Question XXIX: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of charity

NOTE that neighbor is said of us by reason of the identity of nature, coordinated to the blessed life.

This question is also proposed by the Moderns under another title: Whether the motive of Charity toward God and toward neighbor is the same.

The FIRST opinion is that the motives of the charity of God and of neighbor are diverse, such that the motive for loving God is His uncreated goodness; but the motive for loving neighbor is his supernatural perfection of sanctity, virtue, etc.

In favor of this are cited by Mastrius Vasquez, Caspensis, and other more recent authors, adducing D. Bonaventure. That author, however, having proposed the title disp. 6. quaest. 22. of the third part: Whether the motive of Charity toward God and toward neighbor is the same, proceeds thus.

The FIRST opinion denies, and teaches, that the motive of the charity of God is His very uncreated goodness; but the motive of Charity, by which the neighbor is loved with the love of friendship, is the very supernatural goodness of the neighbor. For in two ways (says this opinion) can the neighbor be honestly loved: First on account of God's goodness alone, that is, from the desire of the divine good, because the good conferred upon the neighbor is in a certain way God's good, from the words of Christ, Matth. 25. As long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to me; and this love manifestly pertains to the Theological virtue of Charity. In the other way the neighbor can be loved, either on account of the rational nature which he has like ours, or on account of the sanctity of morals; in which love, since the formal object differs far from the formal object of Charity, he asserts it is not an elicited act of the Theological virtue, but of another inferior one. So Vasquez, Turrianus, Caspensis, Coninck, Arriaga, and other Recentiores, citing in their favor D. Thomas, D. Bonaventure, Richard, Durandus, and other older authors.

These Doctors indeed ADMIT two motives of love, namely of God and of neighbor, yet they say one is the motive of that love which is Charity, as is clear from D. Bonaventure, adduced by these Doctors; indeed by Mastrius himself num. 569. and by Caspensis disp. 3. de Charitate, sect. 1. num. 3., where the same is asserted as by Vasquez lib. 1. de ador. disp. 6. cap. 2. and lib. 3. disp. 1. cap. 6.; and certainly the words of D. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 9. art. 2. quaest. 4., where he is adduced by these, are in favor of the second opinion, to be reported shortly: For the Holy Doctor does not acknowledge those two habits, nor does he say one word about either of them.

Therefore Mastrius errs in reporting that these doctors deny there to be the same motive of the Charity of God and of neighbor, but posit two: Indeed he himself betrays his own error, while he says that these Doctors posit indeed two motives of the love of neighbor, one to be the goods of the neighbor; the other to be God, as the end; and that the former motive is not of Charity, but of an inferior virtue of love.

The SECOND opinion, therefore, is that there is one motive by which God and neighbor are loved, namely uncreated goodness. So D. Bonaventure loc. cit. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 105. art. 3. ad 1. Vasquez, Caspensis, Turtianus, Durandus, Richardus, Valencia, Suarez, Maldetus, Sylvius, whom Amicus adduces and follows disp. 24. sect. 3. The same think Lorca, Tannerus, Mastrius, adducing others, and among the rest Scotus 3. dist. 18. quaest. unica, and all the Scotists. The same thinks D. Bonaventure dist. 27. art. 1. quaest. 2. and art. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore.

¶ I SUPPOSE, which I distinguished in quaest. 17., with D. Bonaventure, from which question some could have deduced that there are two motives of the Charity of God and of neighbor; but there he wills that there are two loves by reason of the material objects on account of which two precepts also are given: yet he asserts one motive, and one act of charity, and one habit, although there be given another habit of virtue, by which we love the neighbor on account of his likeness to us in nature, and on account of his sanctity: and in this is the true difference between the first and second opinion; for the first admits one motive of charity; nevertheless it posits another habit, by which the neighbor is loved by ordination to his perfections, as I said; which habit they do not call charity; but the Authors of the second opinion deny it altogether.

