The Object

By the object is here meant that to which the will primarily and directly tends; that which it determines to do looked at in itself, apart from the circumstances with which the action when done will be clothed; or it is the action considered in the abstract.

It is obvious that some objects, in the sense above defined, have an objective morality of their own, and this causes the will which tends towards them to be either good or bad as the object is good or bad. To blaspheme God is an action which no creature of his can will without the greatest inordinateness. The will to commit murder, or to steal another’s property, is essentially an evil will, because it tends to an evil object. On the contrary, to love God, to relieve human misery, to show love, honour, and reverence to one’s parents, are good actions, because these objects are good, and the will that tends to them is good.

Human actions, then, derive their specific morality from the object, whenever that object is of itself conformable to rational human nature or, on the contrary, not conformable to it. If the object is indifferent, without any objective moral quality, as walking, the action will derive its morality from the circumstances in which the action is performed.

I. Notion. Object is here understood as that toward which, insofar as it is subject to the rules of morals, a human act is borne per se. Thus another's property is the object of theft; God is the object of the act of love (St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVI; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 2).

II. Morality from the object. A human act takes specific morality, goodness or malice, from its known object, good or evil. The reason is that an act takes specific morality from that toward which it is borne per se; such is the object (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVII). I have said "from its known object, good or evil," namely so that morality can be contracted or become formal; for nothing is willed unless known.

Nevertheless, circumstance and end, as we shall note later, sometimes destroy the goodness of the object. Moreover, if the object and the circumstances are indifferent, for example the act of walking, specific morality is taken from the end¹ (St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVIII; XLI).

¹ In this case circumstance or end is said to put on the account of the object. But when the matter is taken in this way, it can be said that even in this hypothesis specific morality is derived from the object.

Whether morality, or moral goodness or malice, is found only in the interior act of the will, or also in the exterior act? - Morality formally is only in the interior, free act of the will; materially, however, it is only also in the exterior act. For a twofold moral goodness or malice can be distinguished in the exterior act. First, the objective moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered, which that act has of itself, namely from its proper object and circumstances, by which it is objectively affected, according to the right order of reason. Goodness or malice of this kind, which the exterior act has in itself because of due or undue matter and due or undue circumstances, is derived from reason, according as that object and those circumstances exhibit the rectitude of reason or a deviation from the right order of reason. This objective goodness or malice of the exterior act is prior to the goodness or malice of the act of the will. And thus the exterior act is the object of the will, insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good apprehended and ordered by reason, or as departing from this order; and it causes moral goodness or malice in the will.

Second, moral goodness or malice can be considered in the exterior act in order to the end, according as this exterior act stands under the interior act of the will. For the end is the proper object of the will. And thus the notion of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found first in the act of the will, and is derived from it to the exterior act. Moreover, insofar as the exterior act consists in the execution of the work, it is an effect of the will and follows the will. The will is then compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause; hence the moral goodness or malice of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act, as existing in the acting cause, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 1. Therefore "the goodness of the end redounds from the will into the exterior act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances redounds into the act of the will," S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3.

Now the exterior act and the interior act of the will, as they are considered in the genus of morals, are one human act, ib. If the human act is considered adequately in this way, the formal moral goodness or malice of the human act is intrinsically only in the interior act of the will, but in the exterior act only by extrinsic denomination. For the morality of a human act, formally considered, is found only in a free act, and freedom formally is only in the will. Likewise formal moral goodness is from order to the end, which is the proper object of the will, q. 20. a. 1. Hence it is clear that in the exterior act moral goodness of this kind, which is according to order to the end, depends wholly on the will, ib. a. 2.

But that "goodness of the exterior act which it has from matter and circumstances is other than the goodness which is from the end; it is not, however, other than the goodness of the will which it has from the very act willed, but is compared to it as its reason and cause," q. 20. a. 4 ad 2. This is confirmed, "for however much the exterior act may seem good in itself and conformable to reason, nevertheless if it is commanded by an evil internal act or depraved intention and election, it is not good insofar as it is a human act. Therefore this is a sign that in the notion of a human act it is good only by denomination from the interior act. A similar argument is this: because the exterior act precisely and taken in itself does not add formal moral goodness to a man, nor render him more virtuous. For if we understand someone who, thinking that he can execute the exterior act of virtue, has an efficacious will to exercise such an act, he is upright and virtuous, whether he can really execute it or not, because virtue does not depend on a faculty which can be lacking to us unwillingly, but on the will, supposing that the will is equal.... This doctrine concerning external acts proceeds in the same way in acts of the intellect and of the sensitive appetite." Suarez tr. 3. d. 10, s. 1. n. 6. 11. "What is clearer than that the will is reputed as the deed, where necessity excludes the deed?" S. Bernard Ep. 77; Gen. 22:16; Matt. 5:28. The will, namely a will efficacious of itself. E. M. 6. 71. 72.

