Sins against hope

47. What sins there are against hope. One can sin against hope by omission and by commission: by omission indeed if an act of hope is not elicited when by force of the precept it is to be elicited. Sins of commission against hope are of two kinds: for they are opposed either to the twofold act which precedes theological hope, namely to love and desire of beatitude, or to the act which essentially constitutes hope, namely to the trust of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for it. Further, to hope insofar as it contains desire of beatitude there is opposed hatred of God, our beatitude, or excessive adherence to earthly goods; but to hope insofar as it is trust two sins are opposed, one by defect, which is despair, the other by excess, which is presumption.

Whether it is a sin against hope to wish for death from weariness of life. Because this act does not contain aversion from God, the ultimate end, nor exclude the desire of eternal beatitude, it is not a sin against hope, but either is a defect of subjection toward the order of divine providence, which defect ordinarily does not exceed venial sin, or it is impatience arising from inordinate love of self, by which someone refuses to bear the miseries of this life, which likewise ordinarily does not exceed venial sin. This desire is a grave sin if it happens with full deliberation and express rebellion against divine providence. But if someone wishes for death with due patience and subordination toward God, he does not commit a sin but performs an act of virtue, provided it proceeds from desire of eternal beatitude to be attained in God.¹ To wish never to have been born, or to be annihilated, is a grave sin against hope, unless someone intends by desires of this kind only to signify the vehemence of pain.

¹ Phil. 1:23.

48. Hatred of God, which is directly opposed to hope, namely hatred of abomination, is that by which man turns himself away from God, his ultimate end, not willing to constitute his beatitude in Him. This hatred of God is a sign of great and inordinate adherence to earthly goods and is certainly a grave sin, because earthly goods are preferred to God and His possession, which involves contempt of God.

Whether it is a grave sin to wish to remain perpetually in this life. If this desire coheres with that disposition of soul by which someone is prepared to leave heaven to God if He grants him earth, it is a grave sin against hope, because, turning himself away from God, he turns himself to creatures and places his happiness in them. But if this desire only signifies an excessive affection for this earth and its goods, or fear of death because of the uncertainty of eternal happiness, it is not necessarily a grave sin against hope, because this disposition of soul of itself does not exclude desire of beatitude. Spouses who desire to live together perpetually on earth not rarely intend by words of this kind only to signify the vehemence of love.

49. Despair is voluntary and full diffidence of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for it.

a. Despair consists in a positive act of the will by which it, all hope having been cast away, voluntarily withdraws from God, the ultimate end, or from beatitude and the pursuit of it. Despair proximately arises from a prior judgment of the intellect by which someone thinks that he will be excluded from beatitude; but the reason because of which someone thinks that he is not to be saved can be diverse: for either he persuades himself that his sins are greater than that God can remit them, or he judges the way of the commandments of God to be too arduous, or he judges that God does not will either to spare him or to grant him helps, or he judges that it will never happen that God spare him, that he duly dispose himself for obtaining pardon of sins, etc.

b. From despair must be distinguished the fear by which sometimes even pious men are distressed because of the uncertainty of salvation. In like manner devout souls, which are sometimes troubled by continual temptations of despair, are not easily to be judged to have sinned gravely. In order that the confessor may know whether the penitent has consented to the sin of despair, he will be able to ask him whether for this reason he omitted his customary exercises of piety. For if someone, for example, for this reason ceases to pray because he is persuaded that God does not will to assist him, he sins gravely against hope; but if only from a certain inordinate sadness he loses heart and ceases from prayer, he does not sin gravely, and he sins in no way if he ceases to ask for health because he thinks that God does not will to restore it to him.¹

¹ Cf. Bucceroni, Casus conscientiae, Rome: Typographia Iuvenum Opificum, 1902, n. 32.

50. Its moral malice. Since despair is directly repugnant to the divine attributes, fidelity and goodness, it is a sin mortal from its whole genus, not admitting smallness of matter; indeed greater than sins which are opposed to the moral virtues, but less than the sins of infidelity and hatred of God which is opposed to charity: for infidelity and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself; but despair is against God as He is our good.

a. Although despair is not the gravest sin of all, nevertheless it is more dangerous than other sins: for experience establishes that, with hope of salvation plainly cast away, men rush without restraint into vices.¹ But in concrete cases it must be adverted whether someone really despairs concerning the goodness and mercy of God, or rather from faint-heartedness concerning his own cooperation with divine grace.

b. Men who from a depraved habit are given to sins, for example of drunkenness or pollution, sometimes seem to despair, since they are accustomed to say that they can no longer lay aside a depraved habit now too inveterate. Yet these are more faint-hearted than despairing; they despair rather concerning their own cooperation than concerning divine help. Wherefore they are to be raised up into greater trust in divine grace and admonished concerning cooperation with the help of grace.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 3.

51. Presumption is the rash expectation of eternal beatitude and of the means for attaining it, namely otherwise than God has ordained. The sin of presumption can be committed in five different ways:

a. If someone trusts that he will obtain remission of sins and eternal beatitude by his own powers, which is Pelagian presumption.

b. If someone trusts that he will obtain remission of sins and eternal beatitude without good works, from the merits of Christ alone, or without observation of the commandments, from the mercy of God alone, which is Lutheran presumption.

c. If someone trusts that he will obtain divine help for carrying out evil, for example revenge. In this case blasphemy is joined with presumption.

d. If someone trusts that he will obtain extraordinary goods against the order of divine providence, for example the holiness of the Blessed Virgin Mary or of the greatest saint, to which he knows that he is not to be elevated by God.

e. If someone assumes divine mercy as a motive of sinning and of repeating sins.¹

Whether it is presumption to sin because of hope of obtaining pardon. a. To sin or to persevere in sin from passion or frailty with the hope of obtaining pardon is not presumption: for hope of pardon is not the motive inducing to sinning, but an affection accompanying the sin; as if a soldier indulging in a rather free life defers confession until his military service has been completed.

b. To sin because of the ease of accusing sins, that is, if someone repeats sin because it is easy to confess or because several sins are accused as easily as one, likewise is not presumption, because the motive inducing one to repeat sins is not the ease of obtaining pardon, but the ease of confession.

c. To sin because of hope of pardon, that is, if someone sins and perseveres in sins because God remits several sins as easily as one, late as easily as soon, is a sin of presumption, because hope of pardon is the motive inducing to sinning and therefore an inordinate trust in divine mercy. Yet this sin of presumption is rarely committed, because hope of pardon must be called rather the occasion than the motive of sinning.²

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 310.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 130.

52. Its moral malice. 1. Presumption is a sin grave from its whole genus, or always mortal, if it contains heresy or blasphemy, the first, second, or third mode; otherwise it admits smallness of matter, the fourth and fifth mode.

Thus it is light to assume divine mercy as a motive of sinning lightly. Likewise, in a light danger, to expect without prayer a help which God has not promised.

2. Despair and presumption are either simple or qualified, according as they either are or are not joined with a sin against faith. For both despair and presumption suppose an erroneous judgment of the intellect; now if that erroneous judgment is against faith, those sins are joined with heresy.

Thus he who despairs because he thinks that God cannot or does not will to save him, or because he judges that observation of the commandments is impossible for him, is not only despairing, but, the suppositions being supposed, also a heretic; likewise both Pelagian and Lutheran presumption contains heresy.

Note 1. For discerning in the practice of confession whether the penitent has really committed a sin against hope, and whether with the sin against hope there is also joined a sin against faith, he will have to be asked why he despaired or presumed, and from the response a judgment concerning this matter can be formed.

Note 2. The habit of hope is not lost through every sin against hope, but only through that which is directly opposed to the formal object of hope; wherefore through the sin of despair, through hatred of God by which one withdraws from God insofar as He is our beatitude, and through Pelagian presumption, the habit of hope is lost. Besides this, since faith is the foundation of hope, through sins by which the habit of faith is lost, at the same time the habit of hope is lost.

The chief sins against hope are despair, presumption, and aversion for God and heavenly things.

Despair is a voluntary diffidence about obtaining heaven and the means necessary thereto. If it arises from mistrust of the goodness, power, and fidelity of God, it is gravely injurious to him, and is always mortally sinful. In an improper sense, despair sometimes springs from an overpowering idea of one’s own weakness and fickleness, and then it is frequently only venially sinful; it is not directly against hope, but rather a failure to make use of the motives to encouragement which hope furnishes.

Presumption here signifies a sin against hope by excess, and is an inordinate confidence in the attainment of heaven without using the necessary means. It is of itself a grave sin, but admits of parvity of matter, as when through such inordinate confidence one commits venial sin.

Aversion for God and heaven is distinguished from hatred of God, which is directly against charity, in that it does not wish evil to God, but prefers earth and earthly joys to God and heaven, It is, as is obvious, a mortal sin.

Besides omission of the act of hope prescribed by reason of the virtue of hope itself, sins against hope are despair by defect and presumption by excess.

I. Despair. 1. Notion. Despair is an act by which someone casts away expectation of eternal beatitude or of the means to it. It does not consist in an act of judgment by which someone judges eternal beatitude to be impossible, but in the fact that he refuses to pursue or expect it. Yet despair commonly is founded on a heretical judgment that beatitude is impossible; sometimes, however, on hatred of abomination, by which one does not wish to place his beatitude in God (St. Alphonsus, II, 20, 4). He too is guilty of despair who would prefer present goods to future ones and would wish to remain forever in this world; for indeed he truly casts away expectation of eternal beatitude (St. Alphonsus, II, 20, 1). Yet commonly a certain velleity rather than a true will of remaining in this world is had.

2. Division. Despair is distinguished into heretical and simple, according as despair proceeds from a heretical judgment or from another motive, for example from a sense of one's own weakness (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 2).

3. Morality. Despair is a grave sin from its whole genus, since he inflicts grave injury on God who does not expect to possess Him and the helps necessary for attaining that end. Yet infidelity and hatred of God are graver; but "despair is more dangerous: because through hope we are called back from evils and are induced to pursue goods; and therefore when hope has been removed, men slide without restraint into vices, and are withdrawn from good labors" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 3).

4. The causes of despair are: 1. lust, by which someone becomes disgusted with spiritual goods; 2. sloth, which is a certain dejecting sadness of spirit, by which it happens that man flees the arduous good of beatitude; 3. defect of faith, by which someone does not acknowledge supernatural goods (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 4).

5. The principal remedies are: 1. consideration of the mercy of God, of the greatest sinners reconciled with God, as were St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St. Mary Magdalene, and of the parables of the Gospel, for example of the prodigal son, the lost sheep, etc.; 2. prayer, especially devotion to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus and to the Blessed Virgin Mary, salvation of the despairing (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, nn. 240-244).

II. Presumption. 1. Notion. Presumption is the inordinate expectation either of eternal beatitude or of the means to it, or at least of divine help. Now the disorder can have place in five ways: 1. if someone, relying on his own powers alone, expects beatitude; this is the presumption of the Pelagians; 2. if someone, relying on divine aid alone, hopes, for example, if he expects remission of sins without penance, glory without merits; this is the presumption of Protestants (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, II, 21); 3. if someone expects supernatural goods apart from the order of divine Providence, for example if someone hopes for as much glory as the Blessed Virgin Mary enjoys, or expects divine help in grave danger without prayer; 4. if someone turns the motive of hope into a motive for sinning, in other words, if he sins or remains in sin because God is merciful; or increases sins because God will remit many sins just as easily as fewer in number. Otherwise it must be said if someone sins, remains in sin, or multiplies sins while concomitantly hoping that the sins will afterward be remitted; or because many sins are declared in confession just as easily as fewer in number. In this last case the ease of confessing, but not hope of pardon, is the motive for sinning (St. Alphonsus, II, 21; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 2, ad 3). One who sins because God is merciful is said to sin from hope of pardon; the other with hope of pardon. Now sinning from hope of pardon occurs very rarely. 5. If someone expects the help of God for illicit things.

2. Morality. a) Presumption committed in the first and second ways is a grave sin from its whole genus. The reason is that they inflict grave injury: the former mode against God as helper, whom it wholly neglects; the latter mode against the justice of God (St. Alphonsus, II, 20, 3).

b) Presumption perpetrated in the third way will commonly be only venial, because it does not inflict grave injury on God.

c) Presumption committed in the fourth way is grave from its genus, or is grave or light according as someone perpetrates a grave or light sin from hope of pardon. The reason is that he inflicts grave or light injury on God, according as he sins gravely or lightly from hope of pardon.

d) Presumption perpetrated in the fifth way is grave from its whole genus, since it inflicts grave injury on God as helper.

Finally note that presumption very often is joined with heresy, sometimes with blasphemy, as if someone hopes for the help of God for illicit things. Besides, "presumption is a sin, yet less than despair: since it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare than to punish, on account of His infinite goodness: for the former belongs to God according to Himself; the latter according to our sins" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 2).

3. The causes of presumption are especially pride and vainglory. "There is a twofold presumption. One, indeed, which relies on one's own power, attempting namely something as possible to oneself which exceeds one's own power; and such presumption manifestly proceeds from vainglory: for from the fact that someone greatly desires glory, it follows that he attempts something beyond his powers; and things of this sort especially are new things, which have greater admiration: and therefore Gregory pointedly placed presumption of novelties as a daughter of vainglory. But the other is presumption which relies inordinately on divine mercy or power, through which someone hopes that he will obtain glory without merits or pardon without penance; and such presumption seems to arise directly from pride, as if he so esteems himself that God would not punish him even when sinning, or exclude him from glory" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 4).

4. The remedies of presumption are humility and meditation on the inscrutable judgments of God.

Presumption, if it is perpetrated in the first or second way, destroys the habit of hope; but not if it is committed in the third, fourth, or fifth way. The reason is that, perpetrated in the first and second way, it indirectly destroys the formal object of hope by destroying its foundation; perpetrated in the other ways, it does not destroy the formal object of hope (De virtutibus, n. 361).

The filial fear of God is identical with the Gift of fear of the Lord, spoken of in scripture: “He shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord” (Is., xi. 3). The function of the Gifts is to make the soul docile to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, and to supplement or serve the habits of virtue, and both these benefits are conferred by filial fear.

(a) This fear makes the soul ready to follow impulses prompted by God, for through it we subject ourselves to God as our Father, revering His wondrous majesty and fearing to stray from Him. Indeed, this is the first of the Gifts, for the realization of one’s nothingness before God is the starting-point of promptitude in receiving His teaching and guidance.

(b) Filial fear is a principle from which proceed acts of all the moral virtues, inasmuch as the reverence for God’s surpassing majesty and respect for His almighty power and justice incline one to lay aside pride, intemperance, and every vice, and exercise good works that are pleasing to Him: “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, and the branches thereof are long-lived” (Ecclus., i. 27).

(c) Filial fear is especially and primarily related to the virtue of hope, for these two complement each other, as do the emotions of hope and fear. Hope aspires to conquer the heights of heaven, and feels that God is on its side; fear reminds one of the greatness of God and of the dangers of over-confidence. Each then is necessary to balance the other: “The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, and in them that hope in His mercy” (Ps. cxlvi. 11).

The Sins Against Hope.—There are two sins contrary to hope: (a) despair, which is the opposite of hope by defect; (b) presumption, which is the opposite of hope by excess.

Since hope has many elements of which it is composed, despair—or the falling short of hope—may happen in various ways. (a) Hope is a turning of the soul towards beatitude, and so the omission of the act of hope may be called despair (negative despair). (b) Hope regards beatitude as its good, and so aversion from divine things may be called despair (despair improperly so-called). (c) Hope pursues a good that is difficult of attainment, and so he who is dejected by the difficulty is said to despair. (d) Hope firmly believes that its goal may be reached, and hence one who doubts the possibility of success in the quest of heaven is in despair. (e) Hope has the expectation of one day entering into eternal life, and hence he is guilty of despair who admits that salvation will be secured by others, but denies that he himself should expect it.

