Sole Question: Of what power despair is an act, and what sin it is

ALMAIN holds, in distinction 26, and in the moral treatise 2, chapter 3, that Desperation is an act of the intellect, and consists in the judgment whereby one judges it impossible for himself to attain beatitude or pardon; and accordingly that no act of the will is required.

Yet this opinion is commonly rejected by the Theologians with St. Bonaventure, dist. 26, article 2, question 5, St. Thomas, first part of the second part, question 23, article 2, and question 40, article 4.

IT IS PROVED by the holy Doctor: Opposites are about the same subject; but hope is in the will: Therefore Desperation also. Thus others argue too, especially Caspensis, disp. 3, sect. 1, num. 2.

Whence it follows that what Turrianus says is false, disp. 64, doubt 2: that for the sin of Desperation it suffices to have a free and imprudent judgment, whereby one judges that he will not attain beatitude.

For Caspensis ANSWERS that this judgment is against hope, but is not yet desperation: I see Caspensis fighting with himself. For opposites are about the same thing, as Caspensis says; but that judgment is in the intellect: Therefore it is not contrary to Hope.

I SHALL SAY, therefore, that it is opposed only in disposition, not formally; for even with that judgment posited, no sin has yet been committed, because one can be deceived invincibly; and if he is deceived vincibly, he sins against the precept not indeed of Hope, but of knowing what is necessary.

Hence that question is resolved: Whether Desperation is always with Infidelity.

It is ANSWERED negatively with St. Bonaventure, cited doubt in the margin, St. Thomas, question XX, article II, whom the rest follow, as is seen in Caspensis, cited place, num. IV, and Valentia, disp. II, quest. III, point first.

IT IS PROVED by the holy Doctors. In this Faith differs from Hope, that Faith regards the very object in the universal, but Hope regards it in the particular, namely with respect to the one hoping; and also in this, that Faith asserts certitude in the intellect, Hope asserts certitude in the affect. Therefore, as it sometimes happens that something is unknown in the particular and known in the universal, as the Philosopher says, first of the Posteriors, chapter I — as in the case of him who knows that every Mule is sterile, and yet thinks this one is with young — so one who has certitude concerning faith can lack Hope; and as one can have certitude in the intellect without having it in the affect, so one can, not having Hope, have faith.

AGAINST this argument Valentia objects, that one who has a negative judgment about some particular proposition does not grant it to be universally true. Wherefore, one who, despairing, judges that he cannot hope for pardon, by this very fact denies that pardon is possible for all sinners.

BUT Caspensis, num. V, observes with St. Bonaventure that a speculative judgment can be had of God as prepared to have mercy on all; and that if one even speculatively says that the mercy of God is not such as to exceed our sins, he is a heretic; but if, oppressed by passion, his judgment succumbs out of pusillanimity, such desperation is without infidelity.

THEREFORE he does not exempt himself from the universal proposition of God's mercy, as Valentia thinks, but, erring in himself, he invents something new whereby the universal proposition might not be true; namely, that God is not about to give a congruous help, or efficacious grace, because he is of the number of those, probably, whom God abandons, as some Theologians assert, saying that sufficient helps are denied to certain ones; for that opinion is not under this anathema. Nor does it follow what Valentia says: that if that opinion were true, one could despair without sin; for still, since he does not know himself to be of that number, he is bound to hope. The holy Doctor concludes that that estimation can arise rather from the subversion of confidence than from the subversion of knowledge. For thus a man, although he knows something, is nevertheless carried by a dominating affection to the opposite; or it may rather be called inadvertence, as St. Augustine says, de poenitentia, chapter V, cited by St. Bonaventure in the Pharetra, Book III, chapter XIV, because with eyes closed he precipitates himself, as St. Gregory says, Morals, chapter VIII, as St. Bonaventure notes, cited place of the Pharetra.

The SECOND reason of St. Bonaventure, which St. Thomas and Caspensis also use, num. IV: When the posterior is removed, the prior is not removed. But Hope is posterior to faith: Therefore, Hope being removed, faith can still remain, and consequently not everyone who despairs is an infidel. The minor is proved by the holy Doctor; for Faith is in the intellect, Hope in the affect, which is posterior.

