Article — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
Article I. On the Vow of Poverty
- I. A Religious bound by a solemn vow of poverty, namely a Religious solemnly professed in an Order approved by the Holy See, is altogether incapable in particular or personally of any dominion over a temporal thing estimable by price 1, even with the permission of the Superior. This is established from the Council of Trent, sess. 25, ch. 2. - But the Community can acquire and possess goods, either by itself or through subjects, unless its constitutions stand in the way. Hence the well-known axiom of Canon Law: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the Monastery."
1 ** Nevertheless the Apostolic See, as is established by several examples, has dispensed that Religious even solemnly professed could validly and licitly have and retain dominion of temporal goods. And, to pass over St. Francis Borgia, who, from a dispensation obtained from Paul III, emitted the solemn vows of the Society of Jesus in such a way that nevertheless only within a four-year period after profession did he abdicate the Duchy of Gandia and the remaining temporal goods from himself (cf. the Life of St. Francis Borgia written in Spanish by Alvaro Cienfuegos, bk. 3, ch. 8, § 2, and ch. 10, § 1), we have Responses of the Sacred Penitentiary, both that given for French nuns on 28 Nov. 1818, by which the faculty is imparted that, notwithstanding the solemn vow of poverty, "... they can retain the goods and revenues which they have acquired up to now" (see Carriere, De Iust. et Iur., p. 4, sect. 1, ch. 4, n. 214), and that given on 20 Nov. 1820 for the nuns of Belgium, to whom, although solemnly professed, by the express authority of the Holy See the faculty is attributed of acquiring, possessing, and administering goods, which they may use for honorable ends, etc. (see Bouix, Tract. De Regularibus, part 3, ch. 3).
But from these things it sufficiently appears that the incapacity of a solemnly professed religious for having and exercising dominion over temporal things must be traced back not to natural or divine law, but only to ecclesiastical law. Hence St. Ignatius de Loyola added to part 6, ch. 2, of the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus a Declaration in which the faculty, even after solemn profession, of acquiring and retaining dominion, which could be obtained from the Apostolic See, is expressly mentioned. "If someone," he says, "moved by his devotion and with holy intention to the greater glory of God, before his profession were to obtain from the Apostolic See the faculty that either he himself, or the house in which he emitted profession, could have the right of succeeding to an inheritance, ... he would not be judged contrary to this Constitution or its intention."
Nor indeed ought the reason of this doctrine to seem hidden. For this must be confessed, as daily practice in the Church teaches, that dominion of temporal things is indeed compatible with a simple vow of poverty. But what is added to the simple vow, namely the solemnity of the same vow, was introduced by ecclesiastical law, as the Apostolic Constitutions openly declare. Now if solemnity is superadded to a vow by ecclesiastical law alone, is it not manifest that the force of the same solemnity, and the measure of its effects, is defined by that power from which solemnity itself proceeds, and therefore depends on the judgment of the Supreme Legislator in the Church? Therefore from the very nature of the thing it is that a solemnly professed religious exists incapable or capable of dominion according to the judgment of the supreme authority, to whose wisdom it belongs to dispose all things according to the circumstances of times, places, and persons. Cf. Marc. Struggl (Th. Moral., tr. 6, q. 5, n. 33), who concludes: Thus Sanchez, in Decal., bk. 5, ch. 2, n. 9, Card. De Lugo, De Iust., disp. 3, n. 75, and others COMMONLY.
Therefore a professed Religious is altogether unfit to exercise any act of proprietorship concerning any thing, whether of the monastery, or of parents, or of outsiders; and therefore without the Superior's permission, either general or special, he can dispose of no thing, either licitly or validly, by acceptance, donation, sale, loan for use, loan for consumption, use, exchange, improvement, etc.
- II. A Religious bound by a simple vow of poverty can indeed have direct dominion of goods; but he can licitly dispose of nothing concerning them without particular or general permission of the Superior 2.
2 ** It is said, he cannot do so licitly; for indeed he would dispose validly, as is said below, q. 2.
This has force even if the Order was not approved by the Holy See, but only by the Bishop, because the efficacy of a simple vow is always the same; for the one vowing entirely despoils himself of the right of disposing of any thing without permission, or of preserving the use of the same thing, or of exercising any act of proprietorship, unless the constitutions of the Order or legitimate custom except something.
Besides sins against the vow of poverty, sins against the virtue of poverty also are not rarely given, although the vow remains uninjured; for example, if a Religious excessively fosters affection 3 for things which he keeps by permission of the Prelate, if he indulges conveniences more than is fair, if he asks superfluous things from Superiors, or keeps them after they have been obtained, and similar things.