Definition of Despair.—Leaving out of consideration negative despair and despair improperly so-called, the sin we are now considering may be defined as follows: “Despair is an act of the will by which one turns away from the beatitude one desires, not under the aspect in which it appears as good, but because one apprehends it as impossible, or too difficult, or never to be realized, and under this aspect as evil.”

(a) Despair is an “act of the will,” and as such it differs from the intellectual sin of unbelief. The Novatians, who rejected the forgiveness of sins, and a heretic who denies the future life, are guilty by these acts of sin against faith, though of course one who disbelieves must also despair (see 1029, 751).

(b) Despair is a positive “turning away from beatitude.” It differs, therefore, from the mere omission of the act of hope or from an act of feeble hope, as well as from the sins against the moral virtues, which consist primarily in a turning towards some created good.

(c) Despair turns away “from God,” and thus it differs from despondency about other things.

(d) Despair turns away from God “apprehended as good and desired as the beatitude of man,” for no one is said to despair of what he considers evil or undesirable. Hence, despair differs from aversions and fears; such as hatred of God (which regards Him as evil) or fear of God (which thinks of Him, not as a rewarder, but as the author of chastisement).

(e) Despair, however, does not reject God, because He is good and desirable, but because He is apprehended as a “beatitude that is impossible,” or too difficult for one, or as a good that one will never attain to. For a person does not turn away from that which he regards as the object of his happiness, unless he considers that there is some inconvenience in seeking after it.

Is despondency about things other than God a sin? (a) It is the sin of pusillanimity, when it makes a person abandon hope of something which he is capable of attaining and which he should aim at, as when students, on account of the labor required, give up hope of learning a certain subject which they have been assigned. This sin will be treated in the section on Fortitude.

(b) It is no sin, if a person gives up the expectation of something about which he has no reason to hope, or which he is not obliged to hope for. Examples: Caius gives up the hope of getting an education, because he lacks money to pay the expenses. Balbus ceases to pray for health, because he thinks it is not God’s will to grant that request. Titus abandons the expectation of a long life, and even at times wishes for death.

To wish for death may include despair of salvation or other sin.

(a) If this wish means that one has no desire for any kind of existence (as when one desires extinction), manifestly eternal life is not looked for, and hence there is despair. It should be noted, however, that such expressions as, “Would that I had never been born!” “Would that I were out of existence!” often signify nothing more than weariness of life on earth, or disgust with conditions.

(b)If the wish is not for annihilation, but only that God send death, it is not a sin of despair; but if the wish is inordinate, some other species of sin is committed—for example, if the person wishing to die is not resigned or submissive to God’s will in the matter, he is guilty of rebellion against Providence, and his sin is grave, if there is sufficient reflection and consent.

(c) If the wish is merely for death and is not inordinate, it may be an act of virtue, as when, out of a longing for heaven, one deliberately desires to be taken from this world, if this be pleasing to God. Thus, St. Paul said that he desired “to be dissolved and to be with Christ” (Philip., i. 23).

Certain acts of fear or sadness must not be mistaken for despair: (a) acts that are praiseworthy, like servile and filial fear spoken of above (see 1048 sqq.), grief over sin, etc.; (b) acts that are a trial from God, such as spiritual desolations in holy persons, scruples about forgiveness of sins, anxieties about predestination, perseverance, or the Judgment; (c) acts that are sinful, such as worldly fear, fear of God that is purely servile, timidity (i.e., an excessive dread of death or other evils). Those who fear that, on account of their frailty, they may not acquire a good habit or overcome an evil one, are guilty of pusillanimity. Those who, on account of sadness, neglect prayer are guilty of spiritual sloth.

There are two species of despair, namely, the despair of unbelief and the despair that is found even in those that have faith.

(a) The despair of unbelief arises from a judgment contrary to faith, as when one holds as general principles that salvation is impossible, that God is not merciful to sinners, that all sins or certain sins cannot be forgiven. Thus, St. Paul designates the pagans who do not accept the Final Resurrection as those “who have no hope” (I Thess., iv. 12).

(b) The despair of believers arises from a judgment formed by them which is not directly opposed to faith, but which is erroneous, and is induced by some wicked habit or passion. Example: Titus lives a very disorderly life, and so thinks that he is predestined to hell, or that he is too weak to repent and persevere. Since his predestination and perseverance are not matters of faith, he is not guilty of unbelief by his judgment about them, but the judgment itself is wrong, and one which he has no right to form or act on.

Signs which indicate that a penitent suffering depression has not been guilty of despair are: (a) if he retains the faith and has not abandoned the usual practices of religion and piety; (b) if he retains the faith, but has given up some of its practices through discouragement or weakness, but intends to repent. His sin is sloth or cowardice or attachment to some vice.

Hence, the erroneous judgment that precedes despair is similar to that which precedes every act of sin, namely, it is always practically erroneous, though not always speculatively so.

(a) Judgment is speculatively erroneous with regard to duty, when one decides that in general something is lawful which is unlawful; or vice versa, as when one thinks that lying is pleasing to God. It is clear that this kind of error need not precede sin, or else all sinners would err against the faith.

(b) Judgment is practically erroneous about duty, when a person decides that here and now he should do something which in fact he should not do, as when he knows well that lying is displeasing to God, and yet makes up his mind that, all things considered, he ought to tell a lie. It is clear that this kind of error precedes every sin, for no one wills something unless his judgment has first told him that he ought to will it. The sinner first judges in a particular case that he should prefer the good of pleasure or of utility to the good of virtue, or he first neglects to consider the right manner in which he should act: “They err that work evil” (Prov., xiv. 22).

The Malice of Despair.—(a) Despair is a sin, for Holy Scripture declares woe to the fainthearted, who trust not God and lose patience (Ecclus., ii. 15, 16), and it holds up the despair of Cain and Judas for reprehension. The malice of despair appears in this, that it is based on a perverse judgment that one ought not to labor for salvation in confident expectation, despite God’s promise and command to the contrary. (b) It is a mortal sin according to its nature, for it destroys the theological virtue of hope, turns man away from God his Last End, and leads to irreparable loss.

In the following cases despair is not a mortal sin, nor at times even a venial sin. (a) When there is not sufficient reflection, despair is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who are ignorant of the sinfulness of despair, those who on account of great discouragement or fear do not fully advert to their despair of amendment, do not sin gravely. Despair is often a result of insanity. (b) When there is not full consent of the will, despair is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who, on account of a melancholy disposition, inclination to pessimism, past sins, etc., are tempted to give up the hope of salvation, are not guilty of sin, provided they fight against these suggestions of the mind or imagination.

The gravity of despair as compared with other sins is as follows:

(a) Despair is a greater sin than offenses against the moral virtues, for the chief inclination of despair is aversion from God, whereas the chief inclination of the latter kind of sins is conversion towards creatures. Thus, a person who drinks excessively does not primarily intend offense against God, but his own enjoyment or escape from certain worries.

(b) Despair in itself is less serious than the sins of unbelief and hatred of God; for, while despair is opposed to God as He is our good, the other two sins are opposed to God’s own truth and goodness.

(c) Despair is more serious than the sins of unbelief and hatred of God with reference to the danger it contains for the sinner; for it paralyzes effort and resists remedies: “Why is my sorrow become perpetual and my wound desperate, so as to refuse to be healed?” (Jer., xv. 18) “If thou lose hope, being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished” (Prov., xxiv. 10). Despair is, therefore, a sin against the Holy Ghost, a sort of attempt at spiritual suicide. But (see 900) it is not unpardonable and may be overcome by divine grace.

It is important to know the causes of despair, for this knowledge enables us to distinguish it from the mystical state known as “the dark night of the soul,” and to prescribe suitable remedies. Despair comes from one’s own fault, whereas mystical purgation from God is a preparation for a higher state of divine union. The causes of despair can be reduced to two, luxury and sloth.

(a) The secondary characteristic of a hopeful pursuit of heaven is courage, the adventurous spirit which foregoes ease and comfort for the sake of higher things, despising the danger and difficulty. Hence, the vice of lust, since it makes one love bodily delights and disregard or underestimate those that are spiritual, is a cause of despair, as well as of other sins opposed to the spiritual life (Gal., v. 17).

(b) The chief and most distinctive characteristic of hope is its cheerful confidence of success. Hence, the vice of sloth, since it is sadness weighing down the soul and making it unwilling to think rightly or to exert itself, is the principal cause of despair (Prov., xvii. 22).

The apparent despair that is a trial to holy persons can be distinguished, therefore, from the sin of despair, especially by two signs: (a) though they are spiritually desolate and find no joy in religious practices, these persons do not turn to unlawful delights for consolation, but retain their dislike for lower pleasures; (b) though overcome with dismay at the thought of their own imperfection and of God’s holiness, they do not so lose heart as to give over their exercises of piety (cf. St. John of the Cross, The Dark Night, Bk. I, e. 9 ff.).

Spiritual writers make the following recommendations for cases of spiritual desolation: (a) the afflicted persons should understand that the deprivation of former sensible devotion is a sign of God’s love and has been experienced by the Saints, and should, therefore, possess their souls in peace, leaving to God the time and manner of His heavenly visitation; (b) they should not burden themselves with new and heavier mortifications, lest they be overcome by too great sorrow, but should go on with their accustomed good works, and realize that, though bitter to them, these works are now all the more pleasing to God (Ibid., c. 10).

Some Remedies for the Sin of Despair.—(a) If the cause is lust, one should learn that spiritual joys are nobler and more enduring than the joys of the flesh, and should take the means to sacrifice the lower in favor of the higher.

(b) If the cause of despair is spiritual sloth, one should meditate on the greatness of God’s power, mercy and love, and should avoid whatever fosters undue sadness, “lest he be swallowed up with over-much sorrow” (II Cor., ii. 7). Thus, those who are tormented by the thoughts of past sins or future temptations must subject their scruples to direction, and remember the mercy shown to the good thief, to Magdalene, and other penitents; those who have lost courage because they read spiritual books of a rigorous or terrifying nature, or have been advised to attempt that for which they were unsuited, should seek more prudent instruction and counsel; those who are naturally nervous or melancholy, should employ such therapeutical or preventive measures as are useful or necessary. All should follow the direction of St. Peter to labor the more, that by good works they may make sure their calling and election (II Pet., i. 10).

Presumption is the name given to certain acts of the intellect. (a) Sometimes it signifies an arrogant self-esteem, as when an ignorant person thinks he is able to dispute with a learned scholar. (b) Sometimes it is a judgment about the affairs of others made rashly or out of fear: “A troubled conscience always presumeth grievous things” (Wis., xvii. 10). (c) Sometimes it is a conclusion based on probable evidence, and which by jurists is called violent, strong, or weak presumption according to the evidence (see 658).

Presumption is also a name given to various acts of the will. (a) It is used, in a good sense, to signify an excellent confidence or hope, which seems rash according to human standards, but is really well founded, since it rests on the immensity of the divine goodness. Thus, Judith prayed: “O God of the heavens, Creator of the waters and Lord of the whole creation, hear me a poor wretch, making supplication to Thee, and presuming on Thy mercy” (Jud., ix. 17). Thus, too, Abraham hoped against hope (Rom., iv. 18). (b) Generally, however, the word “presumption” is applied to acts of the will in a bad sense, and indicates the purpose to do what exceeds one’s powers.

Here we are concerned only with presumption as it is an act of the will choosing to do what exceeds one’s power. “Power” may he understood in three ways, and thus there are three kinds of sins all bearing the name of presumption.

(a) If a person chooses to overstep his moral power (i.e., his right of action), he is guilty of the general sin of presumption, which is not a special category of sin, but a circumstance common to any kind of sin in which one acts with full knowledge, and without subjection to any fear or coercion. Hence, in Canon Law it is said in various places: “If anyone shall presume to transgress” (i.e., if anyone shall coldbloodedly transgress).

(b) If a person wishes to accomplish by his own efforts something so great and difficult that it surpasses his physical powers, he is guilty of the special sin of presumption that is opposed to the moral virtue of magnanimity or greatness of soul, which attempts great things for which it is suited. Thus, he is presumptuous who undertakes a profession, when he has no sufficient knowledge of its duties (cf. Luke, xiv. 28 sqq.). This may be called the moral sin of presumption.

(c) If one wishes to obtain through divine aid something that surpasses even the divine power to confer, one is guilty of the special sin of presumption that is opposed to the theological virtue of hope, which expects from God only such things as are worthy of God and as God has promised. Thus, he who looks forward to a free admission into eternal bliss, without repentance or obedience, does injury both to the character of God and to the virtue of hope. It is this special sin of presumption that we are now considering. It may be called the theological sin of presumption.

Definition of Presumption.—The theological sin of presumption may be defined as follows: “An act of the will by which one rashly expects to obtain eternal happiness or the means thereto.” (a) It is an act of the will, and hence is distinct from intellectual sins, such as disbelief in the justice of God or the necessity of repentance. (b) It is an act of pleasing expectation, and so differs generically from fear, which is an act of dreadful expectation. (c) It is a rash expectation, and so is specifically opposed to hope, which is well-founded expectation.

The objects of presumption are material and formal.

(a) The material object is eternal happiness and the means thereto, such as forgiveness of sin, observance of the Commandments, etc. This object by extension would include also such extraordinary supernatural gifts as the hypostatic union, equality in glory with the Mother of God, etc.; for it would be rash to expect against His will what God has made unique privileges.

(b) The formal object, or motive, of presumption is divine mercy not joined with justice, or divine power not regulated by wisdom, as when one hopes for heaven because one reasons that God is too merciful to be a just judge of sinners. The motive by extension would include also the unaided power of human nature relied on as equal to the task of working out salvation, as when a man feels so confident of his own virtue and his security against temptation that he thinks he can dispense with prayer and all appointed means of grace and yet save his soul. Similarly, a person is presumptuous if he feels that it is absolutely impossible for him to be lost, because he has received Baptism or other Sacraments.

Presumption is rash, therefore, for the following reasons: (a) because it leads one to expect what is impossible according to the absolute or ordinary power of God (e.g., to share in some divine attribute, to sit at the right hand of Christ in glory), or (b) because it makes one expect to obtain supernatural goods in ways other than those ordained by God (e.g., to obtain forgiveness without repentance, to obtain glory without merits or grace).

The nature of presumption as compared with temptation of God and blasphemous hope is as follows: (a) they are alike, inasmuch as all three wrongly expect something from God; (b) they differ, for presumption looks towards salvation and one’s own happiness, whereas temptation of God seeks rashly some sign from God as a proof that He is wise, good, powerful, etc., or that the person is innocent, holy, etc., and blasphemous hope expects that God will help one in working revenge or committing other sin.

The Malice of Presumption.-(a) It is a sin, because it is an act of the will agreeable to false intellectual judgments, namely, that God will pardon the impenitent or grant eternal life to those who have not labored for it. (b) It is a mortal sin, since it does grave injury to the divine attributes. We cannot hope too much in God, but we can expect what a perfect God cannot grant; in this latter respect—that is, in its contempt of God’s majesty and justice—consists the offense of presumption. (c) It is a sin against the Holy Ghost, because it makes one despise the grace of God, repentance, etc., as if they were not necessary.

The gravity of presumption as compared with other sins, is as follows:

(a) It is graver than sins against the moral virtues, because it is directly against God. Thus, theological presumption, being injurious to the power of God, is a more serious offense than moral presumption, which is an exaggeration of the power of man.

(b) It is less grave than despair, for, while presumption is a disregard of God’s vindictive justice, despair is a disregard of His mercy, and God’s vindictive justice is due to the sins of man, His mercy to His own goodness.

(c) Presumption is less grave, therefore, than unbelief and hatred of God, which, as said above, are more wicked than despair (see 1070).

