The Nature of Charity of Neighbor

71. Notions. 1. By the name of neighbor is understood every rational creature which is capable of divine grace and eternal beatitude: the angels and saints in heaven, the souls detained in purgatory, and men, whether they are good or evil, whether friends or enemies, with only demons and the damned excepted.

Christ the Lord teaches that the notion of neighbor, which the Greeks and Romans restricted to fellow citizens, and the Israelites, according to the interpretation of the Pharisees, to fellow tribesmen, must be extended to absolutely all men, enemies not excepted.¹

2. We can love the neighbor with theological charity and with charity which is a moral virtue. We love the neighbor with moral charity when the love has for its motive the natural honesty which by the light of reason we know in love of this kind.² We love the neighbor with theological charity if the motive of loving is God, supremely good in Himself, known by the light of faith.

In order that we may be able to love the neighbor for God's sake and will good to him, he himself must in some way be apprehended as referred to God: as a creature, image, son, friend of God, as a brother of Christ, as redeemed by the blood of Christ, as a temple of the Holy Spirit, as called to glory, etc. And indeed this relation is the foundation and motive of charity toward the neighbor. Therefore we love the neighbor with theological charity if we will good to him because, for example, he is a son of God: for the reason on account of which we love him is God supremely good, or love toward God supremely good, whose son man is. In the same way we love the son of a friend for the sake of the friend: for that which moves us to loving the son of the friend is love toward the friend whom we love in his son.³

¹ Cf. Luke 10:30-37.

² Cf. Struggl, Theologia moralis, tr. 4, q. 4, n. 16; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 152.

³ Cf. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie XXII (1898), p. 77 ff.: "Das Formalobjekt der gottlichen Nachstenliebe."

The precept of charity toward neighbor is proved by the same arguments by which the precept of charity toward self is proved (n. 521). This noted, we shall speak first about the diverse prescribed acts, then about sins against charity toward neighbor.

220. Principles. - I. There is a precept of loving the neighbor with true and internal affection. This is clear 1º from the natural law, because also in the neighbor there flourishes the same formal motive of love, namely participated goodness of God; for all men are creatures of God, founded according to his image, and capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude: therefore just as we ought to love God, so also we ought to love the neighbor on account of God. - 2º It is clear from Sacred Scripture, Matt. 22.39: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. - 3º It is also clear from the condemnation of the 10th proposition by Innocent XI, which lies thus: We are not bound to love the neighbor by an internal and formal act.

But he who lives in a Christian manner sufficiently satisfies this precept, with regard to the internal act, by praying for the neighbor, or by reciting the Lord's Prayer ¹. But with regard to external acts he satisfies by succoring the necessities of the neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be laid down below.

¹ For satisfying the precept, a general love suffices, which excludes no one and embraces all, as St. Thom. teaches (2. 2. q. 25. art. 8.). And therefore for this suffices a prayer which is made for all by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and an external act.

II. Some order of Charity is to be observed in love of neighbor. The reason is that both the persons to be loved are more or less perfect, or more or less joined to us, and the goods to be desired or procured for them are more or less necessary ².

² Concerning the order of charity among neighbors, Laymann (Lib. 2. Tract. 5. Cap. 3. n. 5 and 6.), after St. Thomas, more clearly uses a threefold principle: I. With that love which is accompanied by complacency or joy in another's possessed good, and likewise which is accompanied by honor, reverence, those are to be loved more who are better, St. Thomas being the author (2. 2. q. 26. art. 7. 8. 9.): and for the same reason parents are to be loved more than children and wife, and benefactors more than those upon whom we have conferred benefits. The reason is that they have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all. - II. With that love by which we desire for another a good not yet possessed, and which is accompanied by mercy and beneficence, those are to be loved more who are more joined to us. - III. Those who are more joined to us ought to be preferred to others according to those goods in which conjunction or friendship is founded: because communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. Hence St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 26. art. 8.): The love of diverse persons is to be measured according to the diverse reason of conjunction, so that each one may be loved more in that which pertains to that conjunction according to which he is loved... And therefore in those things which pertain to nature, we ought to love blood-relatives more; but in those things which pertain to civil association, we ought to love fellow citizens more; and in military matters, fellow soldiers more. And (3. Dist. 29. q. 1. art. 6. ad 3.) from the same principles he deduces that ecclesiastical benefices are not to be given more to blood-relatives, but to those who are more fit for the government of the Church.

Likewise the necessities in which the neighbor is to be succored are diverse. For necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold, namely:

1º Extreme, when the danger of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without the help of another.

2º Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil ³, which he cannot escape without great difficulty.

³ The Author in reality exhibits grave necessity with those colors by which other Doctors are accustomed to indicate quasi-extreme, or at least most grave, necessity.

3º Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In the spiritual order vulgar sinners are in this, who, if they wished to employ some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order beggar-poor generally suffer it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. - St. Lig. n. 27, Hom. apost. n. 18.

221. • First rule. Everyone is bound to love himself more, simply and absolutely, than the neighbor ⁴. The reason is that each one is nearer to himself than any other. This is clear besides from the natural and invincible inclination to love oneself more than the neighbor; whence the common axiom: Well-ordered Charity begins from oneself.

⁴ ** In order that this assertion be true, it must be understood concerning those goods which we are bound to obtain or preserve for ourselves. For if this obligation is absent, to prefer the neighbor to ourselves is not only lawful, but pertains to virtue.

Second rule. Nevertheless, we ought to succor the neighbor, even with our own advantages put after ⁵, in the following order:

⁵ Namely, the first rule has force where goods are of the same order, and in the remaining things our condition and the neighbor's condition are equal. But the second has force when either in the order of goods or in the remaining things there is disparity, which can happen in three ways; whence a threefold rule, namely: 1º If the good necessary for the neighbor is of a higher order, we can and sometimes are bound to deprive ourselves of a good of a lower order for procuring that good for the neighbor. - 2º We can and sometimes are bound to help a neighbor constituted in greater necessity with damage to ourselves. - 3º The same thing must be said if indeed the necessity is equal, but the cause of each is not equal, for example, it is of greater importance that the life of the neighbor, as of a public person, be preserved.

But the order among goods is that spiritual and supernatural goods hold the first place; natural and intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc., the second; but natural extrinsic goods, such as reputation, honor, riches, the third. Yet reputation and honor with respect to goods of fortune are of a higher order, because reputation is something spiritual and moral.

1º In extreme spiritual necessity, per se ⁶, the neighbor must be succored even with danger of life; because the eternal life of the neighbor is a good more excellent than our temporal life. - St. Lig. n. 27.

