Chapter — Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis
Title II: Sins Against Hope
I. — Hope is violated by despair, by which the will deliberately ceases from the pursuit of beatitude, which it judges to be morally inaccessible to itself or to be neglected: whether it obstinately at least doubts concerning the divine assistance necessary for overcoming difficulties, or concerning divine mercy because of its sins, or whether it esteems too highly the labor to be endured and fastidiously contemns the reward.
Despair is directly opposed to confidence in God, is injurious to Him, and consequently is mortal from its whole genus. Yet often, for example in grave sadness, imperfection of the act will excuse from grave sin.
II. — Not by defect, as despair does, but by evil excess, man sins against hope by presumption.
Presumption, in general, says a certain confidence concerning a matter before it happens or is known to have happened. In a "pejorative" and more recent sense, it is confidence not founded. But insofar as by vain confidence we in some way sustain or inform our moral life, we act inordinately; we sin by imprudence and rashness of various gravity and species according to the quantity and specific quality of the evil to which we are exposed.
Hence presumption against theological hope is to be distinguished from presumption besides that hope: which presumption can also be called vulgar.
By presumption against hope, man strives to obtain supernatural beatitude by his own powers; or he attributes to the assistance of God what does not befit it, when he dares to hope for pardon without penitence, or glory with final perseverance in sin.
The first genus of presumption removes the formal object of hope; the other changes its material object, as if one wished to believe a non-revealed object. Both these genera are mortal from their whole genus. And St. Thomas judges it graver to wish to exercise hope in false objects than to trust in one's own powers rather than in divine assistance.
Beautifully St. Thomas says that despair is graver than presumption, because it befits God according to Himself to give heaven, but to punish only according to our sins (2, 2, q. 21, art. 2, c.).
Sins of presumption properly so called are scarcely ever committed.
— Practically, by the name of presumptions, men accuse evil confidences by which they expect too much from themselves, even with divine graces, and thus approach dangers rashly, or, abusing divine long-suffering, defer penitence, or add sin to sin, because three sins are accused as easily as one, or because God is no less ready to pardon several sins than one sin, etc.
In acts of this kind they in no way think of relying on the divine promise or of exercising theological hope. Wherefore these presumptions are not against hope but besides hope: these men sin by rashness against charity toward themselves, and by ingratitude toward God. According to the nature and gravity of the danger to which they commit themselves, they will sin gravely or venially. The proposition: God pardons three sins just as easily as one sin, certainly of itself is blasphemous, as if God does not care about the number of sins: but little attention is paid to that blasphemy. Observe also that the divine goodness or mercy is not assumed as a motive of sinning, but rather does not then prohibit from sin (Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 436).
A certain genus of presumption is committed, to be estimated from the gravity of the danger or evil, when someone, esteeming his own powers too highly, casts himself into danger of sinning; or when certain things are expected apart from divine ordination: for example, health without the use of medicine. According to the gravity of the danger or evil, the sin will be grave or light (Cf. the things just said).
III. — Despair is contained in the highest degree in a certain hatred of God, which is called hatred of abomination, by which God is displeasing to us as hostile because of the vengeance of sins, so that man no longer places his happiness in God.
But that sin, rather than being formally opposed to hope itself, is opposed to the love of God which some call the love of hope. That love itself is presupposed to the very elevation of soul which is formal hope, and is better referred to charity (certainly imperfect charity).
— It is mortal to hope for or to love more, with love of concupiscence, these earthly things than heavenly things: suppose someone so disposed that he desires to live perpetually in this life, and would leave heaven to God if He would leave earth to him. Yet for the most part these words do not contain that mortal repudiation of heavenly good before earthly good, but express a mere velleity, which signifies a great affection for the present life, or fear of death because of uncertain salvation, or even a defect of living faith and a certain natural hesitation concerning the future life.
— By every sin by which faith itself perishes, hope is concomitantly taken away. Besides, it is lost by despair: whether you contemn the divine good as not desirable, or you no longer trust that that good is accessible to you; and by the two reasons of presumption properly so called (cf. n. 62): these are directly opposed to theological hope.
— You ask in what way he sins who applies his hope to objects which God can in no way give: moral evil, indifferent things as such. If he wishes to appeal to the very motive of theological hope for obtaining these things, by attributing to the divine promise what in no way befits it, he will have sinned against hope itself, as we said, n. 62, by a sin which can in no way be composed with the habit of hope. Cf. 2, 2, q. 21, art. 1, ad 3. But if he merely prayed to God for that thing, appealing to no divine promise, then an object morally evil is to be distinguished from an indifferent one: he will have sinned gravely, not against hope but against religion, who prays God to assist him in moral evil. That sin is to be ascribed to the genus of superstition. Add that it is objectively blasphemous that you suppose God as favoring moral evil. But those do not sin who merely pray that after the evil has been perpetrated they may escape physically unharmed; nor he who in the very act of sin implores the mercy of God. Although it is also inordinate to ask for indifferent things, as such, since God wills and gives all things insofar as they bear an order to our salvation, nevertheless we do not judge this to be grave.
Summary
— I. Sin is committed against hope: 1. by despair, by which someone ceases from pursuing beatitude, whether he at least doubts concerning divine assistance, for example, after sins have been committed, or whether he fastidiously rejects the heavenly reward itself: this is despair less properly so called; - 2. by presumption, by which someone would attempt to obtain eternal life either by his own powers, or would attribute to the assistance of God what does not befit it: pardon without penitence, glory with final perseverance in sin. By both despair and presumption, the formal object of hope is removed and hope itself is lost. But this presumption is scarcely committed; despair not rarely is excused from grave sin by the very imperfection of the act.
But by the name of presumptions there usually come several evil confidences which, according to the various degree, conscience, and created danger, can be a grave or light sin.
It would be grave against hope itself deliberately to rely on the motives of hope for asking from God things which God cannot give because of His infinite holiness: moral evil, indifferent things as such; and it is also grave against religion simply to ask God for assistance toward moral evil (it would be another thing toward escaping unharmed).
II. They are accustomed to oppose to hope a certain hatred of God, conceived from the occasion of the justice by which God punishes sins. Yet this sin rather is opposed to imperfect charity which is presupposed to hope itself.
III. Grave would be the repudiation of heavenly good before earthly good; but words by which someone seems to wish that he always spend life in this life rather contain a venial inordination of too great affection for the present life, or too great fear of death, or not sufficiently living faith.