Whether it is lawful to follow the more probable but less safe opinion, in concurrence with one less probable but safer, where only the objective honesty of the act is at stake?

I say: When the question is of the objective honesty of an act alone, it is licit to follow the opinion manifestly and solidly more probable though less safe, or favoring liberty, in conflict with one less probable but safer or favoring the law. This is most common opinion, against Wendrock ¹, in his notes on Epist. v of Louis de Montalte; against Sinnich in his Saule exrege; and against a few others who will that the safer is always to be followed. ¹ That is, Blaise Pascal, who under this fictitious name published abroad a work written in French entitled Lettres provinciales, by which he slanderously defamed and held up to ridicule the moral doctrine of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus. Nicolaus added notes to these letters under the assumed name of William Wendrock.

I said, « When the question is of the objective honesty of an act alone, » namely whether it is licit or not; or when the question is of the greater probability of right, and it is asked whether a precept or law binds. For if the question be of the greater probability of a thing or fact, that is, of the validity, substance, quality or condition of some thing, it is not always licit to follow what is more probable, because of the danger of nullity of the thing, or of harming another, which the greater probability of an opinion about fact does not wash away. Thus, e.g., although it be more probable that baptism be valid in thin beer, that a beast and not a man lie hidden in a bush; yet it is not licit without necessity to confer baptism in thin beer, nor to fire into this bush, because this greater probability of fact, since it changes nothing in things, nor makes that which is required for the validity of an act to be not required, nor that which is present to be absent or harmless, does not wash away the danger ¹. Otherwise when the greater probability is of right, whether the action be licit, whether a prohibiting law exists; because, since a law which is prudently believed not to exist does not bind in act, the greater probability of the opinion according to which the law is prudently believed not to exist washes away the danger of acting formally against a law binding in act. Whence this proposition was condemned: « It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, leaving aside the safer, unless law, convention or danger of incurring grave damage forbid it. Hence an opinion merely probable is not to be used in the conferral of baptism, of priestly or episcopal Order. » It is the first among those condemned by Innocent XI. ¹ It will be shown below that these cases wander outside the present question.

It is proved of the conclusion, 1° from the definition of the Apostolic See. It is licit to follow the most probable among probable opinions. Therefore also the solidly more probable. — The antecedent stands from the condemnation of this proposition, which is Sinnich's: « It is not licit to follow the most probable among probable opinions. » It is the third among those condemned by Alexander VIII. — The consequence is proved. If it were not licit to follow the solidly more probable opinion, this would be so, according to the adversaries, because there remains fear of the opposite and danger of transgressing the law. But the most probable opinion also necessarily includes fear of the opposite. Therefore, if notwithstanding this it is licit to follow it, it is also licit to follow the solidly more probable. — Proof of the minor: The most probable opinion remains within the bounds of probability. Therefore it is necessarily attended with fear of the opposite side; for a probable opinion is essentially an assent given to one side from a motive fit to persuade morally, yet fallible, and therefore with fear of the opposite side.

If you say, with Daelman and certain others, to whom only the most probable is licit, that in the most probable opinion there remains indeed fear, but such as in practice does not deserve attention from a prudent man: this same thing we say of the opinion manifestly and solidly more probable.

It is proved 2° by authority. 1° St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 70, a. 2, ad 1: « In human acts, he says, upon which judgments are founded, demonstrative certainty cannot be had, because they are about contingent and variable things; and therefore probable certainty suffices, which reaches the truth in the more numerous cases, although it fail in the few. »

2° St. Antoninus in Summa, I p., tit. 3, c. 10, § 10, says that anyone can act according to a probable opinion, « provided he have probable reasons more for the thing itself than for the opposite opinion. »

3° The Supreme Pontiffs in dispensations and in various cases have often used, and use, the more probable or absolutely probable opinion ¹, although less safe; but kings also, in administering the affairs of the kingdom, and judges both ecclesiastical and secular, in deciding litigations, follow not always what is safer, but what is more probable. Whence those rules or common axioms of law: « What is more like the truth is to be preferred. » — « Where opinions are discordant, let the judge follow the common one. » ¹ Note that clause: « Or absolutely probable, » which does not favor probabiliorism.