3 ** As often as the affection is so depraved, and is carried so far, that even against the commanding will of God he wills or pursues something, certainly there will be sin. But in the remaining cases you will have a defect of further perfection, not however a sin; for sin is defined as a transgression of law.
- Questions. - QUESTION 1º. What is the difference between the vow and the virtue of poverty?
Resp. The vow regards only external acts of proprietorship; but the virtue extends also to the internal affections of the heart 4. For the object of the vow is to despoil the Religious externally of temporal goods. But the virtue has as its end entirely to cut away every inordinate affection of the heart toward earthly things. Therefore the vow of poverty is, as it were, a means to the virtue, which is the end to be obtained. This having been posited, no one does not see that the virtue of poverty extends much more broadly than the vow; for as often as someone infringes the vow, he at the same time injures the virtue, but not conversely.
4 ** These things seem less to cohere with what immediately preceded, where the vice was noted of retaining superfluous things even with the Superior's permission, of indulging conveniences, etc., which surely pertain to externals.
Add that account must be taken of the customs of each Order, which concede a greater or lesser measure of conveniences; and yet no one would have dared to turn these things into fault.
For the rest, Lugo rightly notes (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 3, n. 131) that if in some Order the vow of poverty is observed more severely, the subject who retains superfluous things even with the Superior's permission is not without fault against the vow of poverty, although he cannot be called a proprietor.
I said that the vow affects only external acts of proprietorship; nevertheless the vow could be violated by an internal act which regarded and attained an external act, namely by the desire of acting externally against the vow; since desire puts on all the malice and species of the external act, as was said in the Treatise on Sins, bk. 1, n. 468.
QUESTION 2º. Can a religious preserving direct dominion of goods VALIDLY dispose of these without permission?
Resp. Affirmative, because he is truly the owner, although on account of the vow of poverty he acts illicitly 5. - Yet some deny, because, they say, Religious have themselves as wards, who cannot validly give their goods. But this opinion is of no weight at all.
5 ** That Religious of the Society of Jesus acting thus sin against the vow of poverty, Suarez also taught, although others falsely affixed to him the opposite opinion, as Lugo shows (De Iust., disp. 3, n. 78).
QUESTION 3º. To what does the direct dominion of a Religious not solemnly professed extend?
Resp. 1º To the temporal goods which he possessed before the vows; 2º to the fruits or revenues of the same goods; 3º to those things which come to him by law, without new acceptance, such as a paternal inheritance, legacies, etc.; 4º to all goods which he receives from parents, relatives, friends, etc., by permission of the Superiors. Yet if these are consumable by use, they must be applied according to custom to the common use of the monastery 6, at least speaking generally.
6 ** That some part from these things yields to the use of the monastery does not happen by force of the vow, but by custom; for, the vow preserved, they could be spent for other uses, for example, in alms, although the permission of the Superior ought always to intervene.
- QUESTION 4º. Can a religious, without the Superior's permission, keep his own manuscripts and transfer them to another?
Resp. Affirmative, according to the common opinion; for manuscripts, as offspring of the intellect, are held as something spiritual. Besides, they pertain to knowledge, which does not fall under the vow of poverty; but the stronger reason is that the common and received custom among Regulars bears this way. - St. Ligorius, n. 14. The Salmanticenses and others commonly hold the same also about Relics of the Saints.
QUESTION 5º. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty if he spends something from things conceded for a determined use on another use?
Resp. Affirmative. The reason is that in these things the Religious has only use of fact, and that precariously, as long as it will seem good to the Superior. But it is an act of proprietorship or dominion to dispose of some thing according to one's own judgment, and otherwise the will or permission of the Superior, unless something else is manifest, is restricted to the assigned use. - St. Ligorius, n. 19, and others commonly.
- QUESTION 6º. Can a Religious without permission give away what by living more sparingly he subtracts for himself from things conceded for use?
Resp. No, speaking generally. The reason is plain from the responses to the preceding question. - They except if a certain quantity is assigned to the Religious in such a way that neither is the Monastery held to provide anything else to him, nor is he himself held to render an account. St. Ligorius, n. 23, says that it is commonly permitted by authors that a Religious can bestow, on whom he wishes, his pittances which are provided to him in a limited way, such as eggs, meats, etc., unless the Superior has expressly prohibited this. - St. Antoninus. - Sylvius, etc.
QUESTION 7º. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty who accepts money from an outsider to be spent at will on pious works?
