§ 2. On Lying

166. Definition. Lying is usually defined: voluntary speech against the mind. This definition, if rightly explained, seems better than others.²⁹⁷

It is explained. It is said 1: speech; but under the name of speech is understood any external sign whatever by which interior concepts are signified, whether this is done by words or nod or gesture or writing, etc. Nevertheless, lying is chiefly and almost always done by speech, and for this reason it is deservedly called a sin of the mouth and defined: voluntary speech against the mind. - It is said 2: voluntary speech against the mind,²⁹⁸ for if someone were to speak what is false from ignorance and without consent, it would not be a lie, but objectively false speech. St. Thomas writes to the point: "The notion of lying is taken from formal falsity, namely, from this, that someone has the will of enunciating what is false; hence also lying is named from the fact that it is said against the mind. And therefore if someone enunciates what is false, believing it to be true, it is indeed materially false, but not formally, because the falsity is outside the intention of the speaker; hence it does not have the perfect notion of a lie.... But if someone formally says what is false, having the will of saying what is false, although that which is said is true, nevertheless insofar as such an act is voluntary and moral, it has falsity of itself and truth by accident; hence it attains to the species of lying."²⁹⁹ Therefore he who affirms what is false, which he thinks true, errs; he does not lie. On the contrary, he who affirms what is true, which he thinks false, does not indeed err, but lies.³⁰⁰

Theologians dispute whether the intention of leading others into error pertains to the essence of lying. For four elements can be distinguished in a lie, namely: a) the will of saying what is false, b) speech discordant from the interior judgment of the mind, c) the will of deceiving another, d) the deception really following. Without any doubt this fourth element is not of the essence of lying; hence, e.g., an accused person whom no prudent man believes when he asserts his innocence lies if without mental restriction he denies the crime committed. Therefore the deception of another is sometimes the effect of lying, but not lying itself. The third element, namely, the will of deceiving, is commonly asserted by the Scotists to be of the essence of lying, but the Thomists deny it after St. Thomas, who teaches: "That someone intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another by deceiving him does not pertain to the species of lying, but to a certain perfection of it."³⁰¹ Therefore a true lie is present, even if the one lying certainly foresees that the hearer will by no means believe his fallacious speech. Waffelaert,³⁰² however, tries to prove that in fact there is no distinction between the Thomistic and Scotistic opinion, rightly understood. For by the very fact that someone knowingly and seriously speaks something false, he intends at least implicitly to deceive another. Hence if even this implicit will of deceiving is manifestly lacking, a lie is no longer present. Thus modern authors deservedly teach that there is no lie a) if someone openly says false things from jest; b) if he brings forth things false indeed, but only materially; c) if someone uses locutions manifestly ironic or hyperbolic, or even locutions which are not usually understood as the words sound; e.g., if a servant responds to one asking, "The master is not at home," he does not wish to say that the master truly is not at home, but that the master cannot be approached.³⁰³ Therefore even according to the Thomists, an implicit intention of deceiving pertains to the essence of lying, but an explicit intention is by no means required; it is only an aggravating circumstance.

²⁹⁷ Especially the definition given by Berardi (Praxis confess. I, n. 1095) and others seems defective: "A lie is false speech against the right which another has of knowing the truth or of not undergoing deception."

²⁹⁸ i.e., against one's own knowledge and conscience.

²⁹⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1.

³⁰⁰ Cf. St. Augustine, Enchir. c. 8.

³⁰¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1.

³⁰² Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge (Bruges 1884) p. 16 sqq.

³⁰³ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 916, and St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3 ad 6.

167. Division of lying. According to St. Thomas and other theologians there are two divisions of lying:

1. On the part of the end there is distinguished the officious lie, the jocose lie, and the pernicious or damaging lie.

An officious lie (Nutzlüge) is that which is chiefly brought forth in order to be useful, namely, for one's own or another's utility, without directly harming anyone, e.g., lies of children lest they be punished on account of committed delicts.

