What a lie is

636. Definition. A lie is defined: speech against the mind brought forth for deceiving. By the name of speech is understood any external sign by which the interior concepts of the mind are signified, whether this is done by words or by nod or deed.

a. Four things are to be distinguished in a lie: alpha. speech discordant from the judgment of the mind; beta. the will of saying what is false; gamma. the will of deceiving another; delta. the deception of another. The two former things pertain to the essence of a lie; the fourth is its effect; whether the third is an essential element of a lie or rather a necessary consequent is disputed. It seems one must say that the intention of deceiving belongs virtually and implicitly to the essence of a lie, insofar as the speaker sees that the hearers are deceived if they give faith to his words, and wills that the false thing which he himself brings forth be believed by them; but not formally and explicitly, insofar as he wills that error be generated in the hearers.² Therefore a lie is defined by many as: speech against the mind with the intention of saying what is false.

b. Therefore he who says what is false, thinking it to be true, errs, but does not lie: for he does not have the will of saying what is false. On the contrary, he who affirms what is true, which he thinks false, does not indeed err, but he lies, because he wills to say what is false. He who thinks that prudent hearers do not believe the things which he affirms does not lie, even if he speaks against the mind, because he does not have the will of deceiving. Therefore he does not lie who says that he has seen a flying ox, nor the merchant who says that merchandise cost him more than he sells it to others.

c. A lie can be committed in four modes: alpha. if someone affirms that something is which he knows is not; beta. if someone denies that something is which he knows is; gamma. if someone affirms as certain that about which he doubts whether it is; delta. if someone affirms to be doubtful what is certain to him.

¹ Fr. Ildephonsus, Carmelite, De mendacio et falsiloquio morali; Laymann, l. 4, tract. 3, c. 13.

² Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 110, a. 1.

637. Division. 1. A lie by reason of the intended effect is divided: a. into harmful, which is brought forth so that it may harm; b. into officious, which is brought forth so that it may profit; c. into jocose, which is brought forth so that delight may be drawn from it. Yet in order that a joke be a lie, it is required that it be made with the intention of saying what is false and deceiving others: for he who says what is false while knowing that hearers, at least prudent ones, understand it as false, does not lie.

2. If lie is taken generically for discordance between the mind and its sign, from verbal lie, which can also be committed through writing, must be distinguished real lie, by which someone by deed signifies one thing which he does not have in mind. This is properly called simulation; a lie properly is a sin of the mouth.

From formal simulation, by which someone intends by deed to signify one thing other than what he has in mind, must be distinguished material simulation, by which someone by deed does one thing other than what he has in mind, but does not intend this. The former is never licit, since it is a true real lie; but the latter is licit from a just cause by the same reason as mental restriction. Thus a rich man licitly puts on worn clothing lest he be despoiled by robbers.

638. Malice. 1. A lie is evil in itself, wherefore it is not permitted to lie, not even for avoiding the gravest evil.

a. Whether a lie, especially an officious lie, is absolutely and intrinsically evil, or is sometimes licit, is a very difficult question. Gentile philosophers, Plato and the Stoics, taught that a lie is sometimes licit, namely where there is question of averting a great evil or of pursuing a great good. In the Christian age not only the Priscillianists and Semipelagians asserted that a lie was licit, but also, among ecclesiastical writers, Origen and Cassian; but Clement of Alexandria, Jerome, and Chrysostom are undeservedly counted among these. St. Augustine proves its internal malice,¹ and the scholastic theologians, adhering to his footsteps with common consent, defended the same opinion. Afterward many, especially Protestants with Hugo Grotius, distinguishing between lie and false-speech, declared that a lie, which is repugnant to the right or good of others, is always illicit, but false-speech, which consists simply in speech against the mind, is of itself licit. More recent non-Catholic writers generally adhere to this doctrine, which also some Catholic doctors do not wholly reject. These opine that a lie is then especially licit when it is necessary for protecting a secret.² But the common doctrine must absolutely be held: every speech alien from the mind, even if it harmed no one but rather greatly profited, is a lie; and every lie is morally evil.³

b. Arguments of reason. alpha. That which is repugnant to the natural end for which speech has been instituted is prohibited by natural law; but a lie is repugnant to the natural end of speech and to the faculty of speaking, which were instituted by the author of nature so that man may manifest his thoughts to man. beta. That is prohibited by the law of nature which, if it were licit, would redound to the detriment of human society; but if a lie were licit, faith and security could not be had in society. In order that the force of this argument be perceived, it must be estimated not from something once done, but from something once licit. gamma. That which is repugnant to divine perfections is morally evil; but any lie whatsoever, which by its nature is discordance between a sign and the thing to be signified, is repugnant to supreme truth. Therefore St. John says: every lie is not from truth, that is, from God,⁴ but every lie is from the devil, who is a liar and the father of lying.

c. The same is confirmed by texts of Sacred Scripture: You shall flee a lie;⁵ Do not be willing to lie any lie;⁶ Putting away lying, speak truth each one with his neighbor;⁷ Every lie is not from truth;⁸ which texts, without any distinction and limitation, reprove lying itself.

To the several texts of Sacred Scripture which seem to commend lying,⁹ it suffices to note what St. Augustine has: "When examples of lying are proposed to us from the holy Scriptures, either they are not lies, or, if they are lies, they are not to be imitated."¹⁰ Interpreters must be consulted concerning the individual texts.

2. A lie of itself does not exceed light sin, because formally it is repugnant neither to charity nor to justice, but only to veracity, which from its kind obliges only under light obligation. Insofar, therefore, as a harmful lie is repugnant to charity or justice, it is a sin grave from its kind (635, 3).

Hence the words of Sacred Scripture, The mouth that lies kills the soul,¹¹ must be understood thus, that a lie kills the soul dispositively, not formally, insofar as the custom of lying disposes to grave sins: for he who is accustomed to lies does not shrink from gravely harmful lies, indeed not even from perjuries.

¹ St. Augustine, Contra mendacium ad Consentium and De mendacio.

² Cf. Th. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis (Freiburg: Herder, 1900), II, n. 54 ss.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri II, n. 1055.

⁴ 1 John 2:21; John 8:44.

⁵ Exod. 23:7.

⁶ Ecclus. 7:14.

⁷ Eph. 4:25.

⁸ 1 John 2:21.

⁹ Exod. 1:19; Josh. 2:4 s.; 1 Sam. 20:6; 21:2 s.; 4 Kings 6:19; Tob. 5:18, etc.

¹⁰ Contra mendacium, l. 2, c. 15, n. 31.

¹¹ Wis. 1:11.

A LIE is defined by St Thomas to be a speech contrary to one’s mind.¹ It is, then, of the essence of a lie that there should be an intention of saying what is false, that there should be a contradiction between the mind and the external expression of it. One may tell a lie, then, by saying what is true if it is believed by the speaker not to be true, and a lie is told by denying what is false if it is believed to be true. Although a liar usually has the intention of deceiving others, yet such an intention is not of the essence of a lie. A man may be well aware that he has no chance of being able to deceive another, but may say what he knows to be untrue in order to excuse himself or not to stand self-convicted. Men who are known to lie habitually do not expect others to be deceived by what they say, but still they lie when they say what is not true. One may lie to God, though he knows that he cannot deceive him.

In saying that a lie is a speech contrary to one’s mind we understand not only words but gestures, or any signs by which our thought is manifested to others. As St Augustine says: “* He tells a lie who has one thing in his mind and says something else by word or by any signs whatever.”² For we may and do constantly speak not only by word of mouth, but by our tone, looks, gesture, actions, and by the very circumstances in which our words are uttered. The words “I am not guilty ” in the mouth of a murderer have quite a different meaning when they are uttered in the dock and at the feet of his confessor. The words, the tone, the look may be the same; the circumstances make it a true speech in the first case and a sacrilegious lie in the second.

A lie in action is called hypocrisy or simulation, but the malice is the same as in lying words.

Lies are divided by theologians into jocose, officious, and hurtful lies, A jocose lie is told to amuse others; it is something said in joke which the speaker knows to be false, and uttered with the intention of saying what he knows to be false. If what is not true is said in joke without any intention of lying, and in such a way that ordinary hearers would understand, there is no lie. To speak ironically is not to lie.

An officious lie is a lie of excuse, or a falsehood which, while procuring some advantage, does nobody any harm.

A hurtful lie does an injury to someone.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 110, a. I.

² De Mendacio, c. 3,

438. • A lie is speech or signification against the mind, with the will of deceiving. If it is done by nods or by some deed, it is called simulation. Scav. - A threefold genus of lie is distinguished: 1. harmful, by means of which unjust damage is brought upon someone; 2. officious, which is put forth for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3. jocose, which is done from joke and only for the sake of trifling.

404. Preliminary note. A lie is speech against the mind, expressed by words or by other exterior signs.

¹ St. Augustine, De Mendacio, one book; Contra Mendacium, one book; Migne, P. L., XL, 487-548; St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 110-111; Lessius, lib. II, cap. 47, dub. 6; J. Barnes, O. S. B., Dissertatio contra aequivocationes, Paris, 1625; Th. Raynaudus, S. J., De aequivocatione et mentali restrictione, among his works, Lyons, 1565, t. XIV, p. 71, 232; L. Thomassin, Traite de la Verite et du Mensonge, Paris, 1691; St. Alphonsus, n. 151-171; Carriere, n. 923-960; Bolgeni, in Melanges theologiques de Liege, 4th series, 1850-1851, p. 406-413; Examen de l'opinion de Bolgeni, in Melanges, 6th series, 1852-53, p. 410-462; Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge, Tournai, 1884; F. Bouillier, Questions de Morale pratique, Paris, 1889, p. 249-359; Ami du Clerge, XVIII, 1896, p. 561-572; Dubois, Une Theorie du mensonge, in Science catholique, Sept. 1897; Etude sur la malice intrinseque du mensonge, by a professor of Theology, Paris, 1899; Du mensonge proprement dit, by a Professor of Theology, Paris, 1903.

