Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article First. On Lying
636. Definition. A lie is defined: speech against the mind brought forth for deceiving. By the name of speech is understood any external sign by which the interior concepts of the mind are signified, whether this is done by words or by nod or deed.
a. Four things are to be distinguished in a lie: alpha. speech discordant from the judgment of the mind; beta. the will of saying what is false; gamma. the will of deceiving another; delta. the deception of another. The two former things pertain to the essence of a lie; the fourth is its effect; whether the third is an essential element of a lie or rather a necessary consequent is disputed. It seems one must say that the intention of deceiving belongs virtually and implicitly to the essence of a lie, insofar as the speaker sees that the hearers are deceived if they give faith to his words, and wills that the false thing which he himself brings forth be believed by them; but not formally and explicitly, insofar as he wills that error be generated in the hearers.2 Therefore a lie is defined by many as: speech against the mind with the intention of saying what is false.
b. Therefore he who says what is false, thinking it to be true, errs, but does not lie: for he does not have the will of saying what is false. On the contrary, he who affirms what is true, which he thinks false, does not indeed err, but he lies, because he wills to say what is false. He who thinks that prudent hearers do not believe the things which he affirms does not lie, even if he speaks against the mind, because he does not have the will of deceiving. Therefore he does not lie who says that he has seen a flying ox, nor the merchant who says that merchandise cost him more than he sells it to others.
c. A lie can be committed in four modes: alpha. if someone affirms that something is which he knows is not; beta. if someone denies that something is which he knows is; gamma. if someone affirms as certain that about which he doubts whether it is; delta. if someone affirms to be doubtful what is certain to him.
1 Fr. Ildephonsus, Carmelite, De mendacio et falsiloquio morali; Laymann, l. 4, tract. 3, c. 13.
2 Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 110, a. 1.
637. Division. 1. A lie by reason of the intended effect is divided: a. into harmful, which is brought forth so that it may harm; b. into officious, which is brought forth so that it may profit; c. into jocose, which is brought forth so that delight may be drawn from it. Yet in order that a joke be a lie, it is required that it be made with the intention of saying what is false and deceiving others: for he who says what is false while knowing that hearers, at least prudent ones, understand it as false, does not lie.
- If lie is taken generically for discordance between the mind and its sign, from verbal lie, which can also be committed through writing, must be distinguished real lie, by which someone by deed signifies one thing which he does not have in mind. This is properly called simulation; a lie properly is a sin of the mouth.
From formal simulation, by which someone intends by deed to signify one thing other than what he has in mind, must be distinguished material simulation, by which someone by deed does one thing other than what he has in mind, but does not intend this. The former is never licit, since it is a true real lie; but the latter is licit from a just cause by the same reason as mental restriction. Thus a rich man licitly puts on worn clothing lest he be despoiled by robbers.
638. Malice. 1. A lie is evil in itself, wherefore it is not permitted to lie, not even for avoiding the gravest evil.
a. Whether a lie, especially an officious lie, is absolutely and intrinsically evil, or is sometimes licit, is a very difficult question. Gentile philosophers, Plato and the Stoics, taught that a lie is sometimes licit, namely where there is question of averting a great evil or of pursuing a great good. In the Christian age not only the Priscillianists and Semipelagians asserted that a lie was licit, but also, among ecclesiastical writers, Origen and Cassian; but Clement of Alexandria, Jerome, and Chrysostom are undeservedly counted among these. St. Augustine proves its internal malice,1 and the scholastic theologians, adhering to his footsteps with common consent, defended the same opinion. Afterward many, especially Protestants with Hugo Grotius, distinguishing between lie and false-speech, declared that a lie, which is repugnant to the right or good of others, is always illicit, but false-speech, which consists simply in speech against the mind, is of itself licit. More recent non-Catholic writers generally adhere to this doctrine, which also some Catholic doctors do not wholly reject. These opine that a lie is then especially licit when it is necessary for protecting a secret.2 But the common doctrine must absolutely be held: every speech alien from the mind, even if it harmed no one but rather greatly profited, is a lie; and every lie is morally evil.3
b. Arguments of reason. alpha. That which is repugnant to the natural end for which speech has been instituted is prohibited by natural law; but a lie is repugnant to the natural end of speech and to the faculty of speaking, which were instituted by the author of nature so that man may manifest his thoughts to man. beta. That is prohibited by the law of nature which, if it were licit, would redound to the detriment of human society; but if a lie were licit, faith and security could not be had in society. In order that the force of this argument be perceived, it must be estimated not from something once done, but from something once licit. gamma. That which is repugnant to divine perfections is morally evil; but any lie whatsoever, which by its nature is discordance between a sign and the thing to be signified, is repugnant to supreme truth. Therefore St. John says: every lie is not from truth, that is, from God,4 but every lie is from the devil, who is a liar and the father of lying.
c. The same is confirmed by texts of Sacred Scripture: You shall flee a lie;5 Do not be willing to lie any lie;6 Putting away lying, speak truth each one with his neighbor;7 Every lie is not from truth;8 which texts, without any distinction and limitation, reprove lying itself.
To the several texts of Sacred Scripture which seem to commend lying,9 it suffices to note what St. Augustine has: "When examples of lying are proposed to us from the holy Scriptures, either they are not lies, or, if they are lies, they are not to be imitated."10 Interpreters must be consulted concerning the individual texts.
- A lie of itself does not exceed light sin, because formally it is repugnant neither to charity nor to justice, but only to veracity, which from its kind obliges only under light obligation. Insofar, therefore, as a harmful lie is repugnant to charity or justice, it is a sin grave from its kind (635, 3).
Hence the words of Sacred Scripture, The mouth that lies kills the soul,11 must be understood thus, that a lie kills the soul dispositively, not formally, insofar as the custom of lying disposes to grave sins: for he who is accustomed to lies does not shrink from gravely harmful lies, indeed not even from perjuries.
1 St. Augustine, Contra mendacium ad Consentium and De mendacio.
2 Cf. Th. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis (Freiburg: Herder, 1900), II, n. 54 ss.
3 Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri II, n. 1055.
4 1 John 2:21; John 8:44.
5 Exod. 23:7.
6 Ecclus. 7:14.
7 Eph. 4:25.
8 1 John 2:21.
9 Exod. 1:19; Josh. 2:4 s.; 1 Sam. 20:6; 21:2 s.; 4 Kings 6:19; Tob. 5:18, etc.
10 Contra mendacium, l. 2, c. 15, n. 31.
11 Wis. 1:11.