, take gifts and legacies, and these become the property of their communities (Can. 582).

The simple vow of poverty does not deprive the religious of the direct, but of the indirect, ownership of property; so that he cannot lawfully use or dispose of anything that has a money value without the leave of his superior. Notwithstanding, then, the simple vow of poverty, religious retain the direct ownership of all the property that they had before profession, and of all that comes to them afterwards by any legal title or gift.

Several Canons of the new Code affect the matter of religious poverty. By Canon 568, if during the novitiate a novice in any way whatever renounces his benefices or his property or encumbers them, such a renunciation or encumbrance is not only illicit but also null and void.

Canon 569 prescribes: Sec. i. Before the profession of simple vows, whether temporary or perpetual, the novice must cede, for the whole period during which he will be bound by simple vows, the administration of his property to whomsoever he wishes, and dispose freely of its use.and usufruct, unless the constitutions determine otherwise.

Sec. ii. If the novice, because he possessed no property, omitted to make this cession, and if subsequently property come into his possession, or if, after making the provision, he becomes under whatever title the possessor of other property, he must make provision, according to the regulations of Sec. i, for the newly acquired property, even if he has already made simple profession.

Sec. iii. In every religious congregation the novice, before making profession of temporary vows, shall freely make a will of all the property he actually possesses or may subsequently possess, While safeguarding this latter canon, Canon 580 prescribes that all those who have made profession of simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless the constitutions declare otherwise, retain the ownership of their property and the capacity to acquire other property. But whatever the religious acquires by his own industry or in respect of his institute, belongs to the institute.

As regards the cession or disposition of property treated of in Canon 569, sec. 2, the professed religious can modify the arrangement, not, however, of his own free choice unless the constitutions allow it, but with the permission of the Superior General, or, in the case of nuns, of the local Ordinary, as well as with that of the Regular Superior if the monastery be subject to regulars; the modification, however, must not be made, at least for any considerable part of the property, in favour of the institute; in the case of withdrawal from the institute this cession and disposition ceases to have effect.

Except within sixty days preceding the solemn profession, the professed of simple vows cannot validly renounce his property, but within this time, he must, saving special indults from the Holy See, renounce in favour of whomsoever he wishes all the property which he actually possesses on condition of his profession subsequently taking place. 47 The profession having been made, the necessary measures must be immediately taken to insure that the renunciation be effective also according to the civil law (Can. 581).

‘After profession of solemn vows, likewise without prejudice to special indults of the Apostolic See, all the property which comes in whatever manner to a regular— (1) In an order capable of ownership, goes to the order, to the province, or to the house, according to the constitutions: (2) In an order incapable of ownership, such as the Capuchins, it becomes the property of the Holy See (Can. 582).

Those who have made profession of simple vows in any religious congregation: (1) May not abdicate gratuitously the dominion over their property per actum inter vivos. This phrase is technical, and signifies any way of disposing of property except by will. So that after profession of simple vows the professed cannot lawfully make a gift of his property to anyone.

(2) May not alter the will made according to the terms of Canon 569, sec. 3, without the permission of the Holy See, or if the case be urgent and time does not admit of recourse to the Holy See, without the permission of the higher superior, or, if recourse cannot be had to him either, without the permission of the local superior (Can. 583).

Within the limits indicated above, a religious, with the leave of his superior, may lawfully use and dispose of property. In order to justify such use and to excuse it from sin against the vow, the presumed leave of the superior is sufficient, which consists in a reasonably founded judgement that the act contemplated is not against the superior’s wish. Much more will the actual, virtual, or tacit leave of the superior excuse an act of ownership on the part of a religious and prevent it from being a violation of the vow.

¹ Luke xiv 33.

² Matt. xix 21.

Sins against poverty are grievous if the matter be considerable. The measure as to what matter is considerable is the same here as in theft, for just as the sin of theft consists in taking away the property of another against his reasonable wish, so a sin against religious poverty consists in the use, disposal, or acceptance of property contrary to one’s promise to God and the wish of religious superiors. The absolute sum which is necessary and sufficient for a mortal sin against the vow in all cases will be one pound sterling, and less will be sufficient if the community whose property is used or disposed of without leave is poor. Divines, however, allow that a moderately rich monastery may be considered in this matter as equivalent to an absolutely rich individual proprietor.

In some orders it was customary for the religious to have money, books, eatables, for their own use, and such allowance was called the peculium of the religious. Such a practice is against the purity of religious poverty, and it was forbidden by the Council of Trent, as well as by several Roman Pontiffs. Indeed, if it was understood that subjects had the right to use and dispose of the peculium as they pleased, in perfect independence of the will of their superior, it would be against In many orders the the very essence of religious poverty. custom is still sanctioned of having a peculium in more or less dependence on the will of the superior.

It is not against poverty to administer money in the name of another, for such administration is not an act of ownership. A religious may, then, act as the almoner of another, but he must not distribute alms in his own name as if the money were his own. To keep a deposit of money with the obligation in justice of accounting for it is against religious poverty.

We shall set forth in brief summary the things which are more abundantly explained in the treatise on Religious.

I. Religious solemnly professed. 1. In the individual, per se, they are incapable of ownership; they can, however, dependently on Superiors, use the goods of the community. I said per se, because religious of both sexes solemnly professed in Belgium and in Holland have received the faculty that, with due dependence on legitimate Superiors, they can, at least civilly, acquire, retain, administer, and dispose for pious and honest uses of goods which have come to them.¹ I said at least civilly, because the decrees are explained in a twofold way: either so that they become proprietors only civilly, or so that they become proprietors also naturally and before God.

One professed of simple vows who is about to emit solemn profession must, within sixty days before solemn profession - he cannot validly do so before - with special indults granted by the Holy See being saved, renounce all goods which he actually has, to whomever he shall prefer, under the condition that profession will follow (can. 581, § 1). Once profession has followed, all those things must immediately be done which are necessary so that the renunciation also obtains its effect in civil law (can. 581, § 2). As regards goods that will come to him after solemn profession, see what is to be said below.

2. Religious solemnly professed can have ownership in common both of immovable and of movable goods, except the Franciscans of the stricter observance and the Capuchins, who cannot have ownership of immovable goods, and have only the use of fact of movable goods, dependent on the Apostolic See, which has ownership of those goods. The Fathers of the Society of Jesus, for professed houses, and the Discalced Carmelites do not enjoy ownership of immovable goods, but do enjoy ownership of movable goods. Therefore:

a) If the Order is altogether incapable of possessing, all goods which after profession come in any way to a regular are acquired for the Holy See in ownership (can. 582, 2°).

b) If the Order is not altogether incapable of possessing, the said goods, insofar as they can be possessed in common, fall to the Order, or to the province, or to the house, according to the constitutions; otherwise they are acquired for the Apostolic See (can. cited).

¹ Sacred Penitentiary, December 1, 1820, and Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, July 31, 1848.

II. Religious simply professed. 1. Any professed of simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless something else is provided in the constitutions, preserves ownership of his goods and the capacity of acquiring other goods. Whatever, however, he acquires by his own industry or in view of the religious institute, he acquires for the religious institute (can. 581, §§ 1 and 2).

2. It is not permitted to those professed of simple vows in a religious Congregation, by an act inter vivos, to abdicate ownership of their goods by a gratuitous title (can. 583, § 1).

III. Novices. 1. If a novice, in the course of the novitiate, renounces his benefices or goods in any way, or obligates them, the renunciation or obligation is not only illicit, but void by the law itself (can. 568).

2. Before profession of simple vows, whether temporary or perpetual, a novice must, for the whole time during which he will be bound by simple vows, cede the administration of his goods to whomever he shall prefer, and, unless the constitutions provide otherwise, freely dispose of their use and usufruct. This cession and disposition, if it has been omitted because of a lack of goods and these afterward supervene, or if it has been made and afterward other goods by any title come to him, must be made or repeated according to the norms established in § 1, notwithstanding the simple profession emitted (can. 569, §§ 1 and 2).

3. A professed religious can change the cession or disposition that has been made, not indeed by his own judgment, unless the constitutions allow this, but with the permission of the supreme Moderator; or, if it is a question of nuns, with the permission of the Ordinary of the place, and, if the monastery is subject to regulars, of the regular Superior, provided that the change, at least concerning a notable part of the goods, is not made in favor of the religious institute. But by departure from the religious institute a cession and disposition of this kind ceases to have force (can. 580, § 3).

4. A novice in a religious Congregation, before profession of temporary vows, should freely make a testament concerning goods present or perhaps to come (can. 569, § 3). It is not permitted to change a testament made without the permission of the Holy See, or, if the matter is urgent and there is not time to have recourse to it, without the permission of the major superior, or, if even he cannot be approached, of the local superior (can. 583, 2°).

I. Notion. The vow of poverty is a promise made to God concerning a certain constant repudiation of temporal goods for the sake of following poor Christ. It is said to concern a certain repudiation, inasmuch as it restricts in some way either the ownership itself of goods or acts concerning it.

The remote material object generally consists of external temporal or material goods, capable of being valued by price. I said generally, because the material object can at least by use or by law be extended or restricted, according as there is or is not present a danger of harming the spirit or vow of poverty. The proximate material object consists of certain acts concerning those goods which involve a certain repudiation, such as acts of not having them as one's own, dependent use of them, dependent administration of one's own goods, and so forth.

The remote formal object is the perfect following of poor Christ for obtaining perfection; the proximate formal object is the very honesty which shines forth in following Christ exercised for that end.

Corollary I. For the essence of the vow of poverty there is required at least the abdication of independent beneficial ownership.

Corollary II. The vow and the virtue of poverty differ in this, that the vow excludes independent acts concerning temporal goods, whereas the virtue excludes affection of heart toward them.

II. Fuller exposition of the notion. Two things especially need development, namely the remote and the proximate material object.

1. The remote material object. To it there do not belong: 1st, internal things, such as liberty; 2nd, spiritual things, both supernatural, such as Mass and indulgence, and natural and intermediate things, such as integrity of honor, the right of good reputation, nobility, the right of election, presentation, and collation of benefices; 3rd, material things not capable of being valued by price, that is, things either of no value or of inestimable value, because they are consequently or intrinsically joined to a spiritual thing, for example a benefice; 4th, things which by use or by law are equated with the foregoing (St. Alphonsus IV, 14).

Corollary I. The application of a Mass as such is not against the vow of poverty, for instance if someone celebrates Mass for an intention other than the one prescribed; it can, however, be against obedience. Nevertheless the stipend is for the monastery (cf. can. 580, § 2 and 594, § 2). Nor is it against the vow of poverty to ask for intentions, or to dispose freely concerning them; intentions can also be given to another without injury to poverty. Superiors, however, can interpose their prohibition; for in the decree of 3 May 1914 it was asked whether religious superiors can command their subjects, even in virtue of holy obedience, that they celebrate according to the intention prescribed by the constitutions or determined by those superiors themselves, with the exceptions sanctioned by the constitutions or by legitimate custom preserved. The response was: Affirmatively.

Corollary II. Knowledge is an internal good; it is the fruit of the intellect and, as it were, part of it. One can dispose of his knowledge by a gratuitous title, but not by an onerous title. This would be against poverty. Then it becomes, as it were, an external thing capable of being valued by price.

Corollary III. Relics are exempt from the vow of poverty. By reason of their sacred character they are placed outside commerce, although otherwise they may have great value, for example manuscripts of the Saints. Relics which are not from bones are sacred first and principally from the use of the Church; hence if, apart from the use of the Church, they do not receive a certain veneration, they can as such be the object of the vow of poverty; for example, a manuscript of St. Thomas is rather preserved in museums.

Corollary IV. Reliquaries, as things antecedently annexed to spiritual things, are in themselves capable of valuation by price and are not prohibited from being sold, and thus they are the object of poverty. By use, however, they are usually excepted, provided they are of moderate price. Hence a contrary use can also exist in some Order. Finally, the use is reasonable, for the accessory follows the principal.

Corollary V. Devotional objects, such as images, medals, rosaries, and crosses, are not matter of the vow only by use; and the use perhaps only argues a tacit license of the Superior, not that they are no longer the object of the vow.

Corollary VI. Manuscripts. A religious has full ownership of any manuscripts whatsoever that have no sale value, because they are not things capable of being valued by price, and therefore are not matter of the vow. Likewise he can have full ownership, or at least unlimited use, of manuscripts of some value, and indeed from custom or the tacit consent of Superiors. Nevertheless custom or tacit consent does not support a religious if there is question: 1st, of manuscripts drawn up by command of the Superior for the good of the Order; 2nd, of manuscripts drawn up after profession, to be given away or alienated, at least if this is done for the purpose that they be published;¹ 3rd, of manuscripts for which the Superior, custom, or rule determines otherwise, as perhaps with regard to very precious manuscripts.

Note. The use of these rights over manuscripts, whether salable or not, always remains matter of obedience, and indeed, as it seems, of a certain high ownership.

Corollary VII. Lithographic notes, or notes made in a similar artificial way, even those written by machine, and indeed also those privately printed in type, seem to be equated with manuscripts, and this both from use, and from the fact that they often lack price, and from the fact that, if you except those printed by type or by machine, they are really manuscripts, although multiplied artificially.

Corollary VIII. Works made by art, for example paintings and sculptures composed by a religious, are the object of the vow of poverty, inasmuch as ownership of them cannot be retained by the religious himself; but they belong either to the monastery or to the one who supplied the materials.

St. Alphonsus says concerning a choir religious: "If panels, canvas, colors, etc., are handed over to him by the monastery, then the paintings belong to the monastery; otherwise, if those things are furnished by others" (IV, 14). Concerning lay brothers he says that those works belong to the monastery, because such lay brothers are received only for this, that they exercise external arts; an exception is made if the lay brother makes them on a feast day or by working for one or another hour in the day; in that case they belong to the one who supplied the materials (loc. cit.).

¹ Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, 2 June 1911; 13 July 1913; Ned. Kath. Stemmen, 1913, p. 290.

2. The proximate material object consists: 1st, in dependent use of things; 2nd, in dependent administration of one's own goods; 3rd, in the exclusion of the use of superfluous things, with regard being had to the character of the religion.

a) Dependent use of things, namely on the license of Superiors. Now:

a) License is a faculty granted to a subject for doing something. It is especially divided into express, tacit, and presumed. Tacit license is that which is granted only by an internal act, but truly; hence it should not be confused with mere toleration for avoiding a greater evil¹ (St. Alphonsus IV, 17). Presumed license exists if the Prelate is supposed to be going to grant the license if he were asked.

b) License is granted either by the rule, or by legitimate custom, or by a designated Superior.

c) In order that license be valid, it must be: 1st, voluntary, and therefore not extorted from the Prelate by force; 2nd, obtained without obreption or subreption. In order that the license also be licit, it must be granted for a just cause of necessity or utility. But it is disputed whether a license given for illicit uses, or uses superfluous when the character of the religion and the circumstances are considered, is valid. Now it seems it must be denied, because "the Superior is not the owner, nor does he have any faculty over the goods of the monastery except insofar as the canons and the religion grant it to him. But neither the sacred canons nor the religion can be said to grant him the faculty of giving license for illicit or superfluous uses: not the sacred canons, since the contrary is drawn from them; not the religion, which is never considered to grant that for the spiritual destruction of its children" (St. Alphonsus IV, 30; cf. also n. 31).

d) Tacit license suffices whenever express license is not expressly required. Let these be examples: 1st, "If the prelate knows that a subject receives, retains, or spends something, and does not prohibit it although he easily could, he seems tacitly to consent and approve.... 2nd, if in some religion there is in force a custom of receiving or spending certain things without license, that is excused by the tacit license of the prelate, who by tolerating it reasonably declares the custom; if the prelate gives to a subject, or permits to be given to him, images, rosaries, etc., knowing that he does not need all of them for his own use, he is considered tacitly to grant the faculty of giving them to others" (St. Alphonsus IV, 17). Yet generally you should observe that "not always are the things which are done under the eyes of the prelate to be considered tacitly approved by him; for very often Superiors are reluctantly compelled to tolerate many things which they see done against their will" (St. Alphonsus IV, 18, at the end).

e) Presumed license suffices for saving the vow. The reason is that, according to the notion handed down, in the case of that license the Superior is not considered unwilling as to the substance, as it is said, and therefore the thing is not disposed of wholly without dependence on the will of the Superior. It also suffices for saving the discipline of the rules, if express license cannot be obtained in time; otherwise if it can be acquired in time, because then the superior and the rule require the petition for license, so that, if this is neglected, the authority would be unwilling as to the manner, as it is customarily said (St. Alphonsus IV, 18).

Moreover, note: 1st, "If, however, the things are of great importance, with regard to them presumed license does not support him; otherwise occasion would be given for receiving and retaining things even of greater importance without express license: which would yield grave detriment to religious poverty" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Therefore "they, that is, Superiors, are in such cases to be presumed unwilling even as to the substance"; 2nd, "it must be observed that licenses are not easily to be presumed unless there is certainty, or at least certain probability, about their concession... and one must take the greatest care lest things be presumed which ought not to be presumed" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

¹ License which is virtually or implicitly contained in some express act, for example license to undertake a journey contains license for those things which are necessary for the journey, is counted by some as tacit, by others as express.

b) Dependent administration of one's own goods, namely on the license of Superiors. Now administration in the broad sense is any juridical act concerning temporal things. In the strict sense it is a complex of actions by which temporal things are preserved and so handled that they become fruitful. It is twofold, according as it is done in one's own name or in another's name.

c) Exclusion of the use of superfluous things. The use of superfluous things, namely with regard being had to the character of the religion, seems to be excluded by common law itself, and not only by the particular law of many religions. This is first suggested by can. 594, § 3: The furnishings of religious should befit the poverty which they have professed. Then the vow of poverty excludes those things which are repugnant to the state of poverty which religious have chosen; but the use of superfluous things is repugnant to the said state.¹ (St. Alphonsus IV, 29, 30).

Corollary I. A religious sins against the vow of poverty: 1st, "if, at home or outside, even from those things which pertain to food and clothing, he receives, retains, consumes, exchanges, gives to another, or lends anything without the express, tacit, or presumed consent of the superior or rule" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.); likewise if without license he eats or drinks at home or among externs,² because a religious has abdicated every independent use; 2nd, if he expends for another use anything from the things conceded to his use, or culpably loses or destroys it by broad fault. The reason is that in those things he has only use of fact, and that precariously, so long as it will seem good to the superior, and it is an act of ownership to be able to destroy a thing at one's own judgment (St. Alphonsus IV, 19); 3rd, "if you hide anything, so that you withdraw it from the free disposition of the superior. Nor can procurators, stewards, administrators, or lower prelates spend anything contrary to what the rule of the order, the will of the superiors, or custom demands. The reason is that they are not owners of the common goods, but only administrators" (St. Alphonsus IV, 28); 4th, a religious sins "if, while traveling, he turns aside to other places outside the direct route in order to see curious things; unless perhaps the expenses are moderate, and in an unforeseen case the license of the Superior can certainly be presumed. The same must be said if without faculty from the superior he buys anything, even for the Community";³ 5th, a professed religious of simple vows sins if he acquires ownership or disposes of his own goods entirely by his own authority and will, and not according to the Rule and the will of the Superior, because the vow of religious poverty altogether requires abdication of the proprietorial use and disposition of all goods.⁴

Corollary II. A religious does not sin: 1st, if without express license he makes "remuneratory donations from goods conceded to him for use, because such donations are, as it were, payments of a debt. Indeed he can give more than he received, up to an excess of a fourth part; because gratitude demands that more always be returned than was received" (St. Alphonsus IV, 21); 2nd, if he accepts or gives something under the condition of license to be obtained, provided the thing can be recovered if license is denied, because then the act is suspended.⁵

Corollary III. One who has proceeded from presumed license is afterwards bound to disclose the thing to the Superior, if he still retains the thing, and the Superior is unwilling at least either as to the substance or as to the manner (St. Alphonsus IV, loc. cit.).

Corollary IV. One who acts against a license, even one unduly denied, sins against the vow, "unless there is danger of grave harm in the delay; for then the consent of a major superior is presumed to be present; and if he also then denies license, it can sometimes be prudently judged that the law or vow does not oblige in so great a crisis" (St. Alphonsus IV, 33; cf. St. Thomas I-II, q. 96, a. 6).

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, session 25, chapter 2, on regulars.

² This, however, is not admitted by Lugo (De iustitia, disp. 2, n. 5) and by others; nor should it be extended to those things which do not involve use of a thing as this is commonly understood. Hence I agree with Lugo teaching that it is not against the vow of poverty, for example, if a secular person lights a fire for warming a religious, if he burns some precious perfume to refresh his smell, or if he shows him some spectacle whose viewing is otherwise worthy of a price.

³ Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis I, n. 1193.

⁴ Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis I, n. 1193.

⁵ Aertnys-Damen, loc. cit.

3. Doubts and responses. a) A religious can ask for, accept, and refuse gifts as follows. It is not licit to ask for the community except within the limits of the rule and ecclesiastical laws. This, however, does not seem of itself to pertain to the vow (cf. can. 621 sq.). It is not licit to ask for himself, except within the limits of the rule. 2nd, it is licit to accept things spontaneously offered for the community; for oneself, as was said above. 3rd, it is not licit to refuse what is owed to the community; and this is both against the vow and against justice. To refuse what is offered to the community beyond what is owed is not against the vow, but can be against charity. It is licit for a religious to refuse things offered for himself alone; indeed there is an obligation to do so, unless the rule permits an increase of the substance of his own goods, or the religious declares that they are acquired for the community.

b) A religious seems to sin against the vow by accepting money without license to be spent at his discretion on pious works. The reason is that the arbitrary choice of the pious work involves something of independent disposition. Nor should you say that the choice is made in another's name; since the choice, as one which after the faculty of choosing has been given can no longer be contradicted, is made in one's own name (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 13, n. 7; letter of 3 Oct. 1757).

The same seems to be said if a religious without license accepts money to be distributed at his discretion among indeterminate poor persons, because the arbitrary choice of the poor person also involves something of independent disposition. St. Alphonsus indeed, loc. cit., speaks only of money to be distributed at discretion among pious works; but the same formal reason alleged by him subsists in each case.

If there is question of determinate poor persons, to distribute money or goods without the license of Superiors is not against the vow, since the distributor acts as a bare minister. Superiors, however, if a just cause is present, can prohibit that. But that someone gives counsel, or directs someone's attention to a certain poor family, cannot be disapproved.