Presumption and Unbelief.—(a) Presumption is joined with unbelief whenever it proceeds from a speculatively false judgment about matters of faith. Persons, however, who are in error (e.g., Pelagians, Lutherans, Calvinists, etc.), may be in good faith, and hence guiltless of the formal sin of presumption. Examples: Caius expects to win heaven by his own unaided efforts (Pelagian presumption). Balbus expects to be equal in glory to the greatest Saints, and to be saved by the merits of Christ without repentance or observance of the Commandments (Lutheran presumption). Titus expects to be saved on the strength of wearing scapulars, practising certain devotions, or giving alms, while he wholly disregards church duties and important Commandments (Pharisaic presumption). Sempronius thinks that all members of his sect are predestined, and hence concerns himself little about the Commandments, being persuaded that all must end well with the elect (Calvinistic presumption).

(b) Presumption is committed without unbelief, when it proceeds from a practical judgment that one should act as if salvation were obtainable without merits or repentance, or as if natural efforts were alone sufficient, although speculatively one does not accept such errors (see 1067). The same is true when presumption springs from a failure to consider the divine justice or the established means of obtaining salvation.

Presumption and Loss of the Virtue of Hope.—(a) Presumption properly so-called (i.e., hope of the impossible) takes away the virtue of hope, for it removes the motive and reasonableness of the virtue; now, the essence of true hope is a reasonable expectation, just as the essence of faith is assent to divine authority. Hence, he who expects future blessedness unreasonably (i.e., through his own efforts alone or through exaggerated mercy exercised by God), is not hopeful, but presumptuous.

(b) Presumption improperly so-called (i.e., hope of the uncertain) does not take away the virtue of hope, since it does not remove the motive of hope. Thus, one who commits sin, trusting to go to confession and to make restitution after he has enjoyed the benefits of wrongdoing, is presumptuous in the sense that he puts himself in a state of sin, for it is uncertain whether the time to repent will be granted him. However, he is relying on the mercy of God, which never abandons man during life, and not on his own efforts, or on pardon given freely. He is guilty of a want of charity towards self, and of injustice to his neighbor, rather than of a want of hope.

Presumption properly so-called is a sin rarely committed by Catholics. For (a) the presumption of unbelief is excluded by their faith in the justice of God and in the necessity of repentance and good works; (b) the presumption that is not the offspring of erroneous doctrines is also unusual, because even those who go on sinning with the expectation of being saved in the end, generally have the purpose of repenting at some future date.

Is a sin worse because committed with the hope that later it will be pardoned? (a) If, at the moment of sin, a person has the intention to continue in sin, though he hopes for pardon, he is guilty of presumption, and his sin is made worse. (b) If he has the intention of sinning, but hopes for pardon, and is resolved to repent later on as a means to pardon, he is not guilty of presumption. The intention not to continue in sin diminishes the sin, for it shows that one is not so strongly attached to evil.

The intention to sin now and repent later varies in malice according to circumstances.

(a) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is concomitant as regards the sin now committed—that is, if one sins with the hope, but not because of the hope of pardon-one is less guilty. Example: Titus while on a tour indulges in much drunkenness, because he has the opportunity and is not known; but he intends to repent on his return home.

(b) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is antecedent as regards the sin—that is, if one sins because of the hope of pardon—one is more guilty. Example: Balbus stays away from Mass most Sundays, because he reasons with himself that God is kind and it will be easy to obtain pardon. Caius, when urged to repent, always replies that it will be a simple matter to turn over a new leaf at the hour of death. Sempronius goes on multiplying sins from day to day, because he argues that it is just as easy to be pardoned late as early, just as easy to repent of a hundred sins as of ten.

In the following cases presumption is not a grave sin: (a) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not sufficient reflection; for example, a person who is invincibly ignorant of the seriousness of presumption, or who on account of immaturity has exaggerated ideas of his own strength, does not sin gravely if he presumes on God’s mercy or his own power; (b) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not full consent of the will. For example, Titus is a self-made man, and hence is inclined at times to feel that he can work out even his salvation without any assistance, but he rids his mind of this presumptuous thought as soon as he takes notice of it.

Are there cases in which presumption and despair are transformed into venial sin, not on account of the imperfect knowledge or consent of the subject, but on account of the slightness of the matter involved? (a) If there is question of presumption and despair properly so-called, they are never venial on account of the lightness of the matter, for the matter, man’s eternal destiny, must always be an affair of the utmost moment. (b) If there is question of presumption and despair in a wider sense, these sins may be venial on account of smallness of matter; for they may be understood with reference to things other than salvation. Examples: Titus despairs of his success in overcoming a habit of arriving late for his meals or of talking too much. Balbus imprudently trusts to his own efforts to get up promptly in the morning, or to fight against some slight distraction in prayer.

The causes of presumption are as follows: (a) the presumption which depends too much on one’s own powers arises from vainglory, for, the more one desires glory, the more is one inclined to attempt things that are above one, especially such as are new and will attract applause; (b) the presumption that depends rashly on divine assistance seems to result from pride, for a person who desires and expects pardon without repentance, or heaven without merits, must have a very exaggerated opinion of his own importance.

Sins that Spring from Sloth.—(a) To escape his sadness about divine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden him—his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of cowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his grief—the persons who would lead him to God (sin of rancor) or the spiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for the want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden things: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not concern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless, and he must be continually moving from place to place.

Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.—The vices opposed to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.

(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities, taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in good faith and from inculpable ignorance.

(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary, seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25). This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not per se mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously sinful (e.g., if one’s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments) or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).

(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269). The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575 sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded, and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man. The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g., those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity, like ambition, is per se only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes one boast of one’s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others, or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are the publication by word or deed of one’s own true or pretended exploits (boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of intellect which make one hold obstinately to one’s views (stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others (discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention), sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What are the daughters of acedia? - They are the following: 1. Malice, namely a special malice by which, by reason of sadness to be fled, someone hates and detests spiritual goods, and would wish them not to exist, or by which he is sorry that he has done well or fulfilled that to which he was bound, or by which he contemns a benefit of God, e.g., by desiring not to have been born, or not to have known Christ, etc. It is mortal from its genus. - 2. Pusillanimity, by which someone flees those things which are arduous and which fall under counsels. 3. Torpor, by which someone flees those things which pertain to common justice, or precepts, and does good things without due fervor.

4. Rancor, by which those who induce to spiritual things are wearisome; whence rancor is a certain indignation. 5. Wandering of mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders toward exterior illicit delights, whether by thought, and it is called curiosity; or by speech, and it is called verbosity; or by bodily restlessness, and it is called restlessness, which are commonly venial. 6. Despair of salvation, which is flight from the end itself, and mortal. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, a. 4; q. 35; L. 84.

What are the sins opposed to hope? - By reason of love, the first act of hope, there is opposed to it the hatred of abomination of God, by which someone abominates God as hostile to himself because of vengeance for sins, or by which someone is turned away from God, eternal blessedness, and wishes to place his happiness in some other thing than in God. Hence it is also a mortal sin opposed to hope, to love earthly things more with a love of concupiscence than heavenly things; e.g., if someone is so disposed that he desires to remain perpetually in this life, and to leave heaven to God, if God leaves earth to him.

By reason of hope, the other act of the virtue of hope, there is opposed to it flight from God because of the labor and difficulty of attaining him, and despair and presumption. The former is voluntary diffidence of obtaining blessedness and the means necessary for attaining it. But the latter is an inordinate confidence of obtaining blessedness without the means ordained by God. Presumption is chiefly committed if you presume to obtain eternal life by the proper powers of nature without the help of grace; if you expect it without penance, without labor, from the mercy of God alone; if you expect it above your proper disposition, according to the order of divine providence, e.g., if you should wish to surpass the Blessed Virgin Mary in holiness and glory. Struggl, q. 3, nn. 11, 14-16; Suarez, d. 1, ss. 2, 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20; q. 21; L. 20, 21.

Is there smallness of matter in sins against hope? - R. Negatively as to hatred of God and love of creatures, if the act is perfect, as is clear of itself. R. Negatively as to despair, if it is perfect and properly such; for it is most greatly injurious to the divine Mercy. Eph. 4:19. Otherwise, however, if it is imperfect and improperly such, as often happens in sadness and impatience. But here it must be noted that even devout souls are sometimes troubled by almost continuous temptations of despair. It is certainly not easily to be believed that they have sinned gravely, although they think they have given consent to them; just as excessive fear about the danger of salvation must not be confused with despair properly so called. - R. Affirmatively as to presumption, although it is grave from its genus. Bonacina, cited by La-Croix 128, teaches that he sins only venially who from presumption concerning the goodness of God would sin venially, or would defer doing penance concerning a mortal sin until the following day. - Suarez, d. 2, s. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, aa. 1, 3; L. 20.

1. Argyrophilus clings so ruinously to riches and to the present life that he thinks neither of paradise nor of hell, but only of hoarding treasure. Hence he desires to live on earth for thousands of years, indeed perpetually, lest he be drawn away from riches.

2. Melania, afflicted by a long-lasting illness, begged health from God and from the Blessed Virgin Mary for several years. Since she did not obtain it, she resolved to pour out no more prayers to God and the Saints, saying: God does not wish to hear me.

3. Marinus, after a long life of sins, hears a preacher exhorting sinners to penitence. But he himself, considering the long series of his sins, says within himself: I am already lost; it is now useless to renounce sin.

4. Leonardus, a recidivist, was often admonished by his confessor, but with almost no amendment. The confessor insists, admonishing him again, but he says: Father, indeed I fear the future judgment on account of the multitude of my sins, and scarcely perhaps shall I obtain divine mercy; for I can no longer abstain from sins, both on account of inveterate custom and on account of my excessive frailty.

Q. 1. What are the sins opposed to hope? - 3. What as to the cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 371. To the second: Argyrophilus sins gravely against the virtue of hope. The reason is that he truly places creatures before God; content to be without God, he establishes his happiness and his last end in creatures. G. 203.

Melania sins gravely against hope, if therefore she truly ceases to pray because she is persuaded that God is unwilling to furnish her his aids. But if from a certain inordinate sadness she loses heart and ceases from prayer, she sins only venially. If, finally, she ceases to ask health because she believes that God, by the secret judgment of his wisdom, does not will to restore health to her, she does not on account of this sin. G. 204.

Marinus sins gravely from desperation. This is a most grave sin, and most dangerous. The confessor ought not to desert him; but with all solicitude he ought to try to raise him up, and to stir him to hoping firmly, to sorrowing, and to proposing. If the sick man should despair of recovering bodily health, the prudent physician does not desert him, but then labors especially, so that by salutary counsels and suitable medicines he may restore him to his former health. Elbel 184; G. 203.

Leonardus does not seem to sin gravely from desperation. For he does not seem truly to distrust divine mercy, but only fears too much lest he fall into sin, as one who is well conscious of his own frailty. Wherefore the confessor ought to console and strengthen a pusillanimous man of this sort, so that he may place all his hope and confidence not in his own powers, but in the assisting grace of God, to whom nothing is impossible. G. 203; Elbel 184.

215. • Q. 5º What are the remedies of despair?

Resp. The principal ones are the following: 1º consideration of the infinite goodness and mercy of God; - 2º frequent remembrance of those men who after many and most grave sins obtained pardon; 3º meditation on the parables of the holy Gospel, especially of the lost sheep; - 4º special devotion toward the Blessed Virgin, refuge of sinners; - 5º confidence in Christ affixed to the cross for us, etc.

719. One can sin against hope in a twofold way: by omission, when the prescribed act of hope is not elicited; by commission, when hope is cast away through despair or perverted through presumption. From what has been said it is sufficiently understood when one sins against hope by omission. Yet it may be observed that the principal cause of these sins is disordered adhesion to earthly goods, by which temporal goods are preferred to eternal goods, so that not a few desire to remain perpetually in this life. This happens especially to those who abound in riches and pleasures: for these sometimes contemn heavenly goods and place their happiness in earthly things;¹⁰ and this sin is grave when it turns us away from the love of God and from other duties of the Christian life which oblige under mortal sin. - Therefore it remains to speak concerning despair and presumption.

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20-21; Suarez, disp. II, sect. 2-3; Billuart, De spe, art. 5; St. Alphonsus, lib. III, nn. 20-21; Perrone, nn. 145-158; Bouquillon, nn. 372-383; Lehmkuhl, nn. 310-313; Ballerini-Palmieri, nn. 124-132.

¹⁰ This M. d'Hulst thus explains, Careme, 1892, p. 201: "Hope is therefore a duty, and this duty, so sweet, is costly at its hours. Yes, gentlemen, when life seems to smile upon our earthly hopes, it is hard to disdain those flattering promises which take us by the sensible side of ourselves; it is hard to withdraw from the embrace of pleasure, to say to the happiness which offers itself to us: you could not suffice for me... The Christian needs something of this heroism (of the martyrs) to disengage himself from the caressing embraces of pleasure and to entrust to the distant promises of a mysterious beyond all the hope of his happiness."

720. 1. Notion and causes. (A) Despair is a voluntary diffidence of obtaining beatitude, or the means necessary for it.

In order that it be a sin, it must be voluntary; it is therefore distinguished from involuntary disturbance, which frequently arises in those who fear God, or in the scrupulous: for these, from an empty motive, often fear lest they are in the state of mortal sin, or lest, on account of their malice, they fall into danger of damnation. It likewise differs from that sense of spiritual dereliction which sometimes the most perfect suffer: for these, with God permitting it thus, are deprived of spiritual consolation, and are pressed by various temptations, so that they seem to themselves to have been forsaken by the Lord Himself, and become altogether despondent.¹¹

¹¹ Christ wished to suffer this spiritual dereliction on the cross, namely when He cried out: "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" (Matt. 27:46). Bona describes this state thus (De discretione spirituum, c. 13): "But in the higher part the mind is darkened by the densest darkness, the will languishes, finding consolation nowhere, neither in God nor in creatures: every ardor of love grows cold; and, what is most grave, it is pressed by so many temptations that it often seems to itself to have given assent to diffidence, blasphemies, and despair. Those who have experienced it liken this horrible torment to the pains of hell." Cf. Schram, Instit. mysticae, § 226-237.

In order to know whether a penitent has truly consented to the sin of despair, the confessor will opportunely ask him whether or not he has omitted the accustomed exercises of religion and piety: if, notwithstanding fears and anxieties, he has not ceased to pray, he can be judged free from the sin of despair; but if he has ceased from praying, thinking that God is unwilling to come to his aid, of itself he sins gravely; but if, desponding in soul from a certain disordered sadness, he becomes tepid and remiss, he sins venially.

721. (B) Among the principal causes of despair are numbered:

(a) Defect of faith, because faith is the foundation of hope; such was the despair of Cain when he said:¹² "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon"; for he seemed to suppose that God does not remit sins even to those truly penitent. (b) Disordered adhesion to pleasures, especially lust; for from affection for these delights a man grows disgusted with spiritual goods; and when he wishes to come to his senses, it is so arduous to restrain lust and to leave the enticements of the flesh,¹³ that not a few despair concerning victory and eternal salvation. (c) Spiritual sloth (above, n. 562), that is, languor and weariness in the exercise of virtue, horror of difficulty, labor of combat, by force of which we consider the good to be done as too difficult and impossible, and therefore abstain from it.¹⁴ (d) Presumption, insofar as it leads us into temptation, but afterward into multiple sins and despair; namely, the Seducer deceitfully leads the incautious into sin, by persuading them of the lightness of sin and the ease of pardon; but, once sin has been committed, he deters them from penance, by magnifying its enormity, the inescapable weight of depraved custom, and the implacable justice of God. (e) Among natural causes is numbered a certain melancholic disposition, which begets sadness and dejection of soul.

¹² Gen. 4:13.