Resp. Affirmative. The reason is plain from what has been said; for by acting thus, the Religious would make an act of proprietorship, unless he had the permission of his Superior 7. - But otherwise, if the pious works were determined by the donor; because then the Religious would be nothing except a channel, and as it were the mandatary of the donor. Hence a Religious does not sin against the vow of poverty who accepts from an outsider money to be disbursed to such a poor person, to such a Monastery, Church, such a pious cause, etc. Indeed he does not sin even if he himself without permission of the Superior asks money from an outsider to be handed over to another determinate person. Nevertheless if there is question of a matter of great moment, prudence persuades, and the right order of religious discipline requires, that a subject do nothing unless he has first obtained the assent of the Superior, even if he incurs no danger of violating poverty.
7 ** Sanchez (In Decal., bk. 7, ch. 30), to the question, "Whether, when one giving money to a religious so that he may distribute it to the poor does not designate the poor to whom it is to be distributed, nor designate the quantity to be bestowed on each poor person, but commits the choice of both or of either to the religious, ... the religious then sins against the vow of poverty by designating the poor person to whom the alms are conferred, or by designating the quantity of alms to be conferred?" responds (l.c., n. 4): "I cannot persuade myself that this is against the vow of poverty, and most learned men of our Society and externs consulted by me have approved my opinion. I am led by this, that ... the religious here does not retain or accept that money as his own, nor as owner, but so that, in the name of another, namely of the one handing it over, he may give it to the poor. Therefore he does not exercise any act of dominion or proprietorship.... Secondly, because not any possession and administration whatsoever of money is opposed to the vow of poverty, but when they are something of right, namely when the religious administers in his own name.... But in this event the religious administers not in his own name, but in another's. Thirdly, because in this dispensation these four things alone are found: reception of the money, faculty of choosing the poor, the choosing of them, distribution among them. But none of these is against the vow of poverty. Not reception of the money, because the religious does not receive it for himself..., but so that in the name of the testator he may distribute it to the poor.... Nor even the faculty of choosing the poor; for this is nothing else than the right of naming the poor..., which we proved above to be nothing of right, but of mere fact.... Nor the very choice of the poor; because if the right of choosing is not opposed, a fortiori neither is the choice itself, which is the exercise of that right. Nor finally the very distribution of money to the poor, because the religious does not distribute in his own name, but in the name of the one giving, nor is he himself judged to confer anything, but the giver, as is established from law unum de familia, ff. De Legat. 2.... Finally the solution of the arguments of the contrary party will confirm this part, which they do not prove." Thus Sanchez; but see the following note to n. 160.
- QUESTION 8º. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty who refuses those things which are offered to him by outsiders?
Resp. 1º No, if there is question of mere donations, alms, or gifts to which he has no right. The reason is that the vow of poverty does not oblige him to receive those things which he has not yet acquired, or to which neither he himself nor the Monastery has a strict right. Nevertheless if the Religious has no reason for refusing, he sins against charity by impeding the good of his Religion, but not against justice. - St. Ligorius, n. 20. - Lugo. - Sanchez, etc.
Resp. 2º Otherwise, if there is question of things already acquired, for example, of legacies, of payment owed for the labors of the Religious, or of gifts already accepted, etc. The reason is that the monastery immediately acquires the right of these according to the axiom: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself but for the Monastery." - St. Ligorius, ibid.
- QUESTION 9º. What matter is to be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?
Resp. 1º In sins which are at the same time against Religion and justice, speaking generally, that matter must be held as grave which constitutes mortal sin in theft. - St. Ligorius, n. 24. - Lugo. - Sanchez, and others commonly.
Yet some Theologians say that that matter only is grave which is judged grave in the thefts of sons of a family, namely matter about twice greater than in thefts against outsiders. - Thus Elbel, n. 646. - But this does not seem to be admitted. The reason is that sons are in hope of the goods of the father of the family, but Religious are not. Moreover Superiors are more unwilling as to thefts of subjects than parents are about thefts of sons. Besides, graver detriments follow as to the soul in the former than in the latter 8. - St. Ligorius, ibid. For the rest, in order that judgment may be made about the gravity of matter in thefts of this sort, it must be noted that monasteries of middling wealth are commonly equated with rather wealthy private owners. Hence the same measure as for those generally constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also required if a Religious usurps things of the Monastery for his own use, or gives them to others of the same Community, than if he were to disburse the same things to outsiders, because thus they remain at home. Greater also in minute thefts, which besides, with a notable interval interposed, do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in edible things, as we said concerning servants, tom. 1, n. 608.
8 ** Nevertheless the reason can have force on the contrary, that the Superior, as to the substance of the thing taken secretly, is less unwilling as to members of the household than as to outsiders. But although the condition of a Religious and of a son is different, nevertheless in this there is something similar, that the goods of the monastery are possessed for the good of the subjects, not indeed for the convenience of the Superior. Finally, as to the detriments which seem to be feared, these depend chiefly on the use of the things taken secretly; for a son can consume things taken away in gaming and whoring, and a Religious can disburse them to the poor, and vice versa.
