Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
What are the vices opposed to theological hope?
[The sins opposed to hope are of two kinds: some of them are contrary to the desire for eternal beatitude, others to the confidence of obtaining it.
[Peccata spei contraria duplicis sunt generis : horum alia adversantur desiderio beatitudinis aeternae, alia fiduciae illam obtinendi.
I say 1°: To the desire for eternal beatitude are opposed: 1° the affection of this age, whereby earthly things are desired more than eternal ones; 2° a disordered affection for heavenly felicity, whereby out of weariness of life and labor ultimate happiness is sought.
Dico 1° : Desiderio beatitudinis aeternae adversantur : 1° huius saeculi affectus, quo terrena magis quam aeterna cupiuntur; 2° affectus inordinatus felicitatis coelestis, quo ex taedio vitae et laboris beatitas ultima appetitur.
The former affection is a mortal sin if earthly things are set up as the ultimate end: e.g., if one were so disposed as to wish to dwell perpetually in the present life and to leave heaven to God, if God were willing to leave him the earth. The latter does not exceed venial, unless there be present an express rebellion against divine providence. One may licitly wish for his own death in order to avoid sin or some other immense evil, provided he submit himself to the divine will,118 and in no other sense than the Apostle when he says, Rom., VII, 24: Unhappy man that I am! who will deliver me from the body of this death? 118 Id., ibid.
Prior affectus est peccatum mortale, si in terrenis ultimus finis reponatur : v. g., si quis ita comparatus sit, ut optet perpetuo in praesenti vita degere, et Deo relinquere coelum, si Deus ipsi terram relinquere vellet. Posterior non excedit veniale, nisi adsit expressa rebellio contra divinam providentiam. Licite vero sibi quis mortem exoptat, ut vitet peccatum vel aliud ingens malum, dummodo divinae voluntati se submittat118, et non alio sensu quam Apostolus dicat, Rom., VII, 24 : Infelix ego homo! quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? 118 Id., ibid.
I say 2°: To the fiducial expectation of eternal beatitude there is opposed, by way of defect, despair; by way of excess, presumption.
Dico 2° : Expectationi fiduciali beatitudinis aeternae adversatur, per defectum, desperatio; per excessum, praesumptio.
1° Despair is « a giving over of the soul, or a movement of the will, whereby one refuses to attain beatitude through the ordinary means. » It is also defined otherwise, « a want of confidence in obtaining beatitude, or the means necessary for obtaining it. »
1° Desperatio est « animi desponsio, seu motus voluntatis, quo quis refugit adipisci beatitudinem per media ordinaria. » Definitur etiam aliter, « diffidentia obtinendi beatitudinem, vel media ad illam obtinendam necessaria. »
Despair is a sin; which the Angelic Doctor proves thus, here q. 20, a. 1, o: « Every appetitive movement conformed to true understanding is good in itself; but every appetitive movement conformed to false understanding is evil in itself and sin. Now the true judgment of the intellect concerning God is that salvation comes from Him, and pardon is granted to sinners...; but it is a false opinion that forgiveness is denied to a repentant sinner, or that God does not convert sinners to Himself through justifying grace. And therefore, just as the movement of hope, which conforms to true judgment, is praiseworthy and virtuous; so the opposite movement of despair, which conforms to a false judgment about God, is vicious and a sin. »
Desperatio est peccatum; quod sic probat Angelicus, hic q. 20, a. 1, o : « Omnis motus appetitivus conformiter se habens intellectui vero, est secundum se bonus; omnis autem motus appetitivus conformiter se habens intellectui falso, est secundum se malus et peccatum. Circa Deum autem vera existimatio intellectus est quod ex ipso provenit hominum salus, et venia peccatoribus datur...; falsa autem opinio est quod peccatori poenitenti veniam deneget, vel quod peccatores ad se non convertat per gratiam iustificantem. Et ideo, sicut motus spei, qui conformiter se habet ad existimationem veram, est laudabilis et virtuosus; ita oppositus motus desperationis, qui se habet conformiter existimationi falsae de Deo, est vitiosus et peccatum. »
