Chapter XVII — On returning to the prior matter after the commutation of a vow, once accepted by the one vowing

I. Question I. When a vow is commuted into another matter, is the prior matter extinguished? Response: It is agreed among theologians that commutation differs from dispensation in this: that in the latter, the bond is altogether dissolved; but in the former, only the matter is changed, so that it is fixed on something else. The Angelic Doctor teaches this in express words (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 4, question 5): "When a vow is commuted, the one vowing is absolved from one thing, so as to be bound to another; but when dispensation is given in a vow, he is simply absolved from the vow, without this — that he be bound to anything else." The obligation of rendering the first matter promised by the vow being extinguished, another obligation of the same kind arises, which, that is, binds the one vowing, under the bond of the vow and of religion, to discharge the substituted pension.

II. Question II. When a commutation of a vow has been made, is the one vowing bound to carry out the prior matter, if the substituted matter becomes impossible, or he himself, through his own fault, omits to render it? Response: It is certain that the one vowing sins against the vow, if he deliberately neglects to carry out the substituted matter, or burden. For example: you vowed alms; this was commuted for you into a fast to be performed on such a week. This you omitted through your own fault, or its observance has become impossible on account of illness. As to the first part of the question, the common opinion is that you are not bound to fulfill the thing first promised — since, by the commutation, that obligation is extinguished. But an extinguished thing does not revive. You are, however, bound to fulfill the substituted burden, even the defined time having elapsed — since it was not bound to that time on account of some circumstance of that same time, but as a fitting term of payment, not as a term ending the obligation.

III. Authors commonly note that the original obligation does not revive, when the commutation was made by the legitimate authority of a Prelate, or of one having jurisdiction; not so, when the commutation was made by the one vowing's own authority: for then, if the matter substituted by himself has become impossible in whatever way, the one vowing is bound to fulfill the prior obligation.

IV. Question III. Once a commutation of a vow has been made, and accepted by the one vowing, is he free to return to the prior matter? Response: Some things in this question are certain, and some are matters of controversy. If the commutation was made into a lesser obligation, with dispensation mixed in, without doubt the one vowing can lawfully return to the prior matter, leaving the substituted matter — since no one is compelled to use a privilege of dispensation favoring him; but he can always embrace what is better. The theologians of Salamanca establish the same as certain concerning a commutation made into equal matter, in favor of the one vowing — since the commutation is made for his benefit, and he can renounce a personal favor and benefit at his own pleasure.

V. Authors dispute, however, whether the return to the prior matter is free, when the commutation was made by legitimate authority, whether into equal, or into better, matter. Sánchez affirms this (Bk. IV, ch. 45, n. 26), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 18, q. 24), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 2, punct. 11, n. 10), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 40, dub. 16, n. 111), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 18, q. 10), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 7, §1, n. 20), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 8, n. 27), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 12, n. 165), and others — since commutation, however it is made, is for the favor and benefit of the one vowing. But anyone can renounce his own favor, as is gathered from the chapter "Statuimus," on Regulars. It is added that commutation is made with this tacit condition, that the one vowing fulfill what has been substituted for him, unless he prefers to fulfill the vow first made. Finally, the benignity of God shines forth chiefly in this: that those vowing may perceive that it is dealt more gently with them by God than by men. From which they infer that the one vowing can, as often as it pleases him, return to the original matter, the substituted matter being omitted; and, on the contrary, refuse to return to the prior matter, which, the substituted matter being left, he had again chosen.

VI. The other opinion, to which I subscribe, denies that the one vowing, after a commutation made into something better, and accepted, can return to the original matter. Since, although the commutation is made in favor of the one vowing — which all concede — it by no means follows from this that the one vowing can always, and in whatever circumstance, return to the prior obligation. For a commutation to be said, and to be, in the favor of the one vowing, it is enough that it rescind the obligation of the prior bond, and impose another burden.

This is the sole favor of commutation. Is it, then, because the commutation favors the one vowing, lawful to substitute a light matter for a grave one? Nay, all agree that a moral equality must be preserved. The favor of commutation, then, looks solely to this: that the prior obligation be rescinded, and another substituted. Whenever a superior, in commuting a vow, imposes some better matter, he does this so as to compensate for the rescission of the prior obligation, by which the one vowing was gravely burdened; and he judges it lighter for him to fulfill the substituted matter, even though absolutely better, than to carry out the original one. Nor indeed is it to be thought that a superior commutes a vow into something better at his own arbitrary whim; but he does this sometimes for this reason: that he may compensate the liberty which he took from the prior obligation by exempting the one vowing from it.

