Question VI: Whether charity is of a most special species

I assert that it is one ultimate in species. So the Theologians commonly hold, as at Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 2. dub. 1. num. 19.

It is proved first by D. Bonaventure. Just as Faith regards God as the highest truth, so Charity regards him as the highest goodness; but because the first Truth is one, Faith is one, as the Apostle says Ephes. 4. One faith: Therefore. It is confirmed by 1 Corinth. 13. And now there remain Faith, Hope, Charity, these three: where Faith and Charity are said to be one in the same way. With this argument Valencia deals in disp. 1. quaest. 1. p. 1.

It is proved secondly by S. Thomas. As the rational power is related to the true, and the irascible to the arduous, so the concupiscible is related to the good; but the rational power is perfected by one virtue in believing the truth, and the irascible in hoping for the arduous: Therefore also the concupiscible in loving the good; but this virtue is charity: Therefore.

It is proved thirdly by S. Thomas. The more unitive a thing is, the more one it is in itself; but Charity is the bond of perfection from 3. ad Coloss. Therefore.

It is proved fourthly by S. Thomas. In every genus in which there is an order of motions, the first mover must be one; but charity is the mover of all the virtues, commanding all the others: Therefore it is altogether one in species in all.

It is proved fifthly by S. Thomas in corpore. If the ultimate object is one and the principal act is one, the habit is one; but the object of charity is one as ultimate, because it is the highest good, and the act of willing that highest good is one: Therefore, although that highest good be willed — God loved for his own sake, and for itself, and for the neighbor — there will be one Virtue; and by this the opposite argument is resolved, which labors to multiply charities because Charity is borne toward God and the neighbor.

For S. Thomas answers, and Valencia with him, that both are loved for the sake of one thing under one formal aspect, by which the habit is unified and distinguished.

And if you say that charity wills for the neighbor not only the highest good but also other goods.

S. Thomas answers that the principal act is to will the highest good; the others only secondarily; and not elicited, but imperative, commanding the other virtues, say almsgiving, that it may give succor, etc.

You will object secondly. Where there are two diverse precepts, there are several habits enabling; but there are two precepts of charity: Therefore.

S. Thomas answers that those two precepts are diverse materially, not formally; because one is included in the other. Hence it does not follow that the habit of charity is diversified formally.

You will object thirdly. Where there are diverse acts, there are diverse habits; but the acts of loving God for himself and the neighbor for God are diverse in genus: Therefore.

S. Thomas answers that that diversity comes from a diverse comparison of the same formal object, not from a diversity of object, which is one; and therefore it does not follow that the formal object is diverse.

You will object fourthly. Wisdom, which is about eternal things, is another habit than science, which is about temporal things: And likewise Latria, which is the worship of God, is another virtue than Dulia, which is the worship given to one superior: Therefore by equal reason, the virtue by which God is loved is other than that by which the neighbor is loved.

S. Thomas answers by denying the parity: for Wisdom deals with eternal things according to eternal reasons; Science with temporal things, with a motive diverse from wisdom, namely according to temporal reasons; but Charity has one motivating aspect, namely the Divine goodness, which, since it is supremely lovable by any will whatsoever, not only as it is in itself but as it is participated by a creature, loves it under both aspects under one formal motivating aspect. The same diversity is found between Dulia and Latria, which worship with diverse motives.

You will object fifthly. Just as the Contemplative and the Active life differ from each other, so the acts of the contemplative and the active life ought to differ more than the acts of the contemplative life among themselves: Likewise the habit rectifying contemplation ought to differ more from the habit rectifying action than two habits rectifying contemplation itself differ; but Faith and Charity rectify contemplation and action, and they are not diverse; as appears from 1 Corinth. 13. Therefore charity does not differ in species according as it regards God or the neighbor, but only as the motive differs, according as it bears on contemplation or action.

S. Thomas answers that "contemplative" and "active" denominate a state or the exercise of the virtues; but the diversity of state does not induce a diversity of habits, which arises rather from the diversity of objects. Hence the same virtues direct men in both lives. Thus Faith directs toward both lives. Likewise Charity; hence it is not necessary that there be several.

You will object sixthly. Love of friendship and love of concupiscence are objects of Charity; but these two loves are diverse in genus: Therefore.

Responds S. Thomas that Charity cleaves to the Highest Good with both loves, of concupiscence and of friendship, the latter indeed being principal, as D. Augustine says de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 14. to which the other love of concupiscence is reduced; for something is loved with the love of concupiscence by him who is loved with the love of friendship. Therefore, because the formal object is one, namely God as good, to be united to whom, as D. Dionysius says cap. 4. de divin. nominibus, p. 1. according to the opinion of Hierotheus; Therefore there is one virtue in both loves, of friendship and of concupiscence.