¶ I ASSERT first, that there is one habit of Charity, and one formal act of it toward God and neighbor.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure first, dist. 27. quaest. 2., by the arguments related in quaest. 6: where I showed this ex professo.

It is proved second from the Fathers, who define the same charity to be of God and of neighbor. So D. August. 8. de Trinit. cap. 8. and serm. de Dominica post Ascensionem. Bernardus serm. de coena Domini, Beda in 5. ad Romanos, cited by Mastrius num. 565.

I ADD D. Gregory homil. 38., cited by D. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 25: If anyone loves anyone, but does not love him for God's sake, he has not Charity; but he simulates that he has it, or thinks so: But Charity is true, when the friend is loved both in God, and the enemy is loved for God. In these words he seems not only to assert one habit of Charity, but even to exclude every other habit of virtue by which we might love the neighbor on account of supernatural things.

For other Fathers see the same place. The authorities cited by Mastrius, however, seem to prove only the former point.

It is proved third by the Holy Doctor, by the places alleged. Where there is the same formal object, there is one habit: but there is one formal object of charity: Therefore. The major is proved: for habits are specified by objects, certainly formal ones, as Aristotle teaches, alleged in quaestione 6. The minor is proved; for where there is the same motive, there is the same formal object; but in the Charity of God and of neighbor there is the same motive: Therefore. The minor is proved by D. Bonaventure, because in the neighbor nothing is loved but God, as D. Augustine says, adduced by the second argument, dist. 26. art. 2. quaest. 2.

THEN the Minor is proved by D. Bonaventure. When one thing is on account of another, there is one motive, and therefore one movement: But charity loves the neighbor on account of God: Therefore. The minor is proved third. When one thing is loved principally, then there is one love; but in the love of the neighbor God is principally loved: Therefore. This is the argument of D. Bonaventure dist. 9. art. 2. quaest. 4. ad 3. and dist. 27. art. 1. quaest. 2. in corpore, which Mastrius attributes to Scotus num. 568. The assumption is proved; because what is principally intended principally moves.

From these I see that the Seraphic Doctor admits indeed several material objects of charity, namely the divine goodness and created sanctity; but nevertheless the completed act, when created perfection is reduced to its end, without which direction the act of love of neighbor, by which his perfection, even supernatural, is loved, is not an act of a perfect virtue. And therefore with D. Gregory, alleged above, he denies that without this direction it is an act of virtue. I think this is what the Apostle willed, when he says: He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law, Rom. 13.; and John used to say: Little children, love one another, and preached nothing else. But when asked why he commended only this, he replied: Because, if this be done, it suffices. But certainly if a perfect love terminating in the perfections of man were granted, it certainly would not suffice for the observance of the Divine law, because God, who is principally commanded to be loved, would not be loved by it.

St. Bonaventure observes this acutely, 3. dist. 37. dub. 2. litt., and with him Mastrius num. 569. The Holy Doctor also indicates the same, dist. 23. quaest. 1. ad 1. Hence he argues from the foundation of 1. quaest., to be cited shortly: When one thing is on account of another, then there is one only; but the love of neighbor, in order to be perfect, is on account of God: Therefore it is one with the love of God. Mastrius ascribes this argument to Scotus num. 570.