This sin is mortal, and indeed most grievous, yet less than the sin of unbelief and hatred of God, but more dangerous, as is shown by the same Doctor, ibid., a. 3, o: « That which has aversion from God first and in itself is the most grievous sin among mortal sins. Now to the theological virtues are opposed unbelief, despair, and hatred of God: among which hatred and unbelief, if compared with despair, are found in themselves, that is according to the account of their own species, graver. For unbelief arises from this, that man does not believe the very truth of God; hatred of God from this, that man's will is opposed to the divine goodness itself; but despair from this, that man does not hope to partake of the goodness of God. From this it is evident that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, but despair as His good is partaken of by us. Hence it is a greater sin, speaking absolutely, not to believe the truth of God, or to hate God, than not to hope to obtain glory from Him. But if despair be compared to those two sins on our part, then despair is more dangerous; because by hope we are recalled from evils and led on to pursue goods. And therefore, when hope is taken away, men unrestrained fall into vices and are withdrawn from laborious goods... And Isidore says in his book de Summo bono: « To commit any crime is the death of the soul; but to despair is to descend into hell. »
Hoc peccatum est mortale, et quidem gravissimum, minus tamen peccato infidelitatis et odii Dei, sed periculosius, ut demonstratur ab eodem Doctore, ibid., a. 3, o : « Quod primo et per se habet aversionem a Deo, est gravissimum peccatum inter peccata mortalia. Virtutibus autem theologicis opponuntur infidelitas, desperatio et odium Dei : inter quae odium et infidelitas, si desperationi comparentur, inveniuntur secundum se quidem, id est secundum rationem propriae speciei, graviora. Infidelitas enim provenit ex hoc quod homo ipsam Dei veritatem non credit; odium vero Dei provenit ex hoc quod voluntas hominis ipsi divinae bonitati contrariatur; desperatio autem ex hoc quod homo non sperat se bonitatem Dei participare. Ex quo patet quod infidelitas et odium Dei sunt contra Deum secundum quod in se est, desperatio autem secundum quod eius bonum participatur a nobis. Unde maius peccatum est, secundum se loquendo, non credere Dei veritatem, vel odisse Deum, quam non sperare consequi gloriam ab ipso. Sed, si comparetur desperatio ad duo peccata ex parte nostra, sic desperatio est periculosior; quia per spem revocamur a malis et inducimur ad bona prosequenda. Et ideo, sublata spe, irrefraenati homines labuntur in vitia et a bonis laboribus retrahuntur... Et Isidorus dicit in lib. de Summo bono : « Perpetrare flagitium aliquod, mors animae est; sed desperare, est descendere in infernum. »
It follows that despair properly so called admits no parvity of matter, although at times it may become venial, owing to a defect of full consent.119 Therefore the confessor must examine whether, out of an affect of despair, the customary exercises of piety have been intermitted, especially while the precept urged, or not. Thence he will have a sufficiently safe indication of consent given or refused. He should note, however, that many penitents despair not of God's mercy, but of their own cooperation with His grace; which ought not properly to be called despair, but is pusillanimity, which admits parvity of matter. 119 S. Lig., lib. II, n. 20, Resolv. 2°.
Sequitur, desperationem proprie dictam non admittere materiae parvitatem, quamvis aliquando venialis fieri possit, ob defectum pleni consensus.119 Ideo confessarius examinare debet an ex desperationis affectu consueta pietatis officia, praesertim cum praeceptum urgebat, intermissa fuerint, necne. Inde satis tutum praestiti vel negati consensus indicium habebit. Advertat tamen, plures poenitentes, non de Dei misericordia, sed de sua eius gratiae cooperatione desperare; quod proprie desperatio vocari non debet, sed est pusillanimitas, quae admittit materiae parvitatem. 119 S. Lig., lib. II, n. 20, Resolv. 2°.