¹³ Augustine graphically describes this (Confess., lib. VIII, c. 11, n. 26, P. L., XXXII, 761): "Trifles of trifles and vanities of vanities, my old friends, held me back, and they muttered softly: Do you send us away? and from this moment shall we not be with you any more forever? and from this moment will this and that not be permitted to you any more forever? And what things did they suggest?... what filth did they suggest! what disgraces!... Yet they delayed me, hesitating to tear myself away and shake myself free from them and leap across whither I was called, while violent custom said to me: Do you think you will be able to live without these?"

¹⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 4.

722. 2. The malice of despair. (A) Despair properly so called, which is concerned with salvation or the means necessary for obtaining it, is a mortal sin of its whole kind, less indeed than infidelity and hatred of God, but graver than the sins which are committed against the moral virtues; for it is directly opposed to the very motive of faith, since it at least implicitly denies the mercy or power of God; and therefore it utterly destroys hope itself, without which salvation becomes impossible. Besides, "hope being removed, men slide unrestrained into vices, and are drawn back from good labors."¹⁵ Sometimes it is also joined with heresy, insofar as someone believes that God cannot or does not will to save him: then it contracts the special malice of heresy.

¹⁵ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 3.

(B) But diffidence concerning those things which are not necessary for salvation, for example, concerning avoiding some venial sin or attaining such a degree of perfection, is not despair properly so called, and of itself is a light sin. The same must be said concerning a certain pusillanimity, by force of which we in some way despair concerning our cooperation with grace, but not concerning divine mercy.

723. 1. Notion and causes. (A) Presumption, insofar as it is opposed to hope, is a rash expectation of beatitude and of the means for obtaining it, contrary to the order of Providence. For God, in the conferring of His gifts, has established certain laws conformable to wisdom; and the sin of presumption is situated in this, that spiritual goods are desired without conformity with these laws. This happens in various ways.

(a) Presumption is heretical, namely when it imports some error against faith; such is Pelagian presumption, situated in this, that someone hopes to obtain the remission of sins, or some other grace, and heavenly beatitude by his own powers; or Lutheran presumption, by which someone trusts that he will obtain remission of sins and eternal beatitude from the merits of Christ alone, without penance properly so called and the observance of the commandments;¹ or Calvinist presumption, by which someone hopes for divine help in carrying out something evil, for example, in taking vengeance upon an enemy, as if God could positively cooperate with sin.

¹ From this error they do not sufficiently withdraw who hope, on account of some offices of piety toward the Blessed Virgin, that they will obtain salvation, even if they live carnally and sin more freely. Cf. Tyrrell, External Religion (French, La religion exterieure, Paris, 1902), lect. V.

(b) Presumption is simple, or non-heretical, when someone, without error in faith, presumes too much concerning divine mercy or his own powers, for example, if he trusts that he will obtain extraordinary graces, such as are granted only to the greatest saints, - or assumes divine mercy as a motive for sinning more freely, multiplying sins because, he says, God remits many just as easily as one, and is always ready to spare penitents even when they return late to virtue.

But if someone sins or perseveres in sin from passion or frailty, with hope of obtaining pardon, or because of the ease of accusing sins, this is not properly presumption, but an abuse of grace to be diligently avoided.

724. (B) The principal causes of presumption, besides the errors in faith recounted above, are pride and vainglory.

From pride especially arises that presumption by which someone trusts that he will obtain glory without merits, or pardon without penance; for he esteems himself so highly that he hopes that even while sinning he will not be excluded from glory. From vainglory proceeds especially the presumption by which we attempt something above our powers, expecting thereby to be esteemed by others.² Yet sometimes it also arises from levity of mind, by force of which, forgetful of our own infirmity, we presume too much upon our own strength: then the sin is lighter.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 4.

725. 2. Concerning the malice of presumption. (A) Heretical presumption is of itself a most grave sin, since it is opposed both to faith and to hope, and inflicts injury upon the divine attributes; when it is voluntary, it destroys the habit of hope, since it overturns faith, which is deservedly held to be the foundation of hope. - Yet I said of itself, because there can be, among Lutherans, those who in good faith think that salvation can be obtained from the merits of Christ alone, without observance of the commandments.

(B) Simple presumption is of itself a grave sin, but can admit smallness of matter;³ nor of itself does it destroy the habit of hope, because it preserves its motive: for although someone presumes too much upon himself, he does not for that reason altogether reject divine help.

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 2.

In practice, in order to judge whether a penitent has sinned against hope, and at the same time against faith, he must be asked why and how he despaired or presumed, and from his answers the nature and gravity of this sin will be able to be recognized.

Man sins against the theological virtue of hope either by wilfully entertaining an aversion for God and heavenly things or by confiding in Him either too much or too little.

1. Aversion for God is not the same as hatred of God. The latter is a sin against charity rather than against hope. To have an aversion for God means not to wish Him evil, but simply to prefer the earth and its attractions to Him and to the happiness He has prepared for His rational creatures. To do this is obviously a mortal sin.

In this connection theologians discuss the question whether it is a mortal sin to wish that this terrestrial life might last forever. Noldin says that if this wish is accompanied by a disposition to leave Heaven to God, provided He will give us the earth, it is a mortal sin against hope because by entertaining such a desire the creature turns away from the Creator and seeks its happiness in created things. If, however, it is merely a sign of excessive absorption in earthly pleasures, or of fear of death on account of the uncertainty of reaching Heaven, it is not necessarily a mortal sin against hope because such a disposition of mind does not per se exclude the desire of beatitude. Married people who say that they would like to live together forever, as often as not merely mean to give utterance to the ardor of their mutual affection.¹

¹ Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., p. 55.

2. Against the confidence that forms an essential constituent of hope we may sin either by excess (per excessum) or by defect (per defectum).

We sin by excess of hope, a) If we entertain presumption, which is an inordinate confidence of being able to attain Heaven without employing the necessary means. This may manifest itself in a twofold manner:

α) By tempting God. “Tentatio Dei” is a Biblical term² which denotes the expectation of extraordinary divine help or miraculous intervention when there is no legitimate reason for it. The term may also be applied to anything that is done with the purpose of eliciting such help, as, for example by ordeals (ordalia) or so-called divine judgments (iudicia divina),³ which are based on the belief that God, being just and all-powerful, will, if solemnly invoked by public authority, rather work a miracle than allow his rational creatures to be unjustly punished or to escape punishment when guilty of a serious crime. This belief is contrary to the revealed truth that God’s distributive justice does not work itself out fully in this world.⁴

² Ex. XVII, 7; Deut. VI, 16; Ps. LXXVII, 18; Is. VII, 12; Matt. IV, 7; Acts XV, 10.

³ See, however, A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., p. 250, n. 1: “Nevertheless, if a miraculous intervention of God is expected in the matter of eternal salvation, there is indeed in this expectation or request a certain disorder contrary to theological hope; but this must not be confused with the temptation of God itself. The latter also extends more broadly, since it is committed in any matter whatsoever if such an intervention of God is requested without a just cause and is of itself constitutes a graver malice.”—Gury (I, n. 273) says: “The temptation of God is a request for and expectation from God of some unusual effect placed outside the order of things. It is certain that a formal and express temptation of God is always a mortal sin against religion. . . . If, however, it is only implicit, it can often be merely a venial sin because of ignorance, inadvertence, or smallness of matter. . . . 1. He sins gravely against religion who demands to prove his innocence by duel, red-hot iron, etc., or who offers himself voluntarily for martyrdom, unless he is excused by good faith or divine inspiration. 2. Likewise one who exposes himself to great danger of death without a just cause, relying on divine aid. But if he acts merely from rashness without trusting in divine providence, he does not sin against religion, but only against the fifth commandment of the Decalogue. 3. He sins only lightly who, in a slight illness, rejects remedies and hopes for health from God, because there is no grave disorder there. Indeed, he is excused from every fault if he hopes that, with God’s aid, he will be freed naturally from such a slight illness. 4. Likewise, he sins venially in itself who through negligence approaches unprepared to preach the word of God, hoping for special aid from God.”—On ordeals, etc., see A. Franz, Das Rituale von St. Florian, Freiburg 1904, pp. 180 sqq.; IDEM, Die kirchlichen Benediktionen im Mittelalter, Vol. II, pp. 307 sqq.; E. Vacandard, Études de Critique et d’Histoire Religieuses, 2nd ed., Paris 1906, pp. 204 sqq.; J. P. Kirsch in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, pp. 276 sqq.

⁴ John III, 17.

β) We further sin by presumption if we harbor the inordinate confidence that, no matter what we do, we shall get to Heaven, because it lies entirely with God not only to call men to eternal beatitude but to enable them to obey the call.⁵ This is what theologians call praesumptio salutis.

⁵ Phil. II, 12 sq.—Gury (I, n. 185): “Presumption is a disordered confidence of obtaining beatitude by means not ordained by God.”

Its wrongness lies in seeking certainty of salvation in conditions other than those prescribed by the Christian religion.⁶

⁶ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., III, n. 21.—Gury, I, 187: “In how many ways is the sin of presumption committed? Principally: 1. by presuming to obtain eternal life by one’s own powers; 2. by expecting it without labor, from the mercy of God alone; 3. by sinning because of the hope of easily obtaining pardon from God; 4. by persevering in sin because of the hope of conversion at death.”—St. Augustine, Serm., 13 (al. 94, De Temp.), n. 2: “This is the sum of instruction: Serve the Lord in fear and rejoice in Him with trembling (Ps. II). Rejoice in Him, not in yourself: for from Him you have what you are, both that you are a man and that you are just, if nevertheless you are already just. But if you think that you are a man from Him but are just from yourself, you do not serve the Lord in fear and rejoice with trembling, but in presumption toward yourself. . . . For now you seem just to yourself by not taking another’s property, not committing adultery, not committing murder, not bearing false witness against your neighbor, honoring father and mother, worshipping the one God, and not serving idols and demons; but you will perish from this way if you presume that these things come from yourself, if you think that you have them from yourself. . . . What, then, must be done so that we do not perish from the just way? ‘Blessed are all who trust in Him’ (Ps. II, 13). If those who trust in Him are blessed, those who trust in themselves are wretched. For ‘cursed is every man who places his hope in man’ (Jer. XVII, 5). Therefore do not place it in yourself either, because you too are a man. For if you place your hope in another man, you will be inordinately humble; but if you place your hope in yourself, you will be dangerously proud. What difference does it make? Both are ruinous; neither is to be chosen. The inordinately humble man is not raised up; the dangerously proud man is cast down.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 107).

This sin assumes different forms according to the character of the sects that encourage it. Thus theologians speak of a praesumptio lutherana, a praesumptio calviniana, a praesumptio pelagiana, and a praesumptio pia, or, more correctly, pietistica. The Lutherans base their presumption upon the theory that salvation depends solely on the confidence a man has (fides fiducialis) in the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ, i. e., on faith alone (sola fides) without good works.⁷ The Calvinists believe in absolute predestination.⁸ The Pelagians held that man can work out his eternal salvation without the aid of supernatural grace.⁹ A certain class of Pietists make salvation depend on mere “ortho- doxy.”¹⁰ All these theories are false and pernicious.

⁷ Rom. III, 28; Jas. II, 14 sqq.— Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 9–15.—B. Bartmann, St. Paulus und St. Jakobus über die Rechtfertigung, Freiburg 1897, pp. 140 sqq.—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 274 sqq.

⁸ Cfr. Conc. Arausic. II., c. 25 (epilog.): “We not only do not believe that any persons are predestined to evil by divine power, but if there are any who wish to believe so great an evil, we say anathema to them with all detestation.”—A. Zahn, Über den biblischen und kirchlichen Begriff der Anrechnung, Amsterdam 1899.—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 152 sqq.

⁹ Rom. X, 3; 1 Cor. X, 12.—St. Augustine, Epist., 196 (al. 200), c. 2, n. 7: “Similar to these [Rom. X, 3] are those who, although they profess themselves Christians, oppose the grace of Christ in such a way that they think they fulfill the divine commandments by human powers; as though they too, ignorant of the justice of God and wishing to establish their own, are not subject to the justice of God, and Judaize not indeed in name but nevertheless in error. This kind of men had found for itself as leaders Pelagius and Coelestius, the most vigorous defenders of this impiety.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 893).—IDEM, Confess., IV, c. 16, n. 31: “Our firmness is firmness when You [God] are it; but when it is our own, it is weakness.” (P. L., XXXII, 706).—On the Pelagian heresy see Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 82 sqq. On the prevalence of the same error at the present day see G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London 1920, pp. 65 sqq. Father Joyce says: “The idea that a man’s soul is disabled, and that in order to resist temptation he needs a new force infused into him, is, outside the Catholic Church, almost forgotten. Religion is reduced to the recognition of God’s sovereignty and the observance of a certain standard of morality; but it is not supposed that there is anything in this beyond the scope of our natural powers. The idea that man comes into the world spiritually crippled, and that the religion of Jesus Christ can remedy his ills simply because it communicates to him a new principle of life, has disappeared. What, for instance, is the view taken of Baptism by the vast majority of our fellow-countrymen? It is probably true to say that by most non-Catholics it is at most held to secure to the recipient a certain external favor on God’s part. Many, certainly, regard it as strictly obligatory by reason of Christ’s command. Yet even they do not consider that the rite confers any internal gift, and would very likely dismiss as absurd the idea that the child who dies unbaptized must remain for ever deprived of the beatitude conferred on those who have received that sacrament. There is no mystery as to the source of these errors. They have their origin in a reaction against the false teaching of the Protestant Reformers. Luther and Calvin grossly exaggerated the effects of original sin. They declared that it had so vitiated and corrupted human nature, that fallen man is incapable of the smallest good. Indeed, according to Luther, even after justification, every act that man performs is stained with sin. The justified are saved, not because they are delivered from sin, but solely by the imputation to them of Christ’s merits. A teaching so manifestly false could not but provoke a reaction. Experience teaches us plainly enough that fallen man is not wholly destitute of virtue: that even bad men are capable, from time to time, of good and generous actions. Hence it is no matter of surprise that those who have been brought up to believe that this travesty of Christian teaching is the teaching of Scripture as to human nature, should in preference accept the solution of Rationalism and deny original sin altogether. But when sanctifying grace and original sin are both gone, what remains of Christianity is hardly distinguishable from pure and simple Pelagianism. One of the most marked features of this modern view of religion is the almost universal acceptance of the principle that one religion is as good as another. This is not looked upon as a matter admitting of argument or discussion. It is assumed as one of those self-evident truths which are beyond dispute: and the fact that Catholics deny it is regarded as a standing proof of their wrongheadedness. It is accepted equally by the sincerely pious and by those who are wholly indifferent to religious motives. The pious appeal to it as justifying their charitable hopes for the salvation of all. There are, they say, many roads to heaven: we must not condemn those who are not travelling along the same road as ourselves. The indifferent find in it an adequate excuse for the neglect of all religion. So indubitable does the principle appear to the modern Protestant, that nothing is commoner than to hear the opinion expressed that foreign missions are the most futile of enterprises. Why, it is asked, can we not leave the Mohammedan to serve his God in his own way? A sincere Mohammedan is just as likely to be saved as any Christian: to start a religious propaganda in a Moslem or pagan country may cause much political trouble, and can do no good to anyone. It is, of course, manifest that if the Christian religion has nothing more to offer to its adherents than a somewhat clearer knowledge of the moral law than is to be found in other creeds, there is much to be said for the objection. It might reasonably be doubted in that case, whether it is worth while to disturb the rooted beliefs of a nation in order to confer on it the problematic benefit of Christianity. Far better, it would seem, to try to induce them to observe the law which they already acknowledge as divine. The preaching of a new faith, even though it propose a higher ideal, may well cause more harm by the unsettlement to which it must give rise, than it will do good. But in fact this new form of belief, is, as we have urged, not Christianity at all. It may be said without irreverence that it would not have been worth while for God to become incarnate and die upon the Cross, to give man a gift such as that. The true religion of Jesus Christ does not consist simply in an example of the perfect fulfilment of the law. It is a stupendous gift to our race—the transformation of our nature by grace, the elevation of man to the high dignity of a child of God. It alone comes from God, and it alone can bring man to eternal beatitude. All other religions are the work of human imagination, and are powerless to save us. The Catholic missionary goes out to heathen countries knowing that he brings with him a boon that is beyond all price. Were the result of his life’s work but to make a single convert, his labors would have been well spent. Without him that soul would never have obtained grace, but would have passed out of this life still in the bondage of sin: through him it has been delivered from Satan and raised to be a partaker of the divine nature. He has achieved a result of inestimable value.”

