§ I. On the Vow of Poverty

I. Notion. The vow of poverty is a promise made to God concerning a certain constant repudiation of temporal goods for the sake of following poor Christ. It is said to concern a certain repudiation, inasmuch as it restricts in some way either the ownership itself of goods or acts concerning it.

The remote material object generally consists of external temporal or material goods, capable of being valued by price. I said generally, because the material object can at least by use or by law be extended or restricted, according as there is or is not present a danger of harming the spirit or vow of poverty. The proximate material object consists of certain acts concerning those goods which involve a certain repudiation, such as acts of not having them as one's own, dependent use of them, dependent administration of one's own goods, and so forth.

The remote formal object is the perfect following of poor Christ for obtaining perfection; the proximate formal object is the very honesty which shines forth in following Christ exercised for that end.

Corollary I. For the essence of the vow of poverty there is required at least the abdication of independent beneficial ownership.

Corollary II. The vow and the virtue of poverty differ in this, that the vow excludes independent acts concerning temporal goods, whereas the virtue excludes affection of heart toward them.

II. Fuller exposition of the notion. Two things especially need development, namely the remote and the proximate material object.

1. The remote material object. To it there do not belong: 1st, internal things, such as liberty; 2nd, spiritual things, both supernatural, such as Mass and indulgence, and natural and intermediate things, such as integrity of honor, the right of good reputation, nobility, the right of election, presentation, and collation of benefices; 3rd, material things not capable of being valued by price, that is, things either of no value or of inestimable value, because they are consequently or intrinsically joined to a spiritual thing, for example a benefice; 4th, things which by use or by law are equated with the foregoing (St. Alphonsus IV, 14).

Corollary I. The application of a Mass as such is not against the vow of poverty, for instance if someone celebrates Mass for an intention other than the one prescribed; it can, however, be against obedience. Nevertheless the stipend is for the monastery (cf. can. 580, § 2 and 594, § 2). Nor is it against the vow of poverty to ask for intentions, or to dispose freely concerning them; intentions can also be given to another without injury to poverty. Superiors, however, can interpose their prohibition; for in the decree of 3 May 1914 it was asked whether religious superiors can command their subjects, even in virtue of holy obedience, that they celebrate according to the intention prescribed by the constitutions or determined by those superiors themselves, with the exceptions sanctioned by the constitutions or by legitimate custom preserved. The response was: Affirmatively.

Corollary II. Knowledge is an internal good; it is the fruit of the intellect and, as it were, part of it. One can dispose of his knowledge by a gratuitous title, but not by an onerous title. This would be against poverty. Then it becomes, as it were, an external thing capable of being valued by price.

Corollary III. Relics are exempt from the vow of poverty. By reason of their sacred character they are placed outside commerce, although otherwise they may have great value, for example manuscripts of the Saints. Relics which are not from bones are sacred first and principally from the use of the Church; hence if, apart from the use of the Church, they do not receive a certain veneration, they can as such be the object of the vow of poverty; for example, a manuscript of St. Thomas is rather preserved in museums.

Corollary IV. Reliquaries, as things antecedently annexed to spiritual things, are in themselves capable of valuation by price and are not prohibited from being sold, and thus they are the object of poverty. By use, however, they are usually excepted, provided they are of moderate price. Hence a contrary use can also exist in some Order. Finally, the use is reasonable, for the accessory follows the principal.

Corollary V. Devotional objects, such as images, medals, rosaries, and crosses, are not matter of the vow only by use; and the use perhaps only argues a tacit license of the Superior, not that they are no longer the object of the vow.

Corollary VI. Manuscripts. A religious has full ownership of any manuscripts whatsoever that have no sale value, because they are not things capable of being valued by price, and therefore are not matter of the vow. Likewise he can have full ownership, or at least unlimited use, of manuscripts of some value, and indeed from custom or the tacit consent of Superiors. Nevertheless custom or tacit consent does not support a religious if there is question: 1st, of manuscripts drawn up by command of the Superior for the good of the Order; 2nd, of manuscripts drawn up after profession, to be given away or alienated, at least if this is done for the purpose that they be published;¹ 3rd, of manuscripts for which the Superior, custom, or rule determines otherwise, as perhaps with regard to very precious manuscripts.

Note. The use of these rights over manuscripts, whether salable or not, always remains matter of obedience, and indeed, as it seems, of a certain high ownership.

Corollary VII. Lithographic notes, or notes made in a similar artificial way, even those written by machine, and indeed also those privately printed in type, seem to be equated with manuscripts, and this both from use, and from the fact that they often lack price, and from the fact that, if you except those printed by type or by machine, they are really manuscripts, although multiplied artificially.

Corollary VIII. Works made by art, for example paintings and sculptures composed by a religious, are the object of the vow of poverty, inasmuch as ownership of them cannot be retained by the religious himself; but they belong either to the monastery or to the one who supplied the materials.