⁶ It is said per se; for one must except: 1º if there is not morally certain hope of saving the neighbor; whence a mother is not bound to undergo danger of life so that offspring may be baptized, since it is uncertain whether it will arrive at baptism. - 2º If there is another who can perform this; for then my work is not necessary (see Reginald, Prax. For. poenit. lib. 4. c. 25. n. 357.). - 3º If a graver evil threatens thence, for example, if by someone's dying for that cause, the salvation of many others would be endangered. Moreover, those things are to be seen which St. Alphonsus (Lib. 6. n. 624.) has concerning a dying person to be absolved even with danger of life.

2º In extreme temporal necessity the neighbor must ordinarily be succored with great ⁷ inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest. The reason is that on the one hand the life of the neighbor is a good more excellent than some good of ours; and on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo so great an inconvenience for others. - St. Lig. n. 31.

⁷ See below, n. 228. q. 3, where from St. Alphonsus with the common opinion of the Doctors it is established that someone is not bound to pay out a great sum of money in order to exempt another from danger of death.

3º In grave necessity of either order no one is bound to succor the neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, provided nevertheless the title of justice, piety, or office is excluded ⁸. For from what has been said it follows that we are bound to furnish some help, but not with grave loss of one's own good. - St. Lig. ibid.

⁸ From office, in grave necessity, for example, the pastor and physician are bound to care for another's safety; therefore it is not lawful for them to flee in time of plague, unless an equally suitable substitute has been appointed.

4º In common necessity of either order the neighbor is to be succored with some inconvenience indeed, because the love of neighbor requires this, but only with light inconvenience; for there can be only a light obligation of Charity when the neighbor can fairly easily remove himself from that necessity, or it is not too burdensome for him. But we are not bound to aid all who are placed in common necessity. For this is impossible, and if it could be done, it would already not be a light inconvenience ⁹. - St. Lig. n. 32.

⁹ With regard to relieving the common temporal necessities of the neighbor, see what is said below concerning alms; but with regard to spiritual necessities compare what St. Alphonsus has (Lib. 6. n. 625.) concerning the proper obligation of priests, that they render themselves fit for helping the faithful in spiritual matters, and also what is to be said below concerning fraternal correction.

Third rule. Among various persons to be loved, other things being equal, those are to be preferred who are more joined to us by blood, friendship, office, Religion, living together, etc., since God has bound them to us by stricter bonds.

Hence to be preferred are 1º parents to the rest; 2º a spouse to children, children to brothers, brothers to relatives; 3º friends, benefactors, Superiors, and persons more useful to the public good to the rest. Nevertheless in ordinary necessity, according to the common opinion, spouse and children ought to be preferred to parents ¹⁰. - St. Lig. Hom. apost. n. 15.

¹⁰ It belongs properly to the father that honor be bestowed on him by the children; but to the child, that utility be provided to him by the parents. Although in an article of necessity a son is obligated from benefits received to provide especially for his parents. St. Thom. (2. 2. q. 26. art. 9. ad 3.). And concerning a wife (ibid. art. 11.): A wife is loved more intensely; but greater reverence is to be shown to parents.

222. Resolves. - 1º In an equal order of goods, and equal necessity and cause, we are bound more to love ourselves than the neighbor. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor according to that saying: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. But the rule is prior and more powerful than the thing ruled ¹¹.

¹¹ Thus St. Thomas argues from that evangelical text (2. 2. q. 26. art. 4.): From which it seems that man's love toward himself is as the exemplar of the love which is had toward another. But the exemplar is prior to the thing exemplified. Therefore man ought from charity to love himself more than the neighbor. For this reason the words of Christ, as theologians commonly note, denote likeness, but not equality.

2º He sins against Charity toward himself, gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter, who neglects due care of soul or body ¹². - Nevertheless it is lawful to deprive oneself of non-necessary spiritual goods for the temporal or spiritual good of the neighbor, for example, to omit hearing Mass on a weekday ¹³, etc. Indeed someone can desire and procure for the neighbor greater non-necessary spiritual goods than for himself, provided contempt of them is excluded.

¹² Sins of this kind, however, are scarcely accustomed to be accused in confession. For either it is a matter of damage to the soul brought upon oneself through faults; and it must not be expressed any more than in the sin, for example, of theft, the violation of charity or obedience toward God must be expressed. Or it is a matter of omission of means by which faults may be guarded against; and since this obligation is not distinguished from the obligation of observing the precepts, such negligence is sufficiently expressed through confession of the other sins (see Lugo de Poenit. Disp. 7. n. 242 and Disp. 15. n. 56.). But if it is a matter of damages inflicted upon life or body, although the obligation of charity toward oneself seems to be distinguished from the obligation which the fifth precept of the Decalogue imposes by reason of the divine dominion over our life and body; nevertheless, since the causes of illnesses for the most part are not proximate and immediate, they almost do not infer grave guilt.

¹³ Thus someone leaves the goods of contemplation, fasting, choir, etc., in order to instruct the neighbor, or defers entrance into religion, lest there be lacking someone who may devote labor either to a parish, or to a seminary, or to a mission. Nor indeed then in reality is there a ceasing spiritual gain; since the lesser good is compensated by the greater. Indeed someone can even choose the delay of eternal beatitude in order to help the neighbor; whence that saying of St. Martin: Lord, if I am necessary to your people, I do not refuse labor. The words of the Apostle, Phil. 1.23, also pertain here.

3º No one is bound with danger of life or goods to extract others from sins from which they can free themselves through the Sacrament of Penance or perfect contrition, even if they are in danger of life; but otherwise, per se, if it is judged that with difficulty they can elicit an act of contrition ¹⁴. - St. Lig. and others commonly.

¹⁴ The necessity of succoring certain persons near death, whether from sickness or from a grave wound, does not flow chiefly from the difficulty of eliciting an act of contrition; for the faithful, however rude and sunk in sins, sufficiently know that they must turn themselves to God with their whole heart, nor is the opportune help of divine grace lacking to them: rather there underlies the danger lest in those straits, with the mind distracted to other things, lethal sleep and death may snatch them away before they think anything concerning the salvation of the soul.

A greater and easily even extreme necessity will be able to press when danger threatens from deception, which does not depend on the will alone of those who are deceived; for example, if a teacher of heresy somewhere diffuses his errors, etc. Hence if there are any who in these our days use, as they say, the prudent economy of silence, lest they incur the hatred of the wicked, these surely seem to have entirely forgotten this obligation.

4º It is not lawful for you to undergo the proximate danger of sinning in order that you may prevent another's sin, when your fall appears somehow certain; otherwise, if that danger can be made remote, so that you rightly trust that you will not fall ¹⁵. - St. Lig. Hom. apost. n. 14.