But if gifts are offered "for your poor," as it is said, it depends on the circumstances whether by this word penitents wish to designate determinate poor persons, that is, exclusively the poor for whom that Father has care, or rather more indeterminate poor persons, that is, the poor whom the monastery is accustomed to assist. In the latter case, the subject cannot without license spend gifts on poor persons, as indeterminate; and the same seems to be said of the former case, because a certain arbitrary disposition is left.

c) A religious can accept another's thing on deposit without license as follows. 1st, if there is question of a deposit properly so called, or under a contract that obliges the religious himself or indirectly the monastery (cf. can. 536), it is against the vow. 2nd, if there is question of a deposit in the broad sense, or of mere custody of one's own or another's money, in general it can be said that the vow of poverty is not offended by it, unless it is expressly prohibited by the Rule from a motive of poverty.

III. Division. The vow of poverty is divided into solemn and simple.

1. The solemn vow. The solemn vow, or rather solemn profession, of itself renders a religious incapable of ownership, so that any act of property is invalid (can. 579). But goods which in any way come to one solemnly professed: 1st, in an order capable of possessing, accrue to the Order or province or house according to the constitutions; 2nd, in an Order incapable of possessing, are acquired in ownership for the Holy See (can. 582).

I said: "Solemn profession of itself renders a religious incapable of ownership"; for accidentally solemnly professed religious of either sex in Belgium and in Holland received the faculty that, with due dependence on legitimate superiors, they can acquire, retain, administer, and dispose for pious and honorable uses of goods which have come to them. So from the Sacred Penitentiary¹ and the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs.² These decrees are explained in two ways: either so that they become owners only civilly, or so that they become owners also naturally and before God. The latter seems to us more probable from the terms of the indult. The reason for the faculty granted was that civil laws there do not admit possession by religious. Some wish to extend this also to religious of simple vows, which seems improbable from the end and origin of this institute.

2. The simple vow, or rather simple profession, of itself does not deprive one of direct ownership, nor render acts of ownership invalid, but only prohibits independent use according to the manner determined in the rules. I said of itself, for the spiritual and temporal coadjutors of the Jesuits are wholly incapable of acquiring any ownership. Moreover, concerning simple profession the canons establish:

a) Anyone professed by simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless something else has been provided in the constitutions, preserves the ownership of his goods and the capacity of acquiring other goods, with those things preserved which are prescribed in can. 569 (can. 580, § 1).

b) It is not licit for those professed by simple vows in religious Congregations:³ 1st, to abdicate by an act among the living the ownership of their goods by gratuitous title; 2nd, to change a testament made according to the norm of can. 569, § 3, without the license of the Holy See, or, if the matter is urgent and there is not time to have recourse to it, without the license of the major Superior or, if even he cannot be approached, of the local Superior (can. 583).

c) Anyone professed by simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, can change the cession or disposition of which in can. 569, § 2 (n. 1226), not indeed by his own judgment unless the constitutions allow this, but by license of the supreme Moderator, or, if there is question of nuns, by license of the local Ordinary and, if the monastery is subject to regulars, of the regular Superior, provided that the change, at least concerning a notable part of the goods, is not made in favor of the religion. But by departure from the religion, a cession and disposition of this kind ceases to have force (can. 580, § 3).

d) Anyone professed by simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, whatever he acquires by his own industry or with regard to the religion, he acquires for the religion (can. 580, § 2).

¹ 1 December 1820.

² 31 July 1871.

³ It is said "in religious Congregations" because one who is going to profess in a religious Order is not bound to make a testament, and before solemn profession renounces all goods (can. 569, § 3; 581).

IV. Obligation of the vow. The obligation of the vow of poverty is grave from its kind, so that one sins gravely who, either by claiming something for himself as his own, or by using some thing as his own without the Superior's license, or in any other way, so behaves that, with the nature of the action and the quantity of the thing considered, he places an act of property in grave matter. But the gravity of the matter depends both on the nature of the act and on the quantity of the thing; hence, for example, a greater sum is required if someone uses the goods of the community without license than if he alienates them; much greater if he gives them as a loan than if he gives them as a gift, and so forth. Thus, for example, "regularly a religious does not sin gravely by secretly taking, for example, a book for temporary use, even a long one, but not in perpetuity" (St. Alphonsus IV, 24).

Moreover it cannot be determined accurately when grave matter is present. In addition, slight matters, insofar as they are opposed to the vow and therefore to the religion, quite probably do not coalesce, just as slight matters do not coalesce which, for example, are repugnant to temperance. Besides, observe:

1. To a sin against the vow there can be added a sin against justice, for instance if a religious destroys or without license alienates the goods of the community.

2. What in a case is grave matter, likewise when slight matters coalesce, and what quantity is required, if they do coalesce, so that the matter becomes grave, see in the treatise on justice, nn. 1028-1030.

There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul (Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows. Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others; meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a man’s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as modesty, continency, chastity.

Peace.—The precept of charity also includes a precept of peace, and our Lord commands: “Have peace among yourselves” (Mark, ix. 49). Peace, like joy, has two properties: (a) it should be genuine (i.e., it should be a contentment and agreement based on right), for there is a false peace, of which Christ says: “I am not come to bring peace” (Matt, x. 34), which rests in a good that is only apparent, and which does not exclude great evil and anxiety (Wis., xiv. 22), (b) peace is constant, for, as long as charity remains, there are friendly relations with God and man, and order in the interior of the soul. Perfect tranquility, it is true, is found only in heaven. On earth, disturbances may arise in the lower part of the soul, or from without, but the will continues in the peace of God (II Cor., i. 4).

Reconciliation of a sinner to God is effected through an act of perfect charity: “He who loves Me, will be loved by My Father and I will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (a) Thus, sin is washed away, even before Baptism or absolution, when the sinner makes an act of love of God joined with a desire, at least implicit, of receiving the Sacrament of Baptism or Penance. The act of love is not the cause, but the final disposition introducing justification. (b) The punishment of sin is forgiven, when one makes an act of love, or performs a good deed out of love of God; but the degree of remission corresponds to the fervor of the charity.

Does the precept of peace demand unanimity of judgments?

(a) In matters of greater importance, there should be agreement in judgments; else, there will not be that harmony of wills, desiring the same things and disliking the same things, which constitute peace. In necessary things, therefore, there should be unity of judgments: “I beseech of you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you, but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment” (I Cor., i. 10).

(b) In matters of slight importance, difference of opinion does not remove friendship, for each one thinks that his judgment will better serve the good that is sought alike by all. We find that even very holy men have disagreed on matters of opinion—for example, Paul and Barnabas on the question whether or not Mark should be taken on the second missionary journey (Acts, xv. 37), Jerome and Augustine on the status of Mosaic observances after the death of Christ. Disputes may offend against charity, however, if they become too personal or too heated, as sometimes happens even to minds occupied with heavenly things (e.g., theologians, spiritual writers).

Reconciliation with enemies is necessary, in order that peace may be maintained. It includes: (a) internally, the putting away of thoughts and feelings contrary to concord; (b) externally, signs of renewed charity, if there has been an open breach.

The duty of reconciliation does not necessitate the forgiveness of every kind of wrong suffered from an enemy—that is, it does not always oblige one freely to remit the consequences of an enemy’s acts. There are three kinds of wrong: (a) offenses, which are such contradictions offered to the will of another as do not trespass on any strict right or occasion any damage. Example: Balbus, who is in great distress, asks his friend Titus to secure employment for him. Titus could easily do this favor, but he refuses; (b) injuries, which are violations of the strict right of another, but without damage. Example: Claudia addresses Caia in very disrespectful language when no witnesses are present; (c) damages, which are the taking from another of what is his, or harm done to him as regards his soul, his life, his fame, or his fortune. Examples are theft, scandal, assault and slander.

Who should make the advances towards reconciliation after a rupture of charitable relations? (a) If only one party was the offender, he should normally make the first move towards reconciliation. It is of counsel, but not of precept, that the innocent party ask for reconciliation, unless the circumstances require that he should do so, as when the offended party can much more easily make the advances, or when great scandal will arise, or when the offender will become hardened in hate and lose his soul, if the party offended does not make efforts for peace. (b) If both parties were offenders, he who offended more seriously should make the advances. (c) If both offended equally, he who was first to disturb the peace should also be first to work for its restoration. (d) If it does not appear which of the parties was more to blame in any of the foregoing ways, both are equally bound.

The manner of seeking reconciliation is as follows: (a) Reconciliation can be sought either in person, or through an intermediary who is a friend to both parties. (b) It can be sought either explicitly (by expressing regret and asking pardon), or implicitly (by a friendly conversation or favors shown). Generally speaking, an inferior (e.g., a child) should explicitly request reconciliation with a superior (e.g., a parent); but it will suffice for a superior to seek forgiveness from an inferior implicitly.

The time for seeking reconciliation is the earliest possible moment: “If thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there thou remember that thy brother hath anything against thee, leave there thy offering before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother, and then coming thou shalt offer thy gift” (Matt, v. 23, 24). (a) Thus, internal reconciliation (i.e., repentance on the part of the offender and forgiveness on the part of the one offended) should not be delayed, and should precede any sacred action, such as offering a gift to God, if this latter is to be acceptable and meritorious. (b) External reconciliation (i.e., asking pardon and making satisfaction) and the manifestation of forgiveness should be attended to as soon as the circumstances of time and place permit. The resolve to be reconciled externally is included in internal reconciliation, but prudence dictates that one wait for the suitable occasion, lest precipitation make matters worse.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 37-42.)

The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a) discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.

What is the force of the solemn vow of poverty in relation to the ownership of goods? - A Religious, by force of the solemn vow of poverty, is rendered absolutely incapable of dominion in particular, or personally, over any temporal thing estimable by price, even with the license of the superior. - Absolutely incapable, i.e., incapable perpetually and immutably, both on the part of the religious and on the part of religion.

In particular, or personally: for the solemnity of the vow of poverty does not prevent the community from being able to acquire and possess goods, whether by itself or through subjects, unless its constitutions stand in the way. Hence the widely spread axiom of canon law: Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery. Cf. Schmalzgr. l. 3, t. 27, n. 75 ff. Of a temporal thing estimable by price: because the religious retains dominion over spiritual goods, honor, reputation, and similar things.

Likewise he retains the right of electing, presenting, and conferring a regular benefice. Even with the license of the superior, namely of the regular superior: for this incapacity can be removed by the Supreme Pontiff, without the solemnity of the vow being thereby impeded. Cf. 248. Of dominion, i.e., of dominion both direct and also merely useful. Therefore the ownership of temporal goods, the right of enjoying, the right of using, the right of simply retaining or possessing, the right, i.e., in one's own name and by one's own judgment, is opposed to the solemn vow of poverty; but by no means the usufruct, use, and retention of mere fact, i.e., with the license of the superior, dependently on the superior, and also mere administration. For through this he acquires no temporal advantage for himself by which he might become rich or less poor, and disposes of no thing for his own temporal emolument. Lugo d. 3, n. 155. - C. Cum ad monasterium 6 de Stat. monach.; Trent s. 25, c. 2, 3 de Reg.; Bizzarri ed. 1885, p. 276, 279, 335, 336, 384; E. M.

You will resolve: A Religious solemnly professed is altogether incapable of any act of ownership, of donation, sale, etc. Therefore he cannot make a testament. Incapable, namely unless the dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff is added, which in fact was given to regulars of Belgium, so that they could acquire, retain, administer, and dispose of goods. S. C. Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, July 31, 1878.

Act of ownership, by which he receives some advantage and emolument; but mere causing of damage is by no means against poverty, e.g., to kill at night a barking and troublesome or dangerous dog. D'Annibale p. 3, n. 222. All gifts which are made to religious solemnly professed are thereby acquired for the monastery, legacies and inheritances not excepted, unless a special rule or constitution of the Order stands in the way. Trent s. 25, c. 1 de Reg.; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 14. - Manuscripts are proper to religious.

For they are something spiritual, since they are the offspring of their own intelligence. And this has already been introduced also by custom. Likewise holy Relics can be had, because they are not estimated by price. - The S. C. of Religious, July 13, 1913, declared that Religious, both of solemn vows and of simple vows, who during vows have written some manuscript do not have dominion over the same, so that they can donate it or alienate it by any title whatsoever. - "To have something proper is said to be against poverty, not because it is against some special virtue, for there is none, but because it is against the vow of poverty; and thus that sin is properly against religion." Suarez, de Rel. tr. 10, l. 4, c. 14. For indeed the virtue of poverty excludes only the affection and disordered use of earthly things, not ownership. This is not excluded unless, with a vow added, it is restricted and narrowed. Therefore the virtue of poverty can easily be reduced to modesty, a part of temperance. - L. 14, 22.

What is the force of the simple vow of poverty in relation to exterior goods? - A Religious bound by a simple vow of poverty can indeed have direct dominion of goods; but he can licitly dispose of nothing concerning them without particular or general license of the superior. Licitly, since a religious preserving direct dominion of goods can validly dispose of them without license, since he is truly lord of those goods. Yet the simple vow which formed coadjutors emit in the Society of Jesus renders one incapable even of dominion. Suarez, de Relig. tr. 10, l. 4, c. 6, n. 12; Lugo, de Iust. d. 3, n. 78; Schmalzgr. l. 3, t. 35, n. 9; E. M.

You will resolve: A Religious who is not solemnly professed has direct dominion: of temporal goods which he possessed before vows. The reason is that simple vows do not deprive one of dominion already had. - Of the fruits or revenues of the same goods. The reason is that a thing fructifies for its lord, and simple vows do not deprive one of the right of acquiring dominion. But cf. n. 274. - Of those things which come to him by law, without new acceptance, such as paternal inheritance, legacies, etc. The reason is clear from what has been said. - Of all goods which he receives from parents, relatives, friends, with the license of superiors; if however those donations are made specifically with regard to the private person, and not insofar as he is religious; otherwise donations come to the monastery. For that principle is also applied to these religious: Whatever a monk acquires, etc. - Of all goods which he receives from parents, relatives, friends, etc., given with regard to the private person, without license of superiors. The reason is that since he has the right of acquiring, the defect of license makes him acquire illicitly, not acquire invalidly, just as the defect of license makes him donate illicitly, not donate invalidly.

Manual works, whatever they are, which are made by religious pertain to the community. Therefore private persons, although craftsmen, cannot dispose of them, nor can they receive any emolument from them. The same is to be said of honoraria which are given to regulars for Masses or other spiritual ministries. Yet it is not against poverty, with material furnished by another, at his petition to paint, for example, a small panel, which he then receives. For it is gratuitous work, not an act of dominion from which advantage or emolument is acquired. The same is to be said if a religious gratuitously teaches another canon law, theology, etc. It is a gratuitous office, not an act of ownership. Likewise it is not against poverty to eat and drink at the house of an outsider, for this is the act of dominion of the outsider, not of the religious. Lugo d. 2, n. 51; d. 3, n. 149; Norms art. 126.

A Religious bound by a simple vow acts illicitly if at home, or also outside, even from those things which pertain to food and clothing, he receives, retains, consumes, exchanges, gives to another, lends for consumption, or lends for use, or makes any contract in which an act of ownership intervenes, without the consent of the superior. - He sins against the vow of poverty if he expends for another use anything from the things conceded for his use, or culpably loses or destroys it. The reason is that in these he has only use of fact, and that precariously, as long as it shall seem good to the superior; and it is at the same time an act of dominion to be able to destroy one's own or quasi-own thing by one's own decision. - He also sins against the vow of poverty if he usurps for himself things of the monastery, if he hides or subtracts some thing from the disposition of the superior; if he remits a debt; if he renounces an inheritance or legacy which would be in favor of the community. If he renounces a donation, he does not sin against justice or the vow, but he can sin against charity toward his own convent. L. 19, 20; Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, art. 124.

What is required so that a religious can receive or give a thing? - So that a religious may licitly, by reason of the vow of poverty, receive, donate, etc., a thing, the license of the superior is required and suffices, at least reasonably presumed or interpretative. - Presumed or interpretative license is distinguished from express and tacit license. Express is called that which is openly conceded by word or writing; and this can be formal express, or virtual, as if he says: I concede to you that you call a physician; this will be formal express license in order to consult the physician, virtual in order to apply the prescribed remedies. Tacit is called that when from custom, signs, or other circumstances, it is reasonably concluded that the superior approves the matter.

Presumed or interpretative is called that when, because of some occurring necessity or another just cause, it is believed or presumed that the superior would consent or give license if this were sought in these circumstances. Reasonably presumed: otherwise there is no license, since it is against the will of the superior. - Moreover, for acting against the vow of poverty it is required that the religious act in his own name and independently of the will of the superior. But one who acts from the consent of the prelate according to prudent interpretation does not act in his own name and independently. Therefore. St. Alphonsus 18 calls this opinion more probable, and St. Thomas teaches it expressly, 2. 2, q. 32, a. 8 ad 1, and 4 d. 15, q. 2, a. 5, q. 4.

You will resolve: If the prelate gives or permits to be given to a subject images, rosaries, etc., knowing that he does not need all these for his own use, he is judged tacitly to concede the faculty of giving them to others. - If to a religious for his support a certain quantity is assigned in such a way that neither is the monastery held to provide anything else to him, nor he himself to render an account, then whether he stays within the cloister or outside, whatever he has withheld for himself from that portion he will be able to expend at his good pleasure, provided he expends it for an honorable use.

But otherwise, if no certain quantity is assigned to him, but all necessary things are supplied by the monastery, because then it is not presumed, as in the first case, that the prelate concedes license. - By authors it is permitted to religious, because of the same presumed license, to make some moderate alms, likewise to make light donations for reconciling the love of others toward religion, as a sign of due friendship or due gratitude. And here attention is to be given to the Constitution Religiosae of Clement VIII, moderated by the Decree Nuper of Urban VIII, prohibiting to religious the giving of gifts, unless they are from causes containing by their nature an act of virtue and merit, yet modestly and discreetly, and with license of superiors. By this prohibition convents also and their chapters are comprehended; and those receiving are held to restitution. Illicit donations are also void from these Constitutions. If these exceed the sum of ten scudi, absolution cannot be given unless first, if it can be done, restitution be made. Innocent XII, C. Romanus Pontifex, 1692. - L. 17, 21, 23; E. M.

Note: License sought but unduly denied does not excuse from transgression of the vow, unless there is danger of grave harm in delay, e.g., if the superior denies things necessary for food and clothing, or to relieve the want of one in extreme need. For then the consent of the major superior is presumed to be present. Thus St. Alphonsus 33, and it agrees with the doctrine of St. Thomas 1. 2, q. 106, a. 6; 2. 2, q. 120, a. 1; Schmalzgr. l. 3, t. 35, n. 35, and of others. When the matter has already been done and consummated with reasonably presumed license, there is not given from the vow of poverty an obligation of manifesting the fact to the superior. Otherwise that license would serve for nothing, and can no longer serve for anything. Lugo d. 3, n. 128. - A superior cannot licitly and validly give permission for things extraordinarily superfluous and illicit. For these are unbecoming to the state of poverty of religious, and the superior is not the lord, but the simple administrator of the things of the monastery. L. 29 f.; Lugo d. 3, n. 139 ff.; Kenrick tr. 8, n. 75. - If the preceding superior gave license, it is valid even if he has departed from office. On the contrary, although a superior licitly accepts and retains during the time in which he himself is superior money given to him, nevertheless he will not be able to expend it when he has ceased from office without leave of his superior. La Croix l. 4, n. 116.

As already said, the giving of gifts is prohibited to Regulars of either sex, apart from a cause of virtue and merit, yet modestly and discreetly. And those doing otherwise incur infamy of law ipso facto, deprivation of active and passive voice, and perpetual inability for all offices and dignities. But restitution of things received is to be made to the Convents.

Economic obligations are to be undertaken by religious families according to the Decree Inter ea of the S. C. of Religious, July 30, 1909. - Without the consent of the respective council, obligations cannot be contracted for individual houses which exceed 500 lire and do not reach 1000 lire; for provinces, which exceed 1000 lire and do not reach 5000; for Generalitial Curias, which exceed 5000 lire; and for the sum of 10000 lire, besides license of the respective Council, the Apostolic good pleasure is needed. And no foundation of a house is to be made, and no amplification of a foundation, if the money to be paid is not had. Stipends accepted for Masses can in no way be expended before the celebration of the Masses themselves. And the dowries of Religious women are by no means to be alienated as long as they live. Cf. § 7, Second Supplement, E. M., p. 74 ff.

What is grave matter in transgression of the vow of poverty? - It is difficult to hand down some determined rule as regards the quantity required for grave sin, as is established from the very multiplicity of opinions concerning this matter. - Generally speaking, that matter is to be held grave which constitutes grave sin in theft. For an act of ownership which is grave by reason of matter against justice is also grave against religion when the vow of poverty is added. For the vow of poverty precisely impedes this, namely an act of ownership. But some say that only that matter is grave which is grave in thefts of children in the household, which others more probably deny. For their condition is altogether different as regards the goods of the monastery and as regards paternal goods. And since, as regards religious, it is a question of spiritual detriment, the superior must always be judged more unwilling than the father of a household. And hence it is clear that the aforesaid grave matter is not absolutely grave matter in theft, if the monastery is very wealthy, but only relatively grave matter, namely relative to a monastery moderately rich, as to the common rule, with attention given to the harm which Religion suffers from the sin of ownership. For if it is grave in the reason of an act of theft, it is already grave in the reason of an act of ownership against the vow of poverty. But here the harm of society or community, from which absolutely grave matter is determined, certainly cannot be attended to, but merely the act of ownership, and the grave matter of this act as respectively such. And if the harm of society or community had to be attended to here, since the harm to be attended to here is spiritual harm, it is clear that not only then must absolutely grave matter be rejected, but even on the contrary respectively grave matter must be restricted rather than extended. But this respectively grave matter as regards a monastery moderately rich is that very matter which is respectively grave as regards a person moderately rich. But it is altogether discordant to introduce, for constituting grave sin against the vow of poverty alone, a still greater quantity than that absolutely grave for theft.

Yet this grave matter, according to diverse circumstances, as in theft, can be still greater or lesser. More is required for rich convents than for other poor ones. - More also if a religious usurps things of the monastery for his own use, or for others of the same community, than if he were to expend them on outsiders; for in the former case the thing remains at home. More, if the thing is not from money, but from clothing, books, and similar things. It is not mortal to steal edible things on several occasions, even if they come to a great quantity, provided they are not reserved by the religious, and provided the damage to the convent is not excessive and in an extraordinary and more precious thing. More is also required in small thefts, which moreover, with a notable interval interposed, do not coalesce into grave matter, than in other ordinary thefts. Furthermore, more is required in sins against religion alone, or committed against the vow alone, than at the same time against justice; for in the former case the act of ownership, as is clear, is less. Hence also in the same case of sin against religion alone more is required for sinning gravely when gifts are received from outsiders to be expended on others in one's own name, than if these were retained for one's own uses; and more is also required if someone expends or retains goods of which he has radical dominion. For the whole malice of the act is in this, that it is an act of ownership without dependence on the superior, against his will. Finally more or less is required according as the act participates more or less in ownership. And thus generally a religious does not sin gravely when he secretly receives some thing from the community for his own use, or if he lends for consumption or lends for use to another a thing conceded to him for use. - L. 24, 25, 27; l. 3, n. 545; H. A. tr. 3, n. 10;

Lugo d. 3, n. 170 ff.