A jocose lie (Scherzlüge) is that which is chiefly made for the sake of trifling and delighting, e.g., the tales of hunters.³⁰⁴ But those locutions are not jocose lies which, considered materially indeed, are false, but from the very mode of pronouncing can immediately be understood as false (and not as really true), e.g., narratives made by the so-called Münchhausen or by Don Quixote. St. Augustine writes to the point: "Therefore excepting jests, which have never been thought lies - for they have, from the pronunciation and the very affection of the one joking, a most evident signification of a mind by no means deceiving, even if not enunciating true things - whether this kind is to be used by perfect souls is another question, which we have not now undertaken to untie";³⁰⁵ and: "Lies are performed seriously by liars, not in jest; but when things which are not are said as jokes, they are not reckoned lies."³⁰⁶ Nevertheless in oral conversation jokes of this kind are better avoided, because they easily degenerate into true lies, although jocose.

A pernicious or damaging lie (Schadenlüge) is that which causes special damage. Indeed every lie (even a jocose one) causes damage to another, insofar as by its nature it is inductive of error in the minds of hearers. For error is always something evil. But that sometimes a lie causes no error in fact to the hearers is by accident, and does not prevent every lie from causing damage of itself. Certain lies, however, produce special damages to the neighbor, e.g., concerning knowledge, goods of fortune, goods of the body, etc., and for this reason they are called, in the strict sense, damaging or pernicious lies.

2. On the part of opposition to truth there are distinguished boasting and irony.

Boasting,³⁰⁷ as it is taken here, is a violation of truth by excess and can be defined: a vice by which someone externally raises himself above that which is in himself.³⁰⁸ It very often arises from pride or from vainglory.

Irony³⁰⁹ is not taken here for a figurative locution by which something is mockingly said through the contrary, but for simulation by which someone either asserts of himself something vile which he does not recognize in himself, or denies of himself something great which nevertheless he perceives to be in himself. Hence it is opposed to truth by defect.³¹⁰ The sin of irony is very often accustomed to occur in false beggars, who externally simulate the greatest need, although in reality they are by no means so poor.

³⁰⁴ Commonly Jägerlatein, tall stories.

³⁰⁵ De mendacio c. 14.

³⁰⁶ In Gen. q. 145.

³⁰⁷ Ἀλαζονεία (Aristotle, Ethic. lib. 4, c. 7), Großtuerei, Prahlerische Selbstüberschätzung, Aufschneiderei, gasconnade, bragging.

³⁰⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 112, a. 1, and above I, 414.

³⁰⁹ Εἰρωνεία (Aristotle, l.c.), Kleintuerei, fausse dépréciation de soi-même; false undervaluation of one's self.

³¹⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 113, a. 1.

168. Scholion. On simulation and hypocrisy. Simulation and hypocrisy can be reduced to lying. For it belongs to the virtue of truth that someone show himself externally through external signs such as he is. But external signs are not only words, but also deeds. Falsity in words is lying; but falsity in the signs of external deeds is simulation³¹¹ (Verstellung). But hypocrisy is a species of simulation; for it is the simulation of another person and notably the vice of him who does not have holiness, but nevertheless externally so conducts himself that he may be regarded as holy. Simulation and hypocrisy must be judged especially from the end of the agent. For often they are assumed as means for obtaining a very depraved end, e.g., the kiss of Judas. When a dishonorable end is absent, they are venial sins or even wholly lack culpability. For external deeds are not so clearly and certainly significative as words, but often are of ambiguous interpretation, and therefore they must be regarded as amphibologies, which sometimes can be permitted from a reasonable cause. Thus, e.g., from a grave cause a cleric can proceed in lay dress, although then many will regard him as a lay man.

The malice of lying.

³¹¹ Ibid. q. 111, a. 1.

