Using probable opinions in practice

223. Declaration. 1. The name opinion is used properly subjectively, improperly objectively. Opinion considered subjectively is a judgment by which the mind adheres to a proposition because of persuasive motives, but with fear concerning the opposite; and opinion considered objectively is the matter itself or proposition to which the mind adheres, because of persuasive motives, with fear concerning the opposite. In this objective sense we speak of probable opinion.

From these definitions it is clear: a. that opinion considered subjectively and probable conscience do not in reality differ: for probable conscience properly is a judgment by which the mind judges that some action is licit or illicit, but with fear of erring; b. that positive doubt accepted in a broad sense and opinion considered subjectively likewise do not differ: for any positive doubt is an opinion.

2. The probability of some opinion (or sentence) is that property of the same by which, on account of the motives by which it is supported, it merits the assent of a prudent man, although with fear concerning the opposite. Therefore the reasons by which it can be persuaded and proved constitute the probability of some sentence.

By its nature greater or lesser probability belongs to an opinion according to the diversity of the reasons upon which it rests. Therefore manifold divisions of probability are said equally of opinion: for we speak of an opinion as speculatively or practically, internally or externally, solidly or tenuously, certainly or doubtfully, absolutely or comparatively probable.

224. Division. Probability is divided in many ways:

1. Into speculative and practical: the former belongs to an opinion considered in itself and in the abstract; the latter belongs to an opinion considered in the concrete with the circumstances which affect it in particular cases.

From these things it is understood that it can happen that an opinion speculatively probable is not practically probable on account of scandal or the danger of sinning which would have to be feared in the concrete if someone acted according to that opinion. Thus this sentence, that a woman oppressed by force can hold herself passively on account of fear of death, is said to be speculatively, but not practically, probable, because on account of the very great propensity of fallen man into venereal matters there threatens a danger of consenting to shameful delight.¹

2. Into internal and external: the former is founded on reasons taken from the very nature of the matter; the latter is proximately founded on the authority of doctors. External probability of itself supposes internal probability, namely that the doctors were determined to embrace the truth from internal reasons.

a. According as the weight of the reasons or of the authority by which some sentence is supported is greater or lesser, so also the degree of probability, whether internal or external, is greater or lesser. b. But external probability must be estimated not so much from the number of authors as from their doctrine and prudence, and also from the study and diligence which they used in investigating the truth.

3. Into solid and tenuous: the former is constituted by a fallible but nevertheless grave and firm motive, which truly merits the assent of a prudent man; the latter rests upon a slight and empty motive, so that he who gave assent to it would be imprudent.

Therefore an opinion tenuously probable, being destitute of true probability, is in reality not probable. Yet there are authors who by the name of tenuous probability signify some slight but nevertheless true probability.

4. Into certain and doubtful, according as a grave and solid foundation, which suffices for constituting true probability, belongs to the opinion certainly or doubtfully or only probably.

5. Into absolute and comparative or relative: the former is had when the motives of the opinion are considered in themselves independently of the opposite opinion; the latter is had when the motives of the opinion are considered together with the opposite opinion and its motives.

To these must be added solitary probability, which is had when there are no opposed reasons, although nevertheless it does not attain certitude. Wherefore an opinion uniquely or solitarily probable is called that whose opposite opinion can be supported by no reason, although nevertheless it itself is not certain. Thus where an upright man, whose faithfulness or unfaithfulness has not hitherto been proved by experience, seriously promises something, his promise is a grave motive of trust, which does not furnish certitude, yet is weakened by no contrary reason. In moral theology, opinions uniquely probable are rare; but if there are any, by the very fact that no reason appears on the opposite side, their probability is greatly increased, so that it almost approaches moral certitude.

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl I. n. 72.

225. On opinions considered comparatively. 1. If opinions are compared with one another by reason of security from sinning where someone follows them, these distinctions must be noted:

a. That opinion is called safe which excludes the danger of formally sinning; b. that is called safer which more excludes sin; c. that is called less safe which less excludes sin. Therefore in the concurrence of opinions, of which one stands for the law, the other for liberty, the safer is that which stands for obligation, because it simply excludes the danger of sinning; the less safe is that which stands for liberty, because it does not exclude every danger of sinning.

a. That is called safe which is removed from evil and its danger; since in the present question there is question of sin, that is called safe which removes sin and its danger. The opinion for law alone is not simply safe, but both the opinion for law and the opinion for liberty can be safe.

b. Although of itself the opinion for law is safer, nevertheless from another source it can happen accidentally that the opinion for law is not safer: for on account of the difficulty of observing the law, an opinion safer in itself frequently practically induces the danger of sin.

c. A less safe opinion does not cease to be simply safe, although the opposite is safer; just as the less probable does not cease to be probable, although the opposite is more probable.

b. It is clear that it can happen that the more probable sentence at the same time is less safe, and that the safer sentence is less probable, because it can happen, and in reality sometimes does happen, that an opinion which stands for liberty is supported by graver motives than an opinion which stands for law.

2. If opinions are compared with one another by reason of probability, these distinctions are had:

a. Equiprobable opinions are called those which are supported by reasons equally or almost equally grave: for the moderate excess by which one is supported more than another does not prevent them from being called equally probable.

b. That opinion is called more probable which rests upon graver motives than its opposite, which is called simply probable or less probable.

Note. 1. In St. Alphonsus there also occurs: a. a most probable opinion, which rests upon very grave foundations; its opposite, on account of weak motives, is tenuously or doubtfully probable; b. certainly and notably more probable, whose foundations are certainly and without any hesitation much graver; its opposite is tenuously or doubtfully probable.

2. Since a notably more probable opinion and a most probable opinion are little distant from one another, they are practically equated.

3. Although a most probable opinion is not in itself morally certain, but only occupies the highest degree of probability, nevertheless practically it is equivalent to a sentence morally certain in the broad sense.

It has been already pointed out that, although we may lawfully adopt and follow a probable opinion, there is no obligation of doing so, and it will frequently be more perfect to follow an opposite opinion. It is not intended to propose probabilism as the ideal of Christian conduct; we go to ascetical writers and elsewhere for that.¹ Probabilism is especially an instrument of moral theology, to be wisely and prudently used by the confessor in the confessional, as the doctor uses his medicines in the sick room.

¹ Cf. Rodriguez, On the Practice of Christian and Religious Perfection, i, c. 8.

Theologians warn us that only experts can judge of the intrinsic probability of an opinion. Others must be content to be able to discover extrinsic probable opinions. They can do this by consulting approved authors. If they find that an opinion is held as probable by five or six authors of repute, and it has not become obsolete by new legislation, by decrees of the Holy See, or by the progress of theological opinion, they may act upon it as solidly probable. The Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1831, declared that a professor of theology or a confessor might follow in practice the opinions of St Alphonsus.

In thus adopting extrinsically probable opinions with regard to conduct, the priest or the layman only does what anyone not skilled in law would do in a difficult legal case—he would consult an expert whom he could trust.

A limitation to the use of probabilism is mentioned by theologians. When one has decided on any course of conduct, he must loyally adhere to the consequences which the decision involves. He must not use a probable opinion to gain an advantage, and then in the same matter adopt the contrary opinion in order to shake off a burden. And so when a probable opinion has been adopted in favour of the validity of a will in my behalf, I cannot also adopt a contrary opinion that the will is invalid and refuse to pay the legacies,

Opinion.—The duty of one whose state of mind is opinion is as follows:

(a) If he is able to remove every objection against his judgment or to make unimportant such objection or objections as remain, his opinion has become moral certainty (see above, 644 Sqq.), and he may follow it as a safe guide. Example: Caius promises to marry Sempronia, but his parents forbid the marriage. Caius opines that he should keep his promise, but to be sure he consults his pastor. The latter shows him that the opposition to his marriage is unreasonable, and thus sets at rest the difficulties of Caius.

(b) If a person is not able to remove one or more important objections against his judgment, his opinion has not become moral certitude, and he may not follow it as a safe guide. Example: If Caius’ pastor holds that the parents are right and Caius wrong in the question of marriage with Scmpronia, so that Caius, while still thinking he should keep his promise, has serious fears that it would be a wrong step, the young man should not follow his own view.

Those who act when their state of mind is doubt, suspicion, or uncertain opinion are: (a) guilty of sin, for they do not act in good faith (Rom, xiv. 22, 23), and they are imprudent and lovers of danger (Ecclus., iii. 27); (b) guilty of the species and gravity of sin which they fear may be in their act; for they interpretatively wish that to which they expose themselves. Example: If Titus takes an oath, fearing that his act is perjury, he is guilty of perjury before God, even though what he says is true.

Fears or objections against an opinion are unimportant as follows: (a) if they have only a slight probability (e.g., Titus opines that he is not obliged to say the second lessons, because he knows that he began them, and therefore must have said them; but he fears he may be obliged to say them, because he cannot remember the details of the lessons, and hence has probably not said them); (b) if they are improbable (e.g., Caius fears that he may have omitted Sext, although he recalls going to choir to chant at the regular times.)

Fears against an opinion are important, when they are not merely possible, but have such an appearance of truth that even a prudent man would consider them as worthy of support.

(a) Intrinsic signs of this solid probability are the good arguments by which the fear, or contrary of an opinion, is supported. Example: Titus after careful examination of conscience decides that he is not obliged to mention a theft in confession, because it happened just before his last confession; yet, he fears that he is obliged, because he does not remember having thought of restitution.

(b) Extrinsic signs of solid probability are the good authorities by whom the contrary of the opinion is defended. Example: Caius opines that he is not obliged to confess a calumny, because he is not certain that it is unconfessed; he fears that he is obliged, because St. Alphonsus, whose authority is great in Moral Theology, teaches that a grave sin must be confessed unless it is certain that it has been confessed already.

He who is moved by unimportant fears or difficulties is scrupulous, but not so he who hesitates in the face of an important difficulty. Examples: Balbus fears he may be guilty of murder, because he left a sick person for a moment and the latter unexpectedly died in his absence (scrupulous conscience). Sempronius fears he may be bound to restitution, because by his ridicule he made Titus lose his means of livelihood (disturbed conscience).

What is to be done by one who holds an opinion as to what he may or may not do here and now, but who has a serious fear that his opinion is wrong?

(a) If the fear persists as serious, when the means to remove it (such as consideration and consultation) have been duly resorted to, he should delay, if this is possible, or follow the safer course, if delay is not possible. Example: Titus must go to confession now, but he cannot recall whether or not a past theft was ever confessed; he thinks he is not obliged to mention it now, but is far from feeling certain about this, because of a serious doubt which he cannot resolve. The thing for him to do is to resolve to confess the theft as one that was perhaps unconfessed before.

(b) If the fear is removed or made unimportant, by direct means (such as theological argument from moral principles) or by indirect means (such as consultation or the use of reflex principles), the opinion may be followed. Example: If Titus, mentioned above, learns from his confessor or deduces from reliable reflex principles that he is not obliged to confess the theft, he may act with a safe conscience in following this decision.

The authority that may be safely followed by a lay person who holds an opinion, but fears that the opposite may be true, is that of anyone whom he knows to be pious, instructed and prudent; for, as it is impossible for him either to settle the question for himself or to remain in perpetual uncertainty, he must acquire certainty here as in other important affairs by consulting those who are expert and reliable. Hence, if the conscience is merely opinionative, a dependable adviser should be conferred with to make it certain.

(a) In the case of an accusing or excusing conscience, it is at least advisable that the doubtful sin be mentioned in confession, and especially by those who are not strict in their lives and who are inclined to judge their own acts and motives with leniency.

(b) In case of a forbidding or permitting conscience, it is necessary that one seek reliable information where it can be had, as from parents or teachers, and if these cannot give it, from a pastor or confessor or other priest. Example: Sempronius thinks he has a right to drink a glass of wine now and then to be sociable; but he fears he has no right to do so, as the drink occasions excitement or foolish remarks, and sometimes makes it difficult for him to get to his home safely.

The authority that may be safely followed by confessors and other priests in resolving important doubts against a moral judgment is as follows:

(a) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by all or nearly all of the approved text-books on moral teaching, it may be followed; for surely there would not be such unanimity, if the objections were really formidable.

(b) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by a goodly number (say, six or seven) of those who are considered as preeminent in Moral Theology, and who independently arrived at the same conclusion, it may be followed; for the judgment of many is better than that of one, and the certainty of authorities should prevail over the doubt of one who has not the same authority.

(c) If the opinion has the support as certain of only one theologian, it may be followed without further investigation, if he has received special mention from the Church as an authority and a safe guide. Thus, the Holy See has expressly declared that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus may be safely followed by confessors, and the approbation given to St. Thomas Aquinas as Universal Doctor makes his word more convincing than a contrary argument based on one’s own reasoning. Of course, this does not mean that these or any other private Doctors are infallible in their judgments, or that one should not depart from their teaching in a point where the Church has decided against them, or where there is a manifest reason for doing so; it simply means that they are so conspicuous among moralists for the correctness of their teaching that one who is in doubt may safely follow them unless the contrary is known to him.

But one may be unable to settle one’s difficulty by appeal to authority, as such, as in the following instances: (a) when the particular case to be decided is not considered at all in text-books, or is not considered under the circumstances that exist; (b) when the authorities speak hesitatingly about the question, and say that the opinion in question is at most probable, etc.; (c) when the authorities are about equally divided, as when a few great names are opposed to many names of inferior rank, or when those who are equal in knowledge so disagree that half are on one side, half on the other. In counting authorities, however, it is not always easy to decide who should be included, as a writer may himself be arguing from the authority of an individual or of a school, and thus he is not a distinct witness in favor of what he holds.

When a priest or other person sufficiently instructed in theology is not able to change through recourse to authority an opinionative or doubtful conscience into a certain conscience, he can still obtain certitude: (a) directly, by reexamining the question diligently and with entire impartiality, until he has discovered reasons strong enough to settle it convincingly one way or the other; (b) indirectly, by submitting the question to the arbitrament of a reflex principle that really appears true to him, and permitting it to decide between the opinion and the objection, or between the contending doubts.

45. It is not lawful practically to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable, the safer having been left aside. - This proposition is against the lax probabilists, according to whom it is licit to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. - Proof of the first part. This first is established from proposition 3 condemned by Innocent XI: "Generally, when we do something relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the limits of probability, we always act prudently." - Besides, a slightly probable opinion is an opinion resting upon a slight motive; but a slight motive is a motive by no means sufficient to move a grave or prudent man to assent, and therefore it is not truly probable. Indeed, a truly probable opinion is called that which rests upon such a motive that it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But if such an opinion is insufficient to move a prudent man to a judgment concerning the non-existence of the law, it is impossible to form for oneself a conscience concerning the licitness of the action. - Proof of the second part. Nor indeed is it lawful practically to follow a doubtfully probable opinion. For a doubtfully probable opinion is an opinion resting upon a doubtful motive, concerning which, namely, one can prudently doubt whether it is truly grave and prudent, or sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But it is evident that a prudent man, in matters of grave moment, does not rely upon a motive of this kind; hence, if the matter in fact does not turn out well, all would justly and deservedly charge him with imprudence. But the moral goodness or malice of human acts is a graver matter than any temporal business whatever. - Besides, with slight or doubtful probability standing, it is impossible to form for oneself a practical dictate morally certain concerning the licitness of the action. For a slight or doubtful reason for liberty does not remove, nor can it remove, the certainty of the law. Wherefore, the law remaining morally certain, it must wholly be observed. - L. I, n. 40.