¹⁵ Therefore dangerous matters are lawfully read and handled either by those who must care for souls, such as priests, or by those who must heal bodies, such as physicians. Likewise these latter lawfully undergo danger in treating women, and the former in hearing confessions. See St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 26 and Lib. 5. n. 63.), who indeed from the common opinion teaches (Lib. 6. n. 453.) that sometimes someone can even be obligated to a work of charity, although otherwise a fall is very probable, if the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity. For the help of God, who then commands that the neighbor be succored, is prudently still hoped for.

5º More probably, in those things which are necessary for life, it is lawful to prefer to oneself an equal or inferior, indeed it is a heroic act of charity, provided it is done on account of God. Except if he who exposes himself is necessary to the Republic or to his family. - Thus Suarez. - Laymann, etc., against others.

223. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it against Charity to wish death for oneself on account of the misfortunes of life?

Resp. 1º Neg., if it is done from desire of a better life, or of eternal happiness, as is evident.

Resp. 2º Affirm., if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet they do not sin who desire death when life becomes so burdensome that it is considered harder than death itself. - St. Lig. n. 30. - Otherwise, if it is done from any light cause whatever, although not gravely, unless someone should wish to oppose the order of divine Providence ¹⁶.

¹⁶ Here the question concerns only an inefficacious desire of death, insofar as someone wishes or even asks that death be sent upon him by God. The Salmanticenses (Tr. 20. Cap. 13. n. 46.) condemn this as a grave fault, because (they say) it is a vice of timidity and pusillanimity to wish to lack life for the sake of avoiding evils of lesser moment. But where, then, is grave fault in pusillanimity, unless someone is thence impelled to break a grave precept? But where will you find a grave precept, that I may not ask God to rescue me from the miseries of the world? Therefore if I am impelled by a light cause, it will at last be an act of impatience, which from its genus is light. And since to wish to exchange the present life for the future life is not per se against the order of charity, here indeed we shall have some fault of impatience and pusillanimity, but not of violated charity.

Q. 2º Is it against Charity to desire a temporal evil for the neighbor, or to rejoice over it, on account of a good end?

Resp. 1º Neg., if the due order of Charity is observed, that is, if it is done on account of a greater good, or on account of a lesser evil ¹⁷. Hence this is lawful, 1º on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2º on account of the common good, either spiritual or temporal; 3º on account of the good even of many, of much greater moment, for example, of a family, community, etc. - St. Lig. n. 30. - Moreover such desires can easily and usefully be changed into more perfect ones ¹⁸.

¹⁷ ** Hence the true and only cause is to be sought why Propositions XIII, XIV, and XV were condemned by Innocent XI; for now it will be enough to allege the authority of Viva, Cardenas, and Duarte, who treated expressly of the condemned theses. Thus those propositions have themselves: XIII. If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be sad over the life of someone, and rejoice over his natural death, and ask and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal emolument. - XIV. It is lawful by an absolute desire to desire the death of a father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one desiring; because, namely, a rich inheritance will come to him. - XV. It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness on account of the immense riches thence obtained from the inheritance.

Concerning these Viva says (n. 12.): The falsity is shown: because the order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor be preferred to one's own temporal emolument... Therefore the order of charity is perverted if we seek the death of the neighbor, or rejoice over it, on account of our temporal emolument; because by these affections our emolument is preferred to the life of the neighbor, which is in an order far superior; so that the perversion of order cannot be called light, nor can affections of this kind be free from grave fault. And n. 20: If a daughter were delighted concerning a parricide inculpably committed, lest she be further harassed by a father who wished to prostitute her and was impelling her to sin, such delight could be excused from the end and from the spiritual good, which far excels the life of the father. But a rich inheritance does not excel the life of the father; and therefore a son cannot without mortal sin be delighted over a parricide inculpably perpetrated on account of immense riches obtained from the inheritance.

But Duarte (Brev. Expos. Propp. damn. n. 207. 208.): The reason is that the order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor be preferred to one's own temporal emolument, indeed it requires that for preserving that life we succor a poor man even from things necessary to our state; therefore etc... From which it follows that if a son should wish death for his father, or rejoice over it, or if he should rejoice over parricide committed by himself in drunkenness for the sake of taking possession of an inheritance, he will sin mortally not only against charity, but also against piety, etc.

Finally Cardenas (Part. 4. Diss. 10. n. 20.): It is not lawful to wish death for the neighbor on account of a good of lesser moment. But he who wishes death for the neighbor... on account of any temporal emolument whatever, or on account of entering upon a rich inheritance, desires evil for him on account of a good of lesser moment. Therefore it is mortally illicit. Which doctrine he then (ibid. n. 27.) applies also to Prop. XV with regard to a son who rejoices over parricide perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, etc.

And indeed it will have been useful to note these things, so that it may be clear that VV. have in vain objected the condemnation of these theses against the doctrine of Suarez and others, concerning which we spoke in the Note at n. 172. Since for an entirely different reason than they contend, those theses (as is plain from what has been said) were condemned.

¹⁸ That it can seem more perfect to desire that the impious be converted does not cause those to be reprehended who, for the good of the Church and of society, desire and earnestly ask that by the powerful hand of God they be humbled or even exterminated; since also in this the virtue of true charity toward the Church and neighbors is exercised in a most ordered way. Therefore the Church also in her prayers asks from God now their conversion, now their perdition, now both at the same time disjunctively.

Resp. 2º Affirmatively, when the order of charity is perverted. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, nor of her daughter, because on account of deformity or poverty she cannot marry ¹⁹. This is clear from the condemnation of propositions 13 and 14 by Innocent XI. - St. Lig. n. 30.

¹⁹ St. Alphonsus explains his mind better with regard to this last case in Lib. 5. n. 22, namely that the question is about a mother who, merely to avoid her own annoyance, wishes the death of her daughter; and therefore he gives the reason, because the evil of the mother does not outweigh the evil wished for the daughter. Therefore he does not contradict the other Doctors affirming that, in those circumstances in which death is better than bitter life (as is said Eccli. 30.), both the daughter for herself, and the mother for the daughter, can lawfully wish death and ask it from God. Moreover, also for avoiding her own grave troubles, it will certainly be lawful for a mother, if not to wish the death of either husband or daughter, at least to desire and ask from God that in whatever way it pleases Him, He rescue her from those straits.

570. Proposition. There exists a special precept of loving neighbor with supernatural love, both affective and effective.

Preliminary note. Natural love, by which neighbor is loved on account of natural gifts, whether material (e.g. on account of his beauty, goods of fortune, etc.) or spiritual (e.g. on account of his knowledge, talent, art, etc.), is distinguished from supernatural love, by which he is loved on account of God, insofar as the neighbor is a son of God, brother of Christ, temple of the Holy Spirit, etc. For just as we love the son of our friend on account of the friend, so also we ought to love neighbor as the son of God, loved above all things. Even purely natural love, by which we love neighbor, is licit per se, provided it is not disordered; but now we are not speaking about it. - As was already noted above, by the name neighbor we understand all creatures which are capable of heavenly beatitude, namely, all men on this earth (and consequently even sinners, heretics, Jews, etc.), all the blessed in heaven, and the souls in purgatory; but not the damned in Gehenna, as obstinate enemies of God. - Just as the precept of loving God is a special precept and not only a general one, so also the precept of loving neighbor is distinguished from the other precepts. - But the love to be shown to neighbor is not only by interior affection but also by exterior work, if necessity or occasion requires this.