- Resp. 2º In sins committed against Religion alone, or against the vow alone, the difficulty increases, and the disagreement of Theologians is greater. Yet more commonly they require generally the same matter for mortal sin as in the preceding case where justice is violated, because the act of proprietorship seems to be of the same gravity. Nevertheless not improbably some grave Doctors require a greater quantity for grave sin. - Thus Elbel, n. 646. - Salmanticenses, ch. 6, n. 12.
But they commonly agree that a much greater value is required for sinning gravely when gifts are accepted from outsiders to be disbursed to others, because then the act of proprietorship is much less than if these things were retained for one's own use. St. Ligorius, n. 24, and others commonly. - Indeed some then require 60 argentei, or the value of about 30 francs, for sinning gravely. - Thus Diana. - Leander, etc., apud St. Ligorius, ibid. 9.
9 ** This opinion seems to carry much difficulty before itself. For either it is understood of money to be accepted and disbursed by a religious in his own name, or for his own use; and thus, since we have an act of proprietorship contrary to the vow of poverty, with the old Doctors it will deservedly seem too lax to require 60 argentei, or six Roman scudi, for gravity of fault, especially since the change in the value of money which has occurred in the course of time (see the things said about this argument in tom. 1, note to n. 607) would now require a much ampler quantity of money. Or it is understood of money accepted and disbursed in the name of another; and thus with Sanchez (see note to preceding n. 157) it will be licit to judge that no fault intervenes, even if there is question of a greater sum.
St. Alphonsus borrowed that opinion with its allegations from the Salmanticenses (De Restit., ch. 6, n. 47); yet all these, if they are compared with their Authors, are found to be brought forward beside the point. Namely, with Leander they allege Suarez, Palaus, and Diana. But these hand down the same doctrine as Sanchez.
Thus Suarez (De Relig., tr. 7, bk. 8, ch. 15, nn. 15 and 16): "When the owner concedes only the use of fact..., if the use yields to the convenience of the religious himself, or is properly given to him, it is against poverty to accept that without permission, not so much because of the dispensation as because of the acceptance of the thing, because namely something estimable by price is accepted without permission, and thus it is an acceptance of proprietorship. But indeed if the use neither yields to the convenience of the religious, nor does he accept it for himself, but only that the thing be given to another, so that he himself is only the medium or instrument of transferring the thing from one to another, then in reality there is no sin against poverty, because he neither accepts anything nor expends anything in his own name.... Hence I gather that as often as an indeterminate use of fact is conceded..., it is not against poverty..., if only the dispensation to be made to others in the name of another is accepted, although the particular application is committed to the judgment of the religious...." See also the same bk. 8, ch. 5, n. 31, where he establishes that administration formally and per se is not repugnant to poverty, because it is only something of fact and not of proper right, since things thus administered are held not as one's own but as another's. Hence he concludes: "Therefore administration as such has nothing on account of which it is excluded by the vow of poverty; therefore it is not matter of poverty, but can be matter of obedience," etc.
But Palaus (Tract. 16, disp. 3, punct. 22, n. 4): "If not goods of the Convent ... but things accepted from seculars you hand over to blood relatives, ... a distinction must be made: if you accept them absolutely, you sin not only against poverty, but also against justice against Religion, into which those goods by your acceptance have been incorporated. But if you do not wish to accept them, but make manifest to the giver that in his name you will give them to your blood relatives, you do not seem to violate justice or poverty: not justice, since the handing over happens from the will of the owner; not poverty, because you neither give nor hand over anything to your blood relatives, but the secular person provides the donation through your medium.... This holds true even if the secular person has not designated to whom the money is to be conceded, but has left this to your judgment; because the choice of persons alone belongs to you, which is not against poverty."
And Diana (tom. 7, tr. 3, res. 23, n. 2): "Note also here in passing that a Religious does not sin against poverty if without the Superior's permission he accepts money so that he himself may freely dispose of it in alms in the name of him who gave it. And for this opinion above I cited Sanchez and Faustus, to whom I now add Petrus de Ledesma and Francis Suarez." But he gives this reason (ibid., res. 27, n. 2), "because the vow of poverty obliges a Religious not to accept dominion and proprietorship of any thing while the Superior is unaware: but in our case this Religious does not accept dominion of that money, but only accepts it in the name of another, namely of the one handing it over, so that he may give it to the poor. Therefore."
Cf. also Card. De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 3, n. 155), and Pellizzarius (Manual. Regul., tr. 4, ch. 2, n. 236).