169. Principle 1. Every true lie is intrinsically evil, so that it can be made honorable by absolutely no reason.

Thus, after St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is the most common opinion, with few Catholic theologians contradicting it. Clement of Alexandria,³¹² Origen,³¹³ St. Chrysostom,³¹⁴ St. Hilary,³¹⁵ and especially Cassian³¹⁶ seem to have taught that in a case of necessity, for averting the greatest damage, it is lawful to use a lie as a medicine. Here are the words of Cassian: "Therefore one must think about lying in such a way and use it in such a way as if the nature of hellebore [Nieswurz] were in it; if it is taken when a deadly disease threatens, it becomes healthful; but if it is received without the necessity of supreme danger, it is of present destruction.... Therefore when some grave danger threatens from the confession of truth, then refuges of lies are to be received, yet in such a way that we are healthfully bitten by the guilt of a humble conscience."³¹⁷ There are, however, several Catholic theologians³¹⁸ who explain the Fathers and older ecclesiastical writers as if they spoke concerning the liceity of mental restriction, not of lying properly so called.³¹⁹ Hence there would only be a dispute about words. Certain modern Catholic theologians distinguish between a moral lie, which is never lawful, and a psychological lie, or false-speaking, which in a case of necessity is lawful according to Bolgeni,³²⁰ Piat, O. Cap.,³²¹ Tanquerey,³²² and several Protestants, such as Luther, Grotius, Pufendorf, Martensen.³²³ Again there seems to be a dispute about words; because that which they call a psychological lie or false-speaking (fausseté), others call mental restriction. Nevertheless it would be much better if the expressions "psychological lie" or "false-speaking" were avoided. For in practice it is not so easy to distinguish between a psychological and a moral lie, and it sounds very bad if a Catholic theologian says that some lie is sometimes lawful. - These things having been premised, it is proved that lying properly so called is intrinsically evil:

1. From Sacred Scripture, which indiscriminately prohibits every lie. You shall flee a lie;³²⁴ Do not lie, nor let each one deceive his neighbor;³²⁵ Do not lie to one another.³²⁶

2. From the Holy Fathers. St. Cyprian,³²⁷ citing Prov. 12, 22, says that one must not lie, because lying lips are an abomination to the Lord. - But especially St. Augustine strenuously proved in his diverse writings³²⁸ that a lie is never lawful, neither for anyone's temporal safety, nor for preserving chastity, nor for the safety of the neighbor. But since lies seem to be approved in not a few places of Sacred Scripture, e.g., Jacob, who deceived his father Isaac; the midwives, who concealed the children of the Jews by a lie; Judith, who deceived Holofernes by a lie, etc., St. Augustine shows that the alleged deeds either are not lies properly so called, or are not to be imitated. St. Thomas assumed the doctrine of St. Augustine, and simply asserts: "Every lie is a sin";³²⁹ and, "We concede that lying is always a sin."³³⁰

3. From reason. a) Lying is repugnant to the natural end of speech: "For since words are naturally signs of understandings, it is unnatural and undue that someone should signify by the voice that which he does not have in the mind. Hence the Philosopher says³³¹ that 'lying is of itself depraved and to be fled; but the true is good and praiseworthy.'"³³² Therefore lying is an abuse of the voice.

b) Lying is repugnant to the natural commerce of men. For without truthfulness human society cannot stand in peace.

c) Lying is repugnant to the good of the neighbor hearing. As was said above, any true lie by its nature induces the hearer into error. Now to induce another into error is to harm him. If sometimes a lie does not induce into error, this is by accident, and therefore does not change its absolute culpability.

d) Lying is repugnant to the good of the speaker himself. For although an (officious) lie sometimes seems to be useful to the speaker himself, nevertheless in reality it harms, since it excites to many evils. Hence it is evident from experience that a lying man loses nobility of soul and often sins especially from cowardice or even from a cauterized conscience.

³¹² Strom. l. 7, c. 9 (Migne, Patr. graec. 9, 474).

³¹³ Strom. l. 6 (Migne, l.c. 11, 102).

³¹⁴ Hom. 3, n. 3 in 2 Cor. 1, 17 (Migne, l.c. 61, 408).

³¹⁵ Comm. in Ps. 14, n. 10 (Migne, Patr. lat. 9, 305).

³¹⁶ Collat. 17, c. 17.

³¹⁷ L.c., in Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1062. This doctrine of Cassian seems taken from Plato, who taught that lying is sometimes salutary: ψεῦδος δὴ ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (De republ. l. 3 [ed. Didot n. 389]). Socrates and the Stoics spoke in the same way. On the contrary Aristotle calls lying from its very nature something evil: καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν (Ethic. l. 4, c. [13] 7, 6).

³¹⁸ Waffelaert, Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge p. 41 sqq.