If it is done solely for the sake of joking, it is called jocose; if for one's own or another's utility, it is called officious; but when it is brought forth in order to inflict damage unjustly upon someone, it is named pernicious. - To lying are recalled simulation, by which by deed or external sign the neighbor is induced into error; and also hypocrisy, which covers internal wickedness with the external appearance of virtue; boasting, by which someone by praising himself or his own passes beyond the limits of truth; flattery, which extols another beyond the limits of truth, with the mind of blandishment.

Since there have been various opinions concerning the essence and intrinsic malice of lying, we shall set forth the matter historically, in order to deduce practical conclusions from it.

1. DEFINITION.—To lie is knowingly to tell an untruth in order to deceive others.¹

¹ St. Augustine, De Mendacio, c. 4, n. 5: “Whether one who has no will to deceive lies . . . and whether anyone who wishes to state what is true for the sake of deceiving lies can be doubted. But no one doubts that he lies who willingly states what is false for the sake of deceiving; therefore it is manifest that a false statement uttered with the will to deceive is a lie.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 491).—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. 12, n. 26 (P. L., XL, 537).—IDEM, Enchirid., c. 22: “Everyone who lies speaks contrary to what he feels in his mind, with the will to deceive.” (P. L., XL, 243).—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 453: “A lie is speech contrary to the mind, with the will to deceive.”—Cfr. P. Ch. Kierkegaard, De Notione atque Turpitudine Mendacii, Göttingen 1829.

To constitute a lie, the false declaration, whether made in word or deed, must be opposed to the interior conviction or belief of him who makes it (enuntiatio contra mentem), and further, it must be inspired by the intention (voluntas fallendi) of deceiving and misleading others, especially those who have a right to know the truth.

The matter of a lie (materia), therefore, is the untruth uttered,—not objectively, however, but subjectively, i.e., as opposed to that which one knows or believes to be true.

Consequently, an objectively false statement which one believes to be true is no lie, and, vice versa, an objectively true statement which one believes to be false, is a lie. It is the intention that constitutes a lie (ream linguam non facit nisi mens rea).² One who makes a false statement which he believes to be true, does not wish to deceive others, but is himself deceived.³

² J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching, pp. 108 sqq.—St. Augustine, Serm., 180 (al. 28 De Verbis Apost.), c. 2, n. 2 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 973); De Mendacio, c. 3, n. 3: “He lies who has one thing in his mind and states another in words or by any other signs. Hence the liar is also said to have a double heart, that is, a double thought: one concerning the thing which he knows or thinks to be true and does not state, and another concerning the thing which he states in its place, knowing or thinking it to be false. Thus one may state what is false without lying, if he thinks it is as he says although it is not; and one may state what is true while lying, if he thinks it false and states it as true although in fact it is as he states. For a man must be judged a liar or not a liar according to the judgment of his own mind, not according to the truth or falsity of the things themselves. Therefore one who states as true what is false, yet believes it to be true, may be called mistaken and rash, but he is not rightly called a liar, because when he states it he does not have a double heart and does not wish to deceive, but is himself deceived. The liar’s fault, however, is his mind’s desire to deceive in making a statement, whether he does deceive when his false statement is believed, or does not deceive, either when he is not believed or when he states what is true with the will to deceive, not believing it true. When such a statement is believed, he certainly does not deceive, although he wished to deceive—except insofar as he deceives by being thought to know or believe as he states.” Ibid., n. 4: “Although it is most subtly asked whether, when the will to deceive is absent, there is no lie at all.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 488).—IDEM, Enchir., c. 22: “Every lie is therefore to be called a sin, because a man ought to state what he bears in mind not only when he himself knows what is true, but also if he sometimes errs and is deceived, as a man may be, whether that thing be true or only thought true and is not so.” (P. L., XL, 243).

³ Ibid., c. 18: “No one is to be judged a liar who says what is false while thinking it true, because, so far as he is concerned, he does not deceive but is deceived.” (P. L., XL, 240).

Substantially false statements which are not inspired by the intention of deceiving others (e.g., symbolic or figurative locutions, fables, fairy tales, novels, dramas, riddles, etc., in fact poetry in general) do not partake of the formal character of lies because they are designed merely to veil, sugar-coat or elucidate, not to misrepresent, the truth.

Materially untrue phrases and expressions of which everybody knows that they are not to be taken literally, or the true sense of which is sufficiently revealed by the context or the accompanying circumstances, are not properly lies. To this category belong the complimentary phrases customary in polite society, figurative or metaphorical locutions, such as hyperboles, irony, etc., as well as stratagems and deception in war, at games, and on the theatrical stage.

St. Thomas teaches that the intention to deceive does not belong to the essence of a lie, but rather to its perfection.⁴ Others hold a different view.⁵ According to the Angelic Doctor all that is required to constitute a lie is the intention of telling an untruth. A common example adduced by the defenders of this theory is that of the convicted criminal who denies his guilt. But what is it that inspires his persistent lying if not the intention of deceiving others? Purposely telling an untruth always includes, at least indirectly, the intention to deceive. If the object is not achieved, this is not owing to the liar or his false statement, but solely to the will of the hearer. A lie, therefore, is more correctly defined as telling an untruth with the intention of deceiving others. It must be admitted, at any rate, that the indirect or interpretative intention to deceive is practically always present in the mind when a man lies, because deception is the natural result of lying, though the actual accomplishment of this purpose is not required for the essence of lying, so that he who knowingly tells an untruth is guilty of lying even though he accidentally finds no credence among his hearers.⁶

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1: “It does not belong to the species of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it.” On the controverted question whether the purpose to deceive belongs to the essence of lying, the student may consult J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 133 sq., and Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215 sqq.

⁵ “A statement of the false (a false statement) uttered with the will to deceive.”—Cfr. Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, p. 166.—St. Augustine, De Mendac., c. 3, n. 3: “He certainly does not deceive, although he wished to deceive.” (P. L., XL, 489).

⁶ M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 67 sqq.—Lehmen, S. J., Lehrbuch der Philosophie, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., p. 170.

The notion of a lie, therefore, in contradistinction to that of error, includes (a) the conscious telling of an untruth and (b) the intention to deceive. In popular parlance even objective untruths which are not intended to deceive, are often called lies, e. g., historical lies. But such phrases are misleading. A statement may be an untruth without being a lie. The so-called lies of history are for the most part merely errors and blunders.

2. DIVISION.—a) A lie may either be uttered in words or indicated by signs. A verbal lie consists either in the denial of a truth (falsiloquium) or the assertion of an untruth with the will to deceive (mendacium).

Other species of lying are simulation (simulatio) and hypocrisy (hypocrisis),⁷ which may be defined as the act of assuming a false form, appearance, character, or condition in order to deceive others as to one’s real thoughts or intentions, and especially in regard to one’s true character. Simulation frequently takes the form of sanctimony, an assumed or outward show of probity,⁸ exemplified by the kiss with which Judas betrayed Christ.⁹

⁷ St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 63, n. 11: “Simulated innocence is not innocence; simulated equity is not equity, but twofold iniquity, because it is both iniquity and simulation.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 765).—IDEM, Serm., 355 (al. 49 de Divers.), c. 3, n. 6: “It is evil to fall away from a purpose of holiness, but it is worse to feign such a purpose.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1575).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 1: “Just as it is opposed to truth for someone by outward words to signify something other than what he has within himself, which pertains to lying, so it is also opposed to truth for someone by certain signs of deeds or things to signify something contrary to what is in him, which is properly called simulation. Hence simulation is properly a kind of lie consisting in outward signs of deeds.”

⁸ Matth. VI, 1–6, 16; cfr. 2 Cor. XI, 13–15.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 111.

⁹ Matth. XXVI, 48–50; Luke XXII, 47 sq.

A subspecies of hypocrisy is flattery, which consists in giving insincere, false, or exaggerated praise to others with a view to influencing their future conduct. As a rule flattery is inspired by purely egotistic motives, and partakes of the malice of such motives.¹⁰ b) According to the purpose for which they are uttered, or the effect which they produce, lies are divided into several categories. There is, for instance, the jocose lie (mendacium iocosum); the officious or courtesy lie (mendacium officiosum), inspired by a desire to ward off injury or incon- venience, and the damaging or pernicious lie (mendacium damnosum sive perniciosum), dictated by a desire to injure others in life, property, or good name, perhaps even to prevent them from attaining eternal salvation.¹¹ In lies of this kind the predominant note is not the intention to deceive, but the will to injure others, spiritually or materially.

¹⁰ Prov. XXIX, 5; Acts XXIV, 1 sqq.

¹¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2.

