Point I. On the Precept of Charity Toward All in General

220. Principles. - I. There is a precept of loving the neighbor with true and internal affection. This is clear 1º from the natural law, because also in the neighbor there flourishes the same formal motive of love, namely participated goodness of God; for all men are creatures of God, founded according to his image, and capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude: therefore just as we ought to love God, so also we ought to love the neighbor on account of God. - 2º It is clear from Sacred Scripture, Matt. 22.39: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. - 3º It is also clear from the condemnation of the 10th proposition by Innocent XI, which lies thus: We are not bound to love the neighbor by an internal and formal act.

But he who lives in a Christian manner sufficiently satisfies this precept, with regard to the internal act, by praying for the neighbor, or by reciting the Lord's Prayer ¹. But with regard to external acts he satisfies by succoring the necessities of the neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be laid down below.

¹ For satisfying the precept, a general love suffices, which excludes no one and embraces all, as St. Thom. teaches (2. 2. q. 25. art. 8.). And therefore for this suffices a prayer which is made for all by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and an external act.

II. Some order of Charity is to be observed in love of neighbor. The reason is that both the persons to be loved are more or less perfect, or more or less joined to us, and the goods to be desired or procured for them are more or less necessary ².

² Concerning the order of charity among neighbors, Laymann (Lib. 2. Tract. 5. Cap. 3. n. 5 and 6.), after St. Thomas, more clearly uses a threefold principle: I. With that love which is accompanied by complacency or joy in another's possessed good, and likewise which is accompanied by honor, reverence, those are to be loved more who are better, St. Thomas being the author (2. 2. q. 26. art. 7. 8. 9.): and for the same reason parents are to be loved more than children and wife, and benefactors more than those upon whom we have conferred benefits. The reason is that they have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all. - II. With that love by which we desire for another a good not yet possessed, and which is accompanied by mercy and beneficence, those are to be loved more who are more joined to us. - III. Those who are more joined to us ought to be preferred to others according to those goods in which conjunction or friendship is founded: because communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. Hence St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 26. art. 8.): The love of diverse persons is to be measured according to the diverse reason of conjunction, so that each one may be loved more in that which pertains to that conjunction according to which he is loved... And therefore in those things which pertain to nature, we ought to love blood-relatives more; but in those things which pertain to civil association, we ought to love fellow citizens more; and in military matters, fellow soldiers more. And (3. Dist. 29. q. 1. art. 6. ad 3.) from the same principles he deduces that ecclesiastical benefices are not to be given more to blood-relatives, but to those who are more fit for the government of the Church.

Likewise the necessities in which the neighbor is to be succored are diverse. For necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold, namely:

1º Extreme, when the danger of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without the help of another.

2º Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil ³, which he cannot escape without great difficulty.

³ The Author in reality exhibits grave necessity with those colors by which other Doctors are accustomed to indicate quasi-extreme, or at least most grave, necessity.

3º Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In the spiritual order vulgar sinners are in this, who, if they wished to employ some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order beggar-poor generally suffer it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. - St. Lig. n. 27, Hom. apost. n. 18.

221. • First rule. Everyone is bound to love himself more, simply and absolutely, than the neighbor ⁴. The reason is that each one is nearer to himself than any other. This is clear besides from the natural and invincible inclination to love oneself more than the neighbor; whence the common axiom: Well-ordered Charity begins from oneself.

⁴ ** In order that this assertion be true, it must be understood concerning those goods which we are bound to obtain or preserve for ourselves. For if this obligation is absent, to prefer the neighbor to ourselves is not only lawful, but pertains to virtue.

Second rule. Nevertheless, we ought to succor the neighbor, even with our own advantages put after ⁵, in the following order:

⁵ Namely, the first rule has force where goods are of the same order, and in the remaining things our condition and the neighbor's condition are equal. But the second has force when either in the order of goods or in the remaining things there is disparity, which can happen in three ways; whence a threefold rule, namely: 1º If the good necessary for the neighbor is of a higher order, we can and sometimes are bound to deprive ourselves of a good of a lower order for procuring that good for the neighbor. - 2º We can and sometimes are bound to help a neighbor constituted in greater necessity with damage to ourselves. - 3º The same thing must be said if indeed the necessity is equal, but the cause of each is not equal, for example, it is of greater importance that the life of the neighbor, as of a public person, be preserved.

But the order among goods is that spiritual and supernatural goods hold the first place; natural and intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc., the second; but natural extrinsic goods, such as reputation, honor, riches, the third. Yet reputation and honor with respect to goods of fortune are of a higher order, because reputation is something spiritual and moral.