¹⁰ Gen. XVII, 10–14; Deut. X, 16 sqq.; Matt. III, 8–10; XII, 50; Luke III, 8 sq.; John I, 12 sq.; VIII, 33, 39 sq.; Acts III, 25 sq.; X, 28; Rom. II, 28 sq.; VIII, 14; 1 Cor. VII, 19; 2 Cor. XI, 22; Gal. III, 2–29; V, 5 sqq.; VI, 15; Eph. II, 11–22; Phil. III, 2–9; Apoc. II, 9; III, 9.

What is ordinarily called presumption has its origin in a sinful life inspired by the confident expectation that God will not punish sin, or at least will grant the sinner an opportunity to repent before death. This is a crime against the Holy Ghost, because, as St. Thomas says, “by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.”¹¹ Presumption is not, however, always the inspiring motive of such seemingly presumptuous conduct. Father Noldin says:

¹¹ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 21, art. 1: “Concerning hope, through which someone adheres to divine power, presumption can arise through excess when someone tends toward some good as possible through divine power and mercy although it is not possible, as when someone hopes to obtain pardon without repentance or glory without merits. This presumption is properly a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, because through presumption of this kind the assistance of the Holy Spirit, by which man is recalled from sin, is removed or despised.”—IDEM, ibid., art. 2, ad 3: “To sin with the intention of persevering in sin under the hope of pardon pertains to presumption, and this does not diminish but increases the sin. But to sin under the hope of obtaining pardon at some time, with the intention of abstaining from sin and repenting of it, is not presumption; rather, this diminishes the sin, because through it the person appears to have a will less firmly fixed upon sinning.”

(1) To sin, or to persevere in sin, through passion or weakness, with the hope of eventually obtaining forgiveness (cum spe), is not presumption, because in that case the hope of forgiveness is not the motive of sin, but merely a sentiment accompanying it; as when a soldier who is leading a sinful life defers confession until his time of service expires.

(2) To sin because it is so easy to accuse oneself of repeated sins of the same species, or because the confessional is open at all times, or because it is no harder to confess many sins than one or two, is not presumption, because the real motive in such cases is not the ease with which it is possible to obtain forgiveness, but the facility of confession.

(3) To sin or persevere in sin because of the hope of forgiveness (propter spem veniae), i. e., because God forgives many sins as readily as one, or because He will forgive sins as easily later as now, is presumptuous because the hope of forgiveness in that case is the direct motive of sin and therefore an inordinate confidence in divine mercy. However, this sin is committed but rarely because in most instances the hope of obtaining forgiveness is an occasion rather than a motive.¹²

¹² H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 57.

Presumption is of itself grave (ex toto genere suo grave) and therefore always a mortal sin if it involves heresy or blasphemy; otherwise it admits of smallness of matter.¹³

¹³ Ibid., p. 58.

Certain deep-seated prejudices have recently been corrected by a non-Catholic savant as follows:

“It is a Protestant prejudice . . . that the Evangelical Church alone knows what it is to struggle for certainty in regard to, and to be personally conscious of, salvation. Current opinion [among Protestants] entirely ignores Monasticism, which for two important branches of the Christian Church represents the ideal Christian life. In judging the Catholicism of the western world we must never forget that to St. Thomas (who advanced in this matter beyond Augustine) belongs the merit of having first discussed the question,¹⁴ ‘whether man can know that he has grace,’ and of having laid down certain rules by which it is possible to arrive at an empiric, though not absolute, assurance on this point.”¹⁵

¹⁴ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 5: “Utrum homo possit scire se habere gratiam?”

¹⁵ K. Holl, Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Mönchtum, Leipsic 1898, p. 85.—Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 16.—H. Schell, Kath. Dogmatik, Vol. III, P. 1, pp. 346 sq.

It has been pointed out that St. Bernard of Clairvaux speaks of “certitude” in connection with hope and charity. But the certitude he means has as little in common with the Lutheran brand as St. Bernard’s theory of justification has with that of the Protestant reformers, for according to the Abbot of Clairvaux confidence in God has no justifying power, but justification flows from charity and is never absolutely certain until man has reached Heaven.¹⁶

¹⁶ St. Augustine, Serm., 130, n. 5: “When the doors are closed and the bolts shot, no friend departs, no enemy enters. There we have true and certain security, if here we have not abandoned the truth.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 728).—Cfr. Ps. CXLVII, 12–14.—Cfr. P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, Dublin 1918, pp. 45 sq.

We sin against hope per defectum if we have too little confidence or none at all in God and His mercy. This want of confidence may manifest itself in the form of a) Pusillanimity (pusillanimitas), which, however, is not always an act of the will, but often a mere sentiment or mood, or a temptation arising from timidity, scrupulousness, disease, lack of instruction, or momentary weakness. In such cases, though there have perhaps been manifestations of a violent grief bordering on despair, there may be little or no real guilt; nay, if these periods of mental depression are borne with Christian fortitude, they may lead to a closer union with God.

b) Want of confidence in God may manifest itself also in a feeling of hopelessness, owing to an overpowering realization of one’s own weakness and the consciousness of being unworthy of further graces from above. This is despair in an improper sense, and is frequently only a venial sin.

Despair in the proper sense of the word (desperatio positiva) is a voluntary diffidence in regard to reaching Heaven and the means necessary thereto; a complete and formal surrender of trust in the promises of God and of the hope of ever breaking with sin and leading a better life.¹⁷ This utter loss of confidence in one’s own strength and in the power of divine grace may spring from unbelief or from the positive con- viction that one cannot escape God’s punitive justice. The disposition which leads to despair frequently arises from spiritual or mental indolence, or from excessive indulgence in sensual pleasures, which may so completely ruin a man in body and mind that he loses confidence in himself.¹⁸ Thus despair, by its very nature, excludes the possibility of amendment or conversion, and is a grievous sin against the Holy Ghost,—more grievous even than presumption, first, because divine Revelation is primarily a manifestation of charity and mercy;¹⁹ second, because it is a greater injustice against God to reject His loving mercy than to disregard His justice,²⁰ and, third, because despair entails many other sins and is the proximate cause of eternal damnation.²¹

¹⁷ Gen. IV, 13 sq.; 2 Kings XVII, 23; Matt. XXVII, 3–5.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 40, art. 4, ad 3: “Despair imports not only the privation of hope, but also a certain withdrawal from the desired thing because of the estimated impossibility of attaining it.”—Cfr. 2a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 1.—P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, p. 46.—Vol. II of this Handbook, pp. 94 sq.

¹⁸ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 4: “The object of hope is an arduous good possible to attain either by oneself or through another. Therefore hope of obtaining beatitude can fail in someone in two ways: in one way, because he does not regard it as an arduous good; in another way, because he does not regard it as possible to attain either by himself or through another. That spiritual goods do not taste good to us, as it were, or do not appear to us as great goods, is chiefly brought about by the fact that our affection is infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among which the chief are venereal pleasures; for from affection for these pleasures it happens that man disdains spiritual goods and does not hope for them as arduous goods. And in this way despair is caused by lust. But that someone should not judge an arduous good possible for him to attain either by himself or through another is brought about by excessive dejection; when this dominates a man’s affection, it seems to him that he can never be raised up to any good. And because sloth is a sorrow that casts down the spirit, despair is generated from sloth in this way. Now this belongs properly to the object of hope, namely, that it be possible; for the good and the arduous also pertain to other passions. Hence despair arises especially from sloth. It can nevertheless arise from lust for the reason already stated.”

¹⁹ Ez. XVIII, 23, 32; XXXIII, 11–16; John III, 16; XII, 47; 1 Tim. II, 4; 2 Pet. III, 9.

²⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 21, art. 2: “Presumption is a sin, yet less than despair, because it is more proper to God to have mercy and to pardon than to punish, because of His infinite goodness; the former belongs to God in Himself, but the latter according to our sins.”—Cfr. Ps. CXXIX, 7 sq.—Missale Roman., Dom. X post Pentec.: “O God, who chiefly manifestest Thy omnipotence by sparing and having mercy, multiply Thy mercy upon us. . . .”—Brev. Rom., Litaniae Sanct. Omnium: “O God, whose property it is always to have mercy and to spare, receive our supplication. . . .”

²¹ St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., L, n. 5: “Sin with certain despair is death.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 588).—St. Isidore, Sent., l. II, c. 14: “To commit some disgraceful act is the death of the soul; to despise repentance and to remain in guilt is to descend into hell after death. Therefore to sin pertains to death, but to despair pertains to descending into hell.” (Migne, P. L., LXXXIII, 617).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 3: “If despair is compared with the other two sins [infidelity and hatred of God] on our part, despair is more dangerous, because through hope we are recalled from evils and induced to pursue good things; and therefore, once hope is removed, men fall without restraint into vices and are withdrawn from good works.”

Sometimes what is called despair is a mere motus desperationis, essentially a temptation, and therefore not in itself a sin, and it may be made a means of exercising the soul in virtue.

Despair itself is either partial or total. It is partial if it is not entirely voluntary, and total if it is entirely voluntary. Despair is never complete or total as long as a man continues to pray, or to perform good works, or if he resumes the practice of his religion at least temporarily.

The confessor should know that despair is sometimes a consequence and sometimes a symptom of partial or total insanity.

The sacred writers of both the Old and the New Testament never tire of extolling the mercy of God, i. e., His infinite love and paternal affection for men. He “shows mercy unto thousands;”²² He “is patient and full of mercy;”²³ His mercy is vast and tender beyond human understanding;²⁴ He is “a God of compassion, merciful and patient;”²⁵ “as a father hath compassion on his children, so hath the Lord compassion on them that fear Him, for He knoweth our frame;”²⁶ His “mercy is from eternity and unto eternity”²⁷ and “from generation unto generations;”²⁸ He is “the Father of mercies and the God of all comfort;”²⁹ He “saves us not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy,”³⁰ and so forth. In view of these assurances no sinner need lose confidence, even though he has offended grievously and against his better knowledge,³¹ for God “spared not even His own Son, but delivered him up for us all.”³²

²² Ex. XX, 6.

²³ Numb. XIV, 17–19.

²⁴ Ps. LX, 8; LXVIII, 17; LXXXV, 5.

²⁵ Ps. LXXXV, 15.

²⁶ Ps. CII, 13.

²⁷ Ps. CII, 17.

²⁸ Luke I, 50; cfr. I, 54, 72, 78.

²⁹ 2 Cor. I, 3; cfr. Eph. II, 4.

³⁰ Tit. III, 5.

³¹ Is. I, 18; Ez. XVIII, 23, 32; 2 Pet. III, 9.—St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., L, n. 18: “So full art Thou [God] of the richness of mercy that those who turn to Thee must not despair, not only whatever sinners they may be, but even whatever impious men they may be.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 597).—IDEM, ibid., n. 6: “Come to the aid [O God] of my grave wound according to Thy great medicine. What I have is grave, but I flee to the Omnipotent. I would despair of so deadly a wound of mine if I did not find so great a physician. . . . David himself could not say: ‘I did it ignorantly’ (1 Tim. I, 13). For he was not ignorant how great an evil intercourse with another man’s wife was and how great an evil the killing of her husband was. Those who did it ignorantly, therefore, obtain the Lord’s mercy; and those who did it knowingly obtain not just any mercy, but great mercy.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 588).—IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., 36, 3, n. 11: “We must not despair of others to such an extent that I do not despair even of the man himself so long as he lives. For we must despair of no one who is living.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 370).—IDEM, Serm., 351 (al. inter Hom. 50), c. 5, n. 12: “Whatever you have done, whatever you have sinned, you are still in this life, from which God would have removed you entirely if He had not wished to heal you. Why, then, do you not know that the patience of God leads you to repentance?” (P. L., XXXIX, 1548).

³² Rom. VIII, 32; cfr. John III, 16; Rom. III, 25; 1 John IV, 9 sq.—St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 57, n. 17: “This is the most unconquerable shield by which the enemy of salvation, suggesting despair through the multitude of tribulations and temptations, is repelled.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 89).

But, though the mercy of God is infinite, we must not abuse it or act with presumption, for, like mercy, “wrath quickly cometh from Him, and His wrath looketh upon sinners. Delay not [therefore] to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day, for His wrath shall come on a sudden, and in the time of vengeance He will destroy thee.”³³

³³ Ecclus. V, 7–9; cfr. Ps. CII, 18; Ecclus. XVI, 12 sq.—St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 144, n. 11: “Do not therefore say: Tomorrow I shall turn, tomorrow I shall please God, and all today’s and yesterday’s sins will be forgiven me. You speak truly that God has promised pardon to your conversion, but He has not promised tomorrow’s day to your delay.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1877).—IDEM, Serm., 20, n. 1: “Let the soul that has sinned say, ‘Create a clean heart in me, O God,’ etc. (Ps. L, 12), lest it perish more by despairing than it destroyed itself by sinning.” (P. L., XXXVIII, 138).

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 20 sq.—Billuart, De Spe, art. 5.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., lib. III, n. 20 sq.—Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 341 sqq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 409 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 54 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 247 sqq.—P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, Dublin 1918, pp. 28 sqq.

I. — Hope is violated by despair, by which the will deliberately ceases from the pursuit of beatitude, which it judges to be morally inaccessible to itself or to be neglected: whether it obstinately at least doubts concerning the divine assistance necessary for overcoming difficulties, or concerning divine mercy because of its sins, or whether it esteems too highly the labor to be endured and fastidiously contemns the reward.

Despair is directly opposed to confidence in God, is injurious to Him, and consequently is mortal from its whole genus. Yet often, for example in grave sadness, imperfection of the act will excuse from grave sin.

II. — Not by defect, as despair does, but by evil excess, man sins against hope by presumption.

Presumption, in general, says a certain confidence concerning a matter before it happens or is known to have happened. In a "pejorative" and more recent sense, it is confidence not founded. But insofar as by vain confidence we in some way sustain or inform our moral life, we act inordinately; we sin by imprudence and rashness of various gravity and species according to the quantity and specific quality of the evil to which we are exposed.

Hence presumption against theological hope is to be distinguished from presumption besides that hope: which presumption can also be called vulgar.

By presumption against hope, man strives to obtain supernatural beatitude by his own powers; or he attributes to the assistance of God what does not befit it, when he dares to hope for pardon without penitence, or glory with final perseverance in sin.

The first genus of presumption removes the formal object of hope; the other changes its material object, as if one wished to believe a non-revealed object. Both these genera are mortal from their whole genus. And St. Thomas judges it graver to wish to exercise hope in false objects than to trust in one's own powers rather than in divine assistance.

Beautifully St. Thomas says that despair is graver than presumption, because it befits God according to Himself to give heaven, but to punish only according to our sins (2, 2, q. 21, art. 2, c.).

Sins of presumption properly so called are scarcely ever committed.

— Practically, by the name of presumptions, men accuse evil confidences by which they expect too much from themselves, even with divine graces, and thus approach dangers rashly, or, abusing divine long-suffering, defer penitence, or add sin to sin, because three sins are accused as easily as one, or because God is no less ready to pardon several sins than one sin, etc.