The VV. attack this Note and the preceding one subjected to n. 157 through fourteen columns (pp. 372-378). Therefore two things must be shown here against their objections: 1º that rightly and deservedly it is affirmed in the Note that the allegations of the Salmanticenses and of others are brought forward by St. Alphonsus beside the point; 2º that nothing solid is advanced by the VV. against the doctrine of Suarez, Sanchez, Palaus, Diana, Lugo, etc.
And as to the first, these are the words of St. Alphonsus (bk. 4, n. 24): "But if something is accepted from outsiders to be furnished to others, still more (namely, for gravity of matter) is required; for then Garcia with Palaus, Leander, Diana, etc., apud the Salmanticenses (tr. 13, ch. 6, n. 47), assign for grave matter a value greater than 60 argentei." And the VV. (p. 375) not only acknowledge, but contend, that in this place there is question of a Religious who disburses money accepted from an outsider, by this person's mandate, to the poor.
But the Salmanticenses in the cited place do not treat this question, and therefore neither do the Authors brought forward by them there pertain to our question. Therefore all those allegations are brought forward beside the point apud the Holy Doctor.
The minor is proved: 1º from the words of the Salmanticenses (l.c., n. 47), from which the Holy Doctor took his opinion: "But if from outsiders," they say, "something is received for giving or SPENDING, a greater quantity is still required that it be mortal.... Garcia, citing Leander, Palaus, Diana, and others, assigns as matter things of value greater than 60 argentei." But that which is generally received for giving AND SPENDING does not pertain to alms to be disbursed by force of the mandate of someone. Compare also the title of that Punctum V. Therefore these things do not make to the matter.
2º The matter is more clearly plain from the third preliminary observation there (n. 44): "We note thirdly, from the opinion of all Doctors, that a greater quantity is required that donation and acceptance from goods accepted from seculars be mortal than from common goods; and still greater if the donation is made to Religious of the same Convent than to outsiders." But a donation of a Religious is not what a Religious distributes in the name and by the mandate of another. Therefore there the question is not about our case.
3º But this is most luminously plain when the Salmanticenses, in that same place (l.c., n. 47) from which St. Alphonsus took, render the reason why a greater quantity is required for the gravity of matter if the donation is made to Religious of the same Convent than to outsiders. For after they had said that Garcia, Leander, Palaus, etc., assign as grave matter things of value greater than 60 argentei, they immediately add: "If, however, things are donated to another Religious of the same Convent, Suarez deservedly asserts that a greater quantity is required for grave fault, SINCE THAT THING STILL REMAINS WITHIN THE MONASTERY." And again below: "BECAUSE THAT THING STILL REMAINS WITHIN THE DOMINION OF THE CONVENT." Therefore the Salmanticenses treat of a thing to be disbursed, indeed accepted from outsiders, but which has already yielded into the dominion of the Convent. But whatever a Religious receives from an outsider to be disbursed to the poor in the name and by the mandate of that person by no means passes into the dominion of the Convent. Therefore the Salmanticenses do not there dispute about our controversy.
4º Finally, this very thing shines out from the fact that the Salmanticenses, where they touch our question, find no fault in the Religious, and have the same opinion as Suarez, Sanchez, etc. Thus they say (tr. 13, ch. 6, n. 15): "A Religious would not sin against the vow if he does not wish to accept things offered by another, but manifests to the giver that he will give them to others in his name; because then he himself does not give, but another, using him as minister and instrument, is the one who uses the money and makes the donation, as Sanchez holds, bk. 7, ch. 19, n. 74; Suarez, tom. 3, De Relig., bk. 4, ch. 15, n. 16; Palaus, punct. 22, n. 4; Diana, part 1, tr. 6, res. 29, and part 3, tr. 2, res. 65." Therefore it is most manifest that the question which the Salmanticenses discuss in n. 47, from which St. Alphonsus took, is altogether another and very different one from the present, and therefore the authority both of the Salmanticenses and of the Doctors alleged by them there is invoked beside the point by the Holy Doctor.
Let us now come to the other head, namely to the arguments which the VV. bring against the doctrine of Suarez. Namely, the VV. concede that a Regular does not sin against the vow of poverty when someone committing alms to be distributed to a Religious at the same time determines the poor to whom those things are to be handed over; but that he sins if the free choice of the poor is permitted to the judgment of the Religious. They soon add that the text of the Salmanticenses just set down is to be understood of persons determined by the one committing. To this last thing it must be answered: 1º this is asserted gratis, and therefore it is also denied gratis; 2º this must be denied altogether. The reason is plain; because the Salmanticenses must be understood in that sense which the Doctors exhibit, to whom they themselves remit the matter. But Suarez, Sanchez, Palaus, and Diana, as their texts brought forward in the Note prove, exempt each case from fault, nor do the Salmanticenses place any distinction between case and case, which otherwise would have been necessary there. Therefore.