47. It is not lawful to follow a probable opinion, concerning the very objective truth of a thing, where there is question of an end to be absolutely obtained, the safer having been left aside. - Proof. He who is absolutely bound to an end is bound to choose those means which least of all bring into danger the end to be obtained. But a probable opinion, since it can be false, brings the danger of frustrating the end which must be absolutely obtained. For the objective truth or existence of the thing will certainly not be had if the opinion about it is probable but false. Therefore. L. I, n. 42. To be absolutely obtained, "when, namely, from justice or charity someone is bound to avoid a harm which is present in the thing itself," Suarez apud St. Alphonsus, Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, loc. cit., n. 33, or the danger of it. Then certainly "in doubt the safer way is to be chosen." C. Illud 5, De Cler. Exc. The case must also be added in which someone is bound to the safer course by some special positive law or precept, or by contract, or by vow. - Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5, n. 8; s. 6, n. 10; De Censuris, d. 40, s. 6, n. 8, 9; L. l. 2, n. 10; l. 6, n. 918, p. ult.; L. l. 3, n. 700, p. 167, note, ed. P. Gaude.

51. It is lawful to follow a truly most probable opinion, and even a more probable one, the safer having been left aside, where there is question of the honesty of the action alone. - This proposition is against rigid and mitigated tutiorists. The former say: It is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be held in practice. The latter say: It is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion unless it is most probable. - The honesty of an action, about which there is question here, is quite diverse from the effect of the action itself or from the truth of the thing, about which there was question in the preceding proposition. The honesty of a human action depends upon the dictate of conscience, which is the proximate rule of human acts; the effect of the action, or the truth of the thing, depends upon the very fact of the action. The former is subjective; the latter objective. - Proof of the first part from the third proposition condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions"; the author of this proposition was John Sinnigh, October 8, 1666, a Louvain doctor and defender of Cornelius Jansen, whom other Jansenists followed. Hence it is clear that the rigid tutiorism of the Jansenists has already been reproved by the Church. And indeed no obligation is given of doing what is safer; for it suffices to do what is safe. Likewise no obligation is given, nor can one be given, always to guard against the danger of materially sinning, for this would be morally impossible; there is only an obligation to avoid the danger of formally sinning. - Proof of the second part. The first part of this proposition is against rigid tutiorists, namely Jansenists; this second part is against mitigated tutiorists, favoring Jansen and his followers. Now, if it is not lawful practically to follow an opinion for liberty unless it is most probable, then either this most probable opinion is taken for morally certain, or, as the word sounds, for probable in the highest degree indeed, but not certain. In the first case mitigated tutiorism would fall back into condemned rigid tutiorism; in the other case it would fall into a false doctrine against the Apostle, saying, "all that is not of faith," that is, from a certain persuasion of honesty, "is sin," Rom. 14:23, unless recourse is had to a reflex principle, as is explained in the following proposition; and then it is lawful to follow any probable opinion whatever. Cf. following n. 52. - L. I, n. 40, 54; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 6, n. 8; Antoine, De Consc., c. 4, q. 4.

52. It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer having been left aside, equally probable, or even truly more probable, where there is question of the honesty of the action alone, by forming for oneself a certain conscience not directly, but from reflex principles. - This proposition is against probabiliorists, who say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion for liberty unless it is more probable. It is also against equiprobabilists, who say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is certainly or notably more probable. - There is again question of the honesty of the human action alone, that is, whether the human action is licit and consequently can be placed without sin. There is not question of objective truth, whether, for example, in conferring baptism the water is true water; nor is there question of an objective effect, whether grace is conferred by such a baptism; nor of a harm to be guarded against, whether, in hunting, for example, the harm necessarily to be guarded against and avoided, namely the killing of a man, is sufficiently guarded against by such a shot. In the former case the doubt and question is only about the licitness of the subjective action; in the others the doubt and question is about the suitability of the objective action for verifying the truth of the thing, for producing the effect, for guarding against harm. - It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, not directly by forming a conscience for oneself by the force of the opinion itself. "For for acting licitly probability alone does not suffice, but moral certainty concerning the honesty of the action is required." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 55, p. 25, ed. P. Gaude. But it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion by forming for oneself a certain conscience by means of a reflex principle, by which "in practice the ultimate judgment morally certain is formed from that certain principle." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 36, p. 36, ed. P. Gaude. And thus an action which speculatively is only probably honest becomes in practice certainly morally honest. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit. But the fundamental principle of all is that of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus: "No one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept." Hence an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; and a doubtful law does not oblige, "because it is not sufficiently promulgated." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 61, p. 31, ed. P. Gaude. - Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. 6.

75. What is the force of extrinsic probability? - There is no doubt that extrinsic probability constitutes an opinion truly and sufficiently gravely probable. "Someone of little knowledge," says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 3, "is more certified about what he hears from some learned man than about what seems to him according to his own reason." This probability has force for this reason, that a person is not thought to speak without a grave foundation. L. I, n. 79, p. 59, ed. P. Gaude. Hence, if someone does not stop at authority alone, but weighs this foundation, then extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. But sometimes this extrinsic probability constitutes intrinsic probability itself, namely when there is question of a thing which greatly depends upon the estimation of the wise, L. l. 3, n. 1032, that is, of a thing rather of fact than of law, for example, what is grave matter in canonical hours, in fasting, etc.

An extrinsically probable opinion is customarily designated as a common, more common, or most common opinion. Concerning these Sanchez, De Matr., l. 3, d. 44, n. 3, has the following, from which one can form a judgment concerning a common, more common, etc., opinion: "An opinion is not called common which has several doctors asserting it, no discussion having been premised, but perfunctorily and, as they say, following it in passing... Wherefore Navarrus says very well that an opinion approved by six doctors treating the matter ex professo is to be considered more common than one approved by fifty, led almost only by the authority of the former. Add to these John Lupus... saying that doctors, however much they excel in learning, are not to be believed when they lack foundation." - La-Croix, l. 1, n. 164, 165; Muzzarelli, Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome, 1806, p. 21 seqq.

78. Is there given an opinion speculatively, not practically, probable? - Reply. Negatively, speaking per se; for the reasoning established above, n. 74, can always be made, if the opinion in itself, or speculatively, is truly probable, by which we may proceed to practical conscience itself. - Reply. Affirmatively, per accidens, if, namely, when that opinion is brought into use, there is always or almost always present some extrinsic circumstance which renders the use of such an opinion illicit, for example, danger of a fall, scandal, hallucination, etc. - Pignatelli, Cons. Can., t. 8, cons. 15; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. d. 26, n. 3; De Iust. et Iur., d. 10, n. 165, 189.

79. Can someone licitly follow in practice diverse probable opinions favorable to himself, although those opinions are opposed to one another? - It is indeed lawful, among diverse probable opinions, to choose now this one, now the opposite. But it is not lawful to choose them simultaneously, when either contradiction follows or a certain transgression of the law. The general reason for the assertion is that, if it is lawful for one person to follow one probable opinion, and for another it is lawful to follow the opposite probable opinion, the very same is wholly lawful for the same person; because for the same person in each case the law always remains doubtful. For from the fact that in one case someone used a probable opinion against the law, it does not follow that if the opposite opinion is truly probable against the law, the law becomes certain. Therefore he will be able to use this other opinion well at another time. And as someone the first time used that first opinion, so he could the first time, on the contrary, have used the opposite opinion. Therefore he will be able at another time to use the opinion which he has not yet used. Nevertheless someone cannot use an opposite probable opinion after he has used some probable opinion, if contradiction follows. The reason is that the principle of contradiction must always prevail immovably in the order of truth, whether speculative or practical. And thus, if someone has accepted an inheritance from a testament probably valid, he cannot fail to fulfill the legacies, whether pious or profane, prescribed in the same testament. For by doing this he would at the same time regard the testament as valid and as invalid. Likewise one cannot use an opposite probable opinion after he has used some probable opinion, if from this a certain transgression of the law follows. For then one cannot form one's conscience from that general principle that the law is doubtful; for then the law is certainly contained in one or the other, although in which of them it is contained cannot be determinately assigned. And thus, for example, it is probable that an irregularity is not incurred from baptism repeated, solemnly indeed, but conferred secretly; likewise it is probable that an irregularity is not incurred from baptism conferred privately but publicly before many; for both are required in order that a certain irregularity be contracted from the repetition of baptism, namely that baptism be conferred solemnly and publicly. Now who would ever say that he does not contract irregularity who first rebaptizes someone solemnly but secretly, then a third time rebaptizes him privately but before many? Likewise, if the law of abstinence urges today, and I wish tomorrow to approach Communion, and it is probable that midnight has now passed, and the opposite also is probable, it certainly is not lawful to eat meat and at the same time approach holy communion. - Elbel, De Act. hum., 190 seqq.

51. • Opinion in general is assent to one or the other with fear of the opposite; or it is adherence to one of two contradictories with fear of the other.

But probable opinion, or probable sentence, is a judgment resting on a grave motive, though with fear concerning the opposite. - But improbable opinion is a judgment which is destitute of a solid motive.

59. • It is proved 1. As to the most probable. It is clear 1. from the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius, which is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII and is of this sort: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. Therefore it is licit to follow at least the most probable opinion. Besides, in this condemned proposition there is question of a less safe most probable opinion, since no one ever denied that it is licit to follow the safer most probable one. Therefore. - It is clear 2. from the fact that according to St. Ligorius and others, where a most probable opinion is given, the opposite proposition becomes slightly probable, as was said above (no. 52) in the definition of the most probable opinion. For it is not conceived how a solid reason can stand on one side, if on the other side a most grave foundation of thinking otherwise appears. Therefore with the most probable opinion standing, a very slight fear of erring remains, and therefore, if not absolute certitude, at least some broad moral certitude of the law's non-existence is had. Therefore, etc.

It is proved 2. As to the more probable. That must be admitted as true in which all theologians agree; for it cannot be supposed that all theologians have fallen into error by unanimous consent. Moreover, if you except the very few rigorists, all agree in crowds in admitting this doctrine, at least if there is question of an opinion truly more probable.

Moreover, if you wish to inquire into the intrinsic reason of this sentence, no other solid reason seems able to be brought except that by which the following proposition concerning the liceity of the use of moderate probabilism is accustomed to be proved, namely that the law, if perhaps it is present, is altogether unknown, and therefore that it cannot oblige.

It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, with the safer one, equally probable or even truly more probable, left aside, where there is question only of the licit or illicit ⁸.

⁸ ** Thus also St. Alphonsus, who (Dissertation according to the Naples edition, year 1755), after, as he says (no. 1), to avoid ambiguities and equivocations, he set forth beforehand this definition of a more probable opinion: More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but also with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also truly probable, or gravely verisimilar, although less so; then (ibid., no. 3) writes: We undertake to prove the last, more benign and most common sentence, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one for the law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. Concerning this thesis then (ibid., no. 52) he puts forward this judgment: Our sentence, namely that it is licit to follow a probable opinion for liberty, with the more probable one left aside, is far more probable, or most probable, indeed morally or in a broad way certain. This is clear from the arguments set forth above..... These arguments indeed are each strong enough to show the moral certitude of our sentence; much more when joined together. Moreover even the Authors of the Alphonsian Vindications concede, indeed contend, that St. Doctor never changed his sentence.

This proposition can be demonstrated by a threefold genus of arguments, namely 1. from reason; 2. from authority; 3. from the consequences which flow from the opposite sentence.

74. • It is objected 9. A judge in rendering sentence must follow the more probable opinion, as is clear from the following proposition condemned by Innocent XI: I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. Therefore it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion.

I answer. The example does nothing to the matter, and I deny the consequence. The reason for the condemnation of this proposition is that a judge is constituted by authority so that he may give to each one his own right; moreover he has the greater right for whom the greater probability, or the stronger reason, favors. - St. Lig., book 4, no. 210. In order for the example to be to the matter, a case would have to be brought forward where there is question only of the licit or illicit.

75. • Besides the general principles by which the theory of probabilism was established in the preceding article, namely: An obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it, or a doubtful law does not oblige, certain special rules also are enumerated, by which those principles are confirmed, or applied in particular cases. They are the following:

I. In doubt one must stand for that for which the presumption stands. The reason is that presumption for the most part effects moral certitude, at least broad. Hence if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the Breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, the presumption favors you, and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating. Likewise if you doubt whether the Superior rightly commands or dispenses, the presumption stands for him; because he can be led by reasons unknown to you, or is considered to judge prudently concerning known reasons. Besides, right order and the common good require that in such a case deference be given to him. - Thus commonly theologians.

II. In doubt judgment must be made from things ordinarily happening. An axiom commonly received. - St. Lig. everywhere. This rule falls back almost into the preceding one, since in each presumption is the reason for judging thus. But the prior rule extends more broadly; since presumption can be drawn not only from things ordinarily happening, but also from particular circumstances. - St. Lig. ibid.

III. In doubt one must stand for the value of the act. It is a rule of civil law, commonly applied also to theological matters. This must be understood if the principal fact is certain, and there is doubt concerning some necessary circumstance or condition, or concerning the due manner: for example, if you doubt whether you confessed a sin with sufficient sorrow, you are not held to confess again. - St. Lig., book 1, no. 26, etc. This principle seems also to be understood 1. in favor of liberty, provided that a contrary presumption, or the common good of the Republic or of Religion, does not stand in the way; 2. against liberty in the external forum, or even in the internal forum, when there is question of the public good, for example of contracts, especially of matrimony. But the reason why that principle is not to be applied in every case against liberty is sought from another principle mentioned above, namely: An obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it. Moreover the obligation is not certain, unless some evident reason of justice, of Religion, of the public good, or of another end necessarily to be obtained, urges. - St. Lig., book 1, no. 26, book 6, no. 505. - Voit, no. 38.

76. • IV. In doubt favors are to be enlarged, and odious things restricted (Rule of Canon Law 15 in VI); that is, in doubt the more benign things are to be preferred. Hence according to this principle, and the more common interpretation, these things seem to be established: 1. As often as odious things and favors can be separated, odious things are to be restricted, and favors enlarged, as much as can be done without violence being inflicted on the sense of the words. 2. If odious things and favors are indivisible, then judgment must be made concerning the intention of the legislator from his words, from the subject matter, or from the adjoining circumstances. 3. If the intention of the legislator cannot be clearly determined, attention must be given more to favor than to odium. - St. Lig., book 1, no. 99.

But by odious is here understood whatever tends to punishment, or harms the right of a third party, or is opposed to common right. But favor, or favorable, whatever indulges liberty, or grants grace, without detriment to private persons, or to the community, or to the right itself.

V. In obscure matters, what is least must be held (Rule of Canon Law 30 in VI). This rule is to be understood thus: Where the true sense of a law or statute is not clear, and after inquiry has been made it cannot be determined either from the nature of the thing, or from the context of the words, or from the custom of the place, or from another circumstance, the less burdensome interpretation or the one more benign to liberty is to be admitted. The reason is that the legislator is not considered to wish to oblige beyond that which is clearly expressed in the law. Hence in doubt concerning the quantity of penalty to be inflicted, the least is to be chosen. Likewise, if the delict is not certainly clear, the accused must be absolved.