166. Definition. Lying is usually defined: voluntary speech against the mind. This definition, if rightly explained, seems better than others.²⁹⁷

It is explained. It is said 1: speech; but under the name of speech is understood any external sign whatever by which interior concepts are signified, whether this is done by words or nod or gesture or writing, etc. Nevertheless, lying is chiefly and almost always done by speech, and for this reason it is deservedly called a sin of the mouth and defined: voluntary speech against the mind. - It is said 2: voluntary speech against the mind,²⁹⁸ for if someone were to speak what is false from ignorance and without consent, it would not be a lie, but objectively false speech. St. Thomas writes to the point: "The notion of lying is taken from formal falsity, namely, from this, that someone has the will of enunciating what is false; hence also lying is named from the fact that it is said against the mind. And therefore if someone enunciates what is false, believing it to be true, it is indeed materially false, but not formally, because the falsity is outside the intention of the speaker; hence it does not have the perfect notion of a lie.... But if someone formally says what is false, having the will of saying what is false, although that which is said is true, nevertheless insofar as such an act is voluntary and moral, it has falsity of itself and truth by accident; hence it attains to the species of lying."²⁹⁹ Therefore he who affirms what is false, which he thinks true, errs; he does not lie. On the contrary, he who affirms what is true, which he thinks false, does not indeed err, but lies.³⁰⁰

Theologians dispute whether the intention of leading others into error pertains to the essence of lying. For four elements can be distinguished in a lie, namely: a) the will of saying what is false, b) speech discordant from the interior judgment of the mind, c) the will of deceiving another, d) the deception really following. Without any doubt this fourth element is not of the essence of lying; hence, e.g., an accused person whom no prudent man believes when he asserts his innocence lies if without mental restriction he denies the crime committed. Therefore the deception of another is sometimes the effect of lying, but not lying itself. The third element, namely, the will of deceiving, is commonly asserted by the Scotists to be of the essence of lying, but the Thomists deny it after St. Thomas, who teaches: "That someone intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another by deceiving him does not pertain to the species of lying, but to a certain perfection of it."³⁰¹ Therefore a true lie is present, even if the one lying certainly foresees that the hearer will by no means believe his fallacious speech. Waffelaert,³⁰² however, tries to prove that in fact there is no distinction between the Thomistic and Scotistic opinion, rightly understood. For by the very fact that someone knowingly and seriously speaks something false, he intends at least implicitly to deceive another. Hence if even this implicit will of deceiving is manifestly lacking, a lie is no longer present. Thus modern authors deservedly teach that there is no lie a) if someone openly says false things from jest; b) if he brings forth things false indeed, but only materially; c) if someone uses locutions manifestly ironic or hyperbolic, or even locutions which are not usually understood as the words sound; e.g., if a servant responds to one asking, "The master is not at home," he does not wish to say that the master truly is not at home, but that the master cannot be approached.³⁰³ Therefore even according to the Thomists, an implicit intention of deceiving pertains to the essence of lying, but an explicit intention is by no means required; it is only an aggravating circumstance.

²⁹⁷ Especially the definition given by Berardi (Praxis confess. I, n. 1095) and others seems defective: "A lie is false speech against the right which another has of knowing the truth or of not undergoing deception."

²⁹⁸ i.e., against one's own knowledge and conscience.

²⁹⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1.

³⁰⁰ Cf. St. Augustine, Enchir. c. 8.

³⁰¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1.

³⁰² Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge (Bruges 1884) p. 16 sqq.

³⁰³ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 916, and St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3 ad 6.

167. Division of lying. According to St. Thomas and other theologians there are two divisions of lying:

1. On the part of the end there is distinguished the officious lie, the jocose lie, and the pernicious or damaging lie.

An officious lie (Nutzlüge) is that which is chiefly brought forth in order to be useful, namely, for one's own or another's utility, without directly harming anyone, e.g., lies of children lest they be punished on account of committed delicts.

A jocose lie (Scherzlüge) is that which is chiefly made for the sake of trifling and delighting, e.g., the tales of hunters.³⁰⁴ But those locutions are not jocose lies which, considered materially indeed, are false, but from the very mode of pronouncing can immediately be understood as false (and not as really true), e.g., narratives made by the so-called Münchhausen or by Don Quixote. St. Augustine writes to the point: "Therefore excepting jests, which have never been thought lies - for they have, from the pronunciation and the very affection of the one joking, a most evident signification of a mind by no means deceiving, even if not enunciating true things - whether this kind is to be used by perfect souls is another question, which we have not now undertaken to untie";³⁰⁵ and: "Lies are performed seriously by liars, not in jest; but when things which are not are said as jokes, they are not reckoned lies."³⁰⁶ Nevertheless in oral conversation jokes of this kind are better avoided, because they easily degenerate into true lies, although jocose.

A pernicious or damaging lie (Schadenlüge) is that which causes special damage. Indeed every lie (even a jocose one) causes damage to another, insofar as by its nature it is inductive of error in the minds of hearers. For error is always something evil. But that sometimes a lie causes no error in fact to the hearers is by accident, and does not prevent every lie from causing damage of itself. Certain lies, however, produce special damages to the neighbor, e.g., concerning knowledge, goods of fortune, goods of the body, etc., and for this reason they are called, in the strict sense, damaging or pernicious lies.

2. On the part of opposition to truth there are distinguished boasting and irony.

Boasting,³⁰⁷ as it is taken here, is a violation of truth by excess and can be defined: a vice by which someone externally raises himself above that which is in himself.³⁰⁸ It very often arises from pride or from vainglory.

Irony³⁰⁹ is not taken here for a figurative locution by which something is mockingly said through the contrary, but for simulation by which someone either asserts of himself something vile which he does not recognize in himself, or denies of himself something great which nevertheless he perceives to be in himself. Hence it is opposed to truth by defect.³¹⁰ The sin of irony is very often accustomed to occur in false beggars, who externally simulate the greatest need, although in reality they are by no means so poor.

³⁰⁴ Commonly Jägerlatein, tall stories.

³⁰⁵ De mendacio c. 14.

³⁰⁶ In Gen. q. 145.

³⁰⁷ Ἀλαζονεία (Aristotle, Ethic. lib. 4, c. 7), Großtuerei, Prahlerische Selbstüberschätzung, Aufschneiderei, gasconnade, bragging.

³⁰⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 112, a. 1, and above I, 414.

³⁰⁹ Εἰρωνεία (Aristotle, l.c.), Kleintuerei, fausse dépréciation de soi-même; false undervaluation of one's self.

³¹⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 113, a. 1.

168. Scholion. On simulation and hypocrisy. Simulation and hypocrisy can be reduced to lying. For it belongs to the virtue of truth that someone show himself externally through external signs such as he is. But external signs are not only words, but also deeds. Falsity in words is lying; but falsity in the signs of external deeds is simulation³¹¹ (Verstellung). But hypocrisy is a species of simulation; for it is the simulation of another person and notably the vice of him who does not have holiness, but nevertheless externally so conducts himself that he may be regarded as holy. Simulation and hypocrisy must be judged especially from the end of the agent. For often they are assumed as means for obtaining a very depraved end, e.g., the kiss of Judas. When a dishonorable end is absent, they are venial sins or even wholly lack culpability. For external deeds are not so clearly and certainly significative as words, but often are of ambiguous interpretation, and therefore they must be regarded as amphibologies, which sometimes can be permitted from a reasonable cause. Thus, e.g., from a grave cause a cleric can proceed in lay dress, although then many will regard him as a lay man.

The malice of lying.

³¹¹ Ibid. q. 111, a. 1.

169. Principle 1. Every true lie is intrinsically evil, so that it can be made honorable by absolutely no reason.

Thus, after St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is the most common opinion, with few Catholic theologians contradicting it. Clement of Alexandria,³¹² Origen,³¹³ St. Chrysostom,³¹⁴ St. Hilary,³¹⁵ and especially Cassian³¹⁶ seem to have taught that in a case of necessity, for averting the greatest damage, it is lawful to use a lie as a medicine. Here are the words of Cassian: "Therefore one must think about lying in such a way and use it in such a way as if the nature of hellebore [Nieswurz] were in it; if it is taken when a deadly disease threatens, it becomes healthful; but if it is received without the necessity of supreme danger, it is of present destruction.... Therefore when some grave danger threatens from the confession of truth, then refuges of lies are to be received, yet in such a way that we are healthfully bitten by the guilt of a humble conscience."³¹⁷ There are, however, several Catholic theologians³¹⁸ who explain the Fathers and older ecclesiastical writers as if they spoke concerning the liceity of mental restriction, not of lying properly so called.³¹⁹ Hence there would only be a dispute about words. Certain modern Catholic theologians distinguish between a moral lie, which is never lawful, and a psychological lie, or false-speaking, which in a case of necessity is lawful according to Bolgeni,³²⁰ Piat, O. Cap.,³²¹ Tanquerey,³²² and several Protestants, such as Luther, Grotius, Pufendorf, Martensen.³²³ Again there seems to be a dispute about words; because that which they call a psychological lie or false-speaking (fausseté), others call mental restriction. Nevertheless it would be much better if the expressions "psychological lie" or "false-speaking" were avoided. For in practice it is not so easy to distinguish between a psychological and a moral lie, and it sounds very bad if a Catholic theologian says that some lie is sometimes lawful. - These things having been premised, it is proved that lying properly so called is intrinsically evil:

1. From Sacred Scripture, which indiscriminately prohibits every lie. You shall flee a lie;³²⁴ Do not lie, nor let each one deceive his neighbor;³²⁵ Do not lie to one another.³²⁶

2. From the Holy Fathers. St. Cyprian,³²⁷ citing Prov. 12, 22, says that one must not lie, because lying lips are an abomination to the Lord. - But especially St. Augustine strenuously proved in his diverse writings³²⁸ that a lie is never lawful, neither for anyone's temporal safety, nor for preserving chastity, nor for the safety of the neighbor. But since lies seem to be approved in not a few places of Sacred Scripture, e.g., Jacob, who deceived his father Isaac; the midwives, who concealed the children of the Jews by a lie; Judith, who deceived Holofernes by a lie, etc., St. Augustine shows that the alleged deeds either are not lies properly so called, or are not to be imitated. St. Thomas assumed the doctrine of St. Augustine, and simply asserts: "Every lie is a sin";³²⁹ and, "We concede that lying is always a sin."³³⁰

3. From reason. a) Lying is repugnant to the natural end of speech: "For since words are naturally signs of understandings, it is unnatural and undue that someone should signify by the voice that which he does not have in the mind. Hence the Philosopher says³³¹ that 'lying is of itself depraved and to be fled; but the true is good and praiseworthy.'"³³² Therefore lying is an abuse of the voice.

b) Lying is repugnant to the natural commerce of men. For without truthfulness human society cannot stand in peace.

c) Lying is repugnant to the good of the neighbor hearing. As was said above, any true lie by its nature induces the hearer into error. Now to induce another into error is to harm him. If sometimes a lie does not induce into error, this is by accident, and therefore does not change its absolute culpability.

d) Lying is repugnant to the good of the speaker himself. For although an (officious) lie sometimes seems to be useful to the speaker himself, nevertheless in reality it harms, since it excites to many evils. Hence it is evident from experience that a lying man loses nobility of soul and often sins especially from cowardice or even from a cauterized conscience.