For the rest, the VV., to strengthen their thesis against Suarez, namely that there is sin against the vow of poverty if in the case the free choice of the poor is left to the judgment of the Religious, bring forward 1º from a letter of St. Alphonsus the authority of Azor, Rodriguez, and Lohner, of whom St. Alphonsus also alleges the first two in Hom. Apost. (bk. 15, n. 7); 2º an argument from a threefold reason. A few things, which will suffice, to each.
Therefore 1º from Azor the VV. object these things (p. 1, bk. 12, ch. 9, q. 1): "It is of certain law that a Religious of the second kind cannot have peculium; for even usufruct, use, or administration from which the Abbot cannot remove the Monk by his nod and judgment, is repugnant to the solemn vow of poverty. For a Religious can have nothing proper. But use, or usufruct, or administration which someone has at his pleasure, subject to the power and will of no other, is something proper." - Resp. These things do not make to the matter. For Azor had set down beforehand (ibid.) that that use is understood so that a Religious by his own judgment can use the fruits of those goods and establish concerning them by his own nod what he wishes. But he who in our case receives money to be disbursed to the poor cannot establish concerning it by his own nod what he wishes. Therefore those things do not make to the matter. On the contrary, concerning our case Azor says elsewhere (l.c., ch. 10, q. 10): "Either something is given to a Religious so that in the name of him who gives he may disburse it for certain uses; and then that is not acquired for the monastery, since he who gives does not transfer dominion of the thing, but distributes it through the Religious for certain uses; and in this way money is given to Religious to be restored or to be disbursed for the uses of the poor."
2º From Alphonsus Rodriguez they bring forward these words (p. 3, tr. 3, ch. 15, n. 3): "It is repugnant to the vow of poverty not only to make oneself owner and proprietor of any thing without permission of the Superior," and yet these things are repugnant even with the Superior's permission, which cannot be given by the Superior, "but also to usurp its use and free administration and dispensation." - Resp. These things again do not make to the matter. For Rodriguez judges this when another gives money in such a way that he attributes the free faculty of spending and distributing it as he pleases (sicche mi lasci in liberta di spenderlo e distribuirlo a mio arbitrio, e come mi parra); wherefore the Religious could even buy a little dog with that money. On the contrary, concerning our case Rodriguez had premised (ibid.) that there is no sin against the vow of poverty if someone gives me money so that in his name I may give it to someone, or restore it, or bestow it upon certain poor persons. Therefore the authority of Alphonsus Rodriguez is alleged less faithfully.
3º Finally, Lohner indeed in his Opus Concionatorium seems to go into the opinion of the VV.; but the reason which he adds, namely that use of a thing independent of the Superior does not belong to anyone bound by the vow of poverty, either leaves uncertain in what hypothesis he says money is accepted by a Religious, or is judged plainly false by the Doctors, who, to one objecting that use of a thing is repugnant to the vow of poverty, would respond by distinguishing thus: use of right, I concede; use of fact, I deny. See Sanchez (Dec., bk. 7, ch. 30, n. 4), Azor (p. 1, bk. 12, ch. 12, q. 4), Ferraris (word Votum, art. 2, n. 116). Well does Sanchez say (bk. 6, ch. 11, n. 52): This choice is something of fact rather than of right, as is established from law Cum pater, 77, § 4, ff. de Legatis 2. For the rest, this is no wonder in a homiletic work. Those things of St. Alphonsus (bk. 2, n. 54) also make to this: "When I discharged the office of preacher, I also often tried forcefully to denounce this pernicious practice; but since here I discharge the office of a writer about moral science, I MUST SAY WHAT I THINK ACCORDING TO THE TRUTH."
Now to the arguments of the VV. against Suarez. But it must be premised that this doctrine is not Suarez's alone; indeed it is common among those weightiest Authors who have touched this question. And indeed, that most Writers of moral discipline do not have even a word about this question, although otherwise they pursue at length any modes whatsoever by which the vow of poverty can be injured, makes it abundantly plain that they had not even suspected that those are held by guilt of this kind who have undertaken alms to be distributed in the name of another to poor persons either determinate or indeterminate.
1º Therefore the VV. object (p. 377) that in the case there is had an act by which the Religious, by his free will without the Superior's permission, disposes of temporal goods. - Resp. I distinguish: he disposes by his free will, because this is a human act, I concede; he disposes according to his judgment of temporal goods, I deny; because merely as messenger he executes the certain will of another.