It is proved 3° by reason ¹. 1° He does not sin formally who does what he prudently, reasonably and in good faith judges not even to be material sin against the law. But he who follows the opinion solidly more probable concerning the objective honesty of his act does what he prudently, reasonably and in good faith judges not even to be material sin against the law. Therefore. — The major is certain; for prudence, reason and good faith are rules of our actions. — Proof of the minor: 1° He judges prudently and reasonably who judges according to the merits of the cause, as is plain from the terms, and in all judgments both public and private. But he who judges licit that which is to him more probably licit, or that which weightier and more solid motives persuade to be licit, judges according to the merits of the cause, as is plain. Therefore. ¹ The arguments drawn from reason here brought forward in favor of probabiliorism can rightly be alleged, and will be invoked by us below in favor of probabilism.

2° He judges prudently who judges from the motive whereby a prudent man is wont to be determined to judgment. But a prudent man is wont to be determined to judgment from a motive weightier and more solid. Therefore. 3° He judges prudently who would judge imprudently if he judged otherwise. But he who judged illicit that which is more probably licit would judge imprudently, as he would judge imprudently who should judge black a color more like white than black. Therefore.

2° He who does what he judges more probably objectively honest, or contrary to no law, if perchance there be a prohibiting law, invincibly ignores it. But invincible ignorance of the law excuses from formal sin, as is plain from this second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: « Although invincible ignorance of the law of nature be granted, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse the agent from formal sin by virtue of itself. » — Proof of the minor: He who seriously strives for the truth, and does all that he morally can to attain it, and follows that which comes nearer to it, if perchance he reaches it not, invincibly ignores it; because that ignorance is invincible which cannot be overcome by human study, as the Author says, Ia IIae, q. 76, a. 2, ad 1. But all this he furnishes who, after sufficient examination, follows the more probable opinion. Therefore.

You will say, with Daelman, that ignorance of the law or of the objective malice of an action is not judged invincible where there are found certain arguments known to the agent on behalf of that law or that malice. Whence, although perhaps he then invincibly ignore the certainty of the malice, yet he does not invincibly ignore the malice or the law which he knows probably to be such.

On the contrary: 1° From this argument it follows that neither from a most probable opinion would there be invincible ignorance of the law, since with it are found also arguments known to the agent of the existence of the law. 2° Although there are arguments on the contrary side both in the most probable and in the more probable, these are to be neglected and set after the more probable and weightier ones; whence it comes about that the agent who seriously seeks the truth, and strives toward it as much as he can, cannot prudently judge that less probable part to be true, but rather the contrary, which is more like the truth. Whence, in respect of him, as to prudent judgment, those lighter considerations stand just as if they were not, and thus they do not prevent the ignorance of the law, at least while binding in act, from being morally invincible.

It is proved 4° from the inconveniences. If the safer is always to be followed, it follows 1° that the study of moral theology is utterly useless. For in vain are we wearied, in vain we turn over books, spend nights and days inquiring which opinions are truer or more probable; in vain we heap up arguments, mostly non-demonstrative, to establish them; in vain the unlearned consult the learned whether this or that be licit; since before every study, before every inquiry and consultation, all men know that it is safer, and safe alone, to abstain from these things.

It follows 2° that all books of moral theology are to be prohibited and banished, even the works of SS. Thomas, Bonaventure, Antoninus, etc., as scandalous and inducements into sin, since there is scarcely one author who does not often teach more probable opinions favoring liberty against the safer ones standing for the law.

It follows 3° that these holy Doctors and innumerable others distinguished in doctrine and piety gravely sinned by teaching those more probable opinions less safe, and more gravely than those who follow them in practice; because doctrine creeps forth the further, infects the more, and endures the longer.