It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture, which already in the Old Testament inculcated this precept,² and in the New Testament, which is customarily called the law of love, renewed it in many places and explained it more. Thus, e.g., after Christ had brought forward the first and greatest precept of the dilection of God, He adds: "But the second [commandment] is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."³ "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another. In this all will know that you are My disciples, if you have dilection for one another."⁴ In this place Christ calls the precept of charity a new commandment, not indeed in the sense that previously there had been no obligation at all of loving neighbor, but because these things are new: 1. the exemplar of this dilection (the love of the Savior Himself); 2. its motive; 3. its measure and mode. St. John the Apostle again and again exhorted his disciples to love one another.⁵ - "And now I ask thee, lady, not as writing a new commandment to thee, but that which we have had from the beginning, that we love one another."⁶ That this charity toward neighbor must be shown not only by affection and words but also by work, the same St. John inculcates, saying: "He who has the substance of this world, and sees his brother having need, and closes his bowels from him, how does the charity of God remain in him? My little children, let us not love in word nor with the tongue, but in deed and in truth."⁷ Therefore from Sacred Scripture it is abundantly established that there exists a special precept of loving neighbor by internal and external acts.

It is proved 2. from condemned propositions. Innocent XI proscribed the following two propositions:⁸ "We are not bound to love neighbor by an internal and formal act"; and: "We can satisfy the precept of loving neighbor by external acts alone."

Properties of charity toward neighbor. This charity ought to be 1. affective and effective; 2. universal; 3. well ordered.

1. Charity ought to be affective and effective, i.e. it ought to produce internal and external acts. The internal acts of charity toward neighbor are after the manner of the acts of charity toward God (cf. above n. 555): 1. to rejoice together in his prosperous affairs and to be saddened together in his adverse affairs; 2. sincerely to desire good for him. - But the external acts of charity toward neighbor are to do good to him and especially to provide him the seven works of spiritual and corporal mercy, about which there will be treatment below, n. 587 sqq.

2. Charity ought to be universal, i.e. it ought to extend itself to all capable of heavenly beatitude, so that no one is excluded. The extension of charity to enemies will be treated specially below, § 2.

3. Charity ought to be well ordered both as to persons and as to goods. The order of charity will be treated below, § 3.

² Cf. Lev. 19, 17 sq.; Deut. 15, 11.

³ Matth. 22, 39.

⁴ Jo. 13, 34 sq.

⁵ Cf. 1 Jo. 3, 11, 23; 4, 11.

⁶ 2 Jo. v. 5.

⁷ 1 Jo. 3, 17 sq.

⁸ Denz. n. 1160 sq.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 25; St. Alphonsus, II, n. 25; Billuart, disp. V; Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 3; Elbel, II, n. 207; Suarez, l. c.; Van Roey, de Natura et Ordine carit.; Steinmuller, die Feindesliebe; Berardi, Theol. mor., II, n. 96.

476. Things to be noted beforehand: 1. That the secondary object of charity comprises ourselves and neighbor was said above (n. 465).

2. But under the name NEIGHBOR come all who are capable of eternal beatitude, or already enjoy it, that is, Angels, the Blessed in Heaven, souls in Purgatory, and especially men wayfarers, whether just or sinners. Hence that saying of Gerson (Summa, l. 5, q. de Carit.): "Everything which is beatifiable is to be loved from charity." Only the damned are excepted.

3. The norm of this love of neighbor is supernatural charity which we ought to have toward ourselves. The precept of loving oneself has not indeed been imposed on man in express words, because the tendency of loving oneself is too connatural to each rational being; whence express promulgation of this precept was not necessary. Nonetheless it is a strict and urgent precept.

4. From this necessity of love there follows that each one is bound to wish for himself and procure those goods which are fitting to himself:

a) Supernatural goods, which are: knowledge of the supernatural end and of the means to the end, sanctifying grace, conversion after sin, sacraments.

b) Spiritual goods, such as: instruction, firmness of will, whence each one can devote himself to those things which are imposed on him by office.

c) Bodily goods, under which are comprehended food, clothing, and habitation. Yet moderation must necessarily be present in these. We are bound to those things which health, modesty, and the state of the family require; but attention must be given to those restrictions which temperance and diversity of condition impose.²

d) External goods of the person, such as honor and reputation. It belongs to charity toward oneself to care for a good name, to seek that it be recovered. But someone can, the things to be posited having been posited, renounce this right.

e) External goods of fortune. This is required by reason of preserving life, or feeding a family, or fulfilling an office. From this arises the obligation of laboring and of embracing a certain state of life (Ami du Cl., 1898, p. 1084). Yet besides necessary riches, we are bound to acquire no riches. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 727; Noldin, II, 66; Tanquerey, I, n. 764.

These things having been premised, the following will be better understood.

477. PRINCIPLES. I. There is given a precept, both affirmative and negative, of loving neighbor. For 1. just as we pursue him with natural love because our image shines forth in him, so we ought to love him with supernatural love on account of that which is of God in him (St. Francis de Sales, Theotim., l. 7, c. 8). 2. It is established from the words of the Lord, saying: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself (Matt. 22:39), and more often repeating that commandment of his, and prescribing love of enemies themselves.

But we ought to love neighbor: a) with affective love; for to love is to will good to someone. This is established from the 10th proposition condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "We are not bound to love neighbor by an internal and formal act." b) With effective love, according to that saying (1 John 3:18): Let us not love in word nor with the tongue, but in deed and in truth; for the will is always effective of those things which it wills, provided that faculty is present (2.2, q. 25, a. 1, and q. 44, a. 7; St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 12).

478. II. The precept of charity, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges sometimes to an internal act of love, and to an external one according to circumstances; but insofar as it is negative, it forbids, forever, all and each acts repugnant to charity. The general reason is that we are bound to love neighbor as ourselves. But we love ourselves by an internal and external act, according to the demand of circumstances.

But because in charity a RIGHT ORDER, or proportion of love to the lovable, as St. Thomas speaks, ought to be preserved, it follows that one must discuss three things, namely: 1. the order of charity; 2. the acts which charity prescribes; 3. the acts which it forbids.³

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12; de Virt., q. 2, a. 7.

