§ 1. On the Object Taken More Strictly

I. Notion. The object taken precisely is said to be that which is presented to the will as the matter, so to speak, of its action. It is considered by us not ontologically, or according to its physical being, but morally, or according as it is attained by the will with advertence to the norm of honesty. Thus it becomes moral; thus it introduces morality into the act. Cf. Sertillanges, O. Pr., La philosophie morale de S. Thomas, c. 3, n. 1.

An object is called good which is consonant with the rule of honesty; but evil, which disagrees with the same rule; indifferent, which stands in neither way.

Goodness or malice is intrinsic, which arises from the very nature of the thing and the exigency of order; extrinsic, which positive law confers. The order to which an action is repugnant from the very nature of the thing can be subject to the divine power, if there is a higher order to which a derogation from the prior order can be useful; or the same order is absolutely indispensable: in which case the malice is denominated more strictly intrinsic. The reason for the distinction is to be drawn from the dominion which God exercises over created things. Thus it is not repugnant to divine sanctity that God, in some case, permit or command fornication, by referring it to a higher order ¹; but it is repugnant that He should ever give license for blaspheming or lying.

¹ St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 154, art. 2, ad 4.

Efficacy of the object upon the morality of the act. Because acts are immediately on account of the object, this also holds concerning the object strictly so called: Acts are specified by the object; and the object is said to attribute the first and essential morality to an act. Yet this is to be understood in such a way: a) that the object be taken not materially, but formally, with that relation of its own to the order of reason or to the rule of honesty which is apprehended and adverted to; b) that the object as such be loved. For if it is not loved, that is, if the intrinsic finality is neglected, the evil morality of the object indeed will not be declined; but the good morality will not be participated, because good is from an integral cause.