³¹² Strom. l. 7, c. 9 (Migne, Patr. graec. 9, 474).

³¹³ Strom. l. 6 (Migne, l.c. 11, 102).

³¹⁴ Hom. 3, n. 3 in 2 Cor. 1, 17 (Migne, l.c. 61, 408).

³¹⁵ Comm. in Ps. 14, n. 10 (Migne, Patr. lat. 9, 305).

³¹⁶ Collat. 17, c. 17.

³¹⁷ L.c., in Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1062. This doctrine of Cassian seems taken from Plato, who taught that lying is sometimes salutary: ψεῦδος δὴ ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (De republ. l. 3 [ed. Didot n. 389]). Socrates and the Stoics spoke in the same way. On the contrary Aristotle calls lying from its very nature something evil: καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν (Ethic. l. 4, c. [13] 7, 6).

³¹⁸ Waffelaert, Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge p. 41 sqq.

³¹⁹ Especially it is not so clear what St. Jerome thought in this question. In his Commentaries on the Epistle to the Galatians c. 2, 11-12 he had written that St. Paul did that very thing concerning which he rebuked St. Peter, and therefore did not speak so according to truth. St. Augustine, vehemently moved by this, invites St. Jerome to sing a palinode in this matter (Ep. 67 among the works of St. Jerome; in Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 650), but he took this very badly and wrote rather vehement letters to defend his opinion; yet he expressly asserts that he does not wish to defend an "officious lie," as Augustine imputed to him, but that the holy Apostles committed simulation from a certain "honest dispensation" (Ep. 113; ib. 923). St. Augustine was unwilling to admit even this, and strenuously defended St. Paul (Ep. 116; ib. 936 sqq.). Therefore between St. Augustine and St. Jerome there exists rather a controversy about St. Paul's manner of acting than about the liceity of lying. Nevertheless it must be confessed that St. Augustine extended the words of St. Jerome to an officious lie. - Concina treats this whole matter excellently, both historically and theologically (In Decal. l. 5, diss. 3, c. 20 and l. 10, c. 5), and also clearly shows that St. Raymond of Pennafort is falsely cited as permitting an officious lie in grave necessity.

³²⁰ Mélanges théologiques de Liége, 4th series (1850-1851), p. 409-413.

³²¹ Appendix 4 to Theol. mor. by Van der Velden I, 524 sq.

³²² Theol. mor. De iust., n. 4105 sqq.

³²³ Die christl. Ethik II (1879), 245 sqq.

³²⁴ Ex. 23, 7.

³²⁵ Lev. 19, 11.

³²⁶ Col. 3, 9; cf. also Prov. 12, 22; Eccli. 20, 26.

³²⁷ Lib. 3 testim. ad Quirin. c. 104 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 807).

³²⁸ De mendacio, Contra mendacium, Sermons 81, 133, and 166 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 494-497 and 541-547).

³²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3.

³³⁰ Quodl. 8, a. 14.

³³¹ Ethic. l. 4, c. 7.

³³² S. theol., l.c.

170. Principle 2. Lying, insofar as it is chiefly opposed to truthfulness, is a venial sin; but insofar as it is opposed to justice, religion, and other virtues, it is from its genus a mortal sin.

The reason of the first part is that the abuse of speech and the other disorders found in a pure lie do not seem to be so grave that they constitute a mortal sin. Thus also bears the common sense of the faithful, even those who fear God, who do not think that they have sinned mortally if they have told a purely jocose or officious lie. And truly it seems too harsh to condemn someone to the penalty of Gehenna who departed from this life with a jocose or officious lie. Concerning these lies St. Augustine says:³³³ "There are altogether two kinds of lies in which there is no great fault, but nevertheless they are not without fault, when either we joke, or lie in order that we may help. That first, in joking, is therefore not most pernicious, because it does not deceive. For he to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of a joke. But the second is milder, because it retains some benevolence."

The reason of the other part of the principle is that these virtues (charity, justice, faith, religion) of themselves oblige under grave matter. Hence without any doubt he commits mortal sin who by lying causes grave scandal and thus wounds charity, e.g., if a bishop should tell a pure and foul lie; or if someone by lying causes grave damage, because it is a grave wounding of justice; or if someone tells a lie with an oath, because he wounds the virtue of religion; or if someone speaks against the true faith, because he wounds the virtue of faith. - Therefore lies which, besides truthfulness, also wound other virtues, are from their genus mortal sins; but they become venial sins either from lightness of matter or from imperfection of the act.³³⁴ But when in Sacred Scripture it is said: You will destroy all who speak a lie,³³⁵ and: The mouth that lies kills the soul,³³⁶ such and similar places are to be understood of the pernicious lie.³³⁷

³³³ Enarr. in Ps. 5, n. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 36, 86).

³³⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 4. - The opinion proposed by Tanquerey seems too harsh: "Lying properly so called ... is of itself a grave sin" (Theol. mor., De iust. n. 411). But if under lying properly so called only a damaging lie is understood, the proposition is indeed true, but then that manner of speaking is not pleasing, because it is repugnant to the common usage of theologians. Mausbach also speaks less rightly in this matter (Kathol. Moraltheol. III, 59).

³³⁵ Ps. 5, 7.

³³⁶ Wis. 1, 11.

³³⁷ Cf. S. theol., l.c. ad 1.

S. Th. II-II, q. 110.

857. A lie (mensonge; leugen) is directly opposed to truth by defect and therefore is speech against the mind. It is called:

1. Speech, and indeed external speech, which can be made by any external sign whatever, whether by word, writing, gesture, or deed; hence on the part of the act a lie is divided into a lie strictly so called, which is made by words or equivalent signs, and simulation, which is made by deeds, of which hypocrisy is a species, which chiefly is the simulation of holiness.

2. Against the mind, namely, that which proceeds from the intention of enunciating what is false; hence if someone enunciates what is false, erroneously thinking it to be true, falsity is not present except materially, nor is there a lie; in other words, he errs but does not lie. On the contrary, if someone enunciates what is true, erroneously thinking it to be false, he does not err but lies, because falsity is present formally, and accordingly a lie.

In this intention there is implicitly included the intention of deceiving, because the proper effect of a false enunciation is that another be deceived; but that someone explicitly intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another does not pertain to the species or essence of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it (a. 1).

858. Principle I. Every lie is a sin. - It is proved:

1. From the Scriptures (Ecclus. VII, 14; Prov. XIII, 5 and Col. III, 9; John VIII, 44; I John II, 21).

2. From the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

3. By reason, because a) it is essentially evil, as an act which falls upon undue matter. Namely, it is repugnant to the end of speech and of the faculty of speaking, which were established by the author of nature so that man might manifest his thoughts to man: for since voices by their nature are signs of concepts, it is unnatural and undue that someone signify by voice that which he does not have in his mind; from which disorder follows b) another, that a lie of itself by its nature induces the deception of the neighbor, and accordingly, once universal suspicion has arisen, brings harm to trust and security in social life and to the public good (a. 3).

859. A threefold lie: officious, jocose, pernicious. - On the part of the end (motive) or effect and fault, a lie is distinguished as officious, jocose, and pernicious, according as it is made for the sake of one's own or another's utility, of delight, or of inflicting special harm: the first is lighter than the second, and the second than the third; but the gravest of all is a lie which harms God in the matter of religion (a. 2 and 4).

An officious and jocose lie is venial from its genus, and is not mortal except accidentally, for example by reason of scandal, for a deception of small moment does not overthrow social life, but inconveniences it: for from deception of the neighbor about something of small moment concerning which it does not matter whether it be known, the neighbor is not harmed; but a pernicious lie is mortal from its genus on account of the evil joined to it, whether on the part of the matter, if it is made in doctrine of religion or of good morals or of some science, or in a contract, or on the part of the end, if it is said to the injury of God or to the notable detriment of the neighbor.

860. Principle II. Although it is never licit to lie, "nevertheless it is sometimes licit prudently to hide the truth under some dissimulation" (q. 110, a. 3, ad 4). - This is customarily done in a twofold way:

1. By amphibology or equivocation (dubbelzinnige uitdrukking), which is a speech having of itself a twofold sense: one, ordinarily more obvious and common, which the speaker foresees is to be perceived by the hearer; the other, less common, yet perceptible by the hearer from the circumstances, which the speaker intends to express, for example, I say no, I will, Peter is at home, this book belongs to Peter, etc.

2. By restriction (voorbehoud), which is a limitation made in the mind of some absolute affirmation or negation, or an act of the mind by which someone restricts or turns words in his mind to a sense other than the natural and obvious one. It is twofold: a) purely mental, when the limitation cannot appear externally, but the whole sense lies hidden in the mind and the truth can in no way be perceived, as if someone says that he has seen Rome, understanding in a picture, I did not break the vow, understanding in the previous year, I did not take your thing, thinking with the left hand, I did not do this, namely, that which I am now thinking, etc.; b) broadly mental or real, when the limitation can be gathered from the circumstances of things, persons, places, and received common usage, for example, if a priest or physician says: I know nothing about these things, understanding, which I can reveal; then by reason of the circumstances the speech is now made equivocal, and rather there is restriction of the utterance than of the mind. Now then:

I. It is never licit to use a purely mental restriction, because it is simply a lie, for the words neither of themselves nor from the adjoining circumstances in any way outwardly manifest the internal concept of the mind. This is clear from the condemnation of propositions 26 and 27 by Innocent XI.¹

¹ "If anyone, either alone or before others, whether interrogated, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other end whatever, swears that he did not do something which in reality he did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition whatever, he does not really lie nor is he perjured." - "A just cause for using these amphibologies is present whenever it is necessary or useful for safeguarding bodily health, honor, family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the hiding of truth is then judged expedient and studious."

II. It is licit to use real restriction and amphibology, provided that a just cause is present for hiding the truth, and another honest means is lacking, and deception of the neighbor is not intended.