1º In extreme spiritual necessity, per se ⁶, the neighbor must be succored even with danger of life; because the eternal life of the neighbor is a good more excellent than our temporal life. - St. Lig. n. 27.

⁶ It is said per se; for one must except: 1º if there is not morally certain hope of saving the neighbor; whence a mother is not bound to undergo danger of life so that offspring may be baptized, since it is uncertain whether it will arrive at baptism. - 2º If there is another who can perform this; for then my work is not necessary (see Reginald, Prax. For. poenit. lib. 4. c. 25. n. 357.). - 3º If a graver evil threatens thence, for example, if by someone's dying for that cause, the salvation of many others would be endangered. Moreover, those things are to be seen which St. Alphonsus (Lib. 6. n. 624.) has concerning a dying person to be absolved even with danger of life.

2º In extreme temporal necessity the neighbor must ordinarily be succored with great ⁷ inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest. The reason is that on the one hand the life of the neighbor is a good more excellent than some good of ours; and on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo so great an inconvenience for others. - St. Lig. n. 31.

⁷ See below, n. 228. q. 3, where from St. Alphonsus with the common opinion of the Doctors it is established that someone is not bound to pay out a great sum of money in order to exempt another from danger of death.

3º In grave necessity of either order no one is bound to succor the neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, provided nevertheless the title of justice, piety, or office is excluded ⁸. For from what has been said it follows that we are bound to furnish some help, but not with grave loss of one's own good. - St. Lig. ibid.

⁸ From office, in grave necessity, for example, the pastor and physician are bound to care for another's safety; therefore it is not lawful for them to flee in time of plague, unless an equally suitable substitute has been appointed.

4º In common necessity of either order the neighbor is to be succored with some inconvenience indeed, because the love of neighbor requires this, but only with light inconvenience; for there can be only a light obligation of Charity when the neighbor can fairly easily remove himself from that necessity, or it is not too burdensome for him. But we are not bound to aid all who are placed in common necessity. For this is impossible, and if it could be done, it would already not be a light inconvenience ⁹. - St. Lig. n. 32.

⁹ With regard to relieving the common temporal necessities of the neighbor, see what is said below concerning alms; but with regard to spiritual necessities compare what St. Alphonsus has (Lib. 6. n. 625.) concerning the proper obligation of priests, that they render themselves fit for helping the faithful in spiritual matters, and also what is to be said below concerning fraternal correction.

Third rule. Among various persons to be loved, other things being equal, those are to be preferred who are more joined to us by blood, friendship, office, Religion, living together, etc., since God has bound them to us by stricter bonds.

Hence to be preferred are 1º parents to the rest; 2º a spouse to children, children to brothers, brothers to relatives; 3º friends, benefactors, Superiors, and persons more useful to the public good to the rest. Nevertheless in ordinary necessity, according to the common opinion, spouse and children ought to be preferred to parents ¹⁰. - St. Lig. Hom. apost. n. 15.

¹⁰ It belongs properly to the father that honor be bestowed on him by the children; but to the child, that utility be provided to him by the parents. Although in an article of necessity a son is obligated from benefits received to provide especially for his parents. St. Thom. (2. 2. q. 26. art. 9. ad 3.). And concerning a wife (ibid. art. 11.): A wife is loved more intensely; but greater reverence is to be shown to parents.

222. Resolves. - 1º In an equal order of goods, and equal necessity and cause, we are bound more to love ourselves than the neighbor. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor according to that saying: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. But the rule is prior and more powerful than the thing ruled ¹¹.

¹¹ Thus St. Thomas argues from that evangelical text (2. 2. q. 26. art. 4.): From which it seems that man's love toward himself is as the exemplar of the love which is had toward another. But the exemplar is prior to the thing exemplified. Therefore man ought from charity to love himself more than the neighbor. For this reason the words of Christ, as theologians commonly note, denote likeness, but not equality.

2º He sins against Charity toward himself, gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter, who neglects due care of soul or body ¹². - Nevertheless it is lawful to deprive oneself of non-necessary spiritual goods for the temporal or spiritual good of the neighbor, for example, to omit hearing Mass on a weekday ¹³, etc. Indeed someone can desire and procure for the neighbor greater non-necessary spiritual goods than for himself, provided contempt of them is excluded.