Those things which are light only against the vow of poverty, and therefore only against religion, do not coalesce to constitute at the same time a grave sin, because the reason of grave real harm inflicted is lacking, as in sins against justice.

Is it lawful for religious to have a peculium, i.e., a temporal good destined for their own uses, but by no means for the common uses of the monastery? - It is certain that such a peculium with independent use of it is illicit; for it is against poverty and against Trent s. 25, c. 2 de Reg. - But it is disputed whether peculia with dependent use were prohibited by Trent s. 25, c. 2 de Reg. From custom and permission of the Apostolic See, the use of a peculium and life allowance still perseveres in several monasteries and is licit. All agree that in those convents in which common life is not observed because of poverty, or because of the negligence of superiors in supplying necessary things to subjects, peculia can be conceded at the nod of the prelates. The reason is that the Tridentine Council then commands common life to religious when "nothing that is necessary is denied" by the convent. - A regular cannot refuse common life if the superiors wish to choose it. The reason is that this would be against the vow of poverty, for it would be to have goods independently of the will of superiors. - Clement VIII, Constitution on the Reform of Regulars; L. 15; E. M.

In the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, art. 127, 128, it is said: "All things in the Institute are to be called and to be common, as regards furnishings, food, and clothing. Yet it is fitting for each, indeed in common custody but separately, to keep and distribute clothing of strict personal use. The furnishing which the sisters use, with superiors permitting, is to befit poverty, and nothing superfluous is to be in it, nor is anything necessary to be denied to them." As is clear, no distinction is made between superiors and subjects as regards common life. And from the Decrees of Clement VIII for the Reform of Regulars, art. 10, it is explicitly commanded that common life is to be observed also by Superiors.

Does he sin against the vow of poverty who receives money from an outsider to be spent at will on pious works? - R. In the negative, if the pious works are determined by the donor himself. For then no act of ownership is had. The Religious is only the executor of another's commission. - But if the works are in no way determined by the donor, Fr. Gury 157 affirms it, because he would make an act of ownership. But Sanchez, in Decal. l. 7, c. 30, denies it. The reason is that while he distributes that money not in his own name but in another's, he makes no act of ownership. - St. Thomas Quodl. 3, a. 15.

Are religious by the vow of poverty prohibited from receiving another's thing in deposit without the license of the prelate? - R. In the affirmative, if it is by force of the contract of deposit, because then there is present a true right and obligation from justice. In the negative, if it is only into faithful custody, for then no right and obligation from justice is had.

1. Theodore, a religious, with a general permission of his superiors for spending money, applies to his own use money given to him for this purpose by friends; he spends some things upon objects not indeed necessary, yet useful or proper; other things, on the contrary, upon matters wholly superfluous and useless, and even sometimes unlawful. Hence it is asked:

Whether Theodore sins against the vow of poverty in these expenses?

Response. 1. An abundant use of things, provided it is had by permission of the superiors, is not of itself opposed to poverty. The reason is, first, because a poor man does not cease to be poor because at times he is somewhat more abundantly supplied by the charity and liberality of others; for he does not use those more abundant things by his own right, nor does he cease habitually to suffer want of all things. The reason is, secondly, because religious poverty is not to be understood so strictly, according to the manner of certain very timid persons, that it contains only the use of things strictly necessary, with permission of the superior; otherwise there would be no end of scruples and anxieties. See Suarez, De Religione, tome 3, book 8, chapter 5, nos. 32, 33, and chapter 15, nos. 3, 4. Therefore Theodore is not to be disturbed with regard to things simply abundant beyond strict necessities, as far as concerns the vow of poverty. Nevertheless a fault can perhaps be present by reason of scandal, or danger of relaxing regular discipline; indeed, there can also be so notable and excessive an abundance as to bring an indecency upon the state of poverty contrary to the vow itself. St. Alphonsus, book 4, no. 30.

2. Expenses in things wholly useless and unlawful are plainly illicit. But whether the permission of the prelate for such uses is invalid in itself is a question of no small moment. The first and more common opinion affirms that it is; because the prelate is not the owner, but only the administrator, of the goods of the monastery, and therefore he cannot validly permit useless or unlawful expenses, since he has not this power either from religion or from the canons. The second opinion denies this; for otherwise these purchases would be invalid, and no law declares that they are invalid. St. Alphonsus adheres to the first opinion, but says that he does not dare to reject the second. And certainly the reason for the first opinion is not entirely demonstrative, at least when the question is not about goods of the monastery, but about things received from outsiders in order to be spent. See Suarez, De Religione, tome 3, book 8, chapter 5, no. 33; Lugo, Responsa Moralia, book 4, doubt 6, no. 8; Liguori, book 4, no. 28.

3. As concerns Theodore, he did not receive a faculty to spend money on useless and unlawful things, but only a general permission to spend money. St. Alphonsus asks: if a prelate grants to a religious a general permission to spend some sum at his pleasure, and the religious spends it on base and vain uses, whether the religious sins against poverty, and whether both he and the receiver are bound to restitution? The holy Doctor reports two opinions. The first affirms it, on account of the reason given above. The second denies it, because the fact that the superior is not the owner does not stand in the way. For, at least, the monastery is the owner in such a way that it can dispose of its goods for all uses; and in the case it is presumed to consent, lest the reputation of the subject, of the superior, and of the monastery itself be endangered. Lugo, after reporting this opinion, says:

In truth, although the superior is a simple administrator, still no law is known by which his power is restricted to licit uses alone. For it must not be judged that the superior, when he gives a license, limits it only to licit uses; but, giving a general license, he removes the impediment which arose from the defect of license. In the same way, if the Pope dispenses with relatives so that they may marry, he does not merely grant that they may lawfully have the conjugal act, but he also removes the malice of incest; so that even if afterward they were to sin with one another outside the use of marriage, there would not be the malice of incest. Likewise, if the Pope dispenses with someone for eating meats, even if that man eats meats harmful to his health, he will sin against temperance, but not against the precept of fasting, which has been taken away by the dispensation.

Nevertheless St. Alphonsus says again that he embraces the first opinion, but does not dare to reject the second. Therefore we abstain from charging Theodore, in the proposed case, with a grave sin against the vow of poverty. See Lugo, Responses, as above; La Croix, book 4, no. 115.

2. Francis, a religious, hesitates whether he can ask the superior for permission to spend, in favor of a Marian Congregation of workers, whose Director he has been appointed by the superiors, various alms received for this purpose from devout persons, and the proceeds of various pious books which he has published. These expenditures would be necessary for promoting the Congregation. But it seems to him that he would thereby possess a peculium contrary to poverty.

Response. There is no reason why he should hesitate. This is, in fact, done even by holy religious, as we read concerning St. Francis de Hieronymo. Nor should Francis fear that he possesses a peculium, if he asks and obtains permission from the superior, and if he acts always dependently on him; much more, if he deposits the money with the superior for the destined pious use, and, as often as there is need, asks money from him.

For a peculium is properly that which individual religious have in order to provide for their necessities and useful needs. If they use this according to the need of the state of poverty, with the permission of the superior, and therefore by precarious use, that is, by a use revocable at the superior’s will, it is not against the vow of poverty. See I.M. 288. But in the proposed case the money is not destined for the proper uses of Francis, but for a pious work plainly conformable to his Institute, as is evident from the fact that the superiors have appointed Francis director of that same Congregation. Therefore, since it is used in a pious work exercised by the Institute according to Constitutions approved by the Apostolic See, it is wholly outside the notion of a peculium.

3. Ferdinand, a religious, obtained from the superior permission to dispose of a sum of money. The following day that superior was removed from office, and another was appointed in his place. It is asked:

Whether Ferdinand is obliged to ask permission again?

Response. No. The permission given by the superior also regards the future time, when he will have been removed from the office of superior. For the power or grace once granted is complete and perfect. La Croix adds:

Although a superior can licitly accept something for himself while he is superior, and can retain it after he has ceased to be superior, nevertheless he cannot spend it without the permission of the present superior; because he could delegate or entrust to others, not to himself, the power of spending for the following time, since there must be a distinction between the one delegating and the one delegated.

La Croix, book 4, no. 115.

4. Theodosius, a religious, while his parents were still living, before solemn profession renounced every present and future hereditary right in favor of his nephew Antonius. After the profession, his parents died intestate. The brothers of Theodosius, succeeding their parents, ask whether in conscience they are bound to give a part of the inheritance to Theodosius, or whether they can retain it for themselves. For Theodosius claims the inheritance, invoking the modern laws which favor him, and he thinks of disposing of it in favor of another nephew, Augustinus. Antonius also claims the inheritance by virtue of the renunciation made in his favor. But the steward of the convent says that it is owed to the convent, which succeeds in place of the religious by the principle: “Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery.”

Response. 1. Theodosius invokes the modern laws in vain. For by solemn profession he was made canonically incapable of possessing anything. Nor can he recover this habilitas in a particular case by dispensation of a regular prelate, or even of a bishop. Therefore he cannot dispose of the paternal inheritance in favor of Augustinus, even with the permission of the superior or of the Ordinary; nor in any other way, even in favor of pious causes.

2. Antonius cannot claim the inheritance by reason of the renunciation made in his favor. For that renunciation has no force, since no one can give what is not, and will not be, his own. At the time when the renunciation was made, the inheritance did not belong to Theodosius, since his parents were still living; nor did it belong to him afterward, since a professed religious is incapable of being an heir. Therefore this inheritance was not included in the general renunciation of present and future goods and rights. It was not a present right, and neither was it a future one, since by reason of his incapacity it could not pertain to the professed man. Besides, either civil or canon law prohibits any disposition of an unopened inheritance in favor of a determinate third person, and makes it invalid.

3. The steward has no right, if by the Constitutions of the Order the convent is not capable of hereditary succession in place of the professed religious, as happens in the Society of Jesus, which does not succeed its professed members, nor are the professed capable of hereditary succession. In that case, the brothers of Theodosius claim the inheritance by right. But if the convent is capable of hereditary succession in place of the professed religious, the inheritance belongs to the convent, and the brothers of Theodosius have no right to it.

4. Cardinal Lugo, Responsa Moralia, doubt 5, no. 9, thinks otherwise. He concedes that it is impossible to renounce, by transferring to another and to the prejudice of another, namely the convent, a right which one does not yet have, nor ever will have, if the inheritance is not owed, for example, from a collateral relative. But he says that it is otherwise concerning the renunciation of the legitime; because, although the son does not actually possess it while the father is living, nevertheless he has a right to it, and it is owed to him. Therefore he says that he would not deny that the son could, before profession, renounce it in favor of another, to whom he now gives it. But this does not persuade us. For the son has no strict right to the legitime until the father dies, from the goods then left. Therefore, if the father dissipates the goods during life, although he sins, nevertheless he does not sin against commutative justice, nor is he bound to restitution. Furthermore, such a disposition of an unopened inheritance is prohibited and made invalid by positive law, even in the legitime. See I.M. 1034. Indeed Lugo himself, in the immediately preceding doubt 4, no. 7, says that if a novice or scholastic of the Society after the vows of the biennium renounces the inheritance of a living father in favor of a relative, then if the parent dies and the one renouncing has already been professed, the inheritance does not pertain to the one in whose favor he renounced, unless it is otherwise left to him by intestacy or testament; rather, it is deferred to those who would have to succeed according to the testament or intestacy, because from the renunciation they could acquire no right to the inheritance deferred at that time.

5. John, a professed religious of the Society, before profession renounced, in favor of a certain college of the Society, all his present and future goods and rights. Afterward, when he was already professed, his brother left him a legacy; and a doubt arises whether this legacy is valid notwithstanding the profession, and whether it is acquired by the college in whose favor John had renounced, or by another college in which, at the time of his brother’s death, John was permanently living.

Response. The universal clause of renunciation of all present and future goods and rights is usually added by notarial style, in order to signify the universality of the renunciation; nor is it without every effect. For if, between the renunciation and solemn profession, some goods and rights come to the religious, they are included under that clause. It is otherwise harmless, because it is conditional: if I shall have goods and rights in the future. But that condition cannot be verified after profession, since the professed man is incapable of having any good or right.

There is no doubt about the validity of the legacy. For the professed of the Society cannot be heirs, whether by testament or by intestacy; but they can be legatees. See Sanchez and Lugo. Thus, whether John had renounced or had not renounced, he remained capable of the legacy, although he could not be instituted heir.

But the legacy does not belong to the college in whose favor he had renounced before profession, but to that in which he was living when the legacy devolved. For, if there had been no renunciation, it is certain that the legacy would belong to the house or college in which he was living, according to the principle: whatever a monk acquires, he acquires for the monastery. And when it is said that the Society is not capable of succeeding its professed members, this is to be understood in this sense: that the goods of the professed do not pass by profession itself, by force of law, to the Society, but to the testamentary or intestate heirs. It is not to be understood as meaning that after profession the Society can acquire nothing through the professed. Therefore, if a devout person gives an alms to a professed religious, that alms is acquired wholly by the Society, or by the house and college in which he lives. Although the professed man cannot be heir, and if an inheritance devolved upon him the Society could not acquire it, nevertheless the same professed man is capable of a legacy, which he acquires not for himself, but for the Society, that is, for the house and college in which he is. Therefore, just as an alms given to a professed religious would not be acquired by the college in whose favor he made the renunciation before profession, so neither is the legacy acquired by it. For he cannot transfer to another what he does not have and to which he has no right. But he does not have, at the time when he renounces, things given to him afterward by donation or by legacy after profession, nor does he then have a right to them; nor does he have such a right after profession, since he is incapable of dominion and of right. The whole right, therefore, then belongs to the house and college in which he is. Therefore only this house and college acquires the thing given or left to him. Lugo, Responsa Moralia, book 4, doubt 5.

6. Pius, a testator, ordered that from his goods there be erected, in a parish church and at a fixed altar, a perpetual chaplaincy with the burden of daily Mass, the revenue assigned being 6,000 lire. Sempronius, a regular dispersed after the violent suppression of religious orders, in order to provide for his own support and that of another religious living with him in the same private house, asked for and obtained this chaplaincy from the bishop, although the parish priest was displeased.

Response. Sempronius acted by right. For first, a chaplaincy with a simple burden of Mass has the nature of a simple pious legacy, and, according to the Doctors, religious are not incapable of such chaplaincies. Indeed the Sacred Congregation of the Council, in Meliten., decreed that with the authority of the superiors religious can obtain such chaplaincies not only in their own churches, but also in secular churches, 23 November 1694, 11 June 1695, and 1 December 1691. Moreover, in the Letters of the Sacred Penitentiary by which the faculties already granted to dispersed regulars are enlarged, paragraph 16 grants to solemnly professed regulars that they can legitimately obtain and retain in administration chaplaincies, or even one ecclesiastical benefice, whether residential or with cure of souls, with the consent and at the will of the Ordinary, with the superiors also agreeing; yet they are obliged to leave it immediately when they are recalled by their superiors to the cloisters. Finally, the resolution is made certain from the affirmative response of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 21 August 1869, in Acta Sanctae Sedis, volume 5, page 82 and following.

7. Brother Francis of the Passion, a lay brother of the Congregation of Discalced Clerics of the Most Holy Cross and Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ, before he emitted profession, renounced the usufruct of his goods conjointly to his parents, retaining for himself the right of ownership, as the Constitutions of the Society permit, chapter 13. His father having died, his mother survived with twin unmarried daughters, who were in want of all things. There were also two brothers who had withdrawn from the maternal home, and were placed in such a condition that they could support and nourish themselves and their family. Now these brothers were asking that the part of the usufruct which previously the father enjoyed should be granted to them; the mother, on the contrary, claimed it for herself.

Question 1. To whom does the aforesaid usufruct devolve: to the mother, to the sons, to the daughters, to all, or finally to Francis himself?

Question 2. To whom does the whole usufruct devolve when the mother also has died?

R. To the first question: the usufruct devolves to the mother by right of accretion. To the second question: the usufruct devolves to the owner himself, for the purpose of disposing of it according to the Constitutions. Thus S. C. EE. et RR., 15 September 1837, in Bizzarri, Collect., p. 75, ed. 1885.

8. “Titius by testament established a certain and perpetual revenue for a chaplaincy in the Church of a professed house of the Society of Jesus; and he enjoins the chaplain, to be appointed for the time by the superiors of the Society, that, retaining for himself a determined sum, namely one suitable as an alms for the daily Mass to be celebrated, he should give what remains each year as an alms to the Church of the same professed house.

Question. Whether this is an obstacle to the poverty of the professed house, or of its Church?

R. It is not an obstacle, provided that there is in the hands of the Society no disposal of those revenues, and no civil right is acquired by the same Society for petitioning in court for annual alms of this kind.

All these things are had expressly in the Constitutions of the Society, part 6, chapter 2 and 1, § 6, where it is said thus: ‘No one of the Society ought, nor can he, induce anyone to leave perpetual alms to houses or churches of the same Society; and if any should leave them of their own accord, let no civil right be acquired for petitioning for them in court. But when charity on account of God has moved them to this, then let them bestow them.’ Again, that there can be no disposal of those revenues in the hands of the Society is had in the same chapter, § 2: ‘No revenues can be held as applied to anyone, not even to the sacristy or the Fabric; nor in any other manner, so that there is in the hands of the Society any disposal of them.’ And in the Declarations of the same chapter, letter B, these things are had: ‘If one of the founders of houses or churches should wish to leave certain revenues for the use of the Fabric, provided that neither the disposition of them pertains to the Society, nor there is anything from which an action concerning them belongs to it, although it would be its care that the one to whom such a duty has been committed should do his office, and so in similar matters, this would not be alien to the poverty of the Society.’ From these things the truth of this proposition is manifestly gathered: it is not against the poverty which the Constitutions of the Society require in professed houses and Churches, if these use revenues spontaneously established by benefactors, provided that the disposition of them is not in the hands of the Society, nor a right to petition for them in court.

“It is said, that the disposition ought not to be in the hands of the Society, so that care may be taken lest even colleges have revenues which they perpetually expend, whether from an obligation imposed by benefactors, or from a disposition left free to themselves, for the support of professed houses and their churches. For this is held to be against the poverty of the Society in canon 12 from decree 61 of the Seventh General Congregation. With this caution having been applied, the Society is now understood to have done whatever it can on its part for guarding the purity of its poverty against revenues spontaneously left for its benefit. It has rendered itself incapable of any right whatever in the revenues themselves; it has furthermore willed no right whatever for petitioning and exacting them. What remained for it to perform? Was it that it should not petition in any way whatever? or that it should not accept, when they were given each year? But these two things do not stand in the way of poverty. But you will say: they would be owed each year; therefore they would be like a true revenue. But the response is manifest: for they would not be owed from any right residing in the Society, but from the right of him who disposed of his goods. Thus, one who receives money from another, in order to distribute it to the poor, owes it to the poor, not from a right existing in the poor, but in the owner, especially since the poor either are incapable of right, or are unwilling to have that right. Rome, 26 June 1723. Christopher Rassler, Edward De Vitry, Antonius De Gaizenrode, John De Ulloa, John James Ghezrius.” A copy of this Resolution is preserved in the Archive of the Father Procurator General of the Society of Jesus.

9. Boniface, a regular superior, whenever his subjects ask from him permission to give some alms to the poor, or to spend something on pious causes and on pious works proper to the Order, never exceeds the quantity of a few solidi. For he says that since religious are poor, they cannot, whether in giving alms or in doing pious works, exceed the quantity proper to the poor.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Boniface’s reason, considered in itself, is true if there is question of money and other things, in great quantity, to be expended for uses wholly superfluous, vain, and unlawful. Expenses of this kind in superfluous matters, in notable quantity, are opposed to the state of religious poverty. Hence it is that, although they are made with the superior’s permission, this indeed not improbably prevents the religious from being a proprietor, since he usurps nothing without the consent of the superior; but it does not prevent there being an illicit use opposed to the vow of poverty. I say in notable quantity; otherwise the aforesaid expenditures, although unlawful from another source, are not specially opposed to poverty. Cf. Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, d. 3, 127 ff., n. 134 ff.

But what things are called notably superfluous in this matter cannot be handed down by one general rule. For it depends on prudent judgment, with attention to the circumstances of persons, place, custom, and similar things. Hence, in an observant religion, it would be a grave sin against poverty to have, for example, gold or silver furnishings, silk garments, silk coverlets or ornaments of the bed, forty or thirty linen shirts for one’s private use, etc. For these and similar things are not fitting, but gravely unbecoming to the state of poverty which an observant religion professes. Therefore a subject having these things, even with the superior’s license, sins against the vow of poverty, not indeed because of defect of license, but because that vow is not only about not using any thing without the prelate’s license, but also about preserving the state of a poor man, and not making expenditures which do not befit the poor. Lugo, loc. cit., n. 131, 183.

With these things premised, it is clear first that, although Boniface’s reason is true considered generally, nevertheless it is applied erroneously by restricting the legitimate faculty of the superior and the legitimate use of the subject to a few solidi. Besides, it is also applied erroneously to the giving of alms and to the performing of other pious works. For these are not expenses and expenditures which are unbecoming to religious poverty. And as regards alms for the poor and needy, there is indeed no precept for religious, as there is for beneficiaries, that the superfluous be expended upon the poor and pious causes; but this is so because it is exceedingly clear that religious, who profess poverty, expend the superfluous in alms and other pious causes, which in fact is done by religious even very poor and most observant of poverty. Hence it is that they often feed even many poor daily, and build churches and Altars of great price, and establish public works of piety and mercy.

153. • I. A Religious bound by a solemn vow of poverty, namely a Religious solemnly professed in an Order approved by the Holy See, is altogether incapable in particular or personally of any dominion over a temporal thing estimable by price ¹, even with the permission of the Superior. This is established from the Council of Trent, sess. 25, ch. 2. - But the Community can acquire and possess goods, either by itself or through subjects, unless its constitutions stand in the way. Hence the well-known axiom of Canon Law: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the Monastery."