In acts of this kind they in no way think of relying on the divine promise or of exercising theological hope. Wherefore these presumptions are not against hope but besides hope: these men sin by rashness against charity toward themselves, and by ingratitude toward God. According to the nature and gravity of the danger to which they commit themselves, they will sin gravely or venially. The proposition: God pardons three sins just as easily as one sin, certainly of itself is blasphemous, as if God does not care about the number of sins: but little attention is paid to that blasphemy. Observe also that the divine goodness or mercy is not assumed as a motive of sinning, but rather does not then prohibit from sin (Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 436).

A certain genus of presumption is committed, to be estimated from the gravity of the danger or evil, when someone, esteeming his own powers too highly, casts himself into danger of sinning; or when certain things are expected apart from divine ordination: for example, health without the use of medicine. According to the gravity of the danger or evil, the sin will be grave or light (Cf. the things just said).

III. — Despair is contained in the highest degree in a certain hatred of God, which is called hatred of abomination, by which God is displeasing to us as hostile because of the vengeance of sins, so that man no longer places his happiness in God.

But that sin, rather than being formally opposed to hope itself, is opposed to the love of God which some call the love of hope. That love itself is presupposed to the very elevation of soul which is formal hope, and is better referred to charity (certainly imperfect charity).

— It is mortal to hope for or to love more, with love of concupiscence, these earthly things than heavenly things: suppose someone so disposed that he desires to live perpetually in this life, and would leave heaven to God if He would leave earth to him. Yet for the most part these words do not contain that mortal repudiation of heavenly good before earthly good, but express a mere velleity, which signifies a great affection for the present life, or fear of death because of uncertain salvation, or even a defect of living faith and a certain natural hesitation concerning the future life.

— By every sin by which faith itself perishes, hope is concomitantly taken away. Besides, it is lost by despair: whether you contemn the divine good as not desirable, or you no longer trust that that good is accessible to you; and by the two reasons of presumption properly so called (cf. n. 62): these are directly opposed to theological hope.

— You ask in what way he sins who applies his hope to objects which God can in no way give: moral evil, indifferent things as such. If he wishes to appeal to the very motive of theological hope for obtaining these things, by attributing to the divine promise what in no way befits it, he will have sinned against hope itself, as we said, n. 62, by a sin which can in no way be composed with the habit of hope. Cf. 2, 2, q. 21, art. 1, ad 3. But if he merely prayed to God for that thing, appealing to no divine promise, then an object morally evil is to be distinguished from an indifferent one: he will have sinned gravely, not against hope but against religion, who prays God to assist him in moral evil. That sin is to be ascribed to the genus of superstition. Add that it is objectively blasphemous that you suppose God as favoring moral evil. But those do not sin who merely pray that after the evil has been perpetrated they may escape physically unharmed; nor he who in the very act of sin implores the mercy of God. Although it is also inordinate to ask for indifferent things, as such, since God wills and gives all things insofar as they bear an order to our salvation, nevertheless we do not judge this to be grave.

— I. Sin is committed against hope: 1. by despair, by which someone ceases from pursuing beatitude, whether he at least doubts concerning divine assistance, for example, after sins have been committed, or whether he fastidiously rejects the heavenly reward itself: this is despair less properly so called; - 2. by presumption, by which someone would attempt to obtain eternal life either by his own powers, or would attribute to the assistance of God what does not befit it: pardon without penitence, glory with final perseverance in sin. By both despair and presumption, the formal object of hope is removed and hope itself is lost. But this presumption is scarcely committed; despair not rarely is excused from grave sin by the very imperfection of the act.

But by the name of presumptions there usually come several evil confidences which, according to the various degree, conscience, and created danger, can be a grave or light sin.

It would be grave against hope itself deliberately to rely on the motives of hope for asking from God things which God cannot give because of His infinite holiness: moral evil, indifferent things as such; and it is also grave against religion simply to ask God for assistance toward moral evil (it would be another thing toward escaping unharmed).

II. They are accustomed to oppose to hope a certain hatred of God, conceived from the occasion of the justice by which God punishes sins. Yet this sin rather is opposed to imperfect charity which is presupposed to hope itself.

III. Grave would be the repudiation of heavenly good before earthly good; but words by which someone seems to wish that he always spend life in this life rather contain a venial inordination of too great affection for the present life, or too great fear of death, or not sufficiently living faith.

547. Just as one sins against faith, so also one sins against hope by omission and by commission; but by commission one sins in a twofold way, namely, through defect, i.e. by desperation, or through excess, i.e. by presumption. Therefore three sins are usually enumerated against the virtue of hope, namely: 1. omission of the act of hope when it is commanded, 2. desperation, 3. presumption.

1. Concerning omission of the act of hope, the faithful who have a fearful conscience ought not be anxious, because already in any devout prayer there is an act of hope. But the faithful who lead an irreligious life are rarely to be questioned in confession about omission of the act of hope, because they are not accustomed to know the grave obligation of that act, and moreover because the confessor can judge sufficiently concerning their state when he knows that the penitent has omitted prayer for a rather long time and has lived in full forgetfulness of God. For then he has also violated the obligation of faith, hope, and charity.

To omission of the act of hope is also reduced excessive adherence given to earthly goods, by which temporal things are preferred to eternal things, so that someone desires to remain perpetually in this life. This excessive adherence chiefly occurs in those who abound in riches and pleasures; it is very pernicious, because it diminishes, and indeed even takes away, the desire of the future life, and consequently renders a man languid and unarmed for conquering temptations and for tending strenuously toward Christian perfection. Death suddenly overtakes such men, not rarely wholly unprepared.

548. 2. Desperation sins against hope by defect. But desperation is either positive and perfect, or privative and imperfect.

a) Positive desperation is a voluntary diffidence of attaining beatitude, or better: it is a voluntary withdrawal from pursuing eternal beatitude, which is judged impossible of attainment. Therefore a twofold element (one presupposed, the other formal) must be distinguished in this desperation. The first pertains to the intellect, which judges that beatitude is impossible of attainment (whether because God does not give sufficient helps, or because one's own cooperation is too difficult). The other and formal element is the withdrawal or flight of the will, by which a man turns himself away from pursuing beatitude. For just as hope essentially consists in the confident pursuit of beatitude, so, from the opposite side, desperation is essentially a voluntary flight from this beatitude. Wherefore the Angelic Doctor says:⁶⁷ "Desperation does not imply the mere privation of hope, but implies a certain withdrawal from the thing desired on account of an estimated impossibility of acquiring it." And so desperation is an act of the will fleeing God as beatifying and assisting, but it supposes a false judgment of the intellect by which a man judges eternal beatitude to be impossible of attainment for himself. Such a judgment can indeed arise from unbelief, but it does not necessarily arise so; for a man can, without unbelief, form the false judgment that he is in so bad a state that he will never attain beatitude.⁶⁸

b) Privative desperation is a certain pusillanimity of soul, by which someone, either from a temptation of the devil or from a melancholic or other morbid bodily disposition, loses heart and is tormented by an excessive fear of losing eternal salvation. This privative desperation is (for the most part) no sin, but a mere temptation or scrupulosity. Penitents who labor under such scruples are to be treated with great patience and charity. It is not always easy in practice to discern whether privative or positive desperation is present. Yet it is a sufficiently clear sign that positive desperation is not present if the penitent has not omitted, at least totally, his accustomed exercises of piety and religion.

Its malice. Positive desperation is a mortal sin from its whole genus, so that it does not admit smallness of matter. For it inflicts the greatest injury upon God, because it either denies His mercy or calls it into doubt. Nothing is preached so frequently and fervently in the books of the Old and New Testament as divine mercy; hence a man who nevertheless doubts concerning that divine attribute, despairing of his own salvation, commits a sin against the Holy Spirit, because he makes little of divine mercy, which is the most efficacious means of obtaining salvation. Once voluntary desperation has been admitted and hope removed, a man now rushes headlong into vices and does not seriously strive to accomplish good works. Hence St. Augustine⁶⁹ says: "Sin with desperation is certain death," and St. Thomas⁷⁰ teaches: "Hatred (of God) and unbelief, if they are compared with desperation, are found to be graver in themselves, i.e. according to the notion of their proper species ... but if desperation is compared with the other two sins [unbelief and hatred of God] on our part, thus desperation is more dangerous, because through hope we are called back from evils and induced to pursue goods, and therefore, hope having been removed, men fall unrestrainedly into vices and are drawn back from good labors. Hence ... Isidore says: To perpetrate any wicked deed is the death of the soul, but to despair is to descend into hell."

Contempt or total neglect of beatitude can be reduced to desperation, such as is usually found in Rationalists and especially in those who deny another life after bodily death.

The causes of desperation are chiefly: a) Lust and other disordered desires.⁷¹ For a man who is given over to lust and bodily desire loathes spiritual goods and cares little about eternal beatitude. b) Acedia, which is a certain dejective sadness of the spirit. Beatitude is an arduous good, which cannot be obtained without strenuous labor, which the languid man flees, and consequently he despairs of obtaining beatitude. c) Defect of faith. For a man cannot efficaciously intend and hope for beatitude unless he firmly believes the existence of such beatitude, of divine help, and of graces. Therefore it is necessary that a man weak in faith be also weak in hope, and that he who has suffered shipwreck in faith fall into the abyss of desperation.

The confessor, choosing remedies against desperation, must first see from what cause it has been produced. If it has arisen from inveterate vices, from an irreligious life, from acedia, then let him command works of piety and especially meditation on the parables of Sacred Scripture in which divine mercy shines forth, e.g. concerning the lost sheep, concerning the prodigal son. But before all else let him take care that the penitent be drawn back from vices and approach frequently the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist. But if desperation and pusillanimity have arisen from a morbid bodily disposition, or from fixed ideas (which happens not rarely), then those remedies are to be applied which were indicated above, n. 95 and 322, against fixed ideas and against scruples.

⁶⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 40, a. 4 ad 3.

⁶⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 20, a. 2.

⁶⁹ Enarr. in Ps. 50, n. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 36, 588).

⁷⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 20, a. 3.

⁷¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 20, a. 4.

549. 3. Presumption sins against hope by excess⁷² and against the (servile) fear of God by defect. For a presumptuous man hopes too much from God as good and merciful, and does not sufficiently fear God as justly punishing. Presumption can be defined: a rash confidence of obtaining beatitude by means not ordained by God.

One can sin by presumption in diverse ways, namely, a) by him who wishes to obtain beatitude by his own powers alone, which is at the same time the Pelagian heresy; b) by him who relies on divine mercy alone and presumes to obtain beatitude without his own cooperation; c) by him who expects divine help for illicit things, or who expects wholly extraordinary divine help without a sufficient reason, which presumption is called tempting God and often had place in the Middle Ages in the so-called "ordeals"; d) by him who takes divine mercy as an occasion for sinning more freely or for persevering in the state of mortal sin. In this last case, however, it must be seen whether the vice of presumption is truly present; for if someone sins from frailty or from passion, at the same time hoping that afterward he will obtain pardon, and consequently at least implicitly already now proposes his conversion from sin, he does not commit the sin of presumption, but rather sins more lightly, since such a sinner seems to have a will less firmly set upon sinning.⁷³ But if someone sins with the proposal of persevering in sin under hope of pardon, he commits the sin of presumption, and indeed also a sin against the Holy Spirit, because it is contempt of the help of the Holy Spirit, by which man is called back from sin.

Resolves: 1. A penitent who confesses: I committed such a sin thinking that afterward I could confess it, has not yet certainly committed the sin of presumption. Nevertheless he must be carefully admonished concerning the falsity of his opinion, since he is in no way certain that he can confess the sins committed and so obtain pardon. For this depends on divine grace and not on his will alone. But if the penitent confesses: I committed 20 sins, thinking that I could obtain from God pardon for 20 sins as easily as for 2, he seems truly to have committed the sin of presumption, because he sinned frivolously against divine mercy.

2. It is not the sin of presumption if a man in no way avoids venial sins, because these sins of themselves do not impede beatitude. Nevertheless such a man commits himself to grave danger of perdition, since venial sins often repeated pave the way to mortal sin.

3. It is not properly speaking the sin of presumption if someone has neglected the sacraments for a rather long time.

The malice of presumption. a) Heretical presumption, or that which includes error in faith, is a mortal sin from its whole genus, because it is opposed both to faith and to hope and to the gift of fear, and inflicts a great injury upon divine justice. Four heretical presumptions are distinguished by theologians, namely, Pelagian presumption, Lutheran presumption, Calvinist presumption, and pietistic presumption, according as someone presumes to obtain beatitude either by his own powers without grace, or by faith alone without works, or by absolute predestination alone, or by circumcision alone and the faith of Abraham. But since many Lutherans and Calvinists are in good faith, their presumption is only a material sin.

b) Simple presumption is a mortal sin from its genus, and it admits smallness of matter. The reason is that even this presumption of itself inflicts a grave injury upon divine justice and causes great harm to man. But this sin is lighter than the sin of desperation; for presumption contemns divine justice, but desperation divine mercy. Now, according to our mode of conceiving, mercy is more fitting to God than justice and the avenging of sins.⁷⁴

The causes of presumption, besides the errors in faith recounted above, are pride and vainglory. St. Thomas writes to the point:⁷⁵ "Presumption is twofold: one which relies on one's own power, namely attempting something as possible for oneself which exceeds one's own power; and such presumption manifestly proceeds from vainglory; for from this, that someone greatly desires glory, it follows that he attempts something beyond his powers.... But the other is presumption which relies inordinately on divine mercy or power, by which someone hopes that he will obtain glory without merits, or pardon without penance; and such presumption seems to arise directly from pride, as though he esteems himself so highly that, even when he sins, God will not punish him or exclude him from glory."

Remedies against presumption are all those things which were brought forward above, n. 415, as remedies against pride, since pride is the mother of presumption, as was said; namely, intimate knowledge of oneself, contemplation of the humility of Christ, the exercise of humility.

⁷² Presumption is taken in diverse senses; for it can be referred either to the intellect or to the will. As referred to the intellect, it signifies: a) an excessive estimation of one's own excellence; b) judgment concerning the deeds of others taken from conjectures, and then presumption is usually distinguished as vehement or violent, probable, and light, according to the gravity of the motives which cause the conjecture or presumption (legal presumption or also proof by indicia). In this sense there was discussion above, n. 216, about a law founded upon a false presumption. - As presumption is referred to the will, although sometimes it is taken in a good sense to designate excellent confidence (cf. Judith 6, 15; 9, 17), nevertheless ordinarily it is used in a bad sense and signifies: a) a certain movement of the soul of one who, without fear and force, but knowingly and willingly and with a certain contempt, transgresses the law; in this sense it is often said in law: "If anyone shall presume," "if anyone with rash daring," "if anyone knowingly"; b) a movement by which someone undertakes a work which exceeds his powers; in this sense it is the same as rashness or daring and is opposed to the virtue of fortitude or magnanimity (cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 127 and 130; Bouquillon, De virt. theol. l. 2, c. 2); c) the vice opposed to the virtue of hope.

⁷³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 21, a. 2 ad 3.

⁷⁴ Ib. a. 2.

⁷⁵ Ib. a. 4.

550. Scholion. On cultivating hope. It is of great importance that a Christian man have the firmest hope. For this is necessary both for the continual exercise of virtues and for patience in so many hardships of this life. Hope is increased just as faith is; for he who has a vivid faith in divine omnipotence, goodness, and fidelity also hopes firmly in God, whom he has believed. Concerning the means of advancing in faith it was said above, n. 508. Moreover, a good conscience greatly contributes to the increase of hope. Hence St. John says: "If our heart does not reprehend us, we have confidence toward God, and whatever we ask, we shall receive from Him, because we keep His commandments and do those things which are pleasing before Him."⁷⁶ Concerning the same matter St. Augustine says:⁷⁷ "As an evil conscience is wholly in desperation, so a good conscience is wholly in hope." - Hope is to be cultivated not only in adverse things, but also in prosperous things. For when all things happen prosperously for us, we are prone to forgetting God. But this we must wholly avoid, always breathing after heavenly goods.