¹² Sins of this kind, however, are scarcely accustomed to be accused in confession. For either it is a matter of damage to the soul brought upon oneself through faults; and it must not be expressed any more than in the sin, for example, of theft, the violation of charity or obedience toward God must be expressed. Or it is a matter of omission of means by which faults may be guarded against; and since this obligation is not distinguished from the obligation of observing the precepts, such negligence is sufficiently expressed through confession of the other sins (see Lugo de Poenit. Disp. 7. n. 242 and Disp. 15. n. 56.). But if it is a matter of damages inflicted upon life or body, although the obligation of charity toward oneself seems to be distinguished from the obligation which the fifth precept of the Decalogue imposes by reason of the divine dominion over our life and body; nevertheless, since the causes of illnesses for the most part are not proximate and immediate, they almost do not infer grave guilt.

¹³ Thus someone leaves the goods of contemplation, fasting, choir, etc., in order to instruct the neighbor, or defers entrance into religion, lest there be lacking someone who may devote labor either to a parish, or to a seminary, or to a mission. Nor indeed then in reality is there a ceasing spiritual gain; since the lesser good is compensated by the greater. Indeed someone can even choose the delay of eternal beatitude in order to help the neighbor; whence that saying of St. Martin: Lord, if I am necessary to your people, I do not refuse labor. The words of the Apostle, Phil. 1.23, also pertain here.

3º No one is bound with danger of life or goods to extract others from sins from which they can free themselves through the Sacrament of Penance or perfect contrition, even if they are in danger of life; but otherwise, per se, if it is judged that with difficulty they can elicit an act of contrition ¹⁴. - St. Lig. and others commonly.

¹⁴ The necessity of succoring certain persons near death, whether from sickness or from a grave wound, does not flow chiefly from the difficulty of eliciting an act of contrition; for the faithful, however rude and sunk in sins, sufficiently know that they must turn themselves to God with their whole heart, nor is the opportune help of divine grace lacking to them: rather there underlies the danger lest in those straits, with the mind distracted to other things, lethal sleep and death may snatch them away before they think anything concerning the salvation of the soul.

A greater and easily even extreme necessity will be able to press when danger threatens from deception, which does not depend on the will alone of those who are deceived; for example, if a teacher of heresy somewhere diffuses his errors, etc. Hence if there are any who in these our days use, as they say, the prudent economy of silence, lest they incur the hatred of the wicked, these surely seem to have entirely forgotten this obligation.

4º It is not lawful for you to undergo the proximate danger of sinning in order that you may prevent another's sin, when your fall appears somehow certain; otherwise, if that danger can be made remote, so that you rightly trust that you will not fall ¹⁵. - St. Lig. Hom. apost. n. 14.

¹⁵ Therefore dangerous matters are lawfully read and handled either by those who must care for souls, such as priests, or by those who must heal bodies, such as physicians. Likewise these latter lawfully undergo danger in treating women, and the former in hearing confessions. See St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 26 and Lib. 5. n. 63.), who indeed from the common opinion teaches (Lib. 6. n. 453.) that sometimes someone can even be obligated to a work of charity, although otherwise a fall is very probable, if the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity. For the help of God, who then commands that the neighbor be succored, is prudently still hoped for.

5º More probably, in those things which are necessary for life, it is lawful to prefer to oneself an equal or inferior, indeed it is a heroic act of charity, provided it is done on account of God. Except if he who exposes himself is necessary to the Republic or to his family. - Thus Suarez. - Laymann, etc., against others.

223. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it against Charity to wish death for oneself on account of the misfortunes of life?

Resp. 1º Neg., if it is done from desire of a better life, or of eternal happiness, as is evident.

Resp. 2º Affirm., if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet they do not sin who desire death when life becomes so burdensome that it is considered harder than death itself. - St. Lig. n. 30. - Otherwise, if it is done from any light cause whatever, although not gravely, unless someone should wish to oppose the order of divine Providence ¹⁶.

¹⁶ Here the question concerns only an inefficacious desire of death, insofar as someone wishes or even asks that death be sent upon him by God. The Salmanticenses (Tr. 20. Cap. 13. n. 46.) condemn this as a grave fault, because (they say) it is a vice of timidity and pusillanimity to wish to lack life for the sake of avoiding evils of lesser moment. But where, then, is grave fault in pusillanimity, unless someone is thence impelled to break a grave precept? But where will you find a grave precept, that I may not ask God to rescue me from the miseries of the world? Therefore if I am impelled by a light cause, it will at last be an act of impatience, which from its genus is light. And since to wish to exchange the present life for the future life is not per se against the order of charity, here indeed we shall have some fault of impatience and pusillanimity, but not of violated charity.