Commutation is, indeed, a certain contract, in which equality, so far as it can morally be done, must be observed. When, then, the one vowing, in this contract, accepted the burden substituted, and bound himself by the bond of religion to fulfill it, he passed over into the obligation of the vow; and the greater value of the substituted matter compensates for the greater ease in fulfilling it, and this obligation the one vowing freely accepted. He cannot, then, return to the prior, lesser obligation. Since the one vowing has already felt the benefit of the commutation, on account of the payment of a better matter having been imposed on him for compensating the prior obligation, it was fitting that the benefit conferred be indicated, in that the one commuting judged that something ought to be given to equalize the prior obligation. The one vowing, then, cannot lawfully draw back from discharging this burden. It should be added that, while the commutation is made in favor of the one vowing, it is at the same time also carried out for the greater worship of God. Therefore, if the one vowing enjoys the benefit of liberty from the prior bond, it is equally fitting that divine worship too should shine forth through a more excellent matter offered to him.

This is confirmed by the example of any civil contracts whatsoever. A contract having been entered into between Peter and Paul concerning a silver vessel to be given to Peter, a commutation is sought by Paul, and the silver vessel is commuted into a gold one, Peter consenting, and Paul, who ought to pay, accepting — would it be lawful for Paul to draw back from this second contract, and return to the first, Peter not being consulted? If this would be unjust in human exchanges, why not also in divine ones? This opinion is defended by Suárez (ch. 20, n. 12), Filliucci (tract. 4, disp. 5, n. 3), Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 12, n. 104), Reginaldus (Bk. X, ch. 10, n. 188). Castropalao, however (tract. 15, disp. 2, punct. 18, n. 9), and Prado (ch. 31, q. 15, n. 361) consider it probable. The arguments of the contrary opinion remain resolved only from the proof of our own opinion. For commutation, as regards some things, is in favor of the one vowing, but not as regards all things — for it is at the same time in favor of divine worship. But if it were always, in whatever case, lawful for the one vowing to withdraw from a commutation made, leaving the prior obligation, and to return again to the substituted matter — then certainly commutation... would be for the sole benefit of the one vowing. But it is gratuitously asserted that commutation is a certain contract made under a condition, and this is contrary to the nature of a contract of exchange. Finally, that the benignity of God shines forth in this — that, for any fitting cause, the prior obligation should be remitted, and another substituted in its place — is contrary to nature; and it must rather be said, on the contrary, that it is more consonant with the divine benignity that a promise, once made and accepted, should be preserved.

VII. Thus far the dispute has concerned the commutation of a vow into something better. Let us now add a few words on the commutation of a vow into an equal good. The reasons of the opinion denying that the return to the prior matter is licit, when the commutation is into something better, likewise prove that this return is not licit, when the commutation is into something equal. Since, even when the commutation is into an equal good, it is made by the consent of both parties — that is, of God, taking the place of a superior, and of the one vowing petitioning the commutation, God consenting, and exchanging. The return, then, to the first contract, or vow, is in no way licit, God's minister not being consulted. To this opinion the most learned Pietro Passerini concedes (q. 187, art. 1, n. 771), where, both opinions' foundations having been related, he rejects the reasons alleged for the contrary opinion as weak — which, to confess the truth, seem so to me as well.

For, to embrace everything briefly, the exchange of a vow does not remove the nature of a vow; but the vow remains, only the matter being different; and the one vowing is bound, by force of the vow, to fulfill the obligation imposed on him by the one commuting. But, even according to Sánchez, the theologians of Salamanca, and many other authors of the contrary opinion, the one vowing cannot, by his own authority, commute his own vow into equal matter. They must therefore admit that the return to the prior matter is likewise illicit. Since then, the obligation of the vow being extinguished, in no way revives, as all the adversaries themselves admit — for if the substituted matter should become impossible, the one vowing is not bound to carry out the prior obligation. When, then, he would return to the prior matter, the one vowing would impose upon himself, by his own authority, a new obligation. This obligation is the obligation of a vow. Therefore the one vowing would, by his own authority, commute his vow into equal matter — which the adversaries themselves refuse to admit can be done.