880. The object of love is twofold. - Since to love is to will good to someone, in every love there is a twofold object: the person to whom we will good, who is the immediate object, loved in itself and simply; - and the good which we will to him, which is loved only mediately and under a certain respect, insofar as we love the person to whom this good belongs. Hence loved persons alone are properly called the material object of love.

881. Thesis. The principal material object of charity is God himself, the supernatural end, who is loved in himself on account of his proper goodness, and by reason of whom other persons are loved, so that thus we may love him better and more perfectly. The secondary material object is all rational creatures which can communicate in the beatitude of God: we ourselves, all wayfaring men, the saints in heaven, the good angels, souls dwelling in purgatory; but not irrational creatures, the damned, and evil angels. These are loved not in themselves on account of their proper goodness, but on account of God and his goodness: just as if someone has friendship toward some man, by reason of him he loves all who pertain to that man, whether sons, or friends, or servants, etc., insofar as they pertain to him, so the friendship of charity extends itself to all the members of God's household, whom he calls to his society and beatitude.

882. What good do we will by the love of charity? - The principal good which we will to God is his infinite perfections, which indeed we do not desire for him, but in which we are complacent; the secondary good is the external manifestation and glorification of these perfections, which we wish and procure for God and concerning which, when procured, we rejoice.

The principal good which we will to ourselves and to neighbor is charity itself together with its foundation, grace making one pleasing, and beatitude; the secondary good is both all supernatural goods which of themselves conduce to beatitude, and also, accidentally, natural goods insofar as they can sometimes conduce to beatitude.

Charity can also be concerned with irrational creatures or demons, insofar as it wills them to be preserved for the glory of God or the utility of men.

883. Four diverse things are to be loved from charity, according to Augustine, de doctr. chr., l. 1, cc. 23 and 26:

1. something as the cause and root of beatitude: God;

2. something which directly participates beatitude: the one loving himself, or we ourselves;

3. those whom we can have associated with us in this participation: neighbors;

4. finally, something to which beatitude is derived only through a certain redundancy: our body.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 6 and 7.

889. Sinners are to be loved. - "Every sinner," says Augustine, l. 1 de Doctr. chr., c. 27, "insofar as he is a sinner, is not to be loved, and every man, insofar as he is man, is to be loved on account of God." Therefore sinners according as fault is in them are not to be loved, but rather to be held in hatred, that is, fault in sinners is to be held in hatred; but according to nature, insofar as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, they are to be loved from charity.

To desire evil for a sinner insofar as it is evil is always illicit. But sometimes it is permitted to desire a temporal evil for him under the aspect of a greater good, either for the amendment of fault (for example, illness or adversity so that he may be converted), or for the conservation of justice (for example, that he be punished for a crime committed), or for the common good (for example, the death of a heresiarch lest he lead others away from the faith). But it is illicit to desire for any wayfarer that he be damned or that he sin, because this is simply evil.

890. Sinners do not love themselves from charity. - "Sinners," say the Mechlin theologians, n. 60, q. 2, "do not truly love themselves; because they do not love themselves according to that which is principal in them, that is, according to the soul and spiritual goods; but according to that which they ought to hate and deny, namely, according to the corruption of the exterior man. Whence, says St. Thomas (Q. D. de Virt. 2, a. 12, ad 6), the sinner 'hates himself more than he loves himself according to Ps. X, 6: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.' Nevertheless natural love from love of his own being remains."

St. Thomas illustrates the matter, q. 25, a. 7: "To love oneself in one way is common to all, in another way is proper to the good, in a third way is proper to the evil... Man is said to be something: In one way according to his substance and nature; and according to this... all men, good and evil, love themselves, insofar as they love the conservation of themselves. In another way man is said to be something according to principality...: for what is principal in man is the rational mind, but what is secondary is sensitive and corporeal nature, the first of which the Apostle names the interior man, the second the exterior (II Cor. IV, 16). But the good esteem rational nature, or the interior man, as principal in themselves, whence according to this they esteem themselves to be what they are. But the evil esteem sensitive and corporeal nature, namely, the exterior man, as principal in themselves. Hence, not rightly knowing themselves, they do not truly love themselves, but love that which they reckon themselves to be. But the good, truly knowing themselves, truly love themselves.

"And the Philosopher proves this by five things which are proper to friendship. For each friend 1. wills his friend to be and to live; 2. wills goods to him; 3. works goods for him; 4. lives together with him delightfully; 5. agrees with him, as if delighted and saddened in the same things. And according to this the good love themselves, as regards the interior man, because 1) they will him to be preserved in his integrity; and 2) they wish goods for him, which are spiritual goods; and 3) they also devote effort to attaining them; and 4) they return delightfully to their own heart, because there they find both good thoughts in the present, and the memory of past goods, and the hope of future goods, from which delight is caused. Likewise also 5) they do not suffer dissension of will in themselves, because their whole soul tends to one thing. - On the contrary, the evil 1) do not will to be preserved in the integrity of the interior man; 2) nor do they desire spiritual goods for him; 3) nor do they work for this; 4) nor is it delightful for them to live with themselves by returning to the heart, because there they find evils, present, past, and future, which they abhor; 5) nor do they agree with themselves on account of a remorseful conscience.

"And by the same things it can be proved that the evil love themselves according to the corruption of the exterior man; but the good do not thus love themselves."

(St. Thomas, q. 25.)

We have said in dissertation I that the neighbor is the secondary proximate object of charity. The question now is who come under the name of neighbor.

Theologians commonly observe that one thing can be loved more than another in a threefold way: 1° Objectively, when we wish a greater good for one than for another, as if I were to desire the empire for Titius and the dukedom for Caius, I love Titius objectively more than Caius. 2° Appretiatively, when one is held in higher esteem than the other, and the lover is so disposed toward him that he would rather lose his friendship than that of the other. 3° Intensively, when one is loved with a more intense endeavor, with a more fervent and more perfect affection according to intensive degrees, than the other.

I say 1°: God is to be loved out of charity above all things and before all things, objectively and appretiatively; and thus, simply speaking, he is to be loved more than our neighbor, and than we ourselves¹⁵³. ¹⁵³ Here q. 26, a. 2, c., and a. 3, c.

The reason is that we ought to will God every good, the infinite good, his infinite and lovable perfections, and to take complacency in them. Likewise we ought to esteem him so, and be so affectionately disposed toward him, that we would rather lose all things and endure anything than forsake him. But this is precisely to love him above all things objectively and appretiatively. Therefore.

And this is expressed in several places of Scripture. Matt., XXII, 37 and 38: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. Ibid., X, 37: He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me.

In this conclusion all agree, but the difficulty concerns the intensity of love: whether by the precept of charity God is to be loved more intensively than our neighbor?

I suppose 1° that intensity is not required, of itself, for the nature of charity; for the least charity justifies, and every act of charity, even a remiss one, merits eternal life, as was proved in dissertation II.

