§ I. On the Object

The object is that about which a moral act is immediately concerned, and in which the will of the agent proximately and through itself is terminated.

The object is good or bad or indifferent according as it agrees or does not agree with reason, law, or right order, or stands apart from law or right order. Likewise it can be intrinsically good or bad, that is, by reason of itself from the requirement of right order; or not intrinsically, but only by reason of a positive precept.

I say. From the object morally considered is taken the first and essential morality of a human act; for the morality which the object bestows upon the action is conceived before every other morality, whether it proceeds from the end or from the circumstances.

The morality which is taken from the object is called morality, or objective goodness or malice. If the object has been indifferent in itself, then the act will receive its morality from the end or from the circumstances.

But intrinsically bad objects are of a threefold class, namely: 1st. Some are such absolutely, and independently from every circumstance, because from themselves they involve repugnance with an absolutely necessary right order, as hatred of God, blasphemy, etc. 2nd. Others are intrinsically bad, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of some adjunct or condition which depends on the dominative power of God or of man: such are the taking away of another's thing, injury to body or reputation, and similar things which at times become licit. 3rd. Finally, others are bad only by reason of the danger which they ordinarily have joined to them, such as the sight of a base object, the reading of a depraved book, etc. These, given a reasonable cause and the danger being removed, can become licit.