2º The VV. object (ibid.) that the Religious to whom free choice of persons is committed can enrich his own blood relatives by choosing them; which is estimable by price. - Resp. I deny the whole; for the hypothesis is concerning one who faithfully executes the will of the donor. But if the will of the donor is that something, whether much or little, be attributed also to the blood relatives of the Religious, the very same thing always returns, that the Religious merely acts the parts of a messenger. Thus Laymann (bk. 4, tr. 5, ch. 7, n. 16) in that same place which the VV. object: "A Religious does not sin against the vow of poverty ... if he has himself as the messenger of another, as for instance if in the above-said case he accepts money from a rich man so that he may give it, not in his own name, but in the name of that rich man, to a blood relative or poor person.... And in this sense the opinion of Sanchez is true, that a Religious does not sin against the vow of poverty if without the Superior's permission he accepts money, the faculty of choosing the poor to whom he distributes it having been left to him."
3º The VV. object (ibid.) that the parity which Suarez establishes between this Religious and a steward limps; because he who gives the money to be distributed is not the master of the Religious. - Resp. I deny that the office of messenger or almoner changes its nature, whether the executor of the office is a servant or not a servant. If it pleases, let it be said that in these circumstances the Religious serves another.
And enough concerning these things. For even at first glance it ought to seem burdensome to dwell on this question, when on this side indeed stand the weightiest Authors Suarez, Sanchez, Lugo, Palaus, Pellizzarius, Diana, Laymann, Tamburini (Dec., bk. 8, ch. 3, § 5, n. 5), Azor (p. 1, bk. 12, ch. 10, q. 10), Croix (bk. 4, n. 112), and the Salmanticenses (tr. 13, ch. 6, n. 15); but on the other side scarcely any words of uncertain sense could be brought forward from an ascetical or homiletic work.
Generally, however, a Religious does not sin gravely by secretly accepting some thing from the Community, for example, a book for his own use even for a long time, but not in perpetuity, unless he hides it in such a way that it cannot be found by Superiors; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as to the substance, but only as to the mode. As to things accepted or handed over as loan for consumption or loan for use without permission of the Prelate, speaking generally he will not sin gravely against the vow of poverty if he gives things for his own use or even other things to outsiders as loan for consumption or loan for use, provided he is certain of recovering them and does not therefore bring grave harm upon the Community, which for this reason, for example, lacks the use of a thing gravely necessary here and now. Much less gravely will he sin if he lends for consumption or use to other Religious of the same monastery things conceded for his own use. The reason is that although in these things he makes some act of proprietorship, nevertheless he does not sin gravely, according to the common interpretation of Theologians. - St. Ligorius, n. 27. - Laymann. - Sanchez, etc.
- Resolutions. - 1º A Religious sins against the vow of poverty if without the consent of the Superior he accepts, retains, consumes, exchanges, gives to another, or lends for use anything at home or outside, even from those things which pertain to food or clothing. Likewise if without permission of the Superior he accepts money or other things as loan for consumption or for use from outsiders.
2º He sins against the vow of poverty also who spends things obtained for some use on another use, or culpably loses or destroys them.
3º He sins against the vow who eats or drinks apud outsiders without the faculty of the Prelate; because while he accepts something without permission, he posits an act of proprietorship. Nevertheless generally he does not seem by this to sin mortally 10. - Lacroix, n. 105. - Suarez. - Sanchez, etc.
10 ** Indeed permission can be presumed without difficulty; and otherwise the Superior could perhaps be judged unwilling not so much by reason of the thing accepted by the subject as from another cause.
4º If a Religious accepts from outsiders a thing to be handed over to the Superior, he can very easily suppose presumed permission. But if he cannot suppose it, he seems to sin against poverty; nevertheless generally that sin will not exceed venial sin. - Lacroix, n. 118, etc.
5º He sins against the vow of poverty who keeps a thing accepted with permission for use beyond the limits of time fixed by the Superior; who applies it to another use with detriment of the same; who keeps a thing with the soul of an owner, namely with the intention of subtracting it from the free disposition of the Superior, for example, if he hides it lest it be seen; and indeed this one cannot be excused from this, that he had obtained permission previously.
6º He sins against the vow of poverty who without faculty of the Superior buys something even for the Community, because he acts as proprietor. Sometimes, however, he can presume permission, namely when he knows that this will be pleasing to the Superior and easy recourse to him is not open, for example, on a journey. But permission of this sort can more easily be presumed in matters of lesser moment.
7º A Religious making a journey cannot turn aside to other places outside the straight way to see curious things, unless perhaps the distance is brief and no expenses or very modest expenses must be made; but in a particular case, if a grave cause underlies, the permission of the Superior can deservedly be presumed. Otherwise he will sin both against poverty and also against obedience.