It follows 4° that the yoke of Christ is aggravated beyond measure and made altogether intolerable, as will appear to one running through the various states and cases.

Note, that almost all the arguments objected, if they avail anything, prove that it is not licit even to follow the most probable opinion: which is condemned. Whence, since they prove too much, they prove nothing.

Obj. 1°: St. Thomas, Quodlibet VIII, a. 13, says: « That which is done against the law is always evil, nor is it excused by being according to conscience. » Therefore it is not licit to act according to the more probable opinion; because, if it chance to be against the law, as may happen, the agent sins.

I answer. St. Thomas speaks of what is against the law culpably and vincibly ignored, and according to a conscience culpably and vincibly erroneous. So this text is explained by St. Antoninus, Sylvester, Adrian and others commonly, both Thomists and outsiders. « These words of blessed Thomas, » says St. Antoninus in Summa, I p., tit. 3, cap. 10, § 10, after the middle, « cannot be understood except of those things wherein it plainly appears from Scripture or the determination of the Church that it is against the law of God, and not of those wherein it appears not; otherwise he would contradict himself in the same book, which is not to be believed. »

Obj. 2°: From an opinion merely more probable concerning the objective honesty of an act, there cannot be formed a practical conclusion morally certain of the formal honesty; for the conclusion cannot be more certain than the principle. Therefore.

I answer 1°. I retort the argument. From an opinion merely most probable there cannot be formed a practically certain conclusion,

Therefore. — I answer 2°. I distinguish the antecedent. From an opinion merely more probable there cannot be formed immediately a practically certain conclusion — grant it; mediately — I deny it. For the more probable opinion concerning the objective honesty of an act being posited, the agent, by means of a reflex judgment morally certain which has that more probable opinion for its object, forms a practical dictamen morally certain, in the manner already stated in the proofs, namely: He does not sin formally who does what he prudently judges to be objectively licit. But he who acts according to the opinion solidly more probable does what he prudently judges to be objectively licit. Therefore he sins not. — The major is physically certain. — The minor is morally certain.

You will insist 1°: Tutiorists, and those who stand for the most probable opinion, deny the minor of this reflex judgment. Therefore it is not morally certain.

I answer 1°. I retort the argument. Tutiorists deny the minor of a similar reflex judgment where the question is of the most probable opinion. Therefore that minor is not morally certain. Therefore it is not licit to follow the most probable opinion; which is condemned.

I answer 2°. I distinguish the antecedent. Tutiorists, and those who stand for the most probable opinion, deny the minor of this reflex judgment, and they are exceedingly few in comparison with those who affirm it, and deny it unfoundedly — grant the antecedent; and they are comparatively more numerous, and deny it foundedly — I deny the antecedent: especially since all things whatsoever they urge against probabiliorism fight equally against the most probable, as is plain from what has been said, and nevertheless it remains certain that it is licit to follow the most probable. Whence their denial takes away nothing of the moral certainty of this minor; for as Cajetan rightly observes, s. v. Opinione uti, n. 4, « a thing is not held by opinion [he understands opinion properly so called, which is held with founded fear of the opposite side] because divers doctors illustrate

^{1 1} Attention must be given to the use of reflex principles, which Billuart here affirms to be legitimate. By this method will be proved below the truth of today's probabilism.

and hold contrary sentiments; for alongside such contrariety there can stand that one side is supported by sufficient reason unto moral certainty, and it is then no longer opinion with those who grasp that reason; but because many know not how to discern between moral and mathematical certainty, they somehow place everything under opinion. »

You will insist 2°: This reflex judgment does not take away the probable danger of acting against the law, since what is more probable may be false. Therefore.

I answer. 1° I retort the argument against the most probable opinion. 2° I distinguish the antecedent. It does not take away the danger of acting formally against the law — I deny it; of acting materially against the law — I subdistinguish. It does not take away the danger which a prudent man ought to despise — grant it; which a prudent man ought not to despise — I deny it.