2° Presumption, which is more frequent than despair, arises from a defect of the fear of God, and is defined: « A rash expectation of beatitude or of the means thereto. »
2° Praesumptio, quae est desperatione frequentior, oritur ex timoris Dei defectu, et definitur : « Temeraria expectatio beatitudinis mediorumve ad illam. »
It is a sin, and indeed, according to St. Thomas, here q. 21, a. 1, o, « it is properly a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, because by such presumption the aid of the Holy Spirit, whereby man is recalled from sin, is removed or contemned. »
Est peccatum, et quidem, secundum D. Thomam, hic q. 21, a. 1, o, « est proprie species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quia scilicet per huiusmodi praesumptionem tollitur vel contemnitur adiutorium Spiritus sancti, per quod homo revocatur a peccato. »
It is a grave sin in itself, which is not excused from being so, save by the imperfection of the act. The Angelic Doctor gives the reason, ibid., a. 2, o: « As was said above concerning despair, every appetitive movement which conforms to false understanding is evil in itself and sin. But presumption is a certain appetitive movement, because it imports a certain disordered hope; and it conforms to false understanding, as does despair. For if it is false that God does not grant forgiveness to penitents, or that He does not convert sinners to penance; so too it is false that He grants forgiveness to those persevering in sin, and bestows glory on those ceasing from good work: to which judgment the movement of presumption conforms itself. And therefore presumption is a sin, yet less than despair; because it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare than to punish, on account of His infinite goodness. For the former belongs to God in Himself, the latter on account of our sins. »
Est peccatum per se grave, quod non excusatur a tanto, nisi per actus imperfectionem. Rationem affert Angelicus, ibid., a. 2, o : « Sicut supra dictum est circa desperationem, omnis motus appetitivus qui conformiter se habet ad intellectum falsum, secundum se malus est et peccatum. Praesumptio autem est motus quidam appetitivus, quia importat quamdam spem inordinatam; habet autem se conformiter intellectui falso, sicut et desperatio. Si enim falsum est quod Deus poenitentibus non indulgeat, vel quod peccantes ad poenitentiam non convertat; ita falsum est quod in peccato perseverantibus veniam concedat, et a bono opere cessantibus gloriam largiatur : cui existimationi conformiter se habet praesumptionis motus. Et ideo praesumptio est peccatum, minus tamen quam desperatio; quoniam magis proprium est Deo misereri et parcere, quam punire, propter eius infinitam bonitatem. Illud enim secundum se Deo convenit, hoc autem secundum nostra peccata. »
Hence: 1° He sins who hopes for salvation either on account of his own merits, or on account of the merits of Christ, without any cooperation of his own works.120 — 2° Likewise he sins mortally who, in hope of pardon, is induced to sin, because, e.g., God forgives many sins as easily as one. But it is otherwise if he were to say that he would confess many sins as easily as one: which of itself is only venial.121 — 3° He contracts no guilt of presumption properly so called who sins in hope of pardon, so that this hope is not the motive of sinning, but merely accompanies the sin. — 4° Those who persevere in sin in the hope of repenting sometime are with difficulty excused from grave sin against the charity due to themselves, since they expose themselves to great danger of damnation.122 120 S. Lig., lib. II, n. 21. 121 Id., ibid. 122 Id., ibid.; Homo apost., IV, 8.
Unde : 1° Ille peccat, qui salutem sperat, vel propter propria merita, vel propter merita Christi, absque ulla cooperatione suorum operum120. — 2° Item mortaliter peccat, qui ob spem veniae inducitur ad peccandum, quia, v. g., Deus tam facile plura peccata quam unum ignoscit. Secus vero, si diceret se tam facile declaraturum in confessione plura peccata quam unum : quod per se non est nisi veniale121. — 3° Praesumptionis proprie dictae reatum non contrahit, qui peccat cum spe veniae, ita ut haec spes non sit motivum peccandi, sed peccatum comitetur tantum. — 4° Difficile excusantur a peccato gravi contra charitatem sibi debitam, qui perseverant in peccato sub spe aliquando poenitendi, cum magno periculo damnationis se exponant122. 120 S. Lig., lib. II, n. 21. 121 Id., ibid. 122 Id., ibid.; Homo apost., IV, 8.
It must be observed that with the sin of either despair or presumption there is sometimes joined the sin of heresy, e.g., if one were to judge, like Cain, his own sin to be unforgivable; or if one were to hope for salvation by the sole powers of nature, as the Pelagians; or by faith alone, without works, as the Lutherans.]
Animadvertendum est, cum peccato sive desperationis sive praesumptionis coniungi aliquando peccatum haeresis, v. g., si quis iudicaret, ut Cain, suum peccatum esse irremissibile; aut si quis per solas naturae vires salutem speraret, sicut Pelagiani; vel per solam fidem, sine operibus, ut Lutherani.]