I suppose 2° that God is worthy to be loved with the most perfect and more intense love than any creature whatsoever; for he cannot be so perfectly loved by any creature that he is not worthy of a more perfect love. And therefore it would be inordinate to choose to love a creature more intensely than God; for this would be to judge that she is worthy of a more intense love, and consequently that she is a greater good and to be loved more appretiatively: which is altogether false and inordinate. Therefore man ought to choose to love God with the highest love and more intensely than a creature. But whether, if this greater intensity is not found in the act of love, on account of the condition of nature, as we shall explain presently, there is inordination and sin? Some of the Louvain theologians affirm this, with Peter Soto. They are not, however, in agreement among themselves; for some say this sin is mortal, others that it is only venial. The more common opinion denies it, in agreement with which

I say 2°: He does not sin against the precept of charity who loves his neighbor with a more intense love, whether natural or supernatural, than God.

Proof. 1° by the same argument by which in the treatise on Penance we shall prove that sorrow for sins need not necessarily be the greatest intensively. The intensity of an act of the will arises from the vehemence of the object that moves it; hence it comes about that the will is borne toward that object with greater endeavor and fervor. But the sensible object, such as our neighbor, moves the will more vehemently than the spiritual object, such as God. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The nearer an object is to the will, the more vehemently does it move it. But the sensible object, in this state, is nearer to the will than the spiritual. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Sensible things are proximate and immediate to the senses. But the will, in this state, operates conformably to them and depends upon them, inasmuch as it follows the cognition of the intellect, which in this state draws its cognition from the senses. Therefore.

It is confirmed. The will tends more intensively toward a lesser present good than toward a greater absent one, and flees a lesser present evil more intensively than a greater absent one; this is known from experience, and it happens for no other reason than that the present object is nearer to the will and moves it more; yet in its appretiation it would rather lose the lesser present good than the greater absent one, and suffer the lesser present evil than the greater absent one.

It is proved 2°. All agree, as we have supposed, that we are not bound, speaking absolutely, to the maximum intensity of charity, nor to a definite degree of love, in order to satisfy the precept of charity. I suppose therefore that I now elicit an act of the love of God at four. This act is good and meritorious. Afterwards I elicit an act of honest love, whether natural or supernatural, of my neighbor at five. This second act cannot bring it about that the first, which was good, becomes bad; for the good act passes away, and is no longer subject to mutation. Therefore.

If you say that the question is about two acts elicited at the same time, comparing God and man,

I answer. I deny the supposition; for two really distinct acts are not elicited at the same time, but succeed one another, and when the second arrives, the first passes away. Moreover, if the question were only about two acts elicited at the same time, comparing God and man with each other, the question scarcely arises; for when does this ever happen? Nay, the question vanishes entirely; for it would thus be choosing to love God less intensely than man, which is beside the question and which we confess to be inordinate.

In man there are two things, namely a spiritual nature and a bodily nature¹⁵⁴. To that extent does man love himself or his neighbor, inasmuch as he loves himself or his neighbor according to his spiritual nature. ¹⁵⁴ Ibid., a. 4, c.

I say 1°: Man ought to love himself more out of charity than his neighbor¹⁵⁵. ¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

It is proved 1° from that passage, Matt., XXII, 39: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. From this it seems that man's love for himself is the exemplar of the love which is for another¹⁵⁶. ¹⁵⁶ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

But the exemplar is prior to what is exemplified. Hence Augustine, book I de Civit., c. 20: « He who loves received, he says, from himself the rule of loving his neighbor. » Therefore.

It is proved 2°. God is loved as the principle of the good on which the love of charity is founded¹⁵⁷; but man loves himself as a participator of that good, and his neighbor as an associate in this good. Now participation is more excellent than association, just as unity is more excellent than union. Therefore man ought out of charity to love himself more than his neighbor. ¹⁵⁷ Ibid., c.

I say 2°: Man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; because that thing is more to be loved out of charity which has the fuller account of being lovable out of charity. Now association in the full participation of beatitude, which is the account of loving one's neighbor with respect to his soul, is a greater account of loving than participation in beatitude by way of overflowing, which is the account of loving one's own body. Therefore.

Yet, because the precept of loving one's neighbor, taking the proper body for his spiritual salvation, is affirmative, and although it always binds, nevertheless it does not bind at every moment, but in certain cases of necessity. A threefold necessity is distinguished: extreme, grave, and common. It is called extreme when the neighbor will perish for eternity unless he is helped; as if an infant were about to die without baptism. Grave, when without help he can be saved absolutely, but with great difficulty; as if someone near death and in mortal sin should ask for confession, without which he can be saved absolutely by contrition alone, but far more difficultly than by the sacrament. Common is the necessity in which sinners commonly find themselves, who run into common occasions of sinning.

According to this threefold necessity,

I say 3°: In extreme necessity, anyone is bound to expose his own life for the eternal salvation of his neighbor, if there is hope that he can be helped. In grave necessity, only those are bound upon whom the care of souls rests by office. In common necessity, no one is bound.

Proof. first part. 1° According to Scripture, 1 John, III, 16, we ought to lay down our lives for our brethren; which is true at least in extreme necessity. Hence Augustine, in the book de Mendacio, c. 6, n. 9, says: « A Christian will plainly not hesitate to lose his temporal life for the eternal life of his neighbor. »

2° We are bound to expose goods of fortune for saving the bodily life of a neighbor placed in extreme necessity, according to that passage, 1 John, III, 17: Whoever shall have the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how does the charity of God abide in him? Therefore, to save his spiritual life we ought to expose our bodily life. — The consequence is plain; because our bodily life stands related to the spiritual life of our neighbor as our riches do to his bodily life.

Take note, however, that those are not reckoned to be in extreme necessity who thrust themselves into danger of damnation through their own malice, such as those who enter into an unjust war, take up a duel, and the like, who can withdraw themselves from the danger by their own means.

Proof. second part. Those are more bound to provide for their flock, upon whom the care of souls rests by office, than those upon whom this care does not rest. Now these are bound in extreme necessity, while neither is bound in common necessity. Therefore those are bound in grave necessity upon whom the care of souls rests by office, and not others.

Besides, it would be hard to oblige a private person, who has undertaken no care of another beyond that general one which God has enjoined on everyone concerning his neighbor, to pour out his life for his salvation outside extreme necessity. Otherwise would it be, if the question concerned some loss in goods of fortune; for a private person ought to endure that for the salvation of his neighbor.

From this you will infer that pastors are bound, at the peril of their life, say in time of plague, to administer the sacrament of penance to their parishioners; because, although they could be saved absolutely with contrition, it is nevertheless difficult, and indeed far easier with attrition and the sacrament: hence they are in necessity, if not extreme, at least grave. As to the administration of the sacraments of the Eucharist and Extreme Unction, see what we wrote in the treatise on the Eucharist, dissert. VII, a. 4, You will ask 1° and in the treatise on Extreme Unction art. 7, You will ask 2°.