St. Alphonsus says concerning a choir religious: "If panels, canvas, colors, etc., are handed over to him by the monastery, then the paintings belong to the monastery; otherwise, if those things are furnished by others" (IV, 14). Concerning lay brothers he says that those works belong to the monastery, because such lay brothers are received only for this, that they exercise external arts; an exception is made if the lay brother makes them on a feast day or by working for one or another hour in the day; in that case they belong to the one who supplied the materials (loc. cit.).

¹ Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, 2 June 1911; 13 July 1913; Ned. Kath. Stemmen, 1913, p. 290.

2. The proximate material object consists: 1st, in dependent use of things; 2nd, in dependent administration of one's own goods; 3rd, in the exclusion of the use of superfluous things, with regard being had to the character of the religion.

a) Dependent use of things, namely on the license of Superiors. Now:

a) License is a faculty granted to a subject for doing something. It is especially divided into express, tacit, and presumed. Tacit license is that which is granted only by an internal act, but truly; hence it should not be confused with mere toleration for avoiding a greater evil¹ (St. Alphonsus IV, 17). Presumed license exists if the Prelate is supposed to be going to grant the license if he were asked.

b) License is granted either by the rule, or by legitimate custom, or by a designated Superior.

c) In order that license be valid, it must be: 1st, voluntary, and therefore not extorted from the Prelate by force; 2nd, obtained without obreption or subreption. In order that the license also be licit, it must be granted for a just cause of necessity or utility. But it is disputed whether a license given for illicit uses, or uses superfluous when the character of the religion and the circumstances are considered, is valid. Now it seems it must be denied, because "the Superior is not the owner, nor does he have any faculty over the goods of the monastery except insofar as the canons and the religion grant it to him. But neither the sacred canons nor the religion can be said to grant him the faculty of giving license for illicit or superfluous uses: not the sacred canons, since the contrary is drawn from them; not the religion, which is never considered to grant that for the spiritual destruction of its children" (St. Alphonsus IV, 30; cf. also n. 31).

d) Tacit license suffices whenever express license is not expressly required. Let these be examples: 1st, "If the prelate knows that a subject receives, retains, or spends something, and does not prohibit it although he easily could, he seems tacitly to consent and approve.... 2nd, if in some religion there is in force a custom of receiving or spending certain things without license, that is excused by the tacit license of the prelate, who by tolerating it reasonably declares the custom; if the prelate gives to a subject, or permits to be given to him, images, rosaries, etc., knowing that he does not need all of them for his own use, he is considered tacitly to grant the faculty of giving them to others" (St. Alphonsus IV, 17). Yet generally you should observe that "not always are the things which are done under the eyes of the prelate to be considered tacitly approved by him; for very often Superiors are reluctantly compelled to tolerate many things which they see done against their will" (St. Alphonsus IV, 18, at the end).

e) Presumed license suffices for saving the vow. The reason is that, according to the notion handed down, in the case of that license the Superior is not considered unwilling as to the substance, as it is said, and therefore the thing is not disposed of wholly without dependence on the will of the Superior. It also suffices for saving the discipline of the rules, if express license cannot be obtained in time; otherwise if it can be acquired in time, because then the superior and the rule require the petition for license, so that, if this is neglected, the authority would be unwilling as to the manner, as it is customarily said (St. Alphonsus IV, 18).

Moreover, note: 1st, "If, however, the things are of great importance, with regard to them presumed license does not support him; otherwise occasion would be given for receiving and retaining things even of greater importance without express license: which would yield grave detriment to religious poverty" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Therefore "they, that is, Superiors, are in such cases to be presumed unwilling even as to the substance"; 2nd, "it must be observed that licenses are not easily to be presumed unless there is certainty, or at least certain probability, about their concession... and one must take the greatest care lest things be presumed which ought not to be presumed" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

¹ License which is virtually or implicitly contained in some express act, for example license to undertake a journey contains license for those things which are necessary for the journey, is counted by some as tacit, by others as express.

b) Dependent administration of one's own goods, namely on the license of Superiors. Now administration in the broad sense is any juridical act concerning temporal things. In the strict sense it is a complex of actions by which temporal things are preserved and so handled that they become fruitful. It is twofold, according as it is done in one's own name or in another's name.

c) Exclusion of the use of superfluous things. The use of superfluous things, namely with regard being had to the character of the religion, seems to be excluded by common law itself, and not only by the particular law of many religions. This is first suggested by can. 594, § 3: The furnishings of religious should befit the poverty which they have professed. Then the vow of poverty excludes those things which are repugnant to the state of poverty which religious have chosen; but the use of superfluous things is repugnant to the said state.¹ (St. Alphonsus IV, 29, 30).

