Chapter XVIII — What rule ought to be observed in the commutation of vows

I. Although no certain and precise rule for commuting vows can be given, nonetheless certain general rules can be assigned, which, by the prudence of the Superior, the circumstances of place, time, and persons having been inspected, provide the precise measure of the commutation to be made.

Rule One. In the commutation of a vow, the matter alone is considered, no regard being had to the bond. In dispensation, both the matter promised and the bond of the promise are considered; for although, indeed, this rule does not bind the one commuting, it nonetheless greatly serves him, so that, in practice, he may more closely apply and moderate the limits of prudent equality in the vows of the one commuting.

II. For, although it does not remove... let it suffice that, in practice, it should approach nearer to the bounds of prudent equality. The matter promised by the vow is to be considered, and the bond; both are removed by that... but not so in commutation, in which the bond remains, or another of the same nature is substituted for it. According to this common rule, in the commutation of a vow made to avoid some sin, the imposition of grave matter is not necessary — since the bond of the precept is not thereby removed, nor the bond of the vow; but it is transferred into the substituted matter. In a vow to avoid fornication, the force of the vow ought to be considered as regards its removing the one vowing from a lapse into such a sin. For this is the proximate end of that vow. If, then, it is discerned that the vow has great efficacy in withdrawing the one vowing from a lapse into such a sin, such that, without the vow, the one vowing frequently falls into the crime of fornication, but rarely while bound by the bond of the vow — then that vow greatly conduces to divine worship, and the benefit of the one vowing; and therefore it ought to be commuted into grave matter, which, according to prudent estimation, would possess equal efficacy in warding off the one vowing from the crime of fornication. This matter to be substituted, grave and efficacious for the aforesaid end, authors commonly reckon to be a perpetual monthly confession. If, on the contrary, the vow contributed nothing, or little, to the principal end of freeing the one vowing from sin — but rather the one vowing multiplied his sacrileges by the frequent perpetration of crimes — then a very light matter ought to be substituted in the commutation, such as the recitation of the Office of the Blessed Virgin, or of one Rosary a week for five years, more or less, various circumstances being inspected.

III. Second Rule. The greater or lesser dignity of the matter is by no means to be sought from the excellence alone of the virtue whose fruit it is; but the circumstances are to be examined, and chiefly the utility of the one vowing, and the condition of place and time. To restrain the rebellion of the flesh, you vowed a fast, so as to temper concupiscence. In making the commutation, it would not be rightly substituted with prayer, which is an act of virtue however excellent, but is an act of temperance — nor with penance itself, if that vow was principally directed by the one vowing against the vice of avarice, and thirst for money — since these things contribute little to the intended end. Nor, however, must matter of the same kind always be substituted — such as, for a vow of almsgiving, another almsgiving be prudently substituted; or, for a work of penance, mental prayer — since such things ought to be integral, as far as it can be done, so that the spiritual benefit of the one vowing, and divine service, may be preserved safe. The frequency of the Sacraments is a universal good, which is wont to equal the efficacy of any other matter whatsoever in freeing those vowing from the perpetration of crimes. Against avarice, however, almsgiving ought to prevail; but the circumstances are always to be attended to.

IV. Third Rule. In any vow whatsoever, the dignity of the substituted matter is chiefly to be kept before one's eyes. For the end which the one vowing sets before himself, in a certain way, elevates, and constitutes more precious, the quality of the matter, or of the end. A vow made for such an end ought to be more carefully weighed in commutation, so that a matter more apt for attaining it may be substituted than if it had been uttered without such an end. And, that we may not squander money on this point, therefore the vow, for the sake of avoiding gambling, so that perjuries, or blasphemies, be avoided, is a much more noble and excellent end; therefore, the matter to be substituted ought to be graver, and more worthy.

V. Fourth Rule. The difficulty of executing the vow must also be considered, since it too... increases the merit of such matter. If a vow of fasting is to be commuted into alms, a smaller quantity should be imposed on it, if the one vowing is poor, than if the vow were the rich man's — since the small offering of a poor man is more acceptable to God than the great gifts of the rich, other things being equal. The strength of those vowing must also be examined: more fasts are to be imposed on the idle, the robust, the gluttonous, than on the weak, and on laboring men leading a toilsome life. For this reason, in vows of pilgrimages, the expenses and hardships of the journeys must be examined, so that fitting matter, which morally equals all these, may be substituted, as authors commonly teach — whom Sánchez also cites (Bk. IV, ch. 56, n. 11), where he notes that, in the computation of expenses, attention must be paid to the condition of the one vowing — since, as commonly happens, the rich are accustomed to undertake journeys on foot far less often than they do commonly, and are accustomed to spend far more than the poor; therefore the expenses of the pilgrimage are to be computed with respect to the dignity of their status — which Suárez also teaches, with others. Nor are the expenses of the outward journey alone to be computed, but the expenses of the return as well, as is gathered from the chapter "Magnae," on vows, where the expenses are computed in the commutation of a vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem. "The expenses which he was going to incur going and returning," says the Supreme Pontiff. If the one vowing had determined to change his domicile for that of his pilgrimage's destination, then the expenses of the return would not at all be computed. But when the shrine, or image, whose visitation someone vowed, becomes closer, or more remote, after the vow was uttered — either because the one vowing has changed his domicile, or because the image, having been transferred, has been brought nearer to the one vowing — then it must be considered from which place the vow obliges. If the execution of the vow was to have been carried out from the place where the vow was uttered, in the computation of expenses, account must be taken of that same place. On the contrary, however, if the vow was directed only to the shrine of the pilgrimage, it should be reckoned as obliging from the closer place. Finally, the dangers of the journey ought to be held before one's eyes, and the losses which domestic affairs would suffer from the one vowing's absence, and the expenses of the sojourn during the space of the journey. In all these matters, just as excessive scrupulosity is to be avoided, so too is a supine laziness; and everything is to be referred to the rules of prudent economy, as authors commonly teach, especially Suárez.