¹ ** Nevertheless the Apostolic See, as is established by several examples, has dispensed that Religious even solemnly professed could validly and licitly have and retain dominion of temporal goods. And, to pass over St. Francis Borgia, who, from a dispensation obtained from Paul III, emitted the solemn vows of the Society of Jesus in such a way that nevertheless only within a four-year period after profession did he abdicate the Duchy of Gandia and the remaining temporal goods from himself (cf. the Life of St. Francis Borgia written in Spanish by Alvaro Cienfuegos, bk. 3, ch. 8, § 2, and ch. 10, § 1), we have Responses of the Sacred Penitentiary, both that given for French nuns on 28 Nov. 1818, by which the faculty is imparted that, notwithstanding the solemn vow of poverty, "... they can retain the goods and revenues which they have acquired up to now" (see Carriere, De Iust. et Iur., p. 4, sect. 1, ch. 4, n. 214), and that given on 20 Nov. 1820 for the nuns of Belgium, to whom, although solemnly professed, by the express authority of the Holy See the faculty is attributed of acquiring, possessing, and administering goods, which they may use for honorable ends, etc. (see Bouix, Tract. De Regularibus, part 3, ch. 3).

But from these things it sufficiently appears that the incapacity of a solemnly professed religious for having and exercising dominion over temporal things must be traced back not to natural or divine law, but only to ecclesiastical law. Hence St. Ignatius de Loyola added to part 6, ch. 2, of the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus a Declaration in which the faculty, even after solemn profession, of acquiring and retaining dominion, which could be obtained from the Apostolic See, is expressly mentioned. "If someone," he says, "moved by his devotion and with holy intention to the greater glory of God, before his profession were to obtain from the Apostolic See the faculty that either he himself, or the house in which he emitted profession, could have the right of succeeding to an inheritance, ... he would not be judged contrary to this Constitution or its intention."

Nor indeed ought the reason of this doctrine to seem hidden. For this must be confessed, as daily practice in the Church teaches, that dominion of temporal things is indeed compatible with a simple vow of poverty. But what is added to the simple vow, namely the solemnity of the same vow, was introduced by ecclesiastical law, as the Apostolic Constitutions openly declare. Now if solemnity is superadded to a vow by ecclesiastical law alone, is it not manifest that the force of the same solemnity, and the measure of its effects, is defined by that power from which solemnity itself proceeds, and therefore depends on the judgment of the Supreme Legislator in the Church? Therefore from the very nature of the thing it is that a solemnly professed religious exists incapable or capable of dominion according to the judgment of the supreme authority, to whose wisdom it belongs to dispose all things according to the circumstances of times, places, and persons. Cf. Marc. Struggl (Th. Moral., tr. 6, q. 5, n. 33), who concludes: Thus Sanchez, in Decal., bk. 5, ch. 2, n. 9, Card. De Lugo, De Iust., disp. 3, n. 75, and others COMMONLY.

Therefore a professed Religious is altogether unfit to exercise any act of proprietorship concerning any thing, whether of the monastery, or of parents, or of outsiders; and therefore without the Superior's permission, either general or special, he can dispose of no thing, either licitly or validly, by acceptance, donation, sale, loan for use, loan for consumption, use, exchange, improvement, etc.

154. • II. A Religious bound by a simple vow of poverty can indeed have direct dominion of goods; but he can licitly dispose of nothing concerning them without particular or general permission of the Superior ².

² ** It is said, he cannot do so licitly; for indeed he would dispose validly, as is said below, q. 2.

This has force even if the Order was not approved by the Holy See, but only by the Bishop, because the efficacy of a simple vow is always the same; for the one vowing entirely despoils himself of the right of disposing of any thing without permission, or of preserving the use of the same thing, or of exercising any act of proprietorship, unless the constitutions of the Order or legitimate custom except something.

Besides sins against the vow of poverty, sins against the virtue of poverty also are not rarely given, although the vow remains uninjured; for example, if a Religious excessively fosters affection ³ for things which he keeps by permission of the Prelate, if he indulges conveniences more than is fair, if he asks superfluous things from Superiors, or keeps them after they have been obtained, and similar things.

³ ** As often as the affection is so depraved, and is carried so far, that even against the commanding will of God he wills or pursues something, certainly there will be sin. But in the remaining cases you will have a defect of further perfection, not however a sin; for sin is defined as a transgression of law.

155. Questions. - QUESTION 1º. What is the difference between the vow and the virtue of poverty?

Resp. The vow regards only external acts of proprietorship; but the virtue extends also to the internal affections of the heart ⁴. For the object of the vow is to despoil the Religious externally of temporal goods. But the virtue has as its end entirely to cut away every inordinate affection of the heart toward earthly things. Therefore the vow of poverty is, as it were, a means to the virtue, which is the end to be obtained. This having been posited, no one does not see that the virtue of poverty extends much more broadly than the vow; for as often as someone infringes the vow, he at the same time injures the virtue, but not conversely.

⁴ ** These things seem less to cohere with what immediately preceded, where the vice was noted of retaining superfluous things even with the Superior's permission, of indulging conveniences, etc., which surely pertain to externals.

Add that account must be taken of the customs of each Order, which concede a greater or lesser measure of conveniences; and yet no one would have dared to turn these things into fault.

For the rest, Lugo rightly notes (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 3, n. 131) that if in some Order the vow of poverty is observed more severely, the subject who retains superfluous things even with the Superior's permission is not without fault against the vow of poverty, although he cannot be called a proprietor.

I said that the vow affects only external acts of proprietorship; nevertheless the vow could be violated by an internal act which regarded and attained an external act, namely by the desire of acting externally against the vow; since desire puts on all the malice and species of the external act, as was said in the Treatise on Sins, bk. 1, n. 468.

QUESTION 2º. Can a religious preserving direct dominion of goods VALIDLY dispose of these without permission?

Resp. Affirmative, because he is truly the owner, although on account of the vow of poverty he acts illicitly ⁵. - Yet some deny, because, they say, Religious have themselves as wards, who cannot validly give their goods. But this opinion is of no weight at all.

⁵ ** That Religious of the Society of Jesus acting thus sin against the vow of poverty, Suarez also taught, although others falsely affixed to him the opposite opinion, as Lugo shows (De Iust., disp. 3, n. 78).

QUESTION 3º. To what does the direct dominion of a Religious not solemnly professed extend?

Resp. 1º To the temporal goods which he possessed before the vows; 2º to the fruits or revenues of the same goods; 3º to those things which come to him by law, without new acceptance, such as a paternal inheritance, legacies, etc.; 4º to all goods which he receives from parents, relatives, friends, etc., by permission of the Superiors. Yet if these are consumable by use, they must be applied according to custom to the common use of the monastery ⁶, at least speaking generally.

⁶ ** That some part from these things yields to the use of the monastery does not happen by force of the vow, but by custom; for, the vow preserved, they could be spent for other uses, for example, in alms, although the permission of the Superior ought always to intervene.

156. • QUESTION 4º. Can a religious, without the Superior's permission, keep his own manuscripts and transfer them to another?

Resp. Affirmative, according to the common opinion; for manuscripts, as offspring of the intellect, are held as something spiritual. Besides, they pertain to knowledge, which does not fall under the vow of poverty; but the stronger reason is that the common and received custom among Regulars bears this way. - St. Ligorius, n. 14. The Salmanticenses and others commonly hold the same also about Relics of the Saints.

QUESTION 5º. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty if he spends something from things conceded for a determined use on another use?

Resp. Affirmative. The reason is that in these things the Religious has only use of fact, and that precariously, as long as it will seem good to the Superior. But it is an act of proprietorship or dominion to dispose of some thing according to one's own judgment, and otherwise the will or permission of the Superior, unless something else is manifest, is restricted to the assigned use. - St. Ligorius, n. 19, and others commonly.

157. • QUESTION 6º. Can a Religious without permission give away what by living more sparingly he subtracts for himself from things conceded for use?

Resp. No, speaking generally. The reason is plain from the responses to the preceding question. - They except if a certain quantity is assigned to the Religious in such a way that neither is the Monastery held to provide anything else to him, nor is he himself held to render an account. St. Ligorius, n. 23, says that it is commonly permitted by authors that a Religious can bestow, on whom he wishes, his pittances which are provided to him in a limited way, such as eggs, meats, etc., unless the Superior has expressly prohibited this. - St. Antoninus. - Sylvius, etc.

QUESTION 7º. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty who accepts money from an outsider to be spent at will on pious works?

Resp. Affirmative. The reason is plain from what has been said; for by acting thus, the Religious would make an act of proprietorship, unless he had the permission of his Superior ⁷. - But otherwise, if the pious works were determined by the donor; because then the Religious would be nothing except a channel, and as it were the mandatary of the donor. Hence a Religious does not sin against the vow of poverty who accepts from an outsider money to be disbursed to such a poor person, to such a Monastery, Church, such a pious cause, etc. Indeed he does not sin even if he himself without permission of the Superior asks money from an outsider to be handed over to another determinate person. Nevertheless if there is question of a matter of great moment, prudence persuades, and the right order of religious discipline requires, that a subject do nothing unless he has first obtained the assent of the Superior, even if he incurs no danger of violating poverty.

⁷ ** Sanchez (In Decal., bk. 7, ch. 30), to the question, "Whether, when one giving money to a religious so that he may distribute it to the poor does not designate the poor to whom it is to be distributed, nor designate the quantity to be bestowed on each poor person, but commits the choice of both or of either to the religious, ... the religious then sins against the vow of poverty by designating the poor person to whom the alms are conferred, or by designating the quantity of alms to be conferred?" responds (l.c., n. 4): "I cannot persuade myself that this is against the vow of poverty, and most learned men of our Society and externs consulted by me have approved my opinion. I am led by this, that ... the religious here does not retain or accept that money as his own, nor as owner, but so that, in the name of another, namely of the one handing it over, he may give it to the poor. Therefore he does not exercise any act of dominion or proprietorship.... Secondly, because not any possession and administration whatsoever of money is opposed to the vow of poverty, but when they are something of right, namely when the religious administers in his own name.... But in this event the religious administers not in his own name, but in another's. Thirdly, because in this dispensation these four things alone are found: reception of the money, faculty of choosing the poor, the choosing of them, distribution among them. But none of these is against the vow of poverty. Not reception of the money, because the religious does not receive it for himself..., but so that in the name of the testator he may distribute it to the poor.... Nor even the faculty of choosing the poor; for this is nothing else than the right of naming the poor..., which we proved above to be nothing of right, but of mere fact.... Nor the very choice of the poor; because if the right of choosing is not opposed, a fortiori neither is the choice itself, which is the exercise of that right. Nor finally the very distribution of money to the poor, because the religious does not distribute in his own name, but in the name of the one giving, nor is he himself judged to confer anything, but the giver, as is established from law unum de familia, ff. De Legat. 2.... Finally the solution of the arguments of the contrary party will confirm this part, which they do not prove." Thus Sanchez; but see the following note to n. 160.

158. • QUESTION 8º. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty who refuses those things which are offered to him by outsiders?

Resp. 1º No, if there is question of mere donations, alms, or gifts to which he has no right. The reason is that the vow of poverty does not oblige him to receive those things which he has not yet acquired, or to which neither he himself nor the Monastery has a strict right. Nevertheless if the Religious has no reason for refusing, he sins against charity by impeding the good of his Religion, but not against justice. - St. Ligorius, n. 20. - Lugo. - Sanchez, etc.

Resp. 2º Otherwise, if there is question of things already acquired, for example, of legacies, of payment owed for the labors of the Religious, or of gifts already accepted, etc. The reason is that the monastery immediately acquires the right of these according to the axiom: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself but for the Monastery." - St. Ligorius, ibid.

159. • QUESTION 9º. What matter is to be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1º In sins which are at the same time against Religion and justice, speaking generally, that matter must be held as grave which constitutes mortal sin in theft. - St. Ligorius, n. 24. - Lugo. - Sanchez, and others commonly.

Yet some Theologians say that that matter only is grave which is judged grave in the thefts of sons of a family, namely matter about twice greater than in thefts against outsiders. - Thus Elbel, n. 646. - But this does not seem to be admitted. The reason is that sons are in hope of the goods of the father of the family, but Religious are not. Moreover Superiors are more unwilling as to thefts of subjects than parents are about thefts of sons. Besides, graver detriments follow as to the soul in the former than in the latter ⁸. - St. Ligorius, ibid. For the rest, in order that judgment may be made about the gravity of matter in thefts of this sort, it must be noted that monasteries of middling wealth are commonly equated with rather wealthy private owners. Hence the same measure as for those generally constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also required if a Religious usurps things of the Monastery for his own use, or gives them to others of the same Community, than if he were to disburse the same things to outsiders, because thus they remain at home. Greater also in minute thefts, which besides, with a notable interval interposed, do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in edible things, as we said concerning servants, tom. 1, n. 608.

⁸ ** Nevertheless the reason can have force on the contrary, that the Superior, as to the substance of the thing taken secretly, is less unwilling as to members of the household than as to outsiders. But although the condition of a Religious and of a son is different, nevertheless in this there is something similar, that the goods of the monastery are possessed for the good of the subjects, not indeed for the convenience of the Superior. Finally, as to the detriments which seem to be feared, these depend chiefly on the use of the things taken secretly; for a son can consume things taken away in gaming and whoring, and a Religious can disburse them to the poor, and vice versa.

160. • Resp. 2º In sins committed against Religion alone, or against the vow alone, the difficulty increases, and the disagreement of Theologians is greater. Yet more commonly they require generally the same matter for mortal sin as in the preceding case where justice is violated, because the act of proprietorship seems to be of the same gravity. Nevertheless not improbably some grave Doctors require a greater quantity for grave sin. - Thus Elbel, n. 646. - Salmanticenses, ch. 6, n. 12.

But they commonly agree that a much greater value is required for sinning gravely when gifts are accepted from outsiders to be disbursed to others, because then the act of proprietorship is much less than if these things were retained for one's own use. St. Ligorius, n. 24, and others commonly. - Indeed some then require 60 argentei, or the value of about 30 francs, for sinning gravely. - Thus Diana. - Leander, etc., apud St. Ligorius, ibid. ⁹.

⁹ ** This opinion seems to carry much difficulty before itself. For either it is understood of money to be accepted and disbursed by a religious in his own name, or for his own use; and thus, since we have an act of proprietorship contrary to the vow of poverty, with the old Doctors it will deservedly seem too lax to require 60 argentei, or six Roman scudi, for gravity of fault, especially since the change in the value of money which has occurred in the course of time (see the things said about this argument in tom. 1, note to n. 607) would now require a much ampler quantity of money. Or it is understood of money accepted and disbursed in the name of another; and thus with Sanchez (see note to preceding n. 157) it will be licit to judge that no fault intervenes, even if there is question of a greater sum.

St. Alphonsus borrowed that opinion with its allegations from the Salmanticenses (De Restit., ch. 6, n. 47); yet all these, if they are compared with their Authors, are found to be brought forward beside the point. Namely, with Leander they allege Suarez, Palaus, and Diana. But these hand down the same doctrine as Sanchez.

Thus Suarez (De Relig., tr. 7, bk. 8, ch. 15, nn. 15 and 16): "When the owner concedes only the use of fact..., if the use yields to the convenience of the religious himself, or is properly given to him, it is against poverty to accept that without permission, not so much because of the dispensation as because of the acceptance of the thing, because namely something estimable by price is accepted without permission, and thus it is an acceptance of proprietorship. But indeed if the use neither yields to the convenience of the religious, nor does he accept it for himself, but only that the thing be given to another, so that he himself is only the medium or instrument of transferring the thing from one to another, then in reality there is no sin against poverty, because he neither accepts anything nor expends anything in his own name.... Hence I gather that as often as an indeterminate use of fact is conceded..., it is not against poverty..., if only the dispensation to be made to others in the name of another is accepted, although the particular application is committed to the judgment of the religious...." See also the same bk. 8, ch. 5, n. 31, where he establishes that administration formally and per se is not repugnant to poverty, because it is only something of fact and not of proper right, since things thus administered are held not as one's own but as another's. Hence he concludes: "Therefore administration as such has nothing on account of which it is excluded by the vow of poverty; therefore it is not matter of poverty, but can be matter of obedience," etc.

But Palaus (Tract. 16, disp. 3, punct. 22, n. 4): "If not goods of the Convent ... but things accepted from seculars you hand over to blood relatives, ... a distinction must be made: if you accept them absolutely, you sin not only against poverty, but also against justice against Religion, into which those goods by your acceptance have been incorporated. But if you do not wish to accept them, but make manifest to the giver that in his name you will give them to your blood relatives, you do not seem to violate justice or poverty: not justice, since the handing over happens from the will of the owner; not poverty, because you neither give nor hand over anything to your blood relatives, but the secular person provides the donation through your medium.... This holds true even if the secular person has not designated to whom the money is to be conceded, but has left this to your judgment; because the choice of persons alone belongs to you, which is not against poverty."

And Diana (tom. 7, tr. 3, res. 23, n. 2): "Note also here in passing that a Religious does not sin against poverty if without the Superior's permission he accepts money so that he himself may freely dispose of it in alms in the name of him who gave it. And for this opinion above I cited Sanchez and Faustus, to whom I now add Petrus de Ledesma and Francis Suarez." But he gives this reason (ibid., res. 27, n. 2), "because the vow of poverty obliges a Religious not to accept dominion and proprietorship of any thing while the Superior is unaware: but in our case this Religious does not accept dominion of that money, but only accepts it in the name of another, namely of the one handing it over, so that he may give it to the poor. Therefore."

Cf. also Card. De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 3, n. 155), and Pellizzarius (Manual. Regul., tr. 4, ch. 2, n. 236).

The VV. attack this Note and the preceding one subjected to n. 157 through fourteen columns (pp. 372-378). Therefore two things must be shown here against their objections: 1º that rightly and deservedly it is affirmed in the Note that the allegations of the Salmanticenses and of others are brought forward by St. Alphonsus beside the point; 2º that nothing solid is advanced by the VV. against the doctrine of Suarez, Sanchez, Palaus, Diana, Lugo, etc.

And as to the first, these are the words of St. Alphonsus (bk. 4, n. 24): "But if something is accepted from outsiders to be furnished to others, still more (namely, for gravity of matter) is required; for then Garcia with Palaus, Leander, Diana, etc., apud the Salmanticenses (tr. 13, ch. 6, n. 47), assign for grave matter a value greater than 60 argentei." And the VV. (p. 375) not only acknowledge, but contend, that in this place there is question of a Religious who disburses money accepted from an outsider, by this person's mandate, to the poor.

But the Salmanticenses in the cited place do not treat this question, and therefore neither do the Authors brought forward by them there pertain to our question. Therefore all those allegations are brought forward beside the point apud the Holy Doctor.

The minor is proved: 1º from the words of the Salmanticenses (l.c., n. 47), from which the Holy Doctor took his opinion: "But if from outsiders," they say, "something is received for giving or SPENDING, a greater quantity is still required that it be mortal.... Garcia, citing Leander, Palaus, Diana, and others, assigns as matter things of value greater than 60 argentei." But that which is generally received for giving AND SPENDING does not pertain to alms to be disbursed by force of the mandate of someone. Compare also the title of that Punctum V. Therefore these things do not make to the matter.

2º The matter is more clearly plain from the third preliminary observation there (n. 44): "We note thirdly, from the opinion of all Doctors, that a greater quantity is required that donation and acceptance from goods accepted from seculars be mortal than from common goods; and still greater if the donation is made to Religious of the same Convent than to outsiders." But a donation of a Religious is not what a Religious distributes in the name and by the mandate of another. Therefore there the question is not about our case.

3º But this is most luminously plain when the Salmanticenses, in that same place (l.c., n. 47) from which St. Alphonsus took, render the reason why a greater quantity is required for the gravity of matter if the donation is made to Religious of the same Convent than to outsiders. For after they had said that Garcia, Leander, Palaus, etc., assign as grave matter things of value greater than 60 argentei, they immediately add: "If, however, things are donated to another Religious of the same Convent, Suarez deservedly asserts that a greater quantity is required for grave fault, SINCE THAT THING STILL REMAINS WITHIN THE MONASTERY." And again below: "BECAUSE THAT THING STILL REMAINS WITHIN THE DOMINION OF THE CONVENT." Therefore the Salmanticenses treat of a thing to be disbursed, indeed accepted from outsiders, but which has already yielded into the dominion of the Convent. But whatever a Religious receives from an outsider to be disbursed to the poor in the name and by the mandate of that person by no means passes into the dominion of the Convent. Therefore the Salmanticenses do not there dispute about our controversy.

4º Finally, this very thing shines out from the fact that the Salmanticenses, where they touch our question, find no fault in the Religious, and have the same opinion as Suarez, Sanchez, etc. Thus they say (tr. 13, ch. 6, n. 15): "A Religious would not sin against the vow if he does not wish to accept things offered by another, but manifests to the giver that he will give them to others in his name; because then he himself does not give, but another, using him as minister and instrument, is the one who uses the money and makes the donation, as Sanchez holds, bk. 7, ch. 19, n. 74; Suarez, tom. 3, De Relig., bk. 4, ch. 15, n. 16; Palaus, punct. 22, n. 4; Diana, part 1, tr. 6, res. 29, and part 3, tr. 2, res. 65." Therefore it is most manifest that the question which the Salmanticenses discuss in n. 47, from which St. Alphonsus took, is altogether another and very different one from the present, and therefore the authority both of the Salmanticenses and of the Doctors alleged by them there is invoked beside the point by the Holy Doctor.

Let us now come to the other head, namely to the arguments which the VV. bring against the doctrine of Suarez. Namely, the VV. concede that a Regular does not sin against the vow of poverty when someone committing alms to be distributed to a Religious at the same time determines the poor to whom those things are to be handed over; but that he sins if the free choice of the poor is permitted to the judgment of the Religious. They soon add that the text of the Salmanticenses just set down is to be understood of persons determined by the one committing. To this last thing it must be answered: 1º this is asserted gratis, and therefore it is also denied gratis; 2º this must be denied altogether. The reason is plain; because the Salmanticenses must be understood in that sense which the Doctors exhibit, to whom they themselves remit the matter. But Suarez, Sanchez, Palaus, and Diana, as their texts brought forward in the Note prove, exempt each case from fault, nor do the Salmanticenses place any distinction between case and case, which otherwise would have been necessary there. Therefore.

For the rest, the VV., to strengthen their thesis against Suarez, namely that there is sin against the vow of poverty if in the case the free choice of the poor is left to the judgment of the Religious, bring forward 1º from a letter of St. Alphonsus the authority of Azor, Rodriguez, and Lohner, of whom St. Alphonsus also alleges the first two in Hom. Apost. (bk. 15, n. 7); 2º an argument from a threefold reason. A few things, which will suffice, to each.