VI. In doubt of fact the following axioms, or rules of civil law received among all, are valid, namely 1. In doubt, a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. But this must be understood of doubt concerning a principal act, for example if there is doubt whether someone struck another, this fact must not be presumed, but he who affirms must positively prove it. - 2. In doubt, a fact is presumed, or that which by law had to be done is presumed to have been rightly done. This must be understood of doubt concerning an accessory act, the certitude of the principal act being supposed; for if something had to be done by law, or if it is ordinarily accustomed to be done, or is favorable to the one acting, it is presumed to have been done. - 3. In doubt no one is presumed evil, unless he is proved so. This is valid whenever there is question of doubt concerning some delict. For that must not be imputed unless it is certainly clear concerning it. The reason is that delicts are not presumed; nor is anyone presumed evil, but he must be proved so.

VII. In doubt the safer part must be followed (a rule of canon law). This rule must be restricted to cases of practical doubt, or to those in which the end is necessarily to be obtained, namely where probability would not remove the danger which the law commands altogether to be avoided, as for example in confecting the Sacraments, according to what was said above, no. 56, and is known from all the things thus far set forth ¹.

¹ Above (in the note to no. 70), with St. Alphonsus it was observed that, from the common sentence of the Doctors, this rule, or others of this kind, as to speculative doubts, is of counsel, not however of precept.

77. Resolves. - 1. It is not licit to follow an opinion only probably probable against the law, because that opinion is not properly and solidly probable ², and therefore cannot be had as a sufficient reason for rendering the law uncertain.

² If you apply the words probably probable for a merely nominal and arbitrary definition, so that you wish to signify an opinion for whose probability there militates no grave and solid reason which could move to prudent assent, let what the Author has stand. But if you use the words, as is proper, according to their proper sense, the matter stands otherwise. For to affirm something probably, by the consent of all, is the same as to assert something because of a grave, solid, and prudent reason. Therefore if you say something to be probably probable, with the proper sense of the words considered, it is necessary that you be led to affirm it by a prudent, grave, and solid reason. Therefore it is beside the matter that what you say is probable, being moved probably, that is, by a grave, prudent, and solid reason, you would deny this same thing to be properly and solidly probable. On this matter, to remove ambiguities, it is indeed useful to recall to memory what Suarez, after St. Thomas and very many Doctors of the Scholastics, admonishes (On Penance, disp. 22, sect. IX, no. 5), that in moral matters solid and prudent probability is equivalent to a certain moral certitude; precisely because in matters of this sort greater certitude cannot be had. And this indeed common practice also suggests. For is not someone believed, by common consent, to act prudently enough if he holds as probable that which he finds handed down as probable, for example, by St. Antoninus after St. Thomas, or by St. Alphonsus after Suarez, etc.? Yet what certitude at last do we have in this beyond that prudent probability which, as we have said, ought to seem sufficient in matters of this kind to each wise man?

2. It is not licit for you to follow a sentence probable to others, but actually altogether false to you ³. The reason is that if you actually judge something to be illicit, and you do it, in the present act you have a conscience of sin, and therefore you act against your conscience. Therefore that you may licitly follow the sentence of another, you must first make it your own, that is, judge it to be probably true ⁴, or its object to be probably licit. - Reuter, no. 105.

³ Thus if there is question, for example, of the sentence handed down as probable by St. Alphonsus, that there is no obligation of denouncing a Confessor who has merely consented to solicitation. For it will be altogether false to you, if you know that it was condemned by the Congregation of the Holy Office, as we shall see in its own place, and indeed that that decree of the Sacred Inquisition was confirmed by Benedict XIV (in the constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae) by Apostolic authority.

⁴ That you may make the opinion of another your own, it is not necessary that his intrinsic reasons move you to assent; but it will suffice that the authority of another induce you into a prudent doubt concerning your own sentence.

3. It is not always licit to follow any opinion whatever that is speculatively probable; because sometimes a speculatively probable opinion is not practically probable; namely, there can be an action indeed licit in itself, which nevertheless in practice becomes illicit because of danger of scandal, irreverence, injustice, etc. ⁵.

⁵ Then especially the Doctors called an opinion only speculatively probable, not practically, when the licit use of the same opinion requires those conditions which in practice can scarcely, or not even scarcely, be hoped for.

4. It is not licit to follow a probable opinion when the opposite appears most probable; because a grave motive does not seem able to stand in conflict with a most grave motive; whence such an opinion must be held as doubtfully or slightly probable ⁶.

⁶ Perhaps it will never happen that, with intrinsic reasons considered, someone judges probable an opinion whose opposite he holds as most probable; but it is otherwise if only the judgments of Authors concerning the same matter are considered. For you will certainly find that some hand down as probable, indeed hold as more probable, an opinion whose opposite others defend as most probable, and even morally certain. See St. Alph., book 6, no. 443. But then the matter itself admonishes the prudent reader that inquiry must be made more diligently into the matter; and thence it will easily appear either that the one opinion is called most probable without cause, or certainly that some probability is vainly attributed to the other, as we shall see in its own place in the cited place of St. Alphonsus.

78. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether it is licit to use probability not only in the matter of positive law, but also of divine and natural law?

I answer affirmatively, because in any matter it can happen that the existence of the law is not certain, namely whenever a true and solid probability militates against it; and therefore concerning such a law there is truly invincible ignorance. Moreover God, the author of law and the principle of the natural order, is not considered to wish to oblige us when we invincibly are ignorant of the existence of the law. - Lacroix, etc.

QUESTION 2. Whether a Confessor can, or ought to, absolve a penitent who wishes to follow an opinion indeed probable, but opposite to the sentence which he himself holds?

I answer affirmatively, if the penitent adheres to a truly probable opinion with formed conscience. The reason is that the penitent has a right of following a truly probable opinion, nor does the Confessor have a right of imposing his own opinions on him, even if they seem more probable to him. For the Confessor is not the judge of opinions which the penitent is held to follow, but is only the judge of the disposition of his penitent, as is clear from Trent, session 14, ch. 5. - Thus St. Lig., book 6, no. 604, and others commonly ⁷.

⁷ Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus says (book 6, no. 604): But the Confessor, whenever his opinion is not evidently certain, cannot oblige the penitent to follow it; whence then he not only can, but even is held to absolve him.

QUESTION 3. Whether extrinsic probability constitutes an opinion truly probable?

I answer affirmatively, at least speaking generally; indeed in questions whose solution depends very greatly on the estimation of prudent men, greater authority constitutes greater probability. For it is difficult for something to be extrinsically probable without a truly grave reason being for it. But it must reasonably be presumed that such a reason is present when many and grave Authors hold some opinion to be probable, since they are rightly considered to have looked thoroughly into the truth of the matter, and to rest on solid motives. - Hence St. Thomas: Someone of little knowledge is made more certain about that which he hears from some scientific man than about that which seems to him according to his own reason, 2. 2, q. 4, art. 8.

There is also added the authority of the Sacred Penitentiary. For when the Sacred Congregation was asked whether a Confessor who follows the doctrine of St. Ligorius, without weighing his reasons, but only because of his authority, is to be disturbed, it responded negatively; and this response was approved by the Supreme Pontiff Gregory XVI. Therefore extrinsic probability supposes intrinsic. Therefore...

79. • QUESTION 4. What must be thought concerning that principle most familiar to not a few probabilists: HE WHO ACTS PROBABLY, ACTS PRUDENTLY?

I answer. That principle, enunciated thus, is false ⁸, if it is had as a primary principle and one having force per se. The reason is that an action cannot be prudent by the force of probability alone, but has this from certitude alone. But it is true if it is had only as a consequence of another primary principle, which is per se the ultimate rule of acting, such as this one can be: There is no obligation unless it is certain concerning it.

⁸ To a question of this kind perhaps it would have been better to respond that that principle certainly could have seemed false to probabiliorists. For since according to their own system they contended that the certitude necessary for acting honestly must be sought only from the direct and innermost reasons of the subject matter, and in no way from reflex principles, they rightly and deservedly concluded that he would by no means act prudently who would put after the less verisimilar that which also appeared to him more verisimilar, as though, namely, he preferred as truer that which he himself judged less true. But now he would plainly rave who attributed these so absurd and rotten things to those innumerable and most grave Doctors to whom it was most familiar to use the principle concerning which the discussion is had. Namely, they used that saying by the same reason by which even now in many schools it is most familiar to use as a certain principle that sentence which is proposed in the present thesis, namely that he acts prudently and honestly who follows a probable opinion, even with the more probable left aside. But the principles which gave the reason of the same saying the Doctors sometimes expressed, and sometimes, as obvious and very well known, passed over in silence. Cf. Suarez (On 1.2, tr. 3, disp. 12, sect. 3, no. 3, and sect. 6, no. 8), Laymann (On Conscience, ch. 5, § 2, nos. 7 and 8), Vasquez (On 1.2, q. 62, ch. 5, no. 27, and ch. 9, no. 44), Sylvester (under Opinion, no. 1), Bartholomaeus Medina (On 1.2, q. 19, art. 6, concl. 3), Sanchez (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 9, nos. 14 and 16), etc.

QUESTION 5. How must the axiom be understood: IN DOUBT THE CONDITION OF THE POSSESSOR IS BETTER, and what is its use in forming conscience?

I answer 1. This rule, as it has been accustomed to be handed down and admitted by the Doctors in the schools, was never understood and received concerning the state of opinion, but only concerning the state of doubt taken strictly ⁹. But between doubt and opinion this difference always exists, that the former imports every kind of suspension of assent between two contradictories, while the latter imports assent to one or the other part, although not without fear of the opposite. For this reason all those things manifestly fall which Vincentius Bolgeni (Del Possesso, ch. XV), and some others after him, undertook to draw from that axiom for attacking the use of probable opinions as it was received in the schools; since the arguments applied by them rest only on this preposterous understanding of the axiom, as though, namely, the phrase in doubt also comprehended those cases in which a probable opinion gives its vote.

⁹ Thus Lugo (On Justice and Right, disp. 23, no. 110): The Doctors well observe that this proceeds when there is mere negative doubt; for if it were positive doubt, and probable reasons on each side, then the rules would have to be observed which are commonly given concerning probable conscience, and regularly the debtor can embrace the probable judgment.

** As to positive doubt, you manifestly see in this text of Lugo that probable reasons on each side are supposed. The Author himself also says the same thing clearly enough when he names assent to one or the other part not without fear concerning the opposite. Nevertheless VV. (page 37) write that the Author signifies that opinion is solitary, to which no other contradicts. Thence, certain words of St. Alphonsus having been brought forward (Moral System, book 1, no. 71), they contend that suspension of assent is present even when equally probable reasons militate on this side and on that. Response can be made: Suspension of assent concerning the force and weight of reasons which persuade that each sentence is probable is present, I deny; suspension of assent concerning the doubt whether the law then obliges is present, I deny; suspension of assent as to which opinion is truer in itself is present, let it pass. For in the present matter it is of interest to know this one thing, whether force of obliging belongs to the law when a probable opinion militates against it. But this objection of VV. is so much less to the matter, since St. Alphonsus, precisely because opinions equally probable militate on each side, concludes against Patuzzi that the law does not oblige; which likewise is altogether the conclusion which the Author with the Doctors and Cardinal de Lugo here deduces. As to the mind of St. Alphonsus, see also the note to the following no. 80.

I answer 2. Some judged, but the probabiliorists especially contended, that this axiom is valid only in the matter of justice, not however generally in the matter of other virtues, lest, namely, from this principle, which they saw was received by all, force should accrue to the other principle which they attacked, namely, that a doubtful law does not oblige, or that from an uncertain law a certain obligation cannot be induced. Thus Billuart, On Human Acts, dissertation 6, article 2.

Yet that this axiom is valid also in the matter of other virtues is the more common ¹⁰ and altogether to be held sentence; and Suarez deservedly called the opposite opinion (On Censures, disp. 40, sect. 5, no. 15) false and resting on no foundation.

¹⁰ Cf. Lugo, On Justice and Right, disp. 25, no. 110.

And indeed, as the same Suarez observes (On Vow, book 4, ch. 5, no. 7), the laws from which that rule is taken speak generally and without restriction, as in chapter In pari, 65, On the Rules of Law in VI, it is said absolutely that in any cause whatever the right of the possessor is to be preferred ¹¹.

¹¹ Thus Rule of Law 65 in VI: In an equal... cause the condition of the possessor is stronger. So also Law In pari, 128, ff., On the Diverse Rules of Law: In an equal cause the possessor ought to be had as stronger.

Then, Suarez continues (ibid., no. 8), no reason of difference is assigned, nor does it seem able to be assigned. For in the matter of justice that principle is founded either on this, that when there is doubt concerning the foundation of obligation..., there is a certain equality between the obligation of restoring and the power of retaining, and otherwise possession of the thing confers some right, and therefore the right of the possessor prevails ¹²; or it is founded on this, that because of mere doubt things are not to be changed from the ancient state in which they were existing in good faith, because since in doubt there is equality of both, there is no reason why it should oblige to one part rather than to the other; or it is founded on this, that when invincible ignorance intervenes, an excuse from obligation arises, but when doubt intervenes, ignorance of the thing concerning which there is doubt intervenes, and diligence having been applied to expelling the doubt, and the doubt nevertheless persevering, that ignorance becomes inculpable, because it was not in the power of man to drive it away, and therefore it impedes obligation; or it is founded on this, that obligation is burdensome and in its way odious, and therefore must be restricted so that it does not arise unless its foundation is morally certain, especially where other things are not equal. But all these reasons have place outside the matter of justice... Therefore.

¹² To this pertain the things which are had in § Retinendae, 4, Institutes, On Interdicts: But the advantage of possessing is in this, that even if the thing is not his who possesses, if only the plaintiff has not been able to prove that it is his, possession remains in its place: for which reason, when the rights of both are obscure, judgment is usually made against the petitioner.

All these things are declared and at the same time confirmed from the doctrine of St. Thomas, where he treats of the virtues joined to justice. For, as the holy Doctor (2. 2, q. 80, art. 1) and all the Doctors with him observe, virtues of this kind, which are also accustomed to be called potential parts of justice, have this proper to themselves, that partly they agree with justice, partly they fall short of the notion of justice. Moreover, since the notion of justice consists in this, that it renders to another what is owed to him according to equality, other virtues fall short of the notion of justice in this, that either they cannot preserve equality, as religion toward God, or that they render not a legal debt indeed, but only a moral one, without which, namely, honesty cannot be preserved; but they agree with justice in this, that they render to another what is owed to him, of which sort will be obedience toward God or toward the laws, which embraces all necessary virtues. But if there is any force to the axiom concerning which we are treating in the matter of justice, this whole force is exercised in that which is common to justice with other virtues, and which is contained by the general notion of debt, namely by defining whether, in the case of a doubtful debt, something ought to be rendered. Therefore it is manifest that this rule is equally valid in the matter of justice and in the matter of other virtues, insofar as, comprehended under obedience due to God or to the laws, they are reduced to the virtue of justice as its potential parts ¹³.

