Doubt II: Of how many kinds is a lie

It is to be noted first, that a lie is commonly divided into the Officious, the Jocose, and the Pernicious. So the Holy Doctors after St. Augustine, ad 5. Psal. in the Gloss. For since a lie has as its formal element the deceiving, according to the intention of the liar himself it is divided into species: But he who lies either intends to benefit; and it is an officious lie; or to delight, and behold, the jocose: or to harm, and behold the Pernicious. But he can harm spiritually, or temporally. And then either he harms one so as to benefit another, and according to this there are three differences of the pernicious lie. The first consists in a lie of the doctrine of Religion handed on, and this works to the harm of a spiritual good, namely, faith. The second consists in this, that the lie harm simply. The third, that it harm one; and benefit another.

¶ But if he lies in order to delight, it is thus jocose, and this can be in two ways, either that he delight another, and thus it is simply jocose. Or that he delight himself by lying, and thus it is libidinous, which properly contains the lust of lying, and the malice, which is placed in the readiness for lying, according to Aristotle, 4. Eth. cap. 7. where he says, that a lie, because such it is by habit, rejoices in the lie itself.

But if he lies that he may benefit simply, not that he may harm; or that he may benefit with regard to the goods of fortune, as money, etc. Or to avoid death: Or to avoid impurity, or to preserve chastity, or holiness safe and sound, the lie is officious.

¶ Hence you have that division of a lie into eight members, by reason of the intention, and mode, which St. Augustine brings forward, l. de mendacio, cap. 14. and with him our Holy Doctors. The first, which is done in the doctrine of Religion, as to say that Christ is not born of the Blessed Virgin. The second, which benefits no one, and harms someone, as a lie of detraction. The third, which harms one, that it may benefit another, as a false witness in a pecuniary cause. The fourth, which is done out of the mere lust of lying: The fifth, which is done with the will of delighting by pleasant speech, as flattery. The sixth, whereby one lies for the sake of preserving money. The seventh for the sake of life. The eighth for the sake of preserving chastity. See St. Bonaventure, p. p. Centil. sect. 12.

AGAINST this three-membered division the Holy Doctor objects certain arguments to himself, and solves them.

¶ First. That which is per accidens ought not to denominate; but it is per accidens for a lie to benefit: Therefore the species of the officious lie ought not to be assigned.

He answers, that an act takes its species from the intention, and because the officious is ordered by the intention that it benefit; therefore it can take its species from that.

He objects second. The same lie can benefit and at the same time harm: Therefore by this many differences of a lie are not rightly divided; for opposite differences never belong to the same thing.

He answers, that a lie takes its species from the intention, which either tends that it benefit, or that it harm, and thus the same lie never contains both formally, even though materially, as the falsity is.

¶ He objects third against the second difference. We also jest in other sins, and yet no species of sin is drawn from that: Therefore neither in a lie.

The Holy Doctor answers first, that denomination is not taken from things that happen rarely; but rarely do we jest in accomplishing other things, as in a lie. He answers second, that if other works take their species from the intention, speech above all is denominated from it, and because a lie is in speech, hence it is that a jocose lie is more denominated.

¶ He objects fourth: A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving, according to St. Augustine, cap. 12 against lying, but he who jests does not intend to deceive: Therefore there is no jocose lie.

The Holy Doctor answers, that to deceive is the same as to say what is false, but not the same as to deceive [someone]; whence the sense of the definition is, with the intention of saying what is false, and this belongs to the jocose lie, though less completely, than to the pernicious.

He objects fifth, against the third difference: To be pernicious is common to every sin.

The Holy Doctor answers, that the pernicious is assigned as a difference opposed to the officious, which is proper to a lie; but other genera of sins are not divided thus into officious, etc.

He objects sixth: If the pernicious lie is distinguished from the others; this is either by reason of the matter, or by reason of the will. Not the first, because in any matter whatsoever a man can lie gravely and perniciously, if he lies out of malice. Nor by reason of the will, because in any genus of lie whatsoever the will can be moved inordinately, and bring perdition into the liar.

The Holy Doctor answers, that it is distinguished principally by reason of the will, and by reason of the intention does this differentiate this species from the others per se. It can be said also by reason of the matter with regard to that species of lie in the matter of the doctrine of Religion.