Doubt I: What a lie is

A Lie is opposed to Truth, simulation, Hypocrisy, Boasting, and Irony, as St. Bonaventure teaches. 3rd part. Centil. section 44. and in the Declaration of Theological Terms, and book 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 37. D. Thomas, question 110, art. 2. and question 112. For either a falsehood is signified by words or by deeds according to the mind of the one conceiving it. If by deeds, it is simulation, or in a certain matter hypocrisy. If by words, it is a lie strictly taken. Which again, if it concerns the exceeding morals of the speaker, is called boasting: if by defect, it is called Irony.

These vices seem however to coalesce into one, because they are all opposed to truth, and one thing is essentially opposed to one; but they differ in modes. Hence St. Augustine, book against lying, cap. 3. He lies, who has one thing in his mind, and declares another by words, or by any significations whatsoever. The same is indicated by St. Thomas, question 111, art. 1.

A lie is defined by St. Augustine, book against lying, cap. 12: A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving. But to lie is explained by the same St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 18, thus: He lies, who speaks against what he perceives in his mind, with the will to deceive.

Where it is to be known from St. Bonaventure that a twofold falsity is found in a lie; the material, which is the false saying, and the formal, which is the intention of deceiving. Tanner adds, disp. 6, question 2, num. 8, together with Bassaeus, V. Mend., an effective falsity on account of the will to deceive. But considered in its effect, once obtained, it belongs to the lie per accidens, for a lie can exist without anyone being deceived, as he himself admits; but he says that even the material of the lie, namely the false assertion, belongs per accidens to the lie. The same seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, question 110, art. 1, in the body, and ad 1, with the Thomists.

On the contrary, St. Bonaventure, in 3. d. 38, dub. 3, of the text, and question 1, with the Master, holds that falsity is also required for a lie, although one may lie even if he says the truth, intending nevertheless to deceive.

It is proved first from the Holy Doctor in both places from the definition of a lie, given by St. Augustine, in which he requires for a lie a false signification and the intention of deceiving: But to lie, according to him, requires only the intention of deceiving, as I have reported; for one is said to lie, as it were, to go against the mind.

It is proved second from St. Bonaventure out of the same St. Augustine, cap. 3 against lying, where he opposes the lie to truth as darkness to light; but darkness is formally the privation of light: Therefore also a lie is the privation of truth.

It is proved third from St. Bonaventure: As true being and a lie are related in a man; so in speech are truth and a lie related; but these two are incompossible in the same man at once and together, namely that he be truthful and a liar: Therefore they will likewise be incompossible in speech: Therefore it is impossible that the same speech be at once true and false. If therefore a lie cannot compare itself with truth, it seems that it carries with it an inseparable falsity.

It is proved fourth from the Holy Doctor: Every true thing is from the first truth, But no lie is from the first truth: Therefore no lie is true: Therefore it is false.

They object first from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 18, where he says: He lies, who speaks against what he perceives in his mind, with the will to deceive: Therefore a lie stands in the will to deceive alone.

The Holy Doctor answers that more is required for a lie than for lying, as I said; for a lie is referred both to the deceiving will and to the false thing; but lying regards only the deceit which the will undertakes, even if he were saying what is true, which he thinks is false.

They object second. As speech disagrees with the intention when one denies what he knows, so also it disagrees when he affirms what he does not know, and about which he doubts; and then it is a sin; but only of a lie: Therefore a lie can fall upon an unknown truth.

The Holy Doctor answers that in the assertion of a doubtful or unknown truth there is a lie secundum quid, and it is more properly called lying.

They object third. A right intention makes right, and an oblique one makes oblique: Therefore in him who speaks the truth with an intention of deceiving, the whole utterance is made oblique; but this happens only in a lie: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that the oblique intention falsifies the saying, not according to every account, but only according to the account which it has in respect of the speaker; but that respect alone does not suffice for the account of a lie.

They object fourth. As sin is related to goodness; so a lie to truth: but he who does a good work with an evil intention commits a sin: Therefore he who says something true, with a perverse will to deceive, incurs a lie. It is confirmed; for it implies that some saying is both true and false.

The Holy Doctor answers first, that a good thing done with an evil intention is not evil simply, but only to him who acts with an evil intention; as he who gives alms with an evil intention does not fall into sin in the alms given, but only in himself who gives by reason of the intention; so also in the present case.

It is answered second, by denying the parity, because sin denotes a privation of goodness; but goodness denotes an ordination to the end, which indeed has its being through a right intention, and therefore the right intention removed, the account of goodness perishes, and it is a sin; but a lie denotes a privation of truth, which consists not only in the comparison to the intention, but also to the very thing itself, and therefore, if the thing is true, it is not a lie, except secundum quid.