Q. 2º Is it against Charity to desire a temporal evil for the neighbor, or to rejoice over it, on account of a good end?

Resp. 1º Neg., if the due order of Charity is observed, that is, if it is done on account of a greater good, or on account of a lesser evil ¹⁷. Hence this is lawful, 1º on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2º on account of the common good, either spiritual or temporal; 3º on account of the good even of many, of much greater moment, for example, of a family, community, etc. - St. Lig. n. 30. - Moreover such desires can easily and usefully be changed into more perfect ones ¹⁸.

¹⁷ ** Hence the true and only cause is to be sought why Propositions XIII, XIV, and XV were condemned by Innocent XI; for now it will be enough to allege the authority of Viva, Cardenas, and Duarte, who treated expressly of the condemned theses. Thus those propositions have themselves: XIII. If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be sad over the life of someone, and rejoice over his natural death, and ask and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal emolument. - XIV. It is lawful by an absolute desire to desire the death of a father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one desiring; because, namely, a rich inheritance will come to him. - XV. It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness on account of the immense riches thence obtained from the inheritance.

Concerning these Viva says (n. 12.): The falsity is shown: because the order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor be preferred to one's own temporal emolument... Therefore the order of charity is perverted if we seek the death of the neighbor, or rejoice over it, on account of our temporal emolument; because by these affections our emolument is preferred to the life of the neighbor, which is in an order far superior; so that the perversion of order cannot be called light, nor can affections of this kind be free from grave fault. And n. 20: If a daughter were delighted concerning a parricide inculpably committed, lest she be further harassed by a father who wished to prostitute her and was impelling her to sin, such delight could be excused from the end and from the spiritual good, which far excels the life of the father. But a rich inheritance does not excel the life of the father; and therefore a son cannot without mortal sin be delighted over a parricide inculpably perpetrated on account of immense riches obtained from the inheritance.

But Duarte (Brev. Expos. Propp. damn. n. 207. 208.): The reason is that the order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor be preferred to one's own temporal emolument, indeed it requires that for preserving that life we succor a poor man even from things necessary to our state; therefore etc... From which it follows that if a son should wish death for his father, or rejoice over it, or if he should rejoice over parricide committed by himself in drunkenness for the sake of taking possession of an inheritance, he will sin mortally not only against charity, but also against piety, etc.

Finally Cardenas (Part. 4. Diss. 10. n. 20.): It is not lawful to wish death for the neighbor on account of a good of lesser moment. But he who wishes death for the neighbor... on account of any temporal emolument whatever, or on account of entering upon a rich inheritance, desires evil for him on account of a good of lesser moment. Therefore it is mortally illicit. Which doctrine he then (ibid. n. 27.) applies also to Prop. XV with regard to a son who rejoices over parricide perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, etc.

And indeed it will have been useful to note these things, so that it may be clear that VV. have in vain objected the condemnation of these theses against the doctrine of Suarez and others, concerning which we spoke in the Note at n. 172. Since for an entirely different reason than they contend, those theses (as is plain from what has been said) were condemned.

¹⁸ That it can seem more perfect to desire that the impious be converted does not cause those to be reprehended who, for the good of the Church and of society, desire and earnestly ask that by the powerful hand of God they be humbled or even exterminated; since also in this the virtue of true charity toward the Church and neighbors is exercised in a most ordered way. Therefore the Church also in her prayers asks from God now their conversion, now their perdition, now both at the same time disjunctively.

Resp. 2º Affirmatively, when the order of charity is perverted. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, nor of her daughter, because on account of deformity or poverty she cannot marry ¹⁹. This is clear from the condemnation of propositions 13 and 14 by Innocent XI. - St. Lig. n. 30.

¹⁹ St. Alphonsus explains his mind better with regard to this last case in Lib. 5. n. 22, namely that the question is about a mother who, merely to avoid her own annoyance, wishes the death of her daughter; and therefore he gives the reason, because the evil of the mother does not outweigh the evil wished for the daughter. Therefore he does not contradict the other Doctors affirming that, in those circumstances in which death is better than bitter life (as is said Eccli. 30.), both the daughter for herself, and the mother for the daughter, can lawfully wish death and ask it from God. Moreover, also for avoiding her own grave troubles, it will certainly be lawful for a mother, if not to wish the death of either husband or daughter, at least to desire and ask from God that in whatever way it pleases Him, He rescue her from those straits.