It is proved: a) by the example of Christ. "But of that day no one knoweth... nor the Son," understanding: so as to manifest it (Mk. XIII, 32; Mt. XXIV, 36; cf. John XI, 11; VII, 8);

b) by reason: on the one hand, it is not a lie, because the words which are uttered, taken together with the circumstances of the speaker, the hearer, etc., which according to common estimation co-signify, signify the true sense which the speaker has in mind, although not clearly and distinctly; on the other hand, deception of the neighbor is not necessarily intended: for that speech has a twofold effect, one good, the hiding of truth which the speaker intends, the other evil, the deception of the neighbor which he only permits from a just cause. Hence the neighbor is not directly and necessarily deceived, but his deception is only permitted, which for a just cause is licit. For we are not bound to speak according to the mind of others if a just cause is present. But if this were not licit, there would not exist a way of licitly keeping secrets, which would be pernicious to human commerce, no less than lying, says St. Alphonsus, l. III, n. 152.²

² Real restriction is not something new, although the name is new. In ancient times it was known, although not so expressly; even by St. Thomas, as is clear from what he has concerning various sayings by Christ, and concerning the sacramental seal.

We said: from a just cause; for such utterances ordinarily are not licit, otherwise social life itself, which is founded upon mutual trust and mutual manifestation of truth, would totter. A just cause is an honorable end for preserving goods useful to the spirit or body; and this cause is required to be proportionate, that is, greater 1) the more the words furnish occasion of erring; 2) the graver the matter of error is; 3) the more numerous and greater are those to be deceived. A greater cause, for example, is required that someone use them publicly, or not interrogated, or asked by authority, than that he use them privately, or interrogated, especially if not by authority. But for swearing with real restriction or amphibology a greater and grave cause is required, out of reverence for the name of God.

861. Principle III. It is not always licit to hide the truth. - It is not licit to use any restriction or equivocation when some other special precept of faith, charity, justice, etc., demands the open confession of truth; in which case one who nevertheless used it would sin in two ways, both against truth and against the other virtue: a) when the precept of externally confessing the faith presses; b) when by reason of office we are bound to instruct someone and teach him true things lest he err, especially if for a price or stipend; c) when a judge legitimately interrogates, having the right of knowing the truth (to this right of knowing some truth there corresponds in another the obligation of confessing it, and in such a way that the truth be known by the hearer), or a superior concerning those things which pertain to the governance of subjects, or a confessor concerning those things which he must know in order rightly to judge the penitent; d) in onerous and mutual contracts, on account of a similar motive: for justice requires that no injury be brought upon another.

One who uses amphibology without sufficient cause violates the affirmative precept of truth, by which, on account of the good of society, we are obliged not to hide the truth without cause, or at least not to furnish occasion for the deception of the neighbor: for if this were always done and without reason, no one could any longer believe another without suspicion of ambiguity, which would tend to the manifest detriment of society. Yet such a person does not make a lie, because the utterance in some signification is conformed to the internal judgment of the speaker, provided that it remains equivocal when all the circumstances are considered. Hence if he confirms it by oath, he makes an unjust assertory oath, which of itself is venial; yet it can be mortal, if another virtue is gravely injured, for example commutative or legal justice, as in contracts and judgments.

But one who uses restriction without sufficient cause, besides this, makes a lie, because if sufficient cause is lacking, the circumstances do not sufficiently indicate the restriction added in judgment by the mind; hence one who in this case confirms it by oath makes perjury strictly so called.

862. Remarks. - 1. Let proposition 28 be noted among those condemned by Innocent XI,³ by which we know that all restrictions are illicit when an oath is required on account of the public good, whether by the Republic or by the Church, lest the unworthy be promoted, for example, in those to be promoted to sacred order (concerning birth, censures, irregularity), in those wishing to contract marriage (concerning a diriment impediment), in conditions for teaching in schools for an academic degree, etc.

³ "One who by means of recommendation or a gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office will be able, with mental restriction, to furnish the oath which by mandate of the king is customarily required from such persons, no regard being had to the intention of the one requiring it; because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."

2. We note that Catholics commonly admit broadly mental restriction as a necessary means of hiding the truth. Nor is it to be admitted what certain moderns have said for this end: that false-speaking is licit, or a psychological lie which harms no one but benefits the speaker or another, distinguishing it from a moral lie, which denies truth when it ought to be affirmed, and thus perverting the definition of a lie.⁴ Although practically in most cases broadly mental restriction and false-speaking return to the same thing as to the matter, nevertheless the doctrine must be held which says that every lie and false-speaking is illicit, both because it more easily excludes abuse, and because every false-speaking is against the essence of speech, and because broadly mental restriction, as being speech true in itself, can also be confirmed by oath, which is sometimes necessary. But false-speaking, even if it were said to be licit, cannot be confirmed by oath, because it is falsity.

⁴ Thus not only Grotius and Pufendorf, Protestants, but also certain Catholics, such as Bolgeni, Il possesso, c. 48; Dubois, Une théorie du mensonge; and the author of the little work: Étude sur la malice intrinsèque du mensonge par un professeur de théologie. Against these especially Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge; and Vermeersch, in the periodical Gregorianum, I, wrote very well.

3. The comparison cannot be admitted which some, such as Fr. Vermeersch, institute between homicide licit from just defense on account of a good effect, and false speech or a restriction which is not sufficiently indicated by the circumstances, licit from just defense of a secret which otherwise could not be defended. For homicide is not always and essentially evil, because it is not against the essence of things but only against their natural condition, and therefore it is not always an illicit means but only the homicide of an innocent person; on the contrary, lying is essentially and always evil against the very essence of speech (in the same way as lust against nature, because it is against the very essential order of the generative organs); and therefore it is always illicit even for just defense, because evil things, even the least, are not to be done for the sake of good things.

4. It must be noted that penitents sometimes affirm that they had to lie in order to keep a secret. Then the confessor would try in vain to explain to the simpler the distinction between a lie and broadly mental restriction, which in the case is licit. Therefore, having asked what utterance they had used, let him simply tell them that such things are not lies, but licit responses which can be given on account of necessity, and whose sense in those circumstances does not deceive an upright and prudent man (for example, in a merchant).

863. Corollary. - False testimony is of itself a grave sin, as being a pernicious lie. It is directly prohibited by the eighth precept of the decalogue (Ex. XX, 16), and is hateful to God (Prov. VI, 16, 19) and very harmful to the neighbor (Prov. XXV, 18).

It has a threefold deformity: a) against legal justice, because it does not obey the command of a judge or superior legitimately interrogating, and for that reason it is apt to harm the good of the community; b) against commutative justice, if besides it causes unjust harm to the neighbor; c) against religion, if, as is customary, it is done under oath, because then it is perjury strictly so called. From this last head it is always a mortal sin, even in a slight matter; from the first and the other it is mortal from its genus. Hence in law it is said (Decr. l. V, tit. 20, c. 1): "A false-speaking witness is liable to three persons: first to God, whose presence he contemns; then to the judge, whom he deceives by lying; lastly to the innocent person, whom he harms by false testimony."

From these things it is understood that this is accidentally venial: a) from some inadvertence or insufficient deliberation; b) also from lightness of matter, if it is not done under oath and brings only slight harm.

A false witness is bound:

1. to revoke the testimony, and indeed if he said it only materially or from error, he is bound when revocation is useful to another and does not bring grave harm to himself; but if he said it formally and knowingly, he is bound, when revocation is useful to another, even with equal or greater inconvenience to himself, therefore even with danger of life if he has thrown an innocent person into the same danger, for in equal harm favor is rather to be shown to the innocent;

2. to restitution of the harm already following, he is bound; and indeed if he knowingly said false testimony and thus effectively brought harm upon another, he is bound simply. But when in good faith he gave false testimony, he is bound to restore if afterward he did not revoke it, although he could conveniently have done so and reparation would have been useful to another: for then he indirectly wills to be an efficacious cause.

A lie is speech against the mind, or, as St. Augustine says, it is "to say something knowingly otherwise than we think." If it is done by nods or by some deed, it is called simulation, which again is called hypocrisy when someone simulates the person of another, e.g., when a sinner simulates the person of a just man. - For a true lie it is not required that there be expressly the intention of deceiving, for as the same holy Doctor says: "Everyone who lies speaks against that which he thinks in his soul, with the will of deceiving." - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 110, art. 1. - St. Augustine, Enchir., chap. 18 and 22.

A threefold kind of lie is distinguished: 1st. harmful, by which unjust harm is inflicted upon someone; 2nd. officious, which is put forth for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3rd. jocose, which is said from jest and for the sole sake of trifling.

I. We have already indicated, in the preceding chapter, that, before Augustine's time, several authors defended as licit the use of lying in extreme necessity, for the preservation of human life, or the warding off of some other grave harm. Cassian, above all others, left no stone unturned to fortify this opinion with the authority of Scripture. St. Augustine, on the contrary, snatched the palm from all the impugners of lying. He proposes to himself all the arguments, or cases, of his adversaries, and, with the utmost acuteness of his own genius, discusses and turns them over, so that nothing is left untouched, nothing unresolved. Indeed, he himself devised all those objections, all those events, paradoxes, and sophisms, which more recent theologians treat, so as to show that lying can be favored, and all those same difficulties, lest he pass over anything. And, since I have judged it worth the effort to set before the eyes of readers the disputation of so great a Father, so that they may gather from this how far Augustine's teaching differs from more recent inventions — Augustine wrote this Book on Lying around the year 395, as the Benedictine Fathers observe. All, then, that is contained in this Book I will transcribe here, reduced to a compendium with such brevity as I am able. The proem of this Book begins with these words:

II. "Great is the question concerning lying, which often disturbs us in our own daily actions — lest we either rashly accuse of lying what is not a lie, or judge that one must sometimes lie for some honorable, officious, and merciful reason." Then (ch. 1), the state of the controversy having been set forth, and jesting words, whose signification is plain to all, being excluded (ch. 2) from the present question, he observes (ch. 3) that neither does one who asserts something false always lie, nor is one who states something true always free of a lie. For one is not guilty of lying who, uttering a falsehood, reckons it to be true. On the contrary, he is held a liar who speaks the truth, thinking it false. Wherefore he lies who, having something else in his mind, states, in words, or by whatever signification, what he reckons false. Ch. 4 inquires what act it behooves the whole Book to treat: namely, whether he who lies ought always to have the intention of deceiving; he there discusses other difficulties as well. Ch. 5 asks whether one may sometimes lie. Those who defend this oppose the examples of Sarah, of Jacob, and of the Egyptian midwives. They add the most grave inconveniences which sometimes follow upon the manifestation of some truth — such as death, and the affliction of the sick, who cannot be freed except by a lie — relying on which words, and on those examples adduced from the Old Testament, they answer that it is unlawful for anyone who thinks well [of a matter] to be manifested. On the contrary, those who hold that the ancient Fathers did not lie argue more forcibly from divine examples, that in every event to lie...

