Article — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Article II. On the Theological Virtue of Hope
Concerning this second theological virtue, which in the order of generation follows faith and precedes charity, its notion, object, subject, and properties must be investigated, just as was done above concerning faith.
I. Notion of Hope. Hope is a theological virtue inclining man to expect, with certain confidence, through the help of God, eternal beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 6). It is said:
With certain confidence. By these words is indicated the essential property of the virtue of hope; if this is lacking, the virtue of theological hope cannot exist.
Through the help of God. These words assign the formal object of the virtue of hope.
Eternal beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it. By these words is indicated the material object of this virtue, both primary, which is beatitude, and secondary, namely the means to attaining it.
Since the virtue of hope, as we have indicated, is not destroyed by just any mortal sin, but only by the sin of heresy and of despair, it is clear that, equally with faith, by reason of charity it is distinguished into formed and unformed hope, according as it exists in a subject which has charity or lacks it.
II. Object of Hope. 1. Material object. All agree that beatitude is the primary material object of theological hope. But beatitude is twofold: objective, which is God Himself, and subjective, which is the possession of God. Theologians dispute in which beatitude the primary material object is to be placed. Some admit both kinds of beatitude as such; others admit objective beatitude only. This latter, which is the opinion of the Thomists, seems to be admitted as more probable. For that is the primary material object of hope which beatifies man. Now it is not the very action by which we attain that object which beatifies us, but the object itself. There is added the fact that the primary material object of a theological virtue is immediately God; and this cannot be said of possession itself. It is indeed true that God is not the material object of theological hope except insofar as He is attained by means of subjective beatitude; but this merely makes subjective beatitude a condition without which not.
To the secondary material object of hope pertain all supernatural goods, and even natural goods, insofar as they conduce to beatitude. For the same virtue which primarily tends toward some end secondarily tends toward the means conducing to that end, since they stand under the same formal object.
- Formal object. Omitting the opinions of the few who assign as the formal object of the virtue of hope either the arduousness of the good to be obtained, or only the goodness of God as desirable by us, with the far greater part of theologians we admit as certain that the formal object consists in divine help. But theologians dispute what divine attributes divine help involves by reason of the formal object. More commonly they teach that divine help, by reason of the formal object, involves at least omnipotence, by which in every case God can help us, and relative goodness, by which God wills to help us. With regard to the fidelity of God in His promises, authors disagree. But with St. Alphonsus (Theologia moralis, II, 21) and many others we admit that this fidelity is also a constitutive part of the formal object. For a formal object which regards the future moves to an act only insofar as that object is certain. But that object becomes certain for us through fidelity. For fidelity is that property by force of which the help of God is known as immutable; but help known as immutable is certain help; therefore help becomes formally certain for us through fidelity, and therefore fidelity is a constitutive part of the formal object of theological hope. Yet from this it does not follow that promise too enters into the essence of the formal object; for this is required only so that by divine faith we may be able to believe in divine help, and it is a condition without which there is no eliciting of an act of hope.
III. Subject of Hope. 1. The subject by which and partial of hope is the will. For the virtue of hope is occupied around the divine good, known by reason illumined by faith; but this is the good of the will.
- The subject which and total of hope are:
a) All just wayfarers. For in the just there are all infused virtues compossible with their state. But the virtue of hope is compossible with all wayfarers, even with souls detained in purgatory, since beatitude is for them an arduous good, not yet possessed and possible to obtain.
b) All faithful wayfarers, although sinners, provided they are not guilty of the mortal sin of despair or of unbelieving presumption. This doctrine is founded on the analogy of faith and hope. For on the one hand it is established that divine faith is not always lost when charity is lost. On the other hand: a) while faith remains, the foundation of hope remains, and so hope is not destroyed indirectly;1 b) hope, like faith, is in its essence independent of charity and of habitual grace, although this is the connatural principle of both habits; c) the act of hope, like the act of faith, is, as is clear from the Council of Trent, a remote disposition to justification.2 Therefore, just as the merciful God leaves divine faith in the sinner as long as he does not directly destroy it by the sin of infidelity or heresy, it must be presumed that God similarly does not take away theological hope as long as the sinner does not despair or presume unbelievingly.
Corollary. From what has been said it follows that the subject which and total of the virtue of hope is in no way: 1. the Blessed, for they are possessors of the good to be hoped for; 2. the damned, for whom beatitude is simply impossible; 3. formal heretics as such, since by the sin of infidelity the foundation of hope is destroyed; 4. sinners guilty of the mortal sin of despair, by which the formal object of hope is directly destroyed, and sinners guilty of the sin of presumption joined with the sin of infidelity, by which the formal object is indirectly destroyed through the destruction of its foundation.
1 A virtue is said to be destroyed directly, or per se, by an act contrary to it, by which the object is destroyed; but it is said to be destroyed indirectly, or per accidens, when the foundation is removed.
IV. Properties of Hope. The properties of hope are enumerated as: certitude, moral goodness, utility, and necessity.
- Certitude of hope consists in this, that it firmly expects its object insofar as the attainment of it depends on God's help; it is therefore founded on a complete persuasion that God on His part will furnish man all things necessary for salvation, so that, if man falls short of his end, he ought to ascribe this ruin to himself. From these points it follows of itself that most certain hope does not exclude fear. For man, in cooperating with the grace of God, which is required for salvation, is defectible of himself; and to this defectibility of nature there is added the arduousness of obtaining the good, which can turn man aside from his duty. Hence the certitude of hope and the fear of one hoping are very well joined together. For the one hoping is certain on the part of the motive on which hope rests, but he fears on the part of his own defectibility; this leaves the nature of hope intact.
That certitude belongs to hope is taught 1. by the Council of Trent,1 saying: "All ought to place and repose a most firm hope in the help of God"; 2. by Sacred Scripture, which in various places praises it, for example, as "a sure and firm anchor of the soul";2 3. by theological reason, because the expectation of some thing participates in the state of mind in which it is founded. Now the expectation of beatitude is founded on certitude, namely that God on His part will furnish the things necessary for beatitude (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 18, a. 4).
The moral goodness of hope consists in this, that the virtue of hope inclines man to acts conformed to right reason; from this it follows that the habit itself and its acts, elicited with a view to reward, are morally good. That this property is truly present in the virtue of hope is established from the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that the justified man sins when he works well with a view to eternal reward, let him be anathema."3 It is further proved from Sacred Scripture, in which men are urged countless times to good works with a view to eternal happiness.4 It is confirmed by reason. For that habit and its acts are certainly morally good by which man is inclined to his salvation according to that order by which God Himself has set it before man, that is, by referring it, or at least leaving it referable, to God as the ultimate end. But man by the habit of hope and by its act tends toward himself as the end to whom he wills the good, yet without excluding the further relation, or at least referability, of this act to God as the ultimate end.
The utility of hope is derived both from its moral goodness just explained and from its necessity still to be explained.
Necessity of hope. a) The habit of hope, or habitual hope, is necessary for salvation for all men by necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But sanctifying grace is not granted without the habit of hope. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means, so also is the habit of hope.
b) In what respect the act of hope, or actual hope, is necessary, we shall explain in Book II, where we shall speak of the exercise or cultivation of virtues.
2 Heb. 6:18.
4 Cf. Gen. 15:1.