¹³ You have the use of this principle in Suarez (On 1.2, tr. 3, disp. 12, sect. 5, no. 7): If there is simply doubt about the whole law... that is, whether it has been enacted or not; ... the general rule is that it does not oblige. The reason can be sought from that principle, that in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; but man holds (namely, possesses) his liberty.... But if the law and its sense are clear, there can be doubt whether it obliges in this case; and then the general rule is that if there is no sufficient and probable reason for excusing, then one must obey the law, because it itself or the superior holds his right.

80. • QUESTION 6. If you doubt whether you have already satisfied some obligation, are you still held to satisfy it?

I answer 1. Altogether affirmatively, whenever there is question of doubt properly so called, or of negative doubt, or of practical doubt; the reason is that in such doubt it is never licit to act against the law, as follows from the principles placed above, nos. 39, 41, and 70 ¹⁴.

¹⁴ This also follows from the principle: In doubts the condition of the possessor is better. Hence Lugo (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 59): All agree in this, that he who knows that he has sinned mortally, but doubts whether he has confessed that sin, ought to confess it: for then possession is against the penitent; for the sin and the obligation of confessing are clear, but the confession is not clear. But observe here that the discussion is about negative doubt; for in the same place Lugo denies that there is an obligation of confessing when it is thought even only probably that that sin was said in confession.

— The principle of the safer part. Since the danger of fact is diminished by no probability of opinion, it is said that in morals to act and to expose oneself to the danger of doing are equivalent. Therefore no immediate application of probabilism can be made to probable judgments concerning various facts. Therefore:

1. From an action which will probably be harmful to one's neighbor, one must abstain almost as from one certainly harmful, unless you can bring forward excuses of avoiding proportionately grave harm (one's own or another's). Yet in that estimation the distinction of certain danger and probable danger can be observed.

Nor can the probable honesty of an action be confused with the merely probable existence of a condition required for that honesty. This probable existence leaves the action practically doubtful, and therefore certainly dishonest. Thus a hunter is forbidden to intend the killing of a wild animal with danger to human life; nor can we throw a thing through a window with danger, even merely probable, of harming a passerby.

2. The necessity of attaining eternal salvation demands that, if the supply is had, means be chosen only which will certainly suffice (with moral certainty strictly accepted). He who is content with probable means would gravely derogate from charity toward himself. Hence no one can be content with a baptism which is only probable.

They are accustomed in this place also to allege prop. 4, reproved by Innocent XI: "An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, is excused from unbelief." But the condemnation is not to be understood as if one ought to elicit an act of faith who perceives the Catholic religion only as more probable. For this is impossible, since the assent of faith ought to be certain above all things. But this is the sense. While by successive graces the unbeliever is drawn to faith, he cannot resist the inviting grace of God and cease from inquiry by alleging the probability which he then attributes to his unbelief; much less will he be able to do this if the superstition in which he was born now appears to him less like the truth. Or, to use another way of speaking, never, in no order of things, would this opinion have been probable: "It is permitted to adhere to a religion which is known to be less probable." But now it cannot happen that, for one believing, the credibility of religion is only probable.

3. The reverence owed to the sacrament, and often also an obligation of justice and charity, demand that we procure the certain validity of a sacrament by moral diligence. This moral diligence must be weighed from the necessity, dignity, rarity of the sacrament, and from the ease or difficulty of obtaining certainty. Thus the disposition of a penitent, the genuineness of wine for Mass, the truth of water for baptism, ought to be established in unequal measure. Besides, that principle is tempered by this other one: the sacraments were instituted for men. Wherefore, as often as the good of the faithful seems to have to be preferred to care for a valid sacrament, it is altogether permitted to abandon this care in order that you may procure that good. Therefore, in order wholly to avoid the danger of idolatry, it will never be lawful consciously to put forward doubtful matter for confecting the Eucharist, especially since the Eucharist does not have necessity of means; but often it will be necessary to confer a doubtful baptism, a doubtful absolution, upon one dying.

4. All physicians or surgeons who employ only probable medicines when certain ones are at hand are lacking to the debt of justice. And they will sin more gravely if uncertain medicines can at the same time be harmful. Nor, with strict harm to his own body, can a sick man renounce his right. Wherefore not even with the sick man's consent will it be permitted to try medicines for the sake of experiment, if either life or health would be much endangered thereby.

— Exceptions which permit the use of probability of fact. Nevertheless probability of fact can suffice for the honesty of an action:

1. Where the Church can and wills to supply by her authority a condition required of itself for validity. Thus, "in positive and probable doubt, whether of law or of fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction for both the external and the internal forum" (c. 209).

2. With a legitimate dispensation acceding, which renders the honesty certain. Thus, even when there is question of invalidating and inhabilitating laws, "in doubt of fact, the Ordinary can dispense in them, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense" (c. 15).

3. When no certain reason obliges one to forestall the danger of error, even material error: as the danger of involuntary emission of seed.

4. When, on account of various opinions concerning liceity in such and such a case, the probability of fact can be converted into probability of law.

Thus, not only when you have done a work by which a vow is probably fulfilled; when you have recited the canonical hours in such a mode or time that you have probably satisfied the law; but also if it is probable, though not certain, that the vow has in fact been fulfilled, that the breviary has been recited, a probable opinion judges that you are relieved of the burden, because the obligation does not remain except as uncertain, and it would be little human to oblige you to repeat what you have probably already performed. Therefore, because of this probable opinion, and not as if an immediate use of probabilism then offers itself, practically you will have to do nothing further.

What if there was an obligation of justice? Does he who probably paid what he owed from justice now owe nothing, or will he at least, in proportion to the doubt, have to supply what perhaps he did not pay? Although this is approved by some sense of honesty and therefore is to be urged, and appears to us speculatively truer, nevertheless the matter is disputed; and, because of the disagreement of doctors, a debtor who refuses to supply anything will be able to estimate himself safe.

And observe that practically it does not matter whether the action whence the doubt draws its origin is culpable or not. Certainly it is not permitted to use a less secure way for sending owed money to a creditor. Yet if you have done so badly, as long as it is probable that the money thus sent has arrived, the debtor will be held by no practical obligation.

— On the simultaneous use of opposite probabilities. It is customary to ask whether it is permitted or not to use contrary probabilities. And the following cases are proposed:

a) Two testaments affected by the same defect of form, so that both are probably valid, probably null. Is it permitted to Titius, on account of his own utility, to hold one as valid, the other as null?

b) A testament is formless. Can the legatee accept the legacy because the testament is probably valid, but not fulfill the burdens which are imposed upon the legatee, because the testament is probably null?

c) Two foods are set out on a day on which one or the other is certainly prohibited, but which one it is can no longer be distinguished. Is it permitted to Titius to take both ¹, or either one?

d) On a fast day, Titius, using the opinion which denies that the hour of dinner pertains to the substance of the fast, takes a full refection in the morning. Can he take another full one in the evening, because according to the more severe opinion, by the morning dinner the fast of that day has been substantially broken, so that the observance of the fast on that day has been made impossible?

e) On the night on which a feast day follows a day of abstinence (v.g., on the night between the vigil of Pentecost and Pentecost), Titius, from the diversity of clocks, estimates as probable that the feast day has already and has not yet arrived. Can he eat meat as on a feast day, and recite Compline and approach the holy Eucharist because, at the time when he ate meat, the feast day probably had not yet arrived?

Answer. - First of all, this must be observed, that these questions pertain to probabilism neither proximately nor properly. If you except the fourth case concerning full refection on a fast day, all the rest directly allege probability of fact, and suppose that the use of a formless testament, of food probably (by probability of fact) forbidden, and an estimation of days from a private clock, are permitted. This supposition being made, now the question arises: is it lawful to use contrary probabilities? For the morality of an action which uses those probabilities must be examined directly. And its goodness or malice can be certain, or can be uncertain but probable. Therefore the individual cases must be weighed.

a) The two testaments are two causes numerically fully distinct. Moreover it is established from another source that Titius is permitted, according to his judgment or utility, to hold both testaments as valid or invalid. Therefore, while he treats one as valid and the other as invalid, he makes two options which, taken separately, are honest. And because they are joined to each other by no bond, nothing hinders the honesty of each.

Yet one must abstain from a scandalous variety of option, which is commanded by motives scarcely honest. Besides, the right administration of justice demands that a judge not change his jurisprudence without reason;

b) No probable opinion permits that a legatee consider a testament at the same time as valid and as invalid. For of the two opinions brought forward in this matter, one says that the whole testament, with legacies and burdens, is valid; the other says that the whole testament falls. Therefore the legatee makes an option whose honesty is by no means probable;

c) We think it must be said thus. Probability of fact - it is like the truth that such food is the food which I know to be certainly forbidden - creates a serious danger of violating the law. Wherefore this holds: "In morals to do and to expose oneself to the danger of doing are equivalent." Wherefore, unless I am excused by proportionate inconvenience, it will be permitted to me to eat neither food. Yet the inconvenience can be taken more benignly than if food certainly illicit were set out.

Yet there will be those who think differently. Most will say that mixed dishes from both foods are prohibited, because a dish composed of meat and fish is forbidden by certain law. All also will condemn him who indeed lets the bodies be separated, but has introduced confusion among them artificially: for we are forbidden to make fraud against the law. But if the confusion has occurred by chance, some will permit partial use, others successive total use;

d) Titius could honestly choose the morning dinner under the sole account of the one refection. By that choice the other dinner was excluded. Besides, both opinions concerning fasting have this in common, that they permit only one full refection. While the more severe opinion prohibits the morning dinner under grave sin, it by no means permits another full refection to one acting according to the more benign opinion. Wherefore this cunning of Titius is defended by no probable reason;

e) The difficulty of accurately knowing the time is the cause why, when a more certain indication is lacking, it is permitted to estimate time from clocks even private ones. Hence it happens that clocks, though improperly, are said to be probable doctors ¹. Moreover the most common opinion, which C. de Lugo ¹ attempts to declare by a very subtle reason, solves the case of Titius thus. Titius could not eat meat except as on a feast day. But food taken on a feast day prohibits subsequent communion on that day. Therefore it is not permitted to him to choose both the eating of meat and communion at the same time.

Yet in reality the respects of each fast, ecclesiastical and eucharistic, are diverse and can be separated of themselves. Why must they be joined in the estimation of the day? An intrinsic argument is desired. This at most can be said: because of the material affinity of each cause and a sort of congruence, the reasonable mind of the legislator is that they be joined. This reason seems sufficiently weak to us.

Certainly Lehmkuhl himself permits this, I, 205: He who, needing food and judging Friday to have passed, therefore eats meat and renounces the right of communicating, if afterward he is warned by another clock, in which he can equally trust, that he probably ate on Friday, can, by correcting his error, change his purpose and in the morning be refreshed with the Most Holy Eucharist.

Nor shall we condemn him who, using a discrepancy of clocks, eats meat as on a feast day and recites Compline as on the vigil. Why cannot distinct probabilities be applied to distinct actions?

¹ As if he should pronounce successively concerning each food: this food is probably licit.

¹ To him for whom only one clock is available, he must follow this; nor, unless perhaps there is question of one moment, can he presume that the later hour is indicated by another good one. For when another probable doctor is absent, we must follow the only one who is present.

¹ De Eucharistia, 3, 15, nn. 47, 52, 53.

— On neutral time. Matters must also be judged more benignly where the law itself permits a varied option of time. Canon 33, § 1 permits this: "in private celebration of Mass, in private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving Holy Communion, and in observing the law of fast or abstinence, although the usual computation of the place is otherwise, one can follow the time of the place, or local time, whether true or mean, or legal, whether regional or another extraordinary time." And we have thought it consonant with the mind of the legislator that we should transfer this ample faculty also to indulgences and festive rest (Summa novi iura, n. 19. Cf. also Claeys Bouuaert, Selecta capita Codicis, n. 15).

By that disposition the legislator seems to us to have introduced, for these various actions or offices, a time almost common between two days or two parts of a day, which, as if neutral, can be attributed to either day or part of a day. Wherefore nothing prohibits that, according to true time, you recite the breviary; according to mean time, you observe the law of abstinence; and according to legal time, you attend to the eucharistic fast.

80. All theologians, at least the more recent, teach that the use of probability is not lawful in any matter whatever; for there are circumstances in which, antecedently to every doubt, the law of choosing safer things possesses (cf. n. 42 and 54).

For easier understanding of the question, a threefold danger in the use of a probable opinion must be distinguished, namely danger of error, of sin, and of an evil effect (Vind. Alph., P. I, c. 1, § 1, a. 1, n. 3).

1. The danger or fear of error, with which the danger of materially violating the law is necessarily connected, is always present in the use of a probable opinion, as is clear from the very notion of probability. But such a danger, when moral diligence for finding the truth has been made, we neither can nor are bound to avoid, because the error, if it is present, is invincible (cf. n. 95).

2. The danger of sinning formally is wholly removed in doubt of mere law by reflex principles. For conscience, relying on these principles, drives away practical fear and forms for itself a certain and prudent dictate concerning the honesty of its action, as was shown above (n. 38-39) and will be confirmed below.

3. Another danger, diverse from formal transgression of the law, can intervene in doubts of fact, namely the danger of some damage or evil, temporal or spiritual, on the part of the thing. Thus, for example, homicide embraces both moral evil, or sin, and physical evil, or grave damage, which is inflicted on the neighbor by deprivation of life. Here the matter concerns this last danger.

81. Principle. Whenever in doubts of fact there intervenes danger of damage or evil which does not depend on conscience and which we are certainly bound to avoid, the use of any probability whatever is unlawful, and the safer part is to be followed. So commonly, against certain laxists.

Proof. It is not lawful to expose an end absolutely to be pursued (such as that concerning which the matter here is) to the danger of frustration. But, the safer part being left aside, a danger of that sort (in the case) is not avoided; for, whatever may be true concerning the probability of the opinion, that danger perseveres in the thing itself; nor can it be removed by reflex principles, since it does not depend on the conscience or persuasion of the agent, but on the fact itself.

Thus an opinion, however probable, cannot make what is not a sacrament be a sacrament, or make what is rather poison be medicine.⁸ Namely, in cases of this kind, the matter is not about a doubtful law, but about a certain law, which forbids us to incur the danger of disturbing another from the certain possession of his right. Wherefore St. Alphonsus: "If," he says, "an arrow is shot in probable doubt whether that object is a man or a beast, one does not act against a doubtful law, but against a certain law: for in such a case the law is certain, that the life of one's neighbor, who has a certain right not to be injured, not be cast into probable danger" (H. Ap., I, 68).

We said: Danger of evil which we are bound to avoid; for sometimes there are just causes of permitting evil, indeed of creating the danger itself from which evil may arise: either because between two evils the lesser must be chosen, or because the safer part is judged morally impossible, or because the neighbor is not in certain possession of his right. In cases of this kind, it is lawful, the safer opinion being left aside, to choose the less safe (cf. n. 315).