[several lines here in the source are too faint to reliably transcribe; the discussion continues concerning whether examples like Abraham's servant provide precedent for lying]

...examples are found which provoke to the imitation of lying. But the dissimulation of Peter, and of Barnabas, was not only not commended, but even censured, and corrected. From the guilt of this dissimulation he shows Paul to be immune, when he circumcised Timothy — where he brings forward much in Paul's defense.

III. The inconveniences, moreover, which they object would follow from the revelation of truth (ch. 6), the impugners of lying count as nothing. For, directing their mind to the divine Scripture, which threatens, "The mouth that lieth killeth the soul," they reckon it a perversion of order, to destroy one's own soul, so that another may live bodily. Nor does charity urge this, which bids us to love our neighbor as ourselves, not more than ourselves. For if he departs from the right order who seeks temporal death for another's bodily life, how much more does he exceed the rule of sound doctrine, who loses his own eternal life for another's temporal one? Those, however, who rage and are indignant, if someone is unwilling to destroy his own soul by a lie, so that another may live longer in the flesh — what if it be by our own theft, what if by adultery, that another might be freed from death? Is anyone bound to corrupt his own soul by a lie, so that another may live in the body? It is absurd. Therefore neither theft nor adultery is to be committed, however much it might free someone from death. What, if a man bears a noose, that another may be strangled, unless it is granted to him what he seeks — must one assent to it? What, if a ravisher demands debauchery, affirming that he will kill a man, unless it is conceded to him — will he then be a nefarious murderer? Therefore, in this question, nothing is to be attended to, except whether lying is, by its own nature, iniquitous. Since this has already been shown above, it will be the same as to ask whether, for another's salvation, one ought to be unjust, as if one were to ask whether, for another's soul's health, which cannot be preserved except by equity, one ought oneself to be unjust. But if he rejects this, so that not only another's, but even our own, temporal welfare we must prefer to it — who could call it into doubt that one must never lie at all?

IV. Since, however (ch. 7), chastity of body is itself more precious than life, it can be asked whether a man may rightly use a lie, by which he might avoid the loss of chastity — as if a ravisher should rush in, who might be avoided by a lie. It is easily answered that there is no chastity of body, unless it depends on integrity of mind; which being disrupted, the former must necessarily fall, even if it seems untouched. In no way, then, does the mind corrupt itself by a lie for the sake of its body, which it knows remains incorrupt, if incorruption does not depart from the mind itself. For what the body suffers by violence, without preceding lust, is to be called vexation rather than corruption. Not every corruption is shameful; but there is corruption there, if lust has consented. But, however excellent the mind is above the body, so much the more wickedly is it corrupted. Chastity, then, can be preserved wherever no voluntary corruption of the mind can occur, unless someone has procured it, or consented to it. For certainly, if a ravisher has assailed a body which can be resisted neither by force, nor avoided by any counsel, or lie, it must be confessed that chastity is not violated by another's lust. Wherefore, since no one doubts that the soul is better than the body, integrity of mind is to be preferred to integrity of body, which can be preserved in eternity. But who would say that the mind of a liar is integral? For lust itself is rightly defined as an appetite of the mind by which temporal goods are preferred to eternal ones. No one, then, can prove that one must ever lie, unless he can show that some eternal good can be obtained by a lie. But since each one departs from eternity as much as he departs from truth, and it is most absurd to say that one who lies, departing from truth, can, by so departing, arrive at some good — or, if there is such a good, whatever was not fulfilled will not be true, and therefore not good either, since it is false. Just as, then, mind is to be preferred to body, so too is truth to mind, since the mind ought to desire it not only more than the body, but even more than itself. If, however, Lot, being so just that he deserved even to receive Angels as guests, offered his daughters to be ravished by the Sodomites, so that the bodies of women rather than of men might be corrupted by them — how much more diligently, and constantly, ought chastity of mind be preserved in truth, since the male body is truly to be preferred to the female body?

V. Hence anyone may gather that one ought not to lie even with the intention of attaining eternal salvation; indeed he adds (ch. 8) that the door of eternal salvation is closed, if an entrance is opened by a lie. For the first foundation of salvation is faith. This surely wavers, if it is once granted that it is lawful for good men to lie. For how is one to be believed who thinks that one must sometimes lie? For he can lie even then, when he bids himself to be believed. For how can it be known whether he then also has some cause, as he himself thinks, for a false narration by way of officious lying — and this in such a way that even a man terrified could be restrained from lust by this means, or must be believed even in spiritual matters, judging that he consults his own interest by lying? Wherefore, either it is not to be believed that good men lie sometimes, or it is not to be believed that they are good, of whom we believe that they must sometimes lie. Of these three, the first is pernicious, the second foolish. It remains, then, that good men never lie.

VI. Thus this question (ch. 9), considered and treated from both sides, is nonetheless not a judgment easily to be rendered; but those are still to be diligently heard who say that nothing is so ill done that it must not be done in avoidance of something worse. Now it pertains to the deeds of men not only whatever they do, but also whatever, with consent, they suffer. Whence, if a case arose that a Christian man should choose to burn incense to idols, rather than consent to debauchery, which the persecutor threatened him with unless he did so — they seem rightly to ask why he should not likewise avoid the latter turpitude. That consent, by which he preferred to suffer debauchery rather than burn incense to idols, they say is not a passion but a deed: for, that he might not do this, he chose to burn incense. He answers, that if such consent is to be reckoned a deed, then those too are murderers who preferred to be killed rather than to bear false witness. Consent, therefore, is not to be called such, whenever we do not approve what is done to us; indeed, so far as it is in us, we forbid it to be done. He, then, erred, who, to prevent others from sinning against his body, burned incense to idols. But they reply: How is it not done with them, if, had they not done this, you would have done that? Augustine answers, that in this way we would be said to break down the door along with the housebreakers, if, by not shutting it, we did not prevent them from breaking it down. He proposes the question more precisely: ought he, then, to have suffered debauchery rather than burn incense? If you ask what he ought to have done, he ought to have done neither. For if I say he ought to have done one of these, I would approve one of them, whereas I condemn both. But if it is asked which of these he ought rather to have avoided, since he could not avoid both, but could avoid one or the other, I will answer: his own sin, rather [than to avoid another's]. Indeed, his own lighter sin is to be avoided rather than another's grave one. Finally, he concludes that the knot of the question turns on this: namely, whether a lie ceases to be a sin, when someone uses it to guard bodily chastity.

VII. If the discourse concerns pernicious lies, which injure another's reputation, Augustine answers (ch. 10) that it is never lawful for us to obscure another's good name, so as to prevent, whether of our own or of another's body, a rape, or other such evils, or graver ones, to be avoided — just as it is likewise never lawful to lie in a matter of religion. Indeed, one must not lie even in the doctrine of religion, so that someone might be more easily led to it. For, once the authority of truth is broken, or even lightly diminished, all things will remain in doubt — which, unless believed true, cannot be held as certain.

VIII. This being firmly established, the discussion concerning other lies proceeds more safely (ch. 11). And so all lies which unjustly harm someone are to be removed, just as also those which, although they do not harm another, nonetheless profit no one, not even the liars themselves. Finally, those lies too are to be avoided which are called jesting, which liars therefore employ, so that they may please men, and render human conversation more pleasant.

IX. These kinds having been condemned without any doubt, the discourse (ch. 12) returns to officious lies, which harm no one, but profit someone. Concerning this kind of lie the whole controversy turns on this: namely, whether these lies harm him who utters them, so that they may profit another; and whether the harm which the liar suffers is compensated by the good which the lie obtains. He answers that a lie is never lawful, even if it harms no one, and profits someone: otherwise it would be lawful to steal a measure of wheat from a rich man, abounding in superfluous wealth, to give to a poor man, who would experience great advantage, since the rich man would feel no detriment; it would then also be lawful to bear false witness to conceal the poor man's theft. What could be said more perverse than this? But since it could be replied that this lie is therefore unlawful, because by it another's sin is concealed, it is consequently asked whether it is lawful to lie, when the lie harms no one, benefits someone, and conceals no sin. He answers: If, for this reason, we do not sin in lying, because we harm no one, and benefit someone, why do we not, on the same principle, examine the sin of lying itself when we say a false thing to conceal someone's sin, and thereby benefit and harm no one? Is it not lawful to conceal a sin? Where it is written, "Thou shalt not steal," is it not also written there, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"? Is it, then, lawful to conceal a sin, and yet not lawful to commit one? Or perhaps it is not false witness, except when someone lies in such a way as either to fabricate a crime against someone, or to conceal someone's crime, or in some way to oppress someone in judgment? If this is so, what then, if a murderer takes refuge with a Christian, or that Christian sees where he takes refuge, and is questioned about this matter by one who, seeking the man for punishment, is the slain man's avenger — must one lie? Or is it evil to lie to conceal another's sin, but not evil to lie to conceal the sinner? What, if, led before a judge concerning the very place where he is hiding, or where you know he is hiding, you are questioned? Will you say: I do not know, and I did not see what you know, and did see? You will, then, bear false witness, and destroy your own soul, so that the murderer not be destroyed. Should you, then, being led to death, being innocent, where you know a murderer to be hiding, knowingly answer to a judge who, though commanded by a greater power to seize him for death, yet is only the executor of the law, not its author? Will it not be false witness, because you lie for the innocent, since it is not the judge, but the executor of the law, who asks? What, if the lawgiver himself asks, or some other unjust judge, seeking an innocent man for punishment? What will you do? A false witness, or will you be a betrayer? Or will you remain doubtful between the crime of false witness and of betrayal? How much more strongly, then, how much more excellently, will you say: I will not betray, nor will I lie. This a certain Bishop of the Church of Tagaste, named Firmus, once did — firmer still in will than in name. Why should not we do the same, both before a judge, and outside judgment, that we may fulfill what is written: "Thou shalt not bear false witness," and avoid that punishment: "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie"? Sometimes, however, we are asked, not where he is, but whether he is, or is not, concealed in that place. Where, if we know he is, by keeping silent we betray him; or even if we testify that we will by no means say whether he is there or not, we equally betray him, as if we pointed to him with a finger. In this article, then, you ought to answer thus: He knows where he is; I will never show it; I will not lie here. This alone is a fitting response to distract the mind of the questioner elsewhere, and to turn it away from the place where the innocent man lies concealed. Then, indeed, whatever you suffer, so as not to betray him, will be shown to be not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.

