Chapter I. On Lying and Mental Restriction

A lie is speech against the mind, or, as St. Augustine says, it is "to say something knowingly otherwise than we think." If it is done by nods or by some deed, it is called simulation, which again is called hypocrisy when someone simulates the person of another, e.g., when a sinner simulates the person of a just man. - For a true lie it is not required that there be expressly the intention of deceiving, for as the same holy Doctor says: "Everyone who lies speaks against that which he thinks in his soul, with the will of deceiving." - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 110, art. 1. - St. Augustine, Enchir., chap. 18 and 22.

A threefold kind of lie is distinguished: 1st. harmful, by which unjust harm is inflicted upon someone; 2nd. officious, which is put forth for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3rd. jocose, which is said from jest and for the sole sake of trifling.

But mental restriction differs greatly from a lie; it is an act of the mind turning or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one; whence it happens that they are not true unless they are taken according to the sense which they have in the mind of the speaker. - But a twofold restriction is distinguished, namely purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is called properly mental; and broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from adjuncts.

I say 1st. A lie properly so called is certainly something intrinsically evil, but does not exceed venial sin if it is jocose, or even officious; but if it is harmful, it will be a light or grave sin according to the quantity of harm inflicted. The reason for the first is both because it is repugnant to right reason to use signs of speech against their natural end and institution, and to wish, as it were, to destroy the unity of man; and because, the liceity of lying having been admitted, the order of society, which rests upon mutual commerce and trust, would be altogether subverted. But the reason for the second is taken from the common consent of theologians, from the persuasion of the faithful, and from the very nature of that repugnance with right reason, which certainly does not appear grave. Finally, the reason for the third is that in a harmful lie, besides the virtue of truthfulness, justice is injured, which obliges under grave or light matter according to the harm that is inflicted. - Cf. St. Augustine, books On Lying and Against Lying. - St. Thomas, loc. cit., art. 3 and 4.

I say 2nd. It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction, because, as is clear from its definition, this would be simply to lie. But sometimes it is licit from a just cause to use restriction broadly, that is improperly mental, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but his deception is only permitted from a just cause; besides, for the good of society it is required that there be a licit means of hiding a secret; but sometimes no other means is available besides broad or improperly mental restriction. I said, from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; and this would redound to the greatest harm of human society. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de secund. praec. Decal., nn. 151 and 152. - Lacroix, lib. 3, n. 287.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. They certainly err who place the malice of a lie either solely or primarily in this, that the right of the hearers is injured. For from this it would be deduced that God, against whom properly we have no right, could sometimes lie, which would plainly destroy our faith. Cf. Mazella, de Virt. inf., n. 698.

2nd. Figurative, ironic, and hyperbolic expressions are not lies, which as such can easily be, and usually are, taken by hearers. Much less parables, which Christ himself so frequently used.

3rd. They do not lie who write fables, or from jest openly say false things, because then words are put forth and understood with another superadded signification, but one easily admitted by those conversing.

4th. He who uses broad mental restriction is not without fault: 1st. if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2nd. if the one asking has the right of inquiring or commanding confession of the truth, because regularly in a subject there corresponds to that right the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 154.

5th. Yet all public persons questioned concerning things committed to their trust can use restriction of this kind, such as secretaries, legates of princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has the office and reason of hiding some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow from it in society.

6th. Likewise a servant, by order of the master, can deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by usage to signify that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Attend nevertheless to the custom of places. Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 165.

7th. It is licit to add an oath to a broad and not strictly mental restriction, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 151.