Question Two: On Presumption

S. Th. II-II, q. 21.

833. Presumption is any immoderate or excessive hope;¹ nevertheless not every presumption is opposed to divine hope. For the object of every hope is a good, arduous, possible. But something is possible to man in two ways: through his own virtue, and through divine virtue. Hence presumption is twofold: one by which someone tends to a good as possible to himself, which nevertheless exceeds his faculty; and such presumption is per se opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which is concerned with hope of this kind, and is not opposed to the theological virtue of hope except per accidens, insofar as by his own powers someone would presume to obtain that which is not possible except by divine virtue. - The other is that which tends to some good as possible through divine virtue, which is not possible, as when someone hopes that he will obtain pardon without penance; this per se concerns the theological virtue of hope, through which someone adheres to divine power.

¹ The word presumption (from praesumere) is taken in diverse modes: for it can be referred either to the intellect or to the will. Presumption of the intellect is a judgment drawn from conjectures, by which the intellect takes more than can strictly be proved, and thus they speak of vehement, probable, light, false presumption, according to the foundation of the conjecture, and of a law founded on presumption. Presumption of the will: 1. one acts beyond the ordinary mode of sinning, by which without fear and force, knowingly and willingly, from contempt and singular audacity, someone transgresses the law; in which sense in law it is said: "if someone shall have presumed," "if someone by rash daring," "if someone knowingly"; 2. another acts beyond physical powers, whether a) he undertakes a work beyond his own powers, corporal or intellectual, and this is evil and directly against magnanimity; or b) he undertakes by divine virtue more than the ordinary, and thus it can be good, as if someone hopes from God something great which is fitting with excellent confidence (Judith VI, 15; IX, 17), or c) more than is fitting, and then it is evil against divine hope.

Therefore presumption opposed to divine hope can be defined: the rash and disordered expectation of beatitude or of the means to it. It is apt to follow from heresy or infidelity, and is easily joined to it; nevertheless it can exist without this, in the same way as despair: for it is not required for presumption that someone affirm something against faith by speculative judgment, for example, that pardon can be obtained without penance; but it suffices that practically someone act as if he believed thus, or even thought that God would use with him some singular privilege.

834. The presumption which is opposed to divine hope is manifold. - Presumption is one kind directly against hope, another kind beside hope.

The first is directly opposed to the motive of hope, the virtue of God giving aid, and therefore destroys hope. It is committed in two ways: a) by relying too much on one's own powers, as if someone positively refuses to hope for beatitude or remission of sin from divine virtue, but intends to obtain this or that by his own powers alone; and this presumption is called Pelagian; - b) by relying inordinately on God's virtue, as if someone attributes to him what does not belong to him, and thus detracts from him and diminishes him, by hoping, for example, for remission of sin without penance or glory without merits; and this presumption is called Lutheran.²

² Suarez adds a third presumption: to hope from God for help for sinning. But although this is great blasphemy, nevertheless it is not a disordered expectation of beatitude, whence it is not presumption opposed to the theological virtue of hope.

The other is beside hope: this does not remove the motive of hoping, nor destroy hope, but hopes in a disordered and rash mode for what belongs to God. It is committed in various ways: a) by hoping from God for extraordinary supernatural goods outside the common order of divine providence, as if someone hopes that he will have as much glory as the Blessed Virgin Mary; - b) by hoping from God for ordinary supernatural goods, but which have not been promised, such as time for penance precisely at the end of life, while caring nothing about salvation; - c) by taking confidence in God as a motive for sinning more freely, or for increasing or multiplying sins, or for persevering long in sin, as if someone commits more sins precisely because their remission is easily obtained, or because several are remitted as easily as one. Yet he who sins several times solely because several sins are accused in confession as easily as one, although he has a depraved disposition, does not seem to commit the sin of presumption.

835. The gravity of presumption. - I. Presumption which is against hope is a mortal sin from its whole genus; because it removes the motive of hope and therefore hope itself. Yet Lutheran presumption is graver than Pelagian: for it is graver to diminish divine virtue than to extol one's own. Indeed it is a sin against the Holy Spirit: for it is maximally injurious to God to think that he gives pardon of sin without penance, or glory without merits; but by contemning divine omnipotence aiding under the aspect of justice, fear of God is cast away, which is the special remedy granted by the Holy Spirit that we may be drawn back from sin.

Nevertheless presumption is less grave than despair, because it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare than to punish: for the former belongs to God according to himself, but the latter according to our sins.

The sin of presumption is rarely fully deliberate; but if it is not, it is not a sin against the Holy Spirit, nor does it remove hope.

II. Presumption which is only beside hope is a mortal sin from its genus, which admits lightness of matter. It is light: a) if someone hopes for an extraordinary supernatural good, but with full subjection toward divine providence; - b) if someone in some danger, without prayer and preparation, hopes for ordinary but small help, which God has not promised; - c) if the hope of pardon is the motive of committing only venial sins.

836. Causes of presumption and remedies. - Presumption indirectly arises from the errors in faith described above; in addition, that which relies upon one's own virtue directly proceeds from vainglory: for from this, that someone greatly desires glory, it follows that he attempts something above his powers. - But presumption which relies inordinately upon divine virtue directly arises from pride, from which it happens that someone esteems himself so much that he does not think he should be punished for sins or excluded from beatitude.

The remedies against presumption are: a) humility, which is directly opposed to the causes of presumption, namely, pride and empty glory; - b) meditation on the inscrutable judgments of God, which directly fosters the fear of God, by which presumption is excluded: "For God indeed is not mocked, and he punishes with just judgment those presuming too much concerning themselves."

837. Practical corollaries. - 1. Hope of pardon can be the motive of sinning, in which case the sin is aggravated by the malice of presumption; but if it is not the motive of sinning, but only holds itself concomitantly to the sin, it is not presumption; indeed it diminishes the sin: "To sin with a resolution of persevering in sin under hope of pardon pertains to presumption, and this does not diminish but increases the sin. But to sin under hope of pardon... with a resolution... of repenting (afterward) concerning the sin (if hope is not the motive of sinning but only holds itself concomitantly to the sin), this is not of presumption, but this diminishes the sin, because through this he seems to have a will less firmed toward sin," q. 21, a. 2, ad 3.

2. Since presumption mortally evil is a special sin, hence it must be declared in confession if someone committed some sin from this motive, because it is a circumstance changing the species.