The third part is manifest; because common necessity, from which each person cannot so difficultly extricate himself, and better than anyone else, is not so great that we are bound to pour out our life for it.

[Nevertheless in common or ordinary necessity of either order, namely bodily and spiritual, one must succor one's neighbor even at slight inconvenience. 1° One must succor him, because love of neighbor demands this, and besides, if everyone omitted this duty, common necessity would become grave or even extreme. 2° At slight inconvenience only, because ordinarily the neighbor easily extricates himself from such a necessity, and if he is forced to endure it for a short time, it is not too burdensome for him.

Nor are you bound to come to the aid of everyone placed in common necessity; because others are held by the same obligation, and no one could fulfill it alone.

You will ask whether a man may expose his own bodily life for the bodily life of his neighbor.

Before I answer, I suppose 1° that it is lawful, indeed sometimes necessary, to expose temporal goods for the bodily salvation of one's neighbor; for the life of one's neighbor is more precious than our temporal goods.

I suppose 2° that where the common good is at stake, and the life of persons necessary to the republic, anyone can and is bound to expose his own life for preserving its life.

I suppose 3° that where the lives are equal, if I believe myself to be in mortal sin, or if my life is necessary to my family or others, it is not lawful for me to expose my life for the life of another. These things supposed,

I answer. It is not lawful to expose one's own life for the life of another equal considered precisely in itself, or looking precisely at life and life; for that would be to love one's neighbor not as oneself, but more than oneself, which is against the order of charity. More probably, however, it is lawful out of a motive of Christian virtue.

Proof. this second part from the words of Christ, John., XV, 13: Greater love than this no one has, than that he lay down his life for his friends; which can be understood generally also of bodily welfare, as Chrysostom understood it, book II de Sacerd. Besides, it is lawful to prefer the good of virtue to the good of the body, where necessity so requires.

From this probable opinion many theologians infer that, if two men are in extreme necessity, one may give to the other the only bread he has; in flight from enemies he may give up his horse, though he cannot flee on foot; with plague raging, he may serve the sick; in shipwreck, he may yield the plank which he could occupy, or already has occupied: provided however he has not yet begun to use it; for in this case, says Sylvius, to yield the plank would be to throw oneself into the sea, which seems to belong to the killing of oneself, which is never lawful.]

There are two precepts of Charity: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, etc. And thy neighbor as thyself, Deut. 6. Matth. 22. Therefore the love of neighbor is included in the object of Charity. Hence John 1, cap. 4: This commandment we have from God: that he who loves God should love also his brother.

He distinguishes the ways in which the acts regard the neighbor together with God: either as distinct objects terminating, or as the one, namely God, being the object and the ultimate end; while the neighbor is the object as a means loved for the sake of the end.

If God is loved as the object and the other as the ultimate end, then one and the same motion and act can tend to both, because by the same motion we will the end and the means as such ordered to it. And thus we love the neighbor by willing to God this good, namely the neighbor; and therefore what is given to the neighbor is said to be given to God, Matth. 25. Therefore, since we love the neighbor in order to God, that he may be in God; under one aspect we love God and the neighbor, and so with one act, as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure say in the arguments in the first place.

But if God and the neighbor are considered precisely as two objects terminating love, he distinguishes further: for to love is to will a good; but the good can be a twofold object of Charity: that which is willed, and the one to whom it is willed. If therefore God is compared with the neighbor uniformly, as the one to whom we will a good; then by one motion he is borne toward God, by another toward the neighbor, because they are loved as distinct termini, and one is more intense, the other more remiss; and thus two precepts require this. But if they are compared non-uniformly, so that the neighbor is the good that is desired, and God is the one to whom the good is desired, then with one act he loves the neighbor, and with that very act loves God.

The Saintly Doctor asserts, therefore, first that God and the neighbor are loved by two acts, as material termini.

This is proved by the Saintly Doctor first: Motions are numbered by subject, time, and terminus or object; but the terminus or object of the love of God is one thing, and that of the love of the neighbor another: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's 5 Phys. text 38. The minor is clear from what has been said.

It is proved second by the Saintly Doctor: What presupposes diverse considerations is also sought by diverse acts; but we cannot with one act foreknow God and the neighbor as precise termini: nor love them. The major is proved from 2 Top. cap. 4, in the declaration of locus 33.

It is PROVED third by the Saintly Doctor. The same motion cannot at once be more intense and more remiss; but the motion of love toward God is more intense than toward the neighbor: Therefore it is one and another.

It is PROVED fourth by the Saintly Doctor: Peter and Paul are more conformed in the reason of a lovable object than Paul and God; but one motion of love cannot be toward Peter and Paul: Therefore.

It is PROVED fifth by the Saintly Doctor. The precept regards the use and act of the virtue, but there are two precepts of Charity: Therefore.

He ASSERTS second, that there is one act toward God and the neighbor in the first way, as toward the means and the end, and as toward the good, Q. d. est Bonum, Cui.

It is PROVED by the Saintly Doctor first. The motion toward the end and toward the medium as such ordered to it is the same, because a motion is not numbered according to the difference of the medium but of the extremity; but the motion of Charity is toward God as toward the end, and toward the neighbor as the medium: Therefore.

It is PROVED second by the Saintly Doct. Where there is one beloved, there is one act of love; for a motion is specified by its object, at least as regards us; but in the neighbor nothing is loved except God, by the act of Charity: Therefore.

BUT if you should say that to love the neighbor in himself on account of a rational nature like ours, or on account of his virtues, is not an act of Charity, as St. Bonaventure notes, this dist. 27. art. 2. quest. 2, and dist. 9. art. 2. quest. 4; St. Thomas 2. 2. quest. 109. art. 3. ad 2; Vasquez Lib. 1. de adorat. disp. 6. cap. 2, and Lib. 3. disp. 1. cap. 6; Caspensis de Charitate, disp. 3. sect. 1. The same hold Turrianus, Coninchius, and Arriaga, apud Mastrium disp. 6. quest. 22, of whom I shall treat in quest. 29.

It is PROVED third: As the image of St. Peter is venerated in order to St. Peter with one act, as Damascene says Lib. 4. de Fide, cap. 17, because the honor of the image passes to the prototype; so too the love of the neighbor is referred to God; and hence there is one act by which God and the neighbor are loved, as referred to God the prototype.

In this, however, there is a disparity, because honor is not terminated in any way upon the image, but passes wholly to St. Peter; whereas the neighbor in some way terminates the act of love, and in this sense he is commanded to be loved by a distinct precept; even though in the said way, as end and medium, etc., they are loved by one act.