Corollary I. A religious sins against the vow of poverty: 1st, "if, at home or outside, even from those things which pertain to food and clothing, he receives, retains, consumes, exchanges, gives to another, or lends anything without the express, tacit, or presumed consent of the superior or rule" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.); likewise if without license he eats or drinks at home or among externs,² because a religious has abdicated every independent use; 2nd, if he expends for another use anything from the things conceded to his use, or culpably loses or destroys it by broad fault. The reason is that in those things he has only use of fact, and that precariously, so long as it will seem good to the superior, and it is an act of ownership to be able to destroy a thing at one's own judgment (St. Alphonsus IV, 19); 3rd, "if you hide anything, so that you withdraw it from the free disposition of the superior. Nor can procurators, stewards, administrators, or lower prelates spend anything contrary to what the rule of the order, the will of the superiors, or custom demands. The reason is that they are not owners of the common goods, but only administrators" (St. Alphonsus IV, 28); 4th, a religious sins "if, while traveling, he turns aside to other places outside the direct route in order to see curious things; unless perhaps the expenses are moderate, and in an unforeseen case the license of the Superior can certainly be presumed. The same must be said if without faculty from the superior he buys anything, even for the Community";³ 5th, a professed religious of simple vows sins if he acquires ownership or disposes of his own goods entirely by his own authority and will, and not according to the Rule and the will of the Superior, because the vow of religious poverty altogether requires abdication of the proprietorial use and disposition of all goods.⁴

Corollary II. A religious does not sin: 1st, if without express license he makes "remuneratory donations from goods conceded to him for use, because such donations are, as it were, payments of a debt. Indeed he can give more than he received, up to an excess of a fourth part; because gratitude demands that more always be returned than was received" (St. Alphonsus IV, 21); 2nd, if he accepts or gives something under the condition of license to be obtained, provided the thing can be recovered if license is denied, because then the act is suspended.⁵

Corollary III. One who has proceeded from presumed license is afterwards bound to disclose the thing to the Superior, if he still retains the thing, and the Superior is unwilling at least either as to the substance or as to the manner (St. Alphonsus IV, loc. cit.).

Corollary IV. One who acts against a license, even one unduly denied, sins against the vow, "unless there is danger of grave harm in the delay; for then the consent of a major superior is presumed to be present; and if he also then denies license, it can sometimes be prudently judged that the law or vow does not oblige in so great a crisis" (St. Alphonsus IV, 33; cf. St. Thomas I-II, q. 96, a. 6).

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, session 25, chapter 2, on regulars.

² This, however, is not admitted by Lugo (De iustitia, disp. 2, n. 5) and by others; nor should it be extended to those things which do not involve use of a thing as this is commonly understood. Hence I agree with Lugo teaching that it is not against the vow of poverty, for example, if a secular person lights a fire for warming a religious, if he burns some precious perfume to refresh his smell, or if he shows him some spectacle whose viewing is otherwise worthy of a price.

³ Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis I, n. 1193.

⁴ Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis I, n. 1193.

⁵ Aertnys-Damen, loc. cit.

3. Doubts and responses. a) A religious can ask for, accept, and refuse gifts as follows. It is not licit to ask for the community except within the limits of the rule and ecclesiastical laws. This, however, does not seem of itself to pertain to the vow (cf. can. 621 sq.). It is not licit to ask for himself, except within the limits of the rule. 2nd, it is licit to accept things spontaneously offered for the community; for oneself, as was said above. 3rd, it is not licit to refuse what is owed to the community; and this is both against the vow and against justice. To refuse what is offered to the community beyond what is owed is not against the vow, but can be against charity. It is licit for a religious to refuse things offered for himself alone; indeed there is an obligation to do so, unless the rule permits an increase of the substance of his own goods, or the religious declares that they are acquired for the community.

b) A religious seems to sin against the vow by accepting money without license to be spent at his discretion on pious works. The reason is that the arbitrary choice of the pious work involves something of independent disposition. Nor should you say that the choice is made in another's name; since the choice, as one which after the faculty of choosing has been given can no longer be contradicted, is made in one's own name (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 13, n. 7; letter of 3 Oct. 1757).

The same seems to be said if a religious without license accepts money to be distributed at his discretion among indeterminate poor persons, because the arbitrary choice of the poor person also involves something of independent disposition. St. Alphonsus indeed, loc. cit., speaks only of money to be distributed at discretion among pious works; but the same formal reason alleged by him subsists in each case.

If there is question of determinate poor persons, to distribute money or goods without the license of Superiors is not against the vow, since the distributor acts as a bare minister. Superiors, however, if a just cause is present, can prohibit that. But that someone gives counsel, or directs someone's attention to a certain poor family, cannot be disapproved.