⁷⁶ 1 Jo. 3, 21 sq.

⁷⁷ In Ps. 31, n. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 36, 261).

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 20 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, II, n. 21; Suarez, disp. II, sect. 2-3; Perrone, op. cit., n. 145; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 433; Gopfert, 1, 250.

Things to be noted beforehand. 1. Sins contrary to hope are some of omission, others of commission. But by these the virtue of hope is lost only when they contradict the formal object of the virtue.

2. Sins of commission are opposed, some to the desire of eternal beatitude, others to the confidence of obtaining it.

462. I. To the desire of eternal beatitude is opposed: 1. the affection of this age, by which earthly things are desired more than heavenly things; 2. the inordinate affection of heavenly happiness, by which beatitude is sought from weariness of life and labor.

The former affection, when it passes into act, is a mortal sin if the ultimate end is placed in earthly things; for example, if someone is so disposed that he would desire to leave heaven to God if God would leave earth to him. The latter does not exceed venial sin, unless there is express rebellion against divine providence. But one licitly wishes death for himself in order to avoid sin or some other immense evil, provided that he submits himself to the divine will (II, 20; Cat. Rom., on the 1st precept, n. 7). Cf. n. 755, II.

463. II. To the fiducial expectation of eternal beatitude, desperation is opposed by defect, presumption by excess.

1. DESPERATION is diffidence of obtaining beatitude, or the means necessary for attaining it. It is a mortal sin, and indeed most grave and most dangerous; for hope having been taken away, men slip unrestrainedly into vices. Yet it is less grave than the sin of infidelity and hatred of God, because it is not directed against God according as he is in himself, but against God according as his good is participated by us. St. Thom., 2.2, q. 20, a. 3. - Whence desperation properly so called does not admit smallness of matter.

The causes of desperation are reckoned: defect of faith, inordinate adhesion to pleasures, spiritual sloth, presumption, a melancholic disposition (Tanquerey, II, p. 421).

The CONFESSOR ought to examine whether, from an affection of desperation, the customary offices of piety, especially when the precept urged, were interrupted or not: from this he will have a sufficiently safe indication of consent given or denied. Yet let him take note that many penitents despair not of the mercy of God, but of their own cooperation with grace: this is called pusillanimity, and admits smallness of matter (Panzuti, II, 33).

2. PRESUMPTION (which is more frequent than desperation) arises from defect of the fear of God, and is customarily defined: rash expectation of eternal beatitude or of the means for attaining it. It is of itself a grave sin, because it inflicts grave injury both upon divine justice, as if sin were to be held as nothing, and upon divine mercy, which the presumptuous man abuses for sinning more freely (Scavini, II, n. 849).

Hence: 1. He sins through presumption who hopes for salvation either only on account of his own merits or only on account of the merits of Christ, without any cooperation of his own works. - Likewise, he who is induced to sin by hope of pardon, so that hope of remission to be obtained from God is the motive inducing to sin, that is, the reason why he more easily either repeats sin or perseveres in sin, because God forgives ten sins as easily as five. But otherwise if someone, for example, should say: I shall accuse ten sins as easily as five or six; this of itself is only venial. 2. He who sins from passion with hope of pardon does not contract guilt of presumption properly so called: namely when hope of pardon to be obtained sometime through penance only accompanies the sinner while he sins or perseveres in sin, yet without being the reason or motive influencing toward sin. But men of this kind, persevering in sin under hope of sometime doing penance, are with difficulty excused from grave sin against charity owed to themselves, since they expose themselves to great danger of damnation (II, 21; H. Ap., IV, 8).

464. PRACTICAL RULES. 1. One must diligently inquire from the penitent why he despaired or presumed, in order to know whether the sin is or is not against hope, or even against faith. 2. One must inquire into the causes and effects of the sin; into the causes, so that the confessor may bring a remedy, by prescribing humility to the exalted, confidence and vigor of soul to the pusillanimous; but into the effects, so that from them he may come into knowledge of many other sins which are accustomed to be born from desperation or presumption. 3. The confessor should strive to excite in all penitents, together with divine fear, a great hope of eternal life, and true confidence toward God, Our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Virgin Mary Mother of God. For desire supplies strength, and a man without confidence is like a soldier without a shield. 4. Especially in the dying, let him raise hope with true detestation of sin; for many either yield to desperation, or are affected only by servilely servile fear, which does not suffice for salvation. Cf. Pratica d'amar G. C., c. 8 and 16; H. Ap., App. 2, § 2, n. 2).

S. Th. II-II, q. 20.

829. Despair is a sin which is opposed to hope by defect. It is not the simple absence of hope, but is an act contrary to hope, by which someone positively withdraws from beatitude and flees it, and thus casts away hope concerning beatitude.

Despair is twofold:

1. Despair improperly so called, by which someone contemns and loathes beatitude, because he judges it not good and not desirable. Thus does he who contemns the supernatural end; or who wishes to leave heaven to God, if God leaves earth to him; or who seriously desires to live perpetually in the world, precisely because he prefers this life to eternal life; - but not he who, by speaking thus, would simply show a great natural inclination toward earthly things, or fear of undergoing damnation.

2. Despair properly so called is that by which someone flees beatitude because he judges it impossible for himself, or too difficult of attainment, or not future, for example, because God is thought to deny pardon to the sinner, or not to give grace for conversion. But just as the act of hope is an act of the will which supposes a judgment of the intellect by which beatitude is judged possible, so despair supposes a previous judgment of the intellect by which someone thinks he will not attain beatitude; but that judgment inducing to despair is not despair itself: for this is an act of the will which follows, by which we positively withdraw from beatitude.

830. Despair differs from infidelity. - Despair, although it is easily joined to infidelity, can nevertheless be had without it, insofar as someone believing (by speculative judgment) in the abstract and universal that beatitude or remission of sins is possible, nevertheless despairs of this or that, because he falsely judges (by practical judgment) that in this particular case or state there is no hope for him of pardon or beatitude, for example, because he judges that he is not predestined, or that beatitude is too difficult of attainment, or that God will not give him pardon. In the same way: he who fornicates judges that fornication here and now is good for himself, although in the universal he judges according to faith that it is evil.

831. Despair is a mortal sin from its whole genus: for it is always most injurious to God to regard beatitude as not good, or as not possible; - indeed it is a sin against the Holy Spirit, because through contempt of divine omnipotence mercifully giving aid it casts away hope, which is a special remedy granted to us by the Holy Spirit against sin. - Yet often despair is venial on account of indeliberation, if it comes from impatience, sadness, melancholic temperament, or scruples. - Hence:

1. It is a sin graver than those which are opposed to the moral virtues. For since by the theological virtues we are directly and principally turned toward God, hence sins directly opposed to them directly and principally imply aversion from God; and therefore they are graver than sins opposed to the moral virtues, which directly imply conversion to some created good, and only by a certain consequence aversion from God.

2. But infidelity and hatred of God are graver than despair, because they are opposed to the truth and goodness of God as they are in themselves; but despair is against God according as goodness is participated by us.

3. Nevertheless despair is more dangerous than these, because by hope we are recalled from evils and led to good; and therefore, when hope has been removed, men fall unrestrainedly into vices.

832. Causes of despair and remedies. - Despair improperly so called arises from lust: for from a great love of bodily delights, among which venereal delights are chief, it happens that man loathes spiritual goods and does not hope for them as certain great goods. - But despair properly so called arises from acedia or spiritual sadness, by which someone reckons that it is too difficult to live well, and flees the labors of good works.

Some remedies are against the causes of despair, concerning which St. Thomas says, II-II, q. 35, a. 1, ad 4: "The assault of sin sometimes must be conquered by fleeing, sometimes by resisting: by fleeing, indeed, when continued thought increases the incentive of sin, as in lust...; but by resisting, when persevering thought removes the incentive of sin, which comes from some slight apprehension. And this happens in acedia, because the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they are rendered to us; from which acedia ceases" (I Pet. I, 10; Rom. XII, 11, 12). - But other remedies are those which directly foster hope: firm faith concerning the mercy of God toward sinners (which shines forth greatly in the Gospel parables), consideration of the love and Passion of Christ, meditation on the divine promises, the examples of great sinners who became saints, prayer and devotion toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, and the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is called the salvation of the despairing.

S. Th. II-II, q. 21.

833. Presumption is any immoderate or excessive hope;¹ nevertheless not every presumption is opposed to divine hope. For the object of every hope is a good, arduous, possible. But something is possible to man in two ways: through his own virtue, and through divine virtue. Hence presumption is twofold: one by which someone tends to a good as possible to himself, which nevertheless exceeds his faculty; and such presumption is per se opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which is concerned with hope of this kind, and is not opposed to the theological virtue of hope except per accidens, insofar as by his own powers someone would presume to obtain that which is not possible except by divine virtue. - The other is that which tends to some good as possible through divine virtue, which is not possible, as when someone hopes that he will obtain pardon without penance; this per se concerns the theological virtue of hope, through which someone adheres to divine power.

¹ The word presumption (from praesumere) is taken in diverse modes: for it can be referred either to the intellect or to the will. Presumption of the intellect is a judgment drawn from conjectures, by which the intellect takes more than can strictly be proved, and thus they speak of vehement, probable, light, false presumption, according to the foundation of the conjecture, and of a law founded on presumption. Presumption of the will: 1. one acts beyond the ordinary mode of sinning, by which without fear and force, knowingly and willingly, from contempt and singular audacity, someone transgresses the law; in which sense in law it is said: "if someone shall have presumed," "if someone by rash daring," "if someone knowingly"; 2. another acts beyond physical powers, whether a) he undertakes a work beyond his own powers, corporal or intellectual, and this is evil and directly against magnanimity; or b) he undertakes by divine virtue more than the ordinary, and thus it can be good, as if someone hopes from God something great which is fitting with excellent confidence (Judith VI, 15; IX, 17), or c) more than is fitting, and then it is evil against divine hope.

Therefore presumption opposed to divine hope can be defined: the rash and disordered expectation of beatitude or of the means to it. It is apt to follow from heresy or infidelity, and is easily joined to it; nevertheless it can exist without this, in the same way as despair: for it is not required for presumption that someone affirm something against faith by speculative judgment, for example, that pardon can be obtained without penance; but it suffices that practically someone act as if he believed thus, or even thought that God would use with him some singular privilege.

834. The presumption which is opposed to divine hope is manifold. - Presumption is one kind directly against hope, another kind beside hope.

The first is directly opposed to the motive of hope, the virtue of God giving aid, and therefore destroys hope. It is committed in two ways: a) by relying too much on one's own powers, as if someone positively refuses to hope for beatitude or remission of sin from divine virtue, but intends to obtain this or that by his own powers alone; and this presumption is called Pelagian; - b) by relying inordinately on God's virtue, as if someone attributes to him what does not belong to him, and thus detracts from him and diminishes him, by hoping, for example, for remission of sin without penance or glory without merits; and this presumption is called Lutheran.²

² Suarez adds a third presumption: to hope from God for help for sinning. But although this is great blasphemy, nevertheless it is not a disordered expectation of beatitude, whence it is not presumption opposed to the theological virtue of hope.

The other is beside hope: this does not remove the motive of hoping, nor destroy hope, but hopes in a disordered and rash mode for what belongs to God. It is committed in various ways: a) by hoping from God for extraordinary supernatural goods outside the common order of divine providence, as if someone hopes that he will have as much glory as the Blessed Virgin Mary; - b) by hoping from God for ordinary supernatural goods, but which have not been promised, such as time for penance precisely at the end of life, while caring nothing about salvation; - c) by taking confidence in God as a motive for sinning more freely, or for increasing or multiplying sins, or for persevering long in sin, as if someone commits more sins precisely because their remission is easily obtained, or because several are remitted as easily as one. Yet he who sins several times solely because several sins are accused in confession as easily as one, although he has a depraved disposition, does not seem to commit the sin of presumption.

835. The gravity of presumption. - I. Presumption which is against hope is a mortal sin from its whole genus; because it removes the motive of hope and therefore hope itself. Yet Lutheran presumption is graver than Pelagian: for it is graver to diminish divine virtue than to extol one's own. Indeed it is a sin against the Holy Spirit: for it is maximally injurious to God to think that he gives pardon of sin without penance, or glory without merits; but by contemning divine omnipotence aiding under the aspect of justice, fear of God is cast away, which is the special remedy granted by the Holy Spirit that we may be drawn back from sin.

Nevertheless presumption is less grave than despair, because it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare than to punish: for the former belongs to God according to himself, but the latter according to our sins.

The sin of presumption is rarely fully deliberate; but if it is not, it is not a sin against the Holy Spirit, nor does it remove hope.

II. Presumption which is only beside hope is a mortal sin from its genus, which admits lightness of matter. It is light: a) if someone hopes for an extraordinary supernatural good, but with full subjection toward divine providence; - b) if someone in some danger, without prayer and preparation, hopes for ordinary but small help, which God has not promised; - c) if the hope of pardon is the motive of committing only venial sins.

836. Causes of presumption and remedies. - Presumption indirectly arises from the errors in faith described above; in addition, that which relies upon one's own virtue directly proceeds from vainglory: for from this, that someone greatly desires glory, it follows that he attempts something above his powers. - But presumption which relies inordinately upon divine virtue directly arises from pride, from which it happens that someone esteems himself so much that he does not think he should be punished for sins or excluded from beatitude.

The remedies against presumption are: a) humility, which is directly opposed to the causes of presumption, namely, pride and empty glory; - b) meditation on the inscrutable judgments of God, which directly fosters the fear of God, by which presumption is excluded: "For God indeed is not mocked, and he punishes with just judgment those presuming too much concerning themselves."

837. Practical corollaries. - 1. Hope of pardon can be the motive of sinning, in which case the sin is aggravated by the malice of presumption; but if it is not the motive of sinning, but only holds itself concomitantly to the sin, it is not presumption; indeed it diminishes the sin: "To sin with a resolution of persevering in sin under hope of pardon pertains to presumption, and this does not diminish but increases the sin. But to sin under hope of pardon... with a resolution... of repenting (afterward) concerning the sin (if hope is not the motive of sinning but only holds itself concomitantly to the sin), this is not of presumption, but this diminishes the sin, because through this he seems to have a will less firmed toward sin," q. 21, a. 2, ad 3.

2. Since presumption mortally evil is a special sin, hence it must be declared in confession if someone committed some sin from this motive, because it is a circumstance changing the species.

Question 3. Can the sin of despair be venial by reason of matter?

Response. Negatively, and the reason is that to admit deliberate diffidence of obtaining eternal beatitude or the means necessary for obtaining it is to deny the attributes of God, and especially his mercy, which certainly is mortal from its whole genus. - But despair can be, and sometimes is, only a venial sin, when it arises from sadness or impatience, because then perfect consent is lacking.

Question 4. What are the remedies of despair?

Response. The chief ones are the following: 1st. consideration of the infinite goodness and mercy of God; 2nd. frequent recollection of those men who after very many and very grave sins obtained pardon; 3rd. meditation on the parables of the holy Gospel, especially of the lost sheep; 4th. special devotion toward the Blessed Virgin, refuge of sinners; 5th. confidence in Christ fastened to the cross for us, etc. Yet let the confessor attend to the following practical rules.

Rule I. Let him examine from what root especially despair arises in the penitent, so that he can apply fitting remedies according to the diverse cause. - But for the most part it is accustomed to be born proximately from apprehension of certain damnation; but remotely: 1st. from sloth, by which someone thinks the means of salvation too grave, and therefore is deterred from employing them; 2nd. from lust or other inveterate sins, which turn the mind away from heavenly things and, because of the difficulty of amendment, lead to despair; 3rd. from melancholy, which inclines to sadness and turns away from confidence, which is accustomed to generate joy of soul; 4th. from scruples, by which the soul is cast down and oppressed.