Therefore 1º from Azor the VV. object these things (p. 1, bk. 12, ch. 9, q. 1): "It is of certain law that a Religious of the second kind cannot have peculium; for even usufruct, use, or administration from which the Abbot cannot remove the Monk by his nod and judgment, is repugnant to the solemn vow of poverty. For a Religious can have nothing proper. But use, or usufruct, or administration which someone has at his pleasure, subject to the power and will of no other, is something proper." - Resp. These things do not make to the matter. For Azor had set down beforehand (ibid.) that that use is understood so that a Religious by his own judgment can use the fruits of those goods and establish concerning them by his own nod what he wishes. But he who in our case receives money to be disbursed to the poor cannot establish concerning it by his own nod what he wishes. Therefore those things do not make to the matter. On the contrary, concerning our case Azor says elsewhere (l.c., ch. 10, q. 10): "Either something is given to a Religious so that in the name of him who gives he may disburse it for certain uses; and then that is not acquired for the monastery, since he who gives does not transfer dominion of the thing, but distributes it through the Religious for certain uses; and in this way money is given to Religious to be restored or to be disbursed for the uses of the poor."

2º From Alphonsus Rodriguez they bring forward these words (p. 3, tr. 3, ch. 15, n. 3): "It is repugnant to the vow of poverty not only to make oneself owner and proprietor of any thing without permission of the Superior," and yet these things are repugnant even with the Superior's permission, which cannot be given by the Superior, "but also to usurp its use and free administration and dispensation." - Resp. These things again do not make to the matter. For Rodriguez judges this when another gives money in such a way that he attributes the free faculty of spending and distributing it as he pleases (sicche mi lasci in liberta di spenderlo e distribuirlo a mio arbitrio, e come mi parra); wherefore the Religious could even buy a little dog with that money. On the contrary, concerning our case Rodriguez had premised (ibid.) that there is no sin against the vow of poverty if someone gives me money so that in his name I may give it to someone, or restore it, or bestow it upon certain poor persons. Therefore the authority of Alphonsus Rodriguez is alleged less faithfully.

3º Finally, Lohner indeed in his Opus Concionatorium seems to go into the opinion of the VV.; but the reason which he adds, namely that use of a thing independent of the Superior does not belong to anyone bound by the vow of poverty, either leaves uncertain in what hypothesis he says money is accepted by a Religious, or is judged plainly false by the Doctors, who, to one objecting that use of a thing is repugnant to the vow of poverty, would respond by distinguishing thus: use of right, I concede; use of fact, I deny. See Sanchez (Dec., bk. 7, ch. 30, n. 4), Azor (p. 1, bk. 12, ch. 12, q. 4), Ferraris (word Votum, art. 2, n. 116). Well does Sanchez say (bk. 6, ch. 11, n. 52): This choice is something of fact rather than of right, as is established from law Cum pater, 77, § 4, ff. de Legatis 2. For the rest, this is no wonder in a homiletic work. Those things of St. Alphonsus (bk. 2, n. 54) also make to this: "When I discharged the office of preacher, I also often tried forcefully to denounce this pernicious practice; but since here I discharge the office of a writer about moral science, I MUST SAY WHAT I THINK ACCORDING TO THE TRUTH."

Now to the arguments of the VV. against Suarez. But it must be premised that this doctrine is not Suarez's alone; indeed it is common among those weightiest Authors who have touched this question. And indeed, that most Writers of moral discipline do not have even a word about this question, although otherwise they pursue at length any modes whatsoever by which the vow of poverty can be injured, makes it abundantly plain that they had not even suspected that those are held by guilt of this kind who have undertaken alms to be distributed in the name of another to poor persons either determinate or indeterminate.

1º Therefore the VV. object (p. 377) that in the case there is had an act by which the Religious, by his free will without the Superior's permission, disposes of temporal goods. - Resp. I distinguish: he disposes by his free will, because this is a human act, I concede; he disposes according to his judgment of temporal goods, I deny; because merely as messenger he executes the certain will of another.

2º The VV. object (ibid.) that the Religious to whom free choice of persons is committed can enrich his own blood relatives by choosing them; which is estimable by price. - Resp. I deny the whole; for the hypothesis is concerning one who faithfully executes the will of the donor. But if the will of the donor is that something, whether much or little, be attributed also to the blood relatives of the Religious, the very same thing always returns, that the Religious merely acts the parts of a messenger. Thus Laymann (bk. 4, tr. 5, ch. 7, n. 16) in that same place which the VV. object: "A Religious does not sin against the vow of poverty ... if he has himself as the messenger of another, as for instance if in the above-said case he accepts money from a rich man so that he may give it, not in his own name, but in the name of that rich man, to a blood relative or poor person.... And in this sense the opinion of Sanchez is true, that a Religious does not sin against the vow of poverty if without the Superior's permission he accepts money, the faculty of choosing the poor to whom he distributes it having been left to him."

3º The VV. object (ibid.) that the parity which Suarez establishes between this Religious and a steward limps; because he who gives the money to be distributed is not the master of the Religious. - Resp. I deny that the office of messenger or almoner changes its nature, whether the executor of the office is a servant or not a servant. If it pleases, let it be said that in these circumstances the Religious serves another.

And enough concerning these things. For even at first glance it ought to seem burdensome to dwell on this question, when on this side indeed stand the weightiest Authors Suarez, Sanchez, Lugo, Palaus, Pellizzarius, Diana, Laymann, Tamburini (Dec., bk. 8, ch. 3, § 5, n. 5), Azor (p. 1, bk. 12, ch. 10, q. 10), Croix (bk. 4, n. 112), and the Salmanticenses (tr. 13, ch. 6, n. 15); but on the other side scarcely any words of uncertain sense could be brought forward from an ascetical or homiletic work.

Generally, however, a Religious does not sin gravely by secretly accepting some thing from the Community, for example, a book for his own use even for a long time, but not in perpetuity, unless he hides it in such a way that it cannot be found by Superiors; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as to the substance, but only as to the mode. As to things accepted or handed over as loan for consumption or loan for use without permission of the Prelate, speaking generally he will not sin gravely against the vow of poverty if he gives things for his own use or even other things to outsiders as loan for consumption or loan for use, provided he is certain of recovering them and does not therefore bring grave harm upon the Community, which for this reason, for example, lacks the use of a thing gravely necessary here and now. Much less gravely will he sin if he lends for consumption or use to other Religious of the same monastery things conceded for his own use. The reason is that although in these things he makes some act of proprietorship, nevertheless he does not sin gravely, according to the common interpretation of Theologians. - St. Ligorius, n. 27. - Laymann. - Sanchez, etc.

161. Resolutions. - 1º A Religious sins against the vow of poverty if without the consent of the Superior he accepts, retains, consumes, exchanges, gives to another, or lends for use anything at home or outside, even from those things which pertain to food or clothing. Likewise if without permission of the Superior he accepts money or other things as loan for consumption or for use from outsiders.

2º He sins against the vow of poverty also who spends things obtained for some use on another use, or culpably loses or destroys them.

3º He sins against the vow who eats or drinks apud outsiders without the faculty of the Prelate; because while he accepts something without permission, he posits an act of proprietorship. Nevertheless generally he does not seem by this to sin mortally ¹⁰. - Lacroix, n. 105. - Suarez. - Sanchez, etc.

¹⁰ ** Indeed permission can be presumed without difficulty; and otherwise the Superior could perhaps be judged unwilling not so much by reason of the thing accepted by the subject as from another cause.

4º If a Religious accepts from outsiders a thing to be handed over to the Superior, he can very easily suppose presumed permission. But if he cannot suppose it, he seems to sin against poverty; nevertheless generally that sin will not exceed venial sin. - Lacroix, n. 118, etc.

5º He sins against the vow of poverty who keeps a thing accepted with permission for use beyond the limits of time fixed by the Superior; who applies it to another use with detriment of the same; who keeps a thing with the soul of an owner, namely with the intention of subtracting it from the free disposition of the Superior, for example, if he hides it lest it be seen; and indeed this one cannot be excused from this, that he had obtained permission previously.

6º He sins against the vow of poverty who without faculty of the Superior buys something even for the Community, because he acts as proprietor. Sometimes, however, he can presume permission, namely when he knows that this will be pleasing to the Superior and easy recourse to him is not open, for example, on a journey. But permission of this sort can more easily be presumed in matters of lesser moment.

7º A Religious making a journey cannot turn aside to other places outside the straight way to see curious things, unless perhaps the distance is brief and no expenses or very modest expenses must be made; but in a particular case, if a grave cause underlies, the permission of the Superior can deservedly be presumed. Otherwise he will sin both against poverty and also against obedience.

8º A Religious can accept no deposit properly so called without permission. The reason is 1º because according to the opinion of several he would make an act of proprietorship; 2º because a deposit is a contract; but a Religious without the faculty of the Superior can enter no contract concerning temporal things ¹¹.

¹¹ ** Concerning this matter Pellizzarius says (Manual. Regul., tr. 4, ch. 2, n. 232): "You will ask: Are religious prohibited by the vow of poverty from receiving money of outsiders in deposit without the permission of the Prelate? Resp., they are not prohibited if they receive it with the intention of returning it as often as the owner wishes; although this can be against obedience and religious decency if it is done secretly. Thus Diana from Suarez, Sanchez, and Faustus." And Laymann (bk. 4, tr. 5, ch. 7, n. 4): "To accept things in deposit, so that the depositor retains every right of dominion and possession and administration, is not repugnant to the vow of poverty; although in such a mode, for example, monies have been deposited apud a Religious so that he can use them after permission of the Superior has been sought and obtained; nevertheless such things are against the perfection of poverty, and for the most part against the prescription of the Rule." Lugo has the same things (De Iust., disp. 33, n. 6), who moreover (disp. 3, n. 219) warns that the Convent is not held to repair the damage when some thing deposited by an outsider apud a Religious was lost by his fault or taken away by thieves. Indeed not even if he accepted that deposit with permission of the Prelate, because the offense of a subject does not harm the Convent.

162. • 9º All gifts which are made to Religious solemnly professed are by that very fact acquired for the Monastery, not excepting legacies and inheritances, from the most known principle of Canon Law: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the Monastery." This principle has force also as to other Religious within the limits of the vow of poverty, which does not take away from them the faculty of acquiring and possessing. Hence these are able to accept and acquire legacies and inheritances, although they cannot dispose of them without permission. As to the remaining donations, they come to the Monastery unless they are made specially in view of a private person and not insofar as Religious ¹². But then the Religious cannot accept without at least presumed permission, or under the condition of obtaining permission.

¹² ** The Author says this concerning Religious not solemnly professed. For donations, even if they are made as to private persons, if they are made to solemnly professed persons, come to the monastery.

10º Manual works, whatever they are, which are made by Religious, pertain to the Community. Therefore private persons, although artisans, cannot dispose of them, nor can they receive any emolument from them ¹³. The same must be said about honoraria which are attributed to Regulars for Masses or other spiritual ministries.

¹³ ** Yet sometimes Superiors are accustomed to indulge that the subject receive emolument from the wage of his labors and industry, and apply monies to his own uses. In this surely one must beware lest the devil, as not infrequent experience teaches, draw the unwary monk back from Religion to the world by these, as it were, nets or little cords.

11º Religious sin against the vow of poverty who do not apply equal care lest things conceded for their own use become worse. Say the same about those who, because of negligence, allow things committed to them by office to perish or suffer detriment.

“In order that the decrees of the Council of Trent concerning the faithful observance of the vow of poverty may be observed more faithfully, it is commanded that no one of the friars, even if he is a Superior, can possess as his own, or even in the name of the convent, immovable or movable goods, or money, revenues, alms—whether from sermons, lectures, or for Masses to be celebrated either in their own Church or anywhere whatsoever—or things acquired by their own just labor and cause and under any name whatsoever, even if they were subsidies from blood relatives, pious benefactions, legacies, or donations; rather, let all these things be immediately delivered to the Superior and incorporated into the convent, and let them be mingled with its other goods, revenues, money, and proceeds, so that common food and clothing can thereby be supplied to all. But of those things which had been granted for necessity, let no one possess anything as his own or use it as his own. No dispensation, no permission of any Superiors whatsoever, as regards immovable or movable goods, can excuse the friars from being subject to the fault and penalty imposed by the same decrees of the Council and to be incurred by the very fact, even if the Superiors assert that they can grant dispensations or permissions of this kind; We will that no credence whatever be given to them in this matter.” Constitution of Clement VIII for the reform of Regulars, 20 March 1601, nos. 3, 5, 7.

“The Bishop of Zamora in Spain sets forth that N. N., a Nun of the Premonstratensian Order in the convent of the city of N. in this diocese, has from the Spanish civil Constitutions the right to enter upon an inheritance which has fallen to her from the death of her brother, a priest recently deceased. Hence it is asked:

“1. Whether the aforesaid Nun, given the solemn religious profession which she emitted long ago, can lawfully in conscience undertake proceedings, either personally or through a procurator, so that she may enter upon the inheritance in her own name before the secular judge, yet for the good of the whole Community, as is fitting; or whether she rather needs a lawful dispensation from the vow of poverty in order to undertake the aforesaid juridical proceedings for acquiring the inheritance?

“2. Given that she needs a dispensation, can this be granted to her by the Superior of the convent or by the Bishop to whom the convent is subject; or, by reason of the solemn vow, must it necessarily be obtained from the Apostolic See? Finally, given the necessity of having recourse to the Apostolic See for the aforesaid dispensation, the Bishop petitioner humbly requests:

“3. That the faculty be granted to the aforesaid Nun to institute and complete juridical proceedings through a procurator for entering upon the inheritance for herself and in her own name, which shall redound to the good of the whole Community.

“4. That a sufficient faculty be granted to the same Bishop petitioner so that he may dispense from the vows of poverty in similar cases, so that he may be able to provide for the urgency which regularly occurs in them.

“Response. To the first and second: Provision will be made in the Third. To the third: Affirmative for the faculty requested; yet in such a way that the inheritance be acquired for the Monastery. To the fourth: Affirmative for the faculty requested for three years, only for urgent cases, namely, those in which time does not permit recourse to the Holy See.” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 15 January 1897.

“Those professed in simple vows (in Orders in which solemn vows are emitted) can retain, as they say, the radical dominion of their goods, but the administration of them and the disbursement and use of the revenues are wholly forbidden to them. Therefore, before the profession of simple vows, they must cede, for the time during which they shall remain in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use to whomever they please, and even to their own Order, if they shall judge this according to their pleasure.” Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 12 June 1858.

The same provision was extended to nuns of solemn vows who, before those vows, must now emit simple vows for three years. Cf. no. 277, Decree Perpensis. With respect to the more recent Institutes of simple vows: “115. Before the first emission of vows, they (Sisters and male Religious) must dispose of the use and usufruct of their revenues or fruits in whatever manner they please.… They must also cede the administration of their goods to a person or persons favorable to them.…—116. The cession of administration and the disposition of use and usufruct shall no longer have force in the case of departure from the Institute.…—117. The revocation and even alteration of these acts of Cession and Disposition cannot lawfully be made while the vows endure without the permission of the Moderatrix General.…—119. Those professed are prohibited from abdicating radical dominion before the profession of perpetual vows by acts inter vivos;—121. and without the permission of the Apostolic See.—120. It is fitting that all freely dispose of their goods by testament before vows.—122. Professed Sisters, both to make and to change a testament, need the permission of the Apostolic See.…—124. Concerning goods which come to the Sisters after vows have been emitted…they must or respectively can dispose according to the norms hitherto established.…—125. Sisters can in no manner dispose of a dowry offered to the Institute.—126. Whatever the Sisters shall have acquired after the emission of vows by their own industry or in consideration of the Institute, they cannot ascribe or reserve to themselves; rather, all those things must be assigned to the goods of the community, for the common utility of the Institute or house.” Norms of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 28 June 1901.

“Common life shall be established in all houses of novitiate.… In other houses a common treasury shall be established…in which all the religious shall deposit money.…” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 22 April 1851; Bizzarri, pp. 852, 853; cited Norms, nos. 127, 128.

"So that the decrees of the Council of Trent concerning the vow of poverty to be guarded may be observed more faithfully, it is commanded that no one from among the Friars, even if he is a Superior, can possess as his own, or even in the name of the convent, immovable or movable goods, or money, revenues, alms, acquired either from sermons, or from lectures, or for Masses, whether to be celebrated in his own Church or anywhere whatever, or by another just labor and cause of theirs, and under whatever name acquired, even if they are subsidies of relatives, or pious largesses, legacies, or donations; but let all these things at once be handed over to the Superior and incorporated into the convent, and be mingled with the other goods, revenues, moneys, and proceeds of it, so that from this common food and clothing can be supplied to all. But of those things which had been conceded for necessity, let no one possess anything as his own, nor use it as his own. No dispensation of any Superiors whatever, no license as regards immovable or movable goods, can excuse the brothers from being liable to the fault and penalty imposed by the same decrees of the Council and to be incurred by the very fact, even if Superiors assert that they can grant dispensations or licenses of this kind, to whom We will that faith by no means be given in this matter." Const. of Clement VIII for the reform of Regulars, 20 March 1601, nn. 3, 5, 7.

"Those professed of simple vows in Orders in which solemn vows are emitted will be able to retain the radical dominion, as they say, of their goods; but the administration of them, and the spending and use of revenues, is altogether interdicted to them. Therefore before the profession of simple vows they must cede for the time during which they remain in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use, to whomever they please, and even to their own Order, if they have so judged according to their own choice." S. C. over the State of Regulars, 12 June 1858.

"Concerning the vow of poverty the following disposition was established by the Apostolic See as regards some more recent institutes of this kind: 'The professed will be able to retain the radical dominion, as they say, of their goods; but the administration of them, and the spending and use of revenues, is altogether interdicted to them as long as they remain in the institute. Therefore before profession they must cede, even privately, the administration and use to whomever they please, and even to their own institute, if they have so judged according to their own choice. But this cession will no longer have force in the case of departure from the institute; indeed, there can be added the condition that it is revocable whenever, even if they have remained in the institute; but the professed during vows will be able by no means to use this right of revoking in conscience, unless the good pleasure of the Apostolic See accedes. This must also be said concerning goods which after profession have come to them by hereditary title. Nevertheless, they will be able to dispose concerning dominion, either by testament or, with the license however of the General Moderatrix, through acts among the living; nor is it forbidden to them to perform those acts of property, with the license of the same General Moderatrix, which are prescribed by laws.'" Bizzarri, Collectanea, pp. 793, 806, ed. 1885.

The explanation of the vow of poverty is the most difficult of the three vows. Wherefore, for the sake of clarity, a general idea of that vow seems to have to be placed before the other explanations.

— I. General Idea of the Vow of Poverty. By the vow of poverty, the religious promises to God that renunciation of exterior goods or riches which is prescribed by the constitutions of the religion as the matter of the vow.

In the present discipline of the Church, by force of the vow of poverty, from common law:

1. Every professed is prohibited from the independent use, for his own advantage, of any thing estimable by price; that is, he can use no thing estimable by price as his own, whether that thing is his own property, or belongs to the community, or to another person.

2. Every professed acquires for his religion the temporal fruits of his own industry, so that if he alienates the same without permission, he is also held to restitution on account of violated commutative justice. And this industry, if we take the norm of the responses of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, March 16, 1922, concerning moneys which come to religious on the occasion of military service, is to be taken very broadly, concerning every emolument of one's own action, even one foreign to the religious state, and concerning every donation which seems in some way remuneratory of such action, as is a donation made in reward of military virtue.

3. Those solemnly professed are incapable of ownership and, after such profession, acquire all things for the religion, if this is capable; otherwise, for the Holy See (c. 582).

It is also common that those simply professed of themselves preserve their patrimony and are capable of new acquisition.

All remaining things vary, whether you consider ownership of goods or dispositions concerning goods.

For what goods can those simply professed acquire? Quite often, besides goods which connaturally accede to the patrimony, also any legacies and gifts made in view of their own person. Yet this rule is not universal: the faculty of scholastics of the Society of Jesus is less broad.

As to dispositions concerning revenues, the professed sometimes disposes by his own free judgment; sometimes the disposition must be approved by Superiors; sometimes it is defined by the Constitutions themselves.

But concerning goods, c. 583 establishes this: To those professed of simple vows in religious Congregations it is not lawful: "1. By an act between the living to abdicate the ownership of their goods by gratuitous title." The making of a testament is prescribed to novices of religious Congregations, c. 569, §3. As to the mode of disposing of goods, sometimes, but not always, permission of the Superior is to be sought.

As to sanctions, a disposition illicitly made can be opposed either to the vow or to ecclesiastical law alone or to the Constitutions. More easily are acts contrary to the vow by which something is illicitly acquired or kept than acts by which someone illicitly renounces goods. And because in religious Orders simple profession succeeded solemn profession, which by the vow of poverty excluded all independent acts concerning any goods whatsoever, those simply professed in religious Orders seem, as often as they act illicitly, at the same time to violate the vow, while so absolute a rule cannot commonly be applied to religious Congregations.

The Constitutions must be consulted; the way in which the vow of poverty is commonly understood in the Institute must be considered.

4. But all, with due permission, can perform acts civilly necessary, for example for possessing or acquiring common goods.

— II. The remote matter of the vow of poverty is an external temporal thing estimable by price; therefore not honor, reputation, the very industry of the religious, or the application of Mass, but indeed the fruits of industry, stipends received for the application of Mass. Manuscripts, insofar as they are retained with the person, fall outside this matter, as too much joined with the person; but if the writer wishes to separate them from his person, now donation or alienation without permission is prohibited by the vow itself. Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, July 13, 1913.

A work made by art, a painted picture, are matter of the vow. But a religious artist does not violate the vow who from the beginning promises or cedes to someone the work by which he will make a statue or picture, especially if the other has furnished the material.