It is PROVED fourth: Where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one; but the neighbor is loved for the sake of God: Therefore by one love. This, however, is true in such a way that they can also be the object of love as two termini.

It is PROVED fifth, because although there are several Divine persons, nevertheless they are loved by one love, because there is one objective reason of goodness: Similarly there is one reason of the highest goodness, on account of which God and the neighbor are loved.

He NOTES, however, that the reason in this case is diverse, because the terminating goodness of the neighbor and of God is not altogether the same, in the way in which the goodness of the three persons is, communicating in one essence; whence it stands in a different manner; and because from the diversity of comparisons arises the diversity of acts, while from the unity of the principal motivating reason arises the unity of the habit. Hence it is that the act by which God and the neighbor are loved is one, although the motions are one and another.

The holy Doctors distinguish in sinners the nature by which they were created to the image of God, capable of beatitude; and according to this they say they are to be loved out of Charity; on the other side they see in them faults, on account of which they lack the free likeness of God, and are turned away from God, hateful, as Tannerus also admonishes, disp. 2. quaest. 3. dub. 1.

They assert, therefore, that sinners are to be loved out of Charity by reason of nature.

It is proved by S. Thomas, first from Matth. 5, where Christ commands his holy disciples: Love your enemies; but the enemies of the just are the impious.

Secondly. All the predestined are to be loved out of Charity; but among these many, according to present justice, are wicked, as I showed quaest. 15. Therefore.

Thirdly. All are to be loved for whom we ought to pray; but prayer is commanded even for sinners, Matth. 5: Pray for them that calumniate you: Therefore they are to be loved. The major is clear, because Christ places one of the effects of Charitable love: Pray for them that persecute, etc.

Fourthly. Our Charity ought to be conformed to the Charity of Christ; but Christ loved the impious, and prayed for those crucifying him, Lucae 23: Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do. Rom. 5: But God commendeth his Charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, Christ died for us.

The arguments to the contrary prove only that sinners are to be hated, insofar as they are such.

Furthermore it is objected. Charity is the bond of unity: Therefore only those are to be loved who are of the unity of the mystical body; but some wicked are not of the unity of the mystical body of the Church, as infidels and heretics; the other impious are dead members.

S. Thomas answers that Charity is the bond of perfection and of unity subjectively in the just man, but is terminated toward those who can be of the unity, as toward its object. And so it is not necessary that Charity put both extremes actually united; but it suffices that it put the subject, in which it is, in act, the other being in habit; as science puts the knower in act, but the knowable in habit.

From these things it is also gathered, by the same reasoning, that insofar as sinners are men capable of beatitude, even if they are impious, they can love themselves out of Charity; but if they love iniquity, they hate their own soul, Psal. 10. See D. Thom. art. 7.

NOTE that neighbor is said of us by reason of the identity of nature, coordinated to the blessed life.

This question is also proposed by the Moderns under another title: Whether the motive of Charity toward God and toward neighbor is the same.

The FIRST opinion is that the motives of the charity of God and of neighbor are diverse, such that the motive for loving God is His uncreated goodness; but the motive for loving neighbor is his supernatural perfection of sanctity, virtue, etc.

In favor of this are cited by Mastrius Vasquez, Caspensis, and other more recent authors, adducing D. Bonaventure. That author, however, having proposed the title disp. 6. quaest. 22. of the third part: Whether the motive of Charity toward God and toward neighbor is the same, proceeds thus.

The FIRST opinion denies, and teaches, that the motive of the charity of God is His very uncreated goodness; but the motive of Charity, by which the neighbor is loved with the love of friendship, is the very supernatural goodness of the neighbor. For in two ways (says this opinion) can the neighbor be honestly loved: First on account of God's goodness alone, that is, from the desire of the divine good, because the good conferred upon the neighbor is in a certain way God's good, from the words of Christ, Matth. 25. As long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to me; and this love manifestly pertains to the Theological virtue of Charity. In the other way the neighbor can be loved, either on account of the rational nature which he has like ours, or on account of the sanctity of morals; in which love, since the formal object differs far from the formal object of Charity, he asserts it is not an elicited act of the Theological virtue, but of another inferior one. So Vasquez, Turrianus, Caspensis, Coninck, Arriaga, and other Recentiores, citing in their favor D. Thomas, D. Bonaventure, Richard, Durandus, and other older authors.

These Doctors indeed ADMIT two motives of love, namely of God and of neighbor, yet they say one is the motive of that love which is Charity, as is clear from D. Bonaventure, adduced by these Doctors; indeed by Mastrius himself num. 569. and by Caspensis disp. 3. de Charitate, sect. 1. num. 3., where the same is asserted as by Vasquez lib. 1. de ador. disp. 6. cap. 2. and lib. 3. disp. 1. cap. 6.; and certainly the words of D. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 9. art. 2. quaest. 4., where he is adduced by these, are in favor of the second opinion, to be reported shortly: For the Holy Doctor does not acknowledge those two habits, nor does he say one word about either of them.

Therefore Mastrius errs in reporting that these doctors deny there to be the same motive of the Charity of God and of neighbor, but posit two: Indeed he himself betrays his own error, while he says that these Doctors posit indeed two motives of the love of neighbor, one to be the goods of the neighbor; the other to be God, as the end; and that the former motive is not of Charity, but of an inferior virtue of love.

The SECOND opinion, therefore, is that there is one motive by which God and neighbor are loved, namely uncreated goodness. So D. Bonaventure loc. cit. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 105. art. 3. ad 1. Vasquez, Caspensis, Turtianus, Durandus, Richardus, Valencia, Suarez, Maldetus, Sylvius, whom Amicus adduces and follows disp. 24. sect. 3. The same think Lorca, Tannerus, Mastrius, adducing others, and among the rest Scotus 3. dist. 18. quaest. unica, and all the Scotists. The same thinks D. Bonaventure dist. 27. art. 1. quaest. 2. and art. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore.

¶ I SUPPOSE, which I distinguished in quaest. 17., with D. Bonaventure, from which question some could have deduced that there are two motives of the Charity of God and of neighbor; but there he wills that there are two loves by reason of the material objects on account of which two precepts also are given: yet he asserts one motive, and one act of charity, and one habit, although there be given another habit of virtue, by which we love the neighbor on account of his likeness to us in nature, and on account of his sanctity: and in this is the true difference between the first and second opinion; for the first admits one motive of charity; nevertheless it posits another habit, by which the neighbor is loved by ordination to his perfections, as I said; which habit they do not call charity; but the Authors of the second opinion deny it altogether.

¶ I ASSERT first, that there is one habit of Charity, and one formal act of it toward God and neighbor.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure first, dist. 27. quaest. 2., by the arguments related in quaest. 6: where I showed this ex professo.