Rule II. Penitents given to despair are to be moderated with great circumspection, prudence, and patience, according to the diversity of characters and the varied genus of despair. For those who from malice, or from the weight of sins and a disgraceful life, have been driven into despair are to be directed in one way; those who from pusillanimity or from diabolical temptation are impelled to it in another.

Rule III. Penitents who exhibit themselves as such are not immediately on first appearance to be judged as carried off by despair, especially if they live as Christians. For there are found souls, even devout ones, which are agitated by almost continual temptations of despair; nor is it easily to be believed that they have sinned, especially gravely, although they think that they have furnished consent to them; just as neither is excessive fear concerning the danger of salvation to be confused with despair properly so called.

VII. Question IV. What are the vices opposed to hope? Answer. They are desperation and presumption. Desperation is described as an efficacious will of casting away the eternal salvation to be obtained from the divine mercy. It is a most grave sin: for it thinks ill of the divine mercy.

VIII. Presumption is a perverse, or inordinate, confidence in the divine mercy. It is a grave sin; and into it, more frequently than into desperation, fall those sinners who trust that they will attain eternal glory without fasting, without the buffeting of the flesh, and without laborious works. Wherefore those Christians who lead their life in games, in banquets, in solaces, in promiscuous conversations of men and women, do not hope in God, but tempt God; and although they do not commit the sin of presumption properly so called, which is joined with heresy, they are nevertheless in a continual sin of carelessness of their own eternal salvation. They persevere in sins from an excessive confidence in the divine mercy. This crass negligence alone, this stupid torpor and indolence in the gravest business of eternal salvation, is a grave sin. Long perseverance in sins from hope of the divine mercy is a punishment of the divine vengeance, which scatters penal blindnesses upon illicit desires.

ALTHOUGH Hope is assailed in its ruin by Presumption as well as by Desperation, St. Chrysostom saying with the Seraphic Doctor, book 3, Pharetra, chapter 14: Excessive confidence overthrows one standing, and desperation after the fall does not permit one to rise again; yet the latter opposes hope more than the former, since it fails from it entirely, and casts one down even in this life into the abyss of Anxiety: therefore of what power it is, and what sin it is, must first be briefly seen.

ALMAIN holds, in distinction 26, and in the moral treatise 2, chapter 3, that Desperation is an act of the intellect, and consists in the judgment whereby one judges it impossible for himself to attain beatitude or pardon; and accordingly that no act of the will is required.

Yet this opinion is commonly rejected by the Theologians with St. Bonaventure, dist. 26, article 2, question 5, St. Thomas, first part of the second part, question 23, article 2, and question 40, article 4.

IT IS PROVED by the holy Doctor: Opposites are about the same subject; but hope is in the will: Therefore Desperation also. Thus others argue too, especially Caspensis, disp. 3, sect. 1, num. 2.

Whence it follows that what Turrianus says is false, disp. 64, doubt 2: that for the sin of Desperation it suffices to have a free and imprudent judgment, whereby one judges that he will not attain beatitude.

For Caspensis ANSWERS that this judgment is against hope, but is not yet desperation: I see Caspensis fighting with himself. For opposites are about the same thing, as Caspensis says; but that judgment is in the intellect: Therefore it is not contrary to Hope.

I SHALL SAY, therefore, that it is opposed only in disposition, not formally; for even with that judgment posited, no sin has yet been committed, because one can be deceived invincibly; and if he is deceived vincibly, he sins against the precept not indeed of Hope, but of knowing what is necessary.

Hence that question is resolved: Whether Desperation is always with Infidelity.

It is ANSWERED negatively with St. Bonaventure, cited doubt in the margin, St. Thomas, question XX, article II, whom the rest follow, as is seen in Caspensis, cited place, num. IV, and Valentia, disp. II, quest. III, point first.

IT IS PROVED by the holy Doctors. In this Faith differs from Hope, that Faith regards the very object in the universal, but Hope regards it in the particular, namely with respect to the one hoping; and also in this, that Faith asserts certitude in the intellect, Hope asserts certitude in the affect. Therefore, as it sometimes happens that something is unknown in the particular and known in the universal, as the Philosopher says, first of the Posteriors, chapter I — as in the case of him who knows that every Mule is sterile, and yet thinks this one is with young — so one who has certitude concerning faith can lack Hope; and as one can have certitude in the intellect without having it in the affect, so one can, not having Hope, have faith.

AGAINST this argument Valentia objects, that one who has a negative judgment about some particular proposition does not grant it to be universally true. Wherefore, one who, despairing, judges that he cannot hope for pardon, by this very fact denies that pardon is possible for all sinners.

BUT Caspensis, num. V, observes with St. Bonaventure that a speculative judgment can be had of God as prepared to have mercy on all; and that if one even speculatively says that the mercy of God is not such as to exceed our sins, he is a heretic; but if, oppressed by passion, his judgment succumbs out of pusillanimity, such desperation is without infidelity.

THEREFORE he does not exempt himself from the universal proposition of God's mercy, as Valentia thinks, but, erring in himself, he invents something new whereby the universal proposition might not be true; namely, that God is not about to give a congruous help, or efficacious grace, because he is of the number of those, probably, whom God abandons, as some Theologians assert, saying that sufficient helps are denied to certain ones; for that opinion is not under this anathema. Nor does it follow what Valentia says: that if that opinion were true, one could despair without sin; for still, since he does not know himself to be of that number, he is bound to hope. The holy Doctor concludes that that estimation can arise rather from the subversion of confidence than from the subversion of knowledge. For thus a man, although he knows something, is nevertheless carried by a dominating affection to the opposite; or it may rather be called inadvertence, as St. Augustine says, de poenitentia, chapter V, cited by St. Bonaventure in the Pharetra, Book III, chapter XIV, because with eyes closed he precipitates himself, as St. Gregory says, Morals, chapter VIII, as St. Bonaventure notes, cited place of the Pharetra.

The SECOND reason of St. Bonaventure, which St. Thomas and Caspensis also use, num. IV: When the posterior is removed, the prior is not removed. But Hope is posterior to faith: Therefore, Hope being removed, faith can still remain, and consequently not everyone who despairs is an infidel. The minor is proved by the holy Doctor; for Faith is in the intellect, Hope in the affect, which is posterior.

HENCE also is inferred in what the reason of the sin of desperation consists; which is indeed most grave, as being opposed to a Theological virtue, as the holy Doctor argues in dist. XXVI of the third book, article II, question II, ad 1. Whence Jeremiah XVIII: Who have said: We have despaired; for after our thoughts we will go, etc. Therefore the Lord says: Ask the nations: Who hath heard such horrible things? Shall the snow of Lebanon fail from the rock of the field? Or can the cold, flowing waters be plucked away, and flow away? Truly golden words, and penetrating the inmost limbs: hence the holy Doctor there calls this sin an abyss of guilt, because the one despairing hurls himself headlong into the depths. Therefore Ephesians IV: Despairing, they gave themselves up to impurity, etc.

THEREFORE this sin consists in a certain flight and precipitate rush of the will, whereby it desists from beatitude, or any other object of Hope, as to its being attained by oneself; for in this the contrariety with Hope consists; for as hope is an erection of the soul toward pursuing an arduous good, so the casting down of the soul, desisting from the pursuit of such a good, is the opposite act.

HENCE, however, it is doubted whether the formal object of Desperation is evil, as evil; for since it is a flight of the will, its object seems to be evil.

It is ANSWERED that Desperation is a flight from beatitude, not as evil, but as impossible; therefore it is defined: Desperation is a will oppressing with heaviness, distrusting of help and reward, as St. Bonaventure notes, opuscule, Declaration of the Terms of Theology; and in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter III, toward the end he says it is most evil, because, considering the impunity of sins and distrusting the mercy of God, it slackens the rein to sins: And this indeed is the most grave sin, which is said to be against the Holy Spirit, of which the Lord, Matthew XII: It shall not be remitted, neither in this world nor in the future. Not that it cannot be remitted, but because it can scarcely be remitted; or because there is no reason of excuse there, whereby it might make room for the Divine mercy. This sin is commonly said to arise from Acedia, because, as was said, the slothful man finds no complacency in some good, and therefore withdraws himself from good work; but Hope comes from the merit of the work: So the holy Doctor.

Therefore Desperation stands in a flight from beatitude, and in a willing of the means. So also Aegidius, distinction XX, doubt X, St. Thomas, first part of the second part, question XXV, article III, Caspensis, num. VII, cited place, Valentia, disp. II, quest. III, point I, citing St. Gregory, Book III, Morals, chapter XXXI, and St. Thomas here, article IV.

St. Gregory truly teaches, Morals, book XII, chapter V, that it arises also from pride, as St. Bonaventure notes, cited place of the Pharetra.

MOST BEAUTIFULLY St. Chrysostom, homily X on penance: Both are perilous: perverse confidence and desperation. For excessive confidence overthrows one standing; and desperation, after the fall, does not permit one to rise, as I noted also above, at the Disputation.

St. ISIDORE in the Synonyms, chapter I: Do not despair of salvation, if thou turn to better things: for he who despairs of pardon for sin condemns himself more by his desperation than by the crime committed. For desperation augments sin, and is worse than every sin.

But he WANTS to say "worse," that is, more pernicious; for without doubt the hatred of God, which is against Charity, the Queen of the virtues, is worse, as St. Thomas also teaches, article III, and Valentia, cited place, who say that Infidelity is worse, because it is against God in Himself, as He is truth; but Desperation is against God as participated by us, namely through the diffusion of goodness. Now it is a worse evil to fight against God as He is truthful, by infidelity, or as He is good in Himself, by hatred, than to despair of being about to participate in His goodness, as St. Thomas argues, article III, and with him Fuliensis, book III on faith and hope, chapter VI, after St. Bonaventure, cited place, where he admonishes that the one despairing often believes God to be truthful in what He has said, and faithful in His promises universally; but he applies badly, in the particular, that fidelity of the divine promises to himself; for as error and doubt against faith make the intellect doubt or disagree, so desperation weakens the affect and makes it distrust, with faith standing only in the intellect, and no application thence arising into the will.

PResumption is taken in various ways: and indeed among the Jurists, by interpreting, or consenting for the absent, or judging according to presumed causes, it signifies nothing illicit: but in the discipline of morals, one sort is interior, whereby one who prefers his own sense wrongly to another's; another is exterior, whose signs are (says the Seraphic Doctor, part 1, in the Mirror of Discipline, chapter 5) eyes too lofty, the head raised, and a haughty countenance. But how it is to be taken here, I shall show below.

Here Presumption is taken for the act opposed to Hope by excess.

Now Hope is of obtaining from God grace, and glory, and the other supernatural gifts inordinately, that is, otherwise than God has ordained that they be obtained. Therefore it fights against the glory of God, as the Holy Doctor observes, in the first sermon of the Hexaëmeron.

HENCE you have, that it is a sin mortal in genus: for it gravely fights against God's judgment and will. So D. Bonaventure, in the place cited, D. Thomas 2. 2. question 21. article 1. Suarez disp. 1. sect. 3. Sanchez Tom. 1. Decal. Lib. 2. cap. 14. Valencia disp. 2. question 3. part 2. Bannes question 21. article 2. disp. 2. Fagundez on the first precept of the Decal. cap. 31. num. 20.

IT SEEMS, moreover, that Despair is graver than Presumption: for the latter is against God's mercy, which is most natural to him and proper in its effects; but Presumption is against Justice, as D. Bonaventure notes in 3. dist. 26. dub. 2. at the end, and D. Thomas question 1. article 2. Suarez disp. 2. sect. 3. Fagundez Lib. 1. cap. 31. n. 26.

Presumption, moreover, is opposed not only to Hope, but also to Fear, as Holy Thomas teaches, article 3. Valencia disp. 2. question 3. part 2. and D. Bonaventure dist. 34.

The Holy Doctor observes, moreover, dist. 26. art. 1. question 3. ad 2. that Hope is a mean between presumption and despair, not after the manner of a participation of the extremes, but as excluding the extremes.

THEREFORE Presumption can be manifold: First, by willing beatitude by one's own powers, with Pelagius. Second, without penance and works, with Luther, etc. Third, by willing at the end of life, after a lax life, to be raised up by God. So Suarez disp. 2. section 4. Sanchez Tom. 1. Decal. Lib. 2. cap. 33. Medina Lib. 1. of the summa, cap. 14. §. 2. folio 79. Bannes in the place cited, Azorius Tom. 1. Lib. 9. cap. 2. question 7. Fagundez number 2.

MOREOVER it can be with heresy and without heresy. It will be with heresy if there be present the judgment that salvation can be had by one's own powers, or without merits. So Valencia question 3. part 2. Sanchez num. 8. Fagundez 1. 2. Bassaeus V. Spes.

BUT NOTE that Presumption can be against humility, as D. Bonaventure teaches p. p. Cenil. sect. 17. and it is a species of pride. It can be against fortitude, and coincide with temerity, etc. But of these species of presumption this is not the place to treat.

Penitents, especially children, are apt to say that they have sinned through presuming on God's mercy. When asked what they mean, they say: " I thought I would do something and then confess it." Are such penitents really guilty of presumption?

No! What is presumption? St. Thomas defines it, in his Summa, II. II. qu. 21, a. 1, as "an immoderation of hope by which someone tends toward some good as possible through divine power and mercy when it is not possible, as when someone hopes to obtain pardon without penance or glory without merits." Any such excessus spei is sinful, for underlying it, as the angelic doctor explains (l. c. a. 2) is an intellectus falsus, viz. a false supposition that God pardons those who continue in their sins. Excessus spei arises from this erroneous idea, as a motus quidam appetitivus; and it is sinful because every appetitive movement that conforms itself to a false judgment is in itself evil and a sin.

The explanation given by St. Thomas of the nature and sinfulness of presumption shows that this sin has not been committed in the case under discussion. He is presumptuous, one who hopes to obtain pardon without penance; for this excessus spei, being a motus appetitivus, is based upon a false assumption that God will pardon one who refuses to amend his ways. Our penitent, however, thought that he could confess his sin; consequently he did not make the mistake of supposing that God would pardon him if he persisted in sin, but he was right in believing that the Lord would have mercy upon him if he repented and confessed. Therefore the motus appetitivus is based upon this correct supposition, viz., upon the hope of pardon, and is not sinful. On the contrary, the intention to confess the sin is apparent in this thought, and is contained implicate in it, and is in itself good, so that such a penitent sins less than he would have done without thinking of his conversion; for without this thought his will would have been more inclined to sin and its malice would have been greater. "To sin in the hope of receiving pardon at some future time, with the intention of abstaining from the sin and doing penance for it, is not presumption; rather, this diminishes the sin, because through it one seems to have a will less firmly fixed upon sin" (Th., I. c. q. 21, ad 3). Hence, according to St. Albertus Magnus, Adam sinned less grievously, "Because he sinned in the hope of pardon."

It is with good reason that Lehmkuhl warns confessors (I. n. 312) to make sure that penitents who accuse themselves of presumption are really guilty of this sin. For "if anyone sins from frailty or passion while at the same time hoping that he will afterward obtain pardon, and consequently determining at least implicitly to be converted afterward and withdraw from sin, he does not commit the sin of presumption; indeed, as the writers note, the sin is rather diminished" (/. c).

If, however, the sin of presumption has been committed, how ought we to deal with it? Is it invariably a mortal sin? In its nature it is a mortal sin, but propter indeliberationem vel imperfectionem actus it may, like other sins that are in their nature grievous, become merely venial. Modern moralists, such as Gury, Lehmkuhl, and others, are of opinion that whoever commits a venial sin through presumptuous confidence in God's mercy commits also a venial sin of presumption. Elbel, on the contrary, thinks that in this case there is no real presumption, "because by this happiness is not expected to be obtained rashly or by means in no way ordained by God for this end."—Dr. Kilian.