Does the external act add morality in some way to the internal act? "It must be said first, that the exterior act of itself does not bear an increase of goodness or malice, if the other things are equal, in the interior act. Thus D. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 4.... because the exterior act does not have a goodness distinct from the interior, and necessarily follows from it if it is in our power; but if it is not in our power, it does not diminish the goodness of the will.... Second, it must be said that external action is sometimes necessary for the goodness of the will, or for such goodness.... For when it is in man's power to execute an external action, he cannot have a perfect interior will unless he executes the exterior action, because the exterior act is the term and end of the interior, and because an absolutely perfect will is one that acts when it can.... Third, it must be said that accidentally the exterior act can increase goodness or malice simply.... For 1. because of the exterior act a man often endures and perseveres more in the interior act; indeed he often multiplies interior acts, and in this way it is morally worse to kill. 2. Because the exterior action itself both kindles the affection, and thus contributes to the interior act, in the way in which vocal prayer is accustomed to contribute to interior devotion. 3. External actions are useful for moderating the passions and habituating the body, so that it may more easily serve justice.... It must also be added that good external acts are useful for the effect of satisfaction for temporal punishment due for sin, because satisfaction is taken not only from goodness, but especially from the penal character of the act; but the exterior act of itself brings its own pain and sorrow. Finally it must be added that exterior acts are necessary for certain effects of grace, which are conferred either ex opere operato, or from a special privilege; such as are the effects of the sacraments and the effects of martyrdom, and any others that are similar, because, since these effects do not depend on the mind alone of the one acting, they have been promised to one exercising such a work not only in affection, but also in effect; and in the same way on the contrary, evil external acts, or even their effects, are necessary for incurring certain punishments or censures, which are not incurred by the internal act alone." Suarez tr. 3. d. 10. s. 2. n. 2. 3. 4. 6; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1; L. 1. 2. n. 42; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1, q. 20. a. 5, 2. D. 40. a. 3; E. M. 71. 72.

What is understood by object? - By the object of a human act is not understood here whatever is proposed to the will; for in this way both the end and the circumstances would also be its object. Rather, it is understood as that thing which someone immediately or directly and per se wills. The object is not considered here physically, namely as it is some existing thing. About the same object physically considered, moral acts diverse in species can be concerned. And thus, for example, concerning the same wife there can be an honorable conjugal act and a shameful act of adultery. The object is considered here morally, namely as it stands under the rule of morals, or under law commanding, prohibiting, permitting. And thus the object of theft is not another's property precisely insofar as it is a thing, but insofar as right reason forbids that it be taken away against the owner's will. Hence A. D. says 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 3: "it must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason it pertains to the genus of morals and causes moral goodness in the act of the will." S. Th. q. 18. a. 5, S. q. 41. a. 3 ad 5.

Do human acts take moral goodness or malice from the object? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that acts are intrinsically specified from the object. For the object is said to be that which we will. That which we will; not, to whom we will. Therefore as they have species from the object, so they also have goodness and malice. "The good and evil of an action," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, "as also of other things, is considered from the fullness of being, or from its defect. But the first thing that seems to pertain to fullness of being is that which gives species to a thing. But just as a natural thing has species from its form, so an action has species from its object, as also motion from its term.

And therefore, just as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a suitable object. Hence it is also called by some good from the genus, for example, to use one's own thing. And just as in natural things the first evil is if the thing generated does not attain the specific form, for example, if a man is not generated, but something in place of a man, so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, as to take another's property. And it is called evil from the genus, the genus being taken for the species, in that way of speaking by which we call the whole human species the human genus." Hos. 9:10; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1.

Is an act good if the object is good, but the end evil? - R. Negatively. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the notion of evil, and therefore according as it is willed by him it is evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Hence S. Alph. 1. 5. n. 38 says: "if the object is good, but the end of the one acting is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness." Except unless the end is lightly evil, not chief and moving to acting, but secondary and impelling, for example, if someone preaches the word of God and is also impelled by vainglory. For there is a certain light disorder, which does not corrupt the substance of the action from its object and end, but is joined extrinsically by another act. Cf. 81. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. 6, 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4; Suarez tr. 3. d. 6. s. 1. 2, d. 8. s. 1. n. 13.

Is an act good if the object is evil, but the end good? - R. Negatively. The Apostle condemns those saying: let us do evil things, that good things may come. Rom. 3:8. But the reason is that the intention of a good end, as extrinsic to the very willed object, if this is evil, does not prevent someone from really willing evil. Since the substance of the act is from the object, if this is evil, it is impossible for it to be made honorable from a good end, or even from good circumstances. - S. Aug. l. Contra mendac. n. 18; Suarez tr. 3. d. 4, d. 8. s. 1. n. 20 seq.

What is lawful to do against the enemy in war? - In a just war it is lawful to do all things against the enemy which are necessary and apt for obtaining the just end of war, yet according to the command and express or tacit will of the commander of the war. The reason is that he who has a right to the end also has a right to the necessary and apt means. Therefore in a just war it is lawful to do against the enemy all things which are necessary and apt for obtaining the just end of war. Which are necessary and apt; for other things harmful to the neighbor, which are not necessary for such an end, cannot justly be inflicted, and the damage afterward must be repaired. The just end of war, namely to overcome the enemies. Laym. 9; Sporer 112; Struggl 45; L. 409.