X. This much has been said, so that (ch. 14) it is plain that seven kinds of lying have thus far been sufficiently discussed. It remains now to speak of the eighth, and last, kind. This lie, he says, is when we lie to protect our chastity of body from another's violence. But before he renders judgment on this kind of lie, he undertakes to unfold, with a more severe examination, the testimonies of Scripture which condemn such lies. This is mature, and severe. He begins this discussion at ch. 15, and carries it on to ch. 19. He weighs the various interpretations by which the defenders of each opinion accommodated the texts of the divine Scriptures to their own opinion. From all these, weighed with the utmost diligence, he gathers this: that no one can show, from the divine Scriptures, that any lie is found which either ought to be loved, or ought not to be held in hatred, but is sometimes to be done, as something which you hate (ch. 18), so that what is more to be detested may be avoided. But men err in this, that they set precious things beneath baser ones. For, when you have granted that some evil is to be admitted, lest another, graver, be committed — not by the rule of truth, but by his own desire and custom, does each one measure the evil, and reckons that graver which he himself more shrinks from, not that which is truly more to be fled. This whole vice is born from a perversity of love. For since there are two lives of ours — one everlasting, which is divinely promised to us; the other temporal, in which we now live — when anyone begins to love this temporal life more than that everlasting one, he thinks no sins graver than those which take away this life, or take away from it some advantage unjustly, or wholly deprive one of life by death. And so men hate thieves, and robbers, more than the lascivious, the drunken, the luxurious, the abusive, and torturers, and murderers, if these inflict no injury upon them. But against all these are set opposite rules, which truth prescribes for us to be kept. This teaches us bravely and prudently to endure those sins which take away from us the goods of the body, and are not impeded from eternal life; for those alone sin who take them away, and those who suffer the loss of them scarcely sin at all. But whatever things are preserved for the sake of sanctity and religion, when those who wish to do injury attempt to violate them, are to be retained even at the cost of lesser sins — not, however, of injuries to others — if a condition is proposed, and the opportunity given. And then those sins already cease to be sins, which are undertaken for the avoidance of graver ones.

XI. Moreover, these are the things (ch. 19) which ought to be preserved by our free consent, for the sake of sanctity: chastity of body, chastity of mind, truth of doctrine. Chastity of body is not violated without our consent. For whatever happens to our body against our will, a greater force prevailing, is no impurity; and there can be some reason for permitting it, but none for consenting to it. Chastity of mind, however, consists in a sincere delight, which is not corrupted, except when we love, and desire, what truth teaches ought not to be loved, and desired. A sincere love of God, and of neighbor, is therefore to be guarded: for in this, chastity of mind is sanctified. But the truth of doctrine, of religion, and of piety, is not violated by a lie. The truth of doctrine, then, is to be guarded with the utmost care from lying, so that, if chastity of mind should be violated, it may have a source from which it can be repaired: since, once the authority of doctrine is corrupted, there can be no course, or recourse, to chastity of mind.

XII. Chastity of mind is guarded by sincerity of speech: which, even if it is less violated, when someone lies to guard chastity of body, is nonetheless violated, and that which is to be preserved in the chastity and sanctity of the mind is also violated. Whence we are compelled to know beforehand, not by the opinion of men, which is generally in error, but by truth itself, which is most invincible, that the sincerity, fidelity, or truthful speech of the mind excels above the chastity of the body, and is united with it. Chastity of mind is an ordered love, not subjecting greater things to lesser ones. For less can be violated in the body than whatever can be violated in the mind. When someone does violence to your body, you see that it is not your own, but another's, lust that breaks in. Beware, nonetheless, lest, by consenting, you become a participant: for bodily chastity is in no way corrupted, unless it is violated in... the mind, which not consenting, in no way is bodily chastity corrupted, whatever has been perpetrated on the body by another's lust. Wherefore, so far as it is in us, both are to be fortified and hedged about with holy morals, and wisdom, lest they be violated from without. But when both cannot be kept, but one or the other is subject to the danger of loss, no one fails to see that, in matters of sin, chastity of mind is to be preferred to chastity of body, and one's own fault is to be avoided rather than another's.

XIII. Let it be asked, then (ch. 21), whether, all the testimonies of Scripture having been discussed, it remains established that one must never, absolutely, lie at all. Since no examples of lies worthy of imitation will be found in the morals and deeds of the Saints, so far as it concerns those Scriptures which are historical narratives referred to no figurative signification, such as are the deeds recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. All the words and deeds of the Lord in the Gospel, which to the less experienced seem to be lies, are figurative significations. Never, then, is one to lie — since, of the eight kinds of lies already recounted, not one is licit. Whoever, however, shall think that some kind of lying is not a sin, will shamefully deceive himself, since he will consider himself an honest deceiver of others.

A Lie is opposed to Truth, simulation, Hypocrisy, Boasting, and Irony, as St. Bonaventure teaches. 3rd part. Centil. section 44. and in the Declaration of Theological Terms, and book 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 37. D. Thomas, question 110, art. 2. and question 112. For either a falsehood is signified by words or by deeds according to the mind of the one conceiving it. If by deeds, it is simulation, or in a certain matter hypocrisy. If by words, it is a lie strictly taken. Which again, if it concerns the exceeding morals of the speaker, is called boasting: if by defect, it is called Irony.

These vices seem however to coalesce into one, because they are all opposed to truth, and one thing is essentially opposed to one; but they differ in modes. Hence St. Augustine, book against lying, cap. 3. He lies, who has one thing in his mind, and declares another by words, or by any significations whatsoever. The same is indicated by St. Thomas, question 111, art. 1.

A lie is defined by St. Augustine, book against lying, cap. 12: A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving. But to lie is explained by the same St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 18, thus: He lies, who speaks against what he perceives in his mind, with the will to deceive.

Where it is to be known from St. Bonaventure that a twofold falsity is found in a lie; the material, which is the false saying, and the formal, which is the intention of deceiving. Tanner adds, disp. 6, question 2, num. 8, together with Bassaeus, V. Mend., an effective falsity on account of the will to deceive. But considered in its effect, once obtained, it belongs to the lie per accidens, for a lie can exist without anyone being deceived, as he himself admits; but he says that even the material of the lie, namely the false assertion, belongs per accidens to the lie. The same seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, question 110, art. 1, in the body, and ad 1, with the Thomists.

On the contrary, St. Bonaventure, in 3. d. 38, dub. 3, of the text, and question 1, with the Master, holds that falsity is also required for a lie, although one may lie even if he says the truth, intending nevertheless to deceive.

It is proved first from the Holy Doctor in both places from the definition of a lie, given by St. Augustine, in which he requires for a lie a false signification and the intention of deceiving: But to lie, according to him, requires only the intention of deceiving, as I have reported; for one is said to lie, as it were, to go against the mind.

It is proved second from St. Bonaventure out of the same St. Augustine, cap. 3 against lying, where he opposes the lie to truth as darkness to light; but darkness is formally the privation of light: Therefore also a lie is the privation of truth.

It is proved third from St. Bonaventure: As true being and a lie are related in a man; so in speech are truth and a lie related; but these two are incompossible in the same man at once and together, namely that he be truthful and a liar: Therefore they will likewise be incompossible in speech: Therefore it is impossible that the same speech be at once true and false. If therefore a lie cannot compare itself with truth, it seems that it carries with it an inseparable falsity.

It is proved fourth from the Holy Doctor: Every true thing is from the first truth, But no lie is from the first truth: Therefore no lie is true: Therefore it is false.

They object first from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 18, where he says: He lies, who speaks against what he perceives in his mind, with the will to deceive: Therefore a lie stands in the will to deceive alone.

The Holy Doctor answers that more is required for a lie than for lying, as I said; for a lie is referred both to the deceiving will and to the false thing; but lying regards only the deceit which the will undertakes, even if he were saying what is true, which he thinks is false.

They object second. As speech disagrees with the intention when one denies what he knows, so also it disagrees when he affirms what he does not know, and about which he doubts; and then it is a sin; but only of a lie: Therefore a lie can fall upon an unknown truth.

The Holy Doctor answers that in the assertion of a doubtful or unknown truth there is a lie secundum quid, and it is more properly called lying.

They object third. A right intention makes right, and an oblique one makes oblique: Therefore in him who speaks the truth with an intention of deceiving, the whole utterance is made oblique; but this happens only in a lie: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that the oblique intention falsifies the saying, not according to every account, but only according to the account which it has in respect of the speaker; but that respect alone does not suffice for the account of a lie.