HENCE also is inferred in what the reason of the sin of desperation consists; which is indeed most grave, as being opposed to a Theological virtue, as the holy Doctor argues in dist. XXVI of the third book, article II, question II, ad 1. Whence Jeremiah XVIII: Who have said: We have despaired; for after our thoughts we will go, etc. Therefore the Lord says: Ask the nations: Who hath heard such horrible things? Shall the snow of Lebanon fail from the rock of the field? Or can the cold, flowing waters be plucked away, and flow away? Truly golden words, and penetrating the inmost limbs: hence the holy Doctor there calls this sin an abyss of guilt, because the one despairing hurls himself headlong into the depths. Therefore Ephesians IV: Despairing, they gave themselves up to impurity, etc.

THEREFORE this sin consists in a certain flight and precipitate rush of the will, whereby it desists from beatitude, or any other object of Hope, as to its being attained by oneself; for in this the contrariety with Hope consists; for as hope is an erection of the soul toward pursuing an arduous good, so the casting down of the soul, desisting from the pursuit of such a good, is the opposite act.

HENCE, however, it is doubted whether the formal object of Desperation is evil, as evil; for since it is a flight of the will, its object seems to be evil.

It is ANSWERED that Desperation is a flight from beatitude, not as evil, but as impossible; therefore it is defined: Desperation is a will oppressing with heaviness, distrusting of help and reward, as St. Bonaventure notes, opuscule, Declaration of the Terms of Theology; and in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter III, toward the end he says it is most evil, because, considering the impunity of sins and distrusting the mercy of God, it slackens the rein to sins: And this indeed is the most grave sin, which is said to be against the Holy Spirit, of which the Lord, Matthew XII: It shall not be remitted, neither in this world nor in the future. Not that it cannot be remitted, but because it can scarcely be remitted; or because there is no reason of excuse there, whereby it might make room for the Divine mercy. This sin is commonly said to arise from Acedia, because, as was said, the slothful man finds no complacency in some good, and therefore withdraws himself from good work; but Hope comes from the merit of the work: So the holy Doctor.

Therefore Desperation stands in a flight from beatitude, and in a willing of the means. So also Aegidius, distinction XX, doubt X, St. Thomas, first part of the second part, question XXV, article III, Caspensis, num. VII, cited place, Valentia, disp. II, quest. III, point I, citing St. Gregory, Book III, Morals, chapter XXXI, and St. Thomas here, article IV.

St. Gregory truly teaches, Morals, book XII, chapter V, that it arises also from pride, as St. Bonaventure notes, cited place of the Pharetra.

MOST BEAUTIFULLY St. Chrysostom, homily X on penance: Both are perilous: perverse confidence and desperation. For excessive confidence overthrows one standing; and desperation, after the fall, does not permit one to rise, as I noted also above, at the Disputation.

St. ISIDORE in the Synonyms, chapter I: Do not despair of salvation, if thou turn to better things: for he who despairs of pardon for sin condemns himself more by his desperation than by the crime committed. For desperation augments sin, and is worse than every sin.

But he WANTS to say "worse," that is, more pernicious; for without doubt the hatred of God, which is against Charity, the Queen of the virtues, is worse, as St. Thomas also teaches, article III, and Valentia, cited place, who say that Infidelity is worse, because it is against God in Himself, as He is truth; but Desperation is against God as participated by us, namely through the diffusion of goodness. Now it is a worse evil to fight against God as He is truthful, by infidelity, or as He is good in Himself, by hatred, than to despair of being about to participate in His goodness, as St. Thomas argues, article III, and with him Fuliensis, book III on faith and hope, chapter VI, after St. Bonaventure, cited place, where he admonishes that the one despairing often believes God to be truthful in what He has said, and faithful in His promises universally; but he applies badly, in the particular, that fidelity of the divine promises to himself; for as error and doubt against faith make the intellect doubt or disagree, so desperation weakens the affect and makes it distrust, with faith standing only in the intellect, and no application thence arising into the will.