— III. With the goods which continue to belong to the professed now set aside, the following acts violate the vow, unless they are made honest by due permission: acquisition, in such a way nevertheless that permission can easily be presumed for accepting what yields to the utility of the religion; donation and renunciation of a right already acquired, in such a way that by refusing an alms or donation not yet accepted, though it must be said otherwise of a legacy, charity alone can be injured; exchange, in such a way nevertheless that if it concerns fungible things of the same kind, such as various coins of themselves are, this scarcely seems repugnant to the vow, and, from presumed permission, is done altogether honestly; so that exchange of things wholly similar lacks grave fault, and lesser fault is present in exchanges of similar things among brothers of the same house; consumption, in such a way that if you receive and consume food or drink among outsiders themselves, probably, according to Cardinal De Lugo (De iust. et iure, d. 3, n. 53), you do nothing except a use of fact by which the vow is not injured; otherwise if you carry things home and consume them there; loan and commodatum, in such a way that, if restitution is certain and the concession has been made for a brief time, there will not have been grave violation, and less grave if you give to a brother than to an outsider; use for other ends than those which have been taxatively indicated by the prelate expressly or tacitly, as if you do not expend the whole travel allowance given for a journey and, returned home, keep it for various uses; great negligence or quasi-dissipation in using clothing, etc., or consuming things of which, as for example paper and oil, disposition is permitted to the reasonable judgment of the religious; retention of a thing beyond the time for which it is conceded, as if you retain books of common use longer, but it will not be grave if another who needs them can easily recognize the holder; concealment of a thing, even one obtained with permission, done for this reason, lest the Superior be able to take the thing away. If the thing is concealed or locked up for another end, for example lest others see it importunately, or lest a Superior of lesser grade petition revocation of the faculty, the vow will not be violated, unless the permission is judged to have been given on this condition, that nothing be closed to the immediate Superior.

— They do not violate the vow, although they can be illicit from elsewhere: administration of another's thing, made in his name; destruction of a thing, probably, if you do it merely with the mind of doing harm, taking no utility from it; acceptance of money for a pious use, whether determined, which all concede, or even, as is probable, to be defined by the religious himself, provided that he cannot use the thing also for profane uses by his own judgment; administration of a benefice, since it accedes to a spiritual thing; possession of goods in common.

What concerning a deposit properly so called, not concerning a certain simple custody of a thing furnished? A deposit seems to others repugnant to the vow, since the depositary takes on an obligation to which he cannot fully satisfy except as owner; which others deny, since it contains no act of ownership over the thing deposited.

— The permission by which the vice of proprietorship is warded off must proceed from the proper competent Superior of the religious. Wherefore, unless the constitutions subject guests to the Superior of the house in which they are staying, he will not be able to give permission except to those religious who have domicile or quasi-domicile in the house over which he presides.

Permission would be invalid if it were extorted by force or fraud. But of itself it can be general, special, express, tacit, reasonably presumed. Presumption is plainly legitimate in circumstances where the prelate is prudently judged to oppose neither the thing or substance of the fact, nor the mode by which you act, that is, permission not having first been petitioned. For then the act is made dependently upon the will of the prelate. On the contrary, permission which would be denied cannot be presumed. If the prelate, having been asked, would have conceded permission, but is opposed to the fact that you did it with himself not consulted, then either he is judged so disposed that absolutely he would not will the thing to be used by you without permission, or, the negligence being known, he would be opposed merely to the omission of permission. In the latter case, he is unwilling only as to the mode, nor is the vow injured; in the former case, he is said to be unwilling by reason of the mode as to the substance, and the vow has been violated. Displeasure which seems likely to be grave or light can be held as a sign of one or the other repugnance.

After the fact, it is of itself fitting to admonish the Superior concerning presumed permission, and not rarely the rule enjoins it. Yet to omit this is not opposed to poverty, unless the matter, not plainly past, has some successive course, as if you keep with yourself a thing accepted from a presumed faculty.

Of itself, unless otherwise established, the permission which a prelate now performing an office previously gave continues to be valid; but he cannot give permissions to himself, as to an inferior, for the later time: for he was never subject to himself.

The dissent of a greater prelate, or a simple prohibition made by the same, of itself takes nothing away from the power of a lesser prelate, who therefore can validly concede what the greater Superior has denied. Yet the latter can weaken the former's faculty in advance or after the act.

From a reasonable interpretation, express permission of receiving several medals, rosaries, and little images in number is tacit permission of distributing them; but permission made to someone of giving or receiving, when from the declaration of the Superior or from usage it is judged to regard all, consequently gives to others the faculty of receiving or giving. Yet one must act in good faith, lest one person seem to have been constituted through whom all mutual gifts, with the Superior unaware, pass. And unless the prelate has contradicted it, from tacit or presumed permission, religious can, when the prelate cannot be approached, give modest alms in grave necessity of the poor or when this seems to pertain to edification. The same must be said concerning slight donations which are, as it were, owed from gratitude, if the religious has certain goods conceded to himself for use. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 21. And when, as in certain religions it has been accustomed to be done for clothing, a certain amount of moneys or things is so given for the support of the religious that neither the monastery must supply anything nor he himself render an account, or if he is staying outside the cloister, the faculty is judged conceded of giving to whomever he pleases that which by living more sparingly he has obtained as remaining over.

— IV. Grave Matter. 1. The question concerning grave injury of poverty is reputed difficult and is accustomed to be treated incompletely. For although today most religious are no longer solemnly professed, nevertheless present moral treatises are accustomed to examine only those cases which formerly were almost universal, namely of religious who can have nothing proper. Yet it is manifest that donation of a thing which a religious truly possesses cannot be assimilated to donation of a thing not possessed. Donation of the former, unless there were a positive prohibition, would not even be contrary to the vow of poverty. For by donating or abdicating, someone becomes poorer.

2. When there is question of the vice of proprietorship properly so called, or of acts which are prohibited by the vow to be done concerning things not proper to oneself, the more common opinion proposes this rule: the same quantity which would constitute grave theft is to be indicated as a grave injury of religion in one professing poverty. That rule rests upon a certain likeness between theft and sin against the vow of poverty: in each an undue appropriation is committed.

But this rule must be explained more; for there is absolutely and relatively grave matter of theft. Most take matter relatively grave, with account had of the riches or poverty of the monastery itself. Yet there is not question of estimating damage, which pertains to injustice, but of weighing neglect of due dependence upon Superiors, which seems to be the same whether the thing wrongly usurped belongs to a poor or to a rich one. Wherefore Palmieri, t. IV, whom Genicot follows, II, 98, thinks that an absolutely grave quantity must be taken. That opinion will be safe in a religion whose approved authors have defended it: the intention of those vowing can be judged accommodated to this, who can, not indeed turn light matter into grave, but attenuate the obligation which of itself would correspond to the matter.

But elsewhere we would not put it forward; for it seems to us alien from the true. For does not another relative consideration succeed in place of the relative consideration of damage or detriment brought? Both, justice and poverty, regard property, but in a different way: the former, that you may preserve another's property inviolate; the latter, that you may repel it from yourself. Therefore, just as under the former respect the question concerning grave matter is posed thus: what is notable spoliation of another, so under the other respect, which is our present one, this question must be solved: what is notable acquisition of a religious as such? But that this varies according to the manner of living of the one acquiring is manifest. And who will deny that a religious who, as a Capuchin Friar Minor, professes strict poverty sins gravely by a lesser quantity than a regular canon of a wealthy monastery? Wherefore we judge that the condition in which the religious who has sinned stands from his profession is to be attended to. Is it, as in most present religions, the condition of an honest priest? Matter grave in comparison with an honest priest will of itself have to be taken.

3. But a much greater quantity is required when a religious, without due permission, disposes of goods whose ownership he lawfully keeps. For then not so much the thing as the very distribution or administration is usurped. Wherefore: a. if he disposes for himself, we judge that he sins gravely when from this he draws a tenor of life which gravely derogates from the profession of poverty; b. but if he attributes to another, the quantity absolutely grave in the account of theft could perhaps be taken four or five times. And if the use was a work of piety, or something similar, the Superior will scarcely of himself be gravely unwilling.

4. Several things which are accustomed to make the prelate, whose permission removes the vice of poverty, less unwilling attenuate the gravity of the sacrilege, so that there is need of a greater quantity for lethal sin. Hence, if there is question of edibles and drink, especially for the present use of the religious, unless the thing was extraordinary and precious, grave fault will be absent; the fault is also of itself lighter if from common things you illicitly take for yourself or give to brothers of the same house than if you give to outsiders; if you intend a useful use than if a vain one.

And it is clear that when use alone is usurped, the value of the use is to be considered.

On the contrary, because the prelate is judged more unwilling, several wish that one sins more gravely against the vow if at the same time he has injured justice than if he has injured religion alone.

5. Small sacrileges, although often repeated, do not seem to coalesce. Yet he sins gravely from the beginning who deliberately accepts small things with the mind of progressing to grave matter; and he who, from several things preserved, has with himself a grave value which he cannot retain without grave guilt.

— A religious injures justice, whether toward the religion or toward outsiders, who damages, steals, retains for himself, or gives to others what by right belongs to the community or to others, all these things being understood as is explained in the treatise On Justice. But when the detriment belongs to his own religion, although the very severity of discipline and the lesser faculty of disposing in a prelate, who is not owner but administrator, does not allow that the religious be judged a son under family power, nevertheless, because the goods of the religion yield to the utility of the religious, their case seems able to be estimated more benignly than that of outsiders, so that you can increase somewhat, for example by half, the quantity required for grave sin.

The cases are:

a. of injury without sacrilege: as if a religious, merely from the mind of doing harm, brings damage upon another's thing, or as confessor unjustly dispenses someone from restitution;

b. of sacrilege without injury: as if the religious otherwise applies or hands over to another what he could consume unproductively for a certain end; if he takes for himself what the prelate would not have denied him; if what he has spared of money, for example on a journey, he expends otherwise in the same moral time; if from outsiders he accepts something consumable by use and offered exclusively to himself;

c. of sacrilege concurring with injury: as if he does not hand over to the religion the fruits of his own industry, for example Mass stipends received.

And grave injury can be light sacrilege, and conversely: as if a religious snatches a modest quantity from a poor person, or, conversely, takes for himself a great amount of money from a person lightly unwilling.

— Because permissions and obligations of religious are judged to have been made or undertaken for no temporal profit of the Institute but for the sake of religion, sloth or laziness of a religious does not seem to be condemned as injustice. A religious will make restitution to the community by avoiding expenses which he could lawfully make from common goods, by handing over to the community what he could have applied to other uses. Yet for that reason he must not deprive himself of things which are referred to his own honest support.

— On Common Life and on Peculium. A threefold account of common life can be distinguished. The first is had when, other things being equal, religious are clothed, fed, and treated in a morally equal way. Other things being equal, insofar as Superiors at the same time with paternal charity provide for the peculiar necessities of a weaker body, and, with attention to the end of the Institute, procure what special studies or ministries can require.

Another account is observed if religious obtain necessary things for themselves from the community, formally or equivalently. Formally, as when things are bought with common money; equivalently, as when things bought with another's money are handed over to the free disposition of the Superior, and are conceded for use to the religious for whom they were destined by the buyer only dependently upon the will of the Superior and precariously.

Finally the third account demands that things be administered commonly, and that there be no portion of common things which the religious, beyond what present necessity morally requires, is permitted to possess, administer, or hold for his own uses.

The first account of common life procures uniformity; the other, common possession; the third, common administration.

To the second and third account of common life peculium is opposed. But peculium is distinguished into that of perfect right, which the Superior now cannot take away, and that of imperfect right, which can be circumscribed or taken away by the Superior. Peculium of perfect right is opposed to the vow of poverty, just as it is commonly understood in present law; peculium of imperfect right is not of itself repugnant to the vow, but if there is question of lasting peculium and one received, as it were, by customs, it is alien from the mind of the Church. She urges everywhere the prudent restoration of common life. But a custom which is opposed to the Code cannot be tolerated unless centenary or immemorial, insofar as Ordinaries have judged this opportune.

2. Now the Code, c. 594, §1, prescribes that "in any religion common life be observed by all, even in those things which pertain to food, clothing, and furniture." Besides, in §2 it is enjoined that whatever religious, even Superiors, acquire by their own industry or by reason of religion, and whatever goods come to an Order by reason of the solemn profession of members, be mixed with common goods, and that any money and all securities be deposited in the common chest.

With this prescription of the second paragraph saved, the common life of which in §1 seems able to be understood as it is imposed by the constitutions. This is confirmed by c. 2389. For canon 2389 commands Superiors gravely to admonish, and, if amendment has not followed, to punish religious who in a notable matter violate the law of common life as prescribed by the constitutions.

— There does not exist a special virtue of poverty, since riches and the possession of them are of themselves indifferent. But excessive affection toward temporal goods, just as in another person, so also in a religious, is to be charged as a sin which, according to the varying case, will be opposed to varying virtue.

— Matter of the Vow. By the vow of chastity, which coheres intimately with the profession of sanctity, a religious is prohibited, from the motive of religion: a. from all lust, internal and external; b. from marriage during profession.

For the common understanding of the matter has it thus: that the material object of the vow is the same as that of the virtue. Yet it can happen that, with the virtue intact, only the vow of chastity is violated, and conversely. One who is bound by a simple vow contracts marriage illicitly but, with peculiar exception saved, validly. If he uses the same, he will indeed injure the vow but not the virtue of chastity. And he who, himself free of lust, induces someone to sin with another person, will have sinned against the virtue, but not against the vow.

Some charge the violation of a solemn vow as a stricter sacrilege; but that the species varies on account of solemnity is not demonstrated.

Marriages honorable of themselves, with a pact of continence and therefore with a vow of chastity, can be composed together. But in the vow of chastity of religious, a vow of celibacy is judged to be contained, as is proved by the canonical penalties themselves to be alleged immediately below.

— Juridical Effects. "Religious who have professed solemn vows attempt marriage invalidly" (c. 1073).

Besides, "a marriage not consummated between baptized persons, or between a baptized party and a non-baptized party, is dissolved... by the law itself through solemn religious profession" (c. 1119).

With a special disposition set aside, as in the Society of Jesus, a simple vow of chastity does not dirime marriage. And by no simple profession is a marriage merely ratified dissolved. But by simple profession nuptials are prohibited; and every vow of chastity of religious, since it is public, is reserved to the Holy See. Concerning the effect of dismissal or departure with indult, cf. below, nn. 154, 157.

— Penal Sanction. Those solemnly professed who presume to contract marriage even civilly only, just like persons who presume to contract nuptials with them in the same way, are punished with an excommunication latae sententiae simply reserved to the Holy See. If there is question of those professed of perpetual simple vows, the excommunication latae sententiae is reserved to the Ordinary (c. 2388).

On account of the word "presume," every ignorance, with affected ignorance alone excluded, excuses from the censure. But the Ordinary to whom the excommunication is reserved, since the Code defines nothing further, seems to be the one to whom the penitent is actually subject.

— Account of the Vow. The vow of obedience of religious is a promise made to God of the obedience which is owed in religious life.

1. Whom one must obey. By force of the vow of obedience, the religious must obey: a. that hierarchical prelate who commands him as a religious by power of jurisdiction. This is, as to Orders and Congregations of pontifical law, the Supreme Pontiff (c. 499, §1) and the regular Prelate, at least exempt; as to diocesan religions, also the bishop or quasi-bishop; b. those who are placed over the internal governance of the religion or house: therefore the religious Superior properly so called, and also, if usage bears this, others to whom the Superior has communicated his power, as to a Prior, sub-Prelate, or Minister, sub-Rector. But usage rather has it that, at least when the Superior of the house is present, he alone is to be obeyed from the vow. Yet in other matters the authority of the Superior himself, and thus the vow, could be violated.

2. The remote matter of the vow is contained in all those things which either are explicitly presented by the rule or constitutions, or belong to it reductively, insofar as they are at least very suitable for the observance of the rule: thus mutual services, suitable punishment of delicts. For religious vow obedience according to their religious manner of life. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 104, art. 5 ad 3.

Although the matter is disputed, internal acts do not seem able to be directly prescribed, since obedience owed to man cannot exceed the mutual conversation of men, which is circumscribed by external things.

In doubts concerning power, the presumption stands for the Superior, at least when the matter belongs to the genus in which it is established that the Superior can command; in doubts concerning the honesty of the matter, if the Superior prescribes what is probably honorable, he seems to have to be obeyed, though Lessius is contrary, c. 41, n. 76. In negative doubts, let the subject simply commit himself to the governance of Superiors.

— The proximate matter of the vow of obedience comprehends precepts strictly such, which are imposed on religious as such by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction.⁽¹⁾ Precepts strictly such, that is, by which the Superior intends to oblige conscience; on religious as such, that is, precepts which are referred to their proper state, not to the common condition of citizens or the faithful, such as precepts concerning the observing of sacred times; by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction, so that he also will have violated the vow who has transgressed a rule obliging under sin. Yet one must see how the vow is commonly understood in the religion of the one vowing. But violation of the special law of religious or of laws which have been made for religious does not seem contrary to the vow unless it brings forth properly so-called precepts.

In many religions today, the Superior is not judged properly to command, not even under light sin, through the very words: "I strictly prescribe"; "I enjoin under precept"; but it is necessary that he command in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience, or by at least some other manner clearly express his will of obliging conscience.

Therefore he sins against the vow:

1. Who impedes the precepts themselves while he tries to withdraw himself from the dominion of Superiors in perpetuity or for a time: through apostasy, flight, or by illicitly procuring his own expulsion.

2. Who virtually violates the precepts when, even on the occasion of a simple command, he absolutely declares: "I do not wish to obey, I will not do it," understanding that of every matter or of some grave matter. If he limits it to a small matter, which seems to him useless or ridiculous, the violation will not have been grave.

3. Who violates a precept obliging under sin.

Violation of the vow of obedience is sacrilege; and besides, a sin, generally light, against observance toward the Superior to whose dominative power the religious is subject. If the Superior, which he is not presumed to do, has used his power of jurisdiction in commanding, the sin will also be opposed to that virtue to which the matter prescribed pertains.

⁽¹⁾ There are those (Suarez, Rel., tr. 7, l. 10, c. 2, n. 5; Sanchez, Dec., 4. 11, 25) who think that it remains entire for the Superior, when he prescribes by force of jurisdiction, either to urge or to omit the obligation of the vow. Rather, from our very definition of religious obedience, we would take away the opposite opinion from Lugo. Cf. Lugo, Paenit., 10, 172.

— An Opportune Manner of Prescribing. It pertains to the gentle governance of Superiors that they rarely induce the guilt of sin by their precepts. But a religious who does not obey the more broadly preceptive will of the prelate, although he is not a transgressor of his vow, nevertheless will offend observance toward the Superior, charity toward the community, and humility; and habitual disobedience of this kind does not seem to be excused from grave guilt, whether on account of the sadness by which it affects the Superior and Brothers, or on account of the common detriment which it effects, or on account of the danger of expulsion which it thus prepares. It is not rarely said to transgress the virtue of obedience, or obedience commonly so called. Yet the special virtue of obedience does not intervene here.

197. Principles. - Religious of themselves preserve entire rights in the internal goods of body and soul and in reputation, although they must satisfy special obligations of obedience. But as to external goods of fortune, they are bound by the vow of poverty; by reason of which:

1. The solemnly professed are incapable of private dominion, so that the goods which they possess they cannot keep, and other goods they cannot acquire (can. 579, 581, 582); yet they can possess in common, unless by their special constitutions they are prohibited from this, as the Friars Minor and Capuchins.

Yet by dispensation they can in certain regions, as in Belgium, acquire and retain goods in particular, but only in order to civil law (S. Poen., Dec. 1, 1820; and Leo XIII, July 31, 1878).

2. The simply professed remain capable of possessing goods (c. 580, § 1), but they cannot dispose of them without the express or tacit consent of the superior; consequently:

a) before profession, they must cede the administration of their goods to whom they wish, and, unless the constitutions provide otherwise, freely dispose of their use and usufruct (c. 569);

b) in a religious congregation, the novice must, before the profession of temporary vows, freely make a testament concerning present goods or goods perhaps to come (c. 569, § 3), which, when vows have been emitted, he cannot licitly change without the permission either of the Holy See or, if a cause is urgent, of the Superior (c. 583);

c) the professed in a religious congregation cannot licitly abdicate dominion of their goods by gratuitous title through an act among the living (c. 583);

d) whatever any professed acquire by their own industry or in view of religion, they acquire for the religion (c. 580, § 2).

More particular matters pertain to canonical legislation concerning religious.

I say. 1st. A Religious bound by the solemn vow of poverty, at least by force of ecclesiastical law, and therefore, with dispensation of the Roman Pontiff excluded, is altogether incapable in particular, or personally, of any dominion over a temporal thing estimable by price, even with the permission of the superior. - I said personally, because the community can acquire and possess goods either through itself or through subjects, unless its constitutions stand in the way. Hence the common axiom of canon law: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery." - This is established from the Council of Trent, sess. 25, cap. 2.

I say. 2nd. A Religious bound by the simple vow of poverty can indeed have direct dominion of goods; but he cannot licitly dispose of anything concerning them without the particular or general permission of the superior, although he can validly. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 18 and seq.

Question 1. What is the difference between the vow and the virtue of poverty?

Resp. The vow regards only external acts of ownership; but the virtue extends also to the internal affections of the heart. For the object of the vow is to despoil the Religious outwardly of temporal goods. But the virtue has as its end to cut away entirely every disordered affection of the heart toward earthly things. Therefore the vow of poverty is, as it were, a means to the virtue, which is the end to be obtained; and consequently the virtue of poverty extends much more widely than the vow: for as often as someone infringes the vow, at the same time he also wounds the virtue; but not vice versa. - I said that the vow affects only external acts of ownership; nevertheless the vow could be violated by an internal act which would regard and touch an external act, namely by the desire of acting externally against the vow; since desire takes on all the malice and species of the external act, as was said in the tract on sins, n. 136.

Question 2. To what things does the direct dominion of a Religious not solemnly professed extend?

Resp. §1. Any professed of simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless something else has been provided in the constitutions, preserves the ownership of his goods and the capacity of acquiring other goods, with those things safe which are prescribed in can. 569.

§2. But whatever he acquires by his industry or in view of religion, he acquires for the religion.

§3. The professed can change the cession or disposition of which in can. 569, §2, not indeed by his own judgment, unless the constitutions allow this, but by permission of the supreme Moderator, or, if there is question of nuns, by permission of the local Ordinary and, if the monastery is subject to regulars, of the regular Superior, provided that the change, at least concerning a notable part of the goods, is not made in favor of the religion; but through departure from the religion a cession and disposition of this sort ceases to have force (Can. 580). - Cf. Above, n. 611, Q. 20.

Question 3. Can a Religious, without permission of the superior, keep his own manuscripts and transfer them to another?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion; for manuscripts, as offspring of the mind, are held as something spiritual. Moreover they pertain to knowledge, which does not fall under the vow of poverty; but the more powerful reason is that the common and received custom among Regulars so bears. And the same is to be said, according to many, concerning Relics of the Saints. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 14.

Question 4. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty if he expends something from things granted for a determinate use into another use?