8º A Religious can accept no deposit properly so called without permission. The reason is 1º because according to the opinion of several he would make an act of proprietorship; 2º because a deposit is a contract; but a Religious without the faculty of the Superior can enter no contract concerning temporal things 11.
11 ** Concerning this matter Pellizzarius says (Manual. Regul., tr. 4, ch. 2, n. 232): "You will ask: Are religious prohibited by the vow of poverty from receiving money of outsiders in deposit without the permission of the Prelate? Resp., they are not prohibited if they receive it with the intention of returning it as often as the owner wishes; although this can be against obedience and religious decency if it is done secretly. Thus Diana from Suarez, Sanchez, and Faustus." And Laymann (bk. 4, tr. 5, ch. 7, n. 4): "To accept things in deposit, so that the depositor retains every right of dominion and possession and administration, is not repugnant to the vow of poverty; although in such a mode, for example, monies have been deposited apud a Religious so that he can use them after permission of the Superior has been sought and obtained; nevertheless such things are against the perfection of poverty, and for the most part against the prescription of the Rule." Lugo has the same things (De Iust., disp. 33, n. 6), who moreover (disp. 3, n. 219) warns that the Convent is not held to repair the damage when some thing deposited by an outsider apud a Religious was lost by his fault or taken away by thieves. Indeed not even if he accepted that deposit with permission of the Prelate, because the offense of a subject does not harm the Convent.
- 9º All gifts which are made to Religious solemnly professed are by that very fact acquired for the Monastery, not excepting legacies and inheritances, from the most known principle of Canon Law: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the Monastery." This principle has force also as to other Religious within the limits of the vow of poverty, which does not take away from them the faculty of acquiring and possessing. Hence these are able to accept and acquire legacies and inheritances, although they cannot dispose of them without permission. As to the remaining donations, they come to the Monastery unless they are made specially in view of a private person and not insofar as Religious 12. But then the Religious cannot accept without at least presumed permission, or under the condition of obtaining permission.
12 ** The Author says this concerning Religious not solemnly professed. For donations, even if they are made as to private persons, if they are made to solemnly professed persons, come to the monastery.
10º Manual works, whatever they are, which are made by Religious, pertain to the Community. Therefore private persons, although artisans, cannot dispose of them, nor can they receive any emolument from them 13. The same must be said about honoraria which are attributed to Regulars for Masses or other spiritual ministries.
13 ** Yet sometimes Superiors are accustomed to indulge that the subject receive emolument from the wage of his labors and industry, and apply monies to his own uses. In this surely one must beware lest the devil, as not infrequent experience teaches, draw the unwary monk back from Religion to the world by these, as it were, nets or little cords.
11º Religious sin against the vow of poverty who do not apply equal care lest things conceded for their own use become worse. Say the same about those who, because of negligence, allow things committed to them by office to perish or suffer detriment.
- 12º It is not against the vow of poverty to accept something under the condition of obtaining permission, or even to give, provided the thing can be recovered if permission is denied, because the act is in reality suspended. - Lacroix, n. 108. - Lugo, etc.
13º For accepting licitly, or for making expenses, presumed permission suffices when the Superior cannot be approached and the occasion urges. But a thing accepted from presumed permission ought afterwards to be manifested to the Superior when he can be met, and the thing has not already been consumed. - Suarez. - Lacroix, nn. 109-114.
14º A fortiori tacit permission suffices for giving or accepting; indeed it has force even if the Superior can be approached, because tacit permission is judged to exist de facto: for example, because it is contained virtually in another permission, or is prudently gathered from circumstances, while presumed permission is not supposed to exist de facto, but only to be going to exist if it were sought. - Lacroix, n. 109. - Suarez, etc.
15º If a preceding Superior has given you permission of having some thing, it still has force even if he has departed from office. - Lugo. - Lacroix, n. 145.
16º If you have permission of giving something to Paul, and you give to Peter, you do not sin, unless the Superior gave permission for Paul because of a peculiar reason and would have denied it if you had sought this permission for Peter. - Lacroix, n. 119. - Pellizzarius, etc.
17º If Titius the Religious has permission of giving something to anyone whatsoever, Caius of the same Community by that very fact has the faculty of accepting, because to give and to accept are correlatives, and therefore permission for one is judged also to be for the other. - Sanchez. - Pellizzarius, etc.
These things concerning religious poverty in general. But one must attend to the particular constitutions of individual Orders, or to custom tolerated by Superiors; for in several Monasteries generally it is permitted to Religious to ask, accept, or procure for themselves several things necessary for food, clothing, books, and other things of this kind.