82. But the necessity of an end absolutely to be pursued can arise from the law, whether of religion, justice, or charity, either toward oneself or toward one's neighbor. Whence the following flow:

Corollaries. I. In the conferral of the sacraments the minister cannot, concerning their value, use an opinion either probable or even more probable; but he is bound to follow a safe opinion, such as one which is either safer or morally certain. This is clear from the first proposition proscribed by Innocent XI: "It is not unlawful in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the value of the sacrament, the safer being left aside."⁹ The reason for the condemnation is that to confer a sacrament with only a probable opinion is contrary not only to charity, on account of the danger of grave harm, but also to religion and the reverence owed to the Author of the sacraments.

Except 1. If necessity urges, and by the use of an opinion even slightly probable concerning the value of the sacrament, the salvation of the neighbor is better consulted. For since men are not for the sacraments, but the sacraments for men, it is lawful to expose them to the danger of frustration, so that in this way, in the best way possible, help may be given to the salvation of a man certainly in danger. Hence, when certain matter is lacking, an infant who is in danger of death must be baptized with doubtful matter. Yet he is to be baptized under condition, lest injury be inflicted on the sacrament if perhaps it is made invalidly.¹⁰

2. Unless the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply: which indeed can be done either in the sacrament of penance, if from a just cause it is administered with jurisdiction probable by probability of law; or in the sacrament of marriage, if there is present an impediment introduced by ecclesiastical discipline, also probable by probability of law.¹¹ But when the Church supplies, there is practically moral certitude, and therefore the sacrament is to be conferred not under condition, but absolutely. See more in the Treatise on Penance and on Matrimony.

Note. The question is whether in the reception of the sacraments it is lawful to use a probable opinion. Some affirm; but others not undeservedly deny, both because it is against the reverence due to the sacraments to expose them to danger of frustration, and because the opposite opinion can almost never be brought into practice without detriment to one's own soul (I, 51).

83. II. It is not lawful to use a probable opinion in danger of one's own damage, whether spiritual or temporal, necessarily to be avoided.

Hence: 1. In things necessary for salvation by necessity of means, for example in the matter of faith, the safer religion must be followed, which, without doubt, is our Catholic religion. The reason is that in things absolutely necessary for salvation, persuasion of conscience does not remove the danger of damnation. Therefore in these things the axiom has force: No security is too great where eternity is in danger. And the following fourth proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "An infidel not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity."¹²

2. In a proximate occasion of sin, and generally in every probable danger of sinning formally, the safer thing must similarly be chosen, as will be explained more fully in its place (n. 373 ff.). Hence it is unlawful to follow several opinions which are indeed speculatively probable, but which, with attention to the common or special fragility of the one acting, are in practice certainly joined with probable danger of a fall into formal sin. Opinions of this kind are concerned with reading prohibited books, with kisses, touches, dances, comedies, the matter of simony, etc.

3. In danger of life it is not lawful, without necessity, to expose oneself to probable death, for example, by taking food probably harmless and probably poisonous.¹³

84. III. It is not lawful to follow a probable opinion in danger of spiritual or temporal harm to the neighbor, whenever the neighbor is in certain possession of his right.

Wherefore: 1. on account of the scandal of the neighbor, we are sometimes bound to observe a law which probably or even certainly does not exist.¹ Hence St. Paul (1 Cor. 8:13): "Wherefore," he says, "if food scandalizes my brother, I will not eat flesh forever, lest I scandalize my brother."

2. In healing, the physician is bound to apply the safer remedies. But if the case were desperate, it is sufficiently probable that it is lawful to use a doubtful remedy, that is, one probably going to help and probably going to harm; because, in a case of this kind, some hope of life is to be preferred to the danger of hastening death. But for the sake of experiment alone it is not lawful to apply wholly uncertain and untried remedies to the sick, even to the desperate, with danger of gravely harming them (I, 44 ff.).

3. In the direction and care of souls, the confessor is bound, regularly, to follow benign opinions, which commonly remove penitents more from the danger of formal sin. "But where benign opinions render proximate the danger of formal sin, as are some opinions of authors, for example, as to avoiding proximate occasions, and others of that kind; then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he himself, as a physician of souls, is bound to use the safer opinions, which conduce to preserving penitents in the state of grace" (I, 83; VI, 456).

4. In civil judgment, if neither party possesses, the judge is bound to render sentence in favor of that party for whom the more probable opinion stands. The reason is that the judge, by divine and human precept, must render to each his right, according to the greater weight of reasons which favor each one. Hence proposition 2 was condemned by Innocent XI: "I think it probable that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable."² But if the cause of each litigant seems equally probable, he must divide the contested thing, or its price, equally. The reason is that he himself is not the master of the things, but the distributor according to the rights of the parties. Hence proposition 26 was condemned by Alexander VII: "When litigants have for themselves equally probable opinions, the judge can accept money for rendering sentence in favor of one rather than the other"³ (I, 47).

Note. It was said: a) In civil judgment; because in criminal cases, where the matter concerns inflicting a penalty, especially a capital one, among opposed probable sentences the sentence favoring the accused must always be followed, even if it is less probable; otherwise the judge would expose himself to the danger of condemning an innocent man, which is intrinsically evil. b) If neither party possesses; because if one of the litigants possesses the thing in good faith, and has for himself a probable reason, he cannot be despoiled, even if the other adduces more probable reasons for himself. For legitimate possession gives the possessor a certain right of retaining the thing, until the right of the other is evident (I, l. c.; IV, 210). Cf. above n. 45.

5. In hunting, the hunter who doubts whether that which he sees in the forest is a wild beast or a man cannot strike it, even if he thinks it more probable that it is a wild beast.

The same must be said in similar cases (I, 52).

The theologians, for whom there is morally one and the same sense concerning the use of probability where the matter concerns the danger of an evil absolutely to be avoided, by no means concur in the same opinion in the treatment of the present question; but different men devise different systems, which more or less favor either law or liberty. These systems must now be set forth briefly, so that afterward the system of St. Alphonsus may be better understood, and both the truth and the security of that system may become more clearly known.

87. • Up to this point we have proved that the moderate use of a probable opinion is licit. Further, now it is asked here whether it is also expedient for the salvation of souls to follow benign opinions rather than rigid ones. Concerning this the following rules are handed down.

I. In general: 1° "Where it is a question of removing a penitent from the danger of formal sin, the confessor must, generally speaking, and insofar as Christian prudence suggests" (elsewhere¹ he says more expressly: "insofar as Christian prudence concedes"), "use benign opinions." 2° "But where benign opinions render nearer the danger of formal sin, . . . then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he himself, as a physician of souls, is bound to use, the safer opinions, which lead penitents to be preserved in the state of grace."² Yet as to the manner let him observe this distinction: where the probable danger of sin is present only doubtfully, he is bound altogether to persuade safer opinions; but where such danger is certainly present, he is bound altogether to oblige them to be followed. Moreover, of this kind are some opinions, probable but dangerous in practice, in the matter of the Sixth Precept, concerning touches, kisses, dances, comedies, the repression of sensual motions, the avoiding of proximate occasions, readings dangerous with respect to faith or morals, and similar matters.³

II. As to perfection. Certainly it is more perfect to follow the safer opinions wherever they contain acts of greater virtue and do not give occasion to anxieties and scruples. Hence, generally speaking, we ought to counsel the use of opinions of this kind, as of counsels, when penitents show themselves prepared to follow safer things and prudence dictates that this will profit them.⁴

101. The use of probable opinions must be regulated with the greatest prudence, so that it may be conformable to right reason; for it easily provides occasion for abuse, so that Probabilism, or even Equiprobabilism, degenerates into Laxism, if merely probable opinions without selection are also applied to cases in which a determinate end must be attained absolutely, or if doubtfully or lightly probable opinions are too easily admitted as truly and solidly or almost equally probable, as happened in the seventeenth century and even today sometimes occurs.⁷

⁷ Th. M. fundamentalis, n. 384.

Now, 1) to avoid the first, one must carefully attend in practice whether there is not present a case concerning the validity of an act or the necessity of a means for an end absolutely to be obtained, because such cases occur much more frequently than appears at first sight.

2. To avoid the other, it is asked: what opinion in practice can be held as seriously and sufficiently probable?

To solve this question one must know that, by reason of the principle or motive on which it rests, probability is intrinsic if it rests on reasons taken from the very nature of the thing to be examined (properties, causes, effects, inconveniences of the opposite part); or extrinsic if it rests on the authority of others. The latter supposes the former, and lasts so long as the former can be presumed; for we therefore admit what others affirm because we hold them learned and truthful. But if it is established that they are in error or rest on altogether weak foundations, their authority for this case vanishes.⁸

⁸ "The intrinsic force of reasons must principally be attended to; for extrinsic authority does nothing other than bring a presumption of intrinsic force." St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 80.

Now, a) concerning intrinsic probability, not indeed of fact but of doctrine, only the learned can rightly judge, and indeed not the moderately learned, but those very versed in moral matters. For them, that is probable which, all things having been duly and diligently considered, and the reasons on the opposite side compared with one another, appears as uncertain and yet resting on grave reasons.

b) Concerning extrinsic probability, the learned and the unlearned can judge. For the latter, that is probable or even practically certain which is said to them by a learned man (especially if he has authority for directing morals, for example, by a pastor or confessor), if there is no serious reason for doubting his skill or the probability of his statement. For since they cannot weigh the reasons, they act prudently by following the judgment of him concerning whose knowledge and truthfulness they have no reason for doubting. Hence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 8 ad 2: "someone of little knowledge is made more certain concerning what he hears from someone scientific than concerning what seems to him according to his own reason." But if a reason for doubting is present, for example because the unlearned person sees that it is against common doctrine or the mode of acting, he is held to inquire further.

c) For the moderately learned, i.e., not only for theologians, but also for pastors and confessors, extrinsic probability must be judged not so much from the number of authors as from their merit: authors must not so much be counted as weighed.⁹ On this let Tanquerey be heard, conformably to the warning of Benedict XIV:

⁹ They ask whether a "probably probable opinion" is sufficiently probable so that we may licitly act according to it. If the obvious sense is taken, so that the word probably is taken in the same sense as probable (as it must be taken in the same context), it is illicit, because "probability concerning the probability of an opinion does not pour probability into the opinion itself." Thus Marc and Beaudoin. But if probably is taken in the strict philosophical sense, for that which is much more probable or as it were practically certain, it could be sustained, and Noldin (n. 27) and Vermeersch (n. 363) seem to understand it thus.

"Confessors especially are held to apply themselves to this kind of study... Wherefore Benedict XIV admonishes them 'that in a doubtful matter, they not rely upon their own opinion, but, before they decide the case, consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid, and then come down into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms' (Const. apost. de praep. ad Iub. a. 1750, § 21). a) Namely, they should not rely upon their own opinion, which is often fallacious: for more wisdom is found in the judgment of many than in that of one. b) They should consult very many books, more easily to guard against the same inconvenience: for what could escape one author does not so easily escape many, especially if they do not belong to the same school, but to diverse schools; for experience establishes how easily authors of the same school, without further examination, confidently repeat the opinions and arguments of their predecessors! c) Moreover, they should choose those books whose doctrine is more solid, which, namely, by knowledge, prudence, and piety, have gained for themselves a greater reputation, and have weighed the matter expressly, not in passing... d) They should come down into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Whence, insofar as it can be done, both intrinsic reasons and extrinsic authorities must be attended to: the arguments brought forward should be critically weighed with attention to the circumstances of places and times; and generally speaking, the authority of theologians should not be esteemed more than the weight of the reasons which they bring forward. Nevertheless, if by the common doctrine of all schools some conclusion is confirmed, by that very fact it has great probability, even independently of the arguments brought forward; nor must one depart from it unless a new reason is brought into the open which until now was unknown."¹⁰

¹⁰ "Extrinsic probability must be estimated more from the merit and erudition of the doctors, and also from their study and diligence in investigating the truth of the matter, than from their number; for ten or more authors can hold some opinion whose authority contributes scarcely anything more to its probability than the authority of one, whom perhaps they followed without examination and discussion of the matter." Thus Aertnijs, Th. M., t. I, n. 62, from the Diss. of St. Alphonsus, a. 1763, nn. 84-88.

102. Practical rules. - Recent theologians almost all hand down the same rules. Generally in practice, that doctrine can be judged certainly or at least seriously or gravely probable which, with the Church tolerating it:

a) either is commonly or by most authors asserted as such, although not as more probable;

b) or that which some great theologian2 (for example, St. Thomas, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, Sylvius, Banez, Suarez, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, St. Alphonsus, etc.) testifies3 to be probable, i.e., rightly to be held as such by others;

c) or that which five or six grave and approved authors, namely, men distinguished by probity and knowledge,4 i.e., those whose doctrine, prudence, probity, and faith are everywhere acknowledged, hold absolutely as true; - or assert to be truly probable, if this is not very much called back into doubt by others.

On the contrary, that doctrine is improbable or only thinly, lightly, or doubtfully, and not sufficiently probable:

1. which even many theologians have held, if it is reformed by a decree of the Church, or if to someone on account of most grave reasons it seems certainly false;

2. which one or another author hands down, but several contradict;

3. which five or six authors only hold as probable, if as to this assertion their authority is doubtful, either because against them stands a grave reason which they have not solved, or because others strongly contradict, or because it is not sufficiently established whether they have carefully examined the question; for often they call an opinion probable solely because it is held as such by another;¹¹

¹¹ "The doctors judge an opinion doubtfully probable: 1. if there is doubt concerning the gravity of the reasons; 2. if wise men commonly doubt concerning that probability; 3. if the authority of the doctors who affirm or hold the opinion as probable is doubtful; 4. if the reason of the doctor who defends it does not seem sufficiently firm; 5. if it is a singular opinion brought forth by an author, without his bringing forward a sufficient reason; 6. if one or another hands it down, but several contradict." Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol. mor., book I, de consc., q. 113.

4. a fortiori something is not probable because it is taught by one recent author; whence Alexander VII condemned the proposition (27): "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable" (cf. St. Thomas, Quodl. III, 10).

Yet an exception is made:

a) a general one: if one very learned, prudent, and diligent in examination, and not a lover of novelties, brings forward valid reasons which others have not considered or have not sufficiently solved, and he himself conveniently solves the opposite reasons;¹²

¹² Cf. St. Alphonsus, diss. of the year 1755, n. 117; and diss. of the year 1763, n. 86.

b) a special one, for St. Alphonsus: from the decree of the Sacred Penitentiary, 5 July 1831, a confessor,¹³ while administering the sacrament of Penance, can safely in conscience follow all the opinions of St. Ligorio, even if he does not examine the reasons, but solely because he himself teaches them. And the same is valid a fortiori concerning St. Thomas. - This, however, must not be understood without discretion: for it is not valid for opinions which the author himself, in the case St. Alphonsus, reformed; nor, a fortiori, for those which the Church reformed; nor for opinions contrary to a just civil law or to a new ecclesiastical law; nor for those which appear certainly false to someone.

¹³ Even he who has sworn to defend Probabiliorism, as was answered on 19 Dec. 1855.

The aforesaid rules must not be extended more broadly but must be urged strictly, and the more strictly because in our days so many theological writings and responses are published that much more easily than before five or six recent authors are found to assert the sufficient probability of some opinion, especially if they are of the same school, all the more because rather often they do nothing except copy out another recent author.

103. Practical corollaries. - 1. A lightly probable opinion is not to be attended to except in extreme necessity, in which, more certain remedies failing, even extreme and lightly probable things are to be attempted in order to attain the end; for in those circumstances this is now the safer thing.