VI. Fifth Rule. It is not necessary that a personal vow be commuted into a personal one, and a real vow into a real one; although this is fitting, and it is expedient, where the commuting party can observe such a rule. This is gathered from the chapter 2, on vows, where it is read that a vow of alms, which is real, is commuted, while commuting, into a vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, which is personal. The reason too is clear. That which is chiefly to be considered in commutations of vows is the worship of God, and the spiritual utility of the one vowing. Now these two can equally be found in personal, as in real, actions. There is not to be attended to, then, a mathematical equality, but a moral one — which, insofar as it promotes divine worship more or less, is more or less apt for constituting equality with the prior matter.

VII. Sixth Rule. In the commutation of conditional vows, it must be considered how contingent the outcome of the condition is, while a vow bound to a condition is to be commuted into an absolute one. You vowed, for example, to bestow ten gold pieces in alms, if your ship should arrive safely at port. You seek, before the ship's arrival, that the vow be commuted into an absolute one. According as the ship's arrival at port is more or less probable, the quantity of alms can be increased, or diminished. If the arrival is doubtful, it can be commuted around five out of the ten; if quite probable, around seven — just as, in a contract of insurance, a greater price is exacted, the more uncertain the outcome. You vowed religious life, if your father should recover safely from his illness. You seek to have the vow commuted, before your father becomes well. Then it must be commuted into a greater, or lesser, burden, according as the danger to your father's life is greater or lesser. If a conditional vow is commuted into another conditional one, and the conditions are equally doubtful, the commutation must be made into equal matter. If, however, a more certain condition is attached, the matter which must be substituted is to be diminished. If the commutation is made once the condition has been fulfilled, then the commutation ought to be made into equal matter — since an absolute vow is being commuted into another absolute one. The same must be said of a penal vow, if it is to be commuted once the penalty has been incurred — for then the vow becomes absolute, and consequently the rules of commutation for an absolute vow must be observed. When, however, the vow is to be commuted before the penalty is incurred, then not only the penalty, but the contingency of incurring it, must be considered. Whoever wishes to know more of this, may consult Sánchez in the place cited.

VIII. Eighth Rule. In any commutation of vows whatsoever, the frailty of the one vowing must always be regarded, and weighed, and care must be taken lest he be too greatly burdened, or exposed to the danger of transgressing the new obligation. It is very easy to indulge... nor indeed is such solemn discourse necessary — that the commutation be made into those works which become easier for that same one vowing. As, if the one vowing is bound to fast, to pour out prayers, to frequent sacred reading, sacred works of this kind can be commuted, other circumstances, however, being observed. Sometimes an option is to be shown to the one vowing, so that he may select for himself those burdens which seem to him less grave. The frequency of the Sacraments is that holy work into which very many vows can be commuted. For who would not profit from this moderate frequency — say, once a month? — one ought greatly to fear for such a person.

IX. I subjoin some examples of commuted vows, drawn from law, and from the best authors. In the chapter "Venientis," on vows, a vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, made by a certain boy, with whom there was just cause for dispensing, is commuted into a vow of almsgiving, so that he might provide, for the whole span of his life, for one poor person. And in the chapter "Magnae," the vow of such a pilgrimage, made by a boy, is commuted by a Bishop into this: that he send the expenses of the outward and return journey, and compensate the inconveniences, labors, and dangers of the journey by frequent vigils and fasts.

X. In pilgrimage, authors commonly consider whether the journey is to be made on foot or not. If the one vowing was to perform the pilgrimage on foot, they decide that the labor of one day's journey on foot can rightly be commuted into one day's fast, and of two days' journey into two fasts, etc. If the journey was not to be on foot, but on horseback, they decide that the labor of four days is best exchanged for one day's fast.

XI. Medina notes (Bk. I, Summa, ch. 14, §7, rule 3) that one who had to commute a vow of entering the Dominican Order ought to weigh the burdens to be undergone by the one vowing — namely, the daily recitation of the canonical office, seven fasts of months every year, perpetual abstinence from meat, always wearing a woolen shirt next to the flesh. He then infers that this vow ought to be commuted into these burdens: namely, that the one vowing fast throughout the whole span of his life every sixth day, from fortnight to fortnight, that, sacred confession having preceded, he receive the sacred Eucharist, that he recite the penitential psalms daily, and disburse alms according to his means. I myself would add a modest garment, both in color and adornment, gold or silver ornaments not being used. A simple vow of chastity, however, cannot be removed by pure commutation, as Sotus teaches (Bk. VII, on justice,... q. 4, art. 3), following that saying of Proverbs 16: "He that speaketh not weighed things, is not fit for a continent soul" — and therefore some element of dispensation must necessarily be mixed in.

XII. A vow of not entering marriage is customarily commuted into a confession to be made monthly for two or three years. I would add some alms to be disbursed to a poor girl who wished to embrace the religious state.

XIII. A vow of receiving the priesthood is commonly said to be commuted into the daily recitation of the penitential psalms with the litanies, or of the Office of the Blessed Virgin, or of the Rosary, into confession and communion every fortnight, into a vow of preserving chastity in the world, and into an obligation of paying, every month, alms for one Mass to be celebrated. If the vow concerns chastity, as is probable, it will be better for him to fast every Friday for the whole span of his life. But in such grave vows, dispensation must be sought together with the commutation from those who possess the faculty of granting it. For in such grave vows there is scarcely worthy matter to be substituted, as Sánchez excellently notes in the place cited (n. 31). And let this suffice on the subject of vows.