1. Marianna is accustomed to tell slight lies to prevent quarrels, oaths, and blasphemies of her husband, which have the best success in constantly preserving the peace of the family.

2. Monica confesses that she has sometimes spoken badly about her neighbors, because, she says, they are truly evil and do evil to all.

3. Aurelius confesses that he, pressed by grave necessity, stole a grave sum of money. But when the confessor declares to him the obligation of restoring, Aurelius replies: it is impossible, because I have nothing. Indeed, since that necessity perseveres, I still ought to continue in the same theft, and afterwards I shall restore everything.

Q. 1. Do human acts derive morality from the object? 2. What must be thought concerning the various cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 84. To the second: Marianna, speaking in itself, sinned; but only venially, and this as many times as she lied. The reason is that a lie, as intrinsically evil, cannot be rendered honorable by any extrinsic end, however good, unless perhaps it is done from an invincibly erroneous conscience. For evils are not to be done that goods may come, Rom. 3:8. Therefore Marianna must be advised to abstain altogether from lies; and, when grave necessity urges, rather to use some tergiversation and equivocation, since she is not held always to manifest the truth openly. Elbel 74; G. 27. Cf. I. M. 86, 1523 seqq.

Monica, speaking in itself, must furthermore declare whether she spoke badly about her neighbors in a light matter or in a grave matter; and if in a grave matter, how many times this happened, and whether any other damage happened besides damage to reputation. Speaking in itself; for it is otherwise if from the confession itself it is understood that it is a matter of a thing known and public, whence no damaging of reputation has come; just as already seems sufficiently to be drawn from her words, because they are truly evil and do evil to all. - Elbel 11, 102; G. 31.

Aurelius indeed sinned gravely; for grave necessity does not excuse from theft. Therefore neither can he continue in theft. And if in the present he cannot restore, how will he be able to restore an always greater quantity in the future? Whence neither does his excuse avail. But he sufficiently explained his sin; for the various degrees of grave theft do not change the species. L. 1, 6, n. 47; G. 31; I. M. 1313.

1. As has already been said, the morality of human acts, and their moral goodness or malice, is from relation to the ultimate end and law of human life, from fittingness or unfittingness with the same end and law. Moreover this relation, this fittingness or unfittingness, can arise intrinsically in a human act from a threefold head, namely from the object of the same act, from the end, and from the circumstances. Hence it is commonly accustomed to be said that the object, the end, and the circumstances are the three sources of morality in a human act, and that a human act takes its moral goodness or malice from this threefold head, namely its particular, specific, and individual goodness or malice; for not all good acts are in the same species, nor likewise all evil acts in the same species. But the object, the circumstances, and the end can have order, and a diverse order, to the ultimate end and law of man. And morality consists in this order of human acts to the ultimate end and law.

2. By the object of a human act is not here understood whatever is presented to the will; for thus both the end and the circumstances would also be its object. Rather, the object is understood as that thing which someone immediately or directly and of itself wills. — The object is not considered here physically, namely as it is some existing thing. Concerning the same object physically considered, moral acts diverse in species can be concerned. Concerning the same wife, for example, there can be an honorable conjugal act and a base act of adultery. The object is considered here morally, namely as it falls under the rule of morals, or law, commanding, prohibiting, permitting. And thus the object of theft is not another’s thing precisely as it is a thing, but insofar as right reason forbids that it be taken away against the owner’s will. Hence the Angelic Doctor says, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8: “A human act, which is called moral, has its species from the object in relation to the principle of human acts, which is reason.” And ibid. a. 2 ad 1, he says, “it must be said that although exterior things are good in themselves, nevertheless they do not always have due proportion to this or that action.” And ibid. a. 5 ad 3: “The conjugal act and adultery, according as they are compared to reason, differ in species and have effects differing in species, because one of them merits praise and reward, the other blame and punishment. But according as they are compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species. And thus they have one effect according to species.” And q. 19. a. 2 ad 3: “It must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason it pertains to the genus of morals, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will.” Cf. q. 18. a. 5; S. q. 41. a. 3 ad 5.

3. Human acts take their first and essential moral goodness or malice from the object. — The reason is that acts are intrinsically specified from the object. Therefore, as they have species from the object, so they also have goodness and malice. “The good and evil of an action,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, “just as also of other things, is considered from the fullness of being, or from its defect. But the first thing which seems to pertain to the fullness of being is that which gives species to the thing. But just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has species from its object, just as motion also from its term. And therefore, just as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a fitting object. Whence it is also called by some good from its genus, for example to use one’s own thing. And just as in natural things the first evil is if a generated thing does not obtain its specific form, for example if a man is not generated, but something in place of a man, so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, as to take another’s things. And it is called evil from its genus, genus being taken for species, in that manner of speaking by which we call the human genus the whole human species.” And q. 18. a. 5: “Every act has species from its object.” And q. 19. a. 1: “But the difference of species in acts is according to objects.” Likewise ibid. a. 2: “The goodness of the will depends on that one thing alone which of itself makes goodness in an act, namely on the object, and not on the circumstances, which are certain accidents of the act.” For the first source of morality in a human act is its object. From the object, as from a formal principle, the human act has its being, and the first thing that occurs in each thing is its being.