2. In a practical doubt, probability for acting does not suffice, but one must have certitude; whence one must inquire concerning the truth, and otherwise act more safely. Hence, as to the observance of ecclesiastical law:

a) while the hour of the precept is positively doubtful, one must inquire concerning it, even if diverse clocks indicate differently, for diverse clocks do not suffice to remove a practical doubt. Only in the case in which certitude will be impossible can, from custom, diverse clocks be held as diverse probable opinions;¹⁴

¹⁴ Vermeersch, Th. M., t. I, n. 370.

b) where two foods, of which one is prohibited and the other permitted, can no longer be distinguished, an insoluble practical doubt is present; wherefore one must act more safely and abstain from both - unless there is present so grave an inconvenience; but then it will be licit, not on account of the doubt, but on account of the inconvenience.¹⁵ 3

¹⁵ Ibid.

3. A fortiori it is illicit voluntarily to bring about an insoluble practical doubt concerning the law and nevertheless not to observe it, although, once the doubt has arisen involuntarily, it can be licit not to observe it. Hence if someone does not know whether midnight is at hand or has passed, he is held first to inquire into the truth; if he neglects this, he will sin unless he acts more safely and observes the doubtful law. Thus one who is uncertain, for example, cannot drink unless by renouncing communion on the following day; and if he has drunk, he is held to abstain from it, unless nevertheless after the fact it is established certainly that it had not yet been midnight. On the contrary, he who has drunk in good faith, thinking nothing about the hour, and in the morning doubts whether he is fasting, is not held to observe the law and will be able to communicate.

4. In the direction of one's own life, for each one (unless someone were a Probabiliorist) it is of itself licit, in the same matter, now to follow one solidly probable opinion, now another solidly probable opinion opposed to the former, successively or in diverse cases or acts; because each is sufficiently safe and secure. For example, in one case he can accept the inheritance of an informal testament because, before the judge's sentence concerning nullity, it is probably valid, and, in another case, pursue the annulment of another informal testament to be declared by a judge, because it is null.

Nevertheless per accidens it is illicit, by reason of scandal, or by reason of simultaneity, namely if someone uses opposite opinions at the same time, in the same case and act, or in the same individual thing and action, so that from this a certain obligation or the right of a third party is certainly violated. Thus, for example, someone cannot accept an inheritance from an informal testament because it is valid, and refuse the burdens to be fulfilled under the pretext that the same testament is null; for it is certain that he who takes the inheritance must also take upon himself the annexed burdens.

Likewise it is illicit to reason thus: it is probable that it is not yet midnight of the feast of Pentecost; therefore it is probable that I can take a collation and communicate in the morning. But it is also probable that it is midnight; therefore I can eat meat, and from the prior opinion communicate in the morning. For in no way can it be probable that I can eat meat and communicate in the morning, because for this it would be required that it be probable that it is midnight and at the same time that it is not.

Likewise, supposing two probable opinions, of which one says that today one must fast, the other that today one need not fast but tomorrow, it would not be licit today to embrace the second opinion and not fast, and tomorrow to embrace the first opinion and again not fast, because certainly the same numerically one law is violated. The same would hold for one who on Thursday, having heard twelve at night on one clock, omitted compline because he was no longer held to recite, and wished to eat meat because he had not yet heard the twelfth hour on another clock.

3. Almost thus Lehmkuhl, Th. M., I, n. 205; Noldin, Th. M., I, n. 243; Vermeersch, Th. M., I, n. 374; Th. Mechl. M. gen., ed. 5, n. 20, II. In the same way a priest could not consume a doubtfully consecrated host before the consumption of the most Precious Blood, lest he voluntarily induce a state of doubt concerning the natural fast with danger of violating the law.

1. Do not say: even in the first case, where there are two testaments, some right is certainly violated. - That indeed would be true if one testament were held valid of itself, and another invalid of itself; but not if one, before the sentence of the judge, is judged probably to retain validity, and another after the sentence is altogether invalid, because by the intervention of the judge the invalidating law obtains its full force.

104. Observation. - The rules indicated above generally are accustomed to be handed down by the more recent theologians,¹⁶ even Probabilists; but not all always sufficiently regard them in practice, nor apply them constantly, by which it happens that even laxer opinions are sometimes judged probable.

¹⁶ Thus, for example, Lehmkuhl, Ballerini, Aertnijs, Genicot, Noldin.

Specifically, a) by saying of certain opinions that "they perhaps are probable," or that "they do not dare to confess that they are altogether improbable," they implicitly suggest to readers that those who follow them are not to be condemned, whereas on the contrary according to what has been explained they ought to conclude that the opinions are little and doubtfully probable, and consequently not sufficiently and practically probable, nor generally able to found a rule of acting prudently.

b) In the past century, a certain theologian of a sufficiently great name, while the stricter opinion seemed certainly more probable, strove with all his strength through rational arguments to show that the more benign one was nevertheless intrinsically probable; and, on the contrary, while that one did not seem to rest on valid arguments, he tried to heap up a long series of authors for the extrinsic probability nevertheless to be preserved for it against everything. This is not sincerely to seek the truth.

c) Similarly, what service does it render if a theologian of the best reputation shows well that a certain too benign opinion has no probability for itself, indeed is false; and nevertheless he does not cease to acknowledge some extrinsic probability for it in practice, because some five or six authors said it was probable? But some authors do not make serious extrinsic probability, unless they are truly distinguished, have carefully examined the matter, and do not pronounce from the authority of others alone. But if it is established that the opinion is not founded, by that very fact the probability of the opinion vanishes.

Such a procedure hinders every progress of moral science, which would be reduced to reciting the opinions of authors, without their probability ever being able to cease, unless by the intervening judgment of the Church.

Probability is divided in many ways, but four divisions are chiefly considered here. Therefore it is:

1st. Intrinsic or extrinsic, according as it rests proximately either upon reasons deduced from the nature of the thing, or upon authority. It is called proximately, because extrinsic probability necessarily supposes intrinsic probability; namely so far does the authority of Doctors have force, insofar as it can or ought to be judged that they were moved to hold some opinion by some grave reason.

2nd. Speculative or practical, according as it regards the action considered in itself, namely without attending to those concrete circumstances which are commonly joined to it, or rather according as these circumstances are well weighed in each particular case.

3rd. Of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the law itself, or rather some fact.

4th. Greater, equal, or lesser, according as the foundations upon which some probable proposition rests, comparison having been made with its contradictory, appear more solid, equally solid, or less solid. Cf. Lehmkuhl, n. 79.

Besides the general principles by which the theory of probabilism has been established above, namely: an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it, or, a doubtful law does not oblige, there are also recounted some special rules by which those principles are confirmed, or are applied in particular cases. They are the following:

I. In doubt one must stand for him for whom presumption stands. The reason is that presumption produces moral certainty, at least broad certainty; and in this sense alone the cited principle or rule ought to be understood. Hence if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the whole Breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, the presumption favors you, and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating it. Likewise, if you doubt whether a superior justly commands or dispenses, presumption stands for him; because he can be led by reasons unknown to you, or is judged to judge prudently concerning those known. Besides, right order and the common good require that in such a case deference be shown to him.

II. In doubt one must judge from things ordinarily occurring. This rule nearly falls back into the preceding one, since in each presumption is the reason for judging thus. But the former extends more broadly; since presumption can be drawn not only from things ordinarily occurring, but also from particular circumstances.

III. In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act. It is a rule of civil law; but also commonly applied to theological matters. It is applied if the principal fact is certain, and there is doubt concerning some necessary circumstance or condition, or concerning the due mode; for example, if you doubt whether you confessed a sin with sufficient sorrow, or if you doubt, without being able to drive away the doubt, whether you contracted matrimony duly, which certainly and in good faith was entered into, you are not bound to repeat the confession, and the matrimony must be held as valid.

IV. In doubt favors are to be enlarged and burdens restricted. It is rule 15 of canon law in the Sixth, and signifies that in doubt the more benign things are to be preferred. Whence, according to this principle and the more common interpretation, these things seem to be established: 1st. As often as burdens and favors can be separated, burdens are to be restricted and favors enlarged, as much as can be done without force being brought upon the sense of the words. 2nd. If burdens and favors are indivisible, then one must judge concerning the intention of the legislator from his words, from the subject matter, or from the connected circumstances. 3rd. If the intention of the legislator cannot clearly be determined, one must attend more to the favor than to the burden. But here burdensome is understood as whatever tends to penalty, or harms the right of a third party, or is opposed to common law. But favor, or favorable, is whatever indulges liberty, or grants grace without detriment to private persons, or to the community, or to the law itself.

V. In obscure matters that which is least is to be held. It is rule 30 of canon law in the Sixth, and it is to be understood thus: where it is not certain concerning the true sense of a law or statute, and, inquiry having been premised, it cannot be determined either from the nature of the thing, or from the context of the words, or from the custom of the place, or from another circumstance, the less burdensome interpretation, or one more benign to liberty, is to be admitted. The reason is that the legislator is not judged to will to oblige beyond that which is clearly expressed in the law. Hence in doubt concerning the quantity of penalty to be inflicted, the minimum is to be chosen. Likewise, if it is not certainly clear concerning the delict, the accused must be absolved.

VI. In a doubt of fact the following axioms have force, or rules of civil law received among all, namely: 1st. In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. But this is to be understood concerning doubt about the principal act, for example, if it is doubtful whether someone struck another, this fact ought not to be presumed, but he who affirms must prove it positively. 2nd. In doubt it is presumed rightly done, what had to be done by law. This is to be understood concerning doubt about an accessory act, the certainty of the principal act being supposed; for if something had to be done by law, or if it is ordinarily accustomed to be done, or is favorable to the one doing it, it is presumed to have been done. 3rd. In doubt no one is presumed bad unless he is proved. This has force as often as there is question of the doubt of some delict, which ought not to be imputed unless it is certainly clear concerning it. Therefore, since delicts are not presumed, no one is presumed bad, but must be proved.

VII. In doubt the safer part is to be followed. It is a rule of canon law, which is had in cap. Illud Dominus, de sent. excomm., and in cap. Ad audientiam, de homic. But this rule must be restricted to cases of practical doubt, or to those in which an end must necessarily be obtained, namely where probability would not remove the danger which the law commands altogether to be avoided, as, for example, in confecting the sacraments, according to the things said above, and as is ascertained from all things thus far set forth. But if it is extended to speculative doubts, it ceases to be a rule or precept, but is a mere counsel. Cf. St. Alphonsus, throughout, but especially lib. 1, nn. 26 and 99; Systema Mor., Obj. 4; and lib. 6, n. 505. - Voit, nn. 38 and seq.

Question 1. Is it licit to use probability, not only in the matter of positive human law, but also of divine and natural law?

Response. Affirmatively, because in any matter whatever it can happen that it is not certain concerning the existence of the law, namely as often as true and solid probability militates against it; and therefore concerning such a law there is given truly invincible ignorance. Moreover God, author of law and principle of the natural order, is not judged to will to obligate us when we invincibly ignore the existence of the law. Cf. Scavini, n. 103.

Question 2. Is it licit for a confessor to attend only to extrinsic probability, and to rely upon it alone in questions to be solved practically?

Response. Affirmatively, at least generally speaking, and especially in questions whose solution depends greatly upon the estimation of prudent men. The reason is that it is difficult for something to be extrinsically probable unless a grave reason militates for it; for many and grave authors ordinarily do not teach that some opinion is truly probable unless they have seen through the intrinsic reasons. Therefore this way is indeed rather little scientific, and scarcely worthy of a theologian, but it is short, and must be called safe. There is added the authority of the Sacred Penitentiary, which, having been asked whether a confessor is to be disturbed who follows the doctrine of St. Alphonsus without weighing his reasons, but only on account of his authority, responded negatively; and this response was approved by the Supreme Pontiff Gregory XVI. I said at least generally speaking, because if at some time someone perhaps detects that even many and grave authors have erred in asserting the probability of some opinion, their whole authority, however great it may finally be, and that whole extrinsic probability, will no longer bring it about that this opinion is truly probable for him.

Question 3. What must be thought concerning that principle most familiar to not a few probabilists: "He who acts probably, acts prudently"?

Response. Very many and very grave Doctors who have used this saying have employed it after the manner of a proximate rule of acting, but not as a principle by which they would prove the truth of their doctrine concerning probable opinions. Certainly that principle is false if it is held as a primary principle and one which suffices through itself. The reason is that an action cannot be prudent by force of probability alone, but obtains this from certainty alone. But it is true if it is held only, as it was held by these learned men, as a corollary of another primary principle, which is through itself the ultimate rule of acting, such as this can be: A doubtful law does not oblige; or, There is no obligation unless it is certain concerning it.

Question 4. If you doubt whether you have already satisfied some obligation, are you still bound to satisfy it?

Response. It is greatly controverted, and a twofold sentence is given.

The first sentence affirms. The reason is deduced from this commonly admitted principle: A certain obligation is not satisfied through a doubtful fulfillment. For a law once existing and commanding has the right of exacting rigorous obedience, or the undoubted fulfillment of the obligation. Moreover, when you doubt, or only probably or even more probably judge that you have fulfilled the law, you have by no means rigorously satisfied it. Therefore it still urges and presses you until you have certainly satisfied it. Besides, equity demands that what we grant to liberty we not deny to the law also in an equal condition: but we grant to certain liberty that it cannot be bound by a doubtful law. Therefore it must be granted to certain law that it cannot be loosed by a doubtful fulfillment. Finally, in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; but a law certainly existing possesses against liberty, which it has obligated to itself; therefore in doubt it prevails against liberty. Thus St. Alphonsus, nn. 28 and 29, who in this place, and in several other places, as, for example, lib. 6, n. 477, QQ. ref., ser. 2, nn. 1, 18, etc., seems fully to have retracted whatever he had written to the contrary, lib. 1, n. 99, vers. fin. Almost unanimously the more recent disciples follow the Master: Scavini, n. 87. - Neyraguet, cap. 3, inf. 2. - Gousset, n. 87. - Panzuti, n. 20. - Mueller, § 84, reg. 1, etc.

The second sentence denies, with not a few very distinguished theologians. For, they say, an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it, as was said above concerning probabilism. But it is not certain concerning an obligation to which satisfaction has already more probably or probably been made. Therefore. Besides, just as from that principle: An obligation is not to be imposed, etc., it is drawn that the human will is not obligated by a law whose existence has not yet been proved, so it necessarily follows that the same will is not obligated as soon as the existence of the law becomes uncertain; for just as obligation depends upon certain notice of the law, so also the continuation of obligation depends upon continuation of the same certain notice. But a law to which satisfaction has probably been made probably no longer exists. Therefore.

As to the axiom which is objected: A certain obligation is not satisfied through a doubtful fulfillment, it is answered that it is true as often as there is discussion of practical or negative doubt, but not if true and solid probability favors liberty. Suarez holds this sentence, in 3, St. Thom. ad q. 90, disp. 22, sect. 9, n. 6. - Roncaglia, de Voto, cap. 2, q. 4; and tract. 2, cap. 5, q. 3, de Leg. - Tamburini, Meth. conf., lib. 2, cap. 1, n. 10. - Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, nn. 59 and 60. - Bonacina, de Integrit. conf., disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, punct. 2, § 3. - Lacroix, lib. 1, nn. 599 and 600. - The Salmanticenses, de Voto, cap. 1, n. 145. - etc., etc. - Add from the camp of the probabiliorists Billuart, de Integrit. conf., § 4, and others who say that it is enough if satisfaction has more probably been made to the law.