Resp. Affirmatively; and the reason is that in these things a Religious has only use of fact, and that precariously, as long as it shall seem good to the superior. But to dispose of some thing according to one's own judgment is an act of ownership or dominion; and otherwise the will or permission of the superior, unless something else is manifest, is restricted to the use assigned. Wherefore a Religious cannot, without permission, give to others or in any way alienate those things which by living more sparingly he has taken away for himself from the things granted for use. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 19 and 23.

Question 5. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty who receives money from an outsider to be spent at pleasure upon pious works?

Resp. Affirmatively, if he receives it as given absolutely to himself, in order that he may distribute it in his own name. The reason is that by acting thus the Religious would make an act of ownership. But otherwise it must be said if he received it as to be distributed in the name of the donor, even if there is left to him the faculty of choosing the poor or some pious work, or how much is to be distributed; and a fortiori if a faculty of this sort is not left to him. The reason is that then the Religious would indeed make an act of prudence, but not of ownership; for he would be as it were the channel and mandatary of the donor. Hence a Religious does not sin against the vow of poverty who receives from an outsider money to be expended upon such a poor person, such a monastery, church, such a pious cause, etc. Indeed he does not sin if he himself, without the permission of the superior, asks money from an outsider to be handed over to another determinate person, although, if there is question of a matter of great moment, prudence counsels and the right order of religious discipline requires that the subject do nothing unless first he has obtained the assent of the superior, even if he incurs no danger of violating poverty. Cf. Sanchez, Decal., lib. 7, cap. 30. - Lugo, de just. et jure, disp. 3, n. 155. - Salmant., de Restit., cap. 6, n. 15. - Baller., note (a), p. 97; note (a), p. 99; and note (b), p. 104.

Question 6. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty who refuses those things which are offered to him by outsiders?

Resp. Negatively, if there is question of mere donations, alms, or gifts to which he does not have a strict right. The reason is that the vow of poverty does not oblige him to receive those things which he has not yet acquired, or to which neither he himself nor the monastery has a strict right. Nevertheless, if the Religious has no reason for refusing, he sins against charity by impeding the good of his Religion. - But otherwise one must answer if there is question of things owed by title of justice, or indeed donated but already accepted; for once acceptance has been placed, the monastery immediately acquires a right. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20.

Question 7. Does a Religious sin not only against the vow of poverty, but also against justice, who unduly expends or consumes things of the monastery?

Resp. If he expends or consumes without any, not even tacit or presumed, permission of the superior, he is guilty of violated justice, because he commits true theft by converting another's thing to his own use against the reasonable will of the owner. But if he expends or consumes, the superior permitting or conniving, but for illicit or notably superfluous uses, he certainly sins against the vow; but whether he sins against justice is controverted. St. Alphonsus with others affirms it, because such permission is invalid and void; for the superior is not the owner, but a simple administrator of the goods of the monastery. De Lugo, Elbel, and many others deny it, because, although the Prelate is only administrator of the goods, it is not established by any law, at least universal law, that the owner himself, namely the community or religious Order, wished to invalidate permission of this sort, although it altogether disapproves it. Either opinion seems probable. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30.

Question 8. What matter is to be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1st. In sins which are at once against religion and justice, generally speaking, that is to be held as grave matter which constitutes mortal sin in theft; and although a few theologians say that that matter alone is grave matter which is judged grave in thefts of sons of a family, namely matter about twice greater than in thefts against outsiders, nevertheless this in no way seems to be admitted. The reason is that sons are in hope of the goods of the father of the family, but Religious are not. Moreover Superiors are more, and indeed reasonably, unwilling as regards thefts of subjects than parents are concerning thefts of sons. Besides, graver detriments follow as regards the soul in the former than in the latter. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24. - Lugo, de just. et jure, disp. 3, n. 172. - Sanchez, Decal., lib. 7, cap. 20, n. 3.

But in order that judgment be made concerning the gravity of matter in thefts of Religious, it is to be noted that monasteries moderately wealthy are commonly equated with private masters sufficiently wealthy. Hence the same measure as for them generally constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also to be required if a Religious usurps things of the monastery for his own use or gives them to others of the same community, than if he expended them upon outsiders, because in this way they remain at home. Greater also in petty thefts, which moreover, with a notable interval interposed, do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in foodstuffs, as we said concerning servants.

Resp. 2nd. In sins against religion alone, or committed against the vow alone, the difficulty increases and there is greater disagreement of theologians. Nevertheless more commonly they generally require the same matter for mortal sin as in the preceding case, where justice is violated, because an act of ownership seems to be of the same gravity. Nevertheless not improbably some grave Doctors require a greater quantity for grave sin. Cf. Elbel, n. 646. Salmant., tract. 15, cap. 6, n. 12.

But they commonly agree that a much greater value is required for sinning gravely when gifts are received from outsiders to be expended upon others, because then the act of ownership is much less than if these were retained for one's own use. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24.

Question 9. When can one professed by simple vows not validly renounce, when can he validly renounce, and when must he renounce the goods which he actually has?

Resp. §1. One professed by simple vows cannot validly do so before, but within sixty days before solemn profession, with peculiar indults granted by the Holy See being safe, he must renounce all the goods which he actually has, to whom he prefers, under the condition of profession to follow.

§2. After profession has followed, all those things are to be done at once which are necessary in order that the renunciation obtain effect also in civil law (Can. 581).

Therefore he must, within sixty days before solemn profession, with indults being safe, renounce conditionally all goods which he actually has; before that time he cannot validly make that renunciation.

Question 10. To whom do goods fall which come in any way to a regular after solemn profession?

After solemn profession, peculiar indults of the Apostolic See likewise being safe, all goods which in any way come to a regular:

1st. In an Order capable of possessing, fall to the Order, or province, or house according to the constitutions;

2nd. In an incapable Order, are acquired as property for the Holy See (Can. 582).

Question 11. What is not lawful for those professed by simple vows in religious Congregations in relation to the abdication of dominion and the change of a testament already made according to the norm of can. 569, §3?

Resp. 1st. By an act among the living it is not lawful to abdicate the dominion of one's goods by a gratuitous title;

2nd. It is not lawful to change a testament made according to the norm of canon 569, §3, without the permission of the Holy See; or if the matter is urgent and time does not suffice for recurring to it, without the permission of the major Superior, or, if even he cannot be approached, of the local Superior. Cf. Can. 583.

Question 12. How is an invalid religious profession validated?

Resp. §1. A religious profession invalid because of an external impediment is not validated by subsequent acts, but it is necessary either that it be sanated by the Apostolic See, or that, the nullity having been known and the impediment removed, it be emitted legitimately anew.

§2. But if it was invalid because of a merely internal defect of consent, once this has been furnished, it is validated, provided that on the part of the religion consent has not been revoked.

§3. If there are grave arguments against the validity of the religious profession and the religious refuses, for safety, either to renew the profession or to seek its sanation, the matter is to be referred to the Apostolic See (Can. 586).

Wherefore a subsequent renewal would not validate the profession, but this must be emitted legitimately when at last the nullity has been known and the impediment removed.

You Will Resolve. 1st. A Religious sins against the vow of poverty if without any consent of the superior he accepts, retains, consumes, exchanges, or gives to another, at home or outside, anything, even from those things which pertain to food or clothing. Likewise if without the permission of the superior he accepts money or other things on loan or for use from outsiders. But as regards things received or handed over on loan or for use without the permission of the Prelate, generally speaking, he will not sin gravely against the vow of poverty if he gives things for his use to outsiders on loan or for use, provided he is certain about recovering them and does not therefore bring grave damage upon the community, which on this account, for example, lacks the use of a thing gravely necessary here and now. Much less gravely will he sin if he lends or gives for use to other Religious of the same monastery things granted to himself for use. The reason is that, although he makes some act of ownership in these things, nevertheless this is not here estimable at so great a price that it reaches grave matter, according to the common interpretation of theologians. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 27.

2nd. He sins against the vow of poverty who retains a thing accepted with permission for use beyond the limits of time fixed beforehand by the superior; who employs it for another use with detriment to it; who keeps a thing with the intention of withdrawing it from the free disposition of the superior, for example, if he hides it so that it may not be seen; and indeed this one cannot be excused from the fact that he had previously obtained permission. But, generally speaking, grave fault is not present if a thing is taken secretly from the community, for example, a book for one's own use even for a long time, but not perpetually, unless it is so hidden that it cannot be found by Superiors; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as regards the substance, but only as regards the manner. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24.

3rd. He sins against the vow of poverty who, without the faculty of the superior, buys something even for the community, because he acts as an owner. Sometimes, however, he can presume permission, namely when he knows that it will be pleasing to the superior and easy recourse to him is not open, for example, on a journey. But permission of this sort can more easily be presumed in matters of lesser moment, and much more easily still if there is question of a thing to be accepted from outsiders and handed over to the superior. - Cf. Lacroix, lib. 4, nn. 118 and seq.

4th. A Religious cannot accept any deposit properly so called without permission. The reason is both because according to the opinion of many he would make an act of ownership, and because a deposit is a contract; but a Religious without the faculty of the superior cannot enter into any contract concerning temporal things. - Many, however, think that this is not against the vow, although it is against the perfection of poverty and for the most part against the rule. - Cf. Suarez, de Relig., tract. 7, lib. 8, cap. 11, n. 45.

5th. If a former superior gave you permission to have some thing, it still has force, even if he has departed from office. - Cf. Lacroix, n. 115.

6th. If you have permission to give something to Paul, and you give it to Peter, you do not sin, unless the superior gave permission for Paul because of a peculiar reason and would have denied it if you had asked this for Peter. - Cf. Lacroix, n. 119.

7th. If Titius the Religious has permission to give something to anyone whatsoever, Caius of the same community by this very fact has the faculty of accepting, because to give and to accept are correlatives, and therefore permission for one is judged also to be for the other.

8th. Concerning manuscripts, certain recent replies are to be kept before the eyes:

"Religious belonging to Institutes of simple vows are held by the same laws as Regulars of solemn vows as regards the Imprimatur, or good-pleasure, to be requested from their Superiors, whenever they desire to publish some manuscript of their own." And as often as "publication of some manuscript has been interdicted" by their Superiors, they cannot "hand the same manuscript to some printer who publishes it with the Imprimatur of the local Ordinary, the author's name being suppressed." - S. Cong. de Relig., 11 June, 1911.

It was asked of the same Congregation: "Whether Religious, both of solemn vows and of simple vows, who during vows have written out some manuscript, have dominion of the same in such a way that they can give it or alienate it by any title whatsoever?" and the answer was: Negative, 13 July, 1913. These replies are connected with one another. Cf. the preface to the last one in the context itself. The most recent reply simply excludes the case of a Religious who, permission to print a manuscript having been denied, gives it to a friend, and this friend, having been made owner of it, sees to the printing. Therefore from that reply a Religious cannot give to another, or alienate by any title whatsoever, a manuscript written out by himself during vows. Indeed the Sacred Congregation is not speaking of a manuscript work by a Religious who has been assigned to writing by mandate of the superior, nor of a work of no value. For as regards the first, no one affirms that he can alienate it, just as no one denies it of the second. A manuscript written out seems altogether to be taken as signifying either some complete work composed by industry with labor, or something similar, which by law can be the object of a contract. Moreover the reply is expressed entirely cautiously: "written out during vows"; nothing is said concerning others, concerning which certainly he is obliged now as before, neither more nor less, at least when this reply is considered; it is said, "Whether . . . they so have dominion of the same that they may give it, etc." To which the Congregation responded: "Negative." Therefore the decree is not opposed to the doctrine contained in Question 3. - Cf. De Religiosis, Periodica, v. 7, p. 165. - Nouvelle Rev. Theol., v. 45, p. 709. - Ferreres, n. 156.

Note. - Let these things be said concerning religious poverty in general; but in particular attention must be given to the constitutions of individual Orders or to the custom tolerated by Superiors; for in many monasteries it is generally permitted to Religious to ask, accept, or procure for themselves many things necessary for food, clothing, books, and other things of this kind.

I. The vow of poverty is the first foundation of the regular life. The matter of that vow is the abdication of temporal things, manifested by Christ the Lord, Matthew 19: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. The other two counsels — of cultivating virginity, and of abnegating one's own will and subjecting oneself to a man's authority — the divine Master expressed in few words. But the very method by which the Apostles and the first Christians committed to execution the evangelical counsel of poverty the Evangelist Luke describes clearly and distinctly, Acts 2: And all they that believed were together, and had all things common. Their possessions and goods they sold, and divided them to all, according as every one had need. More fully does the holy Evangelist express this form of poverty in chapter 4: And the multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul: neither did any one say that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but all things were common unto them. … For neither was there any one needy among them. For as many as were owners of lands or houses sold them, and brought the price of the things they sold, and laid it down before the feet of the apostles. And distribution was made to every one, according as he had need.

II. This is that poverty propped by the community of goods, which Christ set forth in his apostolic College as the foundation of heavenly perfection, which, being set in charity, joins men with the bond of the concord of love mutually with one another and with God. For the propriety of goods kindles cupidity, and like a seditious citizen stirs up tumults, quarrels, and dissensions, sunders hearts and souls, and drags them apart into contrary factions. But community, since it takes away all propriety, tears up also the root of contentions, quarrels, and dissensions, and induces a communion of heavenly goods. For these two things are connected: 1. They were one heart and one soul; 2. All things were common unto them.

III. Poverty taken generally admits several degrees: of which one excludes the dominion and use of any thing whatsoever as one's own; another rejects dominion and proper use, yet retains the capacity for dominion; a third neither absolutely abdicates dominion nor becomes incapable of dominion, but only uses no thing as its own; a fourth betrays a privation neither of dominion nor of use, but admits only that measure of goods which is necessary for the sustentation of life, and rejects all the rest. To these four degrees all the others are reduced. The first degree of poverty Regulars now vow. The third the scholars of the Society name. The other two anyone can vow.

IV. Very many theologians exhibit this definition of monastic poverty: The vow of poverty is a voluntary abdication of temporal goods, by which the one vowing is deprived of the propriety of the same. Others say more compressedly: It is the abdication of dominion. Which definitions, exactly squared to the rule of Metaphysics, describe poverty taken generally, but not as to be committed to execution. Two things they distinguish in this vow. The first they call essential, set in the abdication of dominion. The other they call accidental, which regards the use of goods. Hence they infer that the connexion of the vow of poverty with the community of goods is accidental — which holds true of poverty taken generally: whether that suffice for explaining monastic poverty I shall presently say.

I ASSERT secondly that the vow of poverty is a holy Counsel of God. Thou hast very many arguments and authorities in D. Bonavent. in Apologia Pauperum, of the third responsio, chapter one.

It is proved by D. Bonavent. in the first place cited, and in Diaeta salutis, tit. 4. cap. 1. near the end, and tit. 6. cap. 2. from that of Matth. 19.: If thou wilt be perfect: Go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven. D. Aug. epist. 89. quaest. 4. and in Psal. 103. concion. 3. refers this whole place excellently to the Monastic profession.

Calvinus answers lib. 4. Instit. cap. 13. § 13. that that young man lied, when he said: All these things I have kept (that is, the commandments) from my youth, and therefore Christ, mocking him, said to him: Go, sell, etc. That he had not fulfilled the commandments he proves, because the great commandment is to love God above all things, and yet he did not love God with his whole heart, because, having heard: Go, sell all things for love of me, he went away sad.

But Calvinus strikes his foot with the hoe; for if Christ imposed that commandment on that young man, impossible no less than to number the stars of heaven (as he himself says), by what argument is he convicted of sin, because he went away grieving?

The same Petrus Martyr answers nearly with Calvinus; therefore both, now reprobate, lie.

I press the point, for in 10. Marci it is said: Christ loved him. By what argument then do they either convict him of lying, or ironically lead him on to things simply impossible?

Pseudomartyr insists that this is a commandment: If thou wilt be perfect, for in Matth. 5. we are commanded: Be ye perfect, as also your Father is perfect.

It is answered that that perfection, like that of the eternal Father, is simply impossible, unless one be some god; therefore only imitation is urged in charity, not is every work commanded.

Martyr answers that this commandment was given to this young man alone.

But this is false: for many Saints acknowledged that it was said to them also. Thus D. Antonius, as S. Athanasius testifies in his life, and S. P. Franciscus, as S. Bonaventura notes in his life, where S. Doctor advertises that this counsel was given under this condition: If thou wilt be perfect, as if he said: This is the way, and the ladder, to perfection, to which whosoever wills to ascend must leave all things.

From these the exposition of Osiander falls also, apud Alphonsum Viviesium Phil. 20.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonavent. in Diaeta, tit. 4. cap. 1. from 4. Actorum: And the multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul: neither did any one say that aught of the things which he possessed was his own, but all things were common unto them. That they agreed thus by vow, D. Augustinus asserts, in the first sermon de communi vita clericorum.

It is confirmed, for Ananias, and Saphira, were therefore punished with death because they retained something of their own; otherwise they would not have deserved so great a punishment.

That they had already vowed it is proved; for it is said: He defrauded of the price of the field; but it would not be fraud unless the thing had already been promised; and therefore the Apostle says: While it remained, did it not remain to thee, and being sold, was it not in thy power? That that violation was sacrilegious the Apostle testifies: Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart, to lie to the Holy Ghost? Thou hast not lied to men, but to God.

IT IS CONFIRMED from the holy Fathers, who acknowledge this breaking of a vow. Thus Chrysostomus homil. 12. in Acta. Hieronymus epistola 8. which is ad Demetriadem. Augustinus serm. 27. de verbis Apostoli, and sermone 10. de diversis. Fulgentius epistola de debito coniugali, cap. 8. Gregorius lib. 1. epist. 33. Arator lib. 1. in Acta Apostolorum. Oecumenius, on this place. Beda on this place.

IT IS PROVED then by D. Bonavent. in his works on Poverty, from the Fathers, especially in the Apologia, loco citato, where he reports very many; lib. indeed 1. Pharetrae, cap. 41. he brings among others D. Bernardum epistola 103. and in the first sermon of all the saints, expounding that of Matth. 5.: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Thus also the saints expound: Ambrosius in 6. Lucae, Nyssenus, Hieronymus, Beda on 5. Matth. Leo in the sermon on this Gospel, Chrysostomus, and Anselmus on that place; Basil. quaest. 105. Abulensis, Lyra, Caictanus, Iansenius, who expound of actual voluntary poverty: for the Greek word πτωχὸς also sounds of a beggar. It is confirmed, for in Lucae 6. the Poor, who are said to be blessed, are opposed not to the proud but to the rich; for he soon adds: Woe to you, rich, as Bellarminus notes, ad eum locum, where he confirms that the name of poor agrees here with that: Who when he was rich became needy. 2. Corinth. 8. whence S. Bonavent. deduces that it speaks of actual voluntary poverty: and below he observes that the woe against the rich is opposed to the Beatitude of the poor.

HENCE therefore S. Bonavent. argues that it is best to vow poverty, loco citato in Lucam.

From this the exposition of Calvinus falls, who by "the poor" expounds "the afflicted."

AGAINST it, indeed, because, as Bellarminus notes, after D. Bonavent. ad 6. Lucae, he distinguishes the poor from those who mourn.

But S. Bonavent. disputes it deliberately, opuscul. de paupertate Christi, contra Guillelmum.

FIRST he shows it from that Matth. 19.: If thou wilt be perfect: go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor; and follow me.

SECONDLY from that of Peter, who, the promises having been made to the poor, animated, said: Behold we have left all things, and have followed thee: what therefore shall we have? and Christ promises them: Amen I say to you: that you, who have followed me, shall sit upon twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israël; and every one that hath left house, or brethren, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive an hundredfold, and shall possess life everlasting.

But S. Bonavent. OBSERVES, with the Glossa, that not a part of the goods, but all, were to be renounced.

THIRDLY he proves it from that Marci 12. where Christ praised the widow, who sent those two mites, necessary to herself, into the Gazophylacium. But this, of her want, sent all that she had, her whole livelihood.

FOURTHLY he proves it from that Lucae 12. where, that rich man having been blamed, greedy of gathering, he exhorts to renouncing all things, and to living after the manner of the birds, especially the crows, which, possessing nothing, are fed by the providence of God: Consider the ravens, for they sow not, neither do they reap; they have neither storehouse nor barn, and God feedeth them, after that Psalm. 146.: Who giveth to their beasts their food, and to the young ravens that call upon him. But S. Bonavent. advertises, ad eum locum Lucae, that the crows are put among the other birds, partly because they are of the greatest gluttony, as is intimated Genes. 8. of that raven, which went forth and did not return back; because it had settled on carcasses. Then because the young of crows are abandoned by their parents, and, naked and unfit to seek food, are fed by God, as is had Iob 38.: Who will prepare food for the raven, when her young ones cry unto God? Whence by the crows he understands also the other birds, as is said Matth. 6.: Behold the birds of the air.

HENCE Christ elicits the inference: How much more are you better than they: For indeed, because someone could argue that it is more fitting for us to be solicitous, because we have need of more things, Christ rebukes: And which of you, by thinking, can add to his stature one cubit. Thus therefore he argues: He who gives you the growth of the body even to the last hair, will give also the necessaries to the body; therefore he concludes: If then ye be not able to do even the least thing, why are you solicitous for the rest?

HE ADDS also: Consider the lilies, how they grow: they labour not, neither do they spin, etc. From this indeed Christ advances step by step to urging the selling of all things: Sell what ye possess, and give alms, where he answers that counsel, Matth. 19.: If thou wilt be perfect, etc. as D. Bonavent. notes, loco cit. in Lucam, where he also refers the Fathers to this.

FIFTHLY from that Lucae 14.: Every one of you that renounceth not all that he possesseth cannot be my disciple, where he observes from the Gloss that the disciples of Christ, who profess the chief religion, ought to renounce also in effect. Which the same S. Bonavent. observes, ad 14. Lucae, from the same Gloss, where he also notes, from D. Bernardo, loco supra citato declamat that this is laid as the foundation of edification, as he had said, Lucae 12.: For which of you having a mind to build a tower, doth not first sit down and think whether he have means to finish it? and therefore the first beatitude is placed at the beginning for the poor: Blessed are the poor in spirit, etc.

But S. Bonavent. CONFIRMS it in the opusculo cited; whom Bellarminus follows, loco addicto: that Christ urged poverty in affection, because he himself was most poor, as is said Matth. 8.: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head, as the Gloss notes. Whence D. Chrysostomus, homil. 28. in Matth.: Why wouldst thou gather money, following me? Seest thou not that I have not so much as a lodging, not so much as the birds have?

NEXT Matth. 17. Christ had not a stater to pay the tribute. Whence he says to Peter: Go thou to the sea, etc. so the Gloss observes.