4. Nor indeed is it valid to object that the first and essential moral goodness is to be taken from the end, which is the first foundation of all morality, and because every willed object is willed for the sake of the end, and consequently the end is willed before the object. For the human act indeed regards first the end, but the end of the work, which is the intrinsic end and coincides with the object itself, which consequently is ordered by that intrinsic end to the ultimate end, and orders the human act first and essentially to that same ultimate end.

5. In order that an act be morally evil, it suffices that the malice be indirectly, virtually, or implicitly willed in another thing to which it is annexed. The reason is that malice cannot be intended otherwise. No one operates intending evil; but someone does not seek evil except by reason of some good which he apprehends in it. Therefore it suffices that someone seek in a thing the pleasurableness to which he knows malice to be annexed.

6. But in order that an act be morally good, it is required that goodness be formally and directly willed in itself, at least in the act exercised. The reason is that honorableness is appetible in itself. Therefore right reason dictates that it is to be sought in itself. But it is not necessary that someone intend honorableness in a signate act, but it suffices that someone intend that which he sees to be honorable. And thus it is not necessary that one giving alms intend its honorableness, but it suffices that he wish to relieve the misery of his neighbor. “Evil occurs,” says St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3, “from singular defects, but good from a whole and complete cause. Whence whether the will is of that which is evil according to itself and under the aspect of good, or is of good under the aspect of evil, it is always evil. But in order that the will be good, it is required that it be of good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good.”

7. Whether an act is good if the object is good, but the end evil? — R. In the negative. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the aspect of evil, and therefore as it is willed by him it is evil. The honorableness of the means is then in no way truly sought, but only the means of attaining a depraved end is sought. “When someone wills to give alms on account of vain glory, this is one act of the will, and this whole act is evil, although it does not have malice from everything that is in it.” St. Thomas, 2 D. 38. q. 1. a. 4 ad 4; 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. And St. Alphonsus says: “If the object is good, but the end of the one operating is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness.” Tr. de Act. hum. n. XXXVIII; Suarez, D. 6, S. 1, 2; D. 8, S. 1, n. XIII.

8. Whether an act is good if the object is evil, but the end good? — R. In the negative. And indeed the Apostle condemns those saying: “Let us do evils that good things may come.” Rom. 3:8. But the reason is that the intention of a good end, as extrinsic to the willed object itself, if this is evil, does not prevent someone from in reality willing evil. Suarez, D. 4; D. 8, S. 1, n. XX ff.

26. • The object is that about which the moral act is concerned, and in which the will of the agent is proximately and per se terminated.

The object is good, or evil, or indifferent, according as it agrees or does not agree with reason, law, or right order, or holds itself apart from law or right order. Likewise it can be intrinsically good or evil, that is, by reason of itself from the requirement of right order; or not intrinsically, but only by reason of a positive precept.

I say: From the object morally considered is taken the first and essential morality of a human act; for the morality which the object gives to an action is conceived before every other which may come either from the end or from the circumstances.

The morality which is taken from the object is called morality, or objective goodness or malice. - If the object is in itself indifferent, it will receive its morality from the end or from the circumstances.

Intrinsically evil objects, however, are of a threefold class, namely 1. Some are such absolutely, and independently of every circumstance, because of themselves they involve repugnance with right order absolutely necessary, as hatred of God, blasphemy, etc. - 2. Others are intrinsically evil, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of an adjunct or of some condition which depends on the dominative power of God or of man: such are the taking away of another's thing, injury to body or reputation, and similar things which sometimes become lawful. - 3. Finally, others are evil only by reason of danger which they ordinarily have joined to them, as the sight of a base object, the reading of a depraved book, etc. These, a reasonable cause being given and the danger being removed, can become lawful.