It cannot be denied that this sentence, which Cardinal de Lugo in the cited place calls common, enjoys great extrinsic probability. Otherwise, the reasons upon which it rests are efficacious, and make it truly probable. Cf. Baller., notes (a), (b), (c), p. 74.

Question 5. Among several probable opinions is it licit to follow now this one, now the opposite?

Response. Affirmatively, and the reason is that among probable opinions none is formally safer and more secure than another. For all are equally secure. Nevertheless you cannot, as to one and the same matter, use at the same time a probable affirming sentence and a probable denying sentence, so that from one, for example, you gain an advantage, from the other you guard yourself against certain disadvantages. For he who feels the advantage ought also to feel the burden, as rule of law 55 in the Sixth bears.

Besides, I ought to retain the sentence which I have embraced, until it is not certain concerning its improbability, as often as liberty of varying the sentence results in prejudice to another who in that way is defrauded of his right. Add also that a superior obligating me to a precept obligates me to retaining the sentence once accepted, the change of which would impede fulfillment of the precept. Thus, for example, on a fast day it would be illicit in the morning to refresh myself fully, because, as I think, a probable opinion says the hour does not pertain to the substance of the fast, and at midday again to take a full refreshment, because it is probable that the fast has been violated; for indeed such a free faculty of changing would annul the very force of the precept. Moreover, it is not licit to leave a sentence once admitted and embrace another, if, because I act thus, one or the other of two laws is violated, although it is not clearly certain which has been violated. Cf. Castropal., disp. 2, punct. 2, nn. 2 and 3. - Baller., note (b), p. 76.

Question 6. What must be done when the penitent follows a probable opinion but one opposed to the opinion of the confessor?

Response. Since he who acts thus uses his own right, the confessor cannot dismiss him without absolution on this head. Indeed it is not lawful for the confessor to use his own probable opinion for imposing an obligation upon the penitent, whether the latter knows or does not know that the right belongs to him of following a probable sentence. If this opinion of the penitent is publicly probable, it is more difficult to excuse the confessor who does not absolve him: rather let him lay aside his own opinion, leaving liberty to the other. Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 76.

A probable opinion is an assent of the mind given to one side on account of a fitting motive persuading its truth, yet a fallible assent, and therefore accompanied with fear of the opposite side. Hence the probability is greater or lesser according as the motive is more or less fitting and weighty.

The motive or foundation of probability is twofold, intrinsic and extrinsic; hence also a twofold probability, intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic foundation consists of reasons drawn from the very nature, properties, causes and effects of the thing, and even from the inconveniences of the opposite side. The extrinsic foundation is the authority of doctors who hold or have held this opinion; which authority, however, moves only insofar as those doctors are presumed to teach or to have taught this opinion for good reasons. Whence extrinsic probability is rather to be estimated from the merit and erudition of the doctors, and from their study and diligence in examining the matter, than from their number. That the authority of one young and modern theologian does not suffice to found an extrinsic probability is clear from this proposition condemned by Alexander VII: « If a book be that of some young and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, provided it does not stand established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable. »

A probable opinion can be considered in two ways, separately and comparatively with the opposite, which may be equally, less, or more probable; and according to this last consideration the present question proceeds. For we do not deny that an opinion solidly probable, considered separately, if nothing appears against it, or nothing that has not been evidently solved, can safely be chosen; because man cannot always have entire certainty in morals, and he acts prudently who acts according to weighty reasons which nothing solid overthrows.

While a probable opinion is considered in conflict with the opposite, the more the probability of the one grows, the more the probability of the opposite is diminished; and when one becomes more probable and more like the truth, the other becomes less probable and more like falsehood, so that then it ceases to be solidly and expediently probable, as being incapable of persuading the truth; because the stronger motives of the one crush out the efficacy of the motives of the opposite.

The security of an opinion consists in removal from the danger of sinning, and thus it is safer by how much it removes further from the danger of sinning: whence that opinion which stands for the law is safer; that which stands for liberty is less safe. Security and probability of opinions, therefore, differ, as you see. Probability is drawn from the appearance of truth, security from removal of the danger of sinning: whence there can be given an opinion safer though less probable, and an opinion more probable though less safe. It is plain in the common example. The opinion of St. Bonaventure, which teaches that a sinner is held to repentance immediately after his fall, is safer but less probable; the opinion of St. Thomas, who teaches the opposite, is less safe, but more probable.

I say: In the conflict of two opinions concerning the objective honesty of an action, it is not lawful to follow the less probable and less safe, leaving aside the more probable and safer^{1 1} This proposition the probabilists admit and hold, explaining it thus. When the question concerns only the objective honesty of an action, it is not lawful to follow the opinion less probable and less safe, favoring liberty, leaving aside the more probable and safer, which favors the law, when the probability of the latter so exceeds the probability of the former that this appears only lightly probable; because from it a prudent man cannot frame for himself, by virtue of any certain reflex principle, a conscience morally certain of the licitness of the action. The whole system of rightly understood probabilism is contained in the following proposition: « It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, leaving aside the safer, where the question is only of what is licit or illicit »; for although some inequality be detected in the degree of probability between the opposing opinions, this difference is often merely subjective, and the probability which is less to one may be greater to another. Besides, in such matter the trite principle must be recalled: « In morals, little is reputed as nothing. » If therefore the difference is not so great that one opinion seems notably more probable, and consequently the other lightly probable, on either side there is true and solid probability: whence one acts prudently, whether one acts according to or against the doubtful law. — Of these things more fully below.

Omitting many proofs from Scripture, the Fathers, the Supreme Pontiffs and theologians of every school, which may be seen in our former work,

It is proved 1° from St. Thomas, who in Quodlibet VII, a. 13, says: « If he who holds several benefices falls into some doubt from the contrariety of opinions, and thus, if, while such doubt remains, he holds several benefices, he exposes himself to danger, and without doubt sins, as loving temporal gain more than his own salvation¹. » Which words seemed so open to Amedaeus Guimenius, author of the Apologica Casuistarum, that in his Tract. de Opin. probab., n. 6, he exclaimed: « If these things are true, woe to those who act from probable opinion! » ¹ To anyone reading attentively it is plain that this text is not aptly alleged in this question. For the Angelic Doctor treats, not of probability, whether greater or lesser, but of a practically practical doubt, and he rightly pronounces him who acts « while such doubt remains » to sin « without doubt. » This authority could have been more fitly invoked in art. 6 of the preceding dissertation.

It is proved by many reasons: 1° He who in the conflict of opinions concerning the objective honesty of an act follows the less probable standing against the law, leaving aside the more probable standing for the law, cannot frame for himself a conscience morally certain of the honesty and formal licitness of his act, neither from direct principles nor from reflex principles. Therefore he sins. The consequence is plain from what we said above, that only a morally certain conscience is the rule of our actions; because otherwise it is to act imprudently and expose oneself to the danger of sinning formally, and consequently to sin. And thus it is commonly admitted by probabilists. — The antecedent holds also for its first part; for from a less probable principle there cannot be deduced directly and immediately a morally certain conclusion: this too the adversaries concede. The whole difficulty, therefore, lies in the second part of the antecedent. Wherefore it is proved, the second part of the antecedent: 1° The reflex principles from which the probabilists contend they can immediately frame a conscience morally certain of the formal honesty of their action, by following the opinion less probable and less safe, that is, standing for liberty against the law, are: « He who acts probably acts prudently and safely. » — « The law which is probably judged not to exist is insufficiently promulgated and invincibly unknown, and therefore does not bind in act. » — « In doubt, better is the condition of the possessor of his liberty »; and certain others of less moment, for these are the principal ones. But these principles are uncertain and at most probable. Therefore from them there cannot be drawn a certain conclusion, or framed a conscience morally certain in practice of the formal honesty of the action. — The consequence is plain; for the conclusion cannot be more certain than its principles. — Proof of the minor: All anti-probabilists deny these principles as absolutely false, and without doubt their denial is probable; for they are authors most weighty in number and authority, nor are their reasons improbable: which two things found a probable opinion. Therefore these principles are uncertain and at most probable; for if they are probably false, they are only probably true. Wherefore, if the probabilists wish their reflex principles to be certain, such that from them a morally certain conscience can be framed, they must before all else prove that all the arguments we bring against them are not only not certain, but not even probable: which when they have done, we shall gladly associate ourselves with them.

2° Everyone is bound, in controversies and difficulties arising daily, especially in matters of faith and morals, sincerely to seek the truth while it lies hidden, and to strive toward it as much as he can. This principle is most certain and is proved in many ways: 1° From that of Ecclus., XXXVII, 20: Before all works let the word of truth precede thee. 2° Because the religion of Christ is a school of truth; for he himself is the way, the truth and the life, and he testifies that he came into the world to give testimony to the truth, and that he wished to institute a religion in which true adorers would adore the Father in spirit and in truth. 3° The office of an upright man requires that he not knowingly depart from the truth of the law, which all nations seek and intend. 4° Finally, right reason dictates it, whose object is truth. — I subjoin. But he who follows what he judges more probably false and contrary to the truth of the law, most certainly neither loves nor sincerely seeks the truth, nor strives toward it as much as he can. Therefore it is not lawful to follow the less probable opinion against the law, leaving aside the more probable for the law.

3° It is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion if it is not properly, solidly and expediently probable. But the less probable opinion, in conflict with the more probable, is not properly, solidly and expediently probable. — The major the probabilists now admit. — The minor is proved: That opinion is properly, solidly and expediently probable whose motives are so weighty and solid as to suffice for obtaining the assent of a prudent and learned man: thus the probabilists define it. But the motives of the less probable opinion, in conflict with the more probable, do not suffice for obtaining the assent of a prudent and learned man, but only for instilling some fear of the opposite. Therefore. — Proof of the minor: 1° The force and efficacy of those motives is overcome and crushed by stronger motives. Therefore. 2° A prudent man cannot assent to an opinion which he judges more probably false than true; for assent is an act of the mind by which we judge something true or more like the truth. Therefore. And so, although the less probable opinion in itself, or respectively in regard to him to whom its opposite does not appear more probable, can be called properly, solidly and expediently probable, yet otherwise comparatively in regard to him to whom the opposite is more probable.

4° He who acts according to the less probable and less safe opinion, in conflict with one more probable and safer, acts imprudently. Therefore he sins. — The antecedent is proved: Either he doubts of the honesty of his act, or he does not. If he doubts, he acts imprudently while that doubt stands, as he would act imprudently who took food which he doubted was poisoned; if he does not doubt, he is far more imprudent, since he does not doubt where there is so great reason for doubting, as he would be most imprudent who did not doubt food to be poisoned, while stronger motives dictated it to be poisoned.

5° According to the most celebrated rule of law, « in doubts the safer part is to be chosen¹. » But he who judges the action more probably illicit more than doubts of its honesty, as is plain from the terms. Therefore. And by this argument alone the whole controversy is absolutely decided; but this cardinal rule, which the probabilists keenly impugn, we shall establish with all its supports in the following article, and we shall shut off all the evasions of the probabilists. ¹ If the question is of acting while a practically practical doubt stands, because then the agent is not morally certain of the honesty of his action.

Finally attend to the following propositions condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: « Speaking generally, while the question is of probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not pass beyond the bounds of probability, confident we do something, we always act prudently. » It is no. 3. — Likewise: « An infidel will be excused from infidelity, not believing, led by a probable opinion. » It is no. 4. From the condemnation of which propositions these common principles of the probabilists seem condemned: « He who acts probably acts prudently² »; What is probable: therefore licit³; and the like. ² Below it will be said that this principle, taken nakedly, is not admitted by the true probabilists, because probability of itself is not a sufficient motive for acting licitly, unless the conscience be duly framed from some reflex principle. ³ The same must be said as of the preceding.

Obj.: The probabilist can frame for himself a morally certain conscience from this syllogism: He who acts as he probably judges to be licit acts prudently; for a probable opinion is that which rests upon a weighty motive, and to which a prudent man can assent. But he who follows the less probable opinion acts as he probably judges to be licit. Therefore he acts prudently.

I answer. I distinguish the major: He who acts as he probably judges to be licit acts prudently — if he does not judge it more probably illicit, pass the major; if he judges it more probably illicit, I deny the major. And in this sense distinguish the minor; I deny the consequence. For he truly is imprudent who does what he judges more probably illicit.

You will insist 1°: He who acts according to an opinion truly and solidly probable acts prudently, because he acts from a weighty and solid motive to which a prudent man can assent. But the opinion, even though less probable, in conflict with its more probable opposite, is truly and solidly probable; for it rests upon a weighty motive, nor is it contrary to Scripture, councils, or the Fathers, or evident reason. Therefore.

I answer. The major being granted, I distinguish the minor. For the less probable opinion, in conflict with its more probable opposite, is truly and solidly probable respectively in regard to him to whom the opposite does not appear more probable — grant the minor; respectively in regard to him to whom the opposite appears more probable — I deny it. For since its motives are crushed by the stronger motives of the more probable, it is not sufficient to obtain the assent of him to whom the opposite appears more probable; but that opinion only is truly, solidly and expediently probable which suffices to obtain assent, according to the probabilists themselves. See the third proof by reason.

You will insist 2°: The comparative supposes the positive. Therefore, if of two opinions one is more probable, the other is truly probable.

I answer. If probable be taken strictly and properly for that which is capable of obtaining the assent of a prudent man, I deny the supposition of the antecedent; for then the more probable is not taken comparatively but adversatively, so that the sense is: One is probable, the other is not. In which sense the Apostle spoke, I Cor., VII, 9: It is better to marry than to burn. And Susanna, Dan., XIII, 23: It is better to fall into your hands without wrongdoing than to sin in the sight of God — not that it is good to burn or to die; but because it is good not to marry and not to sin, evil to burn and to die. But if probable be taken less strictly and less properly for that which instills some fear of the opposite, then the more probable can indeed be taken comparatively, but nothing thence against us.

You will insist 3°: The less safe remains truly safe in the presence of the safer; e.g., the married state is truly safe, although religion is safer. Therefore similarly the less probable remains truly probable in the presence of the more probable.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is that greater and lesser security, especially in things pertaining to counsels and not to precepts, do not arise from contrary reasons which destroy one another, as greater and lesser probability do. Thus security in religion arises from the possibility of the commandments, likewise in the married state. But, on the contrary, the probability, e.g., of the triple contract as licit arises from the fact that society is not destroyed; the probability of the same as illicit arises from the fact that society is destroyed.

You will insist 4°: From what has been said, the less safe remains safe in the presence of the safer. But the less probable opinion is less safe. Therefore it remains safe in the presence of the more probable and safer. Therefore it is lawful to follow it.

I answer. I deny the minor. For the less probable opinion standing against the law is called less safe not comparatively but adversatively, that is, it is not safe, and the other is safe, as we said above of the less probable and the more probable.