But if gifts are offered "for your poor," as it is said, it depends on the circumstances whether by this word penitents wish to designate determinate poor persons, that is, exclusively the poor for whom that Father has care, or rather more indeterminate poor persons, that is, the poor whom the monastery is accustomed to assist. In the latter case, the subject cannot without license spend gifts on poor persons, as indeterminate; and the same seems to be said of the former case, because a certain arbitrary disposition is left.

c) A religious can accept another's thing on deposit without license as follows. 1st, if there is question of a deposit properly so called, or under a contract that obliges the religious himself or indirectly the monastery (cf. can. 536), it is against the vow. 2nd, if there is question of a deposit in the broad sense, or of mere custody of one's own or another's money, in general it can be said that the vow of poverty is not offended by it, unless it is expressly prohibited by the Rule from a motive of poverty.

III. Division. The vow of poverty is divided into solemn and simple.

1. The solemn vow. The solemn vow, or rather solemn profession, of itself renders a religious incapable of ownership, so that any act of property is invalid (can. 579). But goods which in any way come to one solemnly professed: 1st, in an order capable of possessing, accrue to the Order or province or house according to the constitutions; 2nd, in an Order incapable of possessing, are acquired in ownership for the Holy See (can. 582).

I said: "Solemn profession of itself renders a religious incapable of ownership"; for accidentally solemnly professed religious of either sex in Belgium and in Holland received the faculty that, with due dependence on legitimate superiors, they can acquire, retain, administer, and dispose for pious and honorable uses of goods which have come to them. So from the Sacred Penitentiary¹ and the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs.² These decrees are explained in two ways: either so that they become owners only civilly, or so that they become owners also naturally and before God. The latter seems to us more probable from the terms of the indult. The reason for the faculty granted was that civil laws there do not admit possession by religious. Some wish to extend this also to religious of simple vows, which seems improbable from the end and origin of this institute.

2. The simple vow, or rather simple profession, of itself does not deprive one of direct ownership, nor render acts of ownership invalid, but only prohibits independent use according to the manner determined in the rules. I said of itself, for the spiritual and temporal coadjutors of the Jesuits are wholly incapable of acquiring any ownership. Moreover, concerning simple profession the canons establish:

a) Anyone professed by simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless something else has been provided in the constitutions, preserves the ownership of his goods and the capacity of acquiring other goods, with those things preserved which are prescribed in can. 569 (can. 580, § 1).

b) It is not licit for those professed by simple vows in religious Congregations:³ 1st, to abdicate by an act among the living the ownership of their goods by gratuitous title; 2nd, to change a testament made according to the norm of can. 569, § 3, without the license of the Holy See, or, if the matter is urgent and there is not time to have recourse to it, without the license of the major Superior or, if even he cannot be approached, of the local Superior (can. 583).

c) Anyone professed by simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, can change the cession or disposition of which in can. 569, § 2 (n. 1226), not indeed by his own judgment unless the constitutions allow this, but by license of the supreme Moderator, or, if there is question of nuns, by license of the local Ordinary and, if the monastery is subject to regulars, of the regular Superior, provided that the change, at least concerning a notable part of the goods, is not made in favor of the religion. But by departure from the religion, a cession and disposition of this kind ceases to have force (can. 580, § 3).

d) Anyone professed by simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, whatever he acquires by his own industry or with regard to the religion, he acquires for the religion (can. 580, § 2).

¹ 1 December 1820.

² 31 July 1871.

³ It is said "in religious Congregations" because one who is going to profess in a religious Order is not bound to make a testament, and before solemn profession renounces all goods (can. 569, § 3; 581).

IV. Obligation of the vow. The obligation of the vow of poverty is grave from its kind, so that one sins gravely who, either by claiming something for himself as his own, or by using some thing as his own without the Superior's license, or in any other way, so behaves that, with the nature of the action and the quantity of the thing considered, he places an act of property in grave matter. But the gravity of the matter depends both on the nature of the act and on the quantity of the thing; hence, for example, a greater sum is required if someone uses the goods of the community without license than if he alienates them; much greater if he gives them as a loan than if he gives them as a gift, and so forth. Thus, for example, "regularly a religious does not sin gravely by secretly taking, for example, a book for temporary use, even a long one, but not in perpetuity" (St. Alphonsus IV, 24).

Moreover it cannot be determined accurately when grave matter is present. In addition, slight matters, insofar as they are opposed to the vow and therefore to the religion, quite probably do not coalesce, just as slight matters do not coalesce which, for example, are repugnant to temperance. Besides, observe:

1. To a sin against the vow there can be added a sin against justice, for instance if a religious destroys or without license alienates the goods of the community.

2. What in a case is grave matter, likewise when slight matters coalesce, and what quantity is required, if they do coalesce, so that the matter becomes grave, see in the treatise on justice, nn. 1028-1030.