I. THE OBJECT. —The object of an act (obiectum materiale) is that act itself, considered in the abstract. Though there are objects that are in themselves indifferent (e. g., eating and drinking), as a rule the object of an act has an inherent morality of its own, which causes the will of the agent to be either good or bad, according as the object is good (e. g., prayer, fasting), or bad (e. g., lying, stealing).³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 18, art. 8: "Every act has its species from its object, and a human act, which is called moral, has its species from the object as related to the principle of human acts, which is reason. Hence if the object of an act includes something that agrees with the order of reason, the act will be good according to its species, as giving alms to one in need; but if it includes something contrary to the order of reason, the act will be evil according to its species, as stealing, which is taking another's property. It can happen, however, that the object of an act includes nothing pertaining to the order of reason, as lifting a straw from the ground, going into a field, and things of this kind; and such acts according to their species are indifferent." — Ibid., art. 9: "Every individual act must have some circumstance through which it is drawn toward good or evil, at least on the part of the intention of the end. Since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to a due end, by that very fact is opposed to reason and has the character of evil; but if it is ordered to a due end, it agrees with the order of reason and therefore has the character of good. It is necessary that it either be ordered or not be ordered to a due end. Hence every act of man proceeding from deliberative reason, considered individually, must be good or evil. But if it does not proceed from deliberative reason, but from a certain imagination—as when someone strokes his beard or moves his hand or foot—such an act is not, properly speaking, moral or human, since an act has this character from reason; and thus it will be indifferent, as though existing outside the class of moral acts." —Cfr. St. Ambrose, Expos, in Ps., 118, s. 14, n. 23: "Omnia cum ratione [facias], nihil sine ratione, quia non es irrationabilis, o homo, sed rationabilis." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1400).—St. Jerome, Epist., 112 (al. 89), n. 16: "For indifferent things do not stand between good and evil as the philosophers argue. Continence is good; luxury is evil. Walking, discharging the refuse of the bowels, casting the purgings of the head from the nostrils, and casting out phlegm by spitting are indifferent between the two. This is neither good nor evil; for whether you do it or do not do it, you will have neither justice nor injustice. But to observe the ceremonies of the law cannot be indifferent, but is either good or evil." (P. L., XXII, 926).

Objectively indifferent acts become good or bad when they are willed with a good or bad intention, or when good or bad circumstances surround them.

According to its gravity in the moral order, an act is called materia gravis or levis.

In regard to their object or matter human acts are either intrinsically good or intrinsically bad, according as their objects are good or bad in themselves. Intrinsically good acts may be good either absolutely or relatively. An absolutely good act (secundum se bonus), which can never be bad, is, e. g., the love of God. A relatively good act (in se bonus) is one that may be good or bad according to the reason or motive which inspire or the accidental conditions or circumstances which surround it. Such relatively good acts are, for example, prayer, fasting, almsgiving.

Intrinsically bad acts are such as run counter to the moral order by their very nature. Some are absolutely bad and can never become good, as, e. g., hatred of God, perjury. Others are bad merely because the agent has no right to perform them or because they are a source of danger or temptation, e. g., manslaughter, viewing unchaste pictures. Acts of the latter kind are called relatively bad. A relatively bad act may become good by virtue of special conditions or circumstances, e. g., self-defense or study.

Extrinsically bad acts are bad simply because they are forbidden. As Göpfert rightly remarks, however, "the terms 'extrinsically good' and 'extrinsically bad' do not denote merely the conformity or nonconformity of an act to the law, regardless of its intrinsic ethical character; but they indicate that the relation existing between such an act and the moral order owes its existence to a command or prohibition of the lawgiver.”⁴

⁴ Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 191.

I. Notion. The object taken precisely is said to be that which is presented to the will as the matter, so to speak, of its action. It is considered by us not ontologically, or according to its physical being, but morally, or according as it is attained by the will with advertence to the norm of honesty. Thus it becomes moral; thus it introduces morality into the act. Cf. Sertillanges, O. Pr., La philosophie morale de S. Thomas, c. 3, n. 1.

An object is called good which is consonant with the rule of honesty; but evil, which disagrees with the same rule; indifferent, which stands in neither way.

Goodness or malice is intrinsic, which arises from the very nature of the thing and the exigency of order; extrinsic, which positive law confers. The order to which an action is repugnant from the very nature of the thing can be subject to the divine power, if there is a higher order to which a derogation from the prior order can be useful; or the same order is absolutely indispensable: in which case the malice is denominated more strictly intrinsic. The reason for the distinction is to be drawn from the dominion which God exercises over created things. Thus it is not repugnant to divine sanctity that God, in some case, permit or command fornication, by referring it to a higher order ¹; but it is repugnant that He should ever give license for blaspheming or lying.

¹ St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 154, art. 2, ad 4.

Efficacy of the object upon the morality of the act. Because acts are immediately on account of the object, this also holds concerning the object strictly so called: Acts are specified by the object; and the object is said to attribute the first and essential morality to an act. Yet this is to be understood in such a way: a) that the object be taken not materially, but formally, with that relation of its own to the order of reason or to the rule of honesty which is apprehended and adverted to; b) that the object as such be loved. For if it is not loved, that is, if the intrinsic finality is neglected, the evil morality of the object indeed will not be declined; but the good morality will not be participated, because good is from an integral cause.