IOANNIS C. 14.: The prince of this world cometh, and in me he hath not any thing, as the Gloss notes, and secunda Corinth. 8.: For your sakes he became needy, when he was rich; in this I give counsel. Where D. Bonavent. adds Augustinian words in the original: He became so needy as not to have what the foxes have; and in this I give counsel, he subjoins under a breath, that ye imitate his poverty. Thus it is expounded also by D. Hieronymo in the Gloss, and Lyrano, and other expositors.

NOW indeed D. Bonavent. argues thus most strongly against Guillelmum: Christ made his works holy, most worthy of imitation, especially in suffering nakedness, poverty, etc. as is said prima Petri 2.: Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that ye should follow his steps: Therefore to vow poverty is holy.

HENCE D. Hieronymus ad Hedibiam, epist. 150.: Wilt thou be perfect, and stand in the first pinnacle of dignity? Do what the Apostles did: Sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow the Saviour. The same he has in epistola 1. ad Heliodorum, and Matth. 6. on those words: Behold the birds of the air, etc.

He confirms it with the testimonies of other holy Fathers. These are Ambrosius in Lucam lib. 6. cap. 9. Tom. 3. and lib. 2. de offic. Tom. 4. Augustinus lib. de bono coniug. cap. 8. at the end, Tom. 6. de eccl. dogm. cap. 71. Gregorius homil. 20. in Ezech. Bernardus epist. 42. Prosper de vita contemplativa, lib. 2. cap. 9. and it is had in 12. quaest. 1.

HE PROVES it then by reasons. The first is: The more one withdraws from the occasion of cupidity, the more one ascends toward the city of God: but by poverty we are wholly separated from the occasion of cupidity: Therefore. The minor is evident. The major is proved, because the more one withdraws from one opposite, the more one approaches the other opposite: but the city of God and the city of the Devil are opposites, because the former has for its foundation the love of eternal things; and the city of the devil, cupidity: Therefore. See the other reasons in D. Bonaventura.

But the principal one for proving the sanctity of poverty, even that excluding the common, is: As simple is related to simple, so more to more; but poverty simply is laudable: Therefore greater poverty is more laudable. Such is this: Therefore.

SINCE the price of heaven, appraised by Christ, is the spirit of poverty: Blessed are the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven, no one who wishes to purchase such treasures can exempt himself from this poverty; Truly a loftier voice sounds in the ears of the perfect: If you will be perfect, go, and sell, etc. the rich shrink from this voice; grown fat with riches; the unclean, fatted with delights; and the proud, enlarged with honors, as the Holy Doctor has it tit. 3. dicta salut. cap. 3. citing that of Deuteronomy 32. Incrassatus, impinguatus, dilatatus, dereliquit Deum factorem suum, nor do they gladly receive this counsel, even those who profess a more exact observance of the commandments, as was that Young man who, after he had said, Matthew 19: all these have I kept from my youth, upon hearing: Go and sell, and give, at the sound of these words was struck dumb, and went away sad, for he was having many possessions; nor is it a wonder, for not all receive that word, since poverty is set as a sign, which is contradicted, as the Seraphic Doctor has at the place cited. The essence, excellence, and becomingness of this votive virtue we undertake to discuss here briefly.

All (as the common saying goes,) divert the rivulets of waters to their own mill. They say therefore. D. Thomas quaest. 188. art. 7. with the distinguished disciples of his order, and the Fathers of the Society, among whom Suarez tomo 3. de Relig. lib. 8. cap. 9. Valencia disp. 10. quaest. 6. puncto 2. and others related by Basseus, V. Religio 1. num. 13. that their poverty excels the others.

They suppose, however, that Religion to be more perfect which is ordered to the better end. Since indeed the contemplative life is ordered to a higher end, namely it is raised to union with God; than the active, which is destined to the aids of neighbors, as Christ defines, Luke 10. Martha, you are anxious and troubled about many things: Mary has chosen the best part, etc. But that is better than both which attends to God by contemplation, and to neighbor by aid, especially spiritual; since these more closely imitate the mixed life of Christ and the Apostles, and not only shine by virtue but also illuminate, as D. Thomas discusses quaest. 188. art. 6. Sylvius with Cajet. ibi Sylvest. V. Religio, 1. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 41. dub. 2. Layman lib. 4. tract. 5. cap. 1.

They suppose next, that Poverty, fasts, etc. are not the very formal object of perfection, but are mere instruments, whence it happens that their goodness and perfection must be drawn not from absolute perfection, but from instrumental; and accordingly that poverty will not be more perfect which strips more strictly, but which better serves the end of religion. Thence they advance, that since some external goods are required for the mixed life, the perfection of religion is not diminished if some goods are laid down in common, surely so that individuals without anxiety may attend to the end of religion. This doctrine is acclaimed with much applause, received. This at least Suarez asserts in some Religions num. 5. after Viguet. sum. cap. 17. §. 1. Ferrar. 3. com. G. cap. 143. and others. He proves it with Valencia, because the Most Holy Council of Trent sess. 25. cap. 3. de regul. concedes immovable goods to mendicant Religions, except only the FF. of Observance and the Capuchins.

Caius, born in Belgium, entered a religious order of solemn vows in the English province with the intention of devoting himself to the foreign missions. When his studies were completed, he made solemn profession, and after a year received news of his father’s death in Belgium and of the legitimate portion of his father’s goods falling to him according to Belgian laws. But since regulars in Belgium, notwithstanding even a solemn vow of poverty, remain capable of ownership by a pontifical dispensation, Caius doubted whether he himself could enter upon the inheritance or not. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a vow?

2. What are the effects of the vow of poverty, and which of these are from the nature of the vow and which from ecclesiastical law?

3. How is the solemnity of the vow of poverty compatible with the capacity to have ownership?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 246.

2. What are the effects of the vow of poverty and of these which follow from the nature of the vow, and which follow from positive ecclesiastical law?

By the vow of poverty the Religious makes a voluntary renunciation of temporal goods that have pecuniary value.

It belongs to the essence of such a vow that the Religious should not retain any independent use of such temporal goods, and the unlawfulness of such use independently of the will of the Superior is therefore a necessary effect of the vow of poverty. Ownership of property is not necessarily repugnant to religious poverty, provided that there be no independent use of it. But by ecclesiastical law the solemn vow of poverty makes the Religious incapable of possessing property as his own individually; he becomes civilly dead; individually he can neither own, acquire, or dispose of property that has pecuniary value. As a member of a corporation he remains capable of corporate ownership.

3. How is a solemn vow of poverty compatible with capacity for ownership ?

As has just been said, the incapacity for ownership is not a necessary effect of the vow of poverty by itself; it is a creature of positive ecclesiastical law. The whole distinction between solemn and simple vows, and therefore their different effects, are derived from positive law (C. un. de voto et voti redemp. in 6to). Hence if the Pope so wills it, for good reason a Religious may be under a solemn vow of poverty, and yet by special provision he may be capable of owning property, provided that he has not the independent use of it.

4. The case. Caius was born in Belgium, but entered the English province of a Religious order with solemn vows. After his profession he heard that his father was dead and that the legitimate part of his father's property had devolved on him according to Belgian law. Even solemnly professed regulars in Belgium are capable of succeeding personally to such property by dispensation, as Leo XIII declared, July 31, 1878.¹ Caius doubted whether he could accept his legitim or not. The words of the Pope’s decree are: “All and each of the regulars of Belgium of both sexes, even those who have pronounced solemn vows, validly and lawfully exercised and exercise all the aforesaid acts (to acquire, retain, and administer goods, and to dispose of them).” However, Caius belongs to the English province of his order, and he can not be called a “regular of Belgium.” “Moreover, the regulars of Belgium appear to be all those who are admitted into a community of Belgium,” says Fr. Vermeersch.² Therefore the legitim of Caius lapses just as if he were dead.

1 Lehmkuhl, vol. i, no. 524.

2 De Relig. Instit., vol. i, n. 243.

Caius, a religious, asks his confessor whether a violation of religious poverty or a sin is present in any of the following acts done by him. (a) He received five pounds sterling from a friend to distribute to the poor, which he distributed without any permission of the superior. (b) He asked a friend to pay the expenses of a certain boy’s education. The friend agreed on the condition that Caius should ask him for and pay the required sums as often as necessary; Caius did this also without consulting the superior. (c) A secular priest, who was burdened with more Masses to be celebrated for stipends than he could celebrate, asked Caius to accept twelve to be celebrated without charge; he did this, again without consulting the superior. (d) Although the superior had forbidden his subjects ever to dine outside the house without express permission, Caius dined sumptuously at a friend’s house without the superior’s knowledge. Hence it is asked:

1. To what does the vow of religious poverty oblige?

2. What kind of sin is a violation of poverty?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. To what does the vow of religious poverty oblige?

The vow of poverty obliges the Religious not to exercise any act of ownership with regard to things that have a money value without the leave of the superior.

2. What sort of a sin is a breach of poverty?

Of its kind a breach of poverty is a mortal sin, but it may be venial for lightness of matter. Matter which is grave in theft is also grave in violations of poverty.

3. The cases, (a) Caius, a Religious, received from a friend £5 for his poor, and distributed the money without the Superior’s permission. If he distributed it as his own in his own name he violated poverty; otherwise, if he acted merely as the almoner of his friend. Often Religious are forbidden by rule to keep money, and if the Order to which Caius belonged had such a rule, he broke it by having money in his keeping. (b) In asking a friend to pay for a boy’s education and acting as his intermediary Caius did not violate poverty. There was no act of ownership in the matter. We suppose that Caius did not make himself liable for the money, (c) Caius did not sin against poverty by promising to say twelve Masses gratis for the secular priest. He merely disposed of his Mass, which he may do without violating poverty. (d) Against the express orders of his Superior, Caius took dinner with a friend outside the monastery. He sinned against obedience and also against poverty, according to the common opinion. For without the leave of his superior he disposed of food, a thing which has money value. Lugo excuses him from a violation of poverty on the ground that one who eats a dinner merely passively receives a benefit; but it may be replied that one who eats a good dinner is by no means merely passive.

Caius, a priest of the Society of Jesus, while giving spiritual exercises in a certain convent of nuns who, with the approval of the Holy See, pronounced simple vows, was asked by the superior whether the convent could accept an inheritance coming to a nun from her father who died intestate. For a Catholic lawyer whose advice the convent used denied this, guided, as he said, by a recent example among the Jesuits, whose legal adviser he also was. Caius replied that it was desirable that the lawyer restrict himself to giving advice about the prescriptions of English law and not attempt ecclesiastical law; for since even professed members of the Society of Jesus may accept legacies for the monastery, and an inheritance in the sense of English law corresponds rather to a legacy than to an inheritance of Roman law, nothing prevents professed members of the Society of Jesus in England from also accepting inheritances for the monastery. Hence it is asked:

1. What is religious poverty, and what are its effects from the very nature of the matter?

2. What are the effects of religious poverty from the disposition of ecclesiastical law?

3. What is to be said of the opinions of the lawyer and of Caius?

1. What is religious poverty and what are its natural effects?

The first part of this question is answered above, p. 67.

The effects which follow from the nature of religious poverty may be summed up by saying that one who has taken a vow of poverty can not lawfully accept, dispose of, or use any property without leave of his superior. Acts of ownership are unlawful, not invalid.

2. What are the effects of religious poverty which are due to ecclesiastical law?

The personal incapacity of one who is solemnly professed to own property, and the consequent invalidity of acts of ownership exercised by him, are effects of positive law. Similarly, that one who has a simple vow may retain the direct ownership of property, but that its income must be spent and not allowed to accumulate, is due to positive law. To the same source is due the rule that whatever a Religious acquires he acquires for his monastery, not for himself; and the special rule of some Orders by which the solemnly professed can not acquire anything by inheritance or operation of law even for their monasteries.

3. The case. The rebuke administered to the lawyer by Caius was not undeserved. It by no means follows that because a professed Father of the Society of Jesus can not succeed to property left by an intestate relative, therefore a nun with only simple vows can not do so. In fact such property becomes hers, but she can not dispose of it or administer it without leave of her Superiors. There is some foundation for what Caius says about the difference between an inheritance in Roman and in English law. The heir in Roman law represented the person of the deceased and succeeded to all his rights and obligations. Hence one good reason why a Religious should not succeed as heir. In English law the executor or personal representative is more akin to the Roman heir than is the English heir-at-law. Still in practice Jesuits who have taken their last vows are held incapable of succeeding to property that would devolve upon them by operation of law if they had not taken their last vows. Entailed property and property of intestates come under the rule, but not legacies.

Caius, a religious, went to the city to consult a physician, having received from the superior the expenses of the journey and of a dinner to be eaten in the city. He, however, visited a certain friend in the city, dined most sumptuously at his house, and was furnished with a first-class railway ticket for returning home; he spent the money received from the superior for dinner and the return journey on buying cigars, for, as he told himself, he had received permission for small things. Afterwards, however, when the cigars had been consumed, he began to be tormented by scruples, especially since the friend had spent more than one pound sterling on him. Hence it is asked:

1. What permission of the superior excuses a religious from a violation of poverty?

2. What kind of sin do religious commit who violate poverty?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What sort of leave of the Superior excuses a Religious from a violation of poverty?

Express, virtual, and tacit leave certainly are sufficient to excuse a Religious from committing sin when he disposes of property. Presumed leave is also sufficient if the Superior can not be asked. Whether it is sufficient or not when the Superior can be got at but is not asked on account of the trouble it involves, or for some similar reason, is a disputed point. Probably it is sufficient, because a Religious who acts with the presumption that the Superior would give his consent if he were asked does not act independently of his Superior; he does not exercise an act of private ownership. Venial sin, however, may be committed even then, because the Superior is unwilling that leave should be presumed without necessity, though he would grant it if he were asked.¹

1 Génicot, vol. ii, n. 94.

2. What sort of sin do Religious who violate poverty commit?

This question was answered above, p. 70.

3. The case. Caius dined with his friend without leave of his Superior. If this act was against the will of his Superior so that he had not even presumed leave, he sinned against poverty according to the common opinion, as was said above. In accepting a first-class ticket for his railway journey back, he did not violate poverty any more than he would have done if his friend had driven him back in his carriage. In buying cigars with the money saved, he sinned against poverty, for he used the money as his own without any leave of his superior. It would, however, only be a venial sin, for the matter was not very grave, and the transaction cost the monastery nothing.

The following case is presented for solution: Cornelius, now a secular priest, but formerly belonging to an order, sic confitetur: While still in the order I was called one day to the deathbed of a woman whose regular confessor I had been. Upon having confessed she presented to me, as a token of gratitude for my long years of endeavor with her, a bank book for six thousand dollars. Even then I had the intention of leaving eventually the order and so I asked her whether I might keep the money for my own use for the event of my leaving the order. She answered: I do not give this + money to the order, but to you personally; do with it as you will, keep it for the time when you will have left the order. Accordingly I kept the bank book, without the knowledge of my superiors. Three years after that I left the order, and drew the six thousand dollars, together with interest. Since, however, I belonged to a rigid order with solemn profession, and had taken the vow of poverty, I feel worried and beg you, as my confessor, to advise me whether I may keep the money. To decide this case we must answer the following questions:

1. May a religious, in anticipation of the fact that he will positively obtain permission to leave the order, put away some means (as in our case) for his future use?

2. If this were not lawful in general, would our case perhaps form an exception, the benefactress having expressly declared that she presented the bank book to Cornelius, and not to the order?

3. If his (Cornelius’) action was sinful, was it an offense against poverty, or also against justice?

4. Has the sin against justice ceased through the dispensation from the vows, and may Cornelius now keep the money in good conscience?

5. What is to be done in case of death of this ex-religious? Must the money revert to the relatives, or heirs, of the benefactress, or to the order, or may Cornelius dispose of it as he pleases?

I reply to the questions as follows:

Ad. 1. No; a religious, before his dismissal, must certainly not possess himself of anything to make use of it after his dismissal; for he is hic et nunc still fully bound by the vows of holy poverty.

Ad, 2. As the benefactress expressly agreed that the presentation take place only pro tunc, not at once, it appears to me that the religious may have meanwhile considered himself as depositarius; this of itself is not against poverty, but may certainly be against the rules of the order; whether venialiter or graviter, depends upon rules and circumstances.

‘Ad, 3. As the order had obtained no right to the amount, and the benefactress having renounced her title to it, Cornelius does not violate justice, nor poverty per se (except perhaps secundum desiderium et actum internum; if he per fas et nefas, without a reason valid before God, seeks release from his vows); he may have violated the rules of the order, or also the obedience, perhaps grievously. In this answer, denying the violation of poverty, I am presuming that Cornelius really had reason and prospect to be released from the vow of poverty. Compare, however, my answer Ad. 5.

Ad. 4. This answer is given in the preceding argument.

Ad. 5. The money is not to be given to the heirs of the benefactress, as she has invalidated her and their right to it by voluntary cession. Nor is it to be given to the order, as, according to the will of the benefactress, it has no claim to it. Still it does not follow that Cornelius can freely dispose of it. In secularizing a professed of solemn vows there remains generally intact the substance of the vows; the secularized is and remains disqualified from possessing property, he may have, and acquire, property ad usum suum, quantum eis ad sustentationem indiget; whatever is over and above that he must in his lifetime, or mortis causa, give up to the purposes mentioned in the Indult of Secularization. If a certain work is mentioned to which the legacy of the secularized religious should revert, then all his property must be so disposed of; if, however, the Indult of Secularization gives the right of free disposal, ad pias causas, then the secularized religious in regard to this money may freely choose among the piae causae.

Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J.

Case.—Hildegard, a professed lay-sister of an Order whose lay-sisters take simple but perpetual vows, desired to make to one of the servants a small present as a token of appreciation. Since the Mother Superior would neither give, nor allow, anything for this purpose, Sister Hildegard, without the Superior’s knowledge, asked a woman friend for five dollars, pretending that she wanted it for a pious object. The friend made her a present of this amount, for her free use, and Hildegard in turn gave it to the servant, without the knowledge, and against the will, of her Superior.

Question.—To what extent has Sister Hildegard transgressed the vow of poverty? The matter of giving scandal, of disobedience, etc., in an act of this kind, is not taken into consideration here, but merely the violation of the vow of poverty, and relatively of justice, in the case.

Solution.—1. Through the Votum simplex paupertatis, as distinct from the solemn vow of poverty, Hildegard neither lost the dominium radicale suorum bonorum, nor the ability to acquire for herself temporal goods (bona temporalia pretio aestimabilia), but she had renounced all independent use of such goods, and all free and voluntary disposition of temporal possessions as a grave obligation (sub gravi). Hence Müller (Theol. Moral., 1, II, 216) holds: “Therefore a solemn vow renders every act of ownership not only unlawful but at the same time invalid; a simple vow makes such an act only unlawful, not invalid.” The same views are expressed by Marc, and other authorities who deal with the difference between solemn and simple vows. The acceptance of the gift by Sister Hildegard, asked for and received without permission, even against the wish of the Superior, was, therefore, valid but illicit. Cardinal Gousset writes: “A Religious sins against the vow of poverty if, without permission, he receives money for his own use, or for use according to his intentions, even if employing it for pious ends” (Moral Theol., 540).

2. Sister Hildegard renounces this property by presenting the money to the servant, acting again without either the expressed or presumed permission of her Superior, another action manifestly against the vow of poverty. But is this not also stealing money from the convent? The canonical principle: Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself but for the monastery, would seem to decide that the gift acquired by Hildegard became the property of the convent, and that her unauthorized disposition thus deprived the convent. This view must be rejected, however, because in the case of Religious of simple vows the principle quoted does not cover all possible manners of acquiring property, as is the case with solemn vows, but extends merely to the special work which such Religious practice as members of the community, as is apparent from the form of the profession. In regards to purely personal gifts this principle does not therefore apply in the case of simple vows of poverty. (See Gury II, n. 162 [9], and others.) In our case the justitia commutativa was not violated; the servant, though she sinned, if acting mala fide, by cooperating in transgressing the vow, still acquired possession of the money lawfully, and for this reason is not obliged to restitution.

3. Another question is whether the amount of five dollars forms a materia gravis contra votum, and hence whether Hildegard sinned grievously?

Moralists generally agree that the same amount that constitutes a grave sin against justice is to be considered materia gravis when a Religious violates the vow of poverty. In a case of theft, five dollars would not be a sum sufficient in every case to inflict a grave injury on the loser (materia absolute gravis). In the present instance, Sister Hildegard did not take the money from the Monastery, and consequently, even though the Monastery were very poor, there cannot be question of materia relative gravis. Furthermore, since she received the money for the benefit of another, her act of proprietorship was much less than it would have been had she taken the five dollars for her own personal use. Hence we consider that her sin against holy poverty was not mortal.

4. Finally, if Hildegard had merely begged her friend to give five dollars to the said servant, and the latter had presented the money herself, then there would have been no actus proprietatis, and, therefore, no violation of the vow of poverty, though the nun’s presumption and disobedience would call for censure.

It has been advanced in favor of socialism that in the religious orders of the Catholic Church: perfect communism reigns. Why, then, should it not be practicable in entire nations? There is, however, an impassable gulf between the Catholic religious orders and socialism. Socialism aims at the universal introduction of a system which, of its very nature, demands the greatest detachment from earthly things and an earnest struggle for perfection, and which, consequently, in the present order of things, is suited only for the few. True, where men who have renounced all earthly goods and have devoted themselves to the service of God and of their neighbor voluntarily unite in common life, there may be community of goods without discord and contention; nay, such a system in that case will prove most beneficial, as it will relieve the individuals of the care of providing for their earthly wants. But of the general run of men few are able to rise to such a height of self-denial, and to devote themselves entirely to the pursuit of selfperfection and to the divine service. It is, therefore, a vain and unreasonable attempt to force men generally to renounce all private property and to endeavor violently to weld them together into a mechanical organization for the purpose of production.

Socialists, it is true, plead that they demand not the renunciation of property—that they only desire to establish property upon the basis of justice. These are fair words, but without meaning. He who wishes to abolish private property in all the materials of labor, substantially abolishes private ownership. Property in mere articles of use must of its very nature be limited, and is not sufficient to secure to man the necessary freedom of action and movement. If man is deprived of private property in the materials of labor he is thereby made an integral part of the great public industrial machine, and thus loses all independence of action. Of this fact we believe every one who has carefully followed our exposition will be convinced. ;

Moreover, the analogy from religious orders can afford no argument for this reason—because in them communism is based upon celibacy. Perfect poverty or the renouncement of all temporal goods is incompatible with married life and with the duties which married life entails. It is utterly irreconcilable with family life in the present state of humanity.