³¹⁹ Especially it is not so clear what St. Jerome thought in this question. In his Commentaries on the Epistle to the Galatians c. 2, 11-12 he had written that St. Paul did that very thing concerning which he rebuked St. Peter, and therefore did not speak so according to truth. St. Augustine, vehemently moved by this, invites St. Jerome to sing a palinode in this matter (Ep. 67 among the works of St. Jerome; in Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 650), but he took this very badly and wrote rather vehement letters to defend his opinion; yet he expressly asserts that he does not wish to defend an "officious lie," as Augustine imputed to him, but that the holy Apostles committed simulation from a certain "honest dispensation" (Ep. 113; ib. 923). St. Augustine was unwilling to admit even this, and strenuously defended St. Paul (Ep. 116; ib. 936 sqq.). Therefore between St. Augustine and St. Jerome there exists rather a controversy about St. Paul's manner of acting than about the liceity of lying. Nevertheless it must be confessed that St. Augustine extended the words of St. Jerome to an officious lie. - Concina treats this whole matter excellently, both historically and theologically (In Decal. l. 5, diss. 3, c. 20 and l. 10, c. 5), and also clearly shows that St. Raymond of Pennafort is falsely cited as permitting an officious lie in grave necessity.

³²⁰ Mélanges théologiques de Liége, 4th series (1850-1851), p. 409-413.

³²¹ Appendix 4 to Theol. mor. by Van der Velden I, 524 sq.

³²² Theol. mor. De iust., n. 4105 sqq.

³²³ Die christl. Ethik II (1879), 245 sqq.

³²⁴ Ex. 23, 7.

³²⁵ Lev. 19, 11.

³²⁶ Col. 3, 9; cf. also Prov. 12, 22; Eccli. 20, 26.

³²⁷ Lib. 3 testim. ad Quirin. c. 104 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 807).

³²⁸ De mendacio, Contra mendacium, Sermons 81, 133, and 166 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 494-497 and 541-547).

³²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3.

³³⁰ Quodl. 8, a. 14.

³³¹ Ethic. l. 4, c. 7.

³³² S. theol., l.c.

170. Principle 2. Lying, insofar as it is chiefly opposed to truthfulness, is a venial sin; but insofar as it is opposed to justice, religion, and other virtues, it is from its genus a mortal sin.

The reason of the first part is that the abuse of speech and the other disorders found in a pure lie do not seem to be so grave that they constitute a mortal sin. Thus also bears the common sense of the faithful, even those who fear God, who do not think that they have sinned mortally if they have told a purely jocose or officious lie. And truly it seems too harsh to condemn someone to the penalty of Gehenna who departed from this life with a jocose or officious lie. Concerning these lies St. Augustine says:³³³ "There are altogether two kinds of lies in which there is no great fault, but nevertheless they are not without fault, when either we joke, or lie in order that we may help. That first, in joking, is therefore not most pernicious, because it does not deceive. For he to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of a joke. But the second is milder, because it retains some benevolence."

The reason of the other part of the principle is that these virtues (charity, justice, faith, religion) of themselves oblige under grave matter. Hence without any doubt he commits mortal sin who by lying causes grave scandal and thus wounds charity, e.g., if a bishop should tell a pure and foul lie; or if someone by lying causes grave damage, because it is a grave wounding of justice; or if someone tells a lie with an oath, because he wounds the virtue of religion; or if someone speaks against the true faith, because he wounds the virtue of faith. - Therefore lies which, besides truthfulness, also wound other virtues, are from their genus mortal sins; but they become venial sins either from lightness of matter or from imperfection of the act.³³⁴ But when in Sacred Scripture it is said: You will destroy all who speak a lie,³³⁵ and: The mouth that lies kills the soul,³³⁶ such and similar places are to be understood of the pernicious lie.³³⁷

³³³ Enarr. in Ps. 5, n. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 36, 86).

³³⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 4. - The opinion proposed by Tanquerey seems too harsh: "Lying properly so called ... is of itself a grave sin" (Theol. mor., De iust. n. 411). But if under lying properly so called only a damaging lie is understood, the proposition is indeed true, but then that manner of speaking is not pleasing, because it is repugnant to the common usage of theologians. Mausbach also speaks less rightly in this matter (Kathol. Moraltheol. III, 59).

³³⁵ Ps. 5, 7.

³³⁶ Wis. 1, 11.

³³⁷ Cf. S. theol., l.c. ad 1.