111. Preliminary Note. A human act is a certain motion proceeding from the deliberate will. But every motion from its nature tends toward something, and, when this is obtained, it is terminated. That toward which a human action from its nature tends, and by the obtaining of which it is terminated, is the intrinsic end of the work and is called the object of the act. Thus, for example, the act of seeing has for its object things to be seen, the act of understanding things to be understood, etc. But the object, insofar as it is a principle of morality, is not the physical object itself which the human act reaches, but the moral object, insofar as it falls under the norm of morality, concerning which there was discussion in the preceding article. Hence, for example, in the action of stealing, the moral object is not the very thing of another taken away considered in itself, but insofar as reason forbids it to be taken away when the owner is reasonably unwilling. Next, the moral object does not comprehend all those things which the human action intends and comprehends; for in this way circumstances and end are also reached. But that is called the moral object toward which the human action from its nature first and of itself tends, and which therefore is always the end of the work itself. For example, a thief takes away in a church one hundred francs in order to live luxuriously by using this money. The moral object of this act is the thing of another unjustly taken away; the circumstance is theft committed in a sacred place; but the end is lust to be satisfied. The moral object considered in itself is threefold, namely, 1. good, if it is consonant with reason and the eternal law, for example, to love God, to cultivate chastity, etc.; 2. evil, if, on the contrary, it is dissonant from those rules, for example, to hate God, to lie, etc.; 3. indifferent, if considered in itself and abstractly it neither agrees nor disagrees with those rules, for example, to put on a white or black garment.

Next it must be noted that this moral object can be regarded in two ways: a) materially, insofar as it is considered in itself with relation only to the remote rule of morals, namely, to the eternal law or to other laws justly derived from the eternal law; b) formally, insofar as its morality is perceived by the conscience of the acting man. This twofold consideration of the moral object often, but not always, coincides in the same agent. Thus, for example, a man committing fornication and knowing that this act is a grave sin chooses an object both materially evil (for it is against the remote rule of morals, namely, against the natural law, which is a participation of the eternal law) and formally evil, because he acts against his conscience, which is the proximate rule of morals. On the contrary, if the same man, invincibly ignorant of the malice of fornication, were to fornicate, he would choose a moral object which indeed is materially evil, since it is truly against the natural and eternal law, but he does not commit formal malice, because he labors under an invincibly erroneous conscience and does not act against the proximate rule of morals. From this twofold consideration of the moral object theologians are accustomed to distinguish material sins, which injure the remote but not the proximate rule of morals, and formal sins, which injure the proximate rule of morals, that is, the conscience of the agent, whether this conscience is right or erroneous.³⁹

³⁹ Cf. below in the treatise on conscience, n. 306 sqq.

112. Principle. The first and essential morality of a human act is taken from the object morally considered. Thus the very common opinion with St. Thomas.⁴⁰

Proof. "The first and essential goodness or malice of an act is that which is conceived in it before every other, without which [the other morality of the act] cannot be conceived, and which remains invariable when the others are changed. But the goodness or malice which is in an act from the object is conceived to be in it before any other goodness or malice whatever from circumstances; without it no other can be conceived; and when the extrinsic circumstances and the end are changed, it is not changed: thus adultery, by the very fact that it is access to another's wife, is understood first and essentially as evil without order to other circumstances; without this malice it cannot be conceived; and when circumstance or end is changed it remains invariable. Therefore." Thus very well Billuart.⁴¹ - Nor should anyone object that the respect to the end is prior to the respect to the object, and therefore the first morality must be taken from the end. - For the end is either objective, or the end of the work,⁴² and then it is the same as the moral object; or it is the subjective end, or the end of the worker, and then it already presupposes morality from the object, and consequently does not give the first morality, but the second.

The morality which a human act takes from the moral object is called objective or substantial morality. But the moral object is either good or evil or indifferent, as is plain from what has been said above.

⁴⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 2: "As a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from the object, as also motion from its term. And therefore, as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a fitting object.... And as in natural things the first evil is if the generated thing does not attain the specific form ... so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object."

⁴¹ De act. hum. diss. IV, a. 3, § 1. But this author speaks only of goodness and malice, not of the indifference of the object, because an indifferent object is always drawn by the end to good or evil morality.

⁴² Cf. above n. 16.

113. Scholion. On the perception and intention of morality. Subjective and formal morality cannot arise from the object (and the same holds concerning circumstances and end) unless it is in some way perceived by the agent. Wherefore, if the agent inculpably is ignorant of the goodness or malice of the object, formal morality is not present, but only material; or in other words: the human act is materially good or evil, but not formally, as has already been said. But it is not required that the agent explicitly intend this morality; it suffices that he implicitly will it. Hence, for example, he who commits grave theft or adultery, knowing this to be illicit, truly sins gravely, even if internally or externally he says that he does not wish to commit sin.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2.

101. Etymologically, an object is that which is set before someone; hence the object of a human act is everything that is set before the deliberation of reason and the choice of the will, and thus it also includes circumstances. In the present matter, however, it is taken in a stricter sense and designates that which, whether the thing is a thing or a person, is first and per se attained by the act, and thus it is distinguished from circumstances, which are not attained except secondarily and per accidens and by reason of another: to take another's property is the object of theft; little or much is a circumstance.

Concerning the essential objective element nothing general can be said, because, since all objects are singular, it varies with the different objects.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2; a. 4, ad 3; a. 6; a. 7, ad 1; a. 10; q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3.

147. State of the question.

We have seen that the supreme species in morality, namely goodness and malice, arise from object, circumstance, and end; but the lowest species of moral acts must also be considered, according to which they have such a special goodness or such a special malice. Hence it is asked:

a) whether that distinction arises from the same three sources;

b) indeed, since a natural being is placed in only one species, it is doubted whether several species of morality can be found in one moral act.