You will insist 5°: The opinion absolutely and singly probable favoring liberty against the law is safe. But, from what has been said, safety is not destroyed by another safety. Therefore.

I answer. The antecedent being set aside, I distinguish the minor. Safety is not destroyed by another safety when security arises from elsewhere than from probability — grant the minor; if it arises from probability itself, I deny the minor and the consequence.

Other and indeed more urgent arguments drawn from the insufficient promulgation and invincible ignorance of the law, from possession of liberty, from the right of following the more benign side, etc., we shall propose and solve in the following article. Whence be it

I say: When the question is of the objective honesty of an act alone, it is licit to follow the opinion manifestly and solidly more probable though less safe, or favoring liberty, in conflict with one less probable but safer or favoring the law. This is most common opinion, against Wendrock ¹, in his notes on Epist. v of Louis de Montalte; against Sinnich in his Saule exrege; and against a few others who will that the safer is always to be followed. ¹ That is, Blaise Pascal, who under this fictitious name published abroad a work written in French entitled Lettres provinciales, by which he slanderously defamed and held up to ridicule the moral doctrine of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus. Nicolaus added notes to these letters under the assumed name of William Wendrock.

I said, « When the question is of the objective honesty of an act alone, » namely whether it is licit or not; or when the question is of the greater probability of right, and it is asked whether a precept or law binds. For if the question be of the greater probability of a thing or fact, that is, of the validity, substance, quality or condition of some thing, it is not always licit to follow what is more probable, because of the danger of nullity of the thing, or of harming another, which the greater probability of an opinion about fact does not wash away. Thus, e.g., although it be more probable that baptism be valid in thin beer, that a beast and not a man lie hidden in a bush; yet it is not licit without necessity to confer baptism in thin beer, nor to fire into this bush, because this greater probability of fact, since it changes nothing in things, nor makes that which is required for the validity of an act to be not required, nor that which is present to be absent or harmless, does not wash away the danger ¹. Otherwise when the greater probability is of right, whether the action be licit, whether a prohibiting law exists; because, since a law which is prudently believed not to exist does not bind in act, the greater probability of the opinion according to which the law is prudently believed not to exist washes away the danger of acting formally against a law binding in act. Whence this proposition was condemned: « It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, leaving aside the safer, unless law, convention or danger of incurring grave damage forbid it. Hence an opinion merely probable is not to be used in the conferral of baptism, of priestly or episcopal Order. » It is the first among those condemned by Innocent XI. ¹ It will be shown below that these cases wander outside the present question.

It is proved of the conclusion, 1° from the definition of the Apostolic See. It is licit to follow the most probable among probable opinions. Therefore also the solidly more probable. — The antecedent stands from the condemnation of this proposition, which is Sinnich's: « It is not licit to follow the most probable among probable opinions. » It is the third among those condemned by Alexander VIII. — The consequence is proved. If it were not licit to follow the solidly more probable opinion, this would be so, according to the adversaries, because there remains fear of the opposite and danger of transgressing the law. But the most probable opinion also necessarily includes fear of the opposite. Therefore, if notwithstanding this it is licit to follow it, it is also licit to follow the solidly more probable. — Proof of the minor: The most probable opinion remains within the bounds of probability. Therefore it is necessarily attended with fear of the opposite side; for a probable opinion is essentially an assent given to one side from a motive fit to persuade morally, yet fallible, and therefore with fear of the opposite side.

If you say, with Daelman and certain others, to whom only the most probable is licit, that in the most probable opinion there remains indeed fear, but such as in practice does not deserve attention from a prudent man: this same thing we say of the opinion manifestly and solidly more probable.

It is proved 2° by authority. 1° St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 70, a. 2, ad 1: « In human acts, he says, upon which judgments are founded, demonstrative certainty cannot be had, because they are about contingent and variable things; and therefore probable certainty suffices, which reaches the truth in the more numerous cases, although it fail in the few. »

2° St. Antoninus in Summa, I p., tit. 3, c. 10, § 10, says that anyone can act according to a probable opinion, « provided he have probable reasons more for the thing itself than for the opposite opinion. »

3° The Supreme Pontiffs in dispensations and in various cases have often used, and use, the more probable or absolutely probable opinion ¹, although less safe; but kings also, in administering the affairs of the kingdom, and judges both ecclesiastical and secular, in deciding litigations, follow not always what is safer, but what is more probable. Whence those rules or common axioms of law: « What is more like the truth is to be preferred. » — « Where opinions are discordant, let the judge follow the common one. » ¹ Note that clause: « Or absolutely probable, » which does not favor probabiliorism.

It is proved 3° by reason ¹. 1° He does not sin formally who does what he prudently, reasonably and in good faith judges not even to be material sin against the law. But he who follows the opinion solidly more probable concerning the objective honesty of his act does what he prudently, reasonably and in good faith judges not even to be material sin against the law. Therefore. — The major is certain; for prudence, reason and good faith are rules of our actions. — Proof of the minor: 1° He judges prudently and reasonably who judges according to the merits of the cause, as is plain from the terms, and in all judgments both public and private. But he who judges licit that which is to him more probably licit, or that which weightier and more solid motives persuade to be licit, judges according to the merits of the cause, as is plain. Therefore. ¹ The arguments drawn from reason here brought forward in favor of probabiliorism can rightly be alleged, and will be invoked by us below in favor of probabilism.

2° He judges prudently who judges from the motive whereby a prudent man is wont to be determined to judgment. But a prudent man is wont to be determined to judgment from a motive weightier and more solid. Therefore. 3° He judges prudently who would judge imprudently if he judged otherwise. But he who judged illicit that which is more probably licit would judge imprudently, as he would judge imprudently who should judge black a color more like white than black. Therefore.

2° He who does what he judges more probably objectively honest, or contrary to no law, if perchance there be a prohibiting law, invincibly ignores it. But invincible ignorance of the law excuses from formal sin, as is plain from this second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: « Although invincible ignorance of the law of nature be granted, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse the agent from formal sin by virtue of itself. » — Proof of the minor: He who seriously strives for the truth, and does all that he morally can to attain it, and follows that which comes nearer to it, if perchance he reaches it not, invincibly ignores it; because that ignorance is invincible which cannot be overcome by human study, as the Author says, Ia IIae, q. 76, a. 2, ad 1. But all this he furnishes who, after sufficient examination, follows the more probable opinion. Therefore.

You will say, with Daelman, that ignorance of the law or of the objective malice of an action is not judged invincible where there are found certain arguments known to the agent on behalf of that law or that malice. Whence, although perhaps he then invincibly ignore the certainty of the malice, yet he does not invincibly ignore the malice or the law which he knows probably to be such.

On the contrary: 1° From this argument it follows that neither from a most probable opinion would there be invincible ignorance of the law, since with it are found also arguments known to the agent of the existence of the law. 2° Although there are arguments on the contrary side both in the most probable and in the more probable, these are to be neglected and set after the more probable and weightier ones; whence it comes about that the agent who seriously seeks the truth, and strives toward it as much as he can, cannot prudently judge that less probable part to be true, but rather the contrary, which is more like the truth. Whence, in respect of him, as to prudent judgment, those lighter considerations stand just as if they were not, and thus they do not prevent the ignorance of the law, at least while binding in act, from being morally invincible.

It is proved 4° from the inconveniences. If the safer is always to be followed, it follows 1° that the study of moral theology is utterly useless. For in vain are we wearied, in vain we turn over books, spend nights and days inquiring which opinions are truer or more probable; in vain we heap up arguments, mostly non-demonstrative, to establish them; in vain the unlearned consult the learned whether this or that be licit; since before every study, before every inquiry and consultation, all men know that it is safer, and safe alone, to abstain from these things.

I. The true definition of a probable opinion is this: An assent of the intellect to one part, with fear of the opposite part, on account of a probable motive, as St. Thomas with the other Theologians teaches, I, q. 79, art. 9, ad 4. "Probable" is taken by relation to truth. If this truth lies open to the mind by evident and certain reasons, then the mind elicits a certain and evident assent, and has concerning such truth a certitude free of all fear of the opposite part. If this truth offers itself to the mind by probable reasons only, then the mind forms an opinative assent, that is, a probable opinion. Wherefore probability is the same as verisimilitude.

II. One opinion is called more verisimilar, or more probable, than another, when more solid weights of reason occur for the former than for the latter. Wherefore that is more probable which approaches nearer to the truth. That opinion is named less probable which approaches the truth less, and stands farther from it than the more probable. Before the rise of Probabilism, the more probable opinion alone was held for a probable opinion. For the less probable opinion, in view of the more probable, was not probable to all the ancients — and in very deed is not, as will become plain below. However the matter may stand, our position does not depend upon this distinction.

III. The probable opinion is divided into speculative and practical. This division, taken absolutely, is true. For some sciences are speculative, which halt in speculation and meditation alone; others extend themselves to the work, and are called practical. This distinction many abuse, who call that opinion speculatively probable which regards the action prescinded from its peculiar circumstances, and practically probable that which considers the object, or the action, clothed with its circumstances. Hence they gather that an opinion which was speculatively probable becomes practically improbable on account of the variation of the circumstances. This division, explained in this fashion, Fr. Vasquez rightly impugns, tome I on the I-II, disputation 62, chapter 4, and disputation 65, chapter 1. For when the circumstances are varied in the genus of morals, the opinion does not remain the same, but becomes another. For the same opinion is called speculative inasmuch as it meditates the object with all its circumstances, and halts in speculation alone; but it becomes practical insofar as it directs and commands the execution of the work. For from speculative probability the practical arises; that is, speculative probability itself, by extension, becomes practical, without the variation or diversity of any circumstance.

IV. Again, that opinion is probable from within [ab intrinseco] which rests upon a solid and grave foundation of reason; and it is probable from without [ab extrinseco] when it rests upon the authority of Theologians. This authority must be measured not so much by their number as by their merit, doctrine, and sanctity. Furthermore, one opinion is objectively probable, which is such in itself, inasmuch as it has for itself grave weights of reasons, whether drawn from reason or from authority; and another is called subjectively probable, which so appears to a serious man maturely considering its reasons and foundations. If these reasons be in very truth solid and grave, then the opinion is probable both objectively and subjectively.

V. Finally, one opinion is safe, another safer. The lay and the matrimonial state is safe; the religious state is safer; yet each state is safe. And because Fr. Medina uses this example, on the I-II, question 19, article 6, in explaining the probable and the more probable, he is therefore commonly excused by many from the Probabilism of the Moderns. The use of this distinction, then, has place only when both opinions are certain, but one is more removed from the danger of sinning even materially. Contrition formed by imperfect charity suffices, in the opinion of all, for the Sacrament of penance. This opinion is safe. But if the charity be perfect, the opinion becomes surely safer.

VI. Very many of the unskilled confound the safer opinion with the more probable, and the safe with the less probable. Hence the Probabiliorists are called by the unskilled crowd Tutiorists and Rigorists. But this is a putrid calumny, born of ignorance — and that a supine ignorance. An opinion standing for the law is safer, but not on that account more probable. For that opinion is called safer which more removes a man from the danger of sinning. If, however, it be sometimes asserted that such an opinion binds a man to its execution, it will be false and improbable. More safely, surely, will a man keep chastity if he never look upon or address women; and more safely will he abstain from usury if he enter into no contracts. But if you would absolutely bind men to abstain from converse with all women, and from every contract, the opinion is utterly improbable and false. For the safer opinion and the more probable opinion flow from diverse principles: the latter from a greater approach to the truth, and from graver weights of reasons; the former from a greater withdrawal from the danger of sinning.

VII. Lastly, probability is divided into the probability of conscience and the probability of impunity. The probability of conscience is that of which we have spoken hitherto. The probability of impunity is that which books enjoy that are published with the approbation of the Revisers or Censors — which probability by no means suffices for forming a probable conscience. Wherefore the following opinion was proscribed by Alexander VII: If a Book be that of some more recent and modern author, its opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic See as improbable. Hence it is plain under how great an ignorance they labor who blurt out: The Book is approved; therefore its opinion enjoys probability. This mere probability of impunity is enjoyed by many constitutions of the Regular Orders, which have been approved in common form, but not in specific form. By this latter approbation, with solemn rite, all the opinions and laws contained in the book are discussed and approved one by one. Whether by this approbation in specific form, as they say, any constitutions of Orders have been approved, I do not know. Commonly they have been approved in common form; and then they enjoy only the probability of impunity. Wherefore, just as in other books approved in common form, so also in these constitutions improbable opinions can occur. And then the pontifical approbations are ineptly alleged, that such improbable opinions may be maintained as probable with the probability of conscience, when they are only probable with the probability of impunity.

VIII. The argument about which the disputation is instituted, and which runs through the whole of Theology, is of this kind. Someone doubts whether some action be morally evil, that is, prohibited by the divine law. He recognizes that grave and pious Theologians fight with one another on both sides, and contradict each other. All things having been maturely weighed, by proofs drawn both from reason and from authority, he finds and judges it more verisimilar that such an action is vicious: he sees that the foundations which prove the malice and prohibition of the action are the graver, and outweigh the foundations of the opposite opinion, which stands for the honesty of that same action. It is asked whether he can, rejecting the more probable, embrace the less probable opinion, and freely execute the aforesaid action.

IX. The Antiprobabilists deny it. The Probabilists on the contrary affirm it, and defend the position that the use of either opinion is licit, so that the Christian can choose whichever he prefers: the more probable, indeed, by the counsel of greater perfection; but the less probable by the liberty of election, since no precept urges to the former.

I. This word "safer" can signify a greater security from the danger of sinning even materially; and in this sense we are not always bound to the safer courses. Again, this term "safer" can signify security from falsity; and in this sense the more probable opinion is also the safer. Truth alone is the legitimate rule of an honorable conscience; and therefore the opinion which approaches the truth more is the more probable, and the safer. The opinion which more removes one from the danger of sinning is assuredly safer; but if you should say that the precept of embracing such an opinion always presses, then this position is false. The religious state is safer than the lay, because it more removes a man from the occasion of sinning; but if you should say that Christians are bound to take up this state, this "safer" opinion is false.

II. Further, that it may be licit to embrace the more probable opinion, the less probable and safer being left aside, it is required that this greater probability be notable, and that it rest upon weights of reasons which greatly excel the reasons of the less probable, safer opinion. These things touched upon, the proposed thesis is proved.

III. It is licit to execute that which, all things seriously weighed, appears prudently true and honorable. But when the opinion affirming that such an action is honorable appears to me, after all necessary diligence has been applied, more verisimilar than its opposite, by reasons gravely preponderating, I prudently judge that such an action is honorable, and that such an opinion is true. For although, through the weakness of the human mind, false things sometimes appear more verisimilar, yet commonly and for the most part what is more probable is true. In our case the opposite opinion is less probable, and that greatly: therefore I cannot prudently judge it to be true. And truth, as I have said, is the rule of a right conscience.

IV. It is confirmed by the authority of Alexander VIII, condemning this thesis: It is not lawful to follow an opinion even the most probable among the probable. The obvious sense of the condemned thesis is that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion, even though it be most probable [i.e., this is what stands condemned]. Therefore it is licit to follow the less safe opinion, provided it be much more probable than the opposite, safer, less probable one. Read Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, disputation 10, chapter 1.