They object fourth. As sin is related to goodness; so a lie to truth: but he who does a good work with an evil intention commits a sin: Therefore he who says something true, with a perverse will to deceive, incurs a lie. It is confirmed; for it implies that some saying is both true and false.

The Holy Doctor answers first, that a good thing done with an evil intention is not evil simply, but only to him who acts with an evil intention; as he who gives alms with an evil intention does not fall into sin in the alms given, but only in himself who gives by reason of the intention; so also in the present case.

It is answered second, by denying the parity, because sin denotes a privation of goodness; but goodness denotes an ordination to the end, which indeed has its being through a right intention, and therefore the right intention removed, the account of goodness perishes, and it is a sin; but a lie denotes a privation of truth, which consists not only in the comparison to the intention, but also to the very thing itself, and therefore, if the thing is true, it is not a lie, except secundum quid.

It is to be noted first, that a lie is commonly divided into the Officious, the Jocose, and the Pernicious. So the Holy Doctors after St. Augustine, ad 5. Psal. in the Gloss. For since a lie has as its formal element the deceiving, according to the intention of the liar himself it is divided into species: But he who lies either intends to benefit; and it is an officious lie; or to delight, and behold, the jocose: or to harm, and behold the Pernicious. But he can harm spiritually, or temporally. And then either he harms one so as to benefit another, and according to this there are three differences of the pernicious lie. The first consists in a lie of the doctrine of Religion handed on, and this works to the harm of a spiritual good, namely, faith. The second consists in this, that the lie harm simply. The third, that it harm one; and benefit another.

¶ But if he lies in order to delight, it is thus jocose, and this can be in two ways, either that he delight another, and thus it is simply jocose. Or that he delight himself by lying, and thus it is libidinous, which properly contains the lust of lying, and the malice, which is placed in the readiness for lying, according to Aristotle, 4. Eth. cap. 7. where he says, that a lie, because such it is by habit, rejoices in the lie itself.

But if he lies that he may benefit simply, not that he may harm; or that he may benefit with regard to the goods of fortune, as money, etc. Or to avoid death: Or to avoid impurity, or to preserve chastity, or holiness safe and sound, the lie is officious.

¶ Hence you have that division of a lie into eight members, by reason of the intention, and mode, which St. Augustine brings forward, l. de mendacio, cap. 14. and with him our Holy Doctors. The first, which is done in the doctrine of Religion, as to say that Christ is not born of the Blessed Virgin. The second, which benefits no one, and harms someone, as a lie of detraction. The third, which harms one, that it may benefit another, as a false witness in a pecuniary cause. The fourth, which is done out of the mere lust of lying: The fifth, which is done with the will of delighting by pleasant speech, as flattery. The sixth, whereby one lies for the sake of preserving money. The seventh for the sake of life. The eighth for the sake of preserving chastity. See St. Bonaventure, p. p. Centil. sect. 12.

AGAINST this three-membered division the Holy Doctor objects certain arguments to himself, and solves them.

¶ First. That which is per accidens ought not to denominate; but it is per accidens for a lie to benefit: Therefore the species of the officious lie ought not to be assigned.

He answers, that an act takes its species from the intention, and because the officious is ordered by the intention that it benefit; therefore it can take its species from that.

He objects second. The same lie can benefit and at the same time harm: Therefore by this many differences of a lie are not rightly divided; for opposite differences never belong to the same thing.

He answers, that a lie takes its species from the intention, which either tends that it benefit, or that it harm, and thus the same lie never contains both formally, even though materially, as the falsity is.

¶ He objects third against the second difference. We also jest in other sins, and yet no species of sin is drawn from that: Therefore neither in a lie.

The Holy Doctor answers first, that denomination is not taken from things that happen rarely; but rarely do we jest in accomplishing other things, as in a lie. He answers second, that if other works take their species from the intention, speech above all is denominated from it, and because a lie is in speech, hence it is that a jocose lie is more denominated.

¶ He objects fourth: A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving, according to St. Augustine, cap. 12 against lying, but he who jests does not intend to deceive: Therefore there is no jocose lie.

The Holy Doctor answers, that to deceive is the same as to say what is false, but not the same as to deceive [someone]; whence the sense of the definition is, with the intention of saying what is false, and this belongs to the jocose lie, though less completely, than to the pernicious.

He objects fifth, against the third difference: To be pernicious is common to every sin.

The Holy Doctor answers, that the pernicious is assigned as a difference opposed to the officious, which is proper to a lie; but other genera of sins are not divided thus into officious, etc.

He objects sixth: If the pernicious lie is distinguished from the others; this is either by reason of the matter, or by reason of the will. Not the first, because in any matter whatsoever a man can lie gravely and perniciously, if he lies out of malice. Nor by reason of the will, because in any genus of lie whatsoever the will can be moved inordinately, and bring perdition into the liar.

The Holy Doctor answers, that it is distinguished principally by reason of the will, and by reason of the intention does this differentiate this species from the others per se. It can be said also by reason of the matter with regard to that species of lie in the matter of the doctrine of Religion.

Titius, a religious, is not rarely occupied in preaching the word of God and in giving missions to the people. Having returned to the monastery, he is accustomed to relate to the brethren marvelous things concerning what was seen and heard by him while he was outside the monastery. Almost all of them, however, are entirely fictitious, devised and uttered by Titius in order to increase the esteem of himself among the brethren and to delight them. Without scruple he also invents excusing causes in order that he may remain longer outside the monastery, and with them appeases the superior. He strongly maintains that he does not lie in acting thus, since he harms no one and the essence of a lie consists in the violation of another’s right to the truth. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a lie, and how many kinds are there?

2. In what does the malice of a lie consist, and is it ever lawful to lie?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a lie, and how many sorts of lies are there?

A lie is a speech against one’s mind. Lies are divided into jocose, officious, and hurtful lies.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 464.

2. In what does the malice of a lie consist, and is it ever lawful to lie?

Some would put the malice of lying in the denial to others of that to which they have a right. Others would say that it lies in the deceit practised on others. The common Catholic teaching follows St. Thomas in putting it in the disorder which is intrinsically in saying that which is known to be false. We have from nature the power of communicating our thoughts to our fellow men, and this power is necessary for a social being like man. Those thoughts which are to be communicated to others should be communicated truthfully, and there is a perversion of right order, if this is not done; the virtue of veracity is violated. As lying is intrinsically inordinate and wrong, it is never allowed to tell a lie.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 465.

3. The case. Titius, a Religious, frequently goes out of the monastery to preach. On his return he has wonderful things to tell the brethren, but for the most part, they are pure fabrications, invented to amuse his brethren and to add to his own reputation. He says he does nobody any harm by these tales, and that therefore he does not lie. Titius is wrong. Hurtful lies are not the only species; there are also jocose and officious lies, and Titius is guilty of jocose and officious lying. He says what he knows to be false, and he says it with the intention of deceiving others, or else there would be no prospect of his lies adding to his reputation. Much more is this the case when he invents reasons to be laid before the superior in order to excuse himself for making a longer stay than necessary out of the monastery. In this he is guilty of officious lying. He is also imperceptibly lessening his own estimation of the virtue of truth, and accustoming himself to trifle with it.

1. "Let none doubt," says St. Augustine, "that he lies, who utters what is false for the purpose of deceiving. Wherefore the utterance of what is false with a will to deceive is unquestionably a lie." The only question is, whether this definition does not contain more than is necessary to the thing defined. The objective falseness of what is said makes a material falsehood: the will to utter what is false makes a formal falsehood (Ethics, c. iii., s. ii., n. 7, p. 33): the will to create a false impression regards, not the falsehood itself, but the effect to follow from it. If a person says what is not true, but what he takes to be the truth, he tells indeed a material lie, but at the same time he puts forth no human act (Ethics, c. i., n. 2, p. 1) of lying. If on the other hand he says what he believes to be false, though it turns out true, he tells a formal lie, though not a material one, and moreover, he does a human act of lying. But human acts are the subject-matter of morality. The moralist therefore is content to define the formal lie: the material aspect of the lie is irrelevant to his enquiry. A formal lie is saying what one believes not to be true, or promising what one intends not to perform: briefly, it is speaking against one's mind.

2. We shall show presently that to speak against one's mind is intrinsically, necessarily, and always evil. But when a thing is thus evil in itself, there is no need to bring into the definition of the act, from a moral point of view, the intention with which it is done. There is no use in prying into ends, when the means taken is an unlawful means for any end. If a person blasphemes, we do not ask why he blasphemes: the intention is not part of the blasphemy: the utterance is a sin by itself. But if a person strikes, we ask why he strikes, to heal or to slay, in self-defence or in revenge. So, if speaking against one's mind is a thing indifferent and colourless in point of morality, and all depends on the intention with which we do it, so that we may speak against our minds to put another off, but not to deceive him, then certainly the intention to deceive must be imported into the definition of lying. But if, as we shall prove presently, the act of so speaking is by no means indifferent and colourless, but is fraught with an inordinateness all its own, then the intention may be left out of the question, the act is to be characterised on its own merits, and speech against one's mind is the definition of a lie.

3. Then, some one will say, it would be a lie for a prisoner in solitary confinement to break the silence of his cell with the exclamation, Queen Anne is not dead. The answer is simple: it takes two to make a speech. A man does not properly speak to himself, nor quarrel with himself, nor deal justly by himself. Not that it would be a lie to deny the death of Queen Anne even in public: for speech is an outward affirmation, the appearance of a serious will to apply predicate to subject: but in this case there is no appearance of a serious will: on the contrary, from the manifest absurdity of the assertion, it is plain that you are joking and do not mean to affirm anything. This perhaps is as far as we can go in permission of what are called lies in jest.

Readings.—St Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 110, art. 1.

153. A falsehood, or lie, is speech contrary to one's mind. By a falsehood, a contradiction is willfully established between a person's thoughts and the received expression of those thoughts. For this reason, a falsehood contains a moral disorder and is essentially wrong.

Lying must be distinguished from equivocation and mental reservation.