To these we shall give an answer, with object, circumstances, and end considered separately.

148. Principle I. The object considered morally gives to human acts not only generic morality but also specific morality.

It is explained. The sense is: the object not only makes the essential distinction between good and evil, and constitutes the supreme species of goodness and malice in human acts, but also the lowest species by which various good or evil acts are distinguished among themselves.

It is proved: a moral act is essentially a movement toward an object considered morally, as toward a term. But every movement essentially has its lowest species from the term. Therefore every human act has its lowest moral species from the object considered morally. And therefore according as objects express diverse agreement with reason or opposition to it, various species of good acts are distinguished (for example, love of God and of neighbor, faith and charity, fortitude and temperance), or of evil acts (for example, homicide and theft, blasphemy and detraction, lust and anger).

It is no obstacle to this doctrine 1) that a circumstance can constitute the lowest species of morality in a human act, because then it enters into the object and becomes its principal condition and, as it were, the specific difference of the human act, as will be explained more below, art. 2;

2. that a human act receives species from the end, because a) the end is the object of the will; b) as to the exterior commanded act, the end of the work is the same as the object, while the adjoined end of the one acting is a circumstance adding species, which is considered by the agent as an accessory condition of the object arriving extrinsically, insofar as the act takes place under the influence of the will, whose object is the end of the one acting (cf. art. 3).

149. Principle II. One and the same moral act can have a multiple species of morality.

It is proved: 1) This is not verified of a human act according to physical being, because a physical being is specified by a natural form which is determined to one thing and therefore is one in species; but according to moral being an act is specified by an object apprehended by reason, which is not determined to one thing, but under a diverse consideration can be referred to diverse species according to supervening moral conditions, whether the species are per se subordinated to one another, or are disparate, as if theft is ordered to drunkenness (a. 7, ad 1). Thus to take what belongs to another from a sacred place includes a diverse specific repugnance to the order of reason, which dictates that injury is not to be done to a sacred place; and yet one object remains, but one composed of several things.

2. Moral being accedes as a quality to physical being itself, and therefore just as one physical thing can be of diverse species of perfection or defect according to accidents, for example the same man white and musical, blind and deaf, so one physical act can pertain to several moral species. Hence nothing prevents the same act from being in diverse species of virtue or sin.

150. Principle III. One and the same moral act cannot nevertheless be both good and evil at the same time and in the same respect.

It is proved: for an act to be simply good, goodness from every part is required; for it to be simply evil, malice from any part suffices. Therefore.

And nevertheless an act evil from one part is not therefore deprived of all goodness proceeding from other sources: thus an act good according to species can be evil because of a circumstance, or an act good according to species and circumstances can be ordered to an evil end, because, as St. Thomas says, "when the posterior has been removed, the prior nevertheless remains," I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 2 (cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3). The exception is if the act is done from the sole or total cause of evil, because then no goodness is intended or contracted, but the act is considered as a mere means of evil, insofar as the object is considered as wholly evil.

The object is that about which a moral act is immediately concerned, and in which the will of the agent proximately and through itself is terminated.

The object is good or bad or indifferent according as it agrees or does not agree with reason, law, or right order, or stands apart from law or right order. Likewise it can be intrinsically good or bad, that is, by reason of itself from the requirement of right order; or not intrinsically, but only by reason of a positive precept.

I say. From the object morally considered is taken the first and essential morality of a human act; for the morality which the object bestows upon the action is conceived before every other morality, whether it proceeds from the end or from the circumstances.

The morality which is taken from the object is called morality, or objective goodness or malice. If the object has been indifferent in itself, then the act will receive its morality from the end or from the circumstances.

But intrinsically bad objects are of a threefold class, namely: 1st. Some are such absolutely, and independently from every circumstance, because from themselves they involve repugnance with an absolutely necessary right order, as hatred of God, blasphemy, etc. 2nd. Others are intrinsically bad, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of some adjunct or condition which depends on the dominative power of God or of man: such are the taking away of another's thing, injury to body or reputation, and similar things which at times become licit. 3rd. Finally, others are bad only by reason of the danger which they ordinarily have joined to them, such as the sight of a base object, the reading of a depraved book, etc. These, given a reasonable cause and the danger being removed, can become licit.

§ I. — Whether the first and specific goodness or malice of human act is from the object ?

By object we understand here not whatsoever is objected to the will, for thus the very circumstances would also be its object; but that which is first and per se attained by the will.

I say 1° : The first and essential goodness, or malice of human act, is drawn from the object morally considered¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 2, c.

It is proved. As in naturals first and essential goodness is taken from form which gives species, as in man from rational form, and the first evil from defect of form which gives species, as if generated thing does not attain specific form, suppose man be not generated but something in place of man ; so in morals first and essential goodness is regarded from form giving species to human act, and first malice from defect of this form. But form giving species to human act is the object. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Human act is motion and tending toward object as toward term. But motion and tending regards term as proper form; for it is compared to it as potency to act, perfectible and determinable to perfective and determinative. Therefore.

