Question XVII: Whether God alone is to be loved out of charity, or the neighbor also

There are two precepts of Charity: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, etc. And thy neighbor as thyself, Deut. 6. Matth. 22. Therefore the love of neighbor is included in the object of Charity. Hence John 1, cap. 4: This commandment we have from God: that he who loves God should love also his brother.

He distinguishes the ways in which the acts regard the neighbor together with God: either as distinct objects terminating, or as the one, namely God, being the object and the ultimate end; while the neighbor is the object as a means loved for the sake of the end.

If God is loved as the object and the other as the ultimate end, then one and the same motion and act can tend to both, because by the same motion we will the end and the means as such ordered to it. And thus we love the neighbor by willing to God this good, namely the neighbor; and therefore what is given to the neighbor is said to be given to God, Matth. 25. Therefore, since we love the neighbor in order to God, that he may be in God; under one aspect we love God and the neighbor, and so with one act, as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure say in the arguments in the first place.

But if God and the neighbor are considered precisely as two objects terminating love, he distinguishes further: for to love is to will a good; but the good can be a twofold object of Charity: that which is willed, and the one to whom it is willed. If therefore God is compared with the neighbor uniformly, as the one to whom we will a good; then by one motion he is borne toward God, by another toward the neighbor, because they are loved as distinct termini, and one is more intense, the other more remiss; and thus two precepts require this. But if they are compared non-uniformly, so that the neighbor is the good that is desired, and God is the one to whom the good is desired, then with one act he loves the neighbor, and with that very act loves God.

The Saintly Doctor asserts, therefore, first that God and the neighbor are loved by two acts, as material termini.

This is proved by the Saintly Doctor first: Motions are numbered by subject, time, and terminus or object; but the terminus or object of the love of God is one thing, and that of the love of the neighbor another: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's 5 Phys. text 38. The minor is clear from what has been said.

It is proved second by the Saintly Doctor: What presupposes diverse considerations is also sought by diverse acts; but we cannot with one act foreknow God and the neighbor as precise termini: nor love them. The major is proved from 2 Top. cap. 4, in the declaration of locus 33.

It is PROVED third by the Saintly Doctor. The same motion cannot at once be more intense and more remiss; but the motion of love toward God is more intense than toward the neighbor: Therefore it is one and another.

It is PROVED fourth by the Saintly Doctor: Peter and Paul are more conformed in the reason of a lovable object than Paul and God; but one motion of love cannot be toward Peter and Paul: Therefore.

It is PROVED fifth by the Saintly Doctor. The precept regards the use and act of the virtue, but there are two precepts of Charity: Therefore.

He ASSERTS second, that there is one act toward God and the neighbor in the first way, as toward the means and the end, and as toward the good, Q. d. est Bonum, Cui.

It is PROVED by the Saintly Doctor first. The motion toward the end and toward the medium as such ordered to it is the same, because a motion is not numbered according to the difference of the medium but of the extremity; but the motion of Charity is toward God as toward the end, and toward the neighbor as the medium: Therefore.

It is PROVED second by the Saintly Doct. Where there is one beloved, there is one act of love; for a motion is specified by its object, at least as regards us; but in the neighbor nothing is loved except God, by the act of Charity: Therefore.

BUT if you should say that to love the neighbor in himself on account of a rational nature like ours, or on account of his virtues, is not an act of Charity, as St. Bonaventure notes, this dist. 27. art. 2. quest. 2, and dist. 9. art. 2. quest. 4; St. Thomas 2. 2. quest. 109. art. 3. ad 2; Vasquez Lib. 1. de adorat. disp. 6. cap. 2, and Lib. 3. disp. 1. cap. 6; Caspensis de Charitate, disp. 3. sect. 1. The same hold Turrianus, Coninchius, and Arriaga, apud Mastrium disp. 6. quest. 22, of whom I shall treat in quest. 29.

It is PROVED third: As the image of St. Peter is venerated in order to St. Peter with one act, as Damascene says Lib. 4. de Fide, cap. 17, because the honor of the image passes to the prototype; so too the love of the neighbor is referred to God; and hence there is one act by which God and the neighbor are loved, as referred to God the prototype.

In this, however, there is a disparity, because honor is not terminated in any way upon the image, but passes wholly to St. Peter; whereas the neighbor in some way terminates the act of love, and in this sense he is commanded to be loved by a distinct precept; even though in the said way, as end and medium, etc., they are loved by one act.

It is PROVED fourth: Where one thing is for the sake of another, there is only one; but the neighbor is loved for the sake of God: Therefore by one love. This, however, is true in such a way that they can also be the object of love as two termini.

It is PROVED fifth, because although there are several Divine persons, nevertheless they are loved by one love, because there is one objective reason of goodness: Similarly there is one reason of the highest goodness, on account of which God and the neighbor are loved.

He NOTES, however, that the reason in this case is diverse, because the terminating goodness of the neighbor and of God is not altogether the same, in the way in which the goodness of the three persons is, communicating in one essence; whence it stands in a different manner; and because from the diversity of comparisons arises the diversity of acts, while from the unity of the principal motivating reason arises the unity of the habit. Hence it is that the act by which God and the neighbor are loved is one, although the motions are one and another.