It is proved fourth by D. Bonavent. dist. 27. art. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore. The same object specifies the direct and the collative, or reflex act, even if it concur to the direct act immediately and directly; but to the reflex act only mediately and indirectly; the Reason is, because the principal specificative is always that which is principally intended, whether it concur directly and immediately to the act, or indirectly and mediately: But that which is principally intended in the act of Charity is the goodness of God, in whatever way He is loved, whether directly or reflexly: Therefore the ultimate specification is always taken from it; for the principal act is specified by that on account of which it principally is, and is principally intended. The major is evident, because what is principally intended principally moves, and inflows into the very species of the act. The minor, in the act of love of the first mode, is clear enough; because what moves uniquely is the uncreated goodness: But of the act of love of the second mode it is proved, because then, although charity directly and immediately moves to loving the neighbor on account of his intrinsic goodness; yet it does not move on account of that absolutely, but respectively, inasmuch as it is a singular participation of the uncreated goodness: Therefore also in that second mode, although the uncreated goodness of God itself moves to that act mediately, and indirectly, or terminatively, and in an oblique manner, nevertheless it principally moves. Mastrius ascribes this argument of D. Bonaventure to Scotus num. 568., although in the following number he reports D. Bonaventure teaching the same in 3. dist. 9. quaest. ultima: But this argument in D. Bonav. is dist. 27. loc. cit., which Amicus also uses.

Amicus and Mastrius, however, ADMIT that the charity of neighbor is terminated in God de facto; yet God could have instituted another habit of charity, by which we would love the neighbor in himself, independently of God, just as the saints are venerated with Dulia on account of their perfections.

Arriaga REPLIES that Scripture and the Fathers only will that the habit of the love of God be connected with the habit by which the neighbor is loved; whether the neighbor be a material or a formal object.

¶ AGAINST: for the holy Fathers exclude other loves, as is clear from D. Gregory; and the love of neighbor is called the complement of the law, which would not be true, if the love of neighbor were not one with the love of God.

He REPLIES second that, even if Scripture says: He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law; yet it does not follow that even the love of God proceeds from one habit; otherwise it would have to be inferred that no other supernatural habit distinct from charity exists; for he who loves God is chaste, is just, is patient, as is said first Corinth. 13. This argument is taken from D. Bonav. 3. dist. 33. quaest. 1. and dist. 37., the first argument to the contrary.

But this evasion is precluded, as Mastrius saw num. 573. For first we do not deduce the unity of the habit of Charity from this text alone Rom. 13., but from first Corinth. 13., where Paul posits one charity, just as one faith, and hope; but these are each of one species: Therefore. An argument I used in quaest. 6. with D. Bonaventure dist. 27. quaest. 2., taken from the unity of the object; because just as there is one first truth by which faith is unified, so there is one first and ultimate goodness, which is the object of charity. That other habits besides charity are necessary, is so; because charity exacts other acts only which are not acts of Charity, as the Holy Doctor notes dist. 33. loc. cit. ad 1.; but the charity of God and of neighbor elicits both acts as its own.

You will OBJECT first. Either the created goodness of the neighbor is the formal object of charity, or only the material object. If the first, I have my intent; if the second: Therefore supernatural goodness is not an honest good, because it cannot terminate the appetite, but is only a useful goodness, which is loved on account of others.

D. Bonaventure through the whole of the third question, art. 2. dist. 27. REPLIES that the goodness of the neighbor is an honest and terminative object of the act of Charity; yet it does not terminate the act ultimately, which, since it has for its principal object the Divine goodness, as its ultimate formal object, continues and advances toward it, even if created goodness be terminative of the act and affection of charity subordinately; but the specificative reason is taken from the ultimate to which the act tends and is terminated, and to which the object of created goodness is subordinated: From which it is clear that two virtues of charity are not necessary: one Theological; the other moral, because those two goodnesses are so related that one is ordered to the other; and where there is one on account of another, there is one only; even if that which is ordered to the other be terminative, it terminates less principally. With this doctrine they answer the argument of Amicus loc. cit. and Mastrius num. 576., who attribute it to Scotus 3. dist. 31. quaest. un. §. Sed adhuc, who drew it from D. Bonaventure loc. cit. I add, however, that Scotus in dist. 28. quaest. un. ad argumenta asserts that the goodness of the neighbor moves no more than a straw, which Arias benignly explains dist. 28. art. 1. as meaning: not to move as principal cause.

You will say. When I give alms, the act is terminated ultimately in that object out of piety toward the neighbor, and does not ascend to God, and in this way it is an act of virtue: Therefore there is a distinct habit: Therefore, etc.

It is ANSWERED, by denying the parity; for the habit of charity, being Theological, tends ultimately to God, nor is any other habit of charity known in Scripture and the Fathers.

You will OBJECT second. If the motivating reason of the charity of the neighbor is the goodness of God, it follows that Charity is not a friendship properly so called of ours toward the neighbor: for according to Aristotle 8. Eth. friendship is for the sake of the friend; for he loves the friend out of complacency in the friend himself.

It is ANSWERED from D. Bonaventure that the argument alleged would hold, if I granted that created goodness does not terminate the affection; but we say it does terminate it; yet so that it be ordered to the ultimate end, which is not against the reason of friendship: nor does Aristotle exclude that friendship be ordered to the ultimate end.

You will OBJECT third. Two created honesties and goodnesses differ less than created goodness and uncreated goodness: but created goodness is twofold, the object of diverse virtues: Therefore. The major is evident, because created things are all finite; but created differs from uncreated as finite from infinite. It is taken from D. Bonaventure fund. 4.

It is ANSWERED from D. Bonaventure in corpore, by denying the consequence; because although in the account of material object they differ more; yet in the account of formal object they do not differ more; because one moves by reason of the other, which is principal and ultimate, namely the goodness of God. Hence also various habits of created goodnesses are given, because the other, for instance of justice, is not ordered to the goodness of temperance; but the created goodness of the neighbor is loved in order to God, who alone is ultimately intended, as the Good in the Theological virtue. Mastrius subscribes, num. 580.

You will OBJECT fourth. Human friendship tends ultimately to the good of the friend: Therefore also supernatural friendship.

The Holy Doctor REPLIES, dist. 28. passim, by denying the consequence; because the charity which is now given is a participation of that Charity by which God loves us on account of Himself, and is ordered to beatitude, and to supernatural life in God.

You will OBJECT fifth. Divine excellence differs less from created excellence than Divine goodness from created goodness; but for venerating the divine excellence Latria is given, which is a cult distinct from Dulia, by which created excellence is venerated: Therefore. Arriaga extracted this argument from D. Bonaventure ad 3., where, denying the parity in the cult of images, he concedes (as it seems) that the parity holds in the cult of the Saints and of God, namely that as they terminate different cults, so also God and the neighbor terminate different loves, and that most of all because charity immediately regards the goodnesses, created and uncreated; but Religion immediately regards not the excellences but their cult, whence the minor seems the reason of distinguishing.

It is ANSWERED with Amicus and Mastrius, from the argument of D. Bonaventure, that it can be inferred that it is not repugnant for such a diverse habit to be given; nevertheless that the one which now exists is terminative indeed toward two goodnesses, yet so that the created be ordered to the uncreated. I add from D. Bonaventure, better: that charity indeed is terminated in two distinct objects, God and the neighbor; Yet, because charity has for its object the good, which is the end; therefore in charity this must be received, and so Charity does not rest in created goodness, which is not the ultimate end, but orders it to the ultimate Uncreated; but religion does not regard God and the Saints under the account of good, but according to the excellences, of which one is not subordinated in the account of object, but only in the account of good; and this is the solution of D. Bonaventure in corpore, where he embraces all the arguments.

You will OBJECT sixth. Acts specifically diverse require diverse habits; but the acts of charity toward God and toward neighbor are diverse: Therefore. The minor is proved in the foundations of D. Bonaventure: because the acts of love toward God are on account of themselves; but those of love of the neighbor, on account of God. Similarly the acts of love toward God are of a diverse species in appetition.

Mastrius REPLIES that the major is true in acquired habits, because they are generated from acts of the same account, but not of infused ones.

It is ANSWERED second from D. Bonaventure in corpore, that this is true of acts terminatively ending in diverse objects; but the act of the charity of God and of neighbor tends toward the one goodness of God.