I said : « From object morally considered, » because around same object physically considered acts specifically diverse can turn, good and evil: as around same thing alien, act of injustice, taking away, act of justice, restoring; around same wife adultery and conjugal act; around same man love and hatred.

Object must therefore be taken morally, and as it stands to directing reason, and is conformable or disconformable to it.

You will say. Human act draws first and specific morality from what it first regards. But it regards the end, as St. Thomas teaches here a. 6, c., and above q. 1, a. 3, c. And it is clear because object is willed on account of end. Therefore end is prior willed.

I answer. I distinguish the minor. Human act first regards end of work, I concede; end of worker, I deny. End of work, which also is called intrinsic, coincides with object; end of worker comes to it from extrinsic and accidentally, so that without it the same act could stand.

12. The means chosen may be of four several characters:—

(a) A thing evil of itself and inexcusable under all conceivable circumstances; for instance, blasphemy, idolatry, lying.

(b) Needing excuse, as the killing of a man, the looking at an indecent object. Such things are not to be done except under certain circumstances and with a grave reason. Thus indecent sights may be met in the discharge of professional duty. In that case indeed they cease to be indecent. They are then only indecent when they are viewed without cause. The absence of a good motive in a case like this commonly implies the presence of a bad one.

(c) Indifferent, as walking or sitting down.

(d) Good of itself, but liable to be vitiated by circumstances, as prayer and almsgiving; the good of such actions may be destroyed wholly or in part by their being done out of a vain motive, or unseasonably, or indiscreetly.

13. It is said, "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome." (St. Matt., vi., 22.) The eye is the intention contemplating the end in view. Whoever has placed a good end before him, and regards it steadily with a well-ordered love, never swerving in his affection from the way that reason would have him love, must needs take towards his end those means, and those only, which are in themselves reasonable and just: as it is written: "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." (Deut. xvi., 20.) Thus I am building a church to the glory of God; money runs short: I perceive that by signing a certain contract that must mean grievous oppression of the poor, I shall save considerable expense, whereas, if I refuse, the works will have to be abandoned for want of funds. If I have purely the glory of God before my eyes, I certainly shall not sign that contract: for injustice I know can bear no fruit of Divine glory. But if I am bent upon having the building up in any case, of course I shall sign: but then my love for the end in view is no longer pure and regulated by reason: it is not God but myself that I am seeking in the work. Thus an end entirely just, holy, and pure, purifies and sanctifies the means, not formally, by investing with a character of justice means in themselves unjust, for that is impossible,—the leopard cannot change his spots,—but by way of elimination, removing unjust means as ineligible to my purpose, and leaving me only those means to choose from which are in themselves just.

14. With means in themselves indifferent, the case is otherwise. A holy and pious end does formally sanctify those means, while a wicked end vitiates them. I beg the reader to observe what sort of means are here in question. There is no question of means in themselves or in their circumstances unjust, as theft, lying, murder, but of such indifferent things as reading, writing, painting, singing, travelling. Whoever travels to commit sin at the end of his journey, his very travelling, so far as it is referred to that end, is part of his sin: it is a wicked journey that he takes. And he who travels to worship at some shrine or place of pilgrimage, includes his journey in his devotion. The end in view there sanctifies means in themselves indifferent.

15. As a great part of the things that we do are indifferent as well in themselves as in the circumstances of the doing of them, the moral character of our lives depends largely on the ends that we habitually propose to ourselves. One man's great thought is how to make money; what he reads, writes, says, where he goes, where he elects to reside, his very eating, drinking and personal expenditure, all turns on what he calls making his fortune. It is all to gain money—quocunque modo rem. Another is active for bettering the condition of the labouring classes: a third for the suppression of vice. These three men go some way together in a common orbit of small actions, alike to the eye, but morally unlike, because of the various guiding purposes for which they are done. Hence, when we consider such pregnant final ends as the service of God and the glory of a world to come, it appears how vast is the alteration in the moral line and colouring of a man's life, according to his practical taking up or setting aside of these great ends.

16. We must beware however of an exaggeration here. The final end of action is often latent, not explicitly considered. A fervent worshipper of God wishes to refer his whole self with all that he does to the Divine glory and service. Yet such a one will eat, drink, and be merry with his friends, not thinking of God at the time. Still, supposing him to keep within the bounds of temperance, he is serving God and doing good actions. But what of a man who has entirely broken away from God, what of his eating, drinking, and other actions that are of their kind indifferent? We cannot call them sins: there is nothing wrong about them, neither in the thing done, nor in the circumstances of the doing, nor in the intention. Pius V. condemned the proposition: "All the works of infidels are sins." Neither must we call such actions indifferent in the individual who does them, supposing them to be true human acts, according to the definition, and not done merely mechanically. They are not indifferent, because they receive a certain measure of natural goodness from the good natural purpose which they serve, namely, the conservation and well-being of the agent. Every human act is